





# **Desk Study Matra South - The Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab region**

Final report

Client: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Netherlands

Rotterdam, 5 September 2014

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# Abbreviations

BEMO	Beoordelings memorandum (appraisal memorandum)
BZK	Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations)
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CSI	Civil Society Initiatives
CSO	Civil society organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAM	Directie Noord-Afrika en Midden-Oosten (The North Africa and Middle East Department)
DDE	Directie Duurzame Economische Ontwikkeling (Sustainable Economic Development Department)
EIDHR	European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights
ENP	European Neighborhood Policy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FMS	Foundation Max van der Stoel
GMF	Graham Marshall fund
G2G	Government to Government
HALG	The Hague Academy for Local Governance
HGIS	Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking (Homogeneous Group for International Cooperation)
IAF	The Islamic Action Front
IOB	Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie (Policy and Operations Evaluations Department)
IsDB	Islamic Development Bank
LGBT	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NEA	Netherlands Enterprise Agency
NFR	National Front for Reform
NGO	Non-Governmental Organizations
NTC	National Transitional Council
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
PJD	Party of Justice and Development
PP	Capacity building of Political Organisation programme
PSI	Private Sector Investment
RNE	Royal Netherlands Embassy
SIDA	Swedish International Development Assistance
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference





# Executive Summary

## *Background of the desk study*

The Policy and operations Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has contracted Ecorys Netherlands for the Desk study of the Matra South programme. The objectives of the study is to assess to what extent the Matra South programme has contributed to the process of democratic transition in the Arab region. This desk study focuses both at the programme and project level and in particular on the five priority countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Libya is part of a wider evaluation of the Dutch support to (democratic) transition in the Arab region over the period 2009-2013.

Data was collected and analysed at programme, programme component and project level through a review of relevant documentation and additional interviews to assess relevance, effectiveness efficiency and sustainability. A sample of in total 20 projects from four (of the seven) programme components was selected. Due attention was paid to assessing the level of difficulty of achieving the intended objectives given the complex and volatile contextual circumstances in the different countries.

## *Matra South programme*

In 2011, the Dutch government decided to contribute to the transition processes in the Arab region by providing additional multilateral and bilateral support. More specifically, the programme aims to: encourage democratisation, develop the rule of law and protect human rights and achieve economic growth. The support provided can be broken down into seven components: Private Sector Investment (PSI), Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI), Government-to-government cooperation (G2G), Capacity building of political organisations (PP), Training of civil servants, Training young diplomats, the MENA Scholarship Programme and Matra South initiatives from the centralised budget. While most countries in the Arab region are eligible to receive support it was decided to focus in particular on the five priority countries mentioned above.

Currently around EUR 41 million of the budget of 45 million has been committed to the different components. As of May 2014 about 120 interventions have been implemented in eight countries (the five priority countries and Iraq, Yemen and the Palestinian Authorities specifically and for regional projects (excluding the Mena Scholarship and PP programme).

## **An assessment of the four evaluation criteria**

### *Relevance*

The Theory of Change of the individual components and the Matra South programme as a whole has been reconstructed based on the various projects/ activities being implemented. The analysis shows that the programme is well aligned , however no overarching programme strategy exists and therefor the programme cannot be considered a genuine “ programme”.

The Matra South Programme, and its individual components, are reasonably well aligned with the policy priorities of the Dutch government, the objectives of the Matra South programme and priority country needs. In practice, the programme and its individual components, and in particular the CSI and G2G components, have to a large extent been demand driven. The demand for PSI in the priority countries appears to be very low with only 30% commitments in the priority countries. The programme scores weaker when judged against the criterion of being results-driven. Support has been very fragmented and lacked a strategic results orientation. This can be explained by the lack of a programmatic approach but also by the organisational set up of the programme which is scattered over various different actors. Although all components and activities address relevant issues in most instances the fragmentation combined with the relatively limited budget makes it difficult to achieve significant results.

The demand for the different trainings has in practice been high. The extent to which the training programmes were able to attract suitable participants differed per country, but was in general assessed as satisfactory. The demand for political party support varied between countries and depended on the degree of political organisation and the transition process and focused to a considerable extent at practical courses/ training. The fact that the political party support was very fragmented and that it was not always focused on actual political parties have negatively affected the relevance of this component. The relevance of most selected projects was assessed as being satisfactory to very satisfactory, which demonstrates that the projects succeeded in focusing on key transformation issues in line with the objectives of the Matra South programme.

### *Effectiveness*

On average the selected projects (CSI, Matra South initiatives, G2G and PSI) were given a satisfactory to very satisfactory score for effectiveness indicating that they are likely to reach their planned outputs and objectives. However, it should be taken into account that this average score is based on the scores assigned to thirteen of the twenty sample projects of which only six are finished. For the other seven, scores were assigned based on the available information and the evaluators' assessment of the likelihood that the planned results will be achieved.

The participants' evaluations of the training courses are in general very positive. However no information is available on the extent to which participants actually have been able to use the skills and knowledge acquired and the perceived benefits at organisational level. The number (mass) of civil servants trained differs per country with only a few trainees in Egypt and a relatively large number of civil servants trained for Jordan and Tunisia. The effectiveness of the capacity building of political organisations programme is assessed as limited, which is partly due to the fact that relevant political counterparts were not always present in the five countries.

### *Sustainability*

The sustainability of the selected projects was on average found to be satisfactory. Again it was difficult to assess this criteria due to the fact that the majority of the projects selected is still ongoing. An important explanation for the relative high score for sustainability is the fact that projects have been demand driven and/or local partners have been involved in the formulation of the projects. Whether achieved results prove lasting depends, however, also to a large extent on the external context in which projects are implemented which is a very volatile environment.

The sustainability of the results achieved with the trainings depends to a large extent on the mass and well targeting of trainees but also on the context in which people work. Given the volatile working environments this may prove to be challenging in practice.

### *Efficiency*

Many different stakeholders are involved with the implementation of the programme (components). This is especially the case for the G2G component. It has raised doubts about the efficiency of the organizational set-up of the programme. The management capacity of DAM (North Africa and Middle East Department) which is responsible for the formulation and overall management of the programme is, furthermore, limited. As a consequence project management has often focused to a large extent on the selection process of projects and administrative issues and less on content (guidance and results) issues.

Overall available information to make an analysis of management costs (per component) is limited. The G2G components suffered from serious underspending which can to a large part be explained by the time and effort needed to promote and properly market the added-values the instrument may have. The difficult start up and the organisational set up have affected the management costs and in particular identification costs for the G2G programme which can be considered high when compared to the commitments. It is to be expected that the fragmentation of the PP (capacity building of political organisations) programme into eight

different party programmes and sometimes overlap of activities has affected the level of the management costs.

On average the efficiency of the projects was found to be satisfactory. The efficiency scores for the selected projects are relatively lower than scores for relevance and effectiveness, which mostly relate to project delays encountered.

### Recommendations

- A more programmatic approach is needed to foster better results orientation;
- The delegation of more responsibility to the embassy level for identifying and selecting projects that can strengthen CSOs, G2G and private sector development can be beneficial, as it will allow the embassies to foster complementarities and synergy of the different components. DAM's involvement can then be limited to an oversight role. A larger role for the embassies does, however, require additional capacity;
- The use of the PSI instrument to foster sustainable economic growth is not considered the most logical choice and did not work well in practice. A better option could be to focus on private sector development in the priority countries;
- CSI seems to work well and could be strengthened by assigning a larger percentage of the budget resources to this component (for instance from the centralised budget), but again this will need to go hand in hand with additional capacity for the embassies;
- G2G requires a clearer role of the embassies in terms of promotion and project identification. This may include the need to undertake scoping studies to identify niches that are not covered by other donors, to achieve complementarity;
- Considering the demand for trainings that teach parties practical skills it could be considered to involve a specialised organisation such as NIMD to increase cost-effectiveness. In addition, more collaboration between the different parties could be stimulated;
- The diplomat training courses could be shortened to increase cost-effectiveness;
- To improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the training programmes it could be considered to include additional follow up activities and to more substantially involve the government institutions in which the trainees work.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Background

The Policy and Operations Evaluations Department (IOB) has contracted Ecorys Netherlands for the Desk Study Matra South - The Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab Region. The general objective of this desk study is to assess to what extent the Matra South programme has contributed to the process of democratic transition in the Arab region. The evaluation is part of a wider evaluation of Dutch support to (democratic) transition in the Arab region over the period 2009-2013.

The different elements of this wider evaluation focus on accounting for the results achieved, distilling lessons learned and providing recommendations for possible future programmes. These insights will feed into the decision-making process, scheduled for 2015, regarding the possible continuation/follow-up of the Matra South programme. This desk study focuses both on the programme and project level and in particular on the five priority countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Jordan.

## 1.2 Evaluation questions

Following the ToR, the OECD-DAC evaluation criteria relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability were used to structure this evaluation. The ToR also specified which questions should be addressed in relation to these evaluation criteria both at programme and project level. Judgment criteria and weighting scores were defined for each evaluation question at project level. The different evaluation matrices can be found in Annex VI. The projects have been scored measuring the extent to which the projects meet the evaluation criteria. In our assessment, due attention was paid to assessing the level of difficulty of achieving the intended objectives given the complex and volatile contextual circumstances. The scores for the evaluation criteria were weighted with an overall score for the level of difficulty.

## 1.3 Methodology and organisation

Data for the desk study was collected and analysed at programme, programme component and project level, through a review of relevant documentation and additional interviews. Field research was not part of our assignment as it was already undertaken as part of the umbrella evaluation on the Dutch support to transition in the Arab Region, which encompasses case study research in Morocco (human rights), Libya (rule of law) and Egypt (democratisation). The desk study was conducted in a relative short period in coordination with IOB.

In the inception phase the evaluation design was further developed. In this phase interviews were held with key stakeholders. These interviews complemented the input provided during the kick off meeting and initial desk research conducted by the evaluation team. Based on this information an inception report was written in which an elaborated methodology and a reconstruction of the Theory of Change of the programme and its components was presented.

Twenty projects from four (of the seven) components – CSI (Civil Society Initiatives), Matra South initiatives (centralised budget), G2G (Government to Government) and PSI (Private sector Investment programme) - were selected (see Annex III for the selected projects). In order to assess the projects we conducted a document review and -on average- two interviews per project with key stakeholders (e.g. project advisor, implementing agency and/ or beneficiary).

The assessment of the PP (Capacity building of Political Organisations) programme component and the training programmes for civil servants and young diplomats was done at the programme level. It involved a thorough document analysis and interviews with two or more of the implementing agencies.

## 1.4 Challenges

In conducting the present study, the team has been confronted with a number of challenges, some of which are outlined below.

The key challenge was that it proved very difficult to assess the individual projects, programme components and the programme as whole, based on a desk-study research alone. At the project level, for example, very limited information was available about the actual progress achieved with the projects as monitoring reports were often not yet submitted or of insufficient quality to gain in-depth insight into the outputs and outcomes achieved. In addition, at the programme/programme component level no programme documentation and monitoring framework exist that could have guided and informed this evaluation. Furthermore, it proved very cumbersome to get access to all the necessary documentation for the different components, not only because of the many different actors involved in the programme, but also because of the fact that a considerable part of the information was not available in soft copy or systematically archived. Finally, while the evaluation team has undertaken its utmost best to get hold of the identified interviewees, some key stakeholders were not available for an interview due to e.g. holidays or for other reasons.

All these challenges have necessarily limited the extent to which it was possible to evaluate the programme, its individual components, and projects.



## 2 Context - democratic transition in the Arab region

The main element of the study deals with the question to what extent the Matra South programme has contributed to the process of democratic transition in the Arab region. It is therefore useful to summarise what constitutes the Arab spring and the subsequent transition process (and its key factors and actors) in the Arab region as a whole and particularly the five priority countries.

*What are the key factors that have shaped the public governance and political systems within the Arab region as a whole and the five priority countries in particular?*<sup>1</sup>

Broadly, the Arab region, at least until recently, was marked by a political economy of exclusion that prevents mutual accountability between citizens and the state. The state engages in patronage politics, benefitting mostly the ruling elites and their patronage networks and has, until recently, not spent much effort on job-creation. The inability of the state to co-opt the educated youth into what used to be a relatively well paid civil service together with the decreasing engagement of state institutions in social welfare and social services, posed a problem for the main social contract in the region, where the population had accepted the lack of political freedom in exchange for provision of certain services and exemption from or limited taxation. As a result, an increasing number of well-educated youth found themselves without jobs or voice, and limited access to housing, basic infrastructures and social services. Inequality in economic and political opportunities and access to justice has been high.

### *Evolvements from 2011 onwards*<sup>2</sup>

Although the Arab Spring was preceded in most if not all countries in the region by decades of protests and strikes, social unrest came to a head in 2011. The global economic crisis combined with high food prices weakened the distributive capacity of the state further. Across the region, the youth using social media/networking formed a loose coalition with diverse groups united by a common concern about human rights and social justice. They wanted more inclusive political systems that would bring about transparent and accountable governance, as well as more widely shared economic growth. In many countries the Arab Spring protests had - for a brief time - a mass appeal and brought together different groups in society: secularists as well as moderate Muslims and Islamists, middle classes as well as the poor and left wing as well as moderate political groups. The protests resulted in the downfall of rulers in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Yemen and violent civil uprisings in Syria and Bahrain. Similar protests have caused government changes in Jordan, Kuwait, Oman and Lebanon while the Sudanese president and Iraqi Prime Minister announced that they would not seek re-election. In other countries like Algeria and Morocco, concessions were made to satisfy the large groups of protestors.

More specifically, in **Tunisia**, the revolution allowed for the emergence of a civic and political pluralism unprecedented in recent Tunisian history. By January 2013, more than 140 parties had been legalized under the 1988 party law, in a much less discriminatory way than before. However, there is a danger of excessive fragmentation in the party system, exacerbated by the fact that all opposition forces lack both a serious programmatic substance and solid rooting in the population. The unprecedented extent of free expression is among the most tangible achievements of the Tunisian revolution. Direct state censorship has ended, and the internet has become a major and effective communication and information tool. Nevertheless, journalists advocating a secular state have become increasingly exposed to intimidation or physical aggression by radical Salafist groups.

<sup>1</sup> The main source used for this section is: [http://arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/arab\\_transformations1/UNDP%20Strategy%20of%20Response%20to%20Transformative%20Changes%20in%20the%20Arab%20Region-Final%20%282%29.pdf](http://arabstates.undp.org/content/dam/rbas/doc/arab_transformations1/UNDP%20Strategy%20of%20Response%20to%20Transformative%20Changes%20in%20the%20Arab%20Region-Final%20%282%29.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> The main sources for the country-specific analyses on factors and actors are the five quite detailed country context analyses produced for this report, in turn based mostly on the Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index country reports (BTI 2014; available at: <http://www.bti-project.org/reports/country-reports/index.nc>) and updated by other academic and think-tank reports.

In **Egypt**, the extensive political corruption of the Mubarak regime was a central reason for the 2011 governmental overthrow, with opposition to regime practices ultimately expressed by the military as well as the Islamic and secular opposition. However, whereas President Morsi and his Freedom and Justice Party had declared the fight against corruption as a main priority, there are as yet only few signs that the role of political corruption has in fact changed. As for the media, following Morsi's ouster, the authorities shut down three major Islamist television channels and scores of journalists were arbitrarily detained by the interim government. State media and most remaining private television stations reflect largely pro-military views.

In **Jordan**, the authoritarian rule of the Hashemite monarchy was regularly challenged by protests beginning in January 2011. The escalation of the conflict in Syria flooded Jordan with refugees. Despite this volatile environment, King Abdullah II preserved Jordan's reputation as an "island of stability". The political landscape continues to be dominated by the Royal Court, the appointed government and the security services that extend the monarchy's authoritarian grip over Jordanian society. In reaction to the opposition's demands, a large body of reforms and other new policy measures were implemented in recent years, including 41 constitutional amendments, the establishment of a constitutional court, the institution of elections under the auspices of the newly installed Independent Election Commission, the revision of the long-criticized electoral law in June 2012 and the dismissal of four prime ministers. However, actual political change was far less substantial. The freedoms of opinion and of the press are in principle guaranteed by the constitution but are subject to important restrictions, and self-censorship among journalists is widespread. Media reporting manipulated on a daily basis by state institutions, often in the name of state security.

As for **Morocco**, its political system is still authoritarian in nature, despite constitutional reforms in 2011 following a series of protests by the February 20 movement – a broad coalition of Islamists, leftists and youth activists acting in the context of the Arab Spring. The new constitution continues to reserve three areas as the king's exclusive domain: religion, security issues, and – without further specification – strategic policy choices. The king still appoints key figures such as the ministers of defense and interior, as well as the secretaries of state of all ministries, all governors, heads of administrative provinces, directors of public agencies and enterprises, judges, and magistrates. Royal commissions that hold more power than ministers remain an important feature of the system. Press freedom deteriorated further in recent years.

In **Libya**, the revolution broke out on 17 February 2011, ending a period best labeled as "facade democratisation" under Muammar al-Qadhafi, who had held power for 42 years. The political conflict expressing discontent with al-Qadhafi's leadership quickly turned into a military one, dividing the ruling elite and the country at large. On 5 March 2011, self-declared revolutionaries founded a National Transitional Council (NTC) that served as Libya's official representative body beginning on 16 September 2011. On 3 August 2011, the NTC adopted a Constitutional Declaration that outlined the process by which a new Libyan constitution would be drafted, and continued to serve as head of the rebel government until its handover of power to the newly elected legislature a year later. Libya was declared "free" on 23 October 2011. This development was made possible only by NATO air strikes, enabled by U.N. resolution 1973 (2011), which aimed at protecting Libyan citizens from the threat of large scale assaults evidently ordered by al-Qadhafi. Since the conclusion of the civil war, there has been a struggle for power between the revolutionary brigades and the NTC. Major clashes and fights have erupted between various societal groups. In the area of civil liberties, Law 65 (Regulating Public Protest) of 6 November 2012 stipulates that authorities must be notified of any planned protest at least 48 hours in advance. As a result of repeated arrests, intimidation, arbitrary detention and even torture, journalists are censoring themselves again.

[Who are the key actors that foster democratisation processes, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, and economic growth within the Arab region as a whole and the five priority countries in particular?](#)

Important internal actors are – depending on the specific country – Islamist parties, the military, the monarchy, judiciary, civil society, and private sector actors. As for other political parties (as well as parliaments) as potentially democratic forces, their relative short history in most countries mean they are for the most part not



well rooted in society nor based on solid (and accountable) organisational structures. Main external actors are the International Financial Institutions and the EU. The Deauville Initiative by the G8 in 2011 pledged about \$80 billion U.S. dollars in financing to Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen over the next two years. It relied on two pillars – economic and political – focusing on strengthening the rule of law, supporting civil societies, developing education, speeding up economic development and enhancing the countries' regional and global integration.<sup>3</sup> As for the European Union, it supports democratic change actors through its European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), which is in turn financially supported by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), as well as through the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Even before spring 2011, the EIDHR was supporting numerous actors (though mostly undercover).<sup>4</sup>

#### *Key actors per country*

In **Tunisia**, the Islamist Ennahda movement won the election in 2011, and with two smaller centrist parties formed a “troika” coalition government under Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali. Political and social unrest meant that Ennahda soon had to give up power, but did so in a peaceful way. Important interest groups such as the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and the employers' Tunisian Union for Industry, Commerce and Handicraft (UTICA) that were incorporated into the Ben Ali regime in an authoritarian corporatist arrangement have been able to take more independent stances. New legislation has led to a massive increase in the number of civil society organisations. However, the government refrained from dismantling radical Salafist groups or the so-called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. Private enterprises – often conglomerates owned by influential families – form the backbone of the economy, while state – owned companies dominate strategic sectors such as banking and raw materials. A considerable volume of international support emerged after the revolution. In 2012, external financial aid amounted to around \$2.8 billion, and the granting of advanced status as an EU partner country on 19 November 2012 will allow for easier access to EU funds. Multilateral support was complemented by substantial bilateral diplomatic, financial and development support from a.o. France, Italy, Germany, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.<sup>5</sup>

In **Morocco**, early parliamentary elections in 2011 led to a victory by the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD), which formed a governing coalition of nationalists, leftists and monarchists. In October 2013, the King appointed a new government following a power-sharing deal forged by Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane months after his governing coalition was hit by the resignation of one of its partners. NGOs have flourished since the 1990s, but only pro-regime NGOs receive public funding. Several members of the February 20 movement have been arrested and sentenced. The Moroccan constitution guarantees the right of assembly and association but NGOs are subject to extensive administrative and financial regulation by the state, and Islamist groups and organizations supporting self-determination for the Western Sahara struggle to gain legal status. Much of the economy is dominated by the royal family and the so-called 500 families who control large, multi-sectoral holding companies and are close to the monarchy. However, Morocco has improved its business environment and in 2013, FDI flows recorded gains of nearly 20%, compared to 2012, and Morocco alone was able to attract 25% of all FDI going to North Africa.<sup>6</sup> Morocco continues to enjoy the strong support of the United States and the European Union, as well that of France and Spain as individual states.

In **Libya**, although Islamist parties did not poll strongly in the July 2012 parliamentary elections, there is an unknown number of Islamists among the 120 elected candidates holding non-party seats, and their influence is growing, worrying more moderate elements within the population. More than 150 political parties and several hundred NGOs were founded after al-Qadhafi's death. However, freedom of assembly is restricted for loyalists or supporters of al-Qadhafi, and anyone seen as acting contrary to Islam or Shari'ah. Many of the interest groups are run by Libyans who used to live abroad. Libya's strategic business sectors used to be dominated by

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/21/us-un-assembly-deauville-idUSTRE78K01S20110921>.

<sup>4</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/overview/index_en.htm) and <http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/publications/Delivering%20on%20the%20Arab%20Spring.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> See BTI 2014 Tunisia country report p. 39.

<sup>6</sup> Africa Economic Outlook for Morocco, p. 6. See [http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN\\_Long\\_EN/Maroc\\_EN.pdf](http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/2014/PDF/CN_Long_EN/Maroc_EN.pdf).

state-owned companies. Today, the private-sector economy is growing quickly and private companies mushroom, although Libya's oil industry has been disrupted frequently by strikes and armed occupations, and the future of multinational oil companies' involvement is uncertain. The EU is the largest donor in Libya, and today supports a variety of projects in areas such as education, civil society, democratic transition and public administration, spending a total of about €100 million.<sup>7</sup>

In **Egypt**, a party system has been developing since the beginning of 2011, though it is highly fragmented and unstable, and polarized especially along Islamist-secular lines. The army is a powerful actor, pushing aside the Islamists. Former Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi won the presidential elections in May 2014. Before that, the Islamist political forces led by president Mohamed Morsi (elected in 2012) had engaged in crude power policies that largely ignored any possibility of compromise with the bulk of people who sought political and civic freedom rather than an Islamist-guided culture. Large demonstrations took place across the country on 30 June 2013, the anniversary of Morsi's inauguration. The military intervened shortly afterwards, detaining Morsi, suspending the constitution and installing an interim government led by Adli Mansour, chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court. A new constitution was drafted and then adopted by popular referendum in January 2014, giving enhanced powers to the military, the judiciary, and the police, and banning parties based on religion, among other antidemocratic features. While it guarantees the freedom of assembly and association, Egypt's extremely restrictive and controversial protest law, passed in November 2013, requires organisers to notify authorities at least three days ahead of any demonstration or public meeting, and gives the interior ministry broad discretion to ban any gathering. Hundreds of people, including several high-profile activists and leaders of the 2011 Revolution, have been imprisoned under the law.<sup>8</sup> NGOs are barred from receiving foreign grants without the approval of the Social Affairs Ministry, and the ministry is allowed to dissolve NGOs without a judicial order. The huge military-industrial complex controlled by the army is engaged in public-private international joint ventures in areas such as transport, energy and computer technology.

As for **Jordan**, the king has the power to convene and dissolve the parliament, is the commander of the armed forces, and ratifies laws and treaties. He names all judges, provincial governors and senators of the upper house of parliament. Jordan's party system is underdeveloped and weak. The Islamic Action Front (IAF) is the only political party with significant popular support. Several tribal-based parties are regularly reconfigured by influential political figures, who use the tribal networks' influence to protect the flow of resources toward local constituencies. Election rules ensure the victory of majority loyal to the king. The judiciary's constitutionally guaranteed independence ends when the political or economic interests of key figures are at stake. Jordan's civil society consists mainly of RONGOs (Royal non-governmental organisations) and government-organized NGOs (GONGOs), conducting development and welfare projects among the poorer segments of the society. Associations' freedom of action is limited due to increasingly strict laws. Trade unions have very limited power. Several professional associations are dominated by figures close to the Muslim Brotherhood, representing the backbone of government opposition. Other opposition actors are youth movements and the National Front for Reform (NFR). Jordan's main businesses and trading companies are intimately connected to the palace or to members of the core elite. Many enjoy oligopolies or even a monopoly within their respective segments. Despite some privatization reforms, the influence of the state sector is still high, particularly in the fields of transportation, mineral extraction and oil refining. In October 2010, Jordan reached advanced status in its ENP relationship with the European Union. It also attracted considerable funds from the Gulf states, with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and the Emirates, committing in December 2011 to provide \$5 billion over five years.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> Actual spending mentioned in the BTI Libya country report, p. 24.

<sup>8</sup> See <http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/egypt.html>.

<sup>9</sup> See BTI 2014 Jordan country report, p. 35.

## 3 Matra South programme: Theory of change

In this chapter, we reconstruct the Theory of Change (ToC) of the Matra South programme and its components based on policy documents and interviews with stakeholders.

### 3.1 Background and Objectives

In 2011, the Dutch government decided to contribute to the transition processes in the Arab region by providing additional multilateral and bilateral support. In a letter to the parliament in June 2011, the government stated that it aimed to contribute to a sustainable transition in the Arab region that would lead to:

- Democratisation, which includes promoting free and fair elections;
- Rule of law and the protection of human rights, with a special focus on gender equality, media freedom (including internet), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights; and
- Economic growth through developing the economic infrastructure, which includes promoting social reforms and generating employment opportunities.

The support was to be based on a number of principles, including that it should be demand- and results-driven, that conditionally should be applied strategically (less for less, more for more) and that use should be made of already existing instruments instead of developing new ones.

At the bilateral level, it was decided to use two existing instruments for the envisaged additional support to the region: the MATRA Programme and the Private Sector Investment Programme. These instruments were to address both the political and socio-economical causes of the unrest in the Arab region.

The MATRA Programme was established in 1993 to support democracy and promote active citizenship in Central and Eastern Europe. According to several evaluations, this programme has been a relatively cost-effective and successful instrument to support political transition processes. It was, therefore, decided to create a similar programme for the Arab region: the MATRA South Programme, which would run from 2012-2015. The programme supports – analogous to the MATRA Programme – both civil society and the public sector. While most countries in the Arab region<sup>10</sup> are eligible to receive support under this programme, the government decided to focus, in particular, on the four priority countries: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Tunisia. After the fall of the Qadhafi-regime, Libya was also added to this list.

The Private Sector Investment Programme (PSI) aims to stimulate sustainable economic growth in developing countries. It provides financial support to businesses that would like to invest in emerging markets and, therefore, also provides opportunities to the Dutch private sector. As this instrument has proven to be useful for stimulating economic growth and employment, according to the Dutch government, it was decided to create a specific sub-programme under this instrument that focuses on eligible countries<sup>11</sup> in the Arab region. Yemen, the Palestinian territories, Egypt, and Morocco, were already eligible for PSI support, but the new sub-programme now also added Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Tunisia to this list. Libya was newly added in 2014.

### 3.2 MATRA South Programme: Theory of Change

In the 2011 letter to the parliament, mentioned above, the bilateral support to the Arab region is described as support in the form of the MATRA South Programme and the Private Sector Investment Programme for

<sup>10</sup> Except for Yemen and the Palestinian territories as these countries already received development assistance support.

<sup>11</sup> Eligible countries are OECD DAC countries that do not belong to the upper middle income countries' category.

the Arab region. Nevertheless, from 2012 on, the term “MATRA South Programme” was used to indicate the complete support provided to transition processes in the Arab region via the two instruments. The support provided under the first instrument –the “proper MATRA support”- can be further broken down into six components:

- Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI);
- Government-to-government cooperation (G2G);
- Capacity building of political organisations (PP);
- Training of civil servants;
- Training young diplomats; and
- MENA Scholarship Programme<sup>12</sup>.

Next to the support falling under these categories, a seventh type of support was implemented in practice, as a consequence of spending pressures (e.g. to compensate at the start of the programme for the time it took before spending under the PSI component took off). This seventh type can be summarized as “MATRA South initiatives managed by DAM from the centralized budget”, which focus on either civil society support and economic growth<sup>13</sup>. While the term “MATRA South Programme” is used, the two instruments (Matra support and PSI) and the seven sub-components are in fact not part of a specific programme that is based on an explicit programme design and strategy. In practice, existing instruments/tools were adapted and introduced under the label of “MATRA South Programme”, without being linked to an overall programming framework.

The overall objective of the MATRA South Programme is to contribute to the process of developing democratic, pluralistic states governed by the rule of law in the Arab region (see ToR p.1). In addition, it is to contribute to sustainable economic growth in the region, which is both an aim in itself and a means to foster stable democratic states. The specific impacts were described in section 3.1. Next to these, the programme should also contribute to a strengthened relationship between the Netherlands and the Arab countries involved. The main underlying assumptions of the MATRA South Programme are that:


- the organisational approach followed is conducive to an efficient and effective implementation of the programme;
- the implementation of the seven components described above can together effectively contribute to the aims and the overall objective of the programme.

