A Joint Evaluation

HUMANITARIAN AND RECONSTRUCTION ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN, 2001-05

FROM DENMARK, IRELAND, THE NETHERLANDS, SWEDEN AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark
Danida

Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan 2001-05

From Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

A Joint Evaluation

Main Report

Chr. Michelsen Institute (Lead Agency), Copenhagen Development Consulting and German Association of Development Consultants

October 2005

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Preface

The international assistance to Afghanistan following the ousting of the Taliban-regime at the end of 2001 has in many ways been unique. First, it has sought to combine the immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation efforts with a longer-term post-conflict reconstruction and development perspective. Secondly, the donor countries at a very early stage attempted to coordinate a joint strategic approach of harmonised efforts, including prioritisation of a limited number of selected sector interventions by each donor. Finally, by focusing on capacity building of the new Afghan government aligning the donor assistance mainly through the government-administered programmes, a new agenda of post-conflict assistance has been set.

The evaluation of the assistance to Afghanistan has also set new standards of collaboration. Even before the new government had been elected, representatives of the evaluation departments of the five donor organisations, the Danish and Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs, the Development Cooperation of Ireland (DCI), the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DfID), in 2003 agreed to undertake a joint evaluation of the Afghanistan humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. The Evaluation aimed at assessing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and connectedness of the assistance identifying lessons for improving the response by donor organisations in future complex security, humanitarian, rehabilitation and development situations. In addition, a special focus within the evaluation was also to assess the degree to which the assistance responded to the needs of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Afghanistan.

The preparation of the Evaluation has been quite extensive. The approach was discussed at a workshop at King's College, London, in the summer 2003, and several pre-studies were undertaken. Peter Marsden and David Turton, Refugee Council, UK, produced a preliminary study of assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan, and John Cosgrave and Rie Andersen, Channel Research, collected and analysed the information of the aid flows to Afghanistan from the five bilateral donors. Moreover, the Public Expenditure Review made for DCI, has also been available.

The evaluation was commissioned by Danida in December 2004 on behalf of the five donors to a consultant consortium led by Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen. After visits to the partners' headquarters, the extensive field work in Afghanistan was undertaken in March-April, completed with a workshop in Kabul with participation of key Afghan stakeholders. Finally, the draft reports have been submitted to the reference group, and commented upon by all involved through June-August.

A number of key recommendations and lessons learnt are highlighted by the Evaluation as undertaken by the international consultant team. It should be noted that while the draft reports have been commented upon by the five donors the responsibility of the analysis and the conclusions of the evaluation rests with the Evaluation team. However, we would like to express our thanks to all individuals and officials involved for the support and valuable information which the team received and which highly facilitated the work of the Evaluation.

This report is the Main Evaluation Report of the findings and recommendations of the Evaluation. A short version, intended for a wider audience, the additional Sector Studies, and the pre-studies are available from the website of Danida's Evaluation Department www.evaluation.dk

Danida's Evaluation Department

October 2005

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Abbreviations, Acronyms and Afghan Terms

AACA	Afghanistan Assistance Co-ordination Authority
AHDAA	Agency for Humanitarian Development Assistance for Afghanistan
AHDS	Afghan Health and Development Services
AIA	Afghan Interim Authority
AIHRC	Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission
AKDN	Aga Khan Development Network
ANA	Afghanistan National Army
ANBP	Afghanistan New Beginning Programme
ANGO	Afghan Non-Governmental Organisations
ANSO	Afghanistan NGO Security Office
ARCS	Afghanistan Red Cross Society
AREU	Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
ARTF	Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASP	Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme
ATA	Afghan Transitional Authority
AWSDC	Afghan Women Skills and Development Centre
BAAG	British Agencies Afghanistan Group
BPHS	Basic Package of Health Services
BRAC	Bangladesh Rural Assistance Committee
CAWC	Central Afghanistan Welfare Centre
CBS	Community Based Schools
CDC	Community Development Council
CG	Consultative Group
CHAD	Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department (DFiD)
CIC	Center for International Cooperation, New York University
CLJ	Constitutional Loya Jirga
CoAR	Coordination of Afghan Relief
Concern	Concern Worldwide, Irish NGO
CPAU	Council for Peace and Unity
DAC	Danish Afghanistan Committee
DACAAR	Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees
Danida	Danish International Development Assistance
DAARTT	Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training
DCI	Development Cooperation Ireland
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Program
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)
DIAG	Demobilisation of Illegally Armed Groups
DoRR	Department of Refugees and Repatriation
DOWA	Departments of Women Affairs
DRRD	Department of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office
EO/CA	Ecumenic Office/Christian Aid
EU	European Union
EVT	Education and Vocational Training
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
GoA	Government of Afghanistan
GoAl	Irish International Humanitarian NGO

GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
GAA	German Agro Action
HRAG	Human Rights Advisory Group
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
ILO	International Labour Organization
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IO	International Organization
IOM	International Organization of Migration
ISAF	International Security Assistance Forces
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
JRC	Judicial Reform Commission
MAPA	Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (UNICEF)
MISFA	Microfinance Investment Support Facility
MoA	Ministry of Agriculture
MoE	Ministry of Education/Ministry of Economy
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MoJ	Ministry of Justice
MoPH	Ministry of Public Health
MoPW	Ministry of Public Works
MoRR	Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation
MoWA	Ministry of Women's Affairs
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NDB	National Development Budget
NDF	National Development Frame Work
NEEP	National Emergency Employment Programme
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPO/RRAA	Norwegian Project Office/Rural Rehabilitation Association of Afghanistan
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
NSD	National Security Directorate
NSP	National Solidarity Program
OCHA	(UN) Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OHCHR	Office of the High Commission for Human Rights
Oxfam	Oxford Committee on Famine Relief
PIP	Public Investment Program
PPA	Performance Based Partnership Agreement
PRR	Priority Reform and Reconstruction
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
RANA	Reception and Reintegration of Afghan Nationals to Afghanistan
SC	Supreme Court
SCA	Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
SDF	Sanayee Development Foundation
Sida	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SWABAC	South West Afghanistan and Balouchistan Association for Coordination
TOR	Terms of Reference

Trocaire	Overseas Development Agency of the Catholic Church in Ireland
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nation Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation International Children and Education Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UXO	Unexploded ordnance
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (WFP)
WB	The World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
WP	Water point, mostly dug or tube wells and to a lesser extent stand post as part of gravity schemes

Afghan Terms

Afghani	Afghanistan's currency, abbreviated af.
Ashar	Communal work
Hawala	Traditional network-based money tranfer system
Loya Jirga	Grand (national) council
Madrasa	Quran school
Mufti	Islamic cleric
Muhajideen	Islamic warrior – in the Afghan context primarily those fighting the Soviet invasion
Moustifiat	Fiscal authority at provincial and district level, under the Ministry of Finance
Shura	Village Council
Taliban	Literally 'student' (of Quran schools). In the Afghan context the Islamic movement that held power between 1996-2001
Ulema	Council of Islamic leaders

Map


AFGHANISTAN
Major Roads and Cities
TAJIKISTAN
UZBEKISTAN
TURKMENISTAN
IRAN
PAKISTAN
CHINA
AIMS
LEGEND
BOUNDARIES
International
Province
ROADS
All Weather Primary
All Weather Secondary
SETTLEMENTS
Capital
Province
District
BADAKHSHAN
TAKHAR
KUNDUZ
BAGHLAN
PARWAN
NURISTAN
KUNAR
NANGARHAR
KABUL
LOGAR
KAPISA
PAKTIA
KHOST
PAKTIKA
BAMYAN
WARDAK
GHAZNI
SAMANGAN
BALKH
JAWZJAN
SAR-E PUL
FARYAB
BADGHIS
GHOR
URUZGAN
ZABUL
KANDAHAR
HILMAND
HIRAT
FARAH
NIMROZ

Executive Summary

1. Introduction and Methodology

The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida), the Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida) and the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) (the five 'Donors') initiated an Evaluation of their assistance to Afghanistan over 2001-early 2005 (see Terms of Reference in Annex I). It was commisioned to the Chr. Michelsen Institute, Norway (lead), Copenhagen Development Consulting and the German Association of Development Consultants, by Danida's Evaluation Department on behalf of the five Donor agencies.

From 2001, the Donors contributed financial assistance, which made up approximately 25 per cent of the entire civilian aid to Afghanistan in 2001-04, 791 million Euro in all, of which 383 million was provided by the UK, 165 million by the Netherlands, 123 million by Sweden, 99 million by Denmark and 21 million by Ireland. Of these contributions 77 per cent was channelled through ten major implementing channels:

- The Afghan Reconstruction and Trust Find (202 million Euro, 26 per cent),
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (82 million Euro, 10 per cent),
- United Nations Development Fund (78 million Euro, 10 per cent),
- United Nations Children Fund (57 million Euro, 7 per cent),
- World Food Programme (47 million Euro, 6 per cent),
- The Government of Afghanistan (34 million Euro, 4 per cent),
- International Committee of the Red Cross (30 million Euro, 4 per cent),
- The Afghan Stabilisation Programme (29 million Euro, 4 per cent),
- UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (27 million Euro, 3 per cent),
- The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (23 million Euro, 3 per cent).

The remaining 23 per cent was distributed through a large number of other implementers, often for smaller projects. With the exception of Ireland, the Donors also made military contributions supporting the civilian interventions.

Methodology
The Evaluation commenced January 2005 with a desk review. Subsequently donor agencies, key operational partners and key informants were interviewed in Europe and the USA. Field studies in Afghanistan by a team of seven international and four Afghan consultants took place in March/April.

To ensure that the study of the assistance provided by the Donors was both representative and reflected the situation in the different regions of Afghanistan, a combination of considerations (thematic, sector, implementation channel, and geographical, including ethnic and political differences) was taken into account. Sub-teams accordingly covered the following intervention areas at the central level in the capital, Kabul, and regionally in the provinces specified below:

- Nation and state-building and stabilisation, including human rights; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation-

led (NATO) Provincial Reconstruction Teams provided by the Donors (Balkh, Samangan and Baghlan provinces in the North).
- Refugees and internally displaced persons and the return of rejected asylum seekers, and health (Kandahar, Zabul and Herat in the South and West).
- Primary education and water and sanitation (Laghman and Nanghahar in the East).
- Gender and Livelihoods (Kabul, Parwan and Bamyan in central Afghanistan).

