



Ministry of Foreign Affairs

*IOB Study*

# Development and migration

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## Preface

Migration is an important part of Dutch foreign policy. The cabinet is committed to combating irregular migration, among other things by addressing its root causes. Most people do not want to migrate at all, so the reasoning goes, but are essentially forced to by conflict, poverty, unemployment, hopelessness, the negative impact of climate change, discrimination, etc. If we can do something about that, then it should also be possible to combat irregular migration. This notion finds support in numerous migration studies, which argue that migration is the consequence of concrete push and pull factors (which may be influenced).

Various migration specialists are critical of the possibilities of curbing irregular migration through international cooperation. They cite an empirical correlation that shows that development does not initially go hand in hand with less migration but rather with more migration. It is only when countries reach a level of development comparable to that of Brazil or Algeria that interest in emigration wanes and the opposite occurs, namely a country starts to attract more migrants. Policy that encourages development therefore (initially) promotes emigration from these countries, according to this empirical position.

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Migration is also an issue that readily appeals to the emotions. Facts and assumptions are not always properly distinguished in this debate. The aim of this study is to: (a) provide empirical information about the development of regular and irregular migration and put it into an international context, as well as to (b) offer a better understanding of the relationship between development and migration. This relationship is important when considering the question of whether it is possible to combat irregular migration through international cooperation. The report therefore focuses, in addition to the development of (irregular) migration, on the empirical foundation of leading migration theories as well as determinants of migration. Moreover, it also explores the literature to discover how feasible it would be to combat irregular migration by tackling its root causes. The main conclusion is that this is not a highly feasible option, but also that it would be incorrect to suggest that every form of international cooperation merely furthers (irregular) migration. Another conclusion is that our knowledge at present is still quite limited. This highlights the importance of evaluating projects well. Where possible, the study makes policy recommendations.

IOB researcher officers Jan Bade and Antonie de Kemp wrote the report. In doing so, they made grateful use of extensive support from the University of Groningen, specifically from professor Robert Lensink and researchers Hanna Fromell and Tobias Grohmann.

IOB research officers Nico van Niekerk, Rens Willems and the director of IOB internally supervised the IOB study. Moreover, IOB benefitted from extensive commentary on the draft report by the peer group, consisting of professor Ton Dietz (Leiden University, African Studies Centre), Nathalie Lintvelt (head of the Migration and Development Group at the Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department), Johan Veul (head of the Sustainable

Economic Development Department), Janna van der Linden and Linda Piersma (Office for Migration Policy) and Corien Sips (Social Development Department). IOB thanks all of these people for their valuable contributions. It goes without saying that IOB bears final responsibility for the study.

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# Summary and conclusions



Limiting irregular migration plays a key role in European migration policy and the national policy of the member states. One of the instruments for tackling the root causes of this kind of migration is international cooperation. Views in academic circles about the available options to achieve this differ considerably, however. Some academics believe this kind of policy can be effective, whereas others believe this kind of policy would be counterproductive.

In this report, we have examined in more detail the diverging viewpoints based on the literature and based on our own research. The following evaluation questions are at the centre of the report:

1. What do we know about the relationship between development and migration?
2. What do we know about the determinants of (irregular) migration?
3. What is the significance of a rapidly changing context in the world (including demographic developments in Africa) for previously gained insights?
4. How and to what extent can international cooperation play a role in tackling the 'root causes' of (irregular) migration?

In terms of the last question, the report focuses mainly on development cooperation and foreign trade.<sup>1</sup> The *main conclusion* is that international cooperation will probably not have a large impact on (irregular) migration. Aid budgets are relatively modest in relation to the size of the problem. At the same time, it would be incorrect to suggest that there are no points of leverage. It is possible to exercise some influence on migration with targeted policies. However, it is important that the projects are properly evaluated, because specific insights into 'what works' are still far and few between.

## 1. What do we know about the relationship between development and migration?

The figures show that migration is an important aspect of globalisation, and its importance is only likely to increase in the future. For a long time, about 3% of the world's population lived in a country that was not his or her country of birth. Since 2000, there has been an upward trend, culminating in 3.4% in 2017. Roughly one-third of this increase can be explained by the rise in the number of refugees. That makes it clear that further growth not only depends on economic development, but also on political, socio-economic and probably also climate-related factors.

Migration is primarily the result of an international prosperity gap. Yet there is no consensus about how this prosperity gap affects migration. Neoclassical theories argue that the economic development of a country increases wages, thus decreasing the incentive to

<sup>1</sup> Agreements with other countries (migration deals), which have more to do with tackling the consequences than the root causes, remain beyond our scope. The option of limiting the further migration of refugees by improving the reception of refugees in the region will not be discussed in this study either.

migrate. Push and pull factors affect decisions about migration, whereby the prosperity gap is a dominant underlying motive.

Other researchers emphasise that migration cannot be viewed as an isolated phenomenon, but that it is an inherent part of social development processes and social transformation. This view argues that development initially leads to more – not less – migration. Increased levels of development, which go hand in hand with better education and higher incomes, not only increase opportunities but also the desire to migrate. According to these researchers, emigration generally peaks at an income of around USD 7,000-13,000 or a development index (HDI) of 0.75. It is precisely this conclusion that causes the researchers to be critical of opportunities for combating (irregular) migration from southern countries by means of international cooperation.

There is empirical evidence of the existence of a '*migration hump*'. Yet one can raise objections to the conclusions that are sometimes drawn from it. These conclusions are often based on cross-sectional research, in which small countries, often islands, dominate the top of the curve. The Comoros and Cape Verde are given as much weight in this analysis as China or India. If differences in population size are taken into account, then there is still a migration hump, but a much less pronounced one than shown in graphs based on an unweighted comparison. Second, the notion that the relationship between development and migration is the same in all countries and continents is not set in stone. Thus far, the existence of a migration hump in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa is less evident than it is in Europe and the Western Hemisphere.

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## 2. What do we know about the determinants of (irregular) migration?

A characteristic of recent migration is the strong growth of so-called 'irregular' forms of it – entering a country without permission. Estimates vary from 10% of total migration to over a third. This irregular migration has increased both as a result of the rise in the number of refugees, and a more restrictive admission policy in potential destination countries. Between 2009 and 2013, about 100,000 people entered Europe in an irregular way. This number rose in 2014, and in 2015 there were over 1 million '*illegal border crossings*'.<sup>2</sup> In the vast majority of cases it concerned refugees, primarily from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. The number is back to around 100,000 again.

The motives of many irregular migrants are not only determined by higher economic aspirations, but also by insecurity as a result of direct violence, or by the loss of possessions and income through violence. For 'economic refugees', the loss of confidence in the ability to build a decent existence and put one's education to use plays a key role. Unemployment, low expectations regarding work and income, and frustration are important considerations guiding young African people's decision to migrate.

<sup>2</sup> That year, Frontex registered a total of 1.8 million illegal crossings by migrants at Europe's external borders, but that includes many instances of double counting in the Western Balkan route.

The actual number of (irregular) migrants and their destination are furthermore determined by the existence of networks, money transfers, population growth, family reunification and education, distance and the cost and challenge of the actual move. The odds of succeeding also play a role in irregular migration. These are determined by the odds of being deported and the availability of informal work.

### 3. What is the significance of a rapidly changing context in the world (including demographic developments in Africa) for previously gained insights?

The number of migrants can increase as a result of economic development, but also a result of economic insecurity due to the lack of opportunity for work and income, conflict, forms of repression (including religious and ethnic) and the consequences of climate change (drought, flooding and failed crops). In other words: development can stimulate migration, but so can a lack of development. A large part of current irregular migration, insofar as it does not concern real refugees, is driven by a lack of prospects in people's countries of origin.

One of the concerns of European migration policy is the increase in the number of migrants from Africa. A vast majority of these people come from North Africa. Migration from sub-Saharan Africa is still at a low level (about 2.5% of the population for overall migration, 0.7 percentage points of which is intercontinental) and its intensity has decreased: between 2000 and 2015 the population doubled, whereas overall migration increased by just over 50%. Relatively speaking, however, intercontinental migration increased more than the population during this period. About 70% of the migrants live on their own continent. Some African countries still have high emigration figures, but that is more related to the fact that it concerns small countries (islands) than to the level of economic development.

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Immigration from Africa is expected to increase. Demographic developments, socio-economic developments and the growing diaspora play a role in this. Limiting regular migration will only encourage a rise in irregular migration. At the same time, the rise in emigration, which has been occurring in a number of countries in the past decades, took place in a situation in which receiving countries had actively solicited migrant workers. That is a completely different context than the one in which potential receiving countries are trying to curb irregular migration.

Based on past trends and based on the relationship between economic development and migration, we have examined how migration from Africa could potentially develop. Migration to another continent could increase from 15 million people in 2015 to 30-50 million in 2050. If the current trends persist, then about half of these people will choose a destination in the EU. A large part of this increase is determined by demographics. An uncertain factor is the development of the number of refugees. The greatest risk is that further development in sub-Saharan Africa will go hand in hand with violent political conflict between disillusioned youth and (old) elites that do not want to back down. Migration figures can dramatically increase in such a case, as the case of Syria demonstrates.

#### 4. How and to what extent can international cooperation play a role in tackling the 'root causes' of (irregular) migration?

Research on the relationship between international cooperation and migration has not made it possible to draw many firm conclusions yet. One of the reasons for this is the complexity of the relationship. We know, on the one hand, that trade and migration can be complementary, which entails a positive correlation, but also substitutes, whereby trade exercises a negative effect on migration (and vice versa). The same is true of the relationship between investment and migration. Furthermore, ultimately the most important effect occurs through socio-economic development. Which effect dominates depends both on the local context and the nature of trade and investment.

Research on the relationship between development cooperation and migration shows a diverse picture. This is partly attributable to the complexity of this relationship and the differences in methodological approach, data and choice of variables. It is also related to the main variables in the research. Some studies correlate all development cooperation, regardless of its objective, to all forms of migration, regardless of whether the development cooperation could potentially have an impact on it. This approach can easily underestimate the effects of policy: on the one hand, because a large part of the aid goes to countries that can barely be considered migration countries, if at all; on the other hand, because a considerable part of the aid is not geared towards limiting all forms of migration. More targeted studies on specific forms of development cooperation and specific groups of migrants demonstrate a larger effect. They suggest that it is possible to use targeted instruments (such as rural development) to influence specific forms of migration for specific groups of migrants (such as unemployed youth). Econometric research also suggests that the cost effectiveness of such instruments is higher for low-income countries than for high-income countries. Investments that promote labour-intensive socio-economic development can also somewhat curb irregular migration.

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There is general consensus in the literature that improving education in the short term can help to decrease internal migration from rural to urban areas, migration to another country and the transit migration of refugees. Research also shows that improving education in the long term usually leads to an increase of migration. One should note the following in that regard, however. First, improving access to and the quality of education is a condition for creating prospects in the country of origin. Second, improving education may help to reduce the negative effects of a brain drain, which is currently occurring in a number of countries. Third, education can help to instigate a shift from irregular to regular migration. OECD research suggests that conditional income transfers aimed at education can be an effective instrument for limiting emigration. Here too, the effectiveness depends partly on the specific circumstances. Strengthening (secondary) education for girls is one of the most effective instruments for helping to reduce population growth. It helps to reduce the number of teenage pregnancies, while women with higher levels of education also have fewer children on average.

### Policy implications

In the first place, this literature study suggests that it would be wise to be cautious about expectations regarding the effectiveness of a policy that aims to tackle the root causes of irregular migration. That will certainly continue to be the case as long as the available resources are modest vis-à-vis the problem, and that is especially the case in areas where donors cannot exert much influence. At the same time, there is no empirical evidence that international cooperation will have an adverse effect. Research shows that it is in fact possible to influence irregular migration with a targeted policy.

This study provides the outlines for this. In more developed countries, where foreign investment and remittances from migrants outweigh official development assistance (ODA), cooperation in the area of trade and investment, in conjunction with agreements on circular migration and return migration, and internal measures aimed at limiting irregular migration, is more effective than ODA.

Development cooperation is more cost effective in least-developed countries, where the scope of the ODA is still greater than that of foreign investment and remittances. This includes most countries in sub-Saharan Africa, incidentally. The use of development cooperation would therefore seem to be most effective in curbing irregular migration when it focuses on the relationship between education and employment opportunities. The agenda for aid, trade and investment would then need to focus on stimulating labour-intensive economic growth. A joint effort focusing on the agricultural sector, the stimulation of labour-intensive industry (including the processing of agricultural products) and modern services sector and private entrepreneurship in micro-enterprises is more effective than a direct labour market policy in the form of business training, wage subsidies and employment services. Research on promising transformation processes indicates that the effort should consist of a framework policy in the area of land rights, infrastructure, financing, innovation, competition, legal protection and quality assurance. Foreign investment has to focus more on increasing productivity, technological knowledge and supply possibilities for local companies than is currently the case. Stimulating (secondary) education for girls helps to curb population growth.

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Given demographic developments in Europe and in light of the positive effects of migration on development, development funds can be used to organise circular migration and skills-based partnerships. Under certain conditions, this could curb irregular migration.

Research on the effect that improving the (regional) reception of refugees has on further migration has barely been given consideration in this study. The reason for this is that there is limited literature on this issue. This indicates why it is important to thoroughly evaluate all initiatives in this area. What is clear is that feelings of insecurity, a lack of protection, the inability to find work, poor access to public services and a lack of prospects are the main reasons why people continue to migrate.

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# Introduction

The issue of migration has a prominent place in the Rutte III cabinet's Coalition Agreement.<sup>3</sup> The cabinet has committed itself to an effective and humane migration policy at the national and European levels. This policy entails 'tackling the causes of refugee flows, improving reception in the region, receiving refugees according to international treaties and combating irregular migration'.<sup>4</sup> In order to achieve the latter, the cabinet wants to invest in economic conditions, security and the rule of law in countries of origin and in so-called transit countries. The rationale is that irregular migration is primarily the consequence of economic hopelessness and conditions related to the climate and habitat.<sup>5</sup> So if the policy has the ability to influence the conditions of potential irregular migrants, then it should also be possible to combat irregular migration to Europe. The cabinet has indicated that it is implementing different instruments, including development cooperation (DC), civil-military efforts, and trade and investment, to help strengthen the rule of law and create better prospects for potential migrants in their own countries in order to thus reduce the perceived need to migrate.<sup>6</sup>

The minister for foreign trade and development cooperation's (FTDC) memorandum entitled *Investing in Global Prospects* aims to focus development policy on countries and regions where the Netherlands can make a difference in terms of tackling root causes. The emphasis will lie on the regions of West Africa/Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the MENA region (Middle East and North Africa), in addition to continued cooperation with the Great Lakes region, Afghanistan and Bangladesh.

The Rutte III cabinet is mobilising additional resources for foreign trade and development cooperation, which will increase from EUR 429 million in 2018 to a structural commitment of EUR 490 million from 2022 onwards. Of this, 162 million a year is earmarked for humanitarian aid. Part of that will be made available for the reception of refugees. In addition, the cabinet will set aside an additional EUR 233 million a year for specific direct or indirect migration policies:

<sup>3</sup> *Confidence in the Future*. Coalition Agreement 2017–2021.

<sup>4</sup> IOM and the European Commission adhere to the following definition of irregular migration: 'Movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries.' In other words, tourists fall under this definition, as well as people from the business sector and students who regularly cross borders but allow their visas to expire and people who cross borders in an irregular manner.

<sup>5</sup> Letter to Parliament about comprehensive migration agenda (Parliamentary Paper 19, 637 no. 2375, 29 March 2018).

<sup>6</sup> This report uses the terms international cooperation, development cooperation and development assistance. In practice, the three concepts are often used interchangeably. Here, the concept of international cooperation refers to the themes described on the Dutch government's website. It not only concerns development cooperation but also foreign trade and investment, as well as themes related to foreign policy. Indeed, this study focuses mainly on development cooperation and foreign trade and investment. Development cooperation is part of international cooperation, insofar as it focuses on the development of countries which, according to international definitions (OECD and the World Bank), qualify for development assistance. According to many of the definitions used it concerns the flow of (concessional) money, goods or services to these countries. The term development assistance is used several times in this report to emphasise that it involves official development assistance (ODA).

- EUR 128 million for regional reception;
- EUR 25 million for migration cooperation; and
- EUR 80 million to tackle the root causes (of poverty, migration and terror); in concrete terms for education, work, women's rights, security and rule of law, and the prevention of extremism.

One of the important policy assumptions is that development cooperation has the means to effectively influence economic, political, social and climate-related factors and is thus able to eradicate the root causes of irregular migration. This is not a new assumption. This assumption was also at the foundation of the Addressing Root Causes Fund set up under the previous minister's watch. This EUR 126 million fund aims to tackle the underlying causes of (among other things) irregular migration. Another example is the LEAD programme, which aims to stimulate employment opportunities for youth in sub-Saharan Africa. The minister made EUR 25 million available for this in 2015.

The assumption that it is possible to effectively intervene in the living conditions of large groups of people and in such a way that it diminishes their eagerness to become irregular migrants is also reflected in the cabinet's comprehensive approach to the European asylum problem.<sup>7</sup> Other (European) countries also adhere to this approach. Tackling the root causes of irregular migration is one of the four cornerstones of the European Union's asylum and migration policy, in addition to border control, a common policy on asylum and a policy for legal migration.<sup>8</sup>

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Various migration experts and development economists are critical of the assumptions behind the current policy. According to them, development in the countries of origin actually leads to more – not less – migration. Rising incomes, better education and a stronger infrastructure, they argue, help to increase the desire and opportunity to migrate. In this view, the motives of irregular migrants are not fundamentally different than those of other migrants.

According to other researchers, these conclusions are not as straightforward at the micro-level of the household. They, like the cabinet, argue that irregular migration is usually the consequence of economic, social and political hopelessness. Migration can also be part of a strategy that focuses on spreading the risk. If that is true, then in theory it should be possible, at the household level, to affect the risks and thus also people's considerations. We still know little, however, about what – and under which conditions – the most effective policy instruments are.

<sup>7</sup> Letter to Parliament about the European asylum problem (Parliamentary Paper 682347), 8 September 2015.

<sup>8</sup> See the European Commissions' agenda on migration: COM (2015) 240 final.



## 1.1 Problem definition and approach

There are currently many publications appearing about migration, yet there are still many unanswered questions (Clemens et al., 2018). One of these questions is: to what extent are past trends representative of anticipated developments in the future? In addition, a policy-relevant question is whether and to what degree development cooperation can play a role in influencing migration (and in what sense). Econometric studies based on countries as a unit of analysis provide no clear outcome. Why is that the case? What explains the differences? What insights are generated by evaluations at the micro-level that make it easier to assess the effects of targeted interventions?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs needs to have a systematic overview – both for its own policy formulation and to inform the wider public – that reflects the status of (empirical) literature on the determinants of migration, the relationship between development and migration, and the potential role of international cooperation in ‘eradicating the root causes of migration’. Indeed, the aim of this study is to provide an accessible account of the status regarding (empirical) literature in order to thus supply further guidelines for policy. Ultimately it concerns the question of whether it is possible to use the government’s proposed instruments to tackle the root causes of irregular migration to the EU and especially the Netherlands. In answering this question, the report focuses mainly on irregular migration from Africa.

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The evaluation questions are:

1. What do we know about the relationship between development and migration?
2. What do we know about the determinants of (irregular) migration?
3. What is the significance of a rapidly changing context in the world (including demographic developments in Africa) for previously gained insights?
4. How and to what extent can international cooperation play a role in tackling the ‘root causes’ of (irregular) migration?