Based on the review of relevant documents and interviews, Theories of Change (ToCs) for the programme as a whole and its individual components have been reconstructed. Since programming documents were missing, a bottom-up approach was followed for the reconstruction of these ToCs (see Annex IV for the ToCs of the different components), starting first by analysing the various project(s) (activities), then the components and finally the programme as a whole. The ToC and relationship between the programme as a whole and its individual components can be illustrated as in the figure overleaf:

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<sup>12</sup> In line with the Terms of Reference of this evaluation and the outcome of the discussion during the kick-off meeting with the client, the MENA Scholarship Programme will not be covered by this evaluation. In the next chapter we will provide a short overview of the programme.

<sup>13</sup> Next to civil society support via for instance the Graham Marshall Fund and the Anne Lind Foundation specific projects focused at employment were selected such as the IFC vocational education project and the ILO youth employment project.





## 4 Programme overview

This chapter provides an overview of the implementation of the Matra South programme to date. In this chapter the two following questions will be addressed:

How much of the available Matra South budget resources were committed against contracts and actually disbursed? What are the main activities and focus areas of the programme (where relevant broken down per component and beneficiary country)? How have the activities evolved over time?

### 4.1 Budget resources

To finance the additional support to the Arab region, a total of EUR 45 million was allocated from the “Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking” (HGIS) resources. The breakdown of the HGIS allocations per year is presented in table 4.1<sup>14</sup>

**Table 4.1 Overview of the allocation of HGIS-resources to the Matra South programme**

Year	HGIS-resources (EUR)
2012	7,500,000
2013	10,000,000
2014	12,500,000
2015	15,000,000

According to the information received from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, currently around EUR 41 million of the budget of 45 million has been committed to the different components of the programme, see table 4.2.

**Table 4.2 Allocations MATRA South Programme components (2012-2015)**

MATRA South Programme Component	Committed budget (2012-2015) (in mill. EUR)
Private Sector Investment Programme	14.9
Government-to-government cooperation	5.2 <sup>15</sup>
Support to local civil society initiatives (decentralized budget)	6
Support to Matra South Initiatives (centralized budget)	4.4
Training of civil servants	4.5
Training of young diplomats	1.6
Capacity building of political organisations	2
MENA Scholarship Programme	2.6
Total	41.2

In the next sections we will provide an overview of the activities per component, where relevant broken down per country.


<sup>14</sup> The Dutch House of Representatives (2011), “Actuele situatie in Noord-Afrika en het Midden-Oosten: Brief van de minister en staatssecretaris van buitenlandse zaken”, 32 623, nr. 40.

<sup>15</sup> In total 9.7 million is commissioned to Netherlands Enterprise Agency for both the G2G programme and training of civil servants. Considering the present underspending of the G2G programme it is expected that the commitment for G2G will need to be lowered.

## 4.2 Private Sector Investment Programme (PSI)<sup>16</sup>

PSI is a grant programme that aims to stimulate sustainable economic development by means of fostering innovative private sector investments in developing countries. It pays special attention to youth employment (until age 25) and gender issues. The Programme is managed by the Netherlands Enterprise Agency on behalf of the Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE) of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<sup>17</sup> The advisory commission of PSI is responsible for approving the PSI proposals, while taking into account the project advice of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency's project officer. The project officer, in turn, often seeks advice from the embassies about the relevance of the PSI proposal and to learn more about the reputation of the local partners involved. The investment projects are implemented by a Dutch or foreign business in cooperation with a local business in a PSI-Arab country. Projects are funded in the form of hardware (machines) and/or technical assistance (training, project management).

According to the financial information received, around EUR 22.5 million has been committed<sup>18</sup> and approximately 20% of total PSI commitments has been disbursed, to the PSI component focused on the Arab region, between July 2012 and May 2014. The committed amount is more than the allocated EUR 14.9 million<sup>19</sup>. Most of the PSI budget is allocated to the agriculture and industry sector. Other relevant sectors include Energy/Environment and Transport/Infrastructure.<sup>20</sup> The majority of the PSI budget allocated to the Arab region (70%) has been committed to projects in non-priority countries, see the pie chart below<sup>21</sup>.



PSI to the non-priority countries encompasses allocations to the Palestine territories, Yemen, Iraq and Algeria. The Palestine territories have received the largest share with 64% (EUR 10 million) of the total commitments to non-priority countries. Around EUR 6.7 million – 30% of total PSI Arab commitments – has been committed to the four priority countries<sup>22</sup>, between July 2012 and May 2014. Of these commitments to the priority countries, approximately 30% has been disbursed. More than 50% of total commitments have been made to projects in Morocco, 24% to projects in Jordan, and 11% to projects in Egypt and Tunisia; see the pie chart on the next page.

<sup>16</sup> This section is based on the financial and project information received from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency in May 2014.

<sup>17</sup> <http://english.rvo.nl/subsidies-programmes/psi>.

<sup>18</sup> At the moment the last round for PSI Arab is almost finalised.


<sup>19</sup> In total 14,9 million was transferred from DAM to DDE whilst the agreed PSI Arab Region budget for the period 2012-2015 is 28 million (total expected commitments for PSI Arab Region even add up to over 29 million). The difference between the two budgets could not be explained by DDE/NEA and needs to be analysed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>20</sup> Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland, Private Sector Investment programme (PSI); Annual Report 2013.

<sup>21</sup> The pie chart adds up to 99% due to rounding differences.

<sup>22</sup> The priority country Libya was only eligible for PSI funding beginning 2014.





The expected direct impact of the 28 projects are 764 basic level jobs including 550 for women and 531 medium high level positions of which 214 are women. In total 656 of the employed staff are expected to be younger than 25 years.

In total, 10 projects have been implemented in the priority countries. The average project commitment is around EUR 670,000 and the project commitment values range from around EUR 380,000 to EUR 750,000. See the table below for more detailed information.

**Table 4.3 Private Sector Investment Programme: commitments and disbursements per country**

Country	Number of projects	Commitments (in mill. EUR)	Disbursements (2012- May 2014) (in mill. EUR)
Egypt	1	0.7	0.3
Jordan	3	1.6	0.2
Morocco	5	3.6	1.1
Tunisia	1	0.7	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6.7<sup>23</sup></b>	<b>2</b>

#### 4.3 Government-to-government cooperation (G2G)<sup>24</sup>


The G2G component consists of, demand-driven, government-to government project support. The projects need to have strong ownership in the target countries, while also meeting Dutch interests. Most projects are of a short duration (typically between 3 months and one year) and offer an exchange of public knowledge, skills and experience through, for example, workshops, technical assistance and institutional analyses. Proposals for G2G projects can be submitted by government institutions from the priority countries to the Royal Netherlands Embassies in the respective countries or to the International Co-operation and Matchmaking Unit of the Netherlands Enterprise Agency. The promotion of the G2G component within the priority countries is in practice mainly expected from the embassies. The Netherlands Enterprise Agency is responsible for the facilitation of the design and implementation of the projects, ranging from advising on the project proposals, finding suitable partners in the Netherlands, administering the implementation of the projects, collecting and assessing the financial and narrative progress reports etc. All G2G projects require prior approval of DAM, who is ultimately responsible for the G2G projects and for overseeing the work of the contracted implementation partner (NEA). G2G projects have, in practice, been very diverse and ranged from, for example, the

<sup>23</sup> The difference can be explained by rounding differences.

<sup>24</sup> This section is based on the financial and project information received from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Netherlands Enterprise Agency in May 2014.

cooperation between Ombudsmen, the support to prison management, and the contribution to the implementation of a road safety strategy.

Under the G2G component, around EUR 1.3 million has been committed and approximately 60% of these commitments has been disbursed to projects between 2012-2013. Of the total commitments, 69% has been allocated to projects in priority countries. One G2G project is implemented in a non-priority country (Iraq)<sup>25</sup>, accounting for 31% of the total commitments. This non-priority country project has, however, not come at the expense of allocations for priority countries as the total allocated budget for the total G2G component was increased to cover the expenses of this non-priority country project.<sup>26</sup> Around EUR 890,000 has been committed to G2G projects in the priority countries and approximately 51% of these G2G commitments has been disbursed. More than a third of the commitments to priority countries have been made to projects in Libya, 30% to projects in Morocco, and 22% to projects in Tunisia. One project is a regional project. This project concerns a fact finding mission focused on incubators/ ecosystems in Morocco and Tunisia. Egypt has not benefited from any G2G project yet<sup>27</sup>; see the pie chart below<sup>28</sup>.



In total, 16 projects have been implemented in the priority countries<sup>29</sup>; the table below provides detailed information about the number of projects, total commitments and disbursements per country. The average commitment to a project is around EUR 55,000 and project commitment values range from around EUR 13,000 to EUR 275,000. The majority of projects include fact finding or identification missions (7) and projects which focus on issues related to rule of law/ human rights (6).

**Table 4.4 Government-to-government cooperation: Commitments and disbursements per country**

Country	Number of projects	Commitments	Disbursements (2012-2013)
Jordan	3	93,764	75,075
Libya	3	313,514	55,925
Morocco	3	264,965	158,245
Tunisia	6	191,718	141,761
Region	1	24,385	19,508
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>888,346</b>	<b>450,514</b>

<sup>25</sup> The project in question focuses on cooperation between the Courts of Audit of the Netherlands and Iraq. Total commitments for this project are EUR 399,679 and total disbursements EUR 319,744.

<sup>26</sup> Based on the information provided during the interviews it became clear that this project was only added to the G2G component for administrative reasons.


<sup>27</sup> This can partly be explained by the application of the principle "less for less, more for more".

<sup>28</sup> The pie chart adds up to 101% due to rounding differences.

<sup>29</sup> Identification/fact finding missions and follow-up projects are counted together as one project.

#### 4.4 Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI)<sup>30</sup>

The CSI component consists of demand-driven project support to civil society initiatives. The Dutch embassies in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia have been allocated specific budgets under the MATRA South Programme to support projects of civil society organisations that can contribute to democratisation processes, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, and economic growth. The embassies are required to submit projects above the threshold of 150.000 and politically sensitive projects to DAM for approval. Embassy projects have been very diverse and ranged from cultural exchanges, to professional skills' trainings, to human rights advocacy efforts. Under the CSI component, around EUR 3.9 million has been committed and approximately 72% of total CSI commitments has been disbursed between 2012-2013. Egypt and Morocco received most of the CSI support, see the pie chart below.



In total 48 projects were implemented<sup>31</sup>; the table below provides detailed information about the number of projects, total commitments and disbursements per country. The average commitment to a project is around EUR 80,000 and project commitment values range from around EUR 2,000 to EUR 600,000. The CSI budget is allocated to very diverse projects with a certain emphasis on employment and workers rights (particularly in Egypt), business development and rule of law and human rights.

**Table 4.5 Support to local civil society (CSI): Commitments and disbursements per country**

Country	Number of projects	Commitments (in mill. EUR)	Disbursements (2012-2013) (in mill. EUR)
Egypt	6	1.5	1.2
Jordan	9	0.4	0.2
Libya	9	0.6	0.5
Morocco	7	1	0.5
Tunisia	17	0.4	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>3.9</b>	<b>2.8</b>

<sup>30</sup> This section is based on the financial and project information received from the Dutch Ministry of Foreign affairs in May 2014.

<sup>31</sup> Projects that were indicated in the financial information provided as "pipeline projects" have not been included in this overview.

#### 4.5 Support to Matra South Initiatives (centralized budget)

The Matra South initiatives often constitute contributions to large programmes implemented by multilateral organisations and international NGOs. The embassies were often requested to advice on the selection of the projects, but are apart from that hardly involved in selecting and overseeing the projects. Around EUR 4.4 million has been committed and EUR 3 million has been disbursed to projects financed from the centralized MATRA-South budget, managed by DAM. It concerns seven projects with an average commitment of around EUR 600,000 and project commitment values ranging between approximately EUR 300,000 and EUR 900,000. The table below provides detailed information about the number of these centrally managed projects, total commitments and disbursements per country. Like mentioned in the previous chapter this budget is allocated to projects focused at inclusive economic growth ((youth)employment) and civil society initiatives (e.g. democratisation and cultural understanding).

**Table 4.6 Support to Matra South Initiatives from the centralized (DAM) budget: Commitments and disbursements per country**

Country	Number of projects	Commitments (in mill. EUR)	Disbursements (2012-2013) (in mill. EUR)
Egypt	2	1.3	0.8
Jordan	1	0.2	0.1
Tunisia	1	0.9	0.9
Region	3	2	1.2
Total	7	4.4	3

#### 4.6 Training of young diplomats


Under the “training of young diplomats” component, junior diplomats from the priority countries are trained in the Netherlands on themes such as democratisation and the rule of law, the Dutch human right policy and new forms of diplomacy such as economic diplomacy and public diplomacy. The trainings are implemented by the Clingendael Institute. Clingendael sends the invitation to the embassies of the priority countries in The Hague, who in turn contact their Ministry for potential candidates. Clingendael may contact the Netherlands Embassy for advise in case there are question marks about the experience or suitability of a suggested candidate. Under the training of young diplomats component in total, approximately EUR 1.4 million has been committed and 74% has been disbursed by the end of 2013. The table below provides an overview of the number of participants per country. In the last training also participants from Algeria and Yemen have participated in the training. Most (more than half) of the participants came from Morocco and Tunisia. The low number of Egyptian participants can partly be explained by the late start of the government cooperation which prevented Egyptian participation in the training courses held end 2012 and the application of conditionality in 2013

**Table 4.7 Overview of participants young diplomats training per country**

Training	Egypt	Jordan	Morocco	Libya	Tunisia	Other	Total
2012 -1	-	1	5	2	5		13
2013 -2	3	3	3	4	4		17
2013 -3	4	3	4		4		15
2013 -4	-	4	5	4	5		18
2014 -5	4	3	4	2	5	2	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>83</b>

## 4.7 Training of civil servants

Trainings on public policy, governance, and rule of law, are offered in the Netherlands to civil servants of the priority countries. DAM of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has requested NEA to manage this component, which in turn contracted several training suppliers<sup>32</sup>, to develop and deliver various trainings. The Dutch embassies in the priority countries facilitate the application through dissemination of the course information and advice in the selection of civil servants. Seven trainings are developed between 2012-2013, for the 2012-2015 period (and three additional trainings will be offered in 2014). Total commitments for the seven trainings are around EUR 3 million of which 54% was disbursed by the end of 2013. The pie chart below shows the breakdown of the total commitments per training.



The table below provides an overview of the trainings provided and number of civil servants trained per country in the period 2012-2014. Most participants are from Jordan and Tunisia. As mentioned above participants from Egypt could not participate in the first course (2012) and last course of 2013.


**Table 4.8 Overview of participants Civil servant training per country**

Training/ number	Egypt	Jordan	Morocco	Libya	Tunisia	Total
Administration of Justice (3)	9	19	14	12	18	72
Legislation (3)	8	22	9	12	18	69
Water policy (2)	4	11	11	11	12	50
Social Affairs and employment (2)	-	15	3	8	11	47
PFM module I	-	3	2	4	3	12
PFM module II	-	5	3	3	2	13
Local governance (2)	5	15	7	8	13	48
Food security	6	6	5	4	5	26
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>265</b>

<sup>32</sup> The Hague Academy for Local Governance, the Center for International Legal Cooperation, the Asser institute, Ecorys, The RijksAkademie and Wageningen University.

## 4.8 Capacity building of political organisations (PP)

Under the PP component, Dutch parties can receive a subsidy for supporting (sister)parties in the priority countries by submitting their proposal (activity plans) for supporting political parties in the priority countries (in the Arab region as well as Eastern Europe) to the Ministry of Interior and Kingdom relations (BZK)<sup>33</sup>. The maximum amount of funding they can apply for is based on the number of seats they have in parliament. Following the Law on funding of Political Parties, political parties are completely free in their country selection. Nevertheless they are urged to allocate the subsidy to the priority countries. Every year EUR 500,000 is allocated to capacity building projects of political organisations.<sup>34</sup> amounting to a total budget of EUR 2 million. In 2012, total PP commitments were EUR 480,036 of which 95% has been disbursed. The pie chart below shows the breakdown of the total commitments in 2012 per political party. PvdA, VVD and CDA received most of the budget. For 2013 (and 2014), no overview could be provided since the political parties from 2013 on receive one allocation to support their programmes in both the Arab region and Eastern Europe. It is, however, likely -based on the allocation rules- that the division of funds between the parties has remained more or less the same with the exception that from 2013 the PvdD (Partij van de Dieren) also requested for funding. As mentioned above following the law political parties are completely free in their country selection. Nevertheless the different parties indicate that in practice about 90 to 95% is actually spend in the Arab region.



Activities by the different parties<sup>35</sup> involved mostly fact finding missions and training activities (e.g. campaigning, leadership, presentation skills etc.) and also organization of conferences and regional activities to build the capacity of the political parties but also individuals (e.g. journalists, Christians and students). Based on the six activity plans and/ or annual reports available it could be established that at least four parties are active in Jordan, three in Morocco and two in Tunisia and Egypt whilst also some regional activities (Lebanon) are implemented. With regard to Libya only fact finding missions have taken place.

## 4.9 MENA Scholarship Programme

The MENA Scholarship Programme (2013-2015) offers scholarships for short courses in the Netherlands to professionals with the nationality of the following countries: Algeria; Egypt; Iraq; Jordan;

<sup>33</sup> In 2012, the programme was managed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but this responsibility was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations in 2013.

<sup>34</sup> Source: Interviews and document: The Dutch House of Representatives (2012), "Regels inzake de subsidiëring en het toezicht op de financiën van politieke partijen (Wet financiering politieke partijen); tweede nota van wijziging", 32 752, nr. 9.

<sup>35</sup> The evaluation team did not have access to all activity plans as not all parties provided the necessary approval for disclosing the required information. Plans/annual reports were available for CDA, VVD, PvdA, PvdD, SGP and CU.

Lebanon; Libya; Morocco; Oman; Syria; Tunisia. Each year about 140 scholarships are available which will be proportionally distributed among the countries. In 2013 about EUR 1 million was committed to in total 161 scholarships including 30 for Tunisian scholars and 25 for Moroccan scholars. Scholars from Egypt, Jordan and Libya could only participate in the programme from the 4 February 2014 deadline.

#### 4.10 Portfolio analysis

As of May 2014, EUR 36.1 million of the Matra South resources<sup>36</sup> have been committed to in total 120 interventions<sup>37</sup> in eight countries specifically and for regional projects. For the purpose of this desk study we have assigned the different projects to the three objectives of the programme based on the information provided in the appraisal documents (BEMO) or by the embassies. The table below provides an overview of the number of projects and commitments per objectives per country.

**Table 4.9 Overview number of project and commitment per Matra South objective per country**

	Strengthening democratic processes		Strengthening economic growth		Rule of law and protection of Human Rights		Total	
	committed <sup>38</sup>	nr	committed	Nr	committed	nr	committed	nr
Region	4038	13	2514	6	372	1	6925	20
Egypt	1921	4	1511	5	149	1	3580	10
Jordan	77	3	2074	8	243	6	2394	17
Libya	278	5	24	1	582	7	886	13
Morocco	315	4	4421	11	96	2	4832	17
Tunisia	502	20	1701	5	-	-	2203	25
Other <sup>39</sup>	400	1	14901	17	-	-	15300	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>7531</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>27146</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>1433</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>36120</b>	<b>120</b>

The overview shows that most of the projects focus on democratic processes and economic growth, while most of the budget is spent on strengthening economic growth. Interventions focussing on the rule of law and protection of human rights are smallest in number and budget. Most projects have been implemented in Tunisia (25) with a relatively small budget per project, while most budget resources are committed to Morocco and Egypt. In Morocco, Jordan and Tunisia most of the budget resources are allocated to interventions that are mainly focused at economic growth, whilst in Egypt, also considerable resources are aimed at strengthening democratic processes. If we would have included the budget resources for the PP programme, then in total 9.5 million is spend on activities focusing on strengthening of democratic processes. Projects in other Arab countries (Iraq, the Palestinian authority and Yemen) account for 15% of the number of projects and 45% of the total budget.

In addition to asses the support provided we have distinguished the different types of interventions offered: Vocational training, Capacity building individuals, Capacity building organisations, Awareness raising, lobby and advocacy, Conference, Seminars, Research, Cultural activities and Private sector investment (see table in Annex V for the total overview and overview per country). The overview shows that next to PSI most budget resources were allocated to capacity building of individuals and organisations. In Egypt a considerable percentage of the budget is spend on lobby and advocacy activities while in Tunisia most resources (and projects) are focused at capacity building of organisations. Besides 11 projects were classified as research projects which include fact-finding or identification missions for G2G projects and CSI projects such as support to the Sadeq Institute in Libya and Research on Salafism (Tunisia).

<sup>36</sup> This does not include the Mena scholarship programme and the PP budget.

<sup>37</sup> Training courses were counted as one intervention.

<sup>38</sup> Committed budget x1000 Euro.

<sup>39</sup> Iraq, the Palestinian Authority and Yemen.





# 5 Relevance

## 5.1 Introduction

From the reconstruction of the Theory of Changes of the individual components' and the Theory of Change of the programme as a whole, it has become clear that the individual components and the overall programme are well-aligned. This is logical as the Matra South Programme is in fact the sum of the components. No overarching programme strategy/document (which provides the foundation and links the individual components) exists and, therefore, the programme cannot be considered as a genuine "programme". Relevance will be assessed both at the programme level and the project level.

## 5.2 Relevance at programme level

Does the Matra South programme reflect the policy priorities of the Dutch government? To what extent has the Matra South programme succeeded in providing a relevant response to the demand for assistance from the recipient partners? Are the objectives of the Matra South programme clearly defined and are the objectives translated into the selected projects? Are the objectives and Matra South instruments mutually supportive and coherent in the selected projects?

Following the evaluation questions we will assess relevance at programme level from three different perspectives. First of all, we will assess the extent to which the Matra South programme reflects the policy priorities of the Dutch government. Then, we will look at the extent to which the individual components match the needs of the recipient (countries). Finally, we will assess the extent to which the individual projects, trainings and political party support are aligned with the Matra South programme.

### *Alignment of the programme with the policy priorities of the Dutch government*

The Matra South Programme, and its individual components, are reasonably well aligned with the policy priorities of the Dutch government. The programme is focused on countries that are of great interest to the Dutch government. In addition, it focuses on fostering democratisation and rule of law, economic growth, regional stability and good working relationships with the priority countries, which are all policy priorities. The interests of the private sector are represented by the PSI instrument, while the G2G component provides scope to strengthen relations with public institutions in the priority countries. In addition, the programme offers embassies the opportunity to promote the Netherlands through the G2G, CSI, training and PSI components. The Matra South Programme is, furthermore, in line with the government policy entailing that, where possible, use should be made of already existing instruments instead of developing new ones. Combined with the considerable time-pressure under which the Matra South Programme was "designed", this has, however, led to the situation whereby in fact not a genuine "programme" was developed, as was described above.

The support was, furthermore, to be demand- and results-driven. In practice, the programme and its individual components have indeed, to a large extent, been demand driven. Especially the CSI and G2G components are very much demand driven. The programme scores weaker when judged against the criterion of being results-driven. No strategic reflection has taken place about the question how to optimize the mix of specific support activities under the various components, and to the various countries, in order to ensure synergies and maximize the effectiveness of the programme as a whole. This can be explained by the fact that no programmatic approach was

followed and no genuine “programme” was developed. The organizational set-up of the programme is, furthermore, such that the tasks for selecting, managing, and overseeing the various support activities are scattered over various different actors, which limits the opportunities for strategic and results-oriented programming (see section 8.1). In practice, this has contributed to the fact that hardly any synergy has been realised between the different components. No linkages were made between projects/activities of the various instruments to increase the effectiveness of the programme as a whole. In addition, the support under the programme has been fragmented over different countries, instruments and many activities (see programme overview in chapter 4). Although all components and activities address relevant issues in most instances, this fragmentation, in combination with the relatively limited total budget of the programme given its very ambitious objectives, makes it very difficult to achieve significant results in practice.

Finally, another important policy priority was the strategic application of conditionality (less for less, more for more). Conditionality was applied once, namely in Egypt. At the end of 2013, the development of G2G projects was frozen and trainings for civil servants and junior diplomats were cancelled. It is felt that the application of this conditionality proved to be counterproductive as the main result achieved was that it negatively affected relationships between specific Egyptian government institutions and the embassy.

#### *Alignment of the programme with priority countries' needs*

The Matra South programme focuses on five priority countries that have different historical backgrounds and political-economic contexts, see chapter 2. It is to a large extent demand-driven, which has fostered its alignment with the specific needs of these priority countries. This is especially the case with the **CSI and G2G components**, as was explained above. It, furthermore, focuses on the key areas that are relevant for the priority countries' transition processes, namely democratisation, rule of law, and economic growth. The **PSI component** focuses on this last area by stimulating private sector development. However, in practice the demand for PSI projects in the priority countries apart from Morocco appears to be very low. According to the Netherlands Enterprise Agency the lack of interest can be explained by French language and security issues but also by the limited local market and trade activities in case of Jordan.

With respect to the **training programmes**, an important question is whether there is (still) a need for the external provided training support. The demand for the trainings has, in practice, been high – although this differs per country – and participants were very motivated, which is an indication of their alignment with countries' needs. With regard to the **training courses for civil servants** the number of applications per country and per training course differed but in general Jordan and Tunisia provided the most candidates. It is not clear whether this difference is caused by the embassies doing a better job at yielding applications or simply by a higher level of demand. The number of applications from Libya is the lowest which can be explained by the lack of middle management in the country but also difficulties with the online application. Interviewees indicated that there were questions about the suitability of a reasonable number of participants during the first trainings for civil servants. In subsequent trainings courses the number of applications increased, which allowed more scope for a proper selection process. At present the implementing organisations interviewed are very positive about the quality and motivation of the selected participants in general. Although an equal number of participants from the different countries is aimed for this is not always possible due to the low number of (good quality) applications from certain countries. Similarly, the quality and motivation of the participants in the **diplomat training** courses is perceived as high, whereby only the suitability of Libyan candidates is a concern, also in view of their English language skills. Different from the courses for civil servants, no Arab language translation is provided within the diplomats trainings in light of the international focus of the diplomatic service which proved to be an obstacle in the case of Libya.

Finally, with respect to the **PP** support provided, the degree to which this support aligned well with countries' needs varied per country. The interviews show that the demand for support differed between countries, depending on the degree of political organisation and the transition process. For example, in Libya but also Jordan, a political party system is not really known or underdeveloped and alignment was, therefore, low. Furthermore, across the region, very few parties saw a need to professionalise themselves in terms of party organisation and democratic governance (including regular leadership changes), membership, and funding, given that they traditionally play their main roles in fostering patron-client relations with regime loyalists, rather than aggregating and representing the public interest, as is the case in the West. Parties may, therefore, have been less conscious of their role in bringing about the rule of law and preferred trainings that taught them practical skills. An analysis of the activity plans and reports shows that the sister parties and organisations requested to a considerable extent practical courses on subjects such as negotiation skills, public speaking and dealing with media, but also some assistance with building ideological knowledge.

#### *Alignment of the projects, trainings and political party support with the Matra South programme*

Most of the projects analysed were well aligned with the objectives of the related Matra South component and also to the overall objective of the programme. The selected projects score on average a 3.5. for relevance, see section 5.3, which indicates their relevance for contributing to the objectives of the Matra South programme to be very satisfactory.

The detailed analysis of the implemented projects – see section 4.10 – shows that the focus areas differ per country. In Morocco and Egypt, for example, projects were focused on employment and economic growth while in Libya more emphasis was put on the rule of law and human rights. These variations in focus can partly be explained by the demand-driven approach of the programme, but also by the way the embassies used the flexibility of the programme to focus on objectives they deemed relevant. The implementation of the **CSI component** as well as the role an embassy can play in the identification of potential **G2G interventions**, provides embassies with the scope to focus on the key drivers, and address the key obstacles, of the transition processes in the specific countries and thus to fully align the support to local needs, seen from the perspective of the Matra South objectives. This approach, however, does bear the risk that embassies can be less needs- and more demand-oriented, which can come at the expense of achieving the Matra South objectives. In practice, this risk materialized for two of the selected CSI and one of the selected G2G projects. These projects have all been implemented in Morocco and focused on objectives that are only very weakly linked to the Matra South Programme's objectives. It includes, for example, the CSI project “Study for the creation of an observatoire for the VSME in Morocco”. The observatoire will provide both public and private actors (businesses and investors) with information on the demographics, economic performance and financial condition of micro and small businesses -in both the formal and informal sector- and produce general and thematic studies about this sector. While this may positively contribute to economic growth, this link is quite weak as well as its link to the overall objective of the Matra South Programme. Another example is the G2G road safety project in Morocco which is very much demand-driven, but less relevant from a programme perspective. Similar the portfolio analysis shows that some of the CSI projects implemented in Tunisia are cultural exchange projects and in that sense have a weak link with the Matra South objectives.

With respect to the **training programmes**, trainings are evidently relevant interventions for a programme that aims at democratic transition and creating the conditions for change. The different themes and subjects covered by the training programmes for civil servants and junior diplomats are well aligned with the objectives of the Matra South programme.

Also the **PP** support is in principle in line with the Matra South objectives. The support is, however, very fragmented as it is provided by in total eight political parties/ foundations (see overview chapter 4). Although the political parties do seek for collaboration opportunities with Dutch or international partners (parties), the fragmentation (and consequently the relatively small budgets) makes it difficult to develop a relevant party programme for the region. In addition, most parties did not even have sister parties in the Matra priority countries and, therefore, began the programme with looking for suitable counterparts. This has resulted, in practice, in the situation that political parties not only have organised exchanges with identified sister parties but also focused on working with specific individuals or for instance women organisations or universities. Particularly in the case of the Christian parties the identified counterparts are often active individuals. Both the fragmentation of the support and the fact that the support was not always focused on political parties have negatively affected the relevance of this component.