In the provinces, the sub-teams used interview guides, which also included issues addressed by other sub-teams. This approach allowed for interviews with a wide range of Afghan informants of whom a total of 329 were interviewed, in addition to a specific survey carried out in Kabul.

In late April, a debriefing meeting was held with the stakeholders in Kabul. A draft report was finalised in early June, and a final report in early August to be commented upon by the Donors and resource persons. The Evaluation has endeavoured to incorporate the valuable comments received, wherever possible.

2. The Afghan Context for Aid Provision

The present borders of the land-locked, mountainous state of Afghanistan were delineated in the 19th century as the result of a British-Russian compromise; these borders do not reflect the regional networks of local ethnicities. The South is mainly populated by Pashtuns, who constitute approximately half of the total population of some 23 million. Pashtuns also live in the adjoining parts of Pakistan. Northern Afghanistan is home to Turkmen, Uzbek and Tajik ethnicities. The central part of the country is inhabited by Hazaras, who have been traditionally underprivileged due to their allegiance to Shia rather than to the Sunni Islam followed by the majority of Afghans.

The Pashtuns were the politically dominant ethnicity until the victory of the 'Northern Alliance' in 2001. Balancing ethnicities has been a major concern for nation-building in the present polity. Traditionally, Afghan society is male dominated, with cultural and religious limitations to women's participation in public life and employment.

Since the start of international development cooperation with Afghanistan in the mid 1970s, it has been categorised among the least developed countries, ranking 173 out of 178 on the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Index 2004. While life expectancy has been extremely low, together with the female literacy rate, vulnerability to natural disasters has been high, as demonstrated by recent drought, earthquakes and floods. These problems have been reinforced by continued armed conflict since 1978.

The extended conflict has impacted negatively on relations between citizens and state, militarised society, and weakened traditional civil society structures and the social fabric. It has caused massive environmental destruction, undermined agricultural livelihoods, inhibited development, and forced six million Afghans either to flee to neighbouring countries or to become temporarily internally displaced. While the production of narcotics in Afghanistan had started to grow in the 1970s, there was a sharp increase in opium production from the late 1980s onwards. Despite all the changes, Afghans have remained strongly influenced by culture, traditions and religion, and their ethnic, tribal and family networks have been safety nets in the absence of a functional state.

In 1978 communist groups assumed power, followed by a Soviet invasion in 1979, and, in the context of the Cold War, the resistance, the mujahideen, received massive international military and financial support.
In 1989 the Soviet troops withdrew and in 1992, mujahideen took control of the capital Kabul, only to subject it to civil war, destroying most of the city and, at times, displacing half of the population.
Chaos and atrocities allowed for the emergence of the traditionalist and religiously conservative Taliban. They had gained power in most of the country by 1998, though the 'Northern Alliance' resisted in the North-east. The Taliban's harbouring of Al Qaeda, its demonstrable suppression of women, and the destruction of the Buddha statues, an acknowledged world cultural heritage site, contributed to international sanctions in 1998. A declining economy was aggravated by the Taliban's reduction of opium production and a drought that hit large parts of the country.

International non-governmental organisations and solidarity groups were the main providers of assistance for refugees in Pakistan from 1980 onwards, and many had started cross-border operations by the mid-1980s, providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance including medical, basic education, water and sanitation and agricultural inputs. These activities continued throughout the 1990s. The Donors organised themselves in 1997 into the Afghan Support Group, operating from Pakistan. Guidelines were introduced to ensure policy compliance between humanitarian actors and the need to avoid strengthening the Taliban regime.

The Al Qaeda attack of 11 September 2001 against the United States placed Afghanistan at the centre of international politics. The subsequent US-led attack on Al Qaeda and the Taliban was defined as the departure point for a wider 'war on terror'. The dramatic nature and saturated media coverage of the '9-11 attack', along with US pressure for enrolment, led the governments of Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK to participate in the 'Coalition of the Willing', which ousted the Taliban from most of the country in the autumn of 2001.

The design for the new Afghanistan was institutionalised by the international community and its Afghan partners in the Bonn Agreement of December 2001, and made operational by funding pledges at the Tokyo donor conference of January 2002, reflecting the perceived urgency of the task. Although the Bonn Agreement placed responsibility for the peace-building process with the Afghans, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established to assist the political, rehabilitation and development processes and NATO was charged with providing security through the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Following an emergency Loya Jirga (Grand Council) in June 2002, the Afghan Interim Authority was transformed into the Afghan Transition Authority and Hamid Karzai was elected Chairman. A Constitutional Loya Jirga approved the new Constitution in January 2004, and presidential elections followed in October 2004 in which Mr Karzai was elected. Parliamentary elections took place in September 2005, finalising the transition to constitutional democracy and fulfilling the Bonn Agreement with only a little delay.

Early economic recovery figures supported a positive outlook for economic growth, although the increase in 2002 and 2003 was at least partly due to the reduced impact of

the drought, higher incomes from expanded poppy production, and rapid urban growth. Contributing factors to economic development have included the introduction of a new Afghan currency, which remained fairly stable throughout the period, and large infrastructure projects funded by aid. Recent reports from the International Monetary Fund, however, provide a more cautious assessment of economic growth.

A range of contextual issues has influenced the Donors' ability to provide aid since 2001, including:

- Continued conflict which has increased security risks, limiting access to many parts of Afghanistan and increasing implementation costs.
- Slow progress in the establishment of the rule of law and the co-optation of commanders to positions of power have been conducive to reduced state legitimacy, continued human rights violations, and land disputes.
- Weak Afghan management capacity, slow and uneven capacity building, and increased corruption have reduced the value of aid and threatened government legitimacy.
- A shortage of Afghans with management, foreign language and computer skills led to competition and inflationary pay, draining both government and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) of core staff to the benefit of international organisations and private companies.
- Difficulty in attracting skilled senior international staff to hardship postings, resulting in some frustration among experienced Afghanistan aid workers, who often felt pushed aside by ignorant newcomers.
- The questions of how to organise military provision of aid supplementary to the normal aid distribution channels.
- The high visibility of international actors, often referred to as 'the NGOs', including their housing and transportation standards. When this coincided with a slower rehabilitation pace than the population had anticipated and than had been projected by the Government of Afghanistan, communal anger turned against the international actors.
- Logistical, security and economic factors caused rampant price inflation in Kabul.
- Lack of baseline data, needs assessments, and agreed benchmarks for rehabilitation and development have inhibited the measurement of progress and impact.

3. Main Findings

The Design of the Donor Interventions

First, it should be noted that all five Donors made it a high priority to respond to the urgent need for humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aid and for assistance in the creation of a new, re-unified democratic polity. The situation required, and obtained, a quick mobilisation of political priority and financial resources. Pledges were fast forthcoming, contributions exceeded initial pledges and were disbursed in full and on time, contrary to the criticism the Government of Afghanistan has made of other donors.

Decision-making on the use of funds was shaped by the need to respond urgently and simultaneously to humanitarian, rehabilitation, development and security imperatives. Given the unfamiliarity of Afghanistan within the field of international development cooperation, the five Donors relied to a great extent on international organisations for background information and for subsequently channelling aid. Each Donor also had its own needs and priorities, requiring adequate human resources in the home agencies and

in Afghanistan. However, with the partial exception of the UK, which devoted considerable manpower to its embassy and the Kabul office of the Department for International Development office, the human resources allocated by the Donors to the design and implementation of their policies did not match the high prioritisation of the task and the complicated aid environment in Afghanistan. Staffing has often been at a junior level and/or without prior Afghanistan experience, and turnover rates have been high. Given the continued conflict, complexity and uncertainty about the future of Afghanistan, the evaluation finds a need to remedy that situation.

To varying degrees, the Donors drew on advice from their own NGOs with substantial Afghanistan experience. Ireland chose to channel much of its aid through Irish NGOs, Sweden used the Swedish Afghanistan Committee as an important channel for aid provision and Denmark gave its NGOs significant support. The Netherlands and the UK did not prioritise the areas of previous NGO engagement.

While the creation of the ARTF was a successful novelty based on experience from earlier international interventions, the experience from earlier complex emergencies was not exploited systematically by the Donors, either because interventions were designed under considerable time pressure or because of poor knowledge management capacity in the donor agencies. Limited systematic attempt to draw on these experiences was found, although it might have helped to address at an earlier stage some of the problems described below.

The haste with which activities were subsequently implemented reflected both the urgent needs that existed in Afghanistan and the pressure to demonstrate results given the high political priority attached to conflict resolution in Afghanistan. Perceived emergencies and difficult working conditions and the fact that each donor was to prioritise 2-3 sectors in a situation "where everything was needed", resulted in low aid priority being given to gender, although the suppression of women had been originally cited as a major motivation for the intervention in Afghanistan, and to the environment, another traditional priority of the Donors. While the crisis spirit and the cultural traditions made it difficult to launch major gender projects, concern for Afghan women and girls influenced the prioritisation of support for primary education, human rights and the National Solidarity Programme.

The Overall Results of the Aid

The Evaluation found that the aid, combined with internal Afghan stabilisation and economic recovery, has contributed successfully to meeting the humanitarian challenge, to the rehabilitation of vital parts of Afghan society and polity, and, to a certain extent, to the inception of sustainable development processes. The following accomplishments are particularly noteworthy:

- A political process, which has installed a visible and self-conscious government, adopted the new constitution, and elected a President in ways that promoted stabilisation and regime legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population.
- Progress toward stability, to which the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams and De-mining have contributed.
- The establishment of some of the basic prerequisites of a working state, namely, a Ministry of Finance able to manage budgetary and fiscal functions in cooperation

with the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, ARTF, and the exercise of effective state authority over most of the territory.
- Some progress in meeting the basic needs of the population, most notably within primary education and improved access to water and sanitation, was recorded. Progress within health and sustainable livelihoods appears less solid.

Staff within the donor agencies placed great emphasis on the achievements listed above. There was a general conviction that 'Afghanistan is on the right track, although there may still be a long way to go'. While the Evaluation would not question these commendable accomplishments and the efforts they required, its findings regarding progress in rehabilitation and development were more mixed, thus indicating reason to be prepared for different future scenarios. Nevertheless, it subscribes to the overall positive assessment of the humanitarian response.