The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 looks at recent migration from southern countries in the context of time and global migration.<sup>9</sup> This context is the basis for the question of which factors determine migration and hence the relationship between migration and development. Chapter 3 discusses this in more detail and devotes attention to the background and motives of groups of migrants who (want to) go to Europe. Chapter 4 focuses on knowledge about the relationship between international cooperation and migration, first at the micro-level, and then, in ensuing sections, in more detail regarding stability and good governance, trade and investment, employment opportunities and education.

<sup>9</sup> In accordance with national and international terminology, here we are using the term migrant to refer to people who are attempting to settle in another country as well as people who have already succeeded in settling in another country. Moreover, migration is more than just international migration. Numerically, socially and economically, migration within countries, often from rural to urban areas, is equally important. This report mainly focuses on international migration. For the sake of readability, the adjective ‘international’ is often left out. When it concerns domestic migration, this is explicitly mentioned.

## 1.2 Limitations

This report provides an overview of available knowledge based on the literature. Where relevant, it indicates what the limitations of the existing study are. These concern both the reliability of the data and the problem of disentangling all of the effects properly.

This study focuses mainly on the development of (irregular) migration, its determinants, the relationship between development and migration, and the potential influence of development cooperation on migration. The study does examine the direct relationship between trade and migration, but not the potential role of trade and investment in reducing poverty and promoting development.<sup>10</sup> The study examines the root causes and therefore does not focus on border control and other deterrents. Nor does it focus on the effect that improving the reception of refugees in the region has on irregular migration. There is still an extremely limited amount of empirical literature on this matter.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For this issue in sub-Saharan Africa, see: IOB, 2018.

<sup>11</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned a major impact evaluation of projects aimed at improving reception in the Horn of Africa. The final evaluation is expected in 2020.

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## Development of international migration in perspective

## 2.1 Introduction

When policy or media discusses migration, then they are usually referring to what is called *irregular migration*, for example groups of migrants that try to reach Europe via Turkey or the Mediterranean Sea.<sup>12</sup> Irregular migration is entering a country without proper authority or against the rules, with the aim of settling in that country, or in a third country (Kuschminder et al., 2015; McAuliffe and Koser, 2017). Irregularity is therefore not so much associated with the characteristics that are inextricably linked to the migrant, but much more with a specific legal and administrative context (Vespe et al., 2017). Conditions can easily change. Someone who enters a country through a regular channel (with a visa) can become an irregular migrant if he stays longer than his visa permits. Conversely, someone who entered a country in an irregular way can attain regular status if he requests asylum. This is usually the case with asylum seekers. The EU considers an Afghan or Syrian refugee an irregular (or illegal) migrant if he tries to enter the EU in an irregular way. If he requests asylum, then he will receive regular status in the EU and if he is recognised as a refugee, then he will receive a temporary residency permit, which can be converted into a residency permit of unlimited duration under certain conditions. If the person in question is not recognised as a refugee but also fails to return, then his stay will essentially become irregular/illegal (again). A distinction therefore needs to be made between irregular migration (the journey, entry) and irregular residence (De Haas, 2008).

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Figures on irregular migration and the number of irregularly residing migrants are by definition difficult to ascertain, in particular because illegal migrants are often not registered. This is also partly connected to shifting statuses. International migration flows are increasingly converging. Refugees and asylum seekers that require international protection and those who want to migrate primarily for economic reasons are exploring the same channels and using the same routes. Estimates of irregular migration vary from 10%-15% to about a third of global migration (UN, 2013). In 2010 the UN estimated there were 50 million migrants, which at the time was almost 25% of the total number registered by UNDESA (Martínez Flores, 2018). Many reside in transit countries such as Greece and Italy, but also in Turkey, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania. Partly as a result of policy, transit migration and onward migration are becoming increasingly important. This transit migration is especially common among low-skilled workers who do not have legal status in the country in which they reside (King and Lulle, 2018).

This chapter puts ‘irregular migration’ in the context of overall migration in the world, and it also distinguishes between different forms of migration and developments within it. The chapter begins with the development and international diffusion of migration (section 2.2). Section 2.3 takes a closer look at migration to the EU, in particular migrants who enter Europe through irregular channels, that is to say without proper authority. People often have the idea that these migrants are ‘economic refugees’. Section 2.4 provides some figures

<sup>12</sup> Migration is more than just international migration. Numerically, socially and economically, migration within countries, often from rural to urban areas, is equally important. This report mainly focuses on international migration. For the sake of readability, the adjective ‘international’ is often left out. When it concerns domestic migration, then this is clarified.

for the Netherlands. Figures for the EU show that many irregular migrants come from conflict countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Somalia. Section 2.5 focuses on this latter group: refugees. The policy and the academic literature often speak of forced migration, as opposed to voluntary (economic) migration. It is not always possible to clearly distinguish between these two categories, however.


This chapter also devotes a separate section to migration from Africa (2.6) because of the attention given to it by policy. The chapter closes with a short summary. One of the conclusions is that internationally speaking the level of migration from sub-Saharan Africa is (still) low. An important question therefore is how this will develop, given demographic, socio-economic and security developments. This question is the focus of chapter 3.

## 2.2 International migration in perspective

Contrary to what one would expect in a globalising world, the percentage of migrants worldwide has been stable for a long time now, with fluctuations of about 3%. There are noticeable changes over a short period. Between 1960 and 1980, migration figures decreased from 3.1% to 2.7%, to subsequently remain at that level for two decades. The turn of the century marked a departure from this trend, and since 2010 the global percentage of emigration has been higher than it was in 1960. In 2017 there were almost 260 million migrants (3.4%) in the world, as opposed to just over 170 million in 2000.

| 21 |

**Figure 2.1** Development of international migration 1970-2017



Source: World Bank Global Bilateral Migration Database (1960-2000); UNDESA; IO (2018).

The increase in migration did not coincide with major shifts between continents, with the exception of a sharp rise in the number of migrants from Asia to the Middle East (see Annex I).<sup>13</sup> Between 2000 and 2017 the largest bilateral flows of migrants were from Mexico to the United States, from Syria to Turkey, and from India to the United Arab Emirates (UNDESA, 2018).

The vast majority (80%) of migrants come from a developing country. That is not particularly surprising, because more than 80% of the world population also lives in a developing country. Contrary to common perception, the share of developing countries in overall migration has barely risen: in 1995 that figure was only a percentage point lower (OECD, 2016). A clear change has been noticeable regarding destination: in 1995, 36% of emigrants lived in high-income countries; by 2015 this figure had increased to 51% (OECD, 2016).

## 2.3 Migration to the EU

Driven by demographic developments in the world, the share of emigrants from Europe in overall migration has decreased. In 2000 the number of Europeans that had settled in another continent was still comparable to the number of immigrants that settled in Europe, but in recent years Europe has emphatically become a net immigration region. The continent had about 78 million migrants in 2017, the majority of which (41 million) were from Europe itself.<sup>14</sup> Most of the other 37 million immigrants are from Asia, Central and South America, and North Africa. The group consists of more than 3 million refugees and asylum seekers, especially from Syria (1 million), Afghanistan (400,000), Iraq (300,000), Eritrea (200,000), Somalia (125,000) and Iran (120,000).

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UN figures on the number of migrants in the EU show that the percentage of migrants from outside the (current) EU has been fairly constant for several decades now at a level of about 63%. OECD data on the annual inflow paint a slightly different picture.<sup>15</sup> According to these figures the annual migration within the EU increased from 650,000 to 1.6 million people, whereby the share of countries within the EU in this migration increased from 34% to 43%.


<sup>13</sup> In accordance with national and international terminology, here we are using the term migrant to refer to people who are attempting to settle in another country as well as people who have already succeeded in settling in another country.

<sup>14</sup> UNDESA figures. In 2017 UNDESA estimated that there were 78 million migrants in Europe. According to Statistics Netherlands (CBS) there are 3.9 million people in the Netherlands with a migration background, 2.1 million of whom have a non-Western background. This is a broader definition, which also includes people whose parents were born abroad. In 2016, 2 million people had a first-generation migration background, 1.2 million of whom had a non-Western background. The UNDESA figures are consistent for the Netherlands regarding the first generation with a migration background.

<sup>15</sup> The OECD only provides figures for the inflow to OECD countries. That means that non-OECD countries in the EU are not included in these figures as a destination country. These countries are Bulgaria, Cyprus, Croatia, Malta and Romania. The OECD database does not have any figures on Lithuania as a destination country either.

The number of migrants that entered the EU annually was fairly constant between 2003 and 2013, but it rose sharply in 2015 and 2016 (see figure 2.2). Though the cause of this increase was closely linked to the Syria crisis, irregular migration from other (conflict) countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan also played a role. The figures are more stable if these three conflict countries are not taken into account. There is a shift taking place in the background, however, with an increased share of migrants from low-income countries (from 4% to 9%) and lower middle-income countries (from 28% to 38%).<sup>16</sup> The shift in the inflow coincided with a rise in the number of asylum requests, from 375,000 in 2000 to 1.15 million in 2015 and 2016.<sup>17</sup> About half of the inflow into the EU thus consisted of people who had requested asylum. There is a noticeable shift here as well: in 2000 the majority of people who requested asylum came from a higher middle-income country. This has declined to less than 30%. In 2017 about 630,000 people requested asylum in the EU.

**Figure 2.2** Inflow of migrants into the EU according to income level in country of origin (2000-2016)



Source: OECD migration database; adapted by researchers.


<sup>16</sup> Excluding Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.

<sup>17</sup> Including Afghanistan, Syria and Iraq.

In addition to an income shift, there is also a visible shift in terms of region of origin (see figure 2.3). From 2008 onwards, migration to the EU from Central and South America decreased. Moreover, migration from South Asia (Afghanistan, Pakistan and India) increased. From 2014 onwards migration from the Middle East increased as a result of the crises in Syria and Iraq. If we do not take the three most important conflict countries into consideration, then it is particularly the share of sub-Saharan Africa in the total that increases (from 9% in 2000 to 15% in 2016).

Frontex’s figures for the EU give an indication of irregular migration to Europe. Frontex publishes figures about illegal entry into the EU from 2009 onwards. Between 2009 and 2013 it concerned more than 100,000 ‘illegal border crossings’ a year. In 2014 this number increased to 240,000, and in 2015 it rose to over 1 million.<sup>18</sup> The increase was mainly attributable to a few conflict countries: Syria (a total of more than 500,000), Afghanistan (215,000) and Iraq (94,000) (see figure 2.2).

**Figure 2.3** Inflow of migrants into the EU according to region of origin (2000-2016)




Source: OECD migration database; adapted by researchers.

<sup>18</sup> The Frontex figures contain considerable double counting, because the Western Balkan route runs via the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and Greece. In order to get a clear picture, we have not included illegal border crossings via the Western Balkan in the figures.



**Figure 2.4** *Illegal entry into the EU 2009-2017\**




\* Excluding entry through the Western Balkan route.

Source: Frontex (2018).

Figure 2.4 clearly shows how Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq dominate the overall picture. What's more, it mainly deals with 2015. Excluding these three countries gives us a better idea of irregular migration to Europe from other countries. Figure 2.5 demonstrates this. The numbers in this figure show the volatility of the different flows.

**Figure 2.5** *Illegal entry into the EU 2009-2017\**



\* Excluding entry through the Western Balkan route and excluding migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.  
Source: Frontex (2018).

Between 2010 and 2011 migration from South Asia (Pakistan) and North Africa (Tunisia) in particular increased. The figures also effectively show the share of a few countries of origin in irregular migration: Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Morocco, Nigeria, Somalia and Eritrea. In 2016 and 2017 most irregular migrants came from West Africa, in particular Nigeria, Guinea, Gambia, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali and, just outside West Africa, Cameroon.

Research by IOM, conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, confirms the existing picture of irregular migrants: predominantly young, male (85%) and single.<sup>19</sup> Mandić (2017), on the other hand, describes a shift in the background of refugees using the Balkan route. Whereas until 2015 it mainly concerned educated young men who had jobs and were traveling alone, from 2015 onwards it increasingly concerned couples and poorer groups, including women and the elderly, as well as unsupervised young people and disabled persons. Nor had they enjoyed as much of an education. In terms of nationality the groups became more homogenous: until 2015 migrants originated from a large number of Arabic and Africa countries, whereas in 2015 the picture was dominated by refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

<sup>19</sup> An exception to this are the female Ethiopian migrants who have settled in Greece. On average, migrants from Iraq had a somewhat higher age (an average of age of 30-33 years for migrants in transit countries) and were less frequently single.

Since 2016 irregular migration to the EU has become more diverse again in terms of country of origin and less diverse in terms of profile. Since the closing of the Balkan route, irregular migration has mainly gone through the Central Mediterranean Route (60% in 2017). The largest group using this route come from Nigeria (18,000 in 2017), followed by Côte d'Ivoire (13,000), Guinea (12,000) and Morocco (11,000). Most of the remaining migrants are from other countries in West Africa, the Horn of Africa and North Africa (Tunisia).

With the exception of refugees from Syria and Afghanistan in 2015, irregular migration, as recorded by Frontex, is relatively small compared to the overall recorded migration to the EU. According to OECD data in 2013 1.5 million migrants entered the EU; in 2015 that number had increased to 2.5 million, mainly as a result of the number of refugees from Syria.<sup>20</sup> In 2016 that had become 2.2 million migrants. The number of times Frontex recorded illegal crossings of the EU's external borders in 2013 recorded by Frontex was about 100,000 and in 2015 1.8 million (including the West Balkan borders). In 2016 this number had decreased to just over 500,000. According to OECD data for the period 2014-2016 there was an overall inflow of 6.3 million people. Frontex mentions a total of 1.7 illegal border crossings (excluding the Western Balkan) for the same period, 1 million of which were by migrants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.<sup>21</sup>

## 2.4 Some figures for the Netherlands

The percentage of (first generation) migrants in the Netherlands increased from 9% to 12% between 2000 and 2017.<sup>22</sup> The greatest increase was attributable to the number of Poles in the Netherlands, as well as migrants from Asian countries. The percentage of Western migrants increased slightly from 38% to 40% (in addition to Poles also many Germans and Belgians). In addition to Western migrants, migrants from the former colonies (Indonesia, Suriname, Curaçao, Aruba and Sint Maarten) and the traditional countries associated with labour migration (Turkey and Morocco) account for an important part of the number of migrants. About 1 in 100 inhabitants comes from Africa (not counting Morocco).


<sup>20</sup> The OECD uses national data from OECD countries and therefore also national definitions. Some countries register the number of foreigners that have authorisation to stay in the country permanently or for a longer period of time, while other countries base their figures on the time that foreigners have already stayed or are expected to stay in the country. Various countries, such as Germany, also include asylum seekers. The Netherlands does not include asylum seekers who were accommodated in shelters. For definitions by country, see OECD (2018). International Migration Outlook 2018. Statistical Annex.

<sup>21</sup> The number of asylum requests in the EU also reveals the scope of irregular migration to the EU. Many migrants who enter the EU through an irregular channel then request asylum in an EU country. This development paints a picture that corresponds to Frontex's data. This report essentially leaves out migrants who either willingly returned or were forced to return. There is hardly any quantitative data available on this.

<sup>22</sup> Source: CBS (Statline).

Of the nearly 2 million immigrants in the Netherlands, about 7% comes from sub-Saharan Africa and 10% from North Africa. Almost 90% of the latter are Moroccans, consisting mostly of actively recruited migrant workers and their family members who emigrated to be reunited with their families. Most migrants from sub-Saharan Africa come from West Africa (Cape Verde, Nigeria and Ghana) or South Africa, Ethiopia and Somalia. In the latter case it mainly concerns people who have fled the decades-long violence in that country (Dietz and De Haas, 2018).

**Figure 2.6** Migrants in the Netherlands according to origin (2017)



Source: CBS (adapted by researchers).

Figures about the inflow of asylum seekers give an indication of irregular migrants' countries of origin.<sup>23</sup> Between 2013 and 2017, 110,000 people requested asylum in the Netherlands. They were mainly from Syria (32%), Eritrea (14%), Iraq (5%), Afghanistan (4%) and Iran (4%). But some of the people requesting asylum receive refugee status. In 2017 that was 31%. In the years prior to that the percentage was higher, as a result of the inflow of refugees from Syria. Those receiving status have a right to family reunification, which results in what are referred to as 'follow-to-join' immigrants. Between 2013 and 2017 there were almost 50,000 such migrants, especially from Syria.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> According to a foundation supporting undocumented migrants (Stichting Landelijk Ongedocumenteerden Steunpunt), 60% of undocumented people, who are therefore irregular migrants residing in the Netherlands, submitted a request for asylum in the past, to no avail. Others entered through another channel or allowed their residency permit to expire.

<sup>24</sup> Source: CBS.

## 2.5 Refugees

Refugees are a specific group among migrants: both policy makers and academics often speak of forced migration in that respect, as opposed to the vast majority that choose, for economic or social reasons, to build a new life in a different country voluntarily. Indeed, the 1951 Refugee Convention gives refugees a much different status than it does migrants who wish to establish residence in a country for economic reasons. Based on this convention countries cannot simply refuse entry to refugees and asylum seekers; that is not the case when it comes to economic migrants. In practice the distinction is vague. Refugees are often irregular migrants and vice versa (Kirein and Anderson, 2018).

In the early 1990s there were about 20 million refugees in the world. The vast majority came from Afghanistan, followed by the Palestinian territories, Mozambique, Iraq, Rwanda, Somalia and Burundi. Between 1990 and 2005 their number consistently decreased, in particular due to the declining number of refugees from the first four countries on this list, in addition to Liberia and Ethiopia. After 2005, and especially from 2012 onwards, these figures rose again. The current 28 million refugees and asylum seekers are mainly victims of the crises in Syria, the Horn of Africa, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Myanmar and Afghanistan. Together they account for 60% of the overall number of refugees.


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The number of refugees who have fled their own country for the long term, at least five years, has increased as well. In 2017 that number was 13.4 million, more than half of the overall number of refugees (UNHCR, 2017). More than a quarter of these have been in this situation for almost 40 years. It mainly concerns refugees from Afghanistan who have been residing in Iran and Pakistan since 1979.<sup>25</sup>

About 80% of the refugees receive shelter in the region (see Annex I). Afghan refugees mostly ended up in Pakistan (1.4 million). Bangladesh has received almost 1 million refugees from Myanmar. Refugees from Syria are mostly given shelter in Turkey (3.4 million), Lebanon (1 million) and Jordan (650,000). Ethiopia takes in refugees from South Sudan and Somalia. There are more than 1 million refugees from South Sudan and 225,000 refugees from the DRC in Uganda. In Western Europe, Germany has taken in the most refugees, including 500,000 Syrians.

<sup>25</sup> Moreover, Palestinian refugees have been outside of their country for a very long time. They fall under the UNRWA.

**Figure 2.7** Development of number of refugees 1990-2017



\* Including asylum seekers.

Source: UNHCR (2018); UNWRA (2018).