### 5.3 Relevance at project level

Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? Are the objectives of the projects clearly defined and do projects contribute to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the solution of identified problems? Is it appropriate in the context of its environment?

The table below provides the average scores concerning the relevance criterion for the whole sample of projects and per component. It shows the non-weighted score, which does not take into account the level of difficulty of the project, as well as the weighted score that does take into account the relative difficulty of the project.

On average the projects score a 3.5 on the five-point Likert scale, indicating their relevance is satisfactory to very satisfactory. Three out of the 20 projects (2 CSI projects and 1 G2G project) received a score of 2-indicating limited relevance, which was linked to a weak design of the project and a limited potential contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme. Two other projects scored a 5 indicating a very high relevance, which was due to the fact that they focus on key triggers of the Arab transition process.

Scores	Total sample of projects	Matra South Initiatives-centralized budget	CSI	PSI	G2G
Non-weighted average score	3.5	4.0	3.4	3.8	3.2
Weighted average score	3.6	5.3 <sup>40</sup>	3.5	3.8	3.1

Non-weighted scores: 5 = highly satisfactory, 4 = very satisfactory (the project fully meets the criteria). 3 = satisfactory (the project largely meets the criteria). 2 = unsatisfactory (the project only meets the criteria to a limited extent) and 1= poor (serious deficiencies).

For a more detailed overview of the assessment of relevance at the project level, see the project sheets in Annex I.

<sup>40</sup> In total 3 Matra South Initiatives were assessed of which one project with very high scores was assigned a 4 for the level of difficulty explaining the large difference between the weighted and non-weighted scores for this component.

## 6 Effectiveness

In this chapter we address the following evaluation questions:

What are the achievements of a selected number of Matra South projects/components in terms of outputs and effects? How are the short- and/or long-term objectives formulated and to what extent are these objectives achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise?

Below we present the assessment of effectiveness for the projects, trainings and PP support.

### 6.1 Effectiveness at project level

On average the projects score a 3.5 on the five-point Likert scale, indicating their effectiveness to be satisfactory to very satisfactory. However, it should be taken into account that this average score is based on the scores assigned to thirteen of the twenty sample projects. Only six of the twenty sample projects are finished. The other fourteen projects are still in the implementation phase. For seven of these, scores could not be assigned due to the fact that too limited information was available. For the other seven, scores were assigned based on the available information and the evaluators' assessment of the likelihood that the planned results will be achieved.

Two projects, both CSI projects, received a score of 2-indicating limited effectiveness. Two other projects (one CSI project and one Matra South initiative) scored a 5- indicating a very high effectiveness. For a more detailed overview of the assessment of effectiveness at the individual project level, see the project sheets in Annex I.

Scores	Total sample of projects	Matra South Initiatives-centralized budget	CSI	PSI	G2G
Non-weighted average score	3.5	4.0	3.3	3.0	3.7
Weighted average score	3.6	6.0 <sup>41</sup>	3.4	3.1	3.4

Non-weighted scores: 5 = highly satisfactory, 4 = very satisfactory (the project fully meets the criteria). 3 = satisfactory (the project largely meets the criteria). 2 = unsatisfactory (the project only meets the criteria to a limited extent) and 1= poor (serious deficiencies).

#### 6.1.1 PSI

The PSI component has not yet proven to be very effective in contributing to its objective of achieving sustainable economic growth in the priority countries. As was described in chapter 4, only EUR 6.7 million – 30% of total PSI Arab commitments – was committed to the five priority countries, between July 2012 and May 2014. Of these commitments, approximately 30% has been disbursed, which indicates that most projects are still in the early phase of implementation. In total, 10 PSI

<sup>41</sup> In total 2 Matra South Initiatives were assessed of which one project with very high scores was assigned a 4 for the level of difficulty explaining the large difference between the weighted and non-weighted scores for this component.

projects are implemented in the priority countries, with the majority of PSI projects taking place in Morocco, while only one project is implemented in Egypt and one in Tunisia.

From the ten implemented projects, four were selected for further analysis. All of these are still in the implementation phase. Two of the four projects could not yet be assessed for their effectiveness as they are still in the start-up phase. The other two projects score both a 3, indicating satisfactory effectiveness. This means that they are on course to achieve the planned results, in terms of envisaged (sustainable) economic growth and employment.

For PSI projects strong commitment of, and personal relationship between, the Dutch - and local company are mentioned as vital factors for the success of the projects.

### 6.1.2 G2G

Also the G2G component has suffered from substantial underspending. While the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has allocated EUR 5.2 million to NEA for this component, NEA has only been able to commit EUR 890,000 to G2G projects in the priority countries by May 2014. At the individual project level, five G2G projects were analysed, of which two are finished and three still in the implementation phase. For only three of the five projects a score could be assigned (1 ongoing and 2 closed projects). The G2G projects score satisfactory (3) to very satisfactory (4) in terms of effectiveness. A factor that has limited the effectiveness of some projects is the approach followed, which was to mainly focus on providing one-off training sessions, which is often too limited to effectively contribute to increased government capacity and to build strong relationships between the local and Dutch government institutions. Also for G2G initiatives strong commitment of the local counterpart but also the personal relationship between the Dutch and local partners are seen as vital factors for the success of the projects.

### 6.1.3 CSI

In contrast to the PSI and G2G components, the CSI component has not suffered from underspending. Of the eight sample projects, six could be scored (2 ongoing and 4 closed projects). Most of the scored projects are assessed to be effective. The average score for CSI projects is 3.3 (non-weighted), with two poorly performing projects (scored a 2) and one very good performing project (scored a 5). Since most CSI projects are very small – the majority of CSI projects have a budget of EUR 50,000 or less – the contribution of these projects to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme can of course only be very limited. Nevertheless, at the local level some significant results have been achieved.

### 6.1.4 Matra South Initiatives (centralized budget)

The sample of Matra South Initiatives (centralized budget) consists of three – very different – ongoing initiatives, for which for one project no score could be assigned due to the early phase of the project's implementation. The other two projects have scored a 3 and 5 (unweighted). Even for these larger projects it has proven to be impossible to note (already) significant results at the outcome level. Nevertheless, the "Practicing democracy in a Transitional Egypt" programme has been able to achieve very significant outputs that are likely to positively contribute to the envisaged outcomes of the Matra South Initiatives component.

## 6.2 Effectiveness of the trainings

### 6.2.1 Training of junior diplomats

The training programme for young diplomats included five 6-weeks training courses with in total 83 participants (while two more courses are planned). The participants' evaluation of the courses is in

general very positive, both concerning subjects covered and overall usefulness in terms of building diplomatic skills. A positive bias may, however, exist as self-reported benefits are likely to somewhat overstate the increase in abilities and impacts associated with the training. No information is available on the extent to which the participants actually have been able to use the skills and knowledge acquired and the perceived benefits at the organisational level (leading to improved quality of foreign policy and management in priority countries). Contacts between the embassies or the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the five countries and Clingendael are limited in this respect.

According to the feedback received, the participation in the course has also supported regional relations between the diplomats. Furthermore, it is expected that the training generated goodwill for the Netherlands, which may positively influence future relations.

### 6.2.2 *Training of Civil Servants*

The effectiveness of the training programmes for civil servants is difficult to assess. At present 15 training courses were provided, which were attended by in total 265 participants. The trainings were reviewed very positively by the participants. The participants were particularly positive about the offered combination of a training course in the Netherlands and a follow up training in the region in which the back home action plans are discussed. This follow up provides the opportunity to discuss experiences and challenges at the workplace and to exchange good practices. Again, these self-reported benefits may include a positive bias due to the pressure to provide socially-acceptable answers and participants may want to emphasise the need for external support. The training suppliers (or embassies) are not in contact with the government institutions where the trainees work, which is a missed opportunity for feedback and follow up of the training.

It is difficult to assess the extent to which the provision of trainings has influenced the functioning of the organisations the trainees return to (and contributes to improved quality of public policy, public service management and delivery). The courses are likely to provide benefits to the individual participants in terms of increased competences and expertise. Effects at the government institution level will depend on many other factors such as the openness of the institution for new ideas, the position and motivation of the trainee but also on the number of staff trained. The number (mass) of trainees differs per priority country with only a few trainees in Egypt and considerable more civil servants trained on the different themes for Jordan and Tunisia.

The trainings are likely to have generated goodwill for the Netherlands, which may positively influence future relations.

## 6.3 Effectiveness of the PP support

The various Dutch political parties have assisted political parties, individuals and other organisations with training and capacity building support. Looking at the formulated outputs/outcomes, in practice limited contribution could be made to these due to the fact that relevant political counterparts were not always present in the five countries, which was especially the case for the Christian parties. In addition, not all resources were spend in the priority countries, partly because of security issues (e.g. Libya and Egypt) but also because parties did not implement any activities in the Arab region (e.g. PvdD). Nevertheless, some training and support has been delivered to political parties that play an important role in the political arena such as the support of FMS/PvdA to the Ekkatol in Tunisia and training provided by the VVD to the Movement Populaire Party in Morocco, which was very successful according to the feedback provided.



## 7 Sustainability

What is the likelihood for the achievements to be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Can the outcomes be sustained beyond the life of the project? Will impacts continue to be realised?

As per the ToR, sustainability will be assessed at the project level. In addition, we present brief sustainability analyses for the training and PP support components.

### 7.1 Sustainability at project level

It is difficult to assess the likelihood that projects' achievements can be continued after projects' ending, given the volatile environment projects are implemented in and the fact that the majority of the sample projects (14 of the 20 sample projects) is still ongoing. For ongoing projects, the existence of a sustainable strategy, institutional capacity building and training (of trainers) activities, and the degree of effective collaboration amongst key stakeholders were important indicators for sustainability. Fourteen projects could be scored for sustainability. Of these fourteen projects, five are already finished and nine are still in the implementation phase. On average the projects score a 3.4 (non-weighted) for this criterion, indicating sustainability to be satisfactory. Capacity building activities of **CSI and G2G** projects often resulted in sustainable outcomes in the sense that the results were institutionalized. Also, continued cooperation relationships between the Dutch and local partners after the lifetime of the project was likely to contribute to continuation of the achievements. Furthermore, for the **PSI projects** the likelihood that the businesses would continue after the project was often assessed as reasonable.

Weaker scores were given for some CSI projects that focused on the organisation of conferences and other knowledge exchange events without these being followed-up by dissemination activities or other follow-up events to ensure more sustainable outcomes. An important explanation for the relatively high scores for sustainability is the fact that projects have been demand driven/local partners were involved in the formulation of the projects. For a more detailed overview of the assessment of sustainability at the individual project level, see the project sheets in Annex I.

Scores	Total sample of projects	Matra South Initiatives - centralized budget <sup>42</sup>	CSI	PSI	G2G
Non-weighted average score	3.4	-	3.2	3.3	3.8
Weighted average score	3.5	-	3.3	3.4	3.5

Non-weighted scores: 5 = highly satisfactory, 4 = very satisfactory (the project fully meets the criteria). 3 = satisfactory (the project largely meets the criteria). 2 = unsatisfactory (the project only meets the criteria to a limited extent) and 1= poor (serious deficiencies).

<sup>42</sup> No scores are presented here as only one of the three sample projects could be scored based on the available information.



## 7.2 Sustainability of the trainings and PP support

The sustainability of the results achieved with the trainings depends to a large extent on the degree to which it results in changes at the institutional level. This requires a minimum mass of trained people and the well-targeting of trainees to ensure that those people are trained who have influence over their work environment. Whether changes in working methods and attitudes prove lasting depend, furthermore, on the context in which people work. Given the volatile working environments of the trainees this may prove to be challenging in practice. The **training component of junior diplomats** has included follow up support/ contact with alumni to foster sustainability of results. It includes a face book page for network activities and discussions, yearly e-mail contact and support facilities, and an alumni workshop to be organised in Morocco. Dissemination of the knowledge at the workplace is, furthermore, encouraged. Similar, the follow up session of the **trainings for civil servants** in the region provided additional support for the trainees with the challenges they faced at the workplace and may contribute to the continuation of processes of change.

To foster the sustainability of the **PP** results, some of the Dutch parties have included training of trainers activities. However, the political parties/ individuals supported through the PP are facing a very volatile and often not very supporting environment, which is likely to come at the expense of the sustainability of outcomes achieved.



## 8 Efficiency

In this chapter we address the evaluation questions related to efficiency. First the management and organisational set up is discussed followed with the assessment of efficiency at project level.

### 8.1 Programme organisation and management

To what extent have the managerial and organizational structures of the Matra South programme and its individual components, as well as its implementation arrangements (including procedures for project selection and reporting and monitoring and evaluation), been conducive to an efficient implementation of the programme? How do management costs of the programme compare to the total value of project contracts? To what degree can the components of the Matra South programme be considered efficient in terms of time taken to identify and support interventions?

The North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible for the formulation and overall management of the MATRA South Programme. The capacity for the programme is limited at DAM to one coordinator. The day-to-day management and implementation of many of the components has been contracted out to external implementing agencies. The Netherlands Enterprise Agency (NEA) is responsible for the management of PSI, G2G and the training programmes for civil servants. The training programmes are in turn sub-contracted to training suppliers. DAM and the NEA are in close contact about the implementation of the components – apart from PSI – and NEA submits annual reports on the outputs and results achieved. The NEA reports to DDE of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the results and progress of PSI Arab region as part of the total PSI programme. Clingendael is responsible for the implementation of the training programme for junior diplomats. The PP programme is managed by BZK since 2013.

The Dutch embassies in the priority countries are, furthermore, involved in most components, either in a facilitating and advisory role (e.g. as is the case for the G2G and the training of civil servants components) or by directly providing the support (e.g. CSI component). The embassies in Tunisia and Libya have received additional capacity (0,5 FTE) for implementation of the Matra Programme. The implementing partners report their project results to the embassies.

Many different stakeholders are involved with the implementation of the programme (components), and especially with the G2G component, see the description in section 4.2. Various interviewees raised doubts about the efficiency of this organisational set-up as delays were experienced that often seemed to be due to the need to frequently coordinate and agree on projects/activities with the various stakeholders involved. In practice, it has turned out that the success of the G2G component depends to a large extent on the capacity and interest of the embassy to promote it amongst the local government institutions. The inputs provided by NEA in terms of promoting the component and identifying potential projects have, according to various interviews, been limited.

Overall, management capacity for the Matra programme has been limited and often for a large extent focused on the selection process of projects and administrative issues than on the content side (guidance and results) of the programme.

Similar monitoring by NEA and the Embassies in most cases has only to a limited extent been focused on the actual content of the components and more on administrative issues. In some cases

– as evidenced by the selected project assessments a more critical review of the project proposals (CSI) – could have increased the relevance and effectiveness of such projects. Overall, the various organisations supported through the CSI component struggled with submitting good progress reports, as they often focused mainly on reporting at the activity/output level. In case of the PP component the annual reports are to be checked for conformity with the subsidy regulations. Reporting is limited in most cases and often only includes the statement that activities were implemented as planned.

#### *Programme and management costs*

The Netherlands had only a limited (development) cooperation relationship with most of the priority countries. Only Egypt has received development aid in the past. As a consequence, at the start of the programme it took time to create demand for Matra South support. Furthermore, counterparts within the administration of the countries were also lacking and private sector interest in the priority countries<sup>43</sup> had to be encouraged.

Overall, available information to make an analysis of management costs per component is limited. Management costs for the **PSI Arab** component are not reported on separately but are included in the overall overhead for the PSI programme which is about 5% of the commitments. It is to be expected, however, that the management costs for PSI Arab have been higher due to the need to promote the new programme both in the Netherlands as well as in the Arab countries. Despite these efforts, the demand for PSI projects in the priority countries, apart from Morocco, has been very low. As is mentioned in section 6.1.2 the **G2G component** suffered from serious underspending. A key reason that can explain the underspending is, as indicated by various interviewees, that it takes a lot of time and effort to promote the instrument. Especially because the amount of support that can be offered to the various government institutions is relatively low. In some countries where other development partners such as the EU's twinning programmes offer large government support programmes (e.g. Jordan), it requires a lot of effort to properly market the added-values the G2G instrument may have. The difficult start up and the organisational set up have certainly affected the management costs and in particular identification costs for the G2G programme. The management costs can be calculated at in total EUR 266,000<sup>44</sup> for 2012 and 2013, which compared to a commitment of only EUR 890,000 to G2G projects in the priority countries by May 2014, can be considered high (almost 30% of the commitments). Based on the available documentation we do not have insight in the management capacity involved in the **CSI component** in the different countries. Management costs (human resources DAM) for the **Matra South initiatives** seem to be limited also considering the relatively large budgets for the projects.

No clear breakdown could be made for the management costs and training costs of the **junior diplomat training** courses. The total costs for a course of six weeks seem very reasonable (about 8250 per participant). The set up of the diplomat training is based on the Matra Eastern Europe programme. However, feedback from the participants indicates that it might be more cost-effective in the case of the Matra South programme to limit the duration of the courses to four or five weeks. Management costs made by NEA (EUR 214,000 for 2012 and 2013)<sup>45</sup> are reasonable (10%) considering the activities involved (subcontracting, involvement in selection process and travel to the different countries). compared to the total expenses for the different **training courses for civil servants** in the same years. Based on the budget format no clear breakdown could be made of the overhead costs involved in the budgets for the different training courses. Most training providers have been involved in other Matra programmes and the courses seem to be implemented in an

<sup>43</sup> Morocco and Egypt were already eligible for PSI support but considering the allocated budget for the sub programme for Arab region additional promotional activities had to be implemented.

<sup>44</sup> In both 2012 and 2013 the costs for travel to the different priority countries and the website were allocated evenly to the G2G programme and the trainings for civil servants

<sup>45</sup> Idem

efficient way. Nevertheless in a relative large number of the courses the total number of participants was lower than the 25 places available which increased the training costs per person. Reasons mentioned include the fact that candidates did not get the final permission of their employers but also the too tight timeframe for the selection procedure which left in a number of cases not enough time available for the visa procedures.

**PP-** The budgets provided in the different activity plans are very global and do not allow a thorough analysis of the costs. However, it is to be expected that the fragmentation of the component into eight different party programmes with sometimes overlap of activities (including many identification missions) has led to considerable management costs. The fact that the political parties often work with volunteers will have a positive effect on the cost-effectiveness.

## 8.2 Efficiency at project level

How can the choice of actual and budgeted resources and means be assessed in relation to the realized achievements and the numbers of participants/clients? Is the project delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Have resources been used cost effectively? Do the results - quantity and quality - justify the resources expended?

On average the projects score a 3.2 (non-weighted), indicating their efficiency to be satisfactory. Nineteen out of the twenty sample projects could be scored based on the available information (6 closed and 13 ongoing projects). For a more detailed overview of the assessment of efficiency at the individual project level, see the project sheets in Annex I.

Scores	Total sample of projects	Matra South Initiatives- centralized budget	CSI	PSI	G2G
Non-weighted average score	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.0	3.0
Weighted average score	3.2	3.6	3.5	3.1	2.9

Non-weighted scores: 5 = highly satisfactory, 4 = very satisfactory (the project fully meets the criteria). 3 = satisfactory (the project largely meets the criteria). 2 = unsatisfactory (the project only meets the criteria to a limited extent) and 1= poor (serious deficiencies).

The individual **PSI** projects analysed were assessed as fairly efficient (all scored a 3). All projects are efficiently managed and while some projects experienced some delays, these are all minor. Of the **G2G** projects that were part of the sample, most projects are fairly efficient, with the average project score being a 3. Two projects score less well –a 2– due to the many delays that were experienced and the relative high costs of the projects. The average efficiency score of the sample **CSI** projects is 3.4/3.5 (unweighted/weighted), with one underperforming project (scoring a 2) and one very well performing project (scoring a 5). The efficient implementation is mainly due to the fact that, overall, fairly professional organisations have been selected to implement the various CSI projects. The underperforming project is the exception, as it is implemented by young entrepreneurs who have limited project experience. Some delays in project implementation were, furthermore, experienced in Egypt due to the political unrest and the fact that it has become more difficult and cumbersome for a foreign entity to fund an NGO. It has, therefore, proven to be more efficient to work in Egypt with not-for-profit companies.

The three **Matra South Initiatives** analysed for this study, score respectively weak (2), sufficient (3), and well (4) on efficiency. The weak performing initiative (IFC beroepsonderwijs: E4E Initiative

for Arab Youth) has experienced considerable delays and is relatively expensive given the scope of the projects implemented, while the good performing programme (Practicing democracy in a Transitional Egypt) has hardly experienced any significant delays -despite it being implemented in a difficult context- and works with a lot of volunteers and partners who provide in-kind contributions, which positively affects its cost-effectiveness.

## 9 Conclusions and recommendations

### 9.1 Conclusions

The table below provides, based on the analysis of the twenty sample projects, an overview of the average scores assigned per component and evaluation criterion.

Scores	Total sample of projects	Matra South Initiatives-centralized budget	CSI	PSI	G2G
<b>Relevance</b>					
Non-weighted average score	3.5	4.0	3.4	3.8	3.2
Weighted average score	3.6	5.3 <sup>46</sup>	3.5	3.8	3.1
<b>Effectiveness</b>					
Non-weighted average score	3.5	4.0	3.3	3.0	3.7
Weighted average score	3.6	6.0 <sup>47</sup>	3.4	3.1	3.4
<b>Sustainability</b>					
Non-weighted average score	3.4	-	3.2	3.3	3.8
Weighted average score	3.5	-	3.3	3.4	3.5
<b>Efficiency</b>					
Non-weighted average score	3.2	3.0	3.4	3.0	3.0
Weighted average score	3.2	3.6	3.5	3.1	2.9

Non-weighted scores: 5 = highly satisfactory, 4 = very satisfactory (the project fully meets the criteria). 3 = satisfactory (the project largely meets the criteria). 2 = unsatisfactory (the project only meets the criteria to a limited extent) and 1= poor (serious deficiencies).

#### Relevance

The Matra South Programme, and its individual components, are reasonably well aligned with the policy priorities of the Dutch government, the objectives of the Matra South programme and priority country needs. In practice, the programme and its individual components, and in particular the CSI and G2G components, have to a large extent been demand driven. The programme scores weaker when judged against the criterion of being results-driven. Support has been very fragmented and lacked a strategic results orientation. No strategic reflection has taken place about the question how to optimize the mix of specific support activities under the various components, and to the various countries, in order to ensure synergies and maximize the effectiveness of the programme as a whole. The extent to which the training programmes were able to attract suitable participants

<sup>46</sup> See reference 40

<sup>47</sup> See reference 41

differed per country, but was in general assessed as satisfactory. The demand for political party support varied between countries and depended on the degree of political organisation and the transition process. The facts that the political party support was very fragmented and that it was not always focused on actual political parties have negatively affected the relevance of this component. Finally, most selected projects were assessed as being very relevant, which demonstrates that the projects succeeded in focusing on key transformation issues in line with the objectives of the Matra South programme.

### Effectiveness

On average the selected projects (CSI, Matra South initiatives, G2G and PSI) were given a satisfactory score for effectiveness indicating that they are likely to reach their planned outputs and objectives. However, it should be taken into account that only scores could be assigned to thirteen of the twenty sample projects of which only six are finished. As a result for most projects it was not yet possible to note (already) significant results at the outcome level. The participants' evaluations of the training courses are in general very positive. The effectiveness of the support activities of political parties is limited, which is partly due to the fact that relevant political counterparts were not always present in the five countries.

### Sustainability

The sustainability of the selected projects was on average found to be satisfactory. An important explanation for the relative high score for sustainability is the fact that projects have been demand driven and/or local partners have been involved in the formulation of the projects. Whether achieved results prove lasting depends, however, also to a large extent on the external context in which projects are implemented and trained people work. Given the volatile environment in many of the countries sustainability of results achieved will be challenging.

### Efficiency

Many different stakeholders are involved with the implementation of the programme (components). This is especially the case for the G2G component. It has raised doubts about the efficiency of the organizational set-up of the programme. The management capacity of DAM is, furthermore, limited. Project management has often focused to a large extent on the selection process of projects and administrative issues and less on content issues. Overall, efficiency scores for the selected projects are relatively lower than scores for relevance and effectiveness, which mostly relate to project delays encountered.

## 9.2 Recommendations

- The programme's focus on economic growth, strengthening of the democratisation process and rule of law is very relevant. However, a more programmatic approach is needed to foster better results orientation;
- The organizational set-up of the Matra South Programme is complex and not very efficient and effective. The delegation of more responsibility to the embassy level for identifying and selecting projects that can strengthen CSOs, G2G and private sector development can be beneficial, as it will allow the embassies to foster complementarities and synergy of the different components. DAM's involvement can then be limited to an oversight role. A larger role for the embassies does, however, require additional capacity;
- The use of the PSI instrument to foster sustainable economic growth is not considered the most logical choice and did not work well in practice. A better option could be to focus on private sector development in the priority countries;



- Based on information collected during this desk study CSI seems to work well and could be strengthened by assigning a larger percentage of the budget resources to this component (for instance from the centralised budget<sup>48</sup>), but again this will need to go hand in hand with additional capacity for the embassies;
- G2G requires a clearer role of the embassies in terms of promotion and project identification. This may include the need to undertake scoping studies to identify niches that are not covered by other donors, to achieve complementarity;
- PP seems to work only to a limited extent. Considering the demand for trainings that teach parties practical skills it could be considered to involve a specialised organisation such as NIMD to increase cost-effectiveness. In addition, more collaboration between the different parties could be stimulated;
- The diplomat training courses could be shortened to increase cost-effectiveness;
- To improve the effectiveness and sustainability of the training programmes it could be considered to include additional follow up activities and to more substantially involve the government institutions where the trainees work.

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<sup>48</sup> Based on the current assessment it is not possible to compare the performance of both components but it could be argued that embassies can better anticipate the needs in the countries (**demand-driven** projects).



# Annex I Project sheets

## Matra South Initiative (centralized budget)

- 1) Practicing democracy in a Transitional Egypt (Phase 1 and Phase 2);
- 2) IFC beroepsonderwijs: E4E Initiative for Arab Youth;
- 3) Contribution Anna Lindh Foundation.

## CSI

- 4) Poverty eradication through employment;
- 5) Advocating and Promoting Workers' Rights;
- 6) Entrepreneurship Education Programme;
- 7) The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Salafism;
- 8) The Role of citizenship in promoting the rule of law, transparency and anti-corruption policies Regional Conference;
- 9) Youth Conference (Part 2);
- 10) Study for the creation of an observatoire for the VSME in Morocco;
- 11) Microbiological Analysis Laboratory (CETIA).

## PSI

- 12) Pilot Carbon Footprint Project;
- 13) Fighting the housing deficit with modular solutions in Morocco;
- 14) Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from Tunisia;
- 15) Breeding of disease tolerant vegetable seed.

## G2G

- 16) Improving Road Safety in Morocco;
- 17) CNDH / Mensenrechten gevangeniswezen;
- 18) Training of 8 civil servants;
- 19) Cooperation between the Ombudsman Bureau of Jordan and the National Ombudsman of the Netherlands;
- 20) Enhancing professionalism in the Libyan Prison Service.

## 1) Practicing democracy in a Transitional Egypt (Phase 1 and Phase 2)

General Information	
Project Name	<b>Practicing democracy in a Transitional Egypt (Phase 1 and Phase 2)</b>
Activity number	23652 (Phase 1), 25385 (Phase 2)
Programme component	Matra South Initiative (managed by DAM from the centralized budget)
Country	Egypt
Implementing organisation	Oxfam/Novib and Better Life
Type of project	Capacity building (trainings), network building and awareness raising
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-1-2012 – 31-12-2012 (phase 1) 1-1-2013 – 31-12-2014 (phase 2)
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-1-2012 – 31-12-2012 (phase 1) 1-1-2013 – ongoing
Modality	Programme support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Strengthened democratic governance, rule of law and sustainable economic growth.
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Better Life staff members;</li> <li>• Selected partner CBOs;</li> <li>• Other CBOs and NGOs trained;</li> <li>• Community members trained;</li> <li>• Media;</li> <li>• Young potential future politicians.</li> </ul> <p><b>Secondary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• General public reached by outreach/awareness raising events (over 100.000) (majority of the beneficiaries are young people, women and illiterate people and consist of 50% men and 50% women).</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Phase 1: Closed; Phase 2: Implementation phase
Financial information	
Total project budget	EUR 727,391 (phase 1); EUR 1,016,563 (phase 2).
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	EUR 727,391 (59%) Matra South Programme funding (phase 1); EUR 891,685 (88%) Matra South Programme funding and EUR 124,878 (12%) co-funding from Oxfam Novib (phase 2).
Amount Committed	EUR 1,320,471 (EUR 428,786 (Phase 1), EUR 891,685 (Phase 2)).
Amount Disbursed	821,379 (EUR 428,735 (Phase 1), EUR 392,644 (Phase 2)).
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
Egypt has a history of weak democratic mechanisms and a high level of corruption among officials and representative bodies. Political parties, especially opposition parties are weak. Social dialogue around human rights and democratisation has been mainly limited to the elite, while local communities remain excluded from	

decision-making. Public knowledge about basic political concepts is very low. More than 60% of Egyptians are illiterate and there is a clear need for reliable impartial information and political knowledge. The project focuses on mobilizing poor communities to become active citizens and claim their civil, political and socio-economic rights. It focuses on 5 governorates in Upper Egypt, which have significant less exposure to rights-based organisations and democratization movements than Lower Egypt. It targets the most marginalized and excluded community members (women, young and illiterate people). The project uses a grassroots model, which entails working with and through local Community Based Organisations (CBOs). The project was designed for three years, but first only approved for one year to test whether a political participation awareness raising project would actually work in Egypt. After a successful first phase the second phase was approved.

Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
<p><b>Goal:</b> Strengthened practices of democracy, free elections, human rights and accountability. Increased sustainable development.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthened influence of civil society on government and political activities;</li> <li>• Strengthened active citizenship and political participation;</li> <li>• Strengthened role of independent local media and increased participation of young Egyptians in the political debate.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <p>Strengthened capacity of civil society organizations in 5 governorates of Upper Egypt to foster sustainable development of marginalized communities and to monitor political actors and actions (e.g. elections).</p> <p>Strengthened awareness of people in 5 governorates in Upper Egypt about practicing democracy, human rights, active citizenship and political participation.</p> <p>Strengthened capacity of independent local media and increased access of young Egyptians to the political debate.</p> <p><b>Activities/inputs include (Phase 1+2):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Training of Better life staff in socio-political participation issues and the human rights based approach to development;</li> <li>• Training of 50 local trainers to enable them to train other trainers on political participation and socio-economic rights (50-50 gender balance);</li> <li>• Design and publishing of training curriculum on political participation and socio-economic</li> </ul>	<p>No evidence has yet been collected to directly assess the degree to which the planned outcomes have already been achieved. Data on output level is, however, available. Many of the realized outputs will very likely contribute to –at least the partial- realization of planned outcomes. Overall, the project has already delivered more results than anticipated.</p> <p><b>Realized outputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Capacity of better life and CBOs has strengthened in terms of increased understanding of socio-political participation issues and the human rights based approach to development. Furthermore, a beginning has been made to develop CSO networks to foster joint action and knowledge sharing;</li> <li>2. Various awareness raising events and trainings have strengthened the awareness of communities in the 5 governorates in Upper Egypt about practicing democracy, human rights, active citizenship and political participation;</li> <li>3. Capacity of local media has been strengthened and young people were trained in political participation.</li> </ol> <p><b>Realized activities include:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Better life staff trained on socio-political participation issues and the human rights based approach to development;</li> <li>• 26 trainers trained, training curriculum designed on political participation and socio-economic rights;</li> <li>• 5 civil society networks are being formed at the governorate level for joint campaigning and lobbying;</li> <li>• 125 CBOs and NGOs were trained on the Rights Based Approach and Integrating Democratization activities in their work;</li> <li>• 375 community members trained on civic election observation;</li> <li>• 15 Community Based Organisations organized awareness raising meetings about the elections – 38,000 people reached in phase 1 instead of the</li> </ul>

<p>rights;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Selection of 15 Community Based Organisations (CBOs) from 5 governorates for cooperation;</li> <li>• Training of 375 community members on civic election observation;</li> <li>• Training of 125 community members on budget monitoring;</li> <li>• Creation of 5 civil society networks at the governorate level for joint campaigning and lobby;</li> <li>• Creation of national network of NGOs and CBOs;</li> <li>• Organisation of awareness raising meetings about the elections – targeting 1875 persons in phase 1 and 22500 persons in phase 2;</li> <li>• Training of 125 young potential future politicians, 50-50% gender balance;</li> <li>• Training of media representatives on political and civic issues, context analysis and critical reporting (35 in phase 1, 150 in phase 2);</li> <li>• Seminars about politics –targeting 500 people (100 in each governorate).</li> </ul>	<p>planned 1875; 18,414 people reached in phase 2;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 375 young potential future politicians trained (instead of 125);</li> <li>• 200 (instead of the planned 35) media representatives trained on political and civic issues, context analysis and critical reporting;</li> <li>• 700 young people trained on democratization processes, political participation and citizenship.</li> </ul>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

The project is on course to achieve its planned results and no major obstacles are foreseen. While Better Life's office had to close down for a short period of time during the summer of 2013 given the unrest in Minya, this has, however, not resulted in any significant delays. The difficult environment in which the project is implemented does, of course, require the project team to pay specific attention to the profiling of Better Life as a politically neutral player and to implement measures to ensure the safety of all staff. The project, furthermore, needs to be flexible to adjust to developments in the political-economic environment. In order to deal with conflicts and tensions, the project, for example, introduced new topics into the program like trainings on 'Citizenship and Accepting the Other', which include discussions around the concept of citizenship and practical exercises to work on conflicts.

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)	
See above	See above	
Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)	
See above	See above	
DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment

Relevance	5	The project is highly relevant as it focuses on the aims of the Matra South Programme and responds to a clear need of local communities in Upper Egypt. The timing of the project has proven to be perfect as after the revolution local communities' demands for knowledge about political processes and citizens' rights increased tremendously. The project stimulates active citizenship by empowering local communities and by supporting them with raising their voice and demanding accountability of public institutions.
Efficiency	4	The project is managed efficiently. No significant delays have occurred. Furthermore, many volunteers contribute to the implementation of the programme. The partner CBOs also provide various in kind contributions.
Effectiveness	5	The programme has been able to achieve many outputs and reach numerous (marginalized) people by working together with CBOs and various community volunteers. Various activities have proven to be a lot more successful than initially planned (e.g. the outreach activities) and more people have been reached than envisaged. It is difficult to judge the programme in terms of its effectiveness of achieving its outcomes as this is hard to measure. Nevertheless, based on the outputs achieved and the likelihood that these contribute positively to the planned outcomes, the programme seems very effective. The only planned results that will likely not be achieved relate to the building of a strong (lobby and advocacy) network at governorate and national level. It proved too early in time to achieve this given the highly polarized nature of the civic sector in Egypt. Nevertheless, first steps have been made by bringing together like minded organizations, organize joint trainings, exchange experiences and build trust.
Sustainability	4	The programme builds the capacity of numerous community members, CBOs and NGOs, which is sustainable in itself. Next to specific trainings, the programme implements many activities through its partner CBOs, which build their organisational capacity further and contributes to their sustainability. Furthermore, by focusing on CBOs and community mobilizers, the programme fosters change in attitudes, skills and practices of people who are deeply rooted in the local communities with the potential to affect the rest of the community and thus enhance the sustainability of achieved outcomes. Furthermore, Oxfam is designing a new programme to build upon the results of this project.

**Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:**

1. General country context (external factors): 4;
2. Complexity of the project environment: 4;
3. Ambition-level of the project: 4.

**Overall conclusion: 4**

**Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

The project implementation approach whereby use is made of CBOs and community mobilizers has proven to be a very effective way for organising outreach and awareness raising activities.

Since it has become increasingly difficult in Egypt to fund NGOs (as permission needs to be asked by the NGO to receive foreign funding, which is often a very lengthy process) it works efficiently to work with partners that are not-for-profit businesses.

Local communities have increasingly expressed the wish for the project not only to focus on their civic and political rights but also to address their basic needs (economic empowerment). It might be recommendable for future programming to also include this component into projects as poverty and deprivation are also major sources of political and social unrest.

Implementing projects focused on increasing political participation and active citizenship in difficult environments has learned the lesson that these projects need to be flexible in order to properly adapt to changes in the external environment.

The project itself could be further improved in terms of its monitoring and evaluation system, in order for it to be better able to capture the qualitative change achieved (instead of mainly focusing on outputs in quantitative terms).

#### Other comments

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#### Sources of information:

Project proposal, Narrative report October 18th, 2012; Annual report 2013; Promoting Participatory Democracy Project, Mid-term Evaluation 2012; other project documents including e-mail correspondence, budgets etc.; Interview with Marleen Nolten, Programme Officer Oxfam Novib, Middle East and North-Africa desk; Interview notes IOB field visit 2014.

## 2) IFC beroepsonderwijs: E4E Initiative for Arab Youth

General Information	
Project Name	<b>IFC beroepsonderwijs: E4E Initiative for Arab Youth</b>
Activity number	24878
Programme component	Matra South Initiative (managed by DAM from the centralized budget)
Country	Region: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan
Implementing organisation	International Finance Corporation
Type of project	Research, Lobby & Advocacy, Training and Advisory services
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-12-2012 -30-9-2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-12-2012 - ongoing (the Regional Head of the E4E Initiative for Arab Youth indicated to need an extension of at least 1 year)
Modality	Grant
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Primary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employer associations and Employers;</li> <li>• Education providers;</li> <li>• Policy makers;</li> <li>• Students;</li> <li>• IFC.</li> </ul> Secondary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The wider population in the four countries.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
Financial information	



Total project budget	EUR 5,698,088
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	\$1000,000 (12% Matra South Programme funding, 88% other sources funding including from DFID and SECO)
Amount Committed	EUR 800,000
Amount Disbursed	EUR 800,000
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>Youth unemployment across the Arab region averages 25 percent, which is the highest in the world. Female youth unemployment approaches even 30% in the Middle East and North Africa region ("MENA"). There is wide recognition that if nothing is done, unemployment levels are likely to rise further as the result of a demographic bubble – approximately a third of the total population is currently below the age of 15, and a further third is aged 15-29. As a consequence, an estimated 50-70 million young people will enter the region's work force over the next ten years. Addressing this problem will require efforts on the demand side to make sectors more competitive, but also on the supply side as a significant portion of the problem can be attributed to the limited relevance of the skill delivery system to the needs of the private sector. The failure of the education sector is also at the heart of the reform agenda coming out of the Arab Spring. The governments of Jordan, Egypt and Tunisia are all launching new strategies around vocational training, labor market reform and education. In this context, the International Finance Corporation ("IFC") and the Islamic Development Bank ("IsDB") commissioned a consulting firm to undertake an in-depth review of the role of the private sector in education in MENA. A strategy was developed "Education for Employment: Realizing Arab Youth Potential" with as its main goal to ensure that education leads to improved employment prospects, whether in attractive and sustainable jobs or in self-employment. The education for employment (e4e) initiative is focused on the supply side, and more specifically, on fostering education that provides students with the skills and knowledge demanded by employers. It is implemented in four countries: Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inclusive economic growth.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outcome:</b></p> <p>Increased number of youth that have relevant skills needed by the market.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased availability of high quality and relevant education and training programs;</li> <li>Increased youth demand for market-responsive education and training programs.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducting diagnostic assessments in Egypt and Morocco to identify and prioritize the sectors on which IFC will focus, the qualitative and quantitative gaps in skill provision in those sectors, the policy, regulatory, and institutional reforms, and potential investments. (Diagnostic assessments have already been delivered for Tunisia and Jordan.);</li> <li>Establishing a platform for engagement and outreach aimed at promoting an entrepreneurship culture, improving perception</li> </ol>	<p>The project experienced significant delays and no outcomes or outputs have already been realized.</p> <p>The following main activities/inputs have been realized so far:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Linked to the output "Increased availability of high quality and relevant education and training programs": <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducted a needs assessment in Egypt, which identified the following growth sectors as being particularly constrained by skills gaps: construction, tourism, ICT and manufacturing;</li> <li>Conducted a survey in Egypt of supply and demand of healthcare professionals, which identified a shortage of education supply for healthcare professionals and a shortage of qualified educators in this sector, despite the growing demand for private healthcare services and market willingness to pay for them;</li> <li>Conducted a needs assessment study in Morocco, which identified the followings sectors as being particularly constrained by skills gaps: tourism, construction, logistics, and retail/wholesale.</li> </ul> </li> </ol> <p><i>Jordan:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identification of three high growth sectors to focus upon: ICT, tourism and health care</li> <li>Identification of partners to develop suitable education</li> </ul>

<p>of VET professions, sharing examples of innovation in service delivery, and sharing positive experiences across countries throughout the Arab region on the role of the private sector as an education provider;</p> <p>c) Improving the enabling environment for e4e through 1) enhancing policies on the role of the private sector in education provision, 2) streamlining entry and operations for private education providers, 3) strengthening Independent Quality Assurance, 4) helping organize the private sector to engage, and establish mechanisms for constructive dialogue between education providers, government, and the private sector, 5) increasing the investment attractiveness of the private education sector;</p> <p>d) Compiling and disseminating country benchmarking to generate momentum for reform and identify best practices regionally and globally to better understand performance drivers in the priority countries and enhance policy dialogue;</p> <p>e) Creating an Advisory Board for the strategic development of the e4e initiative, which will be composed of supranational bodies, regional and global foundations, private sector associations, and firm level CSR initiatives;</p> <p>f) Creating an approach and Advisory Board for entrepreneurship development. This advisory board will be composed of global and regional entrepreneurship organizations like Endeavor, Kauffman Foundation, MIT, HBS, Babson, USA Global Entrepreneurship Program, and other key regional private players and education institutions like Silatech, Injaz, etc.</p>	<p>for these sectors and formed a partnership the ICT federation;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of a project in partnership with the ICT federation focused on the ICT sector: 1) identified the job profiles and employability skills ICT employers are looking for and are now working with three universities to develop a suitable curriculum 2) are currently in the process of forming an ICT sector skills council that will consist out of education providers, the ICT federation and potentially also other ICT employers (first meeting is scheduled for October 2014) 3) are currently designing an information platform to inform youth about the demands of employers (scheduled to be launched by the end of 2014);</li> <li>• The project in Jordan is used as a blueprint for similar projects in Tunisia and Morocco. In Tunisia IFC a partnership agreement has been signed with the ICT federation; this has not yet happened in Morocco. The project in Tunisia is to improve access to information and employability of Tunisian youth in the ICT sector, through the creation of (1) Labor market observatory; (2) Qualifications Framework to be adopted by training providers; (3) a virtual matchmaking academy that identifies training needs of ICT firms and oversees contracting of training providers to respond. Estimated student reach: 4,500 students. The project will complement World Bank (WB) efforts in Tunisia. In both countries, the projects are still very much in the beginning phase-no major results are expected to be achieved (at output level) for the next 18 months;</li> <li>• Launched a project in Morocco focused on Logistics/Tourism. A Cooperation Agreement for the Morocco Logistics/Tourism project was signed in October 2013 with the National Logistics Agency of Morocco. The project aims to (1) Add labor information to the existing Logistics and Tourism Observatories; (2) Develop Qualifications Frameworks for the tourism sector;</li> <li>• Signed two agreements with AmidEast and Attitudes Conseil to provide E4E training. One Trainer of Trainers (ToT) workshop for AmidEast was delivered in December 2013;</li> <li>• Provided six workshops on time management and effective communication to 82 students of ESPRIT, a private technical university in Tunisia. The project estimated student reach is 700+ students by the end of 2014;</li> <li>• Held the “E4E Marketplace” event in April 2013 in Morocco, which brought together regional enablers of E4E solutions – from Governments, industry, education entities and civil society – with the goal to explore</li> </ul>
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	<p>innovative solutions to reach more young people with educational opportunities through targeted investments and partnerships in MENA. The event resulted in a pipeline for IFC advisory and investment projects;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The E4E Initiative co-sponsored and actively participated to the annual “Global Business School Network” (GBSN) conference in Tunis in June 2013, which brought together nearly 160 representatives from business schools, development organizations and industry professionals from around the world to discuss and develop partnerships to address youth employability, skills gap, and entrepreneurship in MENA.</li> </ul> <p>2) Linked to the output “Increased youth demand for market-responsive education and training programs”:</p> <p><i>Morocco and Egypt:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducted a study that looked at good practices and innovative approaches to private student lending programs, and hybrid public/private programs, targeted to mid-lower socio-economic groups attending private sector post-secondary education institutions. It included recommendations on student lending model(s) to be implemented in Egypt/Morocco, including structures, market analysis, and potential partners.</li> </ul>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

The project experienced significant delays and an extension of around 1 year is likely to be required to implement the planned activities. In its initial phase the project focused on the regulatory environment in Tunisia and Egypt. The governments in these countries appeared, however, not to be able to significantly be involved in these projects and after “wasting” 1 ½ years, it was decided to focus on sector level projects, like the ICT projects. One of the key obstacles for this project is the lack of governments’ capacity to work on these kind of projects in political volatile times. Drivers of this project are committed employer federations who are interested to improve the supply-side of the education sector through practical solutions.

**Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component**      **Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)**

See above      See above

**Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme**      **Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)**

See above      See above

DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	4	Youth unemployment is a serious problem in the Arab region and one of the causes of the Arab unrest. This problem is not only caused by a lack of jobs, but also due to a mismatch between the skills of jobseekers and the skills demanded by employers. This project, therefore, addresses the supply-side of the education system.

Efficiency	2	The project encountered serious delays and is likely to need an extension of at least 1 year. The project seems to be relatively expensive, especially when taking into account the advantages the World Bank (WB) has because of the clear links with the investment activities of IFC and other WB support. The total budget has fully been allocated to the various studies undertaken and the sector projects described above.
Effectiveness	-	Given the delays encountered and the fact that many of the developed projects are currently in their beginning phase, it is too early to assess this criterion.
Sustainability	-	Idem.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3.3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 4;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 4.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 3,8</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
E4E Initiative for Arab Youth Program, Semi-Annual Operational Report (unaudited), March 31, 2014; E4E Initiative for Arab Youth Program, Semi-Annual Operational Report (unaudited), September 15, 2013; E4E Initiative for Arab Youth Program, Semi-Annual Operational Report (unaudited), March 15, 2013; BEMO; various other project documents and e-mail correspondence; Interview: Dahlia Khalifa, Regional Head, E4E Initiative for Arab Youth, IFC; Interview: Bert Meijerman, DAM.		

### 3) Contribution Anna Lindh Foundation

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Contribution Anna Lindh Foundation</b>
Activity number	24943
Programme component	CSI
Country	Region
Implementing organisation	Anna Lindh Foundation
Type of project	Support to CSO organisations
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01/01/2012 – 31/12/2014
Actual start date – Actual end date project	01/01/2012 – ongoing
Modality	Programme support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Democratisation process
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Citizens in the Arab region, particularly women and youth
Key stakeholders	CSOs in the region
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	ALF is supported by many other donors
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation

Financial information	
Total project budget	EUR 14,500,000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	2%, 98%
Amount Committed	EUR 300,000
Amount Disbursed	EUR 300,000
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
<p>The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) was established by the Member States of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and has as objective 'to bring people together from across the Mediterranean to improve mutual respect between cultures'. After establishment in 2005, the ALF has supported a diversity of activities to support civil society in the region. The ALF programme is focussed on education and youth, culture and arts, peace and co-existence, values, religion and spirituality, cities and migration and media.</p> <p>Matra South provides a financial contribution of EUR 100,000 per year for a period of three years to support the activities of the ALF (a continuation of the previous programme support provided by the Netherlands). The contribution is a general contribution. There is no direct link between the Matra South contribution and the activities under the ALF programme. ALF does not report separately to Matra South on its activities. The contribution of the Netherlands is relatively small with only 2% of the overall budget. The BEMO mentions that the contribution should also increase the engagement and visibility of the Netherlands. It is unclear how that will be realised. The Netherlands is not specifically mentioned in the annual progress report. The financial contribution is listed in the financial report along with all other contributions from EU member states.</p>	
Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
<p>The purpose of the Anna Lindh Foundation is to bring people together from across the Mediterranean to improve mutual respect between cultures and to support civil society working for a common future for the region.</p> <p><b>Goals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Netherlands:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To make the Dutch involvement visible in the activities of the ALF, which are carried out in close cooperation with the national ALF network in the 43 participating countries (EU Member States, Maghreb and Mashreq countries, including Israel and the Palestinian Authority, "and the other countries around the Mediterranean, including Turkey and countries like Albania, Montenegro and others).</li> </ul> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Continuation of a good functioning head quarters of the ALF in Alexandria;</li> <li>Continuation and implementation of</li> </ul>	<p>The Netherlands contributed 300.000 Euro to the ALF for support. The Dutch involvement is with only 2% of the overall budget relatively small. In the 2013 Annual progress Report of the ALF the Netherlands is only mentioned ones in relation to a Dutch organization working together with partners from Cyprus, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia in a Euro-Med project on History Education.</p> <p>Concluded from the formulated goals, the Netherlands supported the ALF with a relatively small contribution and based on the document review did not make the Dutch involvement in the organisation very visible. Nevertheless in the interview with ALF it is mentioned that the annual review to be published in September 2014 will include a double page overview of Netherlands activities within ALF. Dutch organisations have been active in the following ways:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>173 Dutch organisations/ associations are connected to the ALF;</li> <li>In 2012 60 Dutch participants were involved in the activities and in 2013, 166;</li> <li>2 leading companies in 2012 (cool politics and the united network of young peace builders).</li> </ul> <p>In addition it is mentioned that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is always very active in the Board of governance meetings.</p> <p>In 2012 ALF s outreach included over 170.000 people. Some main activities &amp; results include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collaboration in initiatives in 6 partnerships with 44 relevant stakeholders and 415 participants (72 % youth, 45 % South) in</li> </ul>

cooperative activities by the ALF.	<p>activities aiming to promote intercultural dialogue actions around the region. The major topics were citizenship and culture, and combining a Euro- Med approach with a deepening of the Arab perspective;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Young Arab Voices II (YAV) extended its operation area to include Morocco, Algeria, and Libya in addition to the countries; already included in the programme (Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia). As a result, around 300 new debate clubs were established and 700 debates held in different geographic areas in the targeted countries. More than 10,000 young people attended the debates;</li> <li>• the Citizens Exchange programme involved 52 CSOs from 8 Southern and 8 Northern Mediterranean countries. As a result of the programme the exchange of intercultural knowledge in the areas of networking and project development has been supported.</li> </ul>	
N/A		
<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>	
The mandate and activities of the ALF “to bring people together to improve mutual respect and understanding ‘and ‘support CS’ are coherent with the Matra South programme.	Considering the small (not earmarked) contribution of the Netherlands it is difficult to contribute the results to the Matra South resources.	
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	3	ALF activities are very relevant in light of the transition processes in the region. The organisation brings together people from the region in dialogue to improve mutual understanding. The activities however have a more indirect link with objectives of the Matra South programme.
Efficiency	3	Efficiency is difficult to assess based on the documentation available. The contribution of the Netherlands is not earmarked and thus not linked to any activities. Activities seem to be implemented as scheduled. It could be argued that the ALF with its multiple activities in the different countries could have achieved some economies of scale.
Effectiveness	3	The BEMO mentions that the contribution should also increase the engagement and visibility of the Netherlands. No specific activities are mentioned in this respect. Visibility seems to be limited to listing along with the other contributors and participation of Dutch actors. Although it is not clear to what extent this is motivated by the Dutch contribution to the ALF. Nevertheless with the support of the Netherlands the programme has reach out to over 170000 people, with a large number of activities focused at exchanges/ debate and dialogue implemented. The main beneficiaries have been young people, now established as the most relevant target of ALF actions.

Sustainability	-	The ALF is well established and sits at the table with the major donors on governance issues. It can be expected that the foundation will be able to continue/ foster its activities. One can expect that the organisation via its multiple activities has been able to create a certain mass in the different countries in the region. (but again the contribution of the Netherlands is minimal).
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors) 3,25 (average priority countries);</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 3,1</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
Documentation on the exact agreement with ALF seems to be missing. The BEMO mentions that the engagement should also increase the management and engagement of the Netherlands but this is not documented and it is not clear who should initiate this. This should have been monitored better considering the fact that it is a three year project.		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project documentation: BEMO, ALF, annual progress report, 2013, ALF, consolidated financial statements, 2013. Interview Gemma Aubarell Solduga, head of programme and operations unit ALF.		

#### 4) Poverty eradication through employment

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Poverty eradication through employment</b>
Activity number	24823
Programme component	CSI
Country	Egypt
Implementing organisation	Alashanek Ya Balady – Association for Sustainable Development
Type of project	Training, matchmaking job seekers and employers, micro-credit
Planned start date – Planned end date project	19-11-2012-31-6-2014
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-7-2013-ongoing (and extended to 31-12-2014)
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Unemployed poor youth (males and females in the age bracket of 18-35 years).</li> </ul> <p><b>Secondary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employees;</li> <li>• Families of the primary beneficiaries who will benefit from the increased income.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	Projects are separately managed per donor and it has been verified that other donors do not pay for the same activities
Project status (start-up phase, implementation)	Implementation phase



phase, closure)	
Total project budget	
Total project budget	EUR 129,066
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% Matra South Programme funding
Amount Committed	
Amount Committed	EUR 129,066
Amount Disbursed	
Amount Disbursed	EUR 104,893
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>A high level of unemployment is one of the major problems Egypt is facing. AYB is a local NGO that works towards the reduction of poverty through the creation of employment. The main target groups of the organization are poor youth and marginalized women. The project focuses on building the technical capacity of youth, as well as their soft skills, to increase their chances on the labour market. The project helps youth from poor families with finding concrete employment opportunities and with establishing micro/small enterprises. It addresses problems like: a) mismatches in technical skills by providing vocational training and entrepreneurship training programs; b) non-technical mismatches by providing life skills and financial literacy training programs; c) ineffective job matching, by analyzing existing local labor market opportunities for youth, and providing intermediation services between youth and enterprises; and d) the lack of funding for start-ups by designing tailored financial products.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	
<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>	
<p><b>Goal:</b> Sustainable economic growth.</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> Increased employment and decreased poverty - 550 youth employed in full time positions and 200 youth self-employed, which results in lifting in total 750 youth (and their families) out of poverty.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) 550 youth employed in companies, factories, and workshops with proper working conditions and salaries;</li> <li>2) 200 youth started their own small businesses.</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities/inputs include:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 900 unemployed youth coached and mentored before and after job placement;</li> <li>• 700 unemployed youth are trained on various soft and specialized skills (technical and vocational skills);</li> <li>• 550 unemployed youth are placed in job opportunities;</li> <li>• 550 youth are guided and mentored throughout the first 6 months of employment;</li> <li>• 200 youth are trained on various soft and entrepreneurial skills;</li> <li>• 200 youth are trained and guided to create feasibility study for their small businesses;</li> <li>• 200 youth are supported technically through small businesses consulting during the first</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outputs realized:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 400 youth employed (around 60% is female) in companies with decent working conditions;</li> <li>• 146 youth started their own businesses;</li> <li>• 23 employers provided free training;</li> <li>• 769 youth trained on technical and soft skills and have received career counseling;</li> <li>• 385 youth trained on entrepreneurial and business skills.</li> </ul> <p>No data is yet available on the effects of these achievements on the poverty level.</p>



<p>year of starting their small businesses;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Employers are identified with fair labor conditions;</li> <li>• Meetings are organized to introduce the trained youth and potential employers;</li> <li>• Contracts are formulated with companies and factories to provide specialized trainings for youth.</li> </ul>	
<p><b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b></p>	
<p>The project was significantly delayed (6 months) at the start as the NGO had to await the approval of the Ministry of Social Solidarity for receiving funding from a foreign entity. This made it necessary to extend the project with 6 months. The project is now, however, well on course to achieve its planned outputs. Whether this will also contribute to long-term employment of the beneficiaries and reduced poverty levels cannot be determined yet.</p>	
<p><b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b></p>	<p><b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b></p>
<p>See above</p>	<p>See above</p>
<p><b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b></p>	<p><b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b></p>
<p>See above</p>	<p>See above</p>
<p><b>DAC evaluation criteria</b></p>	<p><b>Score      Explanation/qualitative assessment</b></p>
<p>Relevance</p>	<p>4      Youth unemployment is a major problem in Egypt and a key cause of civic unrest. The project addresses the mismatch that exists between the skills demanded by employers and the skills offered by young job-seekers. By training youth and actively matching them with potential employers the project directly addresses the problem of youth unemployment.</p>
<p>Efficiency</p>	<p>3      The project experienced significant delays at the beginning of the project. Furthermore, revised progress reports needed to be requested due to quality concerns. Overall, however, the project is fairly well implemented.</p>
<p>Effectiveness</p>	<p>4      The project is well on course to achieve all of its planned outputs, whether the outcomes and overall impact can be realized cannot yet be determined;</p>
<p>Sustainability</p>	<p>4      The project is sustainable as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• the increased skills of the youth is a sustainable outcome;</li> <li>• the NGO covers already 75% of its administrative expenses through service fees on its loans portfolio and it is expected that this source of income will increase as well as the income from fees paid/in-kind contributions by employers for successful matches. Furthermore, the implementing agency keeps on tracking the results achieved with the job placements and engages in a continuous dialogue with the employers.</li> </ul>
<p><b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b></p>	
<p>1. General country context (external factors): 4;</p> <p>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3 (the project itself is not politically sensitive nor is it situated in a</p>	

difficult location);

3. Ambition-level of the project: 2.

**Overall conclusion: 3**

**Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

The NGO is moving away from formal training towards on-the-job training that is provided by employers as in-kind contribution in return for the match making facilities. This does not only increase the relevance of the technical skills learned but also decreases the costs of the work undertaken by the NGO and is a good practice. While the project is achieving good results, its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme is necessarily limited given its small size.

**Other comments**

**Sources of information:**

BEMO; Training for Employment Project, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Progress Report: July 2013 - December 2013; Project Proposal "Poverty eradication through employment" 2012; MEMO budget neutral verlenging; various other project documents and e-mail exchanges; Interview with Hans Raadschilders, First Secretary Economic Affairs and Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Egypt; Interview with Mohamed El-Kamel, Managing Director Alashanek Ya Balady.