Sector Findings

Nation & State-building and Stabilisation

There is still open conflict with the 'Neo-Taliban'. Efforts to unite the nation through coalition-building, following democratic procedures, have had the unintended consequence of enabling political appointees to capture part of the state. Some of these appointees are former warlords and commanders, who lack both local support and the required motivation and management capacity, while also being prone to corruption and crime. This jeopardises the credibility of nation- and state-building. The numerous elections stipulated under the new political system could lead to long periods of impasse while high to middle ranking civil servants are replaced. In addition, elections are very costly to run, and therefore will constitute a significant drain on the financial resources of the Afghan state.

While such 'democratic excess' may be unavoidable in a difficult transition period, the Evaluation believes that it would have been preferable to give higher donor priority to activities aimed at strengthening the justice sector, which, despite its acknowledged importance, has been rather neglected by the international community. It appears that the donor community has been satisfied in this respect by the existence of the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, although the latter's operational capacity is limited by its disconnection from the Afghan polity and the NGO community. In addition, the Donors have thus far failed to develop and adopt explicit anti-corruption policies related to the function of the Afghan state.

A merit-based civil service, able to manage effective service delivery in all sectors where the Donors have provided aid, would have been preferred. While the Priority Reform and Reconstruction process now underway is endeavouring to achieve this, it is questionable whether the reforms proposed will be adequate to meet existing needs. Initiatives to strengthen the existing civil service, through improved facilities and working conditions at the sub-national levels and better communications between the various levels of the bureaucracy and with citizens, have not been attempted. Donors have focused on fulfilling the minimum requirements of the Ministry of Finance, the army and the police, through the establishment of 'parallel systems' of internationally paid and funded project staff. To some extent, this has been more a case of buying in capacity than of building it. Extreme discrepancies in the remuneration of staff doing identical work have resulted in widespread resentment.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
This programme overall appears to have been relatively successful, especially regarding disarmament and demobilisation. In addition to some 50,000 men who have been disarmed, demobilised and supported in finding alternative livelihoods, another accomplishment has been to limit the legal cover of the commanders, thus encouraging them to seek peaceful co-option into the political system. The results obtained have, according to all stakeholders, been conditioned by the interest of the main players in becoming peaceful politicians, allowing the DDR a catalytic role in this process, and by the visible background presence of the PRTs. The programme has curtailed the commanders' power, but they and their networks have not been dismantled completely. The continued widespread availability of weapons in Afghanistan is a potentially destabilising factor.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams
It was found that the Donors' civilian-military Provincial Reconstruction Teams have performed well in the important tasks that lie within their particular expertise – the provision of stability and support for the police – thus promoting an enabling environment for development. Scope for further improvement is found in: improved institutional PRT memory through more elaborate handover mechanisms; greater inclusion of the local NGO community in information gathering and a higher degree of realism in the analysis of local power structures, including the continued importance of the commander structure.

By contrast, they have performed less well in development tasks, which have generally not been well prepared and coordinated with the national priorities of Afghanistan, and where the staffing of the PRTs has been critically low in terms of numbers and experience in relation to professional development skills. In addition, there is reason to believe that cost-effectiveness is low. Nevertheless, ambitions still seem to be high, if rather vague, regarding the role of the PRTs in overall societal development, in particular within the governance sector on the level of provinces where they operate.

Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons
Afghanistan has witnessed a massive return and reintegration of 3.5 million refugees and more than 1 million internally displaced persons during the evaluation period. Both processes have been managed satisfactorily by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. However, a notable concern is that the funding for return and reintegration has been substantially reduced since 2004, while the number of returnees remains the same as in the last 3 years and those now returning are generally poorer and more likely to be landless than earlier returnees. An innovative and timely process has been initiated with the Governments of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan to enable the focus to shift from refugee return to migration management. This deserves the full backing of the five Donors. Further support and protection are needed for the remaining group of internally displaced persons, predominantly nomads, though efforts here should be concentrated on finding political or developmental solutions to the security and ecological challenges that either inhibit return or prevent their permanent settlement in the areas where they are currently displaced.

The Provision of Basic Needs and Livelihood Support
The Donors have made substantial contributions towards meeting the basic needs of the Afghan population in the education, health, water and sanitation, and livelihood sectors, and have funded the de-mining action that is a prerequisite for rehabilitation and devel-

opment processes. All interventions are regarded as highly needed, though many were initially based on limited needs assessment, and subsequent monitoring and evaluation have been lacking. What is particularly notable is the low support for the agricultural sector, given both its importance to the Afghan economy and substantial NGO involvement in this sector prior to 2001.

As for education, the 'Back to School' campaign led by the United Nations Children Fund has been successful, increasing school enrolment to five million children by 2005, including girls previously deprived of public education opportunities. Given this massive enrolment, the challenge now is to improve the quality of the education, secure appropriate teaching facilities, and improve the planning and management capacity of the Ministry of Education.

The health sector has undergone a major restructuring with the introduction of the Basic Package of Health Services. The Donors have funded this sector primarily through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, United Nations (UN) agencies, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and through implementing NGOs. So far, the Government of Afghanistan has lacked the capacity and ability to assume its stewardship roles. Given the massive health problems faced by the Afghan population, the health sector is in need of greater and more comprehensive attention.

Except for Denmark, the Donors have not given high priority to water and sanitation, despite previous NGO involvement, but efforts to supply safe drinking water and latrines for the population have been judged both important and cost-effective. Given its importance for a wider array of issues the establishment of an Integrated Water Resource Management system should have been prioritised at an earlier stage.

By contrast, the livelihood sector has been highly prioritised, through support for the World Food Programme, the government's national programmes, and various alternative livelihood initiatives, including those within the counter-narcotics campaign. Projects with a development orientation and larger beneficiary involvement, such as the National Solidarity Programme, were found more appropriate than the more emergency oriented ones.

Findings Related to the Evaluation Criteria
Overall, the interventions by the five Donor countries are considered highly **relevant,** given the prevailing context, to the needs of the beneficiaries and to Government of Afghanistan policies as well as to the priorities of the Donor countries. The exceptions are the relatively low priority given to support for agriculture, women and the environment and some components of the civilian aid provided by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

Achieving overall **coherence** between the different aid instruments – political, humanitarian, rehabilitation, development, and stabilisation – and between donor policies and Government of Afghanistan policies, under difficult and rapidly changing conflict conditions, has been a considerable challenge. The Donors have been largely successful in supporting the Government of Afghanistan's priorities and in showing the required flexibility in relation to the provision of the aid needed at different periods of time. Regarding the interplay between stabilisation, aid and the ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Teams, it has been possible to obtain synergy from their contribution towards stabilisation and the creation of an aid-enabling environment.

The Evaluation finds that aid overall has been rather well **connected** with the longer-term development needs identified by the GoA as well as with interconnected problems of the policy of Afghan authorities, with the partial exception of the justice sector. As concerns capacity building of local structures at provincial and district levels, a more mixed picture was observed. Sustainability is difficult to measure at this early stage. However, the absence of a serious attempt to strengthen and connect with the justice sector, as well as the lack of effective protection of human rights and personal security, pose a threat to the future sustainability of the new Afghanistan. The financial sustainability of the various interventions is another major concern, in the light of the expected future incomes of the Government and its consequent ability to assume increasing responsibility for functions presently covered through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund.

While a comprehensive aid **coordination** structure was put in place in Kabul from early on, in practice coordination of the various sectors has been uneven. There has been a general disconnection between the capital and the provincial and district levels, where coordination systems have often been deficient.

In terms of **effectiveness,** the record of assistance provided to Afghanistan is mixed. The most positive results relate to the provision of humanitarian aid, especially, the return of refugees and internally displaced persons and the rehabilitation of the water supply. Regarding the primary education sector, assistance has been very effective in terms of quantity, but teaching quality is in need of improvement. In the health sector, coverage has been low.

Nation building has effectively materialised the objectives of the Bonn Agreement, although the dissemination of the constitution lags behind. Support for state-building has been effective in relation to the key budgetary and fiscal functions, but there has been little progress in most other parts of the state, including the key justice sector. Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration programme have made effective contributions to stabilisation and the strengthening of the state.

On the basis of the above observations, the **impact** of the aid is expected to be considerable, provided that open conflict comes to an end and that adequate reforms take place within the civil service and the justice sector to curtail the risk of criminalisation of the state. Both prerequisites will require the continued and active presence of the aid community in Afghanistan for a considerable period of time. The financial sustainability of the Afghan state will also depend on this.

Regarding cost-effectiveness (a component of overall **efficiency**), it has been difficult to obtain the relevant information, but all the indicators point to a decline: logistics, security overheads, inflated support costs, and high manpower expenses due to capacity buying. One activity appears to have been particularly expensive in terms of funding and manpower, namely, the civilian aid provided by the PRTs.

Regarding the timeliness of aid provision, the overall picture is positive, with the notable exceptions of civil service reform outside the Ministry of Finance in Kabul, and justice reform, where the initiatives have been very slow to get off the ground.

Findings Related to the Donors
While the Donors together have contributed a significant part of the aid to Afghanistan, have shared some common approaches, and have collaborated well on specific issues, they have not acted as a group. Likewise, it has not been possible to identify a 'European model' for assistance to Afghanistan, although guidance has been sought on political matters with the European Union (EU). Rather the Donors, like most of the international community, have accepted the United States and World Bank designed 'Bonn model', the Government of Afghanistan's leading role and their requirement to select 3 main sectors, and adopted roles within the consequent framework.

The Donors have all contributed significantly to state-building through the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, ARTF. All but Ireland have established embassies/representation offices in Afghanistan and contributed significantly to:

- Stabilisation through Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
- The resolution of the refugee and internal displacement problems through the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and collaborated with the International Organisation for Migration on the return of refugees and rejected asylum seekers.

The **Netherlands** decided almost from the start to concentrate her aid on the ARTF and multilateral channels, with the exception of some civilian aid provided by the Dutch Provincial Reconstruction Team. The Netherlands has been a consistent advocate of multilateral coordination, used direct contacts at Afghan ministerial levels to influence development in Afghanistan but did not fully utilise her existing NGO resource base.

Denmark supported the Ministry of Education, De-mining, and Human Rights. Danish contributions were found to have had a positive impact on progress in primary education and are expected to continue to have positive impacts in the future, given the investments in teachers' education and teaching materials. The management capacity of the Ministry of Education has been a bottleneck, which might have been ameliorated through the necessary support for the development of management capacity in the sector. Similarly, the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission could probably have benefited from a closer involvement by Denmark, again through additional representation and/or more expert staff.