Together, four countries, namely Uganda, Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon, have taken in almost 7 million refugees, 30% of the overall number.<sup>26</sup> The percentage of refugees of the total population is especially high in Lebanon and Jordan (respectively more than 16% and 7%, see figure 2.5). And this is excluding the Palestinian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon. The World Bank (2018) concluded in a recent publication that humanitarian assistance to these countries is insufficient to redress the economic, social, cultural and political impact. The large number of 3.8 million in Turkey means it too has a high percentage of refugees (4%), despite having a large population. For the Netherlands that figure is 0.6%. Of all Western countries, Sweden has by far the most refugees in proportion to the size of its population (2.4%). The distribution by income is even more lopsided, because 85% of refugees are taken in by developing countries. For example, a large portion of the refugees from Afghanistan are in Pakistan. Sub-Saharan Africa takes in about 80% of its refugees itself. Their number in relation to the national income is especially high in South Sudan and Uganda.

<sup>26</sup> In addition to refugees and asylum seekers, the UNHCR has taken charge of a much larger group of displaced persons who live in their own country. By 2017 this group's number had quadrupled in ten years' time to 39 million, which means it was twice as large as the number of (international) refugees recorded by the UNHCR. In late 2017 there were almost 69 million refugees, internally displaced persons and asylum seekers worldwide. That is 6 million more than in the previous year.

## 2.6 Migration from Africa

Two out of every three of the world's refugees come from Africa and the Middle East. Although more than 80% are given shelter in their own region, a concern in European migration policy is that they will try to reach Europe in large numbers. Another concern is that many economic migrants will come in their wake and request asylum or stay illegally in Europe. The demographic development of sub-Saharan Africa is another concern: between 1990 and 2017 the population of this region doubled to over 1 billion inhabitants, and the continent is expected to reach the 2 billion mark in the forties of this century.


Demographic developments are one of the main reasons why the number of migrants from Africa to Europe has increased. Furthermore, it appears that the rise in African emigration is lagging behind population growth on the continent, but that this is not the case for intercontinental migration (see figure 2.8).

Between 1990 and 2015 the per capita income rose by an average of 50% and migration increased at essentially the same rate, but the population almost doubled during this period, so that the intensity of emigration in Africa declined (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016).

| 31 | The largest portion of African migrants, including refugees, live on their own continent. In 2000 about 70% of African emigrants lived in sub-Saharan Africa (Beauchemin, 2018), and that percentage has barely changed since then. Destination countries mainly include South Africa, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia (Awumbila, 2017). West Africa has a relatively long migration tradition, which is linked to the large number of smaller countries (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016). It is precisely in smaller countries that migration figures are often relatively high (Lucas, 2015). Greater population pressure can also coincide with a rise in emigration. In addition to demographic factors (including the number of inhabitants in the age category of 15-29 years), a common language, trade relations and a common colonial past are factors that may have impacted an increase in migration in Africa (Lucas, 2015). Most migrants from less developed African countries (such as Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso) generally reside in neighbouring countries (such as Côte d'Ivoire), whereas Africans from more developed countries (such as South Africa) are more likely to emigrate to Europe (Lucas, 2015; Flahaux and De Haas, 2016; Beauchemin, 2018).

The percentage of Africans living outside their own continent has gradually increased from 0.9% in 1990 to 1.2% in 2017. An important part (55%) of that concerns migration from North Africa (with an emigration figure of 4.6%), especially to the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) and Europe (France, Spain and Italy) (see figure 2.9). The increase in sub-Saharan Africa went from 0.3% in 1990 to 0.7% in 2017. It should be noted that this concerns small numbers (a total of 7 million migrants in 2017 out of a population of more than 1 billion people).

Figure 2.8 Development of population and migration in Africa (1990-2015)




Source: UNDESA, UNHCR and World Bank; adapted by researchers.

Many of the migrants who left Africa in recent years have found a destination in the Middle East or in the United States. Relatively speaking, the increase to those regions was higher than the increase in migration to Europe. According to OECD data, in 2000 about 100,000 migrants from sub-Saharan Africa entered the EU. Ten years later that number was 150,000, a small portion of which (10,000 migrants) entered through irregular channels. A change did subsequently occur, in which the increase to 250,000 migrants in 2015 was entirely attributable to an irregular inflow. That mainly concerned refugees from Eritrea and Somalia, as well as migrants from several smaller countries in West Africa, including Senegal, Gambia and Cape Verde.<sup>27</sup>

More than a third of the four million migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who live in Europe come from a handful of West African countries: Ghana, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Cameroon, Mali, Nigeria and Senegal. Senegal has a long tradition of emigration, which actually already started with the demobilisation of Senegalese soldiers after the First World War (Beauchemin, 2018). In recent decades, migration within Africa (especially to Gambia) has declined in favour of emigration to France, Spain and Italy. Ghana has experienced considerable immigration from neighbouring countries, while about 800,000 Ghanaians live abroad, about half of whom live in other sub-Saharan countries (especially Nigeria) and approximately 230,000 in Europe. Since the 1990s, many educated Ghanaians have moved to the United States, Canada and Europe, in particular to the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands (IOB 2014).

<sup>27</sup> Incidentally, the percentage of refugees and asylum seekers among migrants (20%) is lower for Europe than for the African continent itself.



**Figure 2.9** Migration from Africa to Europe (1990-2015)

\* Emigration level, calculated as a percentage of migrants to Europe / (population + total number of emigrants).  
Source: UNDESA and WDI.

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A second group, consisting of about 20% of the above-mentioned African migrants in Europe, come from several countries in Southern Africa: Angola, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and South Africa. A third group of about 14% originates from the Horn of Africa: Eritrea, Kenya and Somalia.<sup>28</sup> Circular migration to the Gulf States plays a more important role than migration to Europe for countries in this region (Koch et al., 2018).

Traditionally, old colonial ties, already existing migration communities from the country of origin and a common language are important considerations when it comes to migration. Examples include emigration from Angola to Portugal, or from the DRC to Belgium and France. In North Africa and West Africa (including Senegal and Mali) it also partially concerns migrant workers who were actively recruited by France. Over time, the influence of colonial ties diminished and migrants also began to choose other destinations (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016). In addition to the United Kingdom, France and Portugal, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden and Spain have also become popular destinations. Flahaux and De Haas (2016) attribute this to a more restrictive immigration policy in France and the United Kingdom. There are often students and people with a higher level of education among migrants to 'traditional' destinations (often ex-colonies), while migrants to new destinations usually have a lower level of education (such as the Senegalese in Italy and Spain, the Ghanaians in the Netherlands and the Congolese in the United Kingdom) (Beauchemin, 2018).

<sup>28</sup> In addition to Europe, migrants from Ethiopia have often found refuge in the United States and Saudi Arabia, (Flahaux and De Haas, 2016).

## 2.7 Summary

This chapter puts current (irregular) migration to Europe in the context of both the long-term development of migration and overall global migration. The figures show that overall migration, measured as the number of migrants in the world divided by the world population, has remained fairly constant for quite some decades: in recent decades about 3% of the world population lived in another country. Since 2000 there has been an upward trend to 3.4% in 2017. Roughly a third of this increase can be attributed to a rise in the number of refugees. Most migrants live in Europe, Asia (including the Middle East) and North America.

There are hardly any reliable figures yet about *irregular migration*, i.e. entering a country without authorisation. Estimates vary from 10% of overall migration to more than a third. Between 2009 and 2013 about 100,000 entered Europe through an irregular channel every year. This figure increased in 2014, and in 2015 there were about 1 million '*illegal border crossings*'.<sup>29</sup> A vast majority of these were refugees, mainly from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. Since then the number of irregular migrants that crossed the EU border decreased again, from approximately 400,000 in 2016, less than 200,000 in 2017 to (an expected number of) about 100,000 in 2018.

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Part of the reason why irregular migration has increased is due to a rise in the number of refugees seeking an alternative to their first country of refuge. The number of refugees in the world continued to decrease between 1990 and 2005, but since then it has started to increase again. The UNHCR recorded 13 million refugees and asylum seekers in 2005; in 2017 that had increased to 23 million. This growth is mainly from the Middle East (Syria) and sub-Saharan Africa. Most refugees are given refuge in their own region, whereby a limited number of countries (Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey and Uganda) have taken in large numbers of refugees. Sweden is the only Western country that has welcomed large numbers of refugees in proportion to the size of its population.

One of the concerns of European migration policy is the increase in the number of migrants from Africa. Historically, a vast majority of migrants from North Africa arrive as migrant workers or to be reunited with their families. Intercontinental migration from countries in sub-Saharan Africa is still at a low level, about 0.7%, though it is increasing faster than the population. Migration from Africa to the US and the Middle East rose higher, relatively speaking, than to Europe.

<sup>29</sup> That year, Frontex recorded a total of 1.8 million illegal crossings by migrants at Europe's external borders, but that includes many instances of double counting in the Western Balkan route.

3

# Determinants of international migration

### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter examines the determinants of migration, paying specific attention to the relationship between development and migration. This relationship is important for opportunities to influence irregular migration via international cooperation. More traditional approaches to migration assume, just as policy does, that migration is to a significant degree the result of negative 'push' factors such as poverty and insecurity. Other migration experts are critical of the possibilities of influencing migration by tackling its root causes. They argue that there is a positive correlation between development and migration and that development will lead to more, rather than less, migration.

Sections 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 discuss a number of dominant theories regarding the relationship between development and migration. The ensuing sections (3.5-3.9) focus on individual determinants. Section 3.10 briefly examines the reverse relationship, namely the influence that migration has on development. Section 3.11 provides several potential projections about the development of migration from Africa. The conclusion (section 3.12) is that even solely on the basis of demographics a considerable rise in emigration from sub-Saharan Africa is probable. Expectations of an 'exodus' do not have any empirical basis whatsoever, on the other hand.

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### 3.2 Wage differentials

Traditional (neoclassical) migration theories explain migration primarily by way of wage differentials. The theory emanates from research on domestic migration from rural areas to cities, in which workers were attracted by higher wages in the (industrial) urban environment. (Lewis, 1954; Todaro, 1969). The neoclassical view argued that this migration resulted in a convergence between urban and rural areas, and between countries, which created new balances (in demand for and supply of labour) and reduced wage differentials. This view sees migration as an investment in human capital, aimed at maximising income in the long term (Sjaastad, 1962; Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009). The decision to migrate is based on a consideration of costs and benefits, on preference in time (the importance of higher wages now or later), on the length of time that the benefits are expected to last and on the willingness to take risks.

The decision to migrate is often made at the household or family level and not at the individual level. In such cases, the migration of a family member is often a way of spreading risk (Stark, 1991; Loschmann et al., 2017). A migrating family member could generate the capital needed to start a company or get an education. In such cases, the possibility of sending money to the family in the country of origin is an important argument in favour of migrating. It turns out that it is particularly the wealthier households that manage to send family members to Europe. The poorest cannot afford the journey. At most, they will move domestically or migrate within a region.

The neoclassical approach is frequently used in research on international migration flows (Borjas, 1989, see also Castles et al., 2014; Lucas et al., 2014; Chiswick and Miller, 2015; Bansak et al., 2015). An example of this is the use of *gravity models* of international migration, which argue that, in addition to economic differences, the distance, common language and social ties between countries also explain why people choose a given destination country (Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, 2009; Castles et al., 2014; Bodvarsson et al., 2015).

Research shows that international income disparities and international wage differentials do in fact provide an important explanation for migration (OECD, 2016; World Bank, 2018). An increase of 10% in income disparity between two countries will increase migration by 3%, according to a study by the OECD (2016). This effect is greater in high-income countries, but considerably lower in countries that are less well-developed (5%). Lucas (2015) explains the rise in emigration from Africa primarily as a result of increased income disparity between the region and the West.

Research also shows that it is not only inequality between countries but also within countries that has an impact on migration. The measured effects are not unequivocal, however. According to various studies, the correlation between inequality in emigration is positive (Clemens, 2014). One explanation is that economic development often coincides with increased inequality, which creates frustration among disadvantaged groups regarding their incomes (Heilbroner, 1963; Clemens, 2014). Carbone (2017) cites insufficiently inclusive development as a key determinant of migration in Africa (see also Adepoju, 2017). Unemployment, expectations about work and pent-up frustrations are important factors that play a part in people's decision to migrate (Migali, 2017; Beauchemin, 2018; IOM, 2018).

Other studies suggest that (domestic) inequality has a negative effect on international migration (Bazzi, 2017; Maestri et al., 2017). An explanation for this is that inequality ensures that fewer people have the (financial) opportunity to migrate. In the neoclassical approach, the latter is used as an argument to explain why it is not the very poorest who migrate to Europe or the United States.<sup>30</sup> Improving the income of potential migrants has two contrasting effects: on the one hand, it improves living conditions, which may alleviate the pressure to migrate, according to the literature. On the other hand, when the income of poorer households grows, it increases opportunities to migrate. This latter effect may dominate the former, according to empirical research (Angelucci, 2015; Bazzi, 2017; Clemens and Postel, 2018). It helps to explain why migration in sub-Saharan Africa is strongly regionally oriented, even though intercontinental migration has increased more than migration within the region since 2000.

The neoclassical theory is thus mindful of the preconditions for migration and provides an explanation for the fact that there is a relatively low level of emigration from the poorest countries. But that does not mean the theory is capable of explaining why migration does not initially decrease when there is growth in prosperity but in fact increases (De Haas, 2010;

<sup>30</sup> The poorest groups do migrate, but they stay closer to home (migration from rural areas to cities or neighbouring countries), often under more unfavourable conditions (De Haas, 2014).

Clemens, 2014; OECD, 2016; Dao et al., 2018). Indeed, between 1995 and 2015 the (relative) income disparities between emerging countries and high-income countries decreased by 45% on average, but the migration of people in the first group of countries to the second increased by 86% (OECD, 2016). It would appear that the neoclassical approach is better equipped to explain migration within Western countries with higher incomes, or the migration of highly skilled Africans to Europe, than irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe (De Haas, 2014).<sup>31</sup>

### 3.3 Push and pull factors

The above observation suggests that migration cannot only be explained by (international) wage differentials and income disparities, but that other factors also play a role. This recognition can be traced back to what are known as push and pull approaches, which often (but not exclusively) can be viewed as an elaboration of the neoclassical model. As is the case with the neoclassical model, the labour markets in the countries of origin and destination play a key role, but push and pull approaches add other factors to the equation. The charm of the notion is in its relative simplicity: there are (push) factors that cause people to want to leave their current community or country and (pull) factors that cause them to want to go to new destinations. Push factors include things such as conflict, unemployment, a lack of economic prospects, low wages, natural disasters, food insecurity, poor health care and persecution. Pull factors are usually complementary, for example the prospect of economic prosperity, employment opportunities, high wages, good educational systems, technology, safety and security.

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According to this approach, different forms of migration arise from various combinations of push and pull factors. One example is the explanation for why two million Irish people emigrated in the mid-nineteenth century, caused by high population growth, the oppression and discrimination of the Catholic population, and famine following a failed potato crop, as well as the American immigration policy, which welcomed the Irish.

The approach is appealing from the point of view of policy: if emigration or immigration is deemed undesirable, then in principle it should also be possible to tackle the root causes. The weakness of this approach also lies in its simplicity, however: it reduces migration to a more or less unlimited and random list of factors that cause people to migrate. The framework is static and does not analyse how migration, in turn, influences the factors that contribute to migration (De Haas, 2010; Dietz and De Haas, 2018). A third criticism is that the approach is based on external factors and not people's intrinsic motivation (De Haas, 2011; Castles et al., 2014; De Haas, 2014). The assumption is that people respond in the same way: they migrate if the benefits outweigh the costs. But then that begs the question: why are many more people not migrating?

<sup>31</sup> Another criticism is the distinctly separate analysis of the reason why people migrate and the effects of migrating, such as sending money home, as if the two are not connected (De Haas, 2014; Bodvarsson et al., 2015).

Table 3.1 Push and pull factors of migration	
Push factors	Pull factors
<b>Economic:</b>	<b>Economic:</b>
Poverty Unemployment Low wages High taxes	Strong economic growth Demand for labour High wages Technology Low cost of living Educational opportunities
<b>Political and social:</b>	<b>Political and social:</b>
War or oppression Discrimination Corruption Crime Military service Poor health care	Rule of law Rights and freedoms Safety Social security Good health care
<b>Other:</b>	<b>Other:</b>
Overpopulation Climate change Natural disaster Famine	Family and friends Services

Source: Bansak et al., 2015; Simpson, 2017.

### 3.4 Migration transition


Unlike the approaches discussed above, migration transition theories do not view migration as resulting from wage differentials or a more or less random set of push and pull factors, but as a process that is an inherent part of development, economic and demographic transition, and globalisation (De Haas, 2014a; De Haas et al., 2018).<sup>32</sup> The transition approach does not predict that emigration will decrease as a result of growing prosperity, but rather it predicts an initial increase.

De Haas (2011; 2014a) analyses migration as a function of people's ambitions and opportunities to migrate. The pivotal idea is that as a country develops more people have the opportunity to migrate: increased wages or a higher level of education are not the only factors that play a role in this process, but also better transport and communication infrastructure, international trade, and access to media and social networks. In addition to these opportunities, which neoclassical models identify as preconditions, *aspirations* play a key role for De Haas. Here he differs from neoclassical approaches, which emphasise wage differentials. Aspirations are linked to people's desire to improve their lives and what they perceive as opportunities for achieving this, both in their own environment and elsewhere,

<sup>32</sup> This approach originates from the work of American geographer Wilbur Zelinsky (1971), who, following his theory of a demographic transition, developed his hypothesis of a mobility transition.

whether in the city, another country or even another continent. These ambitions and expectations are subjective and change over time, influenced by socio-economic and cultural developments. For example, education not only helps to expand knowledge and skills that increase the chances of working in another country, but it also provides knowledge of lifestyles in cities and other countries. In less-developed societies this process initially increases the aspiration to migrate, which later on is followed by the emergence of real opportunities to do so as a result of rising incomes, improved education, the development of the infrastructure and economic transition (see figure 3.1). Usually people first migrate from rural areas to the city and only at a later stage to another country (De Haas, 2014; IOB, 2018). Opportunities for migrating will continue to grow in line with incomes, but the aspiration to migrate will fall again when a certain level of development is reached.

**Figure 3.1** *The relationship between development level and the ability and aspiration to migrate*



Source: De Haas (2010).

De Haas has provided empirical evidence in various papers confirming the existence of a ‘migration hump’. The American economist Michael Clemens has devoted a great deal of attention to this as well. In his research on the relationship between development and migration (Clemens, 2014), the author demonstrates the inverted-U relationship between income per capita of the population and the rate of emigration.<sup>33</sup> His conclusion is that the emigration rate rises until a level of approximately USD 7,000-8,000 (about the level of Morocco; see figure 3.4). According to the researcher, this inverted-U becomes increasingly pronounced as time passes: it turns out that the highest percentage of migration continues to be reached around the same income level, but the peak keeps getting higher (Clemens, 2014).<sup>34</sup>


<sup>33</sup> Here, income here is measured based on purchasing power parity.

<sup>34</sup> According to Clemens a peak was reached in 1960 with an emigration rate of 6% and in 2000 with a rate of about 14%. This suggests that there was a sharp rise in emigration over time. The evidence for this is lacking. See also chapter 2. In Clemens’ analysis, extremely small countries, often island states, have a major influence on these outcomes.




Figure 3.2 outlines the (empirical) relationship between the level of development and rate of emigration. The figure on the left shows the relationship with income (GDP per capita, measured on the basis of purchasing power parity); the figure on the right uses the human development index (HDI). The figures show a similar correlation.<sup>35</sup> They clearly show that the neoclassical theory is better equipped to explain the right side of the figure than the left: migration initially increases with the income instead of decreasing. Dao et al. (2018) examined which factors are responsible for the ascending part of the inverted-U. The researchers concluded that financial constraints only play a role in countries with an average income of below USD 1,000 a year. Above that level, the effect of average income growth is limited, and what mainly causes migration to rise is improved levels of education.