**5) Advocating and Promoting Workers' Rights**

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Advocating and Promoting Workers' Rights</b>
Activity number	24264
Programme component	CSI
Country	Egypt
Implementing organisation	El-Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development (MCSD)
Type of project	Training and Technical Assistance
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01/07/2012 – 31/12/2013
Actual start date – Actual end date project	01/07/2012 – 31/12/2013
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Working conditions and labour rights
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Labour unions Workers' leaders / workers
Key stakeholders	Workers' leaders, activists, community leaders, media professionals, lawyers,
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	MSCD also receives support from SIDA. Support has been tuned to prevent overlap
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Closed
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 153,000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	98%, 2% (own contribution)
Amount Committed	EUR 150,001
Amount Disbursed	EUR 150,001
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
Working conditions in Egypt are often hard and workers' right not respected. Before the revolution Labor Unions	

and labor disputes were controlled by the Government. After the revolution in 2011, new found freedom of speech has led to many labour disputes that often lacked a sense of reality at both sides. In order to stimulate a constructive dialogue between the social partners. This project aims at empowering the workers to engage in a dialogue with employers. by empowering working, provide them with legal support and to advocate for workers' rights. The project is being implemented by MCSD a young CSO established in 2011.

Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
<p>The overall goal of the project is:            "Supporting environment for the rights of the workers and the freedom of association in Egypt". The project has three strategic objectives, each with their own outcomes and activities. In summary:</p> <p><b>1) Empower workers' leaders, activists and supporters in the areas of lobbying, negotiations and conflict management.</b></p> <p><i>Outputs:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Better negotiations skills and conflict management skills;</li> <li>Workers' leaders, activists, and supporters are engaged in direct dialogue and negotiations with companies and/or government representatives;</li> <li>Peaceful methods are adopted in solving workers' disputes.</li> </ul> <p>Activities: 100 worker's leaders, 50 activists, 50 media professionals and 200 community leaders trained, develop training manual, implement training programs and provide technical assistance.</p> <p><b>2) Provide legal support to workers in conflict.</b></p> <p><i>Outputs:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A directory of senior lawyers who are voluntarily providing Legal support to workers and their associations is developed;</li> <li>Proposed legislation for workers' rights is developed and introduced to the policy-makers;</li> <li>A virtual network of senior lawyers and junior lawyers and activists and supporters is created.</li> </ul> <p>Activities: 100 lawyers trained, 20 legal support units established, 100 requests submitted to receive legal support, 10 workers' groups that use legal tools to</p>	<p><b>1) Realised:</b></p> <p>APWR conducted training programmes on negotiation and conflict management skills, community mobilization, advocacy, and leadership and advocacy and networking, targeting activists, labor leaders and lawyers, which had a much larger outreach than planned for. For instanced 446 workers' leaders are trained on negotiation and conflict management skills (target 100).</p> <p>Results mentioned are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>12 advocacy campaigns are successfully developed and implemented;</li> <li>23 workers' disputes are solved peacefully;</li> <li>4 agreements between workers and employees in the four governments are signed for better working conditions.</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Largely realised:</b></p> <p>Although more support is provided as planned, the projects was not able to involve as many (senior) lawyers as planned:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>8 legal support units (legal clinics) in addition to the specialized law firm are contracted (target 20);</li> <li>316 requests submitted to receive legal support (168 legal consultations and 10 lawsuits have been handled). (target 100);</li> <li>28 of workers' groups that use legal tools to advocate their rights (target 10).</li> </ul> <p><b>3) Realised:</b></p> <p>The project targeted community leaders and other supporters for labour issues to build a consolidated front. However, the project's team found that the needs of the workers are higher than the needs of community groups. Accordingly, much of the efforts were directed to the labour leaders and activists:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>18 actions taken by the community groups to support workers' rights (target 15);</li> <li>increased media coverage for workers' protests (not measured but narrative report shows substantial media coverage);</li> <li>16 hearing sessions, awareness sessions, roundtable discussions and policy meetings were hold and attended by 620 participants representing political parties, trade unions, media outlets, NGOs, workers' groups, political and social groups, and representatives of private and public employers.</li> </ul>

<p>advocate their rights, establish online resource centre, provide training program for lawyers, organise hearing sessions, establish legal clinic.</p> <p><b>3) Mobilise community groups and other stakeholders to advocate the rights of workers.</b></p> <p>Outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community is mobilized to support workers' rights;</li> <li>• Better communication skills between the media and interested groups of workers' rights are developed;</li> <li>• Civil society organizations deliberately take actions to support workers' rights;</li> <li>• The business community understands better the specific needs of workers' groups.</li> </ul> <p>Activities: 15 actions taken by the community groups to support workers' rights, increase in objective media coverage for workers' protests, organise network meetings, provide booklets and TA for community networks during advocacy campaigns.</p>	<p>In addition the project achieved a number of unplanned results, including: 1) Establishment of the regional Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Unions (EFITU), 3) dialogue between El Mahrousa and the Union of Business owners in the Constructive sector. The legal consultant hired by the project provided the union with legal support to develop regulations and by laws. The Union is willing to be a role model for CSR/ respect of workers rights. 3) national conferences to call for freedom of associations.</p> <p>The project paid more attention to working women. Women were represented in the training programs by 38% compared to 35% as a target in the proposal. Recipients of legal aid are 56% women.</p>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

Despite the instable political and economic circumstances that cause obstacles to implement the project, the project has achieved its planned results. More work however is required also in view of the changing context. The last quarter of 2013 witnessed the rise of workers' protests and strikes all over Egypt. This challenge imposed restrictions on the field work of AWPR and has led to create a bad image for trade unions which use strikes instead of dialogue to solve their labour conflicts. The situation led to an increased demand of labour organizations for El Mahrousa's technical, legal, and moral support. El Mahrousa only received funds from the embassy of the Netherlands and SIDA, which can cover a small portion of expectations and needs. Another challenge has been the continuity of the political polarization and instability in Egypt. This takes much effort from workers and from labour organizations instead of focusing on how to be unified and how to develop the skills of their members.

<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and Matra South programme</b>	<b>Realised contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences) and Matra South programme</b>
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<p>The project fits well under CSI as it supports a CSO that strives for better working rights (human rights). The project also fits within the overall objective of the Matra South Programme. In particular the project is envisaged to contribute to sustainable economic development.</p>	<p>The project has contributed to the specific CSI objectives and the overall objectives of Matra South. Economic reasons including workers protest movement are one of the main causes of the revolution.</p>
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DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	5	A better supporting environment for the rights of the workers and an improved dialogue between workers and employers is very relevant in the context of the Egypt transition. Support to independent unions is important because the required contribution to state unions make it difficult for them to operate in an sustainable way.
Efficiency	5	The project has been implemented in an efficient way and did not experience any delays. According to the embassy the project was very cost effective. Salaries of MCSD staff are below the average for NGOs. Furthermore MCSD was able to support a large number of beneficiaries than planned for. MCSD is very positive about the support of the Netherlands Embassy and the support provided (organisation of support from Dutch experts etc.).
Effectiveness	5	Despite of the instable political environment and the rise of workers' strikes, El Mahrousa succeeded to end its APWR project with a number of significant achievements The project contributed to the increased public attention for independent trade unions. According to the embassy the project has been able to achieve much in a relative short time period, the project for instance succeeded in the registration of el-Mahala Independent Trade Union for Textile the first ever independent trade union in the state-owned textile sector. The project also provided the embassy with relevant contacts.
Sustainability	4	Capacity development of Labour unions focused also on legislation to support the financial position of the unions. Success stories show that different local labour unions through technical support from APWR developed some creative tools to increase its financial resources.  The development of end 2013 have led to an increased demand for El Mahrousa's technical, legal, and moral support. MSCD however faces shortage of funding. The organisation established a good relationship with the Ministry of Manpower which invited El Mahrousa to any dialogue concerning labour issues. El Mahrousa is treated as a consultative organization in this regard.

#### Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:

1. General country context (external factors): 4;
2. Complexity of the project environment: 4 (the project itself is politically sensitive although the changing context did not effect project implementation);
3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.

**Overall conclusion:** 3,67

**Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

#### Other comments

The embassy has started a follow up project focused at strengthening the capacity of one labour union.

**Sources of information:**

Project information: Proposal, BEMO, contract, email correspondence, Seven Month Narrative Report, Final narrative report December 2013, Interview Hans Raadschilders (RNE Cairo) and Asmaa Sayed, El Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development (MCSD).

**6) Entrepreneurship Education Programme**

General Information	
Project Name	<b>Entrepreneurship Education Programme</b>
Activity number	25423
Programme component	CSI
Country	Egypt
Implementing organisation	The District Egypt
Type of project	Training and Matchmaking entrepreneurs and investors
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-5-2013-30-6-2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-5-2013-ongoing
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Primary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The District Egypt;</li> <li>• Young entrepreneurs (average 23-35).</li> </ul> Secondary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Investors.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation
<b>Total project budget</b>	
	EUR 280,786
<b>% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding</b>	
	EUR 267,204 (95%) Matra South Programme funding, and EUR 13,582 (5%) own contribution
<b>Amount Committed</b>	
	EUR 267,204
<b>Amount Disbursed</b>	
	EUR 141,054
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
<p>Dissatisfaction with economic perspectives and high levels of unemployment and poverty were one of the reasons for the revolution in Egypt. In order to stimulate economic development it is important to increase employment opportunities and to develop small and medium enterprises. There is a lack of knowledge and skills for enterprise growth and of access to (regional and international) capital, markets and business opportunities. The District aims to fill this gap. It offers a co-working space for young entrepreneurs. This project focuses on developing an Entrepreneurship Support Programme to build the capacity of post start-up (6 months up to 3 years operation) enterprises and enhancing their access to finance.</p>	
Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
<p><b>Goal:</b> Sustainable economic growth.</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> Improved productivity and employment due to the existence of more resilient young and innovative enterprises.</p>	<p><b>Realized outputs:</b></p> <p>1) Improved capacity of post start-up enterprises in Egypt: The main result achieved so far with the project is the delivery of 24 training sessions (one day workshops) to on average of 8 participating entrepreneurs per session, which has improved their capacity.</p>

<p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Improved capacity of post start-up enterprises in Egypt;</li> <li>2) Improved access to finance and (inter)-national markets for post start-up enterprises;</li> <li>3) Improved participation of female entrepreneurs in the transition process.</li> </ol> <p><b>Inputs/activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Needs assessment survey amongst 330 entrepreneurs (220 males &amp; 110 females);</li> <li>• Specific needs assessment study under female entrepreneurs;</li> <li>• Development Training methodology;</li> <li>• Selection and training of trainers;</li> <li>• Selection entrepreneurs to participate in the project;</li> <li>• Implementation of the training programme;</li> <li>• Development of a marketing strategy;</li> <li>• Development of the District Academy webpage;</li> <li>• Launch of the District Academy and press conference;</li> <li>• Development of a matchmaking strategy;</li> <li>• Building of an online community of entrepreneurs and investors;</li> <li>• Training course for potential entrepreneurs for the matchmaking challenge;</li> <li>• Matchmaking meetings between entrepreneurs and investors (local and international investors) (target 10 successful matches);</li> <li>• Organisation of a Matchmaking Challenge;</li> <li>• Development and provision of trainings to female entrepreneurs;</li> <li>• Attracting sponsors for sustainability of the program after 2 years.</li> </ul>	<p>No results have yet been realized for the other outputs.</p> <p><b>Realized activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Needs assessment survey conducted amongst 171 instead of the planned 330 entrepreneurs;</li> <li>• Developed The District Knowledge Space delivering methodology (Knowledge Delivery Guideline);</li> <li>• 7 trainers (entrepreneurs) recruited and trained;</li> <li>• First phase of the training programme implemented (consisting of 24 sessions);</li> <li>• Marketing strategy designed for the District;</li> <li>• Website launched in December 2013;</li> <li>• Around 100 people attended the launch of the District Academy and both local and international media reported on it (Local Youm7 – Scoop empire – Community times – Sada El Balad – AmCham magazine; International: Forbes, Wamda, Reuters, Al Jazeera, Sky news);</li> <li>• Participated in 2 main entrepreneurship related events during Global;</li> <li>• Entrepreneurship Week (RiseUp Egypt Summit, Al Rowad ENCC conference);</li> <li>• Matchmaking strategy developed.</li> </ul>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

The project has encountered several delays due to the political developments from August 2013 on (president Morsi support sit-in). These developments forced the District to delay planned activities for 2 months. Furthermore, given the political unrest it has proven to be more difficult than anticipated to conduct the matchmaking activities. Overall, interest from international investors has proven to be very limited and the planned results relating to the matchmaking activities will, therefore, not likely to be achieved. The District has, therefore, now changed its strategy and will try to focus on first securing one good match with an international investor, which can then be used as showcase example to attract other investors.

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)	
See above	It is too early to identify the contribution of the programme to the specific objectives of the programme component.	
Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)	
See above	It is too early to identify the contribution of the programme to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme.	
DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	4	(Youth) unemployment is one of the reasons of the revolution and political unrest. Therefore, supporting young entrepreneurs with creating viable and innovative businesses that can contribute to sustainable economic growth is very relevant. Furthermore, the project also pays special attention to stimulating female entrepreneurship.
Efficiency	2	The project has experienced various delays. Some of these delays were due to the political unrest in Cairo. Other reasons for the delays encountered are linked to the facts that the implementing organisation is young and quite inexperienced and that various activities proved to be more difficult to implement in practice than what was anticipated beforehand.
Effectiveness	-	It is too early to assess the effectiveness of the programme, also in light of the experienced delays. However, it has already become clear that the project will very likely not be able to achieve its planned results concerning the matchmaking activities. It has proven to be very difficult to find interested investors and the plan to develop an online community of entrepreneurs and investors was, therefore, also dropped. Whether the capacity of post-start up entrepreneurs will be significantly built is not yet certain. The planned outputs in terms of number of entrepreneurs that followed various training sessions are likely to be achieved, but whether the training courses are of sufficient quality to significantly contribute to entrepreneurs' capacity remains to be seen. At the moment the District is still very much working on designing and improving its training courses to make these as relevant as possible.
Sustainability	3	The results achieved in terms of knowledge build amongst the entrepreneurs will be sustainable and contributes to a long-term strengthening of the District community. Furthermore, the aim is that the District can finance the training courses after the lifetime of this project from the fees charged to the participants. At the moment, a fee is already charged for the trainings, but this fee is only 25% of the actual planned fee. It is uncertain whether enough entrepreneurs will prove to be willing to pay the full fee after the lifetime of this project. Other donors/sponsors have not yet been found for the project, but the District itself is likely to continue, including with its training activities.



<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 4</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 4</li> </ol>
<b>Overall conclusion:</b> 3.67
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>
-
<b>Other comments</b>
-
<b>Sources of information:</b>
BEMO; The District Entrepreneurship Support Program Narrative Report Vol. 2, 2014; Other project documents and e-mail communication; Interview with Hans Raadschilders, First Secretary Economic Affairs and Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Egypt; Interview with Mazen Helmy Owis, Managing Director of The District.

## 7) The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Salafism

General Information	
Project Name	<b>The Arab Awakening and the Rise of Salafism</b>
Activity number	25293 (TUN/MZ/03/2013)
Programme component	CSI
Country	Tunisia
Implementing organisation	Université Laval, Canada
Type of project	Research
Planned start date – Planned end date project	15/10/2013 – 31/12/2014
Actual start date – Actual end date project	15/10/2013 – ongoing
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Democratisation process
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Primary: policy-makers and other stakeholders in the region and other interested parties (not specified - see below).
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	NA
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation
Financial information	
Total project budget	EUR 45,378
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100%
Amount Committed	EUR 45,378
Amount Disbursed	EUR 37,000
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
<p>The project aims to provide a better understanding into Salafism (a rising Islamic movement) in the Arab Region by supporting a group of 13 researchers led by the Laval University from Canada in doing further background research. The research will result in a book publication answering four research questions:</p>	

- What explains the emerge of Salafism in contexts where its appeal had seemingly been very marginal or non-existent?
- What are the conditions that lead to choose a specific type of activism (institutional engagement, social activism, political violence)?
- How are the common trends and relations mediated by different national contexts?
- What is the role that Salafism might play during this phase of political change?

Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
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<p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Research by 13 researchers (each researcher responsible for one country + introduction and concluding chapters);</li> <li>• Two-day seminar to discuss each contribution before publication.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• A book publication (number of copies not specified);</li> <li>• A publication in a number of ISI ranked journals (number not specified);</li> <li>• Policy document with recommendations for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide readers with a better understanding of Salafism in the Arab World;</li> <li>• Support policy-makers and other stakeholders in the region and outside in their attempts to formulate policies aimed at stabilising the region.</li> </ul> <p>Acceptance of a publication in an ISI rated journal is outside the direct influence of the researchers, but this is considered feasible.</p>	<p><b>Activities:</b></p> <p>The project contained for 70% fieldwork (interviews, participatory meetings, etc.) and 30% deskwork. In April the final version of the book (and the research) was send to the Publisher. The seminar in Tunis was held in October 2013. One extra chapter about Salafism in Kuwait and thereby researcher was added to the project.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <p>In progress. Following the seminar, all contributors submitted their chapters and a concept of the book (400 pages) has been submitted to the Embassy.</p> <p>According to the author the book will be sold for 25 / 30 euro. The target group is anybody who is interested in the politics of the Middle East. 2,5% per bought book goes to the two editors of the book, the rest of the money goes to the publisher.</p> <p>No outcomes yet.</p>
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To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?
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It is likely that all outputs will be realised within the time frame and budget that has been indicated. Three of the initial identified researchers withdrew from the project and have been replaced. One additional researcher has been added to the project to give special attention to the role Salafism in Kuwait which was no part of the original project design.

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)
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programme component		
The project is initiated by the Laval University and as such has no direct link with the objective of CSI to support projects of civil society organisations that can contribute to democratisation processes, the rule of law and the protection of human rights and economic growth.	While the project does fit under the objectives of Matra South, it doesn't fit clearly under one of the specific Matra South components. The Embassy used the CSI window to fund the project, but there is no realised contribution to the specific Civil Society Initiatives objectives.	
Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)	
Salafism is an important movement in the Matra South target countries. The project supports a better understanding of Salafism that will help to assess which activities will be effective to support democratic transition.	It is likely that the planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme will be realised.  Output 3 in particular - the policy document that is still under progress - will have a specific section with policy recommendations.	
DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	3	A better understanding of Salafism is very relevant in the context of the Arab region. Recent security issues and political murders that are linked to Salafi activists reinforces the need to have a better understanding of the movement. The design of the project is however poorly substantiated. The Project proposal and BEMO doesn't specify how many copies of the book will be published, to whom the books will be distributed and whether the book will be made available free of charge etc. The lack of a good dissemination plan lowers the relevance and the potential impact of the project.
Efficiency	4	The project is most likely to be completed within the available budget and timeframe. The costs are considered reasonable in relation to the achieved outputs. The authors made an in-kind contribution with additional hours spend on the project.
Effectiveness	2	The outputs are likely to be achieved. The quality of (draft) outputs have not yet been assessed. The lack of a good dissemination plan which will support the achievement of the outcomes of the project has led to a low score for effectiveness.
Sustainability	2	In general, as the authors point out, developments go fast in the region and as such there is a risk that information will be superseded in a relatively fast mode. The lack of a good dissemination plan has led to a lower score on sustainability.
Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 2 (the project itself is not politically sensitive nor is it situated in a difficult location);</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 2.</li> </ol>		
Overall conclusion: 2,33		
Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and		

**sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

The project proposal/BEMO gives a clear overview of the rationale of the project but could have provided more details on the actual outputs. E.g.: Outputs have not been quantified (how many books will be published from the budget? How many pages will the book cover, how many articles are aimed for, etc.). Not clear from the BEMO what will happen with the book once published. Will it be distributed for free, to whom, etc. (The book will be published and can be bought at book shops (price: 25 to 30 Euro probably).

All of this has not been specified in advance which is a weakness in the design of the project.

**Sources of information:**

Project documentation: proposal, BEMO, contract and narrative report. Interview with RNE Tunis, Mr. Samir Marmouri (in absence of Ms. Marcha Baak) and Francesco Cavatorta Université Laval, Canada.

**8) The Role of citizenship in promoting the rule of law, transparency and anti-corruption policies**

**Regional Conference**

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>The Role of citizenship in promoting the rule of law, transparency and anti-corruption policies Regional Conference</b>
Activity number	24735
Programme component	CSI
Country	Jordan
Implementing organisation	Visions Center for Strategic and Development Studies (in cooperation with Birzeit University and Cairo University)
Type of project	Conference
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01/11/2012- 28/02/2013
Actual start date – Actual end date project	01/11/2012- 28/02/2013
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Strengthened democratic governance and strengthened rule of law
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Visions Center, Birzeit University and Cairo University;</li> <li>• Members of judicial and legal authorities;</li> <li>• Staff of financial and administrative regulatory bodies;</li> <li>• Members of political parties;</li> <li>• Members of the legislature;</li> <li>• Academic Institutions, Research Institutions/Think Tanks;</li> <li>• CSOs/NGOs/International NGOs/Citizen Associations; and</li> <li>• Media; from Jordan, Israel/Palestine, Egypt, Turkey, Tunisia, Morocco, Lebanon, and the Gulf.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Closed
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 25,858
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% Matra South Programme funding

Amount Committed	EUR 25,858
Amount Disbursed	EUR 23,921
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>Demands for political reform, elimination of corruption, and reduction of poverty are at the forefront of public debates in Jordan since 2011. Various anti-corruption reform attempts have taken place in response to public's demand for holding public officials accountable. However, there is no specific strategy that is underlying these reforms and no involvement of civil society. It is unlikely that transparency, accountability and more in general good governance will be strengthened based on the proposed reforms, due to the lack of political will and lack of citizens' participation. Almost all major files investigated by legal committees at the parliament were closed. That was reportedly due to hesitation in bringing public key figures under investigation. The problems faced in Jordan are very similar to those faced in other MENA countries. Therefore, the project brings together key anti-corruption stakeholders, like decision makers, academic institutions, civil society organisations and the media from the MENA region, for a regional conference on Good Governance, Transparency &amp; Accountability. The conference focuses on defining and developing public transparency and anti-corruption approaches to promote a culture of transparency among public officials and citizens and combat corruption effectively. The conference is a collaborative work between Visions Center, Birzeit University, and Cairo University.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b> Strengthened democratic governance and strengthened rule of law;</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Increased participants' understanding of different concepts of transparency and corruption, the causes or corruption and the best approaches and methods to combat and reduce corruption given the specific political-economy context;</li> <li>2. Strengthened pro-active role for citizens, local communities, and NGOs in the decision making process in promoting transparency and accountability;</li> <li>3. Increased motivation and support for the establishment of the rule of law and implementation of democratic values, norms, and practices.</li> </ol> <p><b>Output:</b> Three day regional conference organised on comparative concepts of transparency, accountability and good governance. Researchers present papers and participants from judicial and legal authorities, government, civil society organizations, and the media engage in open panel discussions.</p> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b> Organisation conference.</p>	<p><b>Realized outcomes:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Participants gained a better understanding of the challenges and possible solutions to the problems of corruption in the Arab world. Various recommendations for anti-corruption measures were produced.</li> </ol> <p><b>Realized outputs:</b> The 2-day regional conference "Enhancing Citizenship in Combating Corruption in the Arab World" was organized, which provided a platform for professionals, activists, politicians, civil servants, and members of civil society to engage in meaningful discussions on corruption. 250 participants attended the conference, both from Jordan (also from local communities) and from the wider MENA region. Various themes were covered including regional experiences in combating corruption, as well as the roles of various societal actors – financial and administrative regulatory bodies, civil society, judiciary, political parties, legislature, media – in addressing corruption.</p>
<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary</b>	

requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?		
The project has achieved its planned outputs.		
Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)	
See above	See above	
Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)	
See above	See above	
DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	3	This conference was relevant as it not only explored the concept of transparency and various anti-corruption approaches but also promoted reflection upon stakeholders' opportunities to promote transparency, accountability and anti-corruption reforms. No dissemination strategy was, however, formulated.
Efficiency	4	The conference was well organized and the organiser managed to attract good international, national and local experts and a wide range of stakeholders.
Effectiveness	3	The envisaged outputs have been achieved but there is no evidence suggesting that the project has significantly contributed to the realization of all envisaged outcomes. This may also be due to the fact that no attention has been given to further dissemination.
Sustainability	3	The participations have been exposed to new ideas and experiences which is sustainable in itself. The conference was not followed-up by any other related activities.
Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 2;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 2.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 2,33</b>		
Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?		
Other comments		
Sources of information:		
Abridged Activity Appraisal Document (BEMO); Project proposal 2012; Activity Assessment; Final Narrative Report; Various other project documents and e-mail correspondence; Interview Lina Baj, Projects Officer, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Jordan.		

## 9) Youth Conference (Part 2)

General Information	
Project Name	<b>Youth Conference (Part 2)</b>
Activity number	25603
Programme component	CSI

Country	Libya
Implementing organisation	No Peace without Justice (INGO), Libyan Youth Union (LYU)
Type of project	Conference
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01/09/2013 – 31/03/2014
Actual start date – Actual end date project	01/09/2013 – 31/03/2014
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Rule of law
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	105 youth representatives (primarily students from Tabrok, Sirte and Sebha), LYU.
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	NA
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Closure
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 50,000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100%
Amount Committed	EUR 50,000
Amount Disbursed	EUR 50,000
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>This project supports the international NGO 'No Peace without Justice' in partnership with the national CSO 'Libyan Youth Union' in organising three workshops on Transitional Justice. The objective of the project is to contribute to the national process of Transitional Justice by disseminating relevant information and promoting youth participation. Through the three events, 105 young activists will be trained and will have the necessary resources to contribute to the Transitional Justice process and multiply the efforts within their communities. The workshops will be held in three different cities in the Western, Eastern and Southern part of Libya. The project is a follow-up to the project 'Youth Conference' (25244) which had a similar set-up but only focussed on Tripoli. The Embassy was satisfied with the results and supports through this project a further role-out in other parts of the country.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	
<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>	
<p><b>Activities:</b> Organise three workshops in Tabrok, Sirthe and Sheba, targeting 35 students each on transitional justice and reconciliation in the period September – December 2013.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b> Increased awareness and knowledge about transitional justice among youth (105 students with proper gender-balance).</p>	<p><b>Activities – largely realised:</b> Workshops were organised in Tobruk for the Eastern part of Libya (14-15 December 2013), Tripoli (9 February 2014) instead of Sheba and Houn for the center-south (22-23 February 2014). The three events attracted a total of 150 participants from across Libya, of which 20% were women.</p> <p><b>Outputs - realised:</b> 150 participants were introduced to key transitional justice concepts and mechanisms. Speakers from Libya and abroad gave examples of transitional justice experiences in other countries, emphasising the importance of such processes in democratic transition and as a path to achieving accountability and reconciliation. Besides the programme included a role play exercise that aimed at encouraging participants to consider different points of view in a post-conflict society and how these reflect on the understanding, perception and implementation of Transitional Justice mechanisms.</p>

<p><b>Outcomes:</b> Youth making a contribution to the national process of transitional Justice.</p>	<p><b>Outcome:</b> The type of activity makes it very difficult to make a judgement on the outcome of the project. The project has made a contribution in the sense that it delivered something new that stimulated the students. However it is difficult to find tangible results. For results more long term support and activities are needed.</p> <p>As a side effect LYU gained knowledge and expertise and has now submitted its own proposal to RNE for support of follow up activities. Similar some of the participants plan to start their own NGO and apply for funding for project focused at the dialogue on reconciliation.</p>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

NPWJ and the LYU envisaged holding the second Youth Day event in the city of Sheba, in the South of the country. However, during the implementation period, the worsening of the security situation in the South, which cut off communications with the city of Sheba for an extensive period of time, represented a real obstacle in the organisation of the event. In coordination with the Dutch Embassy, the organisers decided to hold the second Youth Day at the University of Tripoli. The event in Tripoli tried to attract people from outside, but this was difficult due to war South.

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)
<p>The project fits well under CSI. The project supports two CSOs that support the democratisation processes and the rule of law in Libya.</p> <p>NPWJ also pointed out in the proposal that the project includes capacity building of LYU to increase their skills to organise and manage public events, with the concrete possibility to replicate them in other contexts in the future.</p>	<p>The workshops are perceived to be very successful in bringing the new concept of transitional justice across. They have received enthusiasm and very positive feedback from the participants and have motivated some of the participants to plan follow up activities to support the dialogue on reconciliation. In this sense the project as an unintended consequence contributed to the development of civil society in Libya.</p>

DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	4	The project fits within the Matra South mandate and supports two CSOs in promoting youth participation in the process of Transitional Justice. Youth is an important group in society to trigger change. The project is therefore considered relevant. The project introduced new concepts to the target group in an interactive way which is very important in the Libyan context. The design of the project is straightforward although more emphasis could have been placed on follow-up.
Efficiency	3	The project has been implemented within the available time frame and budget. Due to security issues less youth from outside of Tripoli could be involved. The embassy report a good chemistry between implementing partners.
Effectiveness	4	All three planned workshops have been realised. One location



		of the workshops had to be changed due to security issues. As a consequence the workshop was organised in Tripoli were already a previous event had taken place. The project tried to include participants from outside but succeeded only to a limited extent. The overall number of participants was higher than planned (150 vs 105). The interactive programme gave room for discussions and active participation through role plays. The workshop (method and speakers) received very positive feedback and has led some of the participants to plan for follow up activities. Also LYU has gained expertise and plans for follow up workshops. The likelihood that participating youth will contribute to Transitional Justice is difficult to judge. By definition, the longer term impact of a workshop is hard to measure.
Sustainability	3	The workshop provided for the participants with a first introduction to the concept however for long term effects more building up is required. The project included a follow up on the first conference as participants from the first Youth Conference were also involved in the Conference in Tripoli to share lessons learnt and to give an update on their experiences.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 5;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 4;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 2.</li> </ol> <p><b>Overall conclusion:</b> 3,67</p> <p>The project is a follow-up which makes the level of difficulty lower as lessons learnt from the previous project can be taken into account.</p>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project documentation: Proposal, BEMO and contract, final narrative and financial report, Interview: Mr. Ahmed Shalghoum, Senior Programme Officer, RNE Libya.		