Irish contributions were directed to several sectors through Irish NGOs such as Concern, Christian Aid, GoAl and Trocaire, while maintaining a humanitarian approach. This enabled Ireland to economise on manpower and transactions costs. The price has been a lack of influence in the concerned sectors in Afghanistan, although some of the NGOs have contributed significantly to policy debates and have undertaken innovative capacity-building within Afghan NGOs and civil society.

Sweden supported the education sector through the United Nations Children Fund, but her greatest and most valuable input has been to the health sector through the Swedish Afghanistan Committee. The networking of this Committee, in Afghanistan and in Sweden, has given Sweden greater influence over policy than might have been expected from a modestly staffed representation office. Furthermore, Sweden has used her comparative expertise in Sida to undertake joint road construction with the European Commission, thus being the only Donor to implement projects directly with the EC.

Unlike the other Donors, Sweden did not combine her Provincial Reconstruction Team contribution with civilian activities.

The **UK** has been a major player in Afghanistan as the lead Donor in Counter Narcotics, a major donor within state-building and alternative livelihoods, and a major Provincial Reconstruction Team supplier. British NGOs received little support. The UK has maintained well-staffed desks in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and in the Department for International Development to oversee its activities in Afghanistan. Given the size of the British financial contributions and of the human resources devoted to the undertaking, a more visible effect of the UK engagement in state-building might have been expected. Within Counter Narcotics, the UK has mustered donor support for its approach, which emphasises alternative livelihood, while the US engagement in the issue has emphasised poppy eradication. Within Provincial Reconstruction Teams, the UK has had an important lead role for the contributions from Denmark and Sweden.

Findings Related to the Implementation Channels
There is widespread agreement that the **ARTF** has been a very useful funding channel, reducing each Donor's administrative costs while ensuring compliance with GoA policy priorities. The transaction cost is low, while transparency is high. Three concerns were noted, however. One relates to the increasing sums of money spent on paying salaries, reducing the funding available for rehabilitation and development projects. The second is the Donors' increased use of preferred funding allocations, (although this is a necessity for some donors due to more rigid budget allocation procedures), and the third is the minimal Afghan involvement in setting policy directions.

There is a major concern related to the policy development and handling capacity of the **Government** of Afghanistan, and its general dependency on 'bought expertise', though some Ministries have proven ability. More concerted and better coordinated efforts are required to increase the government's capacity to handle development, including at provincial and district levels.

The **UN agencies and the international organisations** have in general performed well (United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees performance has been excellent), though at a quite high cost due to additional security measures and high living and transaction costs. The **NGO sector** represents a more mixed picture. The very real achievements of the professional organisations, implementing the majority of UN and government initiated programmes and projects have tended to be overshadowed by the criticism levelled at the large number of newly established NGOs.

Overall Conclusions
The Evaluation finds that aid to Afghanistan has produced important results, at a high financial cost due to difficult security and logistical problems. Aid has been unevenly distributed between regions and communities, and has thus sometimes failed to target the most needy. A sustainable impact will require long-term development and stabilisation support to Afghanistan and that the donor community takes an active stance to promote of the rule of law, the institution of measures against corruption and effective service delivery by the state. Further, the donor community should be prepared for different future peace-building and conflict scenarios.

4. Main Recommendations

1. The Donors should reaffirm their commitment to supporting the development of Afghanistan for at least the next ten years, considering Afghanistan's poor income generation potential and the still prevailing uncertainty about future development scenarios. (This commitment is already under discussion in some of the Donor countries, within given time-planning horizons).

2. The Donors should give high priority to the effective installation of the rule of law and to the fight against corruption. This should be combined with the full implementation of the constitution and its further dissemination to the Afghan public.

3. To enhance the ability of the Government of Afghanistan to assume full responsibility for future development, the Donors should, with other donors, support development of an interim National Development Strategy, establish a transparent system for the benchmarking of aid, combined with support for capacity building at all levels of government and for meeting immediate needs at sub-national levels.

4. The Donors should endeavour to obtain a more even geographical distribution of aid and a targeting of the poorest, by investigating whether factors other than security are creating obstacles to even distribution and seeking alternative implementation channels such as civil society organisations and local entrepreneurs.

5. In order to safeguard the humanitarian and development contributions of the NGOs working in Afghanistan, the Donors should actively continue to counter unwarranted criticism, correct misinformation and use their influence to ensure that adequate Government supervision and self-regulation of the NGO community is put in place.

6. The Donors should continue to provide support for the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund, support the formal inclusion of the Government of Afghanistan in a policy forum, and a gradual handover of financial control to the government.

7. The donor community at large should coordinate their practices in relation to the recruitment and renumeration of staff so as not to out-compete the government and to avoid the creation of a skewed labour market. The Donors should bring up this issue in the relevant fora since it cannot be solved by individual donor action, however commendable the attempts.

8. Finally, it is recommended that the Donors initiate a number of follow-up studies to inform future decisions in Afghanistan and elsewhere (see Annex IV).

Recommendation 1 entails significant future costs. The other recommendations probably entail modest cost increases in the short run, but have the potential for greater savings in the future. Essentially, they are more demanding politically for the Donors than financially.

5. Lessons Learned

1. There is a need for strengthened knowledge management and analytical capacity within the concerned donor agencies to deal with multi-dimensional crisis interventions. This includes sufficient and adequately experienced staff, mechanisms for the accumulation and use of experience from similar situations, better or more appropriate use of external resources, and the further development of cooperation procedures between agencies.

2. Given that rising levels of corruption, nepotism and organised crime are the likely results of regime and norm breakdown following violence, there is a pressing need to create a strong, transparent, fair and effective justice sector, connected with prevailing religious and customary law, while complying with international human rights legislation. A well-functioning police requires a well-functioning judiciary.

3. Without employment opportunities for ex-combatants, the struggle against crime becomes difficult. Alternative employment initiatives are called for to reduce the propensity for going back to the gun.

4. In multi-dimensional interventions, there is a tendency to focus on political nation-building. State-building, necessary to respond to the needs of citizens, easily gets sidelined. Civil servants identified with the ancient regime have been neglected in favour of new incumbents whose main qualification is their correct political inclination. Politicisation makes the administration prone to corruption and weakens management capacity, thus reducing the value of the aid provided. Thus, new thinking about benchmarking and rewards on aid to secure professional governance is required.

5. Under a complex and somewhat chaotic crisis regime, influenced by political and market economy imperatives, established priorities in development cooperation for the poorest and most vulnerable sections of the population, including the large number in the agricultural sector, and for environment and human security tend to be bypassed.

6. Aid provision in high security risk areas tends to become geographically skewed, to the detriment of its long-term impact. Awareness of this problem is limited since needs assessment and monitoring are also limited. Further, it tends to be accompanied by cost inflation and wage competition for limited staff resources to the detriment of the local public sector. Awareness of these problems and the introduction of counter-measures by the donor community are therefore important. Cost-effectiveness should not be forgotten since it is always a question of allocating limited funds between competing needs.

7. Military intervention works best when it sticks to its areas of comparative advantage. It should, therefore, reduce its civilian activities to small, rapid impact projects. The chief exception is emergency situations, where the armed forces may be the only possible aid providers. Military considerations should not be permitted to determine humanitarian and development actions.

8. The project experience, staff, networks, and community acceptance of NGOs should be used in the early transition period and phased into government plans and capacity development wherever possible. However, steps should be taken to avoid NGOs developing into a local elite which out-competes the public sector. There is a need to find ways of regulating NGOs, foster their self-regulation, and developing profiles of NGOs and civil society organisations to avoid misuse of the concept and to maintain conventional NGO mission and behaviour.

1. Introduction

In 2004, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Danida), the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), hereafter referred to as the five 'Donors', commissioned an Evaluation of the assistance (humanitarian, rehabilitation and development) they had provided to Afghanistan from 2001 to 2005,[1] following the ousting of the Taliban regime in October 2001. According to its Terms of Reference (TOR), the Evaluation was to assess the relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, coherence, connectedness and coordination of the assistance provided and to identify ways in which donor response to similarly complex interventions in the future could be improved (for TOR, see Annex I).

The TOR also stated that the Evaluation had been initiated as part of the 'Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Framework Process', a multi-country exercise on handling the needs of IDPs,[2] and that there should be a special focus on IDP issues. However, a background study for the evaluation, carried out in 2004, examined the IDP issue in some detail and reports from the UNHCR concluded that the problem was less acute in Afghanistan than had been thought.[3] It was therefore agreed that, while the Evaluation would still consider the IDP issue, this issue would no longer be its primary or exclusive concern.

The Donors had already commissioned two background studies in addition to the Irish Public Expenditure Review,[4] and appointed a consortium of the Chr. Michelsen

1 *While the TOR stated that the Evaluation was to cover the period 2001-2004, it was later agreed that it should include all relevant information up to the close of reporting. In the event, reporting finished on 23 July 2005.*

2 *In 2003 a group of donors decided to conduct a number of evaluations with a special focus on IDPs. A common framework was prepared (Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs. Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering, Danida file no. 104.A.1.E.39, 20 October 2003). In addition to the Afghanistan study referenced below, IDP-focused evaluations have been undertaken in Angola (Denmark and ECHO), Democratic Republic of Congo (USAID/OFDA), Sudan (ECHO), Kosovo (Denmark), and Indonesia (Sweden). A Synthesis Report summarised the findings: Borton, John, Margie Buchanan-Smith, and Ralf Otto. Support to Internally Displaced Persons: Learning from Evaluations. Stockholm: SIDA, 2005.0*

3 *Marsden, P. and David Turton (2004), 'Preliminary Study of Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan'. Copenhagen: Danish International Development Association (Danida).*

4 *Development Cooperation Ireland (2004), 'Public Expenditure Review of Support to Afghanistan 2000 to 2003'. (Draft Report August 2004), Dublin, DCI, Department of Foreign Affairs; John Cosgrave and Rie Andersen (2004), 'Aid Flows to Afghanistan. A Study of Aid Flows from Denmark, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Ireland to Afghanistan from January 2001 to June 2004 Inclusive'. Ohain, Belgium: Channel Research Limited/Danida; P. Marsden and David Turton (2004), 'Preliminary Study of Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan'. Copenhagen: Danish International Development Association (DANIDA). All these studies can be found on the CD-ROM that is enclosed with the present report.*
In addition, the Evaluation has been inspired by the following studies: King's College, University of London (2003), 'Key Components for an Evaluation of International Assistance to Post-conflict Afghanistan 2001-2003'. September 2003, Copenhagen, Danida; Niels Dabelstein (2001), 'Aid Responses to Afghanistan: Lessons from Previous Evaluations'. DAC Senior Level Meeting 12-13 December 2001; Anders Tang Friborg (2004), 'Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Post-War Situation'. Copenhagen, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie (2004), Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace. London, Zed Books; Noora Niland, Antonio Donini et al (2004), Nation-Building Unraveled?: Aid, Peace amd Justice in Afghanistan. Blomfield Conn., Kumarian Press.