**Figure 3.2** *The relationship between development and migration (2015)*



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<sup>35</sup> The maximum is a little lower than Clemens indicates, due to a slightly different definition of emigration rate, defined here as total emigration divided by the sum of the total population in the country of origin and total emigration. As we are mainly interested in the relationship between development and migration here, we have subtracted the number of refugees from the total number of migrants, as measured by the UNHCR. The two databases are not consistent with each other. Refugees are overrepresented in international migration data (De Haas et al., 2018). This means that it is not possible to accurately determine for each country what the number of migrants is excluding the number of refugees. That is less of a problem for this exercise, as we are primarily interested in the relationship, whereas the large number of refugees from several low- and lower middle-income countries (including Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia and Eritrea) distort the picture on the left side of the figure.



Source: UNDESA, UNDP and WDI (adapted by researchers).


### The influence of small countries

An objection that could be raised regarding the above presentation is that all countries are given equal weight: Cape Verde, which has just over 0.5 million inhabitants, has just as much influence as Ethiopia, which has 100 million inhabitants; Vanuatu carries the same weight as India or China. At the same time, we know that the emigration rate of small countries (especially islands) is higher on average than the rate of large countries (see, for example, Arslan et al., 2014; Lucas, 2015). Large countries have more internal migration. Figure 3.3 therefore also indicates the size of the population.

It then appears that countries with high emigration figures are indeed usually small countries. The most important exceptions, approximately at the turning point of an HDI value of 0.75, are Russia, Ukraine and Mexico. In Mexico's case, a long tradition of migration to the United States plays an important role; in the case of Russia and Ukraine, it mainly concerns intra-community migration.<sup>36</sup> Many other countries that are situated in the middle of the inverted-U in terms of level of development do not have high emigration figures. Examples include Libya, Algeria, Turkey, Iran, Oman, Botswana, Thailand, Peru, Brazil and Costa Rica. There are also substantial differences between continents. The apparent relationship between development and migration does hold for Europe and Latin America and Central America, but the correlation is much weaker for Asia and Africa.

<sup>36</sup> The Soviet Union had an active policy of promoting internal migration. The dissolution of the Soviet Union resulted in high international migration figures in these countries.

**Figure 3.3** Relationship between development (HDI) and emigration (2015)





Source: UNDESA, UNDP and WDI (adapted by researchers).

Figure 3.4 illustrates the influence of smaller countries on the outcomes in a different way. It presents overall emigration figures, as calculated by the UNDESA, according to HDI group: countries with a low, middle, high or very high level of development respectively. The manner of presentation is borrowed from De Haas (2010).<sup>37</sup> First of all, the figure shows the influence of small countries on the outcomes: the inverted-U is maintained in figure (2), but the average level decreases, which is especially the case for the low and middle categories. This effect increases if we do not calculate the averages per country, as is common in migration studies, but divide the total number of migrants by the total population. In that case, however, the results are strongly influenced by two countries: India (in the low HDI category) and China (in the middle category). If these two countries are excluded, then the expected inverted-U emerges again, in which Russian emigration figures play a dominant role in the 'high' category. Mexico takes on a similar role in the middle category.

<sup>37</sup> For a comparison over time, refugees cannot be left out of the figures. De Haas distinguishes between five HDI categories, the UNDP between four. We adhere to De Haas' classification here, both because of the comparison over time and because his classification is more appropriate for this analysis. De Haas' presentation identifies a fifth category of countries with a very low level of development. This category no longer appears in the UNDP's most recent figures.

**Figure 3.4** Emigration rate by HDI level: total and intercontinental



\* The top figure shows overall international migration; the bottom figure shows intercontinental.

Source: UNDESA and UNDP; adapted by researchers.

The effect of a country's size on intercontinental migration is even greater: intercontinental migration declines sharply if weighted for population size. A migration hump is still evident in the last graph, but the effect is much more limited than when small countries are included unweighted. Here too, the top of the 3.5% in the last graph (4) is mainly determined by high levels of 'intercontinental' migration from Mexico to its neighbour, the United States. Excluding Mexico leads to a figure that is almost one percentage point lower. This also indicates the volatility: as soon as Mexico reaches the status of 'high', the top will be in that category.

Certainly just as interesting in this figure is the rise in emigration figures in the 'low' category vis-à-vis De Haas' figure from 2010. This category contains emerging countries, which is in line with the mobility transition hypothesis. At the same time, we also have to acknowledge that this includes many small countries. There is no reason to assume that the larger emerging countries will reach emigration levels of 8%-10% of the population as well. Morocco's emigration figure comes close to that, but that figure is mainly the result of the proximity of Spanish enclaves and of Spain itself, as well as the active recruitment of migrant workers by countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s, and by Spain and Italy from the mid-1980s onwards (De Haas, 2014b; Dietz and De Haas, 2018).<sup>38</sup>

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The conclusion is that there is definitely a migration hump, but its intensity fluctuates. The fluctuation is stronger for small countries than for large countries, and it is more pronounced in the West and Latin America than in Africa or Asia. Technological developments (mobile telephony) and economic growth played an important role in the recent increase in migration from Africa to other continents, but the fact that this growth was insufficiently inclusive prompted many young people to seek alternatives outside of their own country (Carbone, 2017). This finding has important consequences for policy: if it is true that the relationship between development and migration is not nearly as strong as sometimes suggested, then it is also less evident that targeted DC policy will by definition result in more rather than less migration.

<sup>38</sup> French recruitment actually already started during both world wars. Moreover, family reunification, among first-generation migrants and as a result of their children's marriages in the 1990s, was instrumental in increasing the number of migrants from Morocco. The introduction of Schengen visas in the early 1990s had the paradoxical effect that largely circular migration to Spain and Italy led to the permanent residence of many migrants (De Haas, 2014b). Morocco is more focused on Europe than other countries in Africa due to past labour migration, the Spanish enclaves Ceuta and Melilla, and protracted hostilities with its neighbour Algeria (Dadush et al., 2017).


### 3.5 Demographics

There is broad consensus about the influence of demographic factors: changing demographic patterns will influence the labour market and migration (Newland, 2013). For countries still in the middle of the process of demographic transition, the combination of high birth rates and rapidly declining mortality rates leads to a (temporary) surplus of labour, which leads to a high level of emigration among young people (Williamson, 2015). This is especially true of sub-Saharan Africa: the population there doubled in the past 20 years and it is expected to double again in the coming 30 years (IOB, 2018, see also Annex I). That means the number of migrants will double if the intensity of emigration remains constant. Based on socio-economic developments, further growth can be expected.

Unlike Europe, Africa currently has a very young population (see figure 3.5 and Annex II). In many countries half of the population is under 20 years of age. As a result, the labour force is still relatively small compared to the total population, but that is going to change dramatically in the coming decades. Every year, 15-20 million young people will enter the labour market, which underscores the importance of creating jobs. The demographic and economic transition has not developed sufficiently in sub-Saharan Africa, and as a result there is high population growth in the region, but the number of jobs there lags far behind (IOB, 2018). Therefore, many young people can only find low-productivity and badly paid work in the informal sector. Unemployment, a lack of economic opportunity in the country of origin and the hope of finding work in Europe play an important part in recent irregular migration to Europe (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014; ODI, 2015; Migali, 2017; Adepoju, 2017; Beauchemin, 2018; IOM, 2018). For example, three out of four migrants from Nigeria said they did not have a paid job before leaving (IOM, 2018). The interest in migrating is especially high there among urban (especially Lagos) and highly skilled young people (Kirwin and Anderson, 2018). Young people from Lagos are much more interested in emigrating than young people from other cities.<sup>39</sup> A comparative study by IOM among (potential) migrants in Ethiopia, Somalia and Nigeria also shows that economic considerations (no work, no income, no prospects) play an important role with potential migrants. A third of Somalian migrants were unemployed. Another third were day labourers or self-employed, which usually means a low-productivity job in the informal sector (IOB, 2018). For all three countries, a majority indicated before leaving that they had insufficient income to support themselves.

<sup>39</sup> Research among potential migrants can give a distorted view. The first question is how to define this potential group. But second, immigration figures are many times lower in practice. In a study among potential migrants in Nigeria, half of the people indicated they were interested in migrating. In reality, however, less than 1 per cent of Nigerians lives abroad, and these figures have been extremely stable since 1990. Other studies come to the same conclusions (Abel, 2017).

**Figure 3.5** Dependency ratio of children and young people 1950-2050



Source: UN, 2017.

### 3.6 Family reunification and study

In addition to labour migration, family reunification and education are motives for (temporary) migration. This mainly concerns regular migration. There can be considerable differences between countries on this point. A comparative study by Beauchemin et al. (2018) reveals that education and family reunification, in addition to socio-economic considerations, are much more important to Ghanaian migrants than migrants from Senegal or the DRC. The main consideration for migrants from Senegal was socio-economic; for migrants from the DRC, political and security considerations played an important role.<sup>40</sup>

In the Netherlands almost half of all immigration every year is the result of family reunification.<sup>41</sup> That makes it the most important motive for migrating to the Netherlands, though of course this is derivative of previous migration. Moreover, it mainly concerns migrants from Europe (Poland, Germany and the United Kingdom). Regular labour migration is the second category with an average share of 20%. Education is the third category with a figure that fluctuates between 15% and 20%. Education usually concerns temporary migration.

The flow of asylum seekers experiences the greatest fluctuations. It also often goes hand in hand with family reunification, if refugee status is granted. On average, every two asylum

<sup>40</sup> In 2015 there were more migrants from Senegal (270,000) and Ghana (230,000) than from the DRC (160,000), but there was a higher number of refugees and asylum seekers from the DRC (30,000) than from Senegal (12,000) and Ghana (9,000).

<sup>41</sup> See <https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2017/27/gezin-nog-steeds-belangrijkste-reden-voor-immigratie> ('Family still most important reason for immigration').

requests leads to one follow-to-join migrant. Between 2014 and 2017, most follow-to-join migrants came from Syria and, to a lesser degree, Eritrea (125) (CBS, see also Cleton et al., 2017).

### 3.7 Networks

Research is devoting increasing attention to the importance of social networks. Many of them emerged during the period that receiving countries needed foreign workers (Beine, 2013; Clemens, 2014; Mazzucato et al., 2015; Gladkova en Mazzucato, 2015; OECD, 2016). Networks can act as catalysts that help to make migration possible, for example by providing information about the journey and options for settling, work, cost of living and regulations in the envisaged country of destination. Families and friends who have already moved abroad can provide money and information, which lowers the cost of migration and makes it easier to adapt (Beine, Docquier and Özden, 2011). They reduce the risks because they are able to take care of the initial reception, for example. Networks strengthen migration in another way as well. Migrants often feel obliged to give a positive report of the country they have settled in. This, in turn, attracts new migration (ODI, 2015). The influence of foreign networks on people's decision to migrate is evident, for example, from the fact that the more concrete the aspiration to migrate becomes, the more potential migrants will have access to these kinds of networks (Migali, 2017).

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The presence of networks causes migrants to quickly opt for traditional destination countries. This means that migration flows are not quick to change. The size of the diaspora in receiving countries is therefore a good indicator of the destination of migrants. The larger the diaspora in a given country, the more migrants it will attract (European Commission, 2018; Battisti et al., 2018). According to the OECD (2016), when the size of the diaspora in a country expands by 1 per cent, the flow of migrants will increase by 0.3 percentage points (as long as there are no changes to any of the other factors). Networks are particularly important for poorer migrants (McKenzie and Rapoport, 2007). The diaspora also plays an important role for migrants from Africa in their decision to migrate (European Commission, 2018).

Networks are especially important in regular migration (De Haas, 2011; McAuliffe et al., 2017; Loschmann et al., 2017), though there are exceptions to this (especially in Africa). Compared to regular migration, the choice of destination in irregular migration depends on a larger number of factors, including (Kuschminder et al., 2015; McAuliffe, 2017):

- the cost of the journey;
- the feasibility of reaching certain destination countries;
- the feasibility of traveling through transit countries;
- conditions and experiences in transit countries;
- diaspora communities with the capacity and resources to help others;
- the ability to fund the journey;
- the routes that a smuggler uses and offers;
- the communication options, both for potential migrants and for smugglers;
- the migration policy in the destination countries.



Research shows that the process of migrating can take years. Often many years of planning precedes migration, for example saving for the journey, selling possessions and establishing contacts (Kirwin and Anderson, 2018). Restrictions on regular migration have resulted in an increase in migration through transit countries and the use of human smugglers (ODI, 2015; Flahaux, 2017). Smugglers partly take over the role of networks. They influence the decision to migrate by setting up smuggling routes, the destination and the place where they leave the migrants behind (Kuschminder et al., 2015; Tubiana et al., 2018). Modern telecommunications, moreover, provides migrants with access to information and better opportunities to assess migration options.

In this respect, transit migration from the region and in particular refugee camps are important. Many refugees are first received in (camps in) the region, but the poor conditions there strengthen the desire to continue their migration (Loschmann and Siegel, 2014; IOM, 2016; McAuliffe, 2017; Van Haer, 2018; Crawley et al., 2018; IOM, 2018). A sense of insecurity, a lack of protection, the impossibility of finding work, poor access to public services (especially education and health care) and the need to see a future for oneself and one's family are the most important motives to continue the migration (Crawley et al., 2018). Although a great deal of research is being conducted on the conditions in these countries and camps (see, for example, Vemuru et al., 2016 and Betts et al., 2017), we still know little about the effects of policy aimed at improving reception in the region.<sup>42</sup>

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### 3.8 Rule of law and stability

The degree to which other factors influence future migration not only depends on demographic factors and economic development, but also on political, socio-economic and climate-related factors. The number of migrants can increase as a result of economic development but also because of economic insecurity due to poor job and income opportunities, conflict, forms of oppression (including religious and ethnic) and the impact of climate change (drought, flooding, failed crops) (EC, Joint Research Centre, 2018).

A number of studies reveal that some influence can be accorded to a lack of political freedom, a dysfunctional legal order and corruption (Poprawe, 2015; Ariu et al., 2016). Nevertheless, in themselves these factors usually do not result in the immediate migration of large groups of people (Lucas, 2015; Van Haer, 2018). De Haas et al. (2018) conclude that authoritarian regimes do not necessarily have higher emigration figures than more democratic regimes. In sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia has lower emigration figures than Ghana or Senegal, for example, whereas emigration from Eritrea is very high. An authoritarian state can increase aspiration levels, but effectively limit the possibility of migrating (cf. Soviet Union). De Haas et al. conclude that it is much more likely to be a combination of violent conflict and the absence or collapse of an effectively functioning

<sup>42</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has therefore launched a major evaluation, which will examine the effects of the policy aimed at strengthening reception in the Horn of Africa. The Netherlands is coordinating EU activities for this region.

central state (Somalia) that leads to emigration (see also EASO, 2016; ACVZ, 2018).<sup>43</sup> Political violence in an authoritarian state, including human rights violations, can also be an important motive for fleeing, such as developments in Eritrea have demonstrated. Political violence committed by the government in that country is a potentially strong driver of migration (Hirt, 2017). The country does not have a functioning legal system, and many people end up in jail without any form of due process for criticising the regime or trying to avoid military service. It is precisely this draft that is causing many of the younger males to flee the country.

Although violence in one's own country is often a dominant reason to flee, it is too simple to suggest that there is always a clear distinction between refugees, on the one hand, and economic migrants, on the other. Economic, political and social factors play a role in people's decision to migrate (Battistella, 2008; De Haas, 2011; Kuschminder et al., 2017; Loschmann et al., 2017). In reality, security motives and economic motives overlap (McAuliffe, 2017). Political insecurity and conflict have an impact on living conditions and economic opportunities (De Haas, 2011; ODI, 2015).<sup>44</sup> People stay in their homes until the physical threat begins to outweigh the cost of fleeing (including what one is forced to leave behind) (Adhikari, 2013). Changes to personal circumstances, such as loss of income or possessions or a threat to one's health, frequently tips the balance (ODI, 2015). Economic factors thus play an important role influencing people's decision to migrate and their choice of destination: wealthier, highly skilled migrants are quicker to make the decision to migrate and opt for destinations that are further away, both because they can and because the risk of staying behind often becomes acute more quickly for them (Loschmann and Siegel, 2014; Oltmer, 2015; IOM, 2016; Van Haer, 2018). Poorer refugees leave later and are also more likely to remain in the region. If they migrate further away, then they are often forced to use irregular channels.

### 3.9 Climate

A number of studies mention soil erosion and climate change as important determinants in the explanation for international migration (for example, Jakobeit and Methmann; 2007; Welzer, 2008; Afifi, 2011). Although that may change in the future, thus far there is barely any evidence for this (De Haas, 2010; Dietz, 2018). Insofar as sudden disasters, such as drought or flooding, are concerned the effect is usually temporary and is much more likely to result in migration within one's own country (internally displaced) or region, than intercontinental migration (Vigil, 2017; ACVZ, 2018). Dietz (2018) discusses in detail the

<sup>43</sup> Factors that increase the chances of conflict are a history of previous conflict, a large population, poor socio-economic development, a low level of literacy and inadequate education (Hegre et al., 2016; ACVZ, 2018).

<sup>44</sup> Conversely, other considerations can also play a role with economic migrants. Although economic considerations are often decisive in West Africa (Kirwin and Anderson, 2018), war, conflict and political violence (Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone), as well as rapid urbanisation, human trafficking and arms smuggling, have also led to instability and rapidly changing migration figures there (Walther, 2017; Kirwin and Anderson, 2018).

arguments which suggest that climate change is an important determinant of emigration. Based on empirical research for Africa, Lucas (2015) cannot find a correlation between climate-related factors and emigration. Selby et al. (2017) analyse and criticise the arguments that suggest the Syrian crisis is mainly the result of climate change (drought) and conclude that there is no evidence for this view.

### 3.10 The impact of migration on development

Emigration can have important consequences for the family and family members of migrants, as well as for the countries of origin, which in their turn can influence future emigration. In that sense, migration itself can be an important determinant of future migration. The OECD (2016) cites the following potential advantages of emigration for countries of origin:

1. relieve pressure on the labour market. For example, emigration from new EU member states helped to decrease unemployment and increase wages;
2. financial remittances by migrants (see also section 4.2). These have more than quadrupled in fifteen years' time from USD 100 billion in 2000 to 440 billion in 2015.
3. 'social remittances': the transfer of knowledge and skills and values and standards (both via networks and via returning migrants). This also includes:
  - a. changes in family planning, leading to lower birth rates;
  - b. lobbying and institutional change.
3. 'brain gain' effects, as migrants encourage those who stay behind to prolong their studies;
4. investments in the countries of origin via the diaspora.

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The *potential disadvantages* are related:

1. the emergence of labour shortages;
2. brain drain: the loss of scarce highly skilled people;
3. social costs (separation of family members).

#### Remittances

There is considerable consensus in the literature about the value of remittances for families that stay behind and for the economy in the country of origin (Mazzucato et al., 2008; Mazzucato, 2011; Newland, 2013; Brown and Jimenez-Soto, 2015; Akobeng, 2016; OECD, 2016; Fromell et al., 2018; King and Lulle, 2018). These help to reduce poverty and, even though they mainly result in consumption expenditures, they are also used for economic investments in health care and education. Both consumption and investment have a positive effect on employment opportunities. Moreover, they create greater access to capital, higher creditworthiness and lower interest rates in receiving countries (Newland, 2013; Fromell et al., 2018). Remittances provide a country with hard currency, which can have a positive macro-economic impact and ensure, for example, that a country can invest more in infrastructure. Cisse and Bambio (2015) found that remittances had a positive effect on the number of children attending school in countries of origin.