#### 10) Study for the creation of an observatoire for the VSME in Morocco

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Study for the creation of an observatoire for the VSME in Morocco</b>
Activity number	26043
Programme component	CSI
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	la Confédération Générale des entreprises du Maroc (CGEM)
Type of project	Research
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-12-2013-30-11-2014
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-12-2013 – ongoing

Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Very Small Enterprises, Small and Medium Enterprises (VSMEs).</li> </ul> <p><b>Secondary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Private sector: Trade associations, companies that serve VSMEs, investors;</li> <li>Public sector: Ministries, public institutions responsible for the promotion and financing of micro and small enterprises, statistical institutions.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
Total project budget	
Total project budget	EUR 100,000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% Matra South Programme funding
Amount Committed	
Amount Committed	EUR 100,000
Amount Disbursed	
Amount Disbursed	EUR 80,000
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>There is no reliable data in Morocco about Very small, Small and Medium enterprises (VSMEs). International investors, Moroccan enterprises and public organisations have indicated that the lack of statistics on VSME hinders the development of this sector. The establishment of a VSME Observatory can address this gap. It will provide both public and private actors (businesses and investors) with information on the demographics, economic performance and financial condition of micro and small businesses -in both the formal and informal sector- and produce general and thematic studies about this sector. In addition, it will function as a portal for companies and public institutions to get access to VSMEs.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	
<p><b>Goal:</b> Sustainable economic growth.</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> Improved productivity of the VSME sector.</p> <p><b>Output:</b> The establishment of a VSME Observatory that can effectively monitor and assesses the VSME sector and that will provide a portal for companies and public institutions to get access to VSMEs.</p> <p><b>Activities/inputs include:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Drafting and agreeing upon of a legal, financial and technical road map on how to realize the Observatory;</li> <li>Setting up of the structure of the Observatory;</li> </ul>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
	<p>The output has not yet been realized. Very limited information is available on the realized results so far. The main known result achieved is the fact that a mapping was conducted of the available databases, actors etc.</p>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreeing on indicators and collecting of data;</li> <li>• Mapping of available databases, data etc.</li> </ul>	
<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b>	
This is impossible to determine based on the limited amount of information available.	
<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b>
See above	See above
<b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>
See above	See above
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	2 The project seems not very relevant for contributing to the objectives of the Matra South Programme. This because the link between the establishment of the observatory and improving the productivity of the VSME sector (and thus to contributing to economic growth) is rather weak.
Efficiency	- Because of the very limited information available it is impossible to assess this criterion.
Effectiveness	- Because of the very limited information available it is impossible to assess this criterion.
Sustainability	- Because of the very limited information available it is impossible to assess this criterion.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 2;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>	
<b>Overall conclusion: 2,67</b>	
<b>Other comments</b>	
<b>Sources of information:</b>	
BEMO; project proposal; contract; other project documentation; IOB interview notes.	

#### 11) Microbiological Analysis Laboratory (CETIA)

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Microbiological Analysis Laboratory (CETIA)</b>
Activity number	24743
Programme component	CSI
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	Technical Centre for food industries and the National

	Federation of Food, FENAGRI and Centre techniques des Industries Agro-alimentaires (Cetia)
Type of project	Financial contribution
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01/11/2012 – 31/12/2013
Actual start date – Actual end date project	11/2012 – 07/2013
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable Economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	SMEs
Key stakeholders	Technical Centre for food industries and the National Federation of Food, FENAGRI, The Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of industry, business and in this project, the Embassy of the Netherlands.
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	N/A
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	closure
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 226,942
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	32% is funded by the Matra South Programme funding, 42% by MCNET and 19% by CETIA
Amount Committed	EUR 77,678
Amount Disbursed	EUR 77,678
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>The agro industrial branch accounts for 24% of the companies in the industrial sector. The sector faced important challenges as Morocco has established many regulatory standards to ensure food safety and quality in 2010. Particularly SME face financial and / or logistical challenges testing their products. CETIA has requested for co-financing of the establishment of a new microbiological analysis laboratory. This laboratory will offer the industry the necessary analysis and consulting services to certify their food products compliance with the food safety and quality standards are required by the Moroccan- and International regulation. The testing method is similar to the methods used in the European countries. Cetia provides among others services technical assistance, product analysis and training both to private companies and to professional organisations within the agro-industrial sector.</p>	
<p><b>Goal:</b> Contribution to the construction and equipment purchase for a microbiological analysis laboratory of Cetia.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased access of SME in the agro industrial sector to microbiological testing and testing;</li> <li>• Contribute to the compliance of the Moroccan agro food production to the national and international food safety standards and regulations;</li> <li>• Capacity building of Cetia (expansion of the range of value added services provided to SMEs in the sector).</li> </ul> <p><b>Indicators:</b></p>	<p>The funding allowed the technical centre for food industries to use technical analysis to shorten the period necessary to check the food safety. Instead of 4 or 5 days, this is now shortened to 24 hours, saving the industry (and especially small and medium sized firms) both time and money before they can bring their agricultural produce to the market.</p> <p>The method is developed, however it is three times more expensive than the current testing methods. As a results not many firms are using the method. Reasons are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Due to the crisis firms are spending their money rather not on food safety testing methods;</li> <li>• The level of corruption of the state: it is easier to get a health certificate from the NAHO;</li> <li>• The state is not pushing businesses to go and check the food safety quality of their products.</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Construction and equipment purchase;</li> <li>• Accreditation of new laboratory;</li> <li>• Number of tests/ analysis run by new laboratory (In the proposal no number is provided).</li> </ul>	
<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b>	
Project is finalised.	
<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>
The project is initiated by Cetia a non profit association to improve the competitiveness of small and medium sized firms in Morocco. This will potentially support economic growth.	While the method is developed, not many firms are using and benefitting from it.
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b> <b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	2   A testing laboratory itself is relevant considering the new required certification. The design of the project is however not well substantiated a better problem analysis or need assessment might have shown the issues at stake (and market potential) and might have led to a different design of the project.
Efficiency	3   The project seems to be implemented in an efficient way.
Effectiveness	2   The Laboratory was established as planned, however not many firms are using or benefitting from it.
Sustainability	-   In future the laboratory might prove to be very relevant for SME development in Morocco, but at present no long term effects can be expected.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>	
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3,25;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 4;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>	
<b>Overall conclusion: 3,35</b>	
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>	
The project proposal did not contain a good problem analysis or need assessment and no smart indicators related to the use of the laboratory were formulated. A more critical assessment of the project proposal good have been beneficial for the set up of the project.	
<b>Other comments</b>	
<b>Sources of information:</b>	
Project file: BEMO, proposal, assessment. IOB notes interview Cetia. It has not been possible to interview the implementing organisation specifically for this project .	

## 12) Pilot Carbon Footprint Project

### General Information

Project Name	<b>Pilot Carbon Footprint Project</b>
Activity number	PSI12/MA/02
Programme component	PSI
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	Van Kester – Grootscholten Beheer BV (Kesgro)
Type of project	Horticulture – Fruits and vegetables
Planned start date – Planned end date project	July 1 2012 – June 30 2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	July 1 2012
Modality	Subsidy
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementing organisations (Kesgro and Societe de Production Maraicher SAMIR Sarl -SPMS);</li> <li>• Employees of SPSM;</li> <li>• Local supplier of the tomato on the vine;</li> <li>• Local horticultural companies;</li> <li>• Contracted farmers.</li> </ul> <p><b>Secondary:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Local suppliers;</li> <li>• Local consumers/ clients;</li> <li>• Clients (NL);</li> <li>• Students agricultural schools/ universities (internships).</li> </ul>
Key stakeholders	Kesgro, SPMS, van Oers United
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	NA
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	1.500.000 EUR
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	750.000 EUR under PSI/MATRA 50% Matra; 50% other sources
Amount Committed	750.000 EUR
Amount Disbursed	324.595 EUR
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>A joint venture of Kesgro and SPMS plans to establish a state-of-the-art modern greenhouse of 5 ha near Agadir for the cultivation of tomatoes on the vine. Both partners are horticultural growers. The applicant is a large tomato on the vine grower in the Netherlands. This is a chance for them to serve their clients year-round with tomatoes on the vine with less energy cost. The local partner grows green beans and sweet peppers near Agadir and wishes to diversify its production with tomatoes. The new greenhouse is to be designed to minimise the carbon footprint of greenhouse growing, including solar water heaters. Biological pest control is to be used and the transport of the tomatoes will be done by ship. Water wastage will be minimised because the tomatoes on the vine are grown in coco fibres with a closed water system. The project is planned to set an example for environmentally friendly production methods in a modern greenhouse, minimising the carbon footprint of tomato growing.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realised project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<b>Goal:</b> The set up of a high tech and environmentally friendly greenhouse of 5 ha to grow tomatoes on the vine for export to Europe.	The joined venture is established. The new greenhouse is constructed and 100 employees (of 50% female) are hired and trained. Besides a number of jobs have been created

<p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased youth and women employment;</li> <li>• Increased local attention for and knowledge on food safety standards and environmental standards in producing of tomatoes (vegetables);</li> <li>• Increased productivity / Tomatoes on the vine as export product (annually 1530 ton tomatoes are exported to Europe).</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <p>Total production of 1150 tomatoes on the vine with a turnover of 1.033000EUR, with the introduction of the following aspects coco fibres; water recycling; biological pest control; bumblebees:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 87 employees contracted of 62 are female and 51 younger than 25 with salaries ta least 60% above minimum wage;</li> <li>• 87 employees trained in line with training programme;</li> <li>• 10 horticultural companies trained on food safety and certification;</li> <li>• Greenhouse of 5 ha. constructed and solar panels placed;</li> <li>• Joint venture between Kesgro and SPMS.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Establishment of joint venture;</li> <li>• Production and sale of tomatoes on the vine;</li> <li>• Recruitment and training of employees;</li> <li>• Procurement of the equipment;</li> <li>• Training of horticultural companies.</li> </ul>	<p>at the local suppliers of the company.</p> <p>Currently about 500.000 kg has been produced of which 70% is of good quality.</p> <p>At present the production technique has been adapted well to the local circumstances. At the start of the production phase the project experienced some quality problems due to fungus but these were resolved. The tomatoes have mostly been sold locally due to the European export quotas (and low prices). Consequently the turnover is lower than expected.</p>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

At the start the project experienced some delay due to the required permits for the establishment of the joint venture. According to the implementing partners the project is currently on course to achieve its planned results. Nevertheless turnover at the moment is lacking behind due to the low value of tomatoes in Europe. It is indicated that this is an exceptional situation, normally the tomatoes will provide sufficient turnover. Both the PSI advisor and the Dutch partner indicate that there is a strong commitment of the both partners which is a necessary requirement for achieving the results aimed at. Another potential obstacle are the frequent unrest under employees in the area (South Morocco). The local partner however has a successful company in the area and is experienced in handling these issues.

<p><b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and overall objectives of the Matra South programme</b></p>	<p><b>Realised contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences) and overall objective of the Matra South programme</b></p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased youth and women employment;</li> </ul>	<p>The project contributes to youth employment, including women's employment and is currently employing in total 100 employees of which 50</p>
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Increased local attention for and knowledge on food safety standards and environmental standards in producing of tomatoes (vegetables);</li> <li>Increased sustainable productivity of tomatoes on the vine and export to Europe.</li> </ul>	<p>are female and 75 are youth. Through these employees who receive a wage above the minimum wage in the agricultural sector the project will also impact their family members.</p> <p>The project is to produce tomatoes at a sustainable and environmentally friendly way. A potential spill over effect (on the sector) is foreseen as the production techniques are innovative for the sector. The high tech greenhouse with energy and water saving measures and improved production levels will set an example for other growers in the region of Agadir. Other growers will be trained in cultivation practices and food safety. It is however expected that only part of the production process will be copied by other companies. A production facility is expensive and it is difficult to access funds for agriculture in morocco.</p>
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DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	4	The project introduces a sustainable and environmental friendly way of producing tomatoes on the vine to the Moroccan tomato sector This is also relevant because of the water shortage in the region. The Dutch partner KESGRO has long standing experience in growing tomatoes on the vine whilst its local partner has experience in the region with vegetable greenhouses tailing. The partners have tested various types of tomatoes on the farm of the partner before the start of the project and application. The local partner is very actively involved in the implementation of the project. The project aims to create a considerable amount of jobs, including for women and youth. The project also matches the ambition of the Moroccan government as Morocco has just signed the agriculture free trade agreement with the EU and is aiming at developing its exports of fruits/ vegetables to Europe and quality of these exports.
Efficiency	3	The first phase of the project was delayed by two months. The fact that the NL partner was in charge of all the paperwork instead of the local partner (which is normally the case in projects) could have contributed to this. Initial problems with the quality of tomatoes have been resolved and the project (production) is expected to get back on track. Foreseen capacity of hardware is sufficient to achieve production results proposed and applicant provide the needed knowledge and clients.
Effectiveness	3	The project has contracted and trained more employees than planned, although the total number of female employees (50) is less than planned. Productivity of good quality tomatoes on the vine is lacking behind as is revenue to the low prices (and quota) in Europe. This is however an temporary exceptional situation according to the implementing partner. At this stage of the project nothing can be said about possible spill over effects.
Sustainability	3	The Dutch partner brings in long standing experience in the sector whilst the local partner has a successful business in the region. A large number of training days, including on maintenance are foreseen. The contract foresees follow up investments worth 2,5 million in the first two years after the amount of subsidy has been determined to expand the company. This will however depend on the profitability of the company.

Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:



1. General country context (external factors): 3;
2. Complexity of the project environment: 4 (Potential challenges are unrest under employees in the region. Southern Region has experienced uprisings among employees. Trade Unions are very active as well. Important to take this into account);
3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.

**Overall conclusion:** 3,33

**Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

This is the first PSI (or foreign) project of the NL partner. The first delays may have been prevented with more support from project advisor or contacts/ experiences from other companies. Meetings with companies implementing projects in the same country of region to be organised by PSI could support the effective implementation of these projects.

**Sources of information:**

Documentation RVO/PSI, including proposal and progress reports. Interview Marjolein Vinke, project advisor Morocco PSI and Ad Kester van Van Kester – Grootscholten Beheer BV (Kesgro).

**13) Fighting the housing deficit with modular solutions in Morocco**

General Information	
Project Name	<b>Fighting the housing deficit with modular solutions in Morocco</b>
Programme component	PSI
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	Nagabouw BV
Type of project	Construction / housing
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1 July 2013 - 31 December 2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	Augustus 2013
Modality	Subsidy
Thematic focus/transition issues	Economic Growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementing organisations;</li> <li>• Nagabouw;</li> <li>• Local partner: Helya development;</li> <li>• Sismo (company and inventor of the applied technique).</li> </ul> <p>Secondary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Other local construction companies;</li> <li>• Technical school in Morocco;</li> <li>• Suppliers (European and local);</li> <li>• Subcontractor;</li> <li>• End users: families and individuals.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	Other similar activities are unknown. The project is in line with government priorities regarding combatting housing deficit.
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation
Financial information	
Total project budget	1.442.200 EUR
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	Subsidy: 721.100 EUR 50% PSI – 50% Project Partner

Amount Committed	721.100 EUR
Amount Disbursed	252.385 EUR
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>Nagabouw B.V., an engineering company from the Netherlands, and Helya Sarl, a real estate and building company in Morocco, jointly plan to introduce an innovative building technique in Morocco in order to contribute to the huge demand for quality houses in Morocco. The modular building system, called the Sismo building system, results in shorter building time – up to a time reduction of 50% – and good quality houses. The project is innovative because of the building process introduced and the quality of the product delivered. Besides the realisation of turn key houses and apartments both in the social and commercial sector, the partners will also produce modular building components for third parties in the building sector. These parties will be trained to use the new building method. The production facility is located in Tangiers and has a capacity of about 800 houses/apartments a year.</p> <p>In time, they want to offer the machine capacity for Sismo system building (which is owned by the project) to trained subcontractors to enable them to start building with the same building techniques.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b> The establishment of a production facility for a modular building system (Sismo system) which can produce building materials for about 800 houses/apartments a year.</p> <p><b>Main outcomes:</b> Increased productivity in housing construction sector; increased employment in construction sector; knowledge sharing on construction techniques with other construction companies and technical school. The project aims to create 60 jobs and an additional 182 jobs for subcontractors.</p> <p><b>Main outputs:</b> Joint Venture; Training core team (11 employees; Training of other employees (36);factory hall and processing line; realization of a total production of 80 social housing and 80 middle segment housing, 1540 modules for third parties products and 5.196.188 EUR of sales.</p> <p><b>Main activities:</b> Business establishment; pilot project building; training core team; establishment production infrastructure; production and integration of sub-contractor and knowledge sharing.</p>	<p>Joint venture is established and the procedure to obtain a land permit is almost finalised. This is expected to be finalised in July.</p> <p>When this is realised, building of the factory hall and pilot (demo house) will be started. Then employees can be hired as well.</p>
<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b>	
The project is in its second phase. The first phase (establishment of joint venture) was completed before the	

deadline, which can be explained by the fact that the partners have been collaborating for a long time already. The second phase of the project should be finished by the end of August 2014. The project is expected to suffer some delay in completing this phase that includes pilot project building, contraction of employees, sign long-term land agreement for the construction of the building, first demo building project built. The main causes will be the delays in obtaining the land-agreement and building permits. The land-agreement is expected to be finalised in July. Therefore the pilot project has not been built yet and no employees are hired yet. An important driver is the commitment of the implementing parties which is according to the PSI advisor and the Dutch partners very much present in this project. For example, the local partner was (and is) highly involved in the design and implementation of the project. Besides one of the NL partners (Nagabouw) will be based at the project site for a longer time (80% of the in year in Morocco).

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Innovative business established; employment created (60 jobs of which 6 are women and indirectly another 182 jobs);</li> <li>CSR policy (although limited) will be implemented.</li> </ul> <p>Contribution to economic growth:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Impact on local suppliers (almost everything supplied locally);</li> <li>Increased production of quality houses;</li> <li>Spill over effect on subcontractors and other construction companies.</li> </ul>	<p>Despite the expected delay in the second phase the project is expected to achieve its planned results. The technique is innovative and the partners have the relevant experience. The construction sector is traditionally dominated by male workers. This project is planned to employ 10% women, in total six women, of whom two on high level.</p> <p>Actual spill-over effect on the sector is less predictable. Although the impact on other commercial parties in the sector could be large since the joint venture will make the technology available to other construction companies: they are able to buy and use the innovative construction modules from the joint venture.</p>
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DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	4	<p>The partnership is considered to be strong, with active involvement of the local partner and the business plan is sufficiently elaborated. Addressing the housing deficit is in line with the local needs and government policy. The projects aims to increase productivity and youth employment in the housing construction market. Less attention is given to women's employment, which can be explained by the sector's character. The project is relevant because of the huge housing deficit in Morocco: the supply is not sufficient to meet the demand and housing quality is generally poor.</p> <p>This project will introduce a modular building method which is faster than traditional building and at the same time gives high quality houses in different price ranges, including social housing.</p>
Efficiency	3	The first result was completed before the planned official deadline.

		Delays are expected in achieving second result (mainly because of local contextual issues which seem not exceptional). No delays are expected for the subsequent phases. The implementing organisations are experienced companies and partners and the technology has been commercially proven in other countries. According to PSI the objectives are realistic.
Effectiveness	-	The project has not yet started to employ staff so it is considered too early to assess effectiveness. According to the APSI a considerable high number of and a large impact on suppliers is planned for and expected. No CSR spill over effect is included and the estimated employment opportunities women – seems rather low. Effect on productivity is expected to be large since the project introduces an innovative product and other local companies can benefit from this.
Sustainability	3	Based on the business plan the project will be sustainable. Both companies have sufficient expertise and are very much committed. Nevertheless the success of the business is very dependent of external factors such as prices of commodities.

**Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:**

1. General country context (external factors): 3;
2. Complexity of the project environment: 3;
3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.

**Overall conclusion: 3**

**Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?**

**Other comments**

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**Sources of information:**

Documentation RVO/PSI, including proposal, advise and progress reports, Interview Marjolein Vinke, project advisor Morocco PSI and Hans Dekker Nagabouw.

**14) Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from Tunisia**

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from Tunisia</b>
Activity number	PSI12/TN/01
Programme component	PSI
Country	Tunisia
Implementing organisation	Kwekerij van Antwerpen van Veen BV / AgroCare
Type of project	Agriculture
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-7-2012 - 30-6-2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-7-2012 –ongoing
Modality	Subsidy
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Primary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Kwekerij van Antwerpen van Veen BV / AgroCare;</li> <li>• GAPRIM.</li> </ul> Secondary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TNI;</li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Greenpack;</li> <li>Grow Tunesia SARL and other (international) suppliers.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	N.A.
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 1,495,500
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	EUR 748,250 (50% Matra South Programme funding, 50% own funding)
Amount Committed	EUR 748,250
Amount Disbursed	EUR 433,985
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>The Dutch tomato grower Kwekerij van Antwerpen - Van Veen was looking for alternative winter production locations to benefit from the increasing demand for tomatoes in wintertime in Europe. After having studied several locations, management decided that Tunesia offered the best opportunities to develop a winter garden. During a trade mission they met the local partner GAPRIM who cultivates tomatoes, melons and watermelons in a plastic greenhouse. Both companies agreed to cultivate the tomato variety pomo dolce, which is a new variety for Tunisia. These tomatoes will be grown in a climate controlled greenhouse of 25.000 m2 based on the Agro Care holistic crop management system and with the use of an efficient water management system. This production is new for Tunisia. The products will be GlobalGAP, Tesco and USDA Organic Label certified. Marketing, sales planning, logistics, packaging and distribution will be organised in cooperation with companies linked to Agro Care.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b> The aim of the project is to contribute to sustainable economic growth through the installation of a climate controlled greenhouse of 2.5 hectare to grow pomo dolce tomatoes for the export to the EU.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b> <i>Increased productivity and profits:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>470,000 kg of pomo dolce tomatoes will be produced annually for the export to the EU; the average estimated price the joint venture will receive for the product is EUR 2.50 per kilo and the annual turnover more than EUR 1,000,000. Annual inputs from suppliers will amount to a value of EUR 205,000. The owner of the local company can, furthermore, apply the knowledge gained about holistic crop management in his current company to increase its profitability.</li> </ul> <p><i>Increased decent employment/work opportunities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>90 jobs (full time and seasonal) will be created at the end of the project (of which</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outcomes:</b> <i>Increased productivity and profits:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>400,000 kg of pomo dolce tomatoes are produced for export to the EU; the average price received is EUR 1.50 per kilo. The lower price received than expected is due to quality and marketing problems. The owner of the local company has applied the knowledge gained about holistic crop management in his current company to increase its profitability.</li> </ul> <p><i>Increased decent employment/work opportunities:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>92 jobs (full time and seasonal) have been created (of which 52 for women and 60 for young people). Employees and other growers and stakeholders have benefited from knowledge sharing (100 people in total). The salaries paid to employees are around 15% above the required minimum and bonuses are given based on performance as well as free Saturdays. Medical care is provided to the employees 3x a year.</li> </ul> <p><i>Increased local attention for CSR, gender and environmental policies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Have received the Global GAP certification and the fairtrade certification.</li> </ul>

<p>80 for women and 72 for young people). Employees and other growers and stakeholders will receive training. The salaries the employees will receive are above average (at least 15%) and extra benefits are offered like training in English language, computer skills and childcare.</p> <p><i>Increased local attention for CSR, gender and environmental policies:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The joint venture will lead to increased local attention for environmental policies in the sense that the irrigation system will be closed, organic waste will be recycled, water use will be efficient, CO2 will be compensated by planting trees, the company will be Global GAP certified and achieve TESCO Nurture standard.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs:</b> Key outputs include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A) joint venture established;</li> <li>B) Greenhouse complex established, systems installed and facilities equipped, staff hired and trained;</li> <li>C) Desert Joy tomatoes harvested, exported and marketed in Europe; Global GAP certified;</li> <li>D) Desert Joy study club and Tunisian Tomato Growers Association founded;</li> <li>E) Organization achieved TESCO NURTURE standard TN10.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b> Key activities include: registering the joint venture; building the greenhouse; purchasing the necessary equipment; contracting staff; training staff; growing, harvesting and marketing the tomatoes; implementing the Tesco nurture regulations; establishing the Tunesian Tomato Growers Association Founded to promote Tunesian tomatoes and represent their interest local and international.</p>	<p><b>Outputs realized:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A) joint venture established;</li> <li>B) Greenhouse complex established, systems installed and facilities equipped, 92 staff hired (52 women; 60 young people); 6 people trained in the Netherlands for several weeks, other staff trained on the job;</li> <li>C) Desert Joy tomatoes harvested, exported and marketed in Europe; Global GAP certified;</li> <li>D) Informal knowledge exchange with 3 local growers takes place, but the Desert Joy study club and Tunisian Tomato Growers Association will not be established;</li> <li>E) Organization will not get the TESCO NURTURE standard TN10 (was too expensive).</li> </ul> <p>The production site has been expanded with 5ha.</p> <p>A foundation has been established that is managed by elected employees that will allocate 10% of the fairtrade annual revenues to projects that will directly benefit the employees (e.g on healthcare, education etc.) Till this date no fairtrade tomatoes have yet been sold.</p>
<p><b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b></p>	
<p>It took more time than anticipated to create a good quality product. In addition, it took some time to arrive at an efficient logistical process. It has, furthermore, proven to be difficult to market the product well in the EU, as there is not yet a lot of interest in the product. Finally, employees' propensity to strike is a potential obstacle. By offering above average working conditions, Agro Care aims to keep their employees satisfied and minimize the risks of a strike. Despite the complications faced, the project is on course to achieve its main planned results.</p>	
<p><b>Planned contribution to the specific</b></p>	<p><b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b></p>

<b>objectives of the programme component</b>		
See above	See above	
<b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>	
See above	See above	
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	3	The project is not really innovative as many tomatoes are grown in Tunisia. In addition it is questionable whether the project could not have been commercially financed (especially given the fact that already during the lifetime of the project FMO financed an extension of the project). Nevertheless, the project does contribute to sustainable economic growth and to considerable employment of women and youth (90 people in total, of which 80 women and 72 youth; 5 women will be placed in medium/high level positions).
Efficiency	3	While some delays have been experienced, the project is efficiently managed.
Effectiveness	3	The project is on course to achieve the main –but not all- results planned.
Sustainability	4	The production site has already been expanded with 5ha, which clearly signals the confidence and long-term commitment of Agrocare and investors in the project.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 3</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project documents RVO including the project application/proposal, project assessment, project approval document, the first progress report, the RVO monitoring report (15-4-2014); Interview with van Antwerpen; Interview with Eugene Gies, Project officer PSI-facility, RVO.		

#### 15) Breeding of disease tolerant vegetable seed

<b>general information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Breeding of disease tolerant vegetable seed</b>
Activity number	PSI13/JO/01
Programme component	PSI
Country	Jordan
Implementing organisation	Gebroeders Bakker Zaadteelt en Zaadhandel B.V.
Type of project	Agriculture
Planned start date – Planned end date project	1-7-2013 – 30-6-2016

Actual start date – Actual end date project	1-7-2013 – ongoing
Modality	Subsidy
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p>Primary beneficiaries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gebroeders Bakker Zaadteelt en Zaadhandel B.V. and Alqabas Agricultural Co.</li> </ul> <p>Secondary beneficiaries:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Farmers (out growers);</li> <li>Agricultural faculty of the University of Amman;</li> <li>Future employees;</li> <li>Tomato and eggplant consumers in Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan and Syria.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	N.A.
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 964,300
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	EUR 482,150 (50% Matra South Programme funding, 50% own funding)
Amount Committed	482,150
Amount Disbursed	192,861
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>The pest "Tuta absoluta" is a serious problem for tomato growers in the Middle East and Northern Africa. Chemical control measures are often not very effective against this pest in the region. Tomato is the main agricultural export product of Jordan. Therefore, the Gebroeders Bakker Zaadteelt en Zaadhandel B.V has proposed to develop a hybrid tomato variety that is tolerant for this pest. For similar reasons, the company has proposed to develop an egg plant variety that is Fusarium resistant. The breeding program will be undertaken in Jordan where a seed breeding station will be set-up. The establishment of this seed breeding centre in Jordan is innovative as other breeding companies in the region do not breed these hybrid seeds (as they are connected to/ part of producers of agrochemicals). The applicant "Gebroeders Bakker Zaadteelt en Zaadhandel B.V" is an experienced seed breeding company in The Netherlands, which will work together with the local partner "Alqabas Agricultural Co" who is active in mainly trade and services for the poultry industry in the region and has a small department concerned with seed potatoes.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b> The aim of the project is to contribute to sustainable economic growth by establishing a seed breeding centre in Jordan for initially breeding Tuta absoluta tolerant tomato varieties and a Fusarium resistant eggplant variety.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b> <i>Increased productivity and profits:</i> Approximately 870 kilogram of hybrid tomato seed and 846 kilogram eggplant seed are aimed to be produced annually. These seeds</p>	<p>All planned outputs for the period between 1 July 2013-31 December 2013 have been realized according to schedule. The key planned and achieved outputs for this period was the establishment of the joint venture and the completion of the design of the greenhouse facility and engineering plan.</p>



will be distributed by the local partner. The seeds will improve farmers' productivity without needing to implement chemical control measures.