Institute (lead agency), Copenhagen Development Consulting, and the German Association of Development Consultants to undertake the evaluation. The evaluation was carried out between January-August 2005, with field studies in Afghanistan in March-April.

The Evaluation wishes to record its appreciation of the advice and support it received from the donor reference group during the process and of the frank responses it encountered within the ministries and aid agencies of the donor nations, within the organisations through which much of the aid was channelled, and among representatives of the Afghan Government. The team also wishes to thank the numerous stakeholders who readily shared their experiences and especially the hundreds of beneficiaries in Afghanistan, who enthusiastically welcomed the decision to undertake an evaluation of the aid programme.

From late 2001 to early 2005, the Donors provided considerable financial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, 791 million Euros in all. If their European Commission (EC) contributions are also included, these five donor countries contributed approximately 30 per cent of the entire civilian aid provision to Afghanistan over the period 2001-04. With the exception of Ireland, they also made substantial military contributions supporting their civilian interventions. Contributions exceeded initial pledges and were disbursed in full and on time.

Of the 791 million Euros donated by the five Donor countries as humanitarian assistance between January 2001 and June 2004, 77 per cent of these contributions was channelled through ten recipients (see Figure 1), while the remaining 23 per cent was distributed among a large number of UN and international organisations non-governmental organisations and the Government of Afghanistan, GoA. Information on these can be found in the 'Aid Flows to Afghanistan' study. If otherwise not indicated all financial figures mentioned in this report are drawn from this background study.

Figure 1: Main Channels of Humanitarian Aid Provision to Afghanistan by the Donors, 2001 – mid 2004
(Source: Aid Flows to Afghanistan)

Agency	Euro Million	% of total	Channel
ARTF	202	26	GoA
UNHCR	82	10	UN
UNDP	78	10	UN
UNICEF	57	7	UN
WFP	47	6	UN
Government of Afghanistan	34	4	GoA
ICRC	30	4	ICRC
AF Stabilisation Programme	29	4	GoA
OCHA	27	3	UN
SCA	23	3	NGO
Others	182	23	Various

This report begins by presenting the Afghan background (Section 2) and the initial donor decisions on the design of their interventions (Section 3). The composition of the evaluation team and the methodology it employed are described in Section 4.

Sections 5-8 report on the observations and findings from the assessment of the main intervention areas of the Donors and of cross-cutting issues. Section 9 presents assessments of the main implementation channels, the GoA, UN and international organisations and NGOs, and of the individual interventions of the Donors.

Section 10 analyses the findings specifically in relation to the stated evaluation criteria and presents the overall conclusions of the evaluation. The recommendations that result from the evaluation are set out in Section 11. Section 12 discusses the lessons that can be drawn from the Afghanistan case-study in respect of multidimensional aid interventions in the future, and identifies some issues in relation to this problematique that require further research.

Further to the finalisation of the draft report, a fruitful dialogue process has taken place with the Donors, who have commented upon the draft in writing and at a meeting in Bergen on 28 June 2005 with the joint evaluation reference group. While the Evaluation has responded to and endeavoured to accommodate all comments, some of the Donors have expressed a wish for a more elaborate treatment of their own interventions than is possible to render in a joint evaluation. On the contrary, the team believes that the joint evaluation has gained in value from its comparative approach. In the few instances where assessments diverged substantially, these are noted in the text.

For lack of space in the present report, it has not been possible to include the full studies by the Evaluation of the Education, Health, Water & Sanitation, Livelihood, Gender and Environment sectors. These, and the other background studies can be found on the CD-ROM that is enclosed with the present report, and are available from www.evaluation.dk.

2. Methodology

'We are not satisfied with the level of assistance provided, but we are very pleased to see that the Donors send teams to check how their assistance has been utilised.'
(Community Council, Enjil District, Herat)

2.1 The Evaluation Process

The main directions for the different phases of the Evaluation, as stated by the TOR, are presented below. The field studies in Afghanistan are described in detail, as is the shift away from the single IDP focus to multiple issues.

The TOR state that the purpose of the evaluation was to:

a) Examine the provision of recent assistance to Afghanistan from the perspective of bilateral donors, who together appear to have contributed approximately 25 per cent of total aid flows to the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in the country since 2001.
b) Facilitate a comparison of approaches by five bilateral donors, which should provide valuable insight into the challenges by and practice of donors providing support to complex situations such as Afghanistan.
c) Provide an unprecedented opportunity to examine how the needs of IDPs as a specific vulnerable group within a larger international response are perceived and approached by bilateral donor organisations and the partners they support.

The TOR also outlined a five-phase evaluation strategy that emphasised a participatory and stakeholder-oriented process. The Evaluation has followed these guidelines:

- The Evaluation commenced in January 2005 with a desk review and subsequent interviews with the aid agencies in the five Donor countries.
- The second phase included interviews with key operational partners and key informants in Geneva, Brussels, New York and Washington leading to the preparation of an Inception Report that was discussed at a Donor Reference Group meeting in Dublin on 25 February 2005. A preparatory field visit to Kabul in early March allowed consultation on TOR with key GoA and Afghan civil society stakeholders.
- The third phase in March-April involved the field studies in Afghanistan, detailed below, leading to a presentation of the initial findings at a stakeholder workshop in Kabul on 26 April 2005.
- The fourth phase (May-August) consisted of analysis and report writing, including a consultation in June on the draft report in Kabul with representatives of the Afghan government and civil society, and feedback from the Donors, in writing and at a Donor Reference Group meeting in Bergen on 28 June, and from Afghanistan experts.
- In the fifth phase (September-November) the final findings will be presented to Donors, operational partners and stakeholders, and to the Afghan government.

The Evaluation has been guided by the general evaluation guidelines in the TOR[5] and by the 'Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs: Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering'. The team has also drawn on the 'Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship' as a normative framework for its assessment of the assistance provided by the Donors.

To assist in the process of evaluation, two quality assurance groups were established. The first was an internal quality assurance group (Ms Elna Bering, Copenhagen DC and Ms Astri Suhrke and Mr Jan Isaksen, CMI) while the second was an external group that included Margie Buchanan Smith and Philip Rudge, both experts on IDP issues. The Evaluation was also able to interact with and draw on a range of other evaluations and reviews, most notably, the Public Expenditure Review undertaken by Development Cooperation Ireland, external reviews of the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund (undertaken by the Scan Team) and of the National Solidarity Project (undertaken by Altai Consulting and the Donor Supervision Mission), and a number of internal reviews of the UN agencies and NGOs. An annotated bibliography of key sources prepared by King's College London provided useful background information for the Evaluation.

2.2 Clarification of the Terms of Reference

Three important clarifications to the TOR were made during the Donor Reference Group meeting 25 February 2005:

- First, it was emphasised that the Evaluation should review a selection of projects, programmes and implementation channels funded by all five Donors rather than go into detail on single donor countries.
- Secondly, in respect of the terms applied by the Donors, it was agreed that the Evaluation should prepare a list of definitions of emergency relief, reconstruction, rehabilitation and development (*See Annex II).*
- Thirdly, given that the number of IDPs in Afghanistan had fallen sharply in previous years, it was agreed to limit the extent of this part of the evaluation. In line with the findings of the IDP network on evaluations of assistance to IDPs, it was agreed to focus the evaluation around a set of questions rather than adopt an exhaustive process of enquiry that might not match realities on the ground.[6] These questions were subsequently amended after discussions with Afghan stakeholders and UNHCR (see Chapter 6).

2.3 Team Composition and Limitations for its Work

The selection of the Evaluation was made to meet the five objectives described below, and influenced by the emphasis made in the two background papers on the need to ensure inclusion of the views of intended beneficiaries and IDPs.

5 *Given the nature of the Afghan intervention, where stabilisation and the creation of an effective government is an overall objective, and considering the coexistence in time of humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aid 'connectedness' is interpreted as the aid's ability to promote the overall objective, thus promoting the precondition for future aid.*

6 *See John Borton, Margie Buchanan-Smith and Ralf Otto (2005), Support to Internally Displaced Persons: Learning from Evaluations. Summary Version, Stockholm, SIDA.*

The objectives were a) the sectoral requirements outlined in the TOR; b) the consultants' ability to work in the difficult cultural and security environment of Afghanistan; c) ensuring a gender balanced team; d) ensuring independence of the team members; and e) inclusion of qualified Afghan consultants.

The Evaluation consisted of the following consultants: Arne Strand (Team Leader), Gunnar Olesen (Deputy Team Leader), Katarina Ammittzboell, Sadiqa Basiri, Richard Ellert, Sarah Grey, Eng. Hahim, Holger Munsch, Said Musa Hamidullah Natiq, Najibullah Nooristani, Daud Saba, Akbar Sarwari and Merete Taksdal. The contribution made by the Afghan team members went beyond assisting with interpretation and translation. They took an active part in the planning and debriefing workshops, highlighting local Afghan concerns and understandings of the context and the assistance provision. They provided valuable comments on the draft and final report, and Sadiqa Basiri and Daud Saba wrote respectively the gender and environment sections (see Chapter 8 and enclosed CD-ROM).

Given that one of the selection criteria for the consultants was that they should have had previous Afghanistan experience, care was taken to ensure the team's independence. As a rule, consultants were not supposed to interview former colleagues or personal acquaintances. They were also debarred from assuming overall responsibility for reviewing any organisation or project to which they had prior links.