The relationship between remittances and irregular migration is not straightforward. On the one hand, remittances can fund migration and, on the other hand, they can make migration superfluous by improving conditions for those who stay behind.

### Trade and investment

Migrants help to increase trade between countries of origin and destination through their networks, demand from the country of origin and the products that they send home.<sup>45</sup> There is some empirical evidence that the net impact on trade is greater for host countries than for countries of origin (Brunouw et al., 2015). The less developed the more traditional factors are that play a role in migration, the greater the effect of migration on trade (Lucas, 2014; Parsons and Winters, 2014; Felbermayr et al., 2015). Think, for example, of a lack of a common language, a common cultural background and poorly developed institutions in countries of origin (including a malfunctioning system of judicial protection). This effect is less pronounced with refugees (Lucas, 2014). Ottaviano et al. (2018) discovered similar effects for services. Immigrants promote the export of services, especially to the country of origin but also more in general. They can also reduce the import of services if they provide these services themselves in the destination country.

Migration also influences the scale of the investments, both in the countries of origin and the destination countries (Brunow et al., 2015). Although a large portion of the remittances from migrants are used for consumption expenditures, research shows that households use a considerable amount of the remittances for investments, for example in land, agriculture and building a house (Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011; OECD 2016). Remittances from migrants played a role in the construction boom in a number of African countries (IOB, 2018). In addition, it appears that a relatively large number of returning migrants use their financial capital and the skills they have acquired to set up businesses (OECD, 2016).

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### Brain drain and brain gain

The classic view of emigration of highly skilled people is that it causes a brain drain and that the costs are therefore higher than the benefits for the countries of origin. The departure of highly skilled people slows down the concentration of human capital and thus inhibits development and poverty reduction, so the reasoning goes (Kirwin and Andersson, 2018). The OECD (2016) estimates for several African countries a brain drain rate of 30% (Zambia) to approximately 40% (the DRC and Zimbabwe). Over 50% of some smaller countries' highly skilled citizens emigrate (De la Croix et al., 2014). Research shows that in particular the migration of doctors and nursing staff from sub-Saharan Africa has had a major negative impact on health care on the continent (Capuano and Marfouk, 2013; Bredtmann et al., 2018).

The potential for a brain drain depends on job prospects. When there is a high level of unemployment among highly skilled young people (*brain waste or brain overflow*) in the country of origin, then there will be no brain drain. Examples include South Africa, Kenya, Pakistan, Egypt and Tunisia (Newland, 2013; Fargues, 2017). In the latter two countries, official unemployment among highly skilled citizens is considerably higher than among

<sup>45</sup> Section 4.5 focuses on the influence of trade and investment on migration.

low-skilled citizens.<sup>46</sup> But one can also speak of a brain drain when migrants are unable to find a job in the destination country or have to work below their level. The resources, knowledge and skills of returning migrants depend on the jobs that they had in the host countries. If these jobs were low-skilled, then these migrants will have a limited impact (King and Lulle, 2018). Various studies conclude that a brain drain can have a major negative impact on lower-income countries: a 6%-8% decrease in national income (per capita) (Djiofack et al., 2013; Bredtmann et al. 2016; World Bank, 2018; Docquier and Iftikhra, 2018). These negative effects are only partially compensated by remittances from migrants to the country of origin.

Migration can also have a positive impact if it is temporary and returning migrants help to reinforce human capital in the country of origin (Dustmann et al., 2011). In such cases it is better to speak of *brain circulation* (see also section 4.6). Migration provides developing countries with the opportunity to improve the level of skills, promote technological development and increase trade with other countries (OECD, 2016). A brain drain can also arise if emigration encourages those who stay behind to study or if returning migrants use the knowledge and skills they have acquired in their country of birth. The emigration of highly skilled people reduces the supply in the country of origin, which causes wages to increase in those sectors and thus also the number of students attending the programmes in question (Nyarko, 2015; Tani, 2017). The question of whether there is a net brain drain or a brain drain at all depends on the specific context, including the question of whether, and to what extent, shortages emerge in the country of origin, what the costs are of attending these programmes, the degree to which migrants send money back to the country of origin and whether they return or not.

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### 3.11 Estimates for Africa

Many researchers expect migration from Africa to Europe in particular to increase in the coming decades (see, for example, Dietz and De Haas, 2018). There are various factors at play here: strong population growth and especially an increase in the number of young people entering the labour market; socio-economic development, which increases aspirations and opportunities; poor economic transition, which means the continent has been unable to create enough jobs, resulting in hopelessness and frustration among young people; increased (technical) options as a result of better infrastructure and communication technology; and further development of the diaspora. Violence and instability, partly driven by the discrepancy between young people's higher aspirations and ambitions, and the unwillingness and/or inability of the old elites to respond to that, may help to increase migration in various countries, as examples in North Africa and the Middle East have illustrated.

<sup>46</sup> A problem in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, is that official unemployment figures are hardly a good indicator, if at all, of prospects in the labour market. There are essentially no benefits, and many young people are forced to take jobs in the informal sector. In many countries (hidden) unemployment among low-skilled young people is much higher than among highly skilled young people (IOB, 2018).

The European Commission's Joint Research Centre outlines two scenarios for Africa for future migration from African countries.<sup>47</sup> These scenarios are based on four core variables that they view as the key determinants of migration:

- demographic development;
- socio-economic development;
- climate change; and
- violence and political instability.

The easiest of these factors to predict is the (relevant) demographic development. Indeed, the vast majority of the young people who are going to migrate between now and the next 25 years have already been born. The researchers' first scenario is based on a constant rate of emigration. The second scenario presupposes an acceleration of economic development, with a rising emigration rate, as predicted by the migration transition theory. The researchers adhere to the more or less accepted assumption that the emigration rate is highest around an income of between USD 7,000 and USD 13,000, a level which many countries will not reach in the coming decades (Clemens, 2014).

In the first variant, international migration increases, in line with demographic developments, from 1.4 million people *per year* to about 2.8 million by 2050. The acceleration in the second variant is up to 3.5 million migrants by 2050. This means that the researchers estimate the emigration rate to increase by an average of about 25%. The emigration rate therefore is expected to remain low.

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The analysis does not give any indication of how intercontinental migration will develop or what the impact will be on Europe. Therefore, based on our own analysis, we have further examined here how African emigration might develop in the coming decades. In doing so, we examined two different scenarios: a continuation of the trend of emigration for Africa, based on demographic and socio-economic developments and an increase in line with predictions by the migration transition theory, which are thus based more on overall global patterns.

With the exception of North Africa and several small countries (islands), the data for Africa does in itself suggest that there is a strong correlation between development and emigration: the emigration rate in most African countries in 2017 was barely higher than in 2000 and usually lower.<sup>48</sup> Migration to another continent did increase, however, but it is important to distinguish between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa (see also chapter 2 and Annex III). For example, the intercontinental emigration rate for North Africa increased from 2.9% in 2000 to 3.7% in 2017, but in sub-Saharan Africa this rise remained limited to less than 0.2 percentage points (from 0.5% to 0.7%).<sup>49</sup> Exceptions are small countries such as Cape Verde, Mauritius and Gambia. In addition to South Africa, some of the somewhat larger countries include Somalia, Senegal and Sudan. The increase in North Africa is

<sup>47</sup> The centre cites three scenarios but only quantifies two.

<sup>48</sup> Migration increased less than the population during this period. In fact, Southern Africa is the only exception, where a large percentage of new migrants stayed in sub-Saharan Africa.

<sup>49</sup> This growth was also most pronounced in Southern Africa.

primarily the result of intercontinental migration from Europe to several of the Gulf states.<sup>50</sup> The number of migrants to the EU doubled (see also Dietz and De Haas, 2018), but this is two-thirds in line with the population increase.<sup>51</sup>

Table 3.2 presents the results of several rough estimates for Africa, based on socio-economic and demographic developments. The underlying assumptions are that the countries have an average economic growth of 3% per capita, and also that the HDI improves proportionally.<sup>52</sup> Furthermore, the analyses adhere to the UN's middle variant for demographic development.

The first variant is based on the continuation of the current trend in Africa, which is to say the relationship between economic growth and the migration rate that existed in the period 2000-2015.<sup>53</sup> The second variant assumes that the correlation will become stronger in the coming years and that African countries will develop an emigration rate that corresponds with the correlation that emerged from a cross-section analysis based on data for 2015.<sup>54</sup> The analysis does not take into account a rise in the number of refugees, which is difficult to predict. If political conflict results in more violence, then the numbers will rise, certainly in the minimum variant.

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The estimates show that in the long term (2050) a considerable rise in the number of migrants can be expected. This is true both for overall migration and for intercontinental migration. An important cause is demographic: if the emigration rate remains constant, then population growth will already cause the number of migrants to double. Based on the current trend relationship between economic development and emigration, we can also expect the emigration rate to increase by 0.5 percentage points, which will result in the further migration of about 15 million people. In the broader variant this could potentially involve an increase of over 100 million migrants.

Although the approach adhered to here is very different than the one used by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre, the findings are in line with each other. The European Commission's second variant estimates an average annual emigration of 2.1 million people. The calculation here envisages an *average* annual increase of 1.1-2.3 million African migrants.

The emigration rate for people migrating to other continents, depending on the criteria, is expected to increase from 1.2% in 2015 to 1.5%-2.1% by 2050. For the latter figure, the emigration rate would have to increase much more dramatically than it has in the past

<sup>50</sup> In particular, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

<sup>51</sup> According to UNDESA figures, the number of migrants in the EU from Africa increased between 2000 and 2017 from 5.5 million to 9 million. The African population increased from 820 million inhabitants to 1.3 billion during this period.

<sup>52</sup> Between 2000 and 2015, economic growth per capita in Africa as a whole was about 2% a year, but for emerging countries it was higher, with an average of more than 3% per capita a year.

<sup>53</sup> Panel analysis (fixed effects) with data for 2000 and 2015.

<sup>54</sup> For all countries with a population size >0.5 million. The analysis uses the square root of the population size in its measurement. When unweighted, small islands are given far too much weight and when weighted with the population size the outcome is heavily determined by China and India.

decade. In absolute numbers, the figures amount to 32 and 49 million people respectively. Based on the current distribution, about half of these people (i.e. 15-25 million people) can be expected to travel to Europe. That means an average increase in the number of African migrants to Europe of 200,000 to 500,000 a year.

	Total emigration rate (%)**			Emigration rate outside Africa (%)**		
	2015	2050 based on trend	2015 based on migration-transition	2015	2050 based on trend	2015 based on migration-transition
North Africa	4.4	4.9	4.5	4.3	4.6	4.2
East Africa	1.7	2.2	4.2	0.7	1.0	1.9
Central Africa	1.4	2.0	4.3	0.5	0.8	1.6
Southern Africa	2.2	2.7	2.6	1.2	1.4	1.3
West Africa	2.1	2.7	4.7	0.6	0.9	1.7
<b>Total Africa</b>	<b>2.2</b>	<b>2.8</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>2.1</b>
<b>Total number migrants (million)</b>	<b>26.6</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>14.6</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Total population (billion)</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>2.5</b>

\* Estimates for HDI=0.75 and projected population size in 2050 (middle variant UNDESA).

\*\* Migration rate = migrants / (population + migrants). Figures exclude refugees. In 2015 Africa had a total of 34.6 million migrants (including refugees), 15.7 of whom left the continent. In 2017 these figures were 36.3 million and 16.2 million respectively.

### 3.12 Summary and conclusions

Neoclassical economic theories are based on the assumption that migration, just like the free movement of capital, is caused by wage differentials and that this movement is what is going to level it out again. When a country's economy develops, wages increase, international wage differentials decrease, as does the incentive to migrate, to put the neoclassical migration theory in a nutshell. Push and pull factors influence migration decisions, but prosperity gaps are often the dominant motive. There is little disagreement about that.

There is, however, disagreement about *how* prosperity gaps result in migration. The neoclassical theory predicts that, apart from the poorest countries where most people do not have financial opportunities, migration will be highest in lower-income countries and



that it will decrease as incomes rise. This does not reflect reality. A comparison of countries shows that instead of decreasing with income migration increases with it. Nor is migration an isolated phenomenon that can be reduced to one or a few determinants; rather, it is part of wider social development processes and social transformation. In this light, development leads to more – not less – migration. Increased levels of development, which go hand in hand with better education and higher incomes, initially not only increase opportunities but also the desire to migrate. It is only above a certain level of development, empirically at an income of about USD 7,000-10,000 or a human development index of about 0.75, that emigration decreases. It is precisely this conclusion that causes the researchers to be critical of opportunities for combating immigration from southern countries by means of international cooperation.

Yet there are objections to this scepticism. The conclusions about a migration hump are primarily based on cross-sectional research, in which all countries are given equal weight, regardless of the size of their population. This can easily cause researchers to overestimate migration, because the migration figures of large countries are generally lower than those of small countries. If the population size is taken into account, then there is still a migration hump, but a much less pronounced one. There is something else at play here as well. The rise in emigration that we have witnessed in several countries these past decades took place in a historical context in which receiving countries actively recruited migrant workers (from Morocco and Mexico, for example), or emigration took place in the context of a union, in which migration was actively stimulated (Russia and Ukraine). That is a different context than one in which potential receiving countries try to prevent irregular migration. Both of these factors influence the expectations of future migration and the possibility of influencing them.

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It is important not to only examine relationships at the macro-level, but also (other) factors that influence people's decision to migrate. In addition to development levels and income disparities and wage differentials, the numbers of (irregular) migrants and their destination are determined by demographic factors, unemployment and hopelessness, political violence and conflict, and the cost of migrating. Existing networks play an important role because they draw attention to the opportunities (thus influencing people's aspiration to migrate) and can facilitate migration. Migration is far from always being an individual choice; rather, it is something that concerns the immediate and extended family. It can be a strategy for spreading risk, in which the expected remittances that are sent home play an important role in the decision.

Migration also has an impact on development, and that impact, in turn, affects development. Remittances from migrants, which make new migration possible, are an example. But these remittances may also encourage people to invest or enrol in education, thereby slowing down migration. Research on the effects of a brain drain show that in some African countries the negative effects can outweigh the positive effects of remittances. But (temporary) migration also results in brain gain through education, networking and investing by the diaspora. Brain gain can also emerge when those who stay behind are encouraged to start studying.

Based on past trends and based on the relationship between economic development and migration, we have examined how migration from Africa may develop in the future. Based on these points of departure, migration from Africa to another continent could increase from 15 million people in 2015, to 30-50 million in 2050. A large part of this increase is the result of the projected doubling of the population.

One uncertain factor is the development of the number of refugees. The motives of irregular migrants are often complex, but some of them flee from the violence that threatens their security or causes them to lose their possessions and income.

4

# International cooperation and migration

## 4.1 Introduction

Migration policy can be divided into internal and external policy. *Internal policy* focuses on the Netherlands or the EU and concerns unilateral border control, the reception and distribution of refugees in the EU, the admission rules for legal migration, including visa regulations for deportation and the integration of immigrants.

The cooperation of countries outside the EU is needed for the *external migration policy*. The external migration policy consists of elements such as agreements about admission and the numbers of legal migrants, cooperation with border control, repatriation, the reception of refugees in the region and tackling root causes. The migration policy of many Western countries, including the Netherlands, is increasingly promoting the view that it is possible to influence the root causes of irregular migration through development cooperation.<sup>55</sup>

This chapter focuses, in line with the central question in this report, mainly on external migration policy and in particular on tackling the root causes of irregular migration.<sup>56</sup> The key concerns are preventing armed conflict and instability, promoting good governance, democracy, rule of law and human rights, climate change adaptation, economic development, employment opportunities, a balanced distribution of income, education and reducing population growth, mainly through the use of instruments for development cooperation.<sup>57</sup> To give an idea of the potential role of international cooperation in influencing irregular migration, section 4.2 briefly outlines the relative importance of foreign investment, development funds and remittances by migrants. Section 4.3 analyses the results of empirical studies on the correlation between development cooperation and migration. The following sections discuss individual elements of the policy in more detail, namely stability and strengthening the rule of law (4.4), trade policy and investment (4.5), employment opportunities (4.6) and education (4.7). Section 4.8 examines the relationship with internal policy. Section 4.9 presents the conclusions.

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## 4.2 International cooperation in perspective

There is an ongoing debate in the academic literature about the question of whether a policy aimed at tackling the root causes of migration by means of international cooperation can be successful. If migration is determined by push and pull factors, then the answer should essentially be positive. But if migration and development are inextricably linked, then a positive answer is less evident. Who is right here is an empirical matter.

<sup>55</sup> In this report, development cooperation refers to everything that falls under official development assistance (ODA).

<sup>56</sup> The other areas of cooperation mentioned above do not fall within the scope of this study. In the coming years, there will be separate evaluations of the effectiveness of reception in the region (including the reception of Syrian refugees and reception in the Horn of Africa).


<sup>57</sup> Other instruments of international cooperation, such as foreign trade and investment, are still receiving relatively little attention in academic literature. We do, however, advocate a more integrated approach in the penultimate section.

Providing evidence is anything but straightforward, however, which is partly the consequence of the *endogeneity* of both international cooperation and migration:


1. International cooperation can have a *negative* effect on migration if it eliminates the causes that make people want to migrate (for example, conflict, negative consequences of natural disasters, a lack of prospects, a lack of democratic freedoms).
2. International cooperation can have a *positive* effect on migration if it makes it possible to secure the resources needed to migrate or increases the chances of employment in the envisaged country of destination (for example through education) and helps to increase the aspiration to migrate.
3. International cooperation can also have a *positive* effect if it helps to intensify relations between countries of origin and destination and thus also facilitates the exchange of information. This is also referred to as the *network effect*.
4. Frequently, migration as well as international cooperation will *both be influenced by other factors*: a colonial past, geographic proximity, a common language, the existence of trade relations, etc. In such cases, there is no causal link.
5. Large-scale migration can give rise to attempts to contain it: *migration* then has an *effect on the nature and scale of international cooperation*, for example by shifting development cooperation to countries where many irregular migrants come from.

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**Figure 4.1** *The relationship between international cooperation and migration*



The question of what (public) international cooperation is capable of achieving cannot be seen in isolation from the nature and scale of private remittances. Until the early 1990s, official development assistance (ODA) was more important for most low and middle-income countries than direct foreign investment or remittances from migrants. This picture has changed dramatically, especially since the beginning of this century (see figure 4.2). Taken as a whole, the scale of both foreign investment and remittances in these countries considerably outweighs development assistance.

**Figure 4.2** ODA, remittances by migrants and foreign investments 1990-2017 (in USD billion)


Source: World Bank (WDI).

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It is not unusual for people to draw the general conclusion from this that investments and remittances are more important than ODA. But that certainly does not apply to all countries and definitely not to Africa. In only 17 of the 54 countries in Africa does foreign investment outweigh ODA. More than half of the foreign investments in sub-Saharan Africa go to only two countries: South Africa and Nigeria. At the same time, the importance of foreign trade and investment, as well as remittances by migrants, is expected to increase in the future in low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa (see also figure 4.3). Foreign investment has risen sharply since 2005, though it usually involved investments in commodities (IOB, 2018). Since 2011, the importance of remittances by migrants has also increased.