*Increased decent employment/work opportunities:*

- A) 21 jobs (fte) will be created at the end of the project (of which 5 for women and 9 for young people). All of these employees will receive training, will receive fringe benefits like health insurance, and will be paid at least at the level of living wages. Furthermore, safety standards will be assured by implementing ISTA and ISF safety standards;
- B) 10 outgrowers will be contracted to test the hybrid seeds. These outgrowers will receive a fair fixed amount for their services and are entitled to the profit received from selling their harvest.

*Increased knowledge transfer:* The knowledge of seed breeding will be transferred from the Gebroeders Bakker Zaaeteelt en Zaadhandel B.V to the local partner in Jordan and the Agricultural faculty of the University of Amman.

*Positive impact on the environment:* The project will contribute to a reduction in farmers' needs of chemical pest control products.

**Outputs:**

Key outputs include:

- A) joint venture established;
- B) seed breeding station designed, established and operational;
- C) New seed varieties registered.

**Activities/inputs:**

Key activities include: registering the joint venture, renting land, building the greenhouse, purchasing the necessary equipment, contracting staff and farmers, training staff and farmers, training of farmers, registering seed varieties, drafting business plan, producing seeds, and undertaking an advertising campaign.

<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b>		
The project is implemented according to schedule and no major obstacles are foreseen.		
<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b>	
See above	See above	
<b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>	
See above	See above	
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	4	The business plan is sound but ambitious. A main risk is a possible delay in the development process of the seeds. The local partner has an important role in the implementation of the project and local ownership is high. The project is innovative and addresses important local needs as the problems of pest are significant, chemical control is not effective in this region and other breeding companies do not breed hybrid seeds as they are connected to/ part of producers of agrochemicals. The project contributes to sustainable economic growth as the local partner will have the new economic opportunity to market these hybrid seeds and farmers can use these seeds to improve their production without using chemical control measures. Furthermore, decent employment opportunities will increase (approx. 21 jobs are envisaged to be created by the end of the project, of which 5 will be fulfilled by women and 9 by young people) and important knowledge of seed breeding will be transferred to key partners in Jordan.
Efficiency	3	Activities have been implemented according to plan.
Effectiveness	N.A.	The project has only been implemented for one year so it's too early to assess its effectiveness.
Sustainability	N.A.	The project has only been implemented for one year so it's too early to assess its sustainability.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 3</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project documents RVO including the project application/proposal, project assessment, project approval document, and the first progress report (16-1-2014). Interview Arie Bijl, Project officer PSI-facility, RVO.		

## 16) Improving Road Safety in Morocco

General Information	
Project Name	Improving Road Safety in Morocco
Activity number	G2G13/MR/2/1
Programme component	G2G
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	RDW - Rijksdienst voor het Wegverkeer SWOV - institute for Road Safety research the Netherlands
Type of project	capacity building
Planned start date – Planned end date project	October 1 2013 - January 1 2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	October 1 2013
Modality	Project support, twinning
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic development (infrastructure)
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p>Primary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>National Committee for the Prevention of Road Traffic Accidents (CNPAC);</li> <li>Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport Morocco.</li> </ul> <p>Secondary:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Interdepartmental permanent committees and regional road safety;</li> <li>The Comité Inter-ministeriel of the security Routière (IRB) presided by the Prime Minister;</li> <li>The Permanent Committee of Security Routière (CPSR), presided by the Minister of Infrastructure and Transport;</li> <li>The Committees of Regional Security Routière (CRSR) presided by the Walis of each region.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	World bank grant for capacity building provided to CNPAC. Options for cooperation investigated (to avoid overlap) with this initiative and other initiatives (capacity review/ feasibility study University).
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation
Financial information	
Total project budget	149.306 EUR
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% (The counterpart has taken care of the costs for accommodation/ catering of the workshops and translation costs)
Amount Committed	146.000 EUR
Amount Disbursed	58.400 EUR (as of May 2014). Next payment is due with the submitted interim report
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
<p>Historic figures of road safety in Morocco show that over the period 2002 – 2012 registered road crashes have increased from 52137 to 67151, an increase of 29% (Ministere de L'Equipement et du Transport, 2012). Over the same period the number of fatalities have increased from 3761 to 4167, an increase of 11%. Morocco has recognized the need to improve the road safety situation and has developed a concept road safety strategy 2013 — 2016 which provides the strategic orientation. CNPAC is one of key organisations responsible for ultimately implementing the strategy, specifically the issues relating to Public awareness and communication; Road safety education; and Research and development. During the Moroccan trade mission to the Netherlands</p>	

in March 2013, a delegation of the Moroccan Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and the National Committee for the Prevention of Road Traffic Accidents (CNPAC) visited the Dutch Institute for Road Safety Research (SWOV), the Dutch vehicle and driving license registration authority (RDW) and the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. Following the request from CNPAC the Netherlands Enterprise Agency was approached via the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Economic Affairs to provide the necessary funding. This culminated in a project proposal being developed by SWOV, RDW and CNPAC.

Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realised project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
<p><b>Goal:</b> Contribute to the execution and implementation of the recently approved Moroccan Road safety Strategy for the period 2013-2016 to improve the road safety situation in Morocco, through the transfer of knowledge and various capacity building activities.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contributed to improved road safety management and expertise;</li> <li>• Contributed to better enforcement of road safety policy.</li> </ul> <p><b>Outputs</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Review of road safety management in Morocco, plans and targets of all levels of government, including the (Traffic)police;</li> <li>• Review and refinement of the monitoring, assessment and evaluation capabilities and targets;</li> <li>• Development and identification of Key Performance Indicators and Key Result Areas for improved monitoring, assessment and evaluation of road safety management and law enforcement activities;</li> <li>• Knowledge and best practices transfer when possible;</li> <li>• Recommendations for improvement of the Moroccan road safety situation on the "Road Safety".</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Start up road safety seminar;</li> <li>• Capacity building and training activities;</li> <li>• Study visit to the Netherlands. February 2014;</li> <li>• Development of two workshops / training sessions (Train the Trainer) Rabat, May-Oct 2014; the final workshop will be organized in cooperation with the Dutch Embassy.</li> </ul>	<p>The different workshops and study visit of Moroccan civil servants to the Netherlands except the final workshop planned for October 2014 are implemented.</p> <p>The study visit to the Netherlands provided the opportunity to included all organisations (including the police). The study was adapted to allow for the participation of more participants for a shorter timeframe. The evaluation of the visit was very positive. According to the project leader the Dutch example of cooperation between different organisation in the area of road safety has led too a lot of positive energy among the Moroccan participants. Several collaborations between different Moroccan institutions are already visible.</p> <p>Currently all review activities are finalised and a research and Development framework focusing on monitoring, assessing and evaluating the efficacy of road safety management, enforcement and vehicle and driver testing and registration training is being drawn up.</p>
<p><b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b></p>	

The project experienced some delays in the first phases which caused a delay of the study visit (4 months). According to the project leader the project is now again on track to achieve its planned results. The final workshop will be organised in October 2014 in Rabat.

The RVO advisor and the project leader report a clear commitment from the Moroccan side/ counterpart. Collaboration between the different Moroccan organisations involved is key for the success of the project. It is felt that the counterpart with his large network and ability to enthuse people is able has been able to establish cooperation between the different institutions.

Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component	Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The project intends to improve quality of public service management and delivery of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Transport and partners of road safety in Morocco;</li> <li>G2G relations RDW and other institutions involved.</li> </ul>	<p>The project seems to be on course to contribute improved road safety management. Contacts between RDW and its Moroccan counterpart have been established whilst participants from various road related ministries and organizations from Morocco have met their counterparts during the study trip to the Netherlands. Moreover good relations between the Netherlands Embassy and the Ministry have been established.</p>
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Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme	Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)
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<p>There is no direct link between road safety and the overall objectives of the Matra South programme. According to the 'adviesplan' improved road safety will contribute to building of the rule of law.</p>	<p>According to the project leader a additional objective of the project was to create possibilities for the Netherlands businesses. The project has led to specific contacts for Dutch companies (e.g. speed camera's) which have been involved in special meet &amp; greet activities.</p>
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DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
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Relevance	2	The project is very relevant for the Moroccan context. There has been an active involvement and commitment of the Moroccan counterpart both in formulation and implementation. Only in the inception phase it was discovered that the World bank had provided a grant for capacity building. Nevertheless the absence of a direct link with the overall objectives of the Matra South programme lowers the score for relevance.
Efficiency	4	The project has some initial delays but is on course to achieve its deadlines. According to the project advisor the initial project planning was very ambitious. The project partners have very pragmatically used the opportunities within the budget (e.g cheaper flight tickets offered the opportunity for an additional visit during Women's day).
Effectiveness	4	The results are likely to be achieved. The different respondents are very positive about the final outcomes. It is too early to assess the outcomes and potential impact but collaboration and improved contacts between different organisations are visible. The project leader together with the Embassy have been able to create more spin off for the project by generating media attention and involving 'Blik op de weg' for a special in Morocco.

Sustainability	4	Road safety is very much a priority area for the Moroccan government. The Moroccan counterparts have been very committed and involved and it can be expected that the R&D plan developed will be implemented. The overview of the road safety data can be used for enforcement activities although it needs to be updated in future.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 2 (the project itself is not politically sensitive nor is it situated in a difficult location);</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 4.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 3</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
<b>Other comments</b>		
As part of the assignment the implementing organisation is requested to identify opportunities for Dutch companies. It could be argued if these kind of activities should be part of a G2G project.		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project file including activity plan and inception plan. Interviews with RVO advisor Aafke Wortelboer and Arjan van Vliet RDW.		

#### 17) CNDH / Mensenrechten gevangeniswezen

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>CNDH / Mensenrechten gevangeniswezen</b>
Activity number	G2G12MR21
Programme component	G2G
Country	Morocco
Implementing organisation	DJI (Custodial Institutions Agency) Ministry of Security and Justice, Prison Watch, Prof. dr. Martin Kuijer
Type of project	Capacity building
Planned start date – Planned end date project	12-2012 – 05-2013
Actual start date – Actual end date project	12-2012 – ongoing
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Strengthen rule of law and the protection of human rights
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<p><b>Primary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Staff and members of the National Human Rights Council (CNDH) and its 13 regional Human Rights commissions.</li> </ul> <p><b>Secondary beneficiaries:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prisoners.</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation phase
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 116,344
% Matra South Programme funding, and %	100% Matra South Programme funding

other sources' funding	
Amount Committed	EUR 116,344
Amount Disbursed	EUR 76,479
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>The National Human Rights Council (CNDH) was established in 2002 with the aim to strengthen the commitment of the Kingdom of Morocco to protect human rights and respect its international obligations. The CNDH is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the human rights situation at the national and regional level. It, furthermore, investigates human rights violations, coordinates activities linked to the implementation of the ratified international human rights conventions, and organises training and awareness programs concerned with international humanitarian law. It has 13 regional human rights commissions who monitor the human rights situation at the regional level and have the mandate to receive and investigate complaints in their regions. The Moroccan Parliament approved the ratification of the UN Protocol to the Convention Against Torture (OPCAT). The ratification of this protocol requires the creation of a 'national preventive mechanism' (NPM), which is a monitoring body that visits places of detention on a regular basis to prevent torture and ill-treatment. In 2011 the government announced its intentions to designate the CNDH as NPM. In order to be prepared for this function and to be better able to monitor prisons more in general, the CNDH informed the Dutch Embassy that it would like to benefit from the expertise of the Netherlands. Expertise is especially needed with respect to 1) responding rapidly to human rights reports of the UN and providing follow-up to the recommendations and on 2) how to set up a NPM and effectively monitor places of detention.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Goal:</b> To strengthen the rule of law and the protection of human rights.</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> <i>Improved quality of justice:</i> The National Human Rights Council (CNDH) and its regional commissions have the capacity to effectively monitor prisons, set up and run a NPM, and respond to and follow-up UN reports.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b> Staff and members of CNDH have:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increased understanding of human rights issues, international monitoring mechanisms and requirements under the OPCAT treaty;</li> <li>• Strengthened skills to interact, respond and to follow-up UN reports;</li> <li>• Received advice on how to establish an effective NPM and to set up a system of regular visits to places of detention;</li> <li>• Strengthened skills to effectively monitor places of detention by using UN Standard Minimum Rules (UN SMR) for the Treatment of Prisoners.</li> </ul> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparatory meetings and fact-finding visit to meet staff of CNDH to identify the</li> </ul>	<p><b>Outputs:</b> The main result achieved so far is that the participants in the first training session have gained more insight in international human rights issues, prison monitoring mechanisms, and the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. In addition, the project allowed the members of the various regional committees to share experience and learn lessons, which has positively affected their cooperation relationships according to one of the interviewees.</p> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Fact-finding mission took place in Dec 2012;</li> <li>• Training material developed, including a manual on international human rights standards in the field of prevention of torture.</li> </ul> <p>Trainings held in September 2013: CNDH organised a three day training 'Monitoring, Investigation and follow-up mechanisms, and Skills of visiting places of detention' for their staff and for members of their regional committees. The trainers were Marjan Wijn (DJI), Prof. Martin Kuijer (VU University) and Femke Hofstee (Prison Watch). Around 60 people attended the training on a continuous basis.</p> <p>Topics covered included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• international human rights law; human rights standards and inspection bodies from an international perspective;</li> <li>• Overview of (inter-)national reports about the detention situation in Morocco;</li> <li>• Sharing experiences and 'good practices' of Dutch Prison</li> </ul>

<p>exact needs (to prepare content of the training) and to discuss practical aspects of the training;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development content training in cooperation with CNDH;</li> <li>• Trainings on a) human rights, b) monitoring of places of detention, c) dealing with inspection reports and recommendations.</li> </ul> <p>In 2014 an additional activity was requested by CNDH and approved, namely to provide a monitoring/assessment tool to strengthen and harmonize prison monitoring activities as well as to provide training on this monitoring framework. This activity will take place in September 2014.</p>	<p>Service when dealing with reports and recommendations by inspection bodies;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Examine and report on prison conditions and treatment according to UN SMR;</li> <li>• Sharing experiences and 'good practices' regarding communication with other stakeholders, such as government institutions, Parliament, civil society, media, the international community;</li> <li>• Sharing experiences and 'good practices' regarding the establishment of an NPM and to function as a NPM;</li> <li>• Measurement tools and reporting techniques.</li> </ul>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

The project has encountered serious delays and needed to be extended with one year. These delays were due to miscommunications between the embassy in Morocco, DJI, and CNDH, which were resolved after an intervention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on request of RVO. Furthermore, it proved difficult to plan for the various trainings as CNDH experienced difficulties in coordinating the planning of these trainings with its various regional committees. Despite these delays, the two remaining planned training sessions are now scheduled for this year and the project will likely achieve its envisaged outputs.

<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b>
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See above	See above
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<b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>
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See above	See above
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<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
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Relevance	4	<p>The project was requested by the CNDH, which is a professional organisation well-established (by law) with a good reputation when it comes to protecting human rights. It showed to be eager to become a NPM and to invest in professionalising their capabilities in the field of monitoring prisons. Increasing CNDH's capacity can contribute to the protection of human rights and thus the improvement of the quality of the justice sector. In addition, the project can increase opportunities for cooperation between the Dutch and Moroccan Ministries of Justice. The interaction between the counterparts is, however, limited to the training sessions and the organisation of the project. A stronger focus on longer-term on the job support, might have provided more scope to strengthen relationships.</p>
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Efficiency	2	The project experienced significant delays due to miscommunications between the various actors involved and the difficulty CNDH faced to coordinate the planning of the training sessions with all the different regional committees. In addition, it is relatively expensive.
Effectiveness	-	It is too early to assess the effectiveness of this project.
Sustainability	3	Overall, the achieved results in terms of participants trained and the building of CNDH's capacity to monitor prisons are likely to be sustainable.
<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 3;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 2.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 2,67</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
This project suffered from various delays. A key lesson learned is that the organisation of a G2G project can be cumbersome due to the large number of stakeholders involved (RVO, the embassy, the Dutch partner government institution, sub-contractors, the foreign counterpart and the ministry of foreign affairs).		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project documents RVO including the project assessment, proposal additional training, fact finding mission report, slides of the trainings, training manual, background document information about detention in Morocco, request for and approval of extension. Interview with Femke Hofstee, Prison Watch; Interview with Aafke Wortelboer, Project Consultant International Projects, Missions and Matchmaking, RVO.		

## 18) Training of 8 civil servants

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Training of 8 civil servants</b>
Activity number	G2G12TN21
Programme component	G2G
Country	Tunisia
Implementing organisation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The Hague Academy for Local Governance (HALG);</li> <li>2. Guestmanship.</li> </ol>
Type of project	Training
Planned start date – Planned end date project	September 2012
Actual start date – Actual end date project	September 2012 – November 2012
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Sustainable economic growth/ democratic process
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	8 civil servants from Ministry of Regional Development (Ministère Tunisien de Développement Régional et de Planification).
Key stakeholders	Ministry of regional development Tunisia
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	N/A
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Closure

<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 66.000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% Matra South Programme funding
Amount Committed	EUR 66.000
Amount Disbursed	EUR 54.679,96
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
<p>G2G project is formulated based on a request by the Tunisian authorities for educational opportunities for Tunisian civil servants in the area of local economic development and good governance at HALG. The different institutions included in the request are responsible for and involved in the promotion of regional development and good governance at local level, which is very relevant in light of the large differences between the coastal - and interior areas. To be able to facilitate this request at short notice (the training programmes for civil servants have not started yet) participation in the Open courses of HALG was offered for 8 civil servants from the ministry of regional development.</p>	
<b>Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals</b>	<b>Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)</b>
<p><b>Outcomes:</b> Increased knowledge and skills in the fields of local economic development and good governance</p> <p><b>Activities:</b> Compensation of costs for the participation of eight civil servants in three programmes of the Hague Academy for Local government, involving the following courses:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Local Economic Development;</li> <li>b) Local Service Delivery and the Millennium Development Goals;</li> <li>c) Peacebuilding and Local Governance;</li> <li>d) Leadership and Municipal Management;</li> <li>e) Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Finance;</li> <li>f) Good Governance and the Rule of Law;</li> <li>g) Water Governance at the Local Level;</li> <li>h) Female Leadership.</li> </ul> <p>In addition a programme with guided visits to The Hague and Amsterdam and the facilitation of a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is offered.</p> <p>Provision of follow up training activities at HALG in 2013.</p>	<p>Eight civil servants attended two weeks of courses at HALG and visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p> <p>The participants were satisfied with the training provided however no information is available of the follow up given to the training in Tunisia. The participation of trainees from other countries offered possibilities for networking.</p> <p>Follow up training activities planned for have not taken place because of the possibility for Tunisian civil servants to participate Matra South training programme of HALG.</p>

<b>To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?</b>		
Project outputs were achieved.		
<b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b>	
The project is not a typical G2G project as it only includes training opportunities in the Netherlands and no real government to government exchange. The visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was included to add value to the G2G relations. Moreover the courses included visits to several Dutch institutions.	The visits to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other institutions added value to the G2G relations. The visits however were very short and the potential to built G2G relations can be questioned. The project was the first G2G project and seen as an opportunity to promote the programme.	
<b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>	<b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b>	
The subjects of the courses fit well with the objectives of the Matra South projects because of the focus on economic development and good governance and are inline with the decentralisation process in Tunisia.	The impact of the project since it only included training of eight civil servants limited and dependent on many other factors.	
<b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>	<b>Score</b>	<b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b>
Relevance	3	The training followed can be considered very relevant for the Tunisian context also in view of the decentralisation process. The lower score for relevance can be explained by the limited G2G focus of the project as the participants participated in an open course at HALG. No G2G support was provided.
Efficiency	3	The activities have been offered as planned. The costs (about 7000 per participant based on the amount disbursed) seem to be reasonably high.
Effectiveness	3	The outputs have been achieved, and the participants interviewed gave a positive evaluation of the courses followed. Participants feel that courses contributed to the quality of the decentralisations reports and plans. However the course was considered only to be an introduction and more support would have been helpful to deal with the political issues. Considering the limited G2G contacts it is questionable whether this has led to lasting relations.
Sustainability	3	The sustainability of training activities is difficult to assess. It could be argued that the training of 8 civil servants from the same ministry has created a certain mass within the ministry. Support provided was however limited to a two week (standard) course and no follow up activities were included in the project nor has there been any follow up contact with the employer.

<b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b>		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors):3;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 2 (the project itself is not politically sensitive nor is it situated in a difficult location);</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 1.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 2</b>		
<b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b>		
In total 8 staff member of the Ministry of local development have participated in the open course. To foster effectiveness and sustainability follow up activities could have been considered. Additional support to the participants and contact with the employer might have helped to overcome possible obstacles at the workplace.		
<b>Other comments</b>		
<b>Sources of information:</b>		
Project file, interviews with Sheil Kwint (G2G advisor RvO), Cecil Meijs coordinator HALG and 3 beneficiaries.		

### 19) Cooperation between the Ombudsman Bureau of Jordan and the National Ombudsman of the Netherlands

<b>General Information</b>	
Project Name	<b>Cooperation between the Ombudsman Bureau of Jordan and the National Ombudsman of the Netherlands</b>
Activity number	G2G12JO22
Programme component	G2G
Country	Jordan
Implementing organisation	National Ombudsman of the Netherlands
Type of project	Capacity building
Planned start date – Planned end date project	15-11-2012 – 15-11-2013
Actual start date – Actual end date project	15-11-2012 – 15-11-2013
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Democratic governance
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	Primary beneficiaries: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ombudsman Bureau of Jordan;</li> <li>• Secondary beneficiaries: citizens (complainants).</li> </ul>
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	-
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Closed
<b>Financial information</b>	
Total project budget	EUR 59,468
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	100% Matra South Programme funding
Amount Committed	EUR 59,468 (EUR 65,186 including the identification mission)
Amount Disbursed	EUR 58,104 (EUR 63,822 including the identification mission)
<b>Description of project background and key contextual issues:</b>	
The Jordanian Ombudsman Bureau was established in 2008. It was the first one of its kind in the Arab world. The Jordan Ombudsman, H.E. Al Kurdi, expressed the need to learn from other Ombudsman institutions'	

experiences to improve the competencies and expertise of the Ombudsman's staff. Especially related to the areas of investigation methods and skills, developing good working relationships with the public administration in Jordan, and communications (awareness raising) a clear need was identified to build the Ombudsman's capacity. The project was preceded by an identification mission, during which the Dutch Ombudsman agreed upon a project plan with the Jordanian Ombudsman Bureau.

Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)
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<p><b>Goal:</b> To improve democratic governance.</p> <p><b>Outcome:</b> <i>Improved quality of public service management:</i> Improved effectiveness of the Ombudsman Bureau of Jordan due to its strengthened position, structure and operations.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Strengthened cooperation between the Ombudsman of Jordan and relevant public administrations;</li> <li>2. Strengthened operational capacity of the staff of the Ombudsman of Jordan;</li> <li>3. Strengthened awareness raising capacity of the communications department of the Ombudsman of Jordan</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities/inputs:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) Three visits to Jordan to have informal/brainstorm meetings with the staff of the Ombudsman of Jordan on the topics of investigation methods and skills, developing good working relationships with the public administration in Jordan, and communications;</li> <li>2) Preparation of documents that outline how the envisaged change processes can be implemented;</li> <li>3) Study visit to The Netherlands.</li> </ol>	<p>No evidence is yet available suggesting that the support has led to the achievement of the envisaged outcome. The key achievement realized is that the project did contribute to a changed mind-set and work approach within the Ombudsman Bureau. While before the project a "formalized" approach to complaints was the key modus operandi (entailing the production of a formal report as the key output), after the project the Ombudsman Bureau has shown clear signs, according to the interviewee, of having become more results-oriented and pragmatic in the way it aims to resolve the complaints. In addition, the project introduced weekly meetings for staff to exchange views and share experiences and these have been continued after the end of the project and have resulted in better knowledge sharing and more cooperation amongst staff from the Ombudsman Bureau.</p> <p>No clear results have been achieved concerning the envisaged output to raise the capacity of the communications department.</p> <p><b>Outputs:</b> Staff's capacity has increased related to:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) complaint handling;</li> <li>2) influencing government authorities (around 30 staff members trained).</li> </ol> <p><b>Activities:</b> Three visits were planned to the Ombudsman of Jordan. This was replaced by two visits of which the second one was a longer –four day- visit. During the visits "formal" trainings were provided as well as a lot of on the job training.</p> <p>Six (senior) staff members of the Ombudsman of Jordan visited the Dutch National Ombudsman for 4 working days, during which the Dutch complaint handling system and the work of the Dutch Communication Unit was discussed in detail.</p> <p>An adapted version of the Dutch standards of proper conduct for complaints handling was introduced, which has allowed the Ombudsman to be more consistent in its complaint handling and to offer these guidelines to public administration agencies.</p>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

<p>Almost all of the results have been achieved, apart from the one focused on increasing the capacity of the communications' department. No tangible results were achieved here as the capacity of the department proved to be a lot lower than expected and only very basic support could be provided given the timeframe of this project.</p>		
<p><b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component</b>      <b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component (including unintended consequences)</b></p>		
See above	See above	
<p><b>Planned contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b>      <b>Realized contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b></p>		
See above	See above	
<p><b>DAC evaluation criteria</b>      <b>Score</b>      <b>Explanation/qualitative assessment</b></p>		
Relevance	4	The project is very relevant as a strong Ombudsman bureau is an essential feature of good governance. High local demand existed for this project and the project –which involves a lot of practical and on the job support-, was implemented in such a way to fully align with the needs of the Ombudsman Bureau.
Efficiency	4	There were no significant delays in the implementation of the project and it was well managed.
Effectiveness	4	Important steps have been made to improve the effectiveness of the Ombudsman, although not all envisaged outputs were realized. The project has led to good cooperation relationships between the Dutch and the Jordanian Ombudsman Bureau, which have continued after the end of this project.
Sustainability	5	The project is currently followed-up by a similar project to build upon the results achieved. In addition, also outside these specific projects the Dutch Ombudsman continuous with advising the Jordanian Ombudsman Bureau to ensure the sustainability of the results achieved.
<p><b>Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:</b></p>		
<p>1. General country context (external factors): 3;  2. Complexity of the project environment: 2;  3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</p>		
<p><b>Overall conclusion: 2,67</b></p>		
<p><b>Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?</b></p>		
<p>A key lesson learned from this project is that a flexible approach to G2G projects with a lot of emphasis on “on the job training and support” works really well to both ensure that 1) the support provided matches the needs of the counterpart and 2) strong relations can be developed between the two involved government institutions.</p>		
<p><b>Other comments</b></p>		
<p><b>Sources of information:</b></p>		
<p>Project documents RVO including the project idea, project assessment, project approval document, final report (21-10-2013), RVO end-of-project project evaluation; Interview with Stephan Sjouke, Head International Affairs Bureau, Nationale Ombudsman.</p>		

## 20) "Enhancing professionalism in the Libyan Prison Service"

General Information	
Project Name	"Enhancing professionalism in the Libyan Prison Service"
Activity number	G2G13LY21
Programme component	G2G
Country	Libya
Implementing organisation	Netherlands Agency of Correctional Institutions (DJI), Netherlands Ministry of Justice, and Netherlands Helsinki Comité
Type of project	Human rights
Planned start date – Planned end date project	01-04-2013 – 01-04-2015
Actual start date – Actual end date project	01-04-2013
Modality	Project support
Thematic focus/transition issues	Human rights, justice
Primary/secondary beneficiaries	<b>Primary:</b> Libyan prison service - Prison Staff; Libyan Judicial Police; Libyan Ministry of Justice. <b>Secondary:</b> Prisoners.
Projects' correspondence with projects financed by other donors	Initiatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Libyan authorities and the United Nations (UNODC), International Centre for Prison Studies are taken into account to prevent duplication and create synergies where possible. Cooperation with the EU project implemented by IMG has not succeeded yet
Project status (start-up phase, implementation phase, closure)	Implementation
Financial information	
Total project budget	EUR 325.000
% Matra South Programme funding, and % other sources' funding	EUR 175.000 (original budget) EUR 80.000 (security) EUR 70.000 (Planned by to be paid by the Libyan authorities!) Total EUR 325.000 In the revised budget a contribution for travel and accommodation costs and possible protective clothing by the Libyan government has been agreed.
Amount Committed	175.290
Amount Disbursed	175.290
Description of project background and key contextual issues:	
<p>Just after the revolution serious human rights concerns regarding the situation in prisons were raised, amongst others by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. On 6 March 2012, the Libyan Prime Minister issued a decree establishing a committee specifically tasked to receive and investigate complaints of human rights abuses in detention. However in order to achieve a more sustainable improvement of prison conditions, the Libyan prison service aims to improve the management of the prison system and the professional qualifications of prison staff. The Judicial Police is part of the Ministry of Justice and its main is to manage and operate prisons. Before the revolution, the Judicial Police consisted largely of former police officers with no or inadequate additional training. The management of the Judicial Police agree that training is needed at all levels of the service, something which is also noted by Foreign partners/aid agencies. To ensure sustainable training of all its officers, the management intends to establish a professional training institute that provides initial training for recruits and continuous professional development for existing staff. A site for the construction of the facilities has already been found and building/reconstruction will soon start, however adequate training resources are lacking.</p>	
Planned project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals	Realized project activities/inputs, outputs, outcomes and goals (including unintended consequences)

<p>Goal: The project will assist in the development of a general vision and mission of the Libyan prison service with a specific focus on training prison staff. Also the project will support the development and implementation of an education plan.</p> <p><b>Outcomes:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enhanced security in prisons;</li> <li>• Improved management of prisons -&gt; contributing to well-being of prisoners and respect for their human rights;</li> <li>• Increased awareness on human rights by prison staff and within prison service.</li> </ul> <p><b>Main Outputs:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Education plan prison staff developed;</li> <li>• 12 trainers are trained;</li> <li>• Number of pilot trainings conducted.</li> </ul> <p><b>Main Activities:</b></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Drafting of general mission and vision for the education of prison staff together with the Libyan stakeholders;</li> <li>2. Development of a function profile and an education plan for the prison staff;</li> <li>3. Working visit of Libyan project team to the Netherlands;</li> <li>4. Identification training needs &amp; development of a training program, Train of Trainers and Pilot trainings.</li> </ol>	<p>The project has deviated from its original approach. The original project was planned on a fact finding mission in 2012. Based on extensive discussions with the Libyan officials (Ministry of Justice) during the inception mission it was decided to adapt the project plan to focus on the operational training and support to the training institute as this would be more in line with the demands of the beneficiaries. The development of the mission and vision and education plan on how training structures is still necessary but was found not to be feasible in this phase.</p> <p>The ToT programmes have been designed to build further on the basic training already provided:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) ToT programme for 20 trainers who are at the end of the training able to teach selected prison guards being a member of the emergency rescue team within the prison. The goal of the training is to prepare the participants mentally and physically on solving violent situations with the use of a minimum of violence. De-escalating skills will be trained.</li> </ol> <p>Currently 20 persons were trained and will, if possible (as part of the follow up project) come to the Netherlands for ToT in August 2014. Also special security suits are being purchased for prison staff. After the training in the Netherlands the trainers will be coached in several pilot trainings. Each trainer will be able to provide training to about 15 people.</p> <p>The full follow up programme (€450,000.- still need to be formulated. If the training is successful, additional support to the training institute (training of management etc.) will be discussed with counterpart. Also the dissemination of the results of the pilot to other institutions in the neighbourhood in Tripoli and in other branches will need to be discussed.</p> <p>The training has very much been adapted to the wishes of the Libyan counterparts. HR is indirectly a focus within the training by the focus on deescalating skills, minimum violence solutions however no HR awareness sessions are included.</p>
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**To what extent is the project on course to achieve its planned results? What are the necessary requirements, drivers, and obstacles to achieve the results aimed at?**

In the inception period it was decided to limit the focus of the project to the design of two training programmes and ToT/ pilot training. According to the respondents the project is well on track with achieving its adapted outputs/ activities. However this very much depends on the security situation. At present it is unsure whether the ToT training in the Netherlands will take place as no travel to and from Libya is possible. According to DJI key success factors for the projects are that the project is very demand /driven (commitment of the Libyan prison service) and the coordinating role of the Dutch embassy (with a chaotic government and other donors involved in the sector). Additional drivers which are mentioned are particularly the personal contacts that are valued by the participants and the commitment of the implementing partner. Project staff make continuous visits to the country despite the security risks.