Before presenting the field methodology, it should be noted that the Afghan context imposed a number of limitations on the evaluation, which, for the most part, the team was able to counter through the strategies adopted. Most notable was the high turnover of international staff, leading to loss of organisational memory, particularly relating to details of the initial period of emergency assistance provision. This limitation was countered by interviewing Afghan staff members and by gathering information from key observers. Another problem encountered was that many of the Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Governors and their Afghan advisors were extremely busy, and frequently changed their agendas. The strategy adopted here was to continue to set up new appointments with the key informers while also conducting interviews with lower ranking officials or with persons with particular responsibility for programmes or policies.

The rather politicised environment should also be mentioned. There was a high degree of jealousy and rivalry between Ministries and between the GoA and the NGO sector. This frequently led interviewees to make unsubstantiated allegations about other actors, and it was evident that the different actors had very limited knowledge of what the others actually were doing. The only remedy here was to ask all interviewees (including Ministers) to document their claims. The team also sought to compensate for potentially biased information by consulting with as broad a range of sources as possible.

The lack of written information, both in general and especially for the PRTs, was another source of concern, although some of the Donors had limited written documentation, such as DFID on the livelihood sector for the period under review. Information gathering had here to be supplemented by further interviews and field observations.

Security posed a major concern in all parts of Afghanistan, and the movements of the Evaluation were subject to important constraints whenever team members travelled with UN staff, due to the latter's security arrangements. The use of locally rented cars and taxis, as well as keeping a lower profile by travelling with Afghan NGOs and/or indi-

viduals, allowed the team to gain access to areas where the UN and the Donors were prohibited by security regulations.

Finally, the evaluation process was hampered by the lack of verified baseline data on Afghanistan, with the notable exception of studies undertaken by the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU). In many sectors, 'guestimates' rather than evidence-based figures are used, limiting the ability to measure effect and impact. Again, diversified sources of information, interviews with AREU researchers and field observations were used to counter this limitation. However, it was not possible to substitute for the lack of data in all cases. For this reason, the evaluation has not been able to clarify all the elements of the assessments as it would have liked to do, as it will be reflected in the text and in the suggestions for further studies. This reflects the Afghan realities under which the Donors have had to work.

2.4 Field Methodology

To ensure a degree of representation, a combination of thematic, sectoral, implementation channel and geographical considerations (which partly reflect ethnic, religious and political differences) was taken into account when the fieldwork was designed. Each consultant was assigned individual responsibility for one sector or theme, and four subteams of 2-3 international and Afghan consultants were formed to conduct fieldwork in a selected number of geographical locations.

Initially, the Badakshan province had been identified for a study of sustainable and alternative livelihoods and gender, but, due to climatic and security concerns, Bamyan province was substituted, together with Kabul and the Parwan. One team visited Balqh, Samangan and Baghlan provinces to examine nation- and state-building, human rights, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and PRT. Another team visited Nangarhar and Laghman provinces to examine primary education and water and sanitation, and a third team visited Zabul, Kandahar and Herat provinces, where it focused on health and refugees, and IDPs.

The methodology for the field study was designed with the aim of ensuring the broadest possible data collection to enable comparison of information from a range of sources, and, moreover, to apply a wide variety of evaluation and interview methods to ensure inclusion of relevant resource persons in a culturally sensitive and balanced manner. The team made use of workshops to plan for the field visits, to develop a common methodology, and later to share and discuss the field findings.

In the selected geographical areas all teams mapped a range of general issues, including the impact of state- and nation-building efforts, the structure and effectiveness of aid coordination, the status of refugee/IDP return and resettlement programmes, and the coverage and quality assessment of national programmes and support through ARTF.

Consultants then pursued their sectoral and thematic areas through semi-structured interviews with representatives of local authorities, the AIHRC, UN agencies, international organisations, NGOs, PRTs and beneficiaries of programmes/projects supported by the Donors. The data from these interviews were coupled with personal observations made by the consultants at project locations. All teams emphasised focus group interviews with village councils, including the NSP Community Development Councils,

male and female, while in-depth group and individual interviews were held with male and female IDPs in camps in Kandahar and Herat provinces. In addition, interviews with representatives of district authorities and communities in Zabul province and of NGOs working in Uruzgan, Helmand and Farah provinces enabled information to be gathered in some of the least assisted provinces.

Various methods were used in the selection of individual informants, villages and community councils for interview; in all cases, the Evaluation did its best to minimise bias emanating from the implementing or funding agency. In some instances, the implementing or funding agency suggested particular areas to visit and particular beneficiaries to interview. In this case, agency staff participated in the interview sessions. This was the least preferable method. In other cases, the agency suggested a number of areas. This allowed the team to select the particular areas and beneficiaries to interview; however, agency staff still sat in on the interviews. The third approach, and the one which the Evaluation preferred, was for agency staff to introduce the team to the interlocutors but not sit in on the interview. (In this case, the Evaluation provided agency staff with feedback afterwards on how the beneficiaries assessed the assistance and their performance.) A fourth strategy was for the Evaluation to obtain information on project activities from the implementing agencies, but to go into the field unaccompanied by agency representatives. Finally, a number of interviews were made in areas where no assistance reportedly had been provided.

The Afghan Survey Unit was contracted to undertake a survey in Kabul, mapping migration movement, income patterns, local knowledge of service provision and providers, and what the population perceived as major threats to reconstruction and development. Four districts were selected for the interviews, of which three were predominantly inhabited by one ethnic group and the fourth was more ethnically balanced. The survey team was gender mixed. At least 50 families were interviewed in each location to ensure representation, and 212 interviews were carried out in total. A sampling strategy of interviewing every third household in the selected street was applied, and if no member of a designated household was available for interview, the next household was visited instead.

The field approach allowed the team to consult a wide range of informants in Afghanistan, of which 329 were beneficiaries (Kabul Survey excluded). This included interviews with single beneficiaries, families, village elders, religious leaders, civil servants, male and female IDP groups, male and female Community Development Councils and village councils and male *Ulema* councils. See Figure 2 below for a further breakdown on category and gender, and geographical distribution and gender, and Annex V for the interview list.

Figure 2: Breakdown of Interviewees by Category and Gender

No.	UN/Int. Org	Donors	GoA	NGO	Beneficiaries	PRTs	Independent Experts	Total
Male	99	17	61	79	226	11	16	509
Female	29	13	9	24	103	3	2	183
Total	**128**	**30**	**70**	**103**	**329**	**14**	**18**	**692**

Beneficiaries	North	West/South East	Kabul/Central	East	Total
Male	51	82	10	83	226
Female	23	38	29	13	103
Total	**74**	**120**	**39**	**96**	**329**

3. The Afghan Context for Aid Provision

3.1 Introduction

Afghanistan is a landlocked country that has experienced a revolution, military invasions, and civil war since the Saur Revolution took place in 1978. Formerly at the forefront of Cold War hostilities, then the playground for regional conflicts, it is now the location where the 'War on Terror' is being fought. The population of an estimated 23 million Afghans consists of a number of ethnic groups, with *Pashtuns*, *Tadjiks*, *Hazaras* and *Uzbeks* being the largest.[7] The majority of Afghans are *sunni* Muslims, while an estimated 20 per cent are *shia*. Traditionally Afghan society is male dominated, with traditional, cultural and religious limitations to women's participation in public life and employment.

The Afghan state has traditionally been weak, dominated by *Pashtuns* and with a large degree of self-rule organised through tribal and family networks. Local councils, termed *shura* or *jirga*, whose membership is male, have generally been responsible for conflict resolution and major decision-making. As a result of the long-lasting conflict, traditional leaders and elders have lost some of their influence to military and/or political leaders, termed 'commanders', who also established military *shuras*. The commanders have benefited from generous external military and financial assistance though all stages of the conflict, and this has left the country awash with weaponry and anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. These personal armies have been, and still are, used to secure local influence, including government positions, and in some instances to control drug production and trade and other aspects of the illicit economy. For many of the commanders, conflict has become a way of life, and a business opportunity, making any Afghan government vulnerable to internal upheaval.

Afghanistan is divided by the Hindu Kush range, making the country vulnerable to earthquakes and floods. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979 it was estimated that 80 per cent of the population earned its living predominantly from agriculture or related services and craft production. Water for irrigation and drinking has been scarce, and this has restricted the availability of fertile land. The continued conflicts combined with harsh living conditions have made migration a necessity for survival. By the late 1980s more than five million Afghans were refugees in Pakistan and Iran. The majority of them had resided there since the early 1980s and some had returned and fled again several times.

During the 1980s, international NGOs and solidarity organisations were the main providers of assistance for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and, by the mid-1980s, many of them had started cross-border operations from Pakistan, providing medical assistance, basic education, water and sanitation services and various forms of agricultural input. The number of Afghan NGOs increased from approximately 10 to 200 during 1989 when the UN actively encouraged their establishment to counterbalance the dominance of international NGOs. During the 1990s, the civil war made aid provision a dangerous undertaking. A limited number of international and Afghan NGOs continued to

7 *These are the official population estimates of the Afghan Central Statistics Office, and are based on a 1973 census with adjustments. Some UN agencies operate with the higher estimate of 28 million Afghans (refugees excluded).*

provide services while developing into more professional and rehabilitation and development oriented organisations, handling the majority of funding channelled through the UN organisations.

Afghanistan underwent major transformation in the period covered by this evaluation. By January 2001 the Taliban regime, then in military control of over 80 per cent of the country, was subject to UN sanctions and recognised by only three states. The Donors were represented through the Afghan Support Group, operating out of Pakistan. Assistance was provided in accordance with the UN Strategic Framework Approach. Principled Programming guidelines were introduced in 1998 to ensure a degree of policy compliance between humanitarian interventions and the wish to avoid strengthening the Taliban regime. Provision of development assistance was prohibited, while humanitarian assistance (including reconstruction activities) was provided through NGOs. As the World Disaster Report (2003) noted, one consequence of this policy was that the concept of 'humanitarian need was stretched in Afghanistan to include everything; food shortages, health and education were all defined as 'emergencies' requiring 'humanitarian' action …pushing the definition of humanitarian aid far beyond the alleviation of human suffering.'