The latter are still unevenly distributed, Estimates of the total amount still vary, but data from the World Bank indicate that North African countries receive about USD 32 billion a year and all of sub-Saharan Africa almost USD 40 billion. Egypt (USD 20 billion) and Morocco (USD 7.5 billion) receive the most in North Africa. Most remittances in sub-Saharan Africa go to Nigeria (USD 22 billion), followed by Senegal, Kenya, Uganda and Mali with more than USD 2 billion to just over USD 1 billion a year respectively.

**Figure 4.3** ODA, remittances from migrants and foreign investments to low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2017 (in USD billion)



Source: World Bank (WDI).

### 4.3 Development cooperation and migration

The empirical research focuses primarily on the relationship between development cooperation (ODA) and migration. In this context, a distinction can be made between two kinds of research: macro-research, based on a comparison of countries and the development of countries over time and micro-research, which analyses the effect of interventions on households and businesses. Macro-research, which examines the general relationship between development cooperation and migration, easily underestimates potential effects because a large part of the assistance does not focus on influencing migration and certainly not all migration. Micro-oriented studies are in a better position to focus on the direct effects of development cooperation on migration. One resulting disadvantage is that long-term effects, whether intended or not, are often excluded from the analysis. It should also be noted that micro-oriented empirical research in the area of international cooperation is still in its infancy.

This section presents an overview of the results of empirical (econometric) research on the (macro) relationship between development cooperation and (irregular) migration. The basis for this research is a comparison between countries and a comparison of countries over time. Table 4.1 provides an overview of the studies that were examined. The studies used widely differing approaches, which had an impact on the outcomes. For example, whether a researcher uses emigration or immigration figures can have an impact on the numbers of migrants in a country or on the flows of migration. Several researchers limited

their analysis to a comparison of countries, while others used techniques for panel research, which makes it possible to examine developments over time.<sup>58</sup> Technical details are included in footnotes when possible.

Authors	Year	Analysis Unit	Data	Effect DC	Conclusion
Berthélemy <i>et al.</i>	2009	Donor countries receiving ODA (pairs)	Cross section	Rise in migration	A 10% rise in bilateral aid increases overall number of migrants by about 3%.
Belloc	2011	Countries in sub-Saharan Africa	Cross section	Rise in migration	Increasing ODA by 1% of the GDP increases emigration by 0.2-11 percentage points
Bermeo and Leblang	2015	Donor-DAC pairs (countries)	Panel	n.a.	A 10% rise in the number of migrants increases aid to that country by 2%-7%
Gamso and Yuldashev*	2017	Countries receiving ODA	Panel (6 five-year intervals)	Fall in migration	A fivefold increase in aid in the area of good governance decreases emigration by 0.7 percentage points
Lanati and Thiele	2017	Donor DAC pairs (countries)	Panel	Fall in migration	A 10% rise in aid decreases migration by about 1%
Murat*	2017	Donor DAC pairs (countries)	Panel	Fall in asylum inflow	A 10% increase in bilateral aid decreases the asylum inflow by 0.06%. Increasing humanitarian aid by 10% decreases the asylum inflow by 0.2%.
Dreher <i>et al.</i> *	2018	Countries receiving ODA	Panel (12 three-year intervals)	Fall in number of refugees	Development has no short-term impact. In the longer term (after about 11 years), a 10% increase in aid helps to reduce the number of refugees by 3% (through economic growth).
Gamso and Yuldashev**	2018	Countries receiving ODA	Panel (4 five-year intervals)	Fall in migration	Aid for rural development has a negative impact on migration: countries receiving aid for rural development that is structurally 0.1% of the GDP higher have, all other things being equal, a 0.09 percentage point lower rate of migration to OECD countries

\* Discussed in section 4.5.

\*\* Discussed in section 4.6.

<sup>58</sup> A panel has major advantages, because it makes it easier to make comparisons over time and between groups. It minimises the risk of wrongly assuming that a discovered correlation is a causal link as opposed to when a researcher can only compare data over time or only between groups (countries).



One of the first and most cited empirical studies on the relationship between development cooperation and migration is that of *Berthélemy et al.* from 2009. The researchers based their work on the hypothesis that there are two ways in which development cooperation can affect migration: a higher income provides the financial resources for migrating, and as a result of the migration relationship, information about the labour market in the destination country improves. The researchers concluded that bilateral aid helps to intensify international cooperation, which has consequences for migration. Increasing bilateral aid from country Y to country X by 10% increases the overall number of migrants from country X that settle in country Y by about 3%. Development cooperation from other donors (including multilateral organisations) also has an effect on migration to country Y. This effect is half as great. The latter implies that the increase in migration is both the result of increased (financial) resources and intensified cooperation.

*Belloc* (2011) builds on De Haas' theoretical framework. According to this author, development cooperation can have a positive effect on people's decision to migrate in two ways. First, development cooperation helps to increase incomes by creating job opportunities and thus the ability to cover the costs of migrating. In addition, the different programmes and projects in the areas of education, communication and the development of the private sector enhance people's aspiration to migrate. The researcher limits his analysis to emigration from countries in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the author, an increase in official development assistance (ODA) of 1% of the GDP leads to a rise in emigration of 0.2-1.1 percentage points (depending on the chosen model). The large variations in outcome are connected to the small amount of observational data (48 countries).<sup>59</sup>

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Unlike *Berthélemy et al.*, *Lanati and Thiele* (2017) use inflow figures (for the period 1995-2014) instead of the total number of migrants in the receiving country.<sup>60</sup> They are thus in a better position to take into account the influence of other factors. Although the approach is similar to that of *Berthélemy et al.*, in other ways the results differ: whereas (total) aid has a positive effect on migration with *Berthélemy et al.*, *Lanati and Thiele* find a negative correlation. The researchers conclude that bilateral aid from donor Y to country X helps to increase the number of migrants, but the total ODA to country X leads to a decrease. On balance, a 10% increase in overall aid decreases the total flow of migration by about 1%. The conclusion appears to be that a country wanting to limit migration is better off providing

<sup>59</sup> The number is quite small for the technique that was used, as a result of which the extreme values of a few small countries with a large amount of its population living abroad (including Cape Verde) are given too much weight. A small alteration to the model immediately generates completely different outcomes.

<sup>60</sup> *Berthélemy et al.* (2009) and *Belloc* (2011) do not use panel data, but base their work on a comparison between countries (and not over time). It is therefore not possible to analyse the dynamics of the development of trends. This is especially a problem with *Belloc*, as indicated above. *Berthélemy et al.* have a considerably greater number of observations because the researchers do not limit themselves to sub-Saharan Africa and examine bilateral relations. But because they do not measure any changes but merely the number of migrants from country X in country Y, it is (theoretically) possible that the largest flow of migrants from country X began before country Y provided that country with development assistance. In that case, development cooperation cannot be seen as an explanation for the number of migrants in a country.

aid through a multilateral channel. As the researchers themselves acknowledge, they fact that they examine overall assistance and not specific flow remains problematic. There are other methodological problems as well, which could undermine the conclusions.<sup>61</sup>

### The influence of migration and the scale of the assistance

*Bermeo and Leblang* (2015) examined the inverse relationship. Their hypothesis is that the number of migrants from a given country is an important factor in determining the scale of the assistance: on the one hand, there is the desire to curb migration, while on the other hand, the diaspora plays a potentially important role in the allocation of assistance.<sup>62</sup>

According to the estimates, a 10% increase in the (total) number of migrants from a country will lead to a rise of 2%-7% in assistance to the country.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>61</sup> The researchers' first models suggest that development assistance has a highly negative effect on migration. The value of the tests, which actually show the correlation and not the causal link, are unusually high for this type of research. There are two potential explanations for this. The researchers have not included the income in the land of origin as a separate variable. As a result, the above-mentioned correlation primarily shows the positive relationship between income and migration. After all, development assistance has a negative correlation with income. So it is probable that the assistance variable measures part of the effect of the income. And because the relationship between income and migration is positive, but the relationship between income and ODA is negative, the relationship between ODA and migration is negative. A second element that could be playing a role is that neither assistance variables are scaled (for example, the assistance in relation to the national income or in relation to the population size). As a result, they are not so much measuring the relative effect of assistance as they are the relationship between the size of a country (receiving assistance) and the migration figures. We know from the literature that countries with the highest emigration figures are usually small countries (Arslan et al., 2014; see also chapter 3). That these effects play a role is indicated by the fact that the effect decreases by 85% when the researchers control for country-specific effects. As a result, they control for differences in income levels and differences in scale. The remaining effect may be connected to the negative relationship between income and the scale of the assistance.

<sup>62</sup> The researchers use techniques for the panel analysis that make it possible to eliminate the potentially distorting effect of variables that do not change over time. Think, for example, of colonial ties, a common language or the geographic distance between countries. Put simply, the United Kingdom primarily provides assistance to former colonies, and many migrants from these countries want to go to the United Kingdom, but that does not mean that development assistance from the United Kingdom has an influence on migration. We also recognise the importance of the cross-section studies: incorporating the fixed effects of countries that receive assistance dramatically decreases the coefficient of the main variable, in this case the number of migrants (the same is true in Lanati and Thiele's analysis). In short, the apparently positive relationship between migration and DC is largely determined by country-specific factors. Indeed, the researchers' different models show that the apparently positive relationship between migration and development cooperation is largely determined by these kinds of factors. It illustrates the importance of a panel analysis.

<sup>63</sup> The authors also examine separately the impact that refugees have on the scale of aid, for which they find a negative effect. They do not devote further attention to this. One explanation is that a refugee is also a migrant, and that you should therefore examine the effect of both variables together. In that case, the overall effect comes very close to that of migrants alone. In terms of statistics, chances are high that there is a multicollinearity problem.

The researchers do not base their estimates on flows but on total population. As a result, the analysis is sensitive to trend correlation, as a result of which the effects are overestimated.<sup>64</sup>

### Conclusion

The conclusion from this section is that it is difficult, based on the general relationship between development cooperation and migration, to draw firm conclusions about the potential impact of aid on migration. One of the problems with the above-mentioned studies is that they examine the impact of all development cooperation, regardless of the destination. As a result, these studies may severely underestimate the effects of targeted interventions. Studies that examine more targeted forms of development cooperation and specific groups of migrants, however, find that it is indeed possible to exert influence through these instruments on the scale of (irregular) migration (see also the following two sections). The effects are small, however, which means that effective policy also requires the substantial use of resources.

## 4.4 Stability and strengthening the rule of law

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One of the policy assumptions, which aims to tackle the root causes of irregular migration, is that it is possible to exercise influence on the quality of good governance in the countries of origin through international cooperation, in order to thus prevent potential conflict and also combat irregular migration. The first part of this assumption is very similar to the objectives that donors wanted to achieve several years ago with general budget support. These experiences in the area of good governance do not give cause for much hope. Donors cannot buy reform, as IOB concluded in the policy review of budget support (IOB, 2012). The policy document *Investing in Global Prospects* finds that more often than not the justice and public administration systems serve the ruling elites, but at the same time acknowledges that the key to improvement lies in the hands of the countries themselves. That is not to say that international cooperation in these areas is not important. But it does mean that we should not exaggerate our expectations of a limited commitment to processes that are primarily determined by local political factors. On top of that, as concluded in chapter 3, a dysfunctional legal system, corruption and political oppression do not usually lead directly to the migration of large groups of people; rather, it is often the ensuing violence, in combination with the effect that has on living conditions (personal security considerations and the loss of possessions and jobs) that ultimately causes people to emigrate.

Neither has the large-scale commitment of Western countries, without an empirically founded theory of change, always produced the desired results (IOB, 2013; Andersen, 2016; NOU, 2016), but in a number of cases it has contributed to a sharp rise in the number of refugees (De Haas et al., 2018). The same is true of attempts to curb irregular migration in

<sup>64</sup> In addition, there are other problems. First, the researchers use commitments, as opposed to actual disbursements, so that in this case the effect is overestimated. Second, they choose to avoid the problem of  $\ln(0)$  by adding a dollar to all of the commitments. This is an arbitrary choice, because it could just as easily have been 10 dollars or one cent. This can have important consequences for the outcomes.

the short term by cooperating with autocratic regimes (De Haas et al., 2018). While this kind of cooperation may contribute to stability in the short term, in the longer term it will drive the emergence of new generations of disenfranchised, unemployed and politically excluded young people, which can subsequently result in outbursts of violence such as the Arab Spring or the crisis in Syria (see also Fargues, 2017a).

Tubiana et al. (2018) come to a similar conclusion. They suggest that the way in which the EU has set up external border control in West Africa to combat irregular migration is not conducive to stability in the region. It contributes to the increasing power of militias, which undermines the state's ability to function effectively in terms of security and ultimately encourages more migration.

Despite these reservations, *Gamso and Yuldashev* (2017) found support for the hypothesis that it is possible to combat emigration through development cooperation that aims to improve the quality of good governance. The researchers concluded that donors who want to limit immigration from Southern countries should spend much more on aid that goes towards good governance. It would have a limited effect, however. Calculations show that a fivefold increase in aid in the area of good governance decreases emigration by 0.7 percentage points.<sup>65</sup> Second, it is difficult to say to what extent the relationships identified as a result of a fivefold increase in aid will endure. Chances are that the marginal effects will decrease dramatically.

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Two other researchers looked at the influence of development cooperation on refugees and asylum seekers. *Murat* (2017) examined the influence of bilateral aid on the inflow of asylum seekers.<sup>66</sup> The researchers concluded that bilateral development cooperation has a negative effect on the number of asylum seekers in the poorest countries, such as Burundi, Eritrea or the Central African Republic. The effect is not substantial, however: a 10% increase in bilateral aid decreases the inflow of asylum seekers by 0.06%. The cost for each (avoided) asylum seeker thus amounts to about USD 40,000.<sup>67</sup> This figure is considerably higher for Afghanistan: almost USD 190,000. The effect of more targeted assistance, in this case humanitarian aid, is more than three times as great. Targeted assistance to targeted groups can therefore have a negative effect on migration. In terms of policy, another important conclusion is that bilateral aid to countries in North Africa does not help to reduce the

<sup>65</sup> They also found, for higher levels of education, a stronger negative correlation between aid in the area of good governance and emigration. This could mean that the quality of governance is a more important consideration for people with a higher level of education than the decision to migrate.

<sup>66</sup> They used a database with information from 113 developing countries and 14 destination countries, including the Netherlands (namely, the US, Canada and 12 European countries) for the period 1993-2013.

<sup>67</sup> However plausible, we have to approach these results with caution as well. Murat uses commitments for the auxiliary variables and not actual payments, which are 10% lower on average. This suggests that the actual effect is greater. What is more important is that the negative effect of bilateral DC on the flow of asylum seekers only manifests itself after an interaction term of bilateral aid and income in the country of emigration. This latter effect, then, is positive, which means that for people with higher incomes the negative effect turns into a positive effect (increased flow of asylum seekers). It could be we are dealing with a multicollinearity problem here.

number of asylum requests from those countries. According to this researcher, the violence there plays a key role in people's decision to migrate.

*Dreher et al.* (2018) looked at the influence of foreign aid on the number of refugees from receiving countries.<sup>68</sup> They examined both the relationship between DC and the overall number of refugees and the flows to donor countries. They have not found any evidence that development cooperation has an influence in the short term on the number of refugees. Indeed, the correlation even appears to be positive in the short term, which can potentially be explained by the fact that donor countries become a more appealing destination as a result of aid in the eyes of refugees. In the longer term (after approximately 10-15 years) development cooperation decreases the number of refugees as a result of rising incomes. It should be noted that the effect is not substantial: according to the model, an increase in development assistance of 12% of the GDP decreases the flow of refugees by 0.3% after 15 years. Moreover, assistance to countries bordering conflict countries has a negative effect on the number of refugees to donor countries. Humanitarian aid, providing its share of overall aid is sufficiently large, is also more effective at limiting the number of refugees than overall aid. This finding is in line with Murat's (2017). The correlations that have been discovered are too weak, however, to be considered statistically significant. That means that the outcomes are uncertain.<sup>69</sup>

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## 4.5 Trade policy and investment

'Trade with Africa is *the* tool for countering migration,' read the headline in *Trouw* on 30 November 2017. The article cited examples of potential investments that Dutch companies could make in Africa in order to benefit from intraregional trade in Africa and the African growth market. The article is a good example of neoclassical logic: trade is good for economic development, and economic development reduces differences between countries, which will decrease the desire to migrate.

<sup>68</sup> The researchers also used panel data for this, with data from 141 countries for the period 1976-2013. They see the flow of refugees as a change in the number of refugees.

<sup>69</sup> Other problems play a role here as well, such as technical ones. First, there are reservations about the way in which they try to solve the problem of endogeneity. This approach can be described, in a highly simplified way, as follows: the endogenous variable is replaced by an estimate of it with the aid of a variable that is exogenous. But if there is only a weak correlation between this instrument and the original auxiliary variable, then it should come as no surprise that the researchers are unable to discover an effect of aid on flows of refugees. In this case, the researchers instrumented for development assistance with the interaction term of the degree to which governments in donor countries are comprised of different groups and what the odds are of a recipient country getting assistance from that donor. The hypothesis is that public expenditure by coalition governments comprised of a larger number of parties is higher than that of governments that rely on the support of fewer parties, and also that the scale of the development assistance is positively correlated to this. There are also reservations about the procedure for estimating the longer-term effects (by including delays in the effect). By shifting the explanatory variables in a fairly arbitrary way in time and omitting all control variables, statistical artefacts may easily arise. This means that the coefficients can change considerably when one or more variables are incorporated.

This raises the question of whether exports from Africa to Europe could be improved by adapting trade regulations. For example, by dispensing with import tariffs and quotas, scrapping non-tariff restrictions, easing rules of origin or reducing support to European producers, especially in agriculture. Proponents cite pilot projects in Jordan and Lebanon, where investments in the vicinity of refugee camps are being stimulated by easing trade regulations. Critics point out that most African countries can already export to the EU tariff-free and that the trade to Europe is hampered by poor infrastructure and a poor power supply.

In 2015 IOB concluded that trade facilitation programmes had not made a convincing contribution to inclusive economic growth, improved productivity and more competitive businesses.<sup>70</sup> A more recent evaluation of the aid that the Netherlands provides to improve trade rules and regulations (IOB, 2017) is more positive and concludes that Dutch projects are likely to have had a positive effect on trade from and to developing countries. Evaluations of programmes that promote investments in developing countries shows a similar picture. IOB concluded that while we were aware of how much the many private sector development programmes spent and how many businesses, farmers and households they reached, we knew very little about what kind of an impact the growth of businesses, employment opportunities and higher incomes was having.<sup>71</sup> Based on a review of the literature, the report did emphasise the importance of investing in a better business climate, including infrastructure.

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Although *Trouw* called trade with Africa the tool for deterring migration, research on the determinants of migration hardly referred, if at all, to the role of trade (see, for example, OECD, 2016). The relationship is also more complex than the article headline would suggest: trade and migration can influence each other but are simultaneously influenced by an array of other factors (Parsons and Winters, 2014). Trade and migration can be complementary, but also substitutes (Ojapinwa and Kolawole, 2007). The correlation can thus be positive, but also negative. Research on the influence of trade on labour migration from several Southern European countries to Germany during the period 1970-1998 mainly identified a negative effect (Bruder, 2004). The author explained this based on a decrease in pay differentials. Recent reviews of the literature have not found any empirical evidence suggesting trade has an effect on migration (Parsons and Winters, 2014; Felbermayr et al., 2015). The conclusion is that we do not have sufficient understanding of the influence of trade on migration at the moment to comment on it.