<p><b>Planned contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and overall objectives of the Matra South Programme</b></p>	<p><b>Realized contribution to the specific objectives of the programme component and overall objectives of the Matra South Programme (including unintended consequences)</b></p>
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After the revolution serious concerns were raised concerning human rights of prisoners serious. The projects intends to achieve increased security in prisons and awareness on human rights by prison staff contributing to the rule of law and human rights.	The training programmes developed can indirectly contribute to HR with the focus on de-escalating skills and minimum violence solutions. 20 trainers will be trained who in turn can train 300 staff per course.	
DAC evaluation criteria	Score	Explanation/qualitative assessment
Relevance	3	The initial project plan was too ambitious and was not thoroughly discussed with the Libyan counterparts (to the extent too which was possible during the very chaotic period after the civil war). The revised project proposal seems to be very demand driven. A possible problematic issue could be that the training is developed before the establishment of the education plan for the sector. Less attention is paid to HR issues as originally planned.
Efficiency	2	The project has experienced serious delays. The project costs are considerable because of the high security costs involved.
Effectiveness	-	It is considered too early to asses effectiveness. The selected trainers are found to be motivated and committed but the present situation is very unsure
Sustainability	-	Sustainability is questionable due to the security issues. Currently there is a project application for EU funding (700.000) to support the establishment of an education plan for the prison service (which was initially part of this project). This could secure continuation of the trainings under this project (although cooperation until now has not been possible)
Levels of difficulty to achieve intended objectives:		
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. General country context (external factors): 5;</li> <li>2. Complexity of the project environment: 5;</li> <li>3. Ambition-level of the project: 3.</li> </ol>		
<b>Overall conclusion: 4,33</b>		
Lessons learned and recommendations for improvement of the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability of the project, the wider programme component, and its contribution to the overall objectives of the Matra South Programme?		
<p>Flexible approach needed in such a volatile country context as Libya.</p> <p>High commitment of the implementing partner -contact and actual visits to the beneficiary helps to maintain trust and support of beneficiaries / Libyan counterparts.</p>		
Other comments		
Sources of information:		
Project file, including activity plan and proposal, report of inception mission. Interview Michiel Zimmer RVO en Mariette Horstink DJI.		



## Annex II Level of difficulty, general country context

The project evaluations were not done in isolation of the local context. As also requested in the ToR, the project performance assessment was to be combined with the level of difficulty. In our assessment due attention is therefore paid to assessing the level of difficulty of achieving the intended objectives given the complex and volatile contextual circumstances. Next to project specific scores for the complexity of the project environment and the ambition-level of the project, for each country a general country context indicator (external factors) is given. We have used the following five point scale for scoring the level of difficulty:

- 1 – Very easy
- 2 – Easy
- 3 – Neutral
- 4 – Difficult
- 5 – Very difficult

i.e. the more points the more difficult.

The general country context indicator is composed of three indicators:

- The Human Development Index (ranking HDI index UNDP);
- The governance score (World Bank's worldwide governance indicators for 2012<sup>49</sup>);
- The economic climate indicator (combining indicators for Business Climate<sup>50</sup> as well as the World Development Indicators GDP average annual growth percentages from 2007 until 2014<sup>51</sup>).

We have given an average score per country based on the countries' worldwide rankings for the different indicators (top 20% will be 1 as it would be the best/ easiest context), independent of the programme component of which the project is a part. In view of the present security situation in the country we have adapted the total score of Libya to 5. The total Level of Difficulty scores are shown in the table below:

**Table A.2.1 Level of Difficulty**

Indicator	Morocco		Libya		Jordan		Tunisia		Egypt	
	Ranking	Lo D	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD
HDI	130	4	64	2	100	3	94	3	112	3
Economic climate	2,5	2,5	5	5	3	3	2,5	2,5	3,5	3,5
Governance score	-0,3	3	-1,37	5	-0.11	3	-0,25	3	-0,75	4
Total		9,5		12		9		8,5		10,5
Average		3,17		4		3,00		2,83		3,50
LoD SCORE		3		<b>5</b>		3		3		4

The Human Development index is directly based on data of the World Bank. The governance score and Economic climate ranking are composed of different indicators. The governance score is

<sup>49</sup> <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wqi/index.aspx#countryReports>. If possible 2013 data is used.

<sup>50</sup> <http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings>.

<sup>51</sup> <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries>.

composed of six dimensions: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption.

**Table A.2.2 Governance score**

Indicator	Morocco	Libya	Jordan	Tunisia	Egypt
Governance indicator V&A	-0,61	-0,94	-0,73	-0,19	-0,74
Governance indicator PS & AVT	-0,46	-1,56	-0,52	-0,73	-1,48
Governance indicator GE	-0,04	-1,49	-0,04	-0,02	-0,77
Governance indicator RQ	-0,09	-1,66	0,18	-0,21	-0,49
Governance indicator RL	-0,19	-1,15	0,37	-0,14	-0,45
Governance indicator CC	-0,41	-1,4	0,07	-0,18	-0,57
Total governance score	-1,8	-8,2	-0,67	-1,47	-4,5
Average governance score	-0,30	-1,37	-0,11	-0,25	-0,75

The economic climate is composed of the business climate and an economic growth index. The latter index is based on data from the World Bank showing the economic development from 2007 until 2014. Following this index Libya has an average annual percentage growth rate of GDP of 5,27, however this includes two extreme rates for 2011 and 2012 with respectively economic growth of -62,08 and 104,48. Based on the economic development in the last two years which is negative we have adapted the score to 5.

**Table A.2.3 Economic climate**

Indicator	Morocco		Libya		Jordan		Tunisia		Egypt	
	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD	Ranking	LoD
Business Climate	87	3	187	5	119	4	51	2	128	4
Economic Growth	4,09	2	5,27	5	4,35	2	3,46	3	4,06	3
Average		2,5		5		3		2,5		3,5

## Annex III Project selection

For the CSI and Matra South initiatives component, we selected 11 of the 55 projects (3 projects that are financed from the centralized budget and 8 projects that are managed by the embassies). For the centralized budget projects we only selected projects that had a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. For the CSI projects, we used the monetary threshold of a minimum total project commitment of EUR 15,000 and a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. The number of CSI projects selected per country was based on the relative weight of each country in terms of their share in total disbursements. The following projects were randomly selected:

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total commitments	Total disbursements (2012-2013)
<b>Centralized budget:</b>				
Egypt	Oxfam/Novib en Better Life/democratisering <sup>52</sup>	2012-2014	1,320,471	821,379
Region: Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt	IFC beroepsonderwijs	2012-2015	800,000	800,000
Region	Anna Lindh Foundation	2012-2014	300,000	200,000
<b>Decentralized budget (CSI)</b>				
Egypt	Poverty eradication through employment	2012-2014	129,066	104,893
Egypt	Advocating and promoting Workers'rights (APWR), Contract party: El Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development (MCSD).	2012-2013	299,008	299,008
Egypt	Entrepreneurship Education Programme, Implementer the District.	2013-2014	267,204	141,054
Tunisia	Wetenschappelijk onderzoek Salafisme in de Arabische regio	2013-2014	45,378	43,253
Jordan	Visions centre – conference on the role of citizenship in promoting the rule of law	01/11/2012-28/02/2013	25,858	23,921
Libya	Jeugdforum over Transitional Justice in Benghazi, Tobruk en Sebha	2013	50,000	40,000
Morocco	CGEM (Marokkaanse VNO-NCW) MKB monitoring project	2013-2014	100,000	80,000
Morocco	CETIA - Centre Technique des Industries Agroalimentaires: medefinanciering van de installatie en inrichting van een microbiologisch laboratorium voor kwaliteitscontrole van voedingsmiddelen	2012-2013	77,678	77,677
<b>Total</b>			<b>3,414,663</b>	<b>2,631,185</b>

<sup>52</sup> This project is a combination of two individual registered projects by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that cover a first and a second phase of a single project, for this reason the evaluators decided to present it as one project.

This proposed selection accounts for 41% of the total value of project commitments within the CSI component, and for 46% of the total disbursements.

For the PSI component, we selected 4 projects, with disbursement rates higher than zero and which together represent at least 45% of total disbursements. Based on the relative weight of each country in terms of their share in total disbursements, we randomly selected the following projects.

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total commitments	Total disbursements (2012- May 2014)
Morocco	Pilot Carbon Footprint Project	2012-2015	750,000	337,500
Morocco	Fighting the housing deficit with modular construction solutions in Morocco.	2013-2015	721,100	324,495
Tunisia	Desert Joy, the tomato with taste from Tunisia	2012-2015	748,250	433,985
Jordan	Breeding of disease tolerant vegetable seed	2013-2016	482,150	192,861
<b>Total</b>			<b>2,701,500</b>	<b>1,288,841</b>

This selection accounts for 40% of the total value of project commitments within the PSI component, and for 64% of the total disbursements.

Of the 16 projects implemented under the G2G component, we selected 5 projects. The selected projects needed to be in a mature state of implementation, be significant in monetary terms and together represent at least 50% of total 2012-2013 disbursements. We used the monetary threshold of a minimum total project commitment of EUR 20,000 and a minimum disbursement rate (as a percentage of total commitments) of 50%. Based on this strategy we randomly selected the following projects.

Country	Description	Implementation period	Total commitments	Total disbursements (2012- May 2014)
Morocco	Improving Road Safety in Morocco	2013-2014	146,000	58,400
Morocco	CNDH / Mensenrechten gevangeniswezen	2013	95,599	76,479
Tunisia	Training 8 ambtenaren Ministerie van regionale ontwikkeling	2012	66,000	54,680
Jordan	Samenwerking Nederlandse en Jordaanse ombudsman	2012-2013	65,186	63,822
Libya	Missie DJI/NHC gevangenismanagement	2012	20,000	18,148
<b>Total</b>			<b>392,785</b>	<b>271,529</b>

This selection accounts for 44% of the total value of project commitments within the G2G component, and for 60% of the total disbursements.

# Annex IV Theory of change Matra South Components


## Support to local civil society initiatives (CSI)

The CSI component consists of demand-driven project support to civil society initiatives. The Dutch embassies in Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia have been allocated specific budgets under the MATRA South Programme to support projects of civil society organisations that can contribute to democratisation processes, the rule of law and the protection of human rights, and economic growth.

The main underlying assumptions of this component are that:

- embassies are in principle a good position to decide on the way the support is provided to the civil society organisations as well as its specific focus, albeit that there is a need for DAM to approve large and political sensitive projects;
- civil society demand for this type of project support provided by the Dutch embassies is sufficient;
- civil society organisations have the capacity to effectively implement the CSI projects; and
- the budget allocated to the CSI component is appropriate to effectively contribute to the overall goals of the MATRA South Programme.

Based on an analysis of the CSI project documents and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:




## Government-to-government cooperation (G2G)

The focus of the G2G cooperation is on supporting institutional reform and capacity building in the public sector, which can help to improve public governance and the rule of law, and can facilitate economic development.

The main underlying assumptions of this component are that:

- the embassies are capable to effectively promote G2G and that there is sufficient demand from the government institutions in the priority countries for this type of project support;
- Dutch partners can be found with matching interests;
- the Netherlands Enterprise Agency is in a good position to facilitate the design and implementation of G2G projects;
- DAM is in the best position to judge the relevance and quality of the proposed G2G projects;
- these relatively small projects can effectively contribute to improved governance and public sector management in the priority countries; and
- these projects can strengthen relationships between the Netherlands and the priority countries.

Based on an analysis of the G2G project documents, the annual G2G reports and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:



## Private Sector Investment Programme (PSI)

The PSI Arab component focuses on stimulating private sector development within the broader policy goal of stimulating the democratic transition in the Arab countries.


The main assumptions underlying this component are that:

- there is sufficient demand and capacity for investment projects in the priority countries;
- relevant Dutch or foreign partners are interested to cooperate with, and can find suitable, local business partners; and



- stimulating private sector investment will contribute to employment creation (especially for youth and women) and economic growth in the Arab countries.

Based on an analysis of the annual PSI reports, PSI project documents and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:




### Capacity building of political organisations (PP)

The overall aim of the PP programme is to foster multi-party democracy in the Arab region by building the capacity of political organisations. In addition, political party diplomacy is aimed to be fostered by strengthening the bilateral relations between the parties in the Netherlands and political parties in priority countries.

The main underlying assumption of the component are that:

- Relevant political counterparts are present in the priority countries;
- Dutch political parties can effectively find and support their counter-parts in the priority countries;
- Dutch political parties do spend the allocated funds in the priority countries.

Based on an analysis of the PP documents and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:




## Training of civil servants

The main underlying assumptions of this component are that:

- there is enough demand in the priority countries for the offered trainings;
- the embassies are capable to advise on the most appropriate candidate trainees;
- the trainings offered are relevant to the needs of the trainees;
- the trained civil servants can effectively apply their new skills and knowledge learned in their home country;
- it strengthens relations between civil servants from the priority countries; and
- it strengthens relationships between the Netherlands and the priority countries.

Based on an analysis of the training documents, annual reports and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:




## Training of junior diplomats

The overall objective of the trainings is to strengthen the capacity of junior diplomats to contribute to the process of democratisation and enhance the rule of law in their respective countries and to promote relationships with these countries, inter alia by strengthening the bond of the participant with the Netherlands and the Dutch government, and by transferring knowledge on and understanding of the Dutch policies.

The main underlying assumptions of this component are that:

- there is enough demand in the priority countries for the offered trainings;
- the trainings offered are relevant to the needs of the trainees;
- the trained diplomats can effectively apply their new skills and knowledge learned in their home country;
- it strengthens relations between diplomats from the priority countries;
- it strengthens relationships between the Netherlands and the priority countries.

Based on an analysis of the annual reports and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed:




### MATRA South initiatives from the centralized budget

The Matra South initiatives often constitute contributions to large programmes implemented by multilateral organisations and international NGOs, which focus on at least one of the three Matra South objectives.

The main underlying assumption of these initiatives are that DAM is the appropriate actor to decide on the selection of these initiatives and that the provided contribution to the respective programmes is an efficient and effective way to contribute to the achievement of the Matra South objectives.

Based on an analysis of the project documents and interviews, the following ToC could be reconstructed<sup>53</sup>:

<sup>53</sup> The projects are used as an example to show the relationship between the activities (project), output and outcome. It may be the case that projects contribute to more outputs/ outcomes than shown in the graph (e.g. Oxfam/ Better life project also may result in increased capacity of CS and strengthened influence of CS).





## Annex V Portfolio per type of activity

	Capacity building individuals		Capacity building organisations		Awareness raising, lobby and advocacy		Conferences		Research		Cultural		PSI		Vocational training		Total	
	Committed <sup>54</sup>	Nr. <sup>55</sup>	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.	Committed	Nr.
Region	4408	8	1392	9	300	1	-	-	24	1	-	-	-	-	800	1	6925	20
Egypt	416	2	771	3	1320	2	-	-	211	1	-	-	732	1	129	1	3580	10
Jordan	80	2	393	4	12	1	26	1	77	4	-	-	1610	3	195	2	2394	17
Libya	42	1	502	6	-	-	86	2	217	3	39	1	-	-	-	-	886	13
Morocco	104	1	470	7	-	-	184	2	-	-	-	-	3592	5	481	2	4832	17
Tunisia	210	6	1082	7	27	2	27	2	51	2	57	5	748	1	-	-	2203	25
Other	-	-	400	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14901	17	-	-	15300	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>5261</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>5010</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>1659</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>323</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>581</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>21584</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>1606</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>36120</b>	<b>120</b>

<sup>54</sup> Committed budget x1000 Euro.

<sup>55</sup> Number of projects.





## Annex VI Evaluation matrices

CSI

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
<b>Relevance</b>		
1) Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? (50%)	<p><i>-The main needs and demands are adequately identified and addressed given the specific governance and political-economy context</i></p> <p><i>-The project has been aligned and harmonized with those of the recipient partners and other development partners.</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Existence of good quality need assessment;</li> <li>• Degree of ownership of intervention as shown in active involvement of the beneficiary in formulation, implementation etc.;</li> <li>• The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound;</li> <li>• Positive synergy with effects of other initiatives.</li> </ul>
2) To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? (50%)	<i>-The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole</i>	Match with objectives Matra South programme (component)
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
1) To what extent have the project short and/ or long term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? (weight 50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their contribution to attaining the intended project effects;</i></li> <li>• <i>-Level of attainment of project outcomes that have been achieved (compared to the estimates).</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidence of achievements and contribution;</li> <li>• Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.</li> </ul>
2) To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole (weight 50%)	<i>(Likely) contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component.</i>	Evidence of project contribution to the programme specific impacts
<b>Efficiency</b>		
1) To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms - justify the resources spent?	<p><i>-Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule (40%)</i></p> <p><i>-The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements (40%)</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Realised time planning; if changes occur they are substantiated;</li> <li>• Comparison of unit costs (per beneficiary/participant/client with costs of similar projects);</li> <li>• Comparison of project resources</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The implementation and management arrangements contribute to the realisation of the project objectives (20%).</i></li> </ul>	<p>consumed in achievement of outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Quality and adequateness of project planning, management (administrative, financial and HR) and M&amp;E.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>		
1) What is the likelihood for the achievements of the project to be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised?	<p>Organisational or institutional sustainability (50%):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions;</li> <li>Extent to which changes observed/ results achieved are likely to persist.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of a sustainable strategy, including exit strategy;</li> <li>Required organisational/ institutional capacity in place (structures, staff, expertise, etc.) exists/developed.</li> </ul>
To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit-strategy an integrated part of the project? To what extent contributes the project to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?	<p>Financial continuity (30%):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Availability of financial resources needed to ensure continuity.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Comparison of the financial resources needed to ensure the continuity of the results to the financial capacity of local structures.</li> </ul>
	<p>Political sustainability (20%) — existence of political basis for the project theme and approach</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>degree of coherence between the project approach and policies of the countries (national and sub-national levels)?</li> <li>degree of effective collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. government and other actors at national and sub-national levels).</li> </ul>

## PSI

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
<b>Relevance</b>		
Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? (50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Needs (innovative business opportunities) are adequately identified and addressed given the specific political-economy context.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of good quality and realistic business plan (given the complexity and volatility of the environment);</li> <li>Degree of ownership of intervention as shown in active involvement of the local counterpart in formulation, implementation etc.;</li> <li>The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
		the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound
To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? (50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole.</i></li> </ul>	Alignment project with objectives Matra South programme (component) (incl. contribution to youth employment and women entrepreneurship)
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
1) To what extent have the project short and/ or long term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved? What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? (weight 50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their (likely) contribution to attaining the intended project outcomes.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of achievements (e.g. established business, annual turnover, number of (direct/indirect/youth/ female) net (additional) jobs as well as suppliers/ outgrowers of the project, amount of high level and low level employees / suppliers / outgrowers trained, percentage of total project inputs/raw materials from local suppliers etc.);</li> <li>Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.</li> </ul>
2) To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole (weight 50%)	<i>(Likely)contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component(sustainable economic growth.</i>	Evidence of (likely) project (spin-off) contribution to sustainable economic growth (e.g. expansion and catalysing effect of (innovative) business(es), improved job opportunities for local population / suppliers / outgrowers and increased local attention for CSR, gender and environmental business policies).
<b>Efficiency</b>		
To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms - justify the resources spent?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>-Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule (40%)</i></li> <li><i>-The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements (40%)</i></li> <li><i>-The implementation and management arrangements contribute to the realisation of the project objectives(20%)</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Realised time planning; if changes occur they are substantiated;</li> <li>Comparison of unit costs (per job created/ suppliers/out growers) with costs of similar projects;</li> <li>Comparison of project resources consumed in achievement of outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context;</li> <li>Quality and adequateness of</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
		PSI project management and M&E.
<b>Sustainability</b>		
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What is the likelihood for the achievements of the project to be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised?</li> <li>To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit-strategy an integrated part of the project design? To what extent contributes the project to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?</li> </ul>	Organisational or institutional sustainability (50%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions;</li> <li>Extent to which changes observed/ results achieved are likely to persist.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Required organisational capacity in place (staff, expertise, technology etc.) and commitment exists;</li> <li>trends/ trajectory of earlier comparable projects.</li> </ul>
	Financial continuity (50%): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Availability of financial resources needed to ensure continuity.</li> </ul>	Financial prospects of business(es)

## G2G

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
<b>Relevance</b>		
1) Was the project well-conceived given the situation? Is it still relevant to the original problem it was intended to address? (50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The main needs and demands are adequately identified and addressed given the specific governance and political-economy context;</i></li> <li><i>The project has been aligned and harmonized with those of the recipient partners and other development partners.</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Existence of good quality need assessment/ involvement of beneficiary in formulation;</li> <li>Degree of ownership of intervention as shown in active involvement of the beneficiary in implementation etc.;</li> <li>The assumptions of the ToC of the project are realistic (given the complexity and volatility of the environment) and sound;</li> <li>Positive synergy with effects of other initiatives.</li> </ul>
2) To what extent does the project contribute to the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole? (50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>The project complies with the objectives of the related Matra South component and to those of the programme as a whole.</i></li> </ul>	Alignment with objectives Matra South programme (component)
<b>Effectiveness</b>		
1) To what extent have the project short and/ or long term objectives been achieved or are likely to be achieved?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Level of attainment of outputs (compared to estimates) and their contribution to attaining the intended</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of achievements and contribution (e.g. capacity development, policy)</li> </ul>

Evaluation questions	Judgement criteria	Indicators
<p>What are the reasons for the state of achievement? What supports and barriers have affected achievement? Are there unanticipated positive or negative consequences? Why did they arise? (weight 50%)</p>	<p><i>project effects;</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Level of attainment of project outcomes that have been achieved (compared to the estimates).</li> </ul>	<p>improvement);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of unanticipated positive or negative consequences.</li> </ul>
<p>2) To what extent has the project contributed to the achievement of the objectives of the related component of the Matra South programme and to those of the programme as a whole (weight 50%)</p>	<p><i>(Likely)contribution of the specific project outcomes to the objectives of the Matra South programme and the related component</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Evidence of project contribution to the programme specific impacts.</li> </ul>
<b>Efficiency</b>		
<p>1) To what extent has the project been delivered in a timely and cost-effective manner? Do the results achieved – in qualitative and quantitative terms - justify the resources spent?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Extent to which the activities have been implemented according to the time schedule (40%);</li> <li>The costs of service, including management costs are reasonable in relation to the type of project, the outputs and realised achievements (40%);</li> <li>The implementation and management arrangements contribute to the realisation of the project objectives(20%).</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Realised time planning; if changes occur they are substantiated;</li> <li>Comparison of project resources consumed in achievement of outputs/outcomes with interventions with similar goals in light of the degree of outcome achievement and context;</li> <li>Quality and adequateness of project planning, management and M&amp;E.</li> </ul>
<b>Sustainability</b>		
<p>1) What is the likelihood for the achievements of the project to be sustained and/or processes of change be continued after the withdrawal of support? Is there an enabling environment that supports ongoing positive impacts? Will impacts continue to be realised? To what extent is the project implementing appropriate strategies to help ensure sustainability? Is an exit-strategy an integrated part of the project design? To what extent contributes the project to the development of partners' capacity, enabling sustainable delivery after the project?</p>	<p>Organisational or institutional sustainability (50%):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The degree of absorption of the achievements by the local organisations/ institutions;</li> <li>Extent to which changes observed/ results achieved are likely to persist.</li> </ul> <p>Political sustainability (50%) — existence of political basis for the project theme and approach.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The level of integration of the project in local structures and processes;</li> <li>Required organisational/ institutional capacity in place (staff, expertise, etc.) exists/ developed;</li> <li>Existence of a sustainable strategy, including exit strategy.</li> <li>degree of coherence between the project approach and policies of the countries (national and sub-national levels);</li> <li>degree of effective collaboration with other stakeholders (e.g. other government actors, other actors at national and sub-national levels).</li> </ul>



## Annex VII Persons interviewed

Name	Position/Organization
Marleen Nolten	Programme Officer Oxfam Novib, Middle East and North-Africa desk
Dahlia Khalifa	Regional Head, E4E Initiative for Arab Youth, International Finance Corporation
Bert Meijerman	Coordinator Matra South programme, The North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM)
Hans Raadschilders	First Secretary Economic Affairs and Development Cooperation, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Egypt
Mohamed El-Kamel	Managing Director, Alashanek Ya Balady
Asmaa Sayed	Director, El Mahrousa Center for Socioeconomic Development (MCSD), Egypt
Mazen Helmy Owis	Managing Director of The District
Mr. Samir Marmouri	Programme officer Netherlands Embassy Tunis
Francesco Cavatorta	Université Laval, Canada
Lina Baj	Projects Officer, Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands Jordan
Mr. Ahmed Shalghoum	Senior Programme Officer, RNE Libya
Gemma Aubarell Solduga	Head of programme and operations unit, Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF)
Marjolein Vinke	Project Advisor Morocco PSI, Netherlands Enterprise Agency
Ad van Kester	Van Kester Grootscholten Beheer BV (Kesgro)
Hans Dekker	Nagabouw
Dhr van Antwerpen	Kwekerij van Antwerpen van Veen BV / AgroCare
Eugene Gies	Project officer PSI-facility, Netherlands Enterprise Agency
Arie Bijl	Project officer PSI-facility, Netherlands Enterprise Agency
Arjan van Vliet	Department of Road Transport, the Netherlands (RDW)
Femke Hofstee	Prison Watch
Aafke Wortelboer	Project Consultant International Projects, Missions and Matchmaking, Netherlands Enterprise Agency
Sheil Kwint	Project Advisor Matra-South , Netherlands Enterprise Agency.
Cecil Meijs	Training programme coordinator, The Hague Academy for Local Governance (HALG)
Stephan Sjouke	Head International Affairs Bureau, Nationale Ombudsman
Michiel Zimmer	Netherlands Enterprise Agency, G2G advisor
M. Benaceur BOULAAJOU	CPNAC, Morocco
Mariette Horstink	Hoofd Bureau Internationale Aangelegenheden

Name	Position/Organization
	Dienst Justitiële Inrichtingen (DJI) Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie
Arjen Berkvens	Director Max van der Stoel Foundation (FMS)
Friso Rip	VVD International
Guido Beusekom	Christen Unie
Marianne Ducasse-Rogier	Senior Training and Research Fellow, Clingendael Academy – Coordinator Training Junior Diplomats
Tamara Takacs, Sanae Hamzaouis	Asser Instituut
Abdeljalil Taktak, Anne Demoed	Center for International Legal Cooperation
Hans van Vloten Dissevelt	Ambassador at Embassy of the Netherlands in Tunis
Anis Nacibi, Fatma Ouchari, Cherifa Kakai,	Participants G2G training 8 ambtenaren
Reinier Fleurke	Ministry of interior and Kingdom Relations
Walid Al Qazaz,, Mohsen Antit	Participants Junior Diplomat training







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