Al Qaeda's attack on the USA on 11 September 2001 initiated a period of profound change for Afghanistan, by placing the country at the centre of international politics and humanitarian and development cooperation. The decision by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to invoke Article V, the mutual defence clause, laid the ground for a US-led attack on Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan and the Taliban regime in collaboration with a loose alliance of Afghan groups termed 'the Northern Alliance'. 'Operation Enduring Freedom' was defined as the departure point for a wider 'War on Terror'. The dramatic, symbolic and highly media aware nature of the '9-11 attack', along with US pressure, created a strong impetus for the governments of the Donors (Ireland and Sweden excluded) to enrol in the 'Coalition of the Willing' and to participate in military operations, which began on 7 October.[8] This impetus was reinforced by the considerable public hostility towards the Taliban that existed in the West. The regime was already subject to UN sanctions based on its demonstrable oppression of women, its harbouring of terrorists, its role in drug production, and its increasing international isolation following the destruction of the Buddha statues in 2001.

The model for the new Afghanistan was agreed by the international community and the Northern Alliance at the rapidly convened Bonn conference in December 2001. The Bonn Agreement was subsequently made operational by the establishment of the Afghan Interim Administration and through funding pledges at the Tokyo donor conference of January 2002, indicating the urgency the donor nations attached to this task. Although the Bonn Agreement placed responsibility for the peacebuilding process on the Afghans, UN resolutions established the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to assist the political process, while the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was to provide security.[9]

Following an emergency session of the *Loya Jirga* (Grand Council) commencing 9 June 2002, the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) was transformed into the Afghan Transition Authority (ATA), and Hamid Karzai was elected as its Chairman. A Constitutional

8 *For details on contributions towards OEF see http://www.centcom.mil/Operations/Coalition/joint.htm*

9 *UN Security Council Resolutions 1386 (20 December 2001), 1413 (23 May 2002) and 1444 (27 November 2002).*

Loya Jirga was convened in December 2003, and approved the new Constitution on 4 January 2004. Thus, by early 2004, the Bonn Agreement of 6 December 2001 had been largely fulfilled. Afghanistan had gained international recognition, international military forces were assisting in the provision of security, embassies, UN agencies, NGOs and international organisations had moved their offices to Kabul, and Government-led state/nation-building processes and rehabilitation and developmental efforts were underway. This was followed by presidential elections in October 2004 in which Mr Karzai was elected as President. Parliamentary elections took place 18 September 2005, finalising the transition to a constitutional democracy stipulated by the Bonn Agreement.

This political transformation has taken place in a country that has been subject to continued military conflict since 1978. Extended conflict has impacted negatively on relations between the Afghan state and its citizens, has militarised society, and weakened traditional civil society structures and the social fabric. It has caused massive destruction of infrastructure, inhibited development, and forced six million Afghans to become refugees in neighbouring countries and more than a million temporarily to become IDPs. Despite these profound changes, Afghans remain strongly influenced by culture, traditions and religious beliefs, and ethnic, tribal and family based networks have proved to be important safety nets in the absence of a functional or trusted state.

3.2 The Humanitarian Situation

As a result of its recent history, Afghanistan ranks 173 out of 178 on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Index 2004. Mortality rates are high and life expectancy extremely low (see Figure 2). The female literacy rate was estimated to be 14.1 per cent by 2002. At the same time, Afghanistan is very vulnerable to natural disasters, as is demonstrated by the recent drought, earthquakes and floods. As a result, the country has a long way to go before it meets the Millennium Development GoAls (MDG) that the ATA adopted in 2004.

Figure 3: Mortality Rates and Life Expectancy in Afghanistan – 2000 Estimates
(Sources: UNICEF, UNDP & UNFP)



Many commentators have emphasised the fact that Afghanistan over the period under review 'has had it all – at the same time'. This complexity makes it impossible to plot a continuum graph on assistance with set dates or to distinguish sharply between emergency, rehabilitation and development stages. Moreover, the pattern on the ground is very uneven. Sometimes only a valley separates a peaceful area from an area that continues to experience warfare. Development programmes are ongoing in one district while people in neighbouring districts are in desperate need of emergency assistance. This was the case in Afghanistan even before 2001 and it is likely to continue to be the case until national programmes manage to improve livelihood conditions and reduce the general vulnerability of the population.

A large influx of international assistance and aid providers into Kabul and other major Afghan cities began in late 2001. While the UN had committed itself to a 'light footprint', this did not apply to the various UN agencies. The number of NGOs registered with the Afghan Ministry of Planning increased from 250 in September 2001 to over 2000 by early 2004, of which the majority were Afghan NGOs. It has been alleged that some of these were either commercial companies seeking to evade taxation or the 'personal property' of military and political leaders. The GoA and the NGOs have been negotiating the establishment of a regulatory framework for the NGOs, which finally came in place in July 2005.[10]

Humanitarian aid interventions in Afghanistan took place in a context of continued conflict. The Coalition's fight against the Taliban in the south and the south-east of the country had negative repercussions on security throughout most of Afghanistan, as well as causing ethnic persecution and sporadic factional fighting and tension within the winning Afghan coalition. The security situation makes Afghans and the international communities subject to different sets of threats and differing understandings of the nature of human security (see Annex III), with government officials and humanitarian workers coming under increased attack – 24 NGO staff members were killed in 2004 alone.[11] There has been a gradual shift in donor country priority from primarily supporting NGOs, the Red Cross, UN agencies and international organisations in 2001 to increasingly funding the GoA from 2002 onwards, with an overarching political process influencing the humanitarian, reconstruction and development priorities (see Figure 4).

10 *There is still a notable concern in the NGO community that the legislation might be used to curtail rather than regulate their activities.*

11 *For details see Afghanistan NGO Security Office and CARE (2005), NGO Insecurity in Afghanistan, May 2005, Kabul.*

Figure 4: Timeline on Emergency, Rehabilitation and Development interventions in Afghanistan, 2001-2005[12]



3.3 Nation and State-Building – the Challenges

> *'When I graduate I want to work for the people and also to collect money for my own family.'*
>
> (Student at the University of Balkh)

The presentation of a National Development Framework (NDF) in April 2002, and of a National Development Budget (NDB) in October of the same year, were critical for state- and nation-building processes in Afghanistan and for defining the AIA's authority in relation to the international community. The establishment of the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Afghanistan Assistance Co-ordination Authority (AACA) ensured a degree of uniformity in external assistance provision by directing contributions through one governmental channel and by enabling the Afghan government to have an overview of the financial contributions.

AIA and later ATA forecasts of economic growth were optimistic, and both expected the country gradually to become more self-sufficient. Their predictions assumed that

12 *The assistance levels shown in this figure are only indicators of increase and decrease, and are not based on statistical data. It should further be noted that substantial rehabilitation projects had been implemented since mid 1990s.*

the government rather than the commanders would secure income from taxation and border trade. Early economic recovery figures supported a positive outlook, although the increases in 2002 and 2003 were at least partly due to the reduced impact of the drought, higher incomes from expanded opium poppy production, and rapid urban growth. Another contributory factor in the positive economic development was the introduction of a new Afghan currency, which remained fairly stable to 2005.

The International Monetary Fund's reviews from spring 2005, however, provide a more cautious assessment of future economic growth.

Nation- and state-building has encountered many challenges:

- The composition of the AIA and the ATA caused tension between former military power holders and representatives of the modern (and modernising) state. The latter were embodied by a core group of ministers who had been recruited from the Bretton Woods Institutions, the international NGOs, and from among other Afghans returning from exile in the West.
- The coordination of the entire intervention, where a UN- and donor-led national model was replaced by a Kabul-based structure of Consultative and Advisory Groups (CG and AG), ensuring participation and involvement from the donors, UN agencies and Afghan Ministries.
- The balancing of a de facto US leadership with the military and economic presence of other major donors, notably, the five Donor countries, and, to a lesser extent, the EC and Japan.
- Logistical, security and economic factors creating sky-high price inflation in Kabul.
- A shortage of Afghans with higher education and/or English language, management and computer skills created stiff competition for trained staff and resulted in wage inflation. This drained the government administration and local NGOs of their core staff to the benefit of the UN and international organisations, and, more particularly, private companies funded by the international assistance.
- The difficulties experienced in attracting skilled senior international staff to difficult and dangerous hardship postings was the cause of some frustration among experienced Afghanistan aid workers (international and Afghan), who often felt pushed aside by ignorant newcomers.
- The question of how to implement military humanitarian and reconstruction aid supplementary to the normal aid channels.

3.4 National Programmes and Migration

A key concern, shared by the Afghan authorities and the donors, has been to ensure Afghans a 'peace dividend'. This led to a Public Investment Programme structured around three pillars: Human Capital and Social Protection; Physical Infrastructure; and Enabling Environment for Development. Starting with the introduction of the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) in 2002, a number of developmental and state-building efforts were initiated, including the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme (ASP). At the Afghanistan Development Forum in April 2004, seven new programmes were introduced. Their aim was to 'accelerate Afghanistan from a position of recovery and rehabilitation to that of sustainable development'.[13] National programmes were influenced by a strong preference on the

13 *The Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (2004), National Priority Programmes: An Overview, Kabul, ATA.*

part of the AIA/ATA for assuming a policy formulation and regulation role. The implementation was generally left to NGOs and other private actors, who tendered for the work. NGOs, which had assumed the main responsibility for service provision in the fields of education, health, and water and sanitation for the last two decades, became subject to central governmental control from spring 2002.

An important development during the evaluation period was the return of 3.5 million refugees from neighbouring countries, with a peak of more than 2 million in 2002 and the return of more than 800 000 IDPs (see Figure 4). However, rather than return to their place of origin, many of the returning refugees settled in Kabul, whose population quadrupled in the period 2001-2004. The Kabul survey undertaken for this evaluation showed that of 212 families interviewed, only 32 had lived in their present location in Kabul before 2002. Over the last 10 years there have been several rounds of returning and leaving due to insecurity, unemployment or as family strategy for vulnerability reduction, making migration a common feature of daily life.

Figure 5: Repatriation to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan 1988/89 - June 2004
(Source UNHCR)



Another programme with high visibility was the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) led 'Back to School' initiative. In the wake of the Taliban ban on female public education, this massive campaign to bring children, especially girls, back to school resulted in the enrolment of some five million children and adults in 2004/05. The health sector has been reformed with the introduction of the Basic Packages of Health Services (BPHS), water and sanitation projects have gradually been shifted from single implementers to government control, and emphasis has been put on securing sustainable, alternative livelihoods.