This conclusion is certainly true for the influence of foreign investment on (irregular) migration as well. If trade and investment have an effect on migration, then this essentially takes place via the effect on economic development (Parsons and Winters, 2014). Investments result in economic development in the form of employment opportunities and

<sup>70</sup> Only 10%-20% of the supported businesses reached the goal set by the Centre for the Promotion of Imports (CBI) of achieving an additional export volume of 2.5 times the amount invested in the business by CBI within two years.

<sup>71</sup> The evaluation protocol from 2012 has resulted in improved monitoring and evaluation of the PSD programmes.

higher incomes, which reduces the need to migrate, though the opportunities increase. The net effect depends strongly on the nature of the trade and investments. If they do not contribute to inclusive development, then they can stimulate emigration (Clemens, 2014; IOB, 2018).

This conclusion is also supported by research by Gamso and Yuldashev (2018), which shows that aid for rural development can help to reduce emigration. The key notion is that urbanisation coincides with a rise in emigration and that deterring migration to these cities will slow it down. According to the researchers, rural inhabitants, primarily farmers, are more likely to stay in their familiar surroundings and only migrate once they are forced to (by socioeconomic conditions). Aid, in the form of rural development, is thus an effective instrument for deterring this migration (to the cities). This then curbs urbanisation, and that in turn has an inhibitory effect on emigration to the cities. Increasing aid to rural areas by 1% of the GDP decreases the rate of emigration (the number of emigrants divided by the total population) by 0.93 percentage points. This corresponds to an amount of about USD 1,000 per inhabitant in low-income countries.<sup>72</sup> The results lead to another important conclusion: the cost effectiveness, measured as the cost per avoided migrant, is higher in countries with low incomes than in countries with high incomes. Aid for urban development, on the other hand, should accelerate urbanisation and thus increase emigration in two ways. The researchers present no empirical evidence for this latter hypothesis.<sup>73</sup>

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The conclusion is that based on the status of economic research no conclusive statements can be made about the effect of trade and investment on irregular migration. The question of whether trade and investment can curb irregular migration, or actually induce more migration, depends on the nature of the trade and investment: to the extent that they aim to provide opportunities to groups of young people who cannot find a job, this could have a negative effect on irregular migration. Random encouragement can have the opposite effect.

## 4.6 Employment

Trade and investment are closely related to the issue of employment opportunity. The basic idea is that they will ultimately be able to make enough of a contribution to employment opportunity both qualitatively and quantitatively that it will have an inhibitory effect on irregular migration. International research shows that increased employment opportunity

<sup>72</sup> The statistical effect for a per capita income of USD 1,000 is approximately USD 1,100. The researchers do not provide the dynamic (long-term) effect. We have estimated that here based on one of the coefficients included in the models for the delayed dependent variable (0.138). The long-term effect is about USD 925.

<sup>73</sup> Migration from rural areas to cities plays a key role in the study, but the researchers have presented little empirical data on this phenomenon. They only provide figures for Arab countries, but those effects are not necessarily representative of other countries, nor are those results conclusive. Indeed, several of the assumptions seem contradictory. For example, they both assume that farmers only migrate when they have no other choice and that an effective policy in the city acts as a pull factor on rural areas. And people migrate from the cities both because wages are decreasing as a result of this pull factor and because of the effect of rising wages (due to investments in the cities).

coincides with less emigration (Clemens and Postel, 2017).<sup>74</sup> Empirical research demonstrates a link in North Africa (Fargues, 2017) and sub-Saharan Africa (Adepoju, 2017; Carbone, 2017; Migali, 2017; Beauchemin, 2018; Crawley et al., 2018; IOM, 2018) between the frustration arising from the discrepancy between people's aspirations and their opportunities for achieving these aspirations in their own country. Many young people are unable to find a job that does justice to their training or is even capable of lifting them above the poverty line.

This does not mean that every employment opportunity programme leads to a reduction of emigration. Programmes that increase the capacity to migrate, such as credit or training programmes, but do not provide the possibility of using that credit or the acquired knowledge locally, will most likely increase migration, whereas programmes that create alternatives for migration are probably more effective (Fratzke and Salant, 2018). If migration is more of a choice than a necessity, then additional income for a household could make migration possible. For those who have less to gain from migrating or run a greater risk, but find themselves in a hopeless situation, creating local employment opportunities may cause them to reconsider migrating.

Employment opportunity programmes assume that development money will improve the scale and quality of employment opportunities. The assumption is that the labour market is not functioning properly. That could be related to the supply or the demand or to the fact that supply and demand are not aligned. If the problem is a lack of suitable employees, then the labour supply can be improved through training. A lack of work experience, for example, can be remedied by giving young people vouchers for an internship. If the problem is demand for work, because employers find it too risky to directly hire staff, for example, then (temporary) wage subsidies can be used for internships (see also Ismail, 2015). And if supply and demand are not aligned, then the situation can be mediated.

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Research reveals that many businesses' training programmes are not properly evaluated and that there is not a great deal of evidence on their effects (Card et al., 2015; Blattman and Ralston, 2015; Alfonsi et al., 2017; McKenzie, 2017).<sup>75</sup> When that is the case, the results are not entirely positive. McKenzie (2017) concludes that many programmes aimed at increasing people's employability are relatively expensive and have little impact in the long term.

<sup>74</sup> Clemens and Postel compare youth unemployment in different groups of countries with the overall rate of emigration. They draw far-reaching conclusions from this regarding the influence of income, unemployment and emigration. It is difficult, however, to infer causal links from the figure presented by the authors. First, the problem of small countries having too much influence exists here as well. In addition, the claim that the size of the diaspora abroad (built up over decades) can be explained by current youth unemployment is untenable. Third, measuring youth unemployment in low-income countries is problematic.

<sup>75</sup> Card et al. examined 200 econometric studies and concluded that training has no short-term effect, but it does after 2-3 years, and programmes focusing on general skills score higher. The motivation of participants plays a role as well. Training the long-term unemployed and providing training activities during economic recessions produce better results. Blattman and Ralston (2015) looked specifically at employment opportunity programmes in fragile states. They also concluded that improving the labour supply through training has little effect and is relatively costly. They concluded that providing capital for a longer period of time can promote entrepreneurship. Cash-for-work programmes promote employment opportunities by replacing capital-intensive projects with labour-intensive ones.



He mentions employment services, professional training activities and/or projects that promote entrepreneurship and programmes that stimulate the demand for labour through subsidies. Wage subsidies are particularly suitable for absorbing temporary shocks and preventing layoffs or for creating temporary employment opportunities to stabilise a fragile situation (pre- or post-conflict).

Employment opportunity programmes in low-income countries aimed at training general skills work better than specific business skills training. Training that focuses on entrepreneurship in agriculture or micro-enterprises is especially promising in that respect, particularly if it is combined with cash transfers to overcome financial obstacles (Fox and Kaul, 2017). An example of a programme aimed at improving labour supply is an experiment in Uganda (Alfonsi et al., 2017; see also IOB, 2018). In this experiment one group were given vocational training (VT) and another group were given training through the wage subsidised business skills training (BST).<sup>76</sup> The research confirmed that business skills training is more cost effective than subsidised business skills training. VT reduced the unemployment percentage among participants by 9 percent and BT by 6 percent. BT usually does not result in additional jobs but it does improve, while the training is given, the productivity and profitability of businesses that cannot afford to hire extra staff. VT does result in *additional* employment opportunities, particularly in the most productive businesses. Moreover, business skills training not only helps to create salaried jobs but it also stimulates entrepreneurship.

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McKenzie (2017) draws attention to the effectiveness of measures aimed at eliminating sectoral and geographical mismatches on the labour market. Retraining (aimed at a target group with proven skills, just not the right ones) and migration, both internal and to countries in the region or even intercontinental, contribute more to reducing unemployment than generic training, wage subsidies and employment services. Measures that encourage entrepreneurship are also effective. One example is from Nigeria, where a contest was held to write a business plan (McKenzie, 2015). The 1,200 winners received an average of USD 50,000 to set up or expand a business. Collectively they created 12,000 jobs, 7,000 more jobs than in the control group. The entire project cost USD 60 million, or just over USD 8,500 per additional job.<sup>77</sup> The results are more favourable than those of startup subsidy programmes and business training programmes for micro-enterprises, which are mainly aimed at the self-employed. They often do generate more income, but not more job opportunities.

<sup>76</sup> The level of unemployment among the group of young people that the programme focused on was about 60%. The researchers compared the two groups with young people who did not receive any training.

<sup>77</sup> Selection effects are lurking here, because the group of winners have different characteristics than the control group. As a result, the effect of the subsidy is difficult to gauge. Whether these really are additional jobs, as McKenzie describes them, cannot be ascertained with certainty. The startups could undercut other businesses or prevent similar businesses without subsidies from emerging. By contrast, only the direct effects on employment opportunities were examined. The startups also generate indirect employment opportunities. In the absence of information, the author assumes that the indirect effects on employment are at least as great as the displacement effects.

### Enabling policy for employment opportunity

Chapter 3 already showed how a slow demographic transition combined with the absence of an economic transition in sub-Saharan Africa led to a sharp rise in labour supply, on the one hand, and jobless growth, on the other (see also IOB, 2018). It is precisely this divergence that contributes to a rise in emigration, which would lead you to expect that the problems will increase dramatically in the coming decades if no permanent changes to the problems are introduced.

With reference to research departments at major international organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the UN and the African Development Bank, IOB (2018) concluded that an integrated multi-sectoral policy is required to create sufficient employment opportunities, generate hard currency, stimulate the acquisition of knowledge and facilitate effective demand (Stiglitz, 2017). The governments of African countries have an important role to play in the transition process described above (Chang, 2015; Stiglitz, 2017). In terms of policy, this means that all sectors have to examine which factors hamper the growth of employment opportunities the most. Governments have to actively eliminate restrictions and create conditions in the areas of education, health, urban development, upgrading of the agricultural sector and financing. Donors can join forces to help these governments. That seems to be a simple and effective strategy for creating employment opportunities without high costs and distorting subsidies.

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The agricultural sector, where more than 60% of the labour force still work, plays a key role in this. With the exception of South Africa, productivity in agriculture throughout sub-Saharan Africa is low, both per hectare and per household/worker (Pardey, 2014; Benin, 2016). Most farmers have small businesses with low productivity. Analyses suggest there are ample opportunities to increase productivity, both per hectare and per hour in agriculture. Which factor is the most limiting differs strongly. Land rights, availability of fertilizer, improved seeds, better harvesting methods and credit can contribute to productivity (ACET, 2017). But sufficient demand is probably the most important factor of all. This depends strongly on the transport costs. As a result of poor infrastructure and long distances, food prices are relatively high in Africa. Consequently there is little demand, which means it is not lucrative to invest a substantial amount of money in increasing productivity. These high prices also drive up the cost of labour. These factors mean that it is crucial to reinforce the agricultural sector's link to the rest of the economy (ACET, 2017). Reducing the cost of transport between rural and urban areas expands the market and causes farm gate prices to rise, thereby also increasing investment opportunities, while food prices fall in the cities, as a result of which wages can become more competitive internationally. Increased investments and productivity in agriculture are also the basis for the creation of employment opportunities in the processing of agricultural products and in services, such as the delivery of inputs, storage, machine maintenance, transport and financing (OECD, 2018).

The processing industry can develop by using the available resources, and by combining this with agriculture and the processing of agricultural products as a basis for creating employment opportunities, for one thing to obtain sufficient tax revenue and hard

currency. In addition to agroprocessing, Newfarmer et al. (2018) also identify telecom, ICT, tourism, air and road transport and financial services. The challenge in the services sector in African countries is to make services lucrative regionally and internationally as well. That requires education, training, certification and quality assurance.

Another way of creating employment opportunities is to stimulate local micro-businesses by improving local infrastructure (safety, water, sanitation, electricity and transport) and financial inclusion. These businesses are an important source of employment and income and often pay more taxes than large businesses (Filmer et al., 2014). And finally, the factors hampering the growth of modern sectors can be eliminated by improving infrastructure, institutions, financial services, innovation, competition, judicial protection and quality assurance (IOB, 2018). Direct foreign investments can provide capital, markets, technology and management, but they can also undercut more labour-intensive local businesses. Special economic zones have not been very successful in Africa. A recent study by the African Union Commission and the OECD emphasises that foreign investment has to focus much more than is the case at present on increasing productivity, technological expertise and supply options. The report also advocates strengthening economic ties between urban and rural areas, for which a good infrastructure is vital, though not the only factor (AUC/OECD 2018).

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### Circular migration

In *Perspectives on Global Development Report*, the OECD (2016) advocates improving the coordination of migration in order to achieve 'triple wins': positive outcomes for countries of origin, destination countries and migrants. Concretely, it involves facilitating regional labour mobility, issuing visas, recognising diplomas, circular migration and global skills partnerships.

Circular migration refers to temporary labour migration. That can mean seasonal labour, but often it involves a regular job for a limited period of time to overcome shortfalls on the labour market. The idea is that circular migration generates a triple win: work without integration problems for the destination countries; remittances and better trained returning employees for the countries of origin; and work, income and experience (education) for the migrants. Success stories describe Spain's partnerships with Morocco, Colombia and Romania. Spain experienced exceptional growth at the beginning of this century, when it decided to recruit workers for different sectors by means of circular migration. Constant et al. (2012) describe how circular migration can work effectively. Admission, for example, has to be based on labour market shortages in order to prevent displacement. Governments can facilitate this and ensure that accrued pensions and social security contributions are available after migrants return to their country of origin. When people have the opportunity to stay multiple times, can easily transfer their earnings to their country of origin and have prospects of upward mobility, then they are willing to actually return to their country of origin.

In global skills partnerships (Clemens, 2017) employers from destination countries work together with schools and training centres in countries of origin, coordinated by the governments in both of these types of countries. The training institutes train people for

jobs, both temporary and otherwise, in the destination countries. Indeed, more people can be trained than want to/are able to migrate, so that the country of origin also benefits from the paid training. This rules out brain drain. Circular labour migration and global skills partnerships are examples of triple wins, which also promote employment opportunities in the countries of origin. As IOB concluded: 'Donors could experiment more with types of (temporary) labour migration' (IOB, 2018, p. 100).

## 4.7 Education

In the push and pull approaches, poor education in the country of origin (for parents) is an incentive to migrate. There is empirical evidence for this view as well. For example, in Africa, especially in rural areas, the desire of parents to ensure that their children receive a better education leads to migration, both to the cities and abroad (De Haas, 2017). The absence of secondary schools is often a reason to send children to the city, either to family or to a boarding school. Parents emigrate to pay for their children's education in the country of origin (OECD, 2016 and 2017). Improving education in rural areas could therefore curb migration. The conclusion for policy thus seems simple: improve access to education and its quality.

The effects in the longer term are not as clear, however, because education also exposes young people to urban lifestyles (De Haas, 2017). Education increases both the feasibility of migrating and the aspirations to migrate. On average migrants have a higher level of education, and migrants with a higher level of education choose destinations that are farther away than migrants with a lower level of education (Beauchemin et al., 2018). This is also true of refugees and irregular migrants (IOM, 2018; Beauchemin, 2018).

Research shows that on balance improving education promotes migration (Massey, 2010; De Haas, 2017; Dao et al., 2018), though increasing enrolment in education can have a mitigating effect in the short term (Fratzke and Salant, 2018). Dao et al. (2018) conclude that raising the level of education, in addition to macro-economic factors, plays an important role in rekindling migration. The OECD (2016) comes to the same conclusion based on an analysis spanning the period 1990-2015. Flahaux (2017) concludes that in Africa the effect of education on migration is greater for intercontinental migration than for migration within the continent. This conclusion, incidentally, is based on a comparison between countries, and here too the endogeneity of education is ignored, which considerably qualifies the conclusions for policy. For example, while higher quality education and intercontinental emigration may coincide, that is mainly because economic development stimulates them both.

Various developing countries have invested in improving their educational systems in recent decades and have thus become attractive for students from neighbouring countries (OECD, 2017). These students receive a better education there than is available in their own countries, and it costs less than in Europe or the United States. Vocational training is also becoming an increasingly important instrument in developing countries. At the international level, it appears that in Africa the emigration of students outside their

homeland is lower in countries that have a greater tertiary education supply than in countries where this capacity is weaker (Kritz, 2015). Strengthening tertiary education can thus be a cost-effective method for limiting the negative effects of brain drain. One condition, however, is that there are jobs available for graduates (IOB, 2018).

The OECD (2017) analysed the effect of various educational interventions on people's decision to migrate. The organisation distinguishes between: (a) conditional income transfers; (b) investments in educational provisions, such as schoolbooks, uniforms and meals; and (c) supporting programmes such as transport, literacy programmes and programmes that enable young mothers to continue their education. Of these three types of intervention, cash transfer programmes appear to have the greatest influence on migration, both in a positive and negative sense (OECD, 2017). One explanation for the different conclusions is that the effects are connected to the size of the transfer and the degree of conditionality (IOB, 2018). Hagen-Zanker and Himmelstine (2013) conclude that well-executed programmes, which provide households with a reliable source of income, can help to prevent emigration. The context is crucial, however: in areas with poor employment prospects, these programmes tend to only delay emigration.

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A recent review of the literature commissioned by IOB on providing education to refugees (Compernelle and Hansen-Shearer, 2018) concludes that refugees face many obstacles in trying to find a good education for their children, such as a lack of information about educational opportunities, legal impediments, the long travelling distance to schools, the poor quality and limited relevance of the education, partly as a result of a lack of resources, placing the children in the wrong class and xenophobia, the bullying of children and cultural barriers. In addition, insufficient income can force parents to have their children work. These factors can contribute to people's desire to migrate elsewhere. In those cases, increasing investments in education for refugees can help to combat transit migration. Little research has been conducted on the effects, however.<sup>78</sup>

### **Education, population growth and migration**

In the longer term, economic development increases the number of people in society with a higher level of education and thus also emigration, but at the same time it also slows down population growth (Docquier, 2018). Not only does higher population growth result in an absolute increase in the number of migrants, but it can also contribute to a higher rate of emigration.


<sup>78</sup> The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is working on a major evaluation of the effects of reception in the Horn of Africa region. This study aims to provide a better understanding of these effects.

An effective way of limiting population growth is stimulating the education of girls (European Commission, 2018; IOB, 2018). To begin with, an increase in secondary education considerably decreases the number of girls who have children at an extremely young age. In Ethiopia, for example, more than 60% of women without an education have a child before reaching the age of 20; for women with 8 years of education that figure is 16% (Pradhan and Cunning, 2016). An additional year of education for girls reduces the chances of teenage childbirth by 7 percentage points and teenage marriage by 6 percentage points. Moreover, women with a higher level of education also have fewer children: in countries with higher female enrolment in secondary education, women under the age of 20 have far fewer children on average (see also figure 4.4). Countries such as Niger and Mali combine low enrolment in secondary education with a high number of young women giving birth to children. Mauritius and South Africa are on the other end of the spectrum with high enrolment in education and a much lower number of childbirths among young women between the ages of 15 and 19. Rwanda is a clear exception: there the number of births per 1,000 women in the age category of 15-19 years is relatively low, despite the low enrolment of girls in secondary education. This is the result of the Rwandan government's active demographic policy (IOB, 2018). On balance, a higher enrolment in secondary education of 50 percentage points corresponds to a decrease of about 90 births per 1,000 girls in the age category of 15-19 years.<sup>79</sup>

Although a higher degree of education leads to more migration and children of women with a higher level of education migrate relatively more often than children of women with a lower level of education, on balance the effect of lower population growth on migration appears to be negative. As a result, various studies have been focusing on the influence of demographic developments on migration (OECD, 2016; European Commission, 2018; ACVZ, 2018).

<sup>79</sup> The graph only provides a correlation and not a causal link. Indeed, there is also reverse causality here: girls drop out because they have given birth to a child as well. Nevertheless, a statistical analysis for sub-Saharan Africa (based on panel data for the period 1993-2016; source: WDI) that corrects for the potential influence of other factors suggests that the correlation persists. The analysis controls for endogeneity by using fixed effects and enrolment in primary education as an instrument for enrolment in secondary education. Income is included as a control variable. The conclusions correspond to those in the literature (Canning et al., 2015)

**Figure 4.4** *Girls' enrolment in education and childbirth among young women*



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\* Gross enrolment figures in secondary education and number of births per 1,000 women in the age category of 15-19 years.

Source: WDI.

Migration can also influence population growth in the country of origin (Mountford and Rapoport, 2016). Migration contributes to the transfer of values and standards (social remittances) from the new destination country (Beine et al., 2013). Whereas on the one hand (and in the short term) social networks help to increase the number of migrants, they can also have an inhibitory effect on it in the longer term. But Mountford and Rapoport's most important conclusion in terms of policy is that people's decision of how many children to have is connected to the expected results of education and that this decision is therefore influenced by the global demand for labour. First and foremost, migration has an influence on the expected results of education and therefore also on family planning.

## 4.8 Internal policy and internal factors

The internal migration policy defines the entry options and the rules for legal migration. In addition, border control and effective deportation are important in restricting irregular immigration.

According to a number of studies, while on their own stricter visa requirements and tighter border controls do help to change types of migration, they do not help to reduce overall migration (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014; De Haas, 2011c; Duvell, 2009; ODI, 2015). For example, according to a number of researchers, a more restrictive migration policy in Europe and the United States has primarily increased irregular migration (De Haas, 2007; Czaika and De Haas, 2013; Dustmann et al., 2017; European Commission, 2018). The World Bank (2018) shows how irregular migration from Mexico to the United States increased after the latter substantially limited the options for circular (temporary) migration in 1965. Another effect was that temporary migrants did not return to Mexico. For the Netherlands, the WODC (2009) examined what the effects were of tightening income and age requirements in 2004 on marriage and family reunification. The WODC concludes that the income requirement in particular has caused the number of requests to decline, but that the measure has also led to more irregular migration and the use of alternative routes (other visas and through other countries). The question has also been raised of how Europe intends to monitor its 9,000 km-long land frontier and 44,000 km-long sea border if the US cannot even manage to control its border with Mexico, which is only a little over 3,000 km long.<sup>80</sup>

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Several more recent studies are more positive. The OECD (2016) concludes that destination countries' restrictive immigration policies can be effective. Visa requirements, for example, can limit the inflow of migrants. On the other hand, there is a potentially unwanted side effect, namely that these requirements also act as a disincentive for people to return because migrants are afraid that they will not be able to come back to the country they are living at that moment (Czaika and De Haas, 2017). Flahaux (2017) and De Haas (2018) conclude that restrictive immigration policy can indeed be effective, though the policy can have unanticipated side effects that undermine this effectiveness:

1. Migration restrictions can result in people choosing other destination countries, which only shifts the problem elsewhere;
2. Limiting the migration routes can result in the creation of new routes (see also Tubiana et al., 2018);
3. Migration restrictions can cause people to formally change their motives (such as asylum) or resort to irregular migration;
4. Migration restrictions contribute to longer stays in transit countries and cause people to resort to smugglers. Both can put migrants at high risk;
5. The announcement of restrictions can in fact encourage people to migrate;

<sup>80</sup> See, for example, <https://decorrespondent.nl/191/hoer-bewaak-je-een-grens-van-53-000-kilometer/14196457-d2a499bd> ('How to protect a border of 53,000 kilometres').



6. Migration restrictions can lead circular migrants to settle permanently as they fear they will be unable to come back later;<sup>81</sup> and
7. Quick procedures and deportation may result in fewer asylum procedures, but not necessarily in fewer irregular migrants, as long as the demand for informal labour in Europe does not decrease or opportunities for migrants in the countries of origin do not improve.

An important question in the migration debate is whether irregular migration can be prevented by allowing more legal migration. Promoting legal migration routes and curbing irregular migration are both pillars of European and Dutch migration policy.

Researchers in the neoclassical tradition see great economic benefit in removing obstacles to migration, as is the case for the free movement of goods or capital (see, for example, Clemens, 2011 and Clemens and Pritchett, 2016). According to Kennan (2013), removing obstacles to immigration would more than double incomes in developing countries.<sup>82</sup> As we have seen, in some developing countries that would lead to more emigration and in others to less. An important question, however, is how realistic the theoretical assumptions are (Borjas, 2015). We do not know what the effect would be of the potential emigration of tens of millions of people on productivity and productivity developments in receiving countries (Borjas, 2015).

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It is not evident what the effect of regular migration on irregular migration would be in a world without the free movement of people. Increasing regular options can only affect irregular migration if substitution occurs – that is, if migrants were to opt for regular channels instead of irregular channels. Otherwise it would only increase migration. In that case, it could even lead to more irregular migration as a result of network effects. Regular migration between Mexico and the US has reduced irregular migration, but only in combination with strict enforcement of the law that forbids people from hiring irregular migrants (Clemens and Gough, 2018). De Haas (2018) points out that quick procedures and deportation can result in fewer asylum procedures. But he adds that these do not necessarily result in fewer irregular migrants, as long as the demand for informal labour in Europe does not decrease.

## 4.9 Summary and conclusions

This chapter focused on the question of whether it is possible to influence (irregular) migration from Southern countries with instruments of international cooperation. The main conclusion is that there is not an abundance of options, but that it would also be incorrect to suggest that more cooperation would only result in more migration.

<sup>81</sup> This conclusion dovetails with research by Koser and Kuschminder (2017) on migrants' reasons for returning. It appears that conditions in the country in which they are staying are by far the most important factor in this decision. In contrast to what is often assumed, a safe legal status in the receiving country increases the tendency to return (Russell and Lulle, 2018; Beauchemin, 2018).

<sup>82</sup> The question is how realistic the theoretical assumptions are here. We do not know what the effect would be if a hundred million people were to migrate (Borjas, 2015).

The previous chapter concluded that there is a (slight) positive correlation between development and migration: development results in more migration. This means that an unfocused policy, aimed solely at economic growth, can increase migration. This effect should not be overestimated, incidentally. Although there is sufficient evidence to suggest that international cooperation has a positive effect on development, the scale of the assistance, both in relation to a country's own efforts and to other external sources of funding, means that this effect cannot be particularly great at the *macro level*. The latter is especially true of more developed countries, where foreign investment and remittances from migrants outweigh ODA. In these countries, including countries in North Africa, but also Nigeria, for example, cooperation in the area of trade and investment in conjunction with the possibility of circular migration, agreements about restrictions and internal measures aimed at restricting irregular migration are more effective than development assistance. The latter can be most cost-effective in least-developed countries, where the scale of the ODA still outweighs that of foreign investment and remittances.

In recent years, a number of empirical studies have been published that examined the relationship between development cooperation and migration. These studies reach different conclusions about this correlation. This is partly the result of methodological problems. Different studies tend to relate all (bilateral) aid to (all) migration. This can easily cause the effects of targeted policy to be underestimated: on the one hand, because a large part of the aid goes to countries that are barely migration countries, if at all, and because a considerable part of the aid does not focus on restricting migration, but on the other hand also because the policy does not focus on restricting all forms of migration either. In other words, the most crucial variables are fairly rough proxies for what the researchers actually want to measure. Studies on the effect of targeted aid on migration do find a negative correlation, and this effect is also greater than the effect discovered in studies that analyse overall (bilateral) aid. This is also true of the studies that examine the effects of development cooperation on specific forms of migration (refugees and asylum seekers). The observed effects are minor, but it is possible that greater effects will be discovered in the future with aid that focuses more specifically on the root causes of migration. Another important conclusion of the research on more targeted aid is that the cost-effectiveness, measured as the cost per avoided migrant, is greater for low-income countries than for countries with higher incomes.

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Empirical research on the influence of trade and investment on migration does not generally lead to any clear conclusions. One reason is that both can result in more migration (when they are complementary), as well as less migration (when they are substitutable). In addition, the net result is channeled through economic development. The net effect relies strongly on the nature of trade and investment. If they contribute to inclusive development, then they can curb irregular migration. Investments in rural development are an example.

Investing in the promotion of labour-intensive socioeconomic development can somewhat curb irregular migration. Moreover, a joint effort in the agricultural sector, the stimulation

of a labour-intensive industry (including the processing of agricultural products) and modern services sectors and entrepreneurship in micro-businesses is more effective than direct labour market policy in the form of business training, wage subsidies and employment services. Research on promising transformation processes shows that the effort should consist of an enabling policy that covers land rights, infrastructure, financing, innovation, competition, judicial protection and quality assurance. Foreign investment should focus much more than is the case at present on increasing productivity, technological expertise and supply options for local businesses.

A great deal of empirical research has been conducted on the relationship between education and development, but less so on the relationship between education and migration. There is consensus in the literature that improving education in the short term can help to reduce migration, from rural areas to cities and to other countries, as well as the transit migration of refugees. In the longer term education can stimulate emigration. Which effect will dominate depends on the labour market prospects after education has been completed. Research by the OECD suggests that conditional income transfers aimed at education can be effective in limiting emigration. The effectiveness depends on the specific circumstances.

| 83 | Increasing the enrolment of girls in (secondary) education is an effective instrument for decreasing population growth. On the one hand, it helps to prevent school-aged girls from already having children, while better-educated women generally have fewer children as well. The increase in emigration from sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades can largely be attributed to population growth, and this is not expected to change in the coming decades either. Educating girls can have a moderating influence on this growth.

Studies on the effectiveness of *internal migration policies* confirm that they can be effective, though the effectiveness can be undermined by unintentional side effects (such as a shift in destination countries and migration routes, temporary migrants who no longer return and the growing role of smugglers). What is most effective appears to be a policy that focuses both on tackling several root causes, which increases the options for temporary migration, and strengthening internal instruments. Circular migration and skills partnerships can curb migration. Circular labour migration can act as a substitute for irregular migration, but only if the incentives for irregular migration are simultaneously addressed. It is also a question of scale. Results can be achieved given the current scope of development cooperation, but they would be too modest in relation to the scale of the problem.

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# Annexes

## Annex I Development intercontinental migration

**Table I.1 Continental and intercontinental migration (2000; numbers x 1 million)**

Continent of destination:	Continent of origin:								Total
	Europe	North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	West Asia	Other Asia	Oceania	North America	Central and South America	
Europe	31	3	2	6	10		1	2	56
North Africa				1					1
Sub-Saharan Africa			12						14
West Asia**	2	2	1	5	8				18
Other Asia	5			1	23				31
Oceania	3				1	1			5
North America	7		1	1	10		1	19	40
Central and South America	1						1	4	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>173</b>

\* Number of migrants who have settled in another country (stock data). If empty: <500,000 migrants.

Total figures include migrant whose land of origin is unknown.

\*\* Primarily Middle East.<sup>83</sup>

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2018). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin. Adapted by researchers.

<sup>83</sup> The UNDESA's definition of a migrant is someone who is present at a particular point in time (for a longer period) in another country. Data are primarily based on the population of a country born abroad and data on foreign citizenship.



Table I.2 Continental and intercontinental migration (2017; numbers x 1 million)									
Continent of destination:	Continent of origin:								Total
	Europe	North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	West Asia	Other Asia	Oceania	North America	Central and South America	
Europe	41	5	4	6	14		1	5	78
North Africa				1					2
Sub-Saharan Africa	1		19						23
West Asia**	2	3	1	13	21				43
Other Asia	5				29				37
Oceania	3				3	1			8
North America	8	1	2	2	15		1	26	58
Central and South America	1						1	6	10
<b>Total</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>258</b>


\* Number of migrants who have settled in another country (stock data). If empty: <500,000 migrants. Total figures include migrant whose land of origin is unknown.

\*\* Primarily Middle East.

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2018). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin. Adapted by researchers.

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Figure I.1 Migration to the EU 2014-2018\*



\* Total immigration (OECD data 2014-2016); irregular migration 2014 - first months of 2018.


Source: OECD; Frontex.

<b>Table I.3 Refugees and asylum seekers according to origin and region of reception (2017; numbers x 1,000)</b>									
Continent of destination:	Continent of origin:								Total
	Europe and Central Asia	Middle East and North Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	South Asia	East Asia/Oceania	Latin America	North America	Stateless/Unknown	
Europe and Central Asia	500	1.421	794	749	62	41	0	232	<b>3.800</b>
Middle East and North Africa	38	5.963	444	954	0	0	0	91	<b>7.491</b>
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	29	6.723	42	0	0	0	32	<b>6.827</b>
South Asia	0	2	2	1.570	1.062	0	0	0	<b>2.636</b>
East Asia / Oceania	7	41	15	67	612	1	0	7	<b>749</b>
Latin America	2	14	35	8	3	327	0	47	<b>435</b>
North America	80	78	125	85	167	540	2	9	<b>1.086</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>7.549</b>	<b>8.137</b>	<b>3.475</b>	<b>1.907</b>	<b>909</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>23.025</b>


\* For refugees from the Middle East and North Africa, Turkey has been counted as a destination in this region. It concerns 3.6 million refugees, 3.4 million of whom are from Syria. In 2017 Turkey took in a total of 3.8 million refugees. Source: UNHCR (2018).

## Annex II Demographic structure of sub-Saharan Africa and the European Union

**Figure II.1** Population pyramid European Union and sub-Saharan Africa (2015; millions of people)



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Source: UNDESA.

## Annex III Results of statistical analyses

Both regression equations below demonstrate the existence of a migration hump for the period 1990-2015 (based on UNDESA stock data). The income variable log income per capita (based on purchasing power parity at constant prices) is positive and the quadratic term is negative, which produces the inverted-U shape. The population size has a negative effect on the rate of emigration: large countries have a lower rate of emigration than smaller countries: a population of 100 million inhabitants has an emigration rate that is almost 9 percentage points lower than the rate for a population of 1 million people. The second equation shows that the effect of income on migration halves when weighted with the population size.

The comparison for intercontinental migration draws the same conclusion, keeping in mind that the coefficients are necessarily smaller. Here too, the coefficients for the income when weighted with the population size halve.

Table III.1 The relationship between income and migration rate				
	Total migration rate (excluding refugees)		Intercontinental migration rate (including refugees)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted
Income per capita (log, based on PPP and constant prices)	0,36*** (8,54)	0,16*** (4,45)	0,22*** (7,99)	0,13*** (6,69)
Income squared	-0,045*** (-8,11)	-0,020*** (-4,27)	-0,027*** (-7,40)	-0,020*** (-6,53)
Population (x 1 million)	-0,000086*** (-8,35)	-0,000029*** (-16,43)	-0,000036*** (-7,49)	-0,000014*** (-11,31)
Trend <sup>a</sup>	0,00060** (2,48)	0,00020 (1,46)	0,00023 (1,43)	0,000014* (1,64)
Constant	-0,64*** (-8,30)	-0,27*** (-4,16)	-0,41*** (-8,15)	-0,23*** (-6,48)
N	902	901	906	906
R <sup>2</sup> adj.	0,10	0,25	0,08	0,19

\* Significant at  $p < 10\%$ ; \*\* significant at  $p < 5\%$ ; \*\*\* significant at  $p < 1\%$ .

<sup>a</sup> This has the value 0 for 1990, 5 for 1995, etc.

T-values (based on robust standard errors) in brackets.

The first two equations correct for the number of refugees. That has not been done in the two equations for intercontinental migration. As a result, these take an additional country into account (5 observations).

Data: UNDESA and UNHCR.

The table below shows results for Africa only. Given the low average incomes, there is much less interest here in the quadratic term and more in the positive relationship between income and migration. A comparison of tables III.1 and III.2 reveals that the relationship between income and emigration in (sub-Saharan) Africa is not nearly as strong as it is on other continents. The dummy for North Africa shows that intercontinental emigration figures in these countries are about 2-3 percentage points higher than in sub-Saharan Africa, even without considering income disparity.

	Total emigration rate (excluding refugees)		Intercontinental emigration rate (including refugees)	
	unweighted	weighted	unweighted	weighted
Income per capita (log, based on PPP and constant prices)	0,06 (1,02)	0,08** (2,00)	0,03 (0,73)	0,06** (2,04)
Income squared	-0,008 (-0,96)	-0,012** (-2,04)	-0,003 (-0,48)	-0,008* (-1,82)
Population (x 1 million)	-0,00037*** (-7,88)	-0,00020*** (-7,61)	-0,00010*** (-4,86)	-0,00007*** (-6,41)
North Africa	0,014*** (2,70)	0,024*** (6,44)	0,025*** (4,49)	0,031*** (7,16)
Trend <sup>a</sup>	0,00033* (1,94)	0,00036*** (3,17)	0,00015 (1,43)	0,0002*** (2,70)
Constant	-0,063 (-0,70)	-0,107 (-1,60)	-0,063 (-0,87)	-0,10** (-2,11)
N	274	274	279	279
R <sup>2</sup> adj.	0,17	0,42	0,34	0,69

\* Significant at  $p < 10\%$ ; \*\* significant at  $p < 5\%$ ; \*\*\* significant at  $p < 1\%$ .

<sup>a</sup> This has the value 0 for 1990, 5 for 1995, etc.

T-values (based on robust standard errors) in brackets.

The first two equations correct for the number of refugees. That has not been done in the two equations for intercontinental migration. As a result, these take an additional country into account (5 observations).

Data: UNDESA and UNHCR.

Table III.3 repeats the first analysis for bilateral migration flows (1990-2015). However, countries without bilateral migration (in the period 1990-2015) have not been taken into account, because they can distort the results. In practice, it involves small islands, for example. The analysis used fixed effects for destination countries. These effects are not significant for most countries, including the Netherlands. In this analysis, the effect of income on migration also appears to decrease dramatically when smaller countries are not taken into account.

The last column limits the analysis to (bilateral) migration from African countries to the EU. The average effects are slightly weaker than for the total of bilateral flows. It should be borne in mind that the extent of the effect is mainly determined by two factors: first, migration from North Africa to Europe. Chapter 2 showed that this is five times as high as migration from the rest of sub-Saharan Africa. Second, small countries are included in this analysis as well. The effect is much lower when these countries are disregarded.

	Bilateral flows	Excluding countries <2.5 million inhabitants	Bilateral flows from Africa to the EU
In income per capita (based on GDP, PPP and constant prices)	0.0047**	0.0024**	0.0039**
In income squared	-0.00027**	-0.00014**	-0.00022*
In distance	-0.00026*	-0.000084	-0.00016
neighbouring countries	-0.00166**	-0.00058	-0.00081
common language	-0.000006	-0.000061	0.000089
colonial ties	0.0036*	0.0020	-0.00012
relative size of migration at the start of the period	-0.55**	-0.011	-0.195
Constant	-0.017**	-0.0095**	-0.016**
N	8.222	6.805	1.822
R2 adj.	0.39	0.04	0.06

\*  $p < 10\%$ ; \*\*  $p < 5\%$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 1\%$ .

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