However, in the rapidly changing and challenging Afghan environment, a number of local factors has impinged on the donors' ability to assist in the provision of emergency, recovery and development assistance. These include:

- Continued military activities, which have increased security risks, limited access to many parts of Afghanistan, slowed the state-building process and increased implementation costs.

- Delays in establishing law and order and the inclusion of former military actors in power positions, which have resulted in continuing human rights violations, land disputes and displacement, thereby undermining state legitimacy.
- A lack of baseline data, needs assessments and agreed benchmarks for the rehabilitation and development process inhibits measurement of progress and impact.
- Slow (and uneven) capacity building; and a weak Afghan management capacity.
- A lack of income possibilities for unskilled labourers and farmers has bolstered labour migration cycles and undermined the return and resettlement process.
- Sharply rising levels of corruption within NGOs and state institutions have reduced the value of donor investments and pose a threat to the legitimacy of both the Afghan government and aid implementers.
- The problem of protection, especially for returnees and *pashtun* IDPs, for whom land disputes have emerged as a major problem.
- The visibility of NGOs, UN agencies and international actors, including their housing and transportation standards, combined with a rehabilitation process than has been much slower in practice than the Afghan population had anticipated on the basis of GoA projections, have turned communal anger against humanitarian actors and the Afghan government.

What was possibly the least predictable development over this period, though exerting a strong influence over the state-building and humanitarian processes, was the sharp increase in poppy cultivation and processing. The Afghan Government warned donors early on that Afghanistan could become a 'narco-mafia' state if the problem was not promptly and adequately addressed, and donors responded by contributing substantial financial support to anti-narcotics initiatives.

4. Deciding and Designing the Five Donors' Interventions

'Afghanistan was invented in 2001!'
(An international NGO representative in Afghanistan)

Denmark, the Netherlands and, especially, the UK participated in the US-led coalition military operations ('Operation Enduring Freedom' (OEF)) against Al Qaeda and the Taliban and, together with Sweden, they took part in establishing the ISAF in Kabul. While Ireland stayed out of the military intervention, the other four Donors subsequently expanded their military engagement through the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Northern Afghanistan.

The military campaign in 2001 was the prelude to a major reconstruction of the Afghan polity and economy. There was international consensus that, to be successful, reconstruction would have to rest not only on the establishment of democracy and a free market economy, but also on the provision of much needed humanitarian, rehabilitation and development aid. However, the Afghanistan intervention differed from earlier post-conflict interventions by the international community, such as in the former Yugoslavia, where open conflict had been stopped by military intervention and where the international community assumed a formal responsibility for the political process, neither being the case in Afghanistan.

4.1 Factors Informing and Influencing Decisions

In the autumn of 2001, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK thus perceived an urgent need for deciding and designing substantial contributions to a multidimensional intervention in a country, still in conflict, of which they hitherto had only limited operational experience. This experience had been mainly acquired through assistance-providing NGOs, originating in and funded from the five Donor countries since the early 1980s, and indirectly through the UN organisations operating in Afghanistan and supporting Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

In addition to NGO and UN experience, the design of the national interventions was informed and influenced by membership of other international organisations involved in Afghanistan. All Donors are members of the European Union (EU) (which participated as a political player and an operational aid-provider but without a military dimension), the Red Cross Movement, and the international finance institutions, in particular the World Bank (WB). In addition, Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK belong to NATO.

The Donors faced new challenges in designing interventions that reflected national interests relating to Afghanistan. Interventions had to take account of the fact that concerned ministries within each donor nation often had distinct perceptions of where

national interest lay. While the MFA/development agencies were concerned with the political, humanitarian and development aspects of the situation, the Ministries of Defence (MoD) were concerned with war and security aspects, and the Ministries of Integration/Home Office focused on migration issues. The interplay between the various aid components, and between their corresponding home agencies, followed a different trajectory within each of the five donor nations. While they shared overall humanitarian and (with the exception of Ireland) military purposes, each of them, to varying degrees, also had other objectives to pursue. This combination of objectives shaped the policies that were adopted, and determined the visible results each donor hoped to gain through the giving of aid. At the same time, the Donors had to implement their decisions in a largely unfamiliar and difficult environment.

Background Parameters

The Evaluation found that a background parameter of some importance in Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK was the desire to reduce the influx of Afghan **refugees** and, later on, to return **rejected asylum seekers** to Afghanistan. These three nations consequently attached a high priority to the return of refugees from Pakistan and Iran, as did Ireland and Sweden, and to return programmes for refugees and asylum seekers, in collaboration with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM)[14] and the GoA. The design and implementation of these policies received more attention in the latter part of the period under review.

Another issue with a background bearing on policy-making in the five countries was the perceived importance of developing **counter narcotics initiatives**, Afghanistan being a major producer and exporter of drugs (opium and heroin). Such initiatives have included poppy eradication and the development of alternative livelihoods. The UK assumed an operational role as an active lead nation in 2002, while the other four Donors have become increasingly involved, to varying degrees, through their support for UK-led alternative livelihoods programmes.

While the importance of the drug economy to Afghanistan and its negative impacts on the international community are uncontested, approaches to the problem have varied over the evaluation period. Initially, the US appears to have been rather tolerant towards the drug activities of its local allies. Subsequently, opium poppy eradication became one of its priorities, although the extent to which this policy was implemented on the ground is contested. In contrast, the UK-approach has emphasised the importance of creating alternatives to opium production. This presents a big challenge, given the size of the Afghan drug economy, currently estimated to be worth the equivalent of 50-60 per cent of the official economy.

In deciding on the military engagement, each of the five Donors appears to have been influenced by **broader foreign policy objectives,** including traditions of participation in peace-keeping operations, and existing alliances. The UK, defining itself as a bridge-builder between the US and Europe, took on the most visible and active participation in military and later stabilisation operations. The other two NATO nations, Denmark and the Netherlands, participated on a smaller scale, while Sweden, not a NATO member, chose to participate in the UN-mandated ISAF operation, but without a civilian component. Of the five Donors, only Ireland stayed out of the military dimension.

14 Sweden also collaborated with the IOM for this purpose, although the return issue had a less prominent position as a background factor in the Swedish political debate.

Finally, the Donors gave high priority to the design of **rapid intervention packages**, including the channelling of funds through the ARTF. This was expected to facilitate the rapid implementation and coordination of the considerable pledges made by the Donors in Tokyo, and achieve visible results from the comprehensive package of aid.

Informing Decisions
In all five Donor countries, subsequent national policy decisions on the design and implementation of assistance to Afghanistan were informed and influenced by the abovementioned multilateral channels. Decisions were also informed and to some extent influenced by inputs from Afghanistan experts, including NGOs from the donor nations.[15] These NGOs not only possessed rare and needed expertise on Afghanistan, but they were also active in sectors in which the five nations were believed to have a comparative advantage, and/or that were considered to be of particular relevance to the shared development objectives of poverty eradication, the promotion of gender equality, environmental protection, human rights and good governance. This did not necessarily imply that the resulting decisions took these criteria into account.

By contrast, the Donors made only **limited and unsystematic attempts to draw on their experiences of** participation in earlier complex emergency operations. This is noteworthy given that these earlier situations, especially in Bosnia and Kosovo, bear some significant resemblances to the situation in Afghanistan. In this respect, it may be worth noting that the Evaluation was often told in donor country home offices that, for security reasons and because of the relative novelty of Afghanistan in international development cooperation, and with some notable exceptions, it had not been easy to recruit staff with adequate experience to work there.

Resulting Action
The interplay between the various aid components, and between their corresponding home agencies, within each of the five Donor nations, resulted in the particular intervention packages described below. It has not been possible to obtain an exact picture of the processes of decision-making, but a main feature appears to be that the events of late 2001 led to the establishment of task forces within the MFAs/development agencies and the MoDs. In Denmark, Ireland and Sweden, these were supplemented by representatives of the NGO community.

The designated MFA officials then met at a series of conferences, starting in Bonn in December 2001, where the overall policy and humanitarian agendas were laid out, and participated, either directly or through NGOs, in the various forms of needs assessment that had begun in mid-November 2001. These engagements produced rough overviews of the overall needs, and the consequent size and purpose of the aid packages were developed for presentation in Tokyo in January 2002, and at later pledging conferences.[16]

Simultaneously, considerable efforts were devoted (except in Ireland) to the establishment of representational offices/embassies in Kabul. Once this had been accomplished, practical decision-making on the local level throughout 2002 was to a large extent driven by the perceived imperatives to grasp the opportunity to meet immediate needs and to materialise, within a difficult and politicised environment, the national aid parameters

15 *Contrasting opinions were expressed on the involvement of Dutch NGOs in the decision-making process in the Netherlands. Representatives of the Dutch NGOs claimed that they were not involved in a significant way, whereas the Dutch MFA said that they had been involved.*
16 *For a list of Conferences and pledges, see the Aid Flows Background Study, p.32.*

decided in the home offices. Here the head of the AACA, and later Minister of Finance, Ashraf Ghani, appears to have had an important mentoring role for the donor community. During the evaluation period, the Donors also sought guidance on political matters from the representational offices of the EU in Afghanistan, which organised periodic meetings for the member states,[17] and from UNAMA.

While the Donors together have contributed a significant part of the aid to Afghanistan, have supported the principle of Afghans in 'the driving seat', have shared certain approaches in common, and have collaborated well on particular issues, they have not acted as a group. Likewise, it has not been possible to identify a 'European model' for assistance to Afghanistan. Instead, the Donors accepted the US and World Bank designed 'Bonn model', emphasising the political processes and the minimum prerequisites for a functional (lean and efficient) state, by prioritising the Ministry of Finance and the creation of a new police force and army, unconnected with the former regimes. Not only has the US been the largest donor nation, but its political and military influence in the new Afghanistan is uncontested.[18] The continuing conflict with its inherent security problems, and the commonly acknowledged risk of a growing drug economy, made it all the more difficult for the five Donors to diverge from the 'Bonn model'.

The 'Aid Flows Background Study' gives an overview of the assistance provided by the five Donors. Figure 6 summarises the grants and financial contributions made by the Donors over January 2001 – June 2004. The twelve largest recipients of the aid from each of the Donors are shown in Figure 7.[19]

Figure 6: Financial Contributions Made by the Donors, January 2001 - June 2004
(*Source: Aid Flows to Afghanistan)*

Donor	No of grants	Total Euro million	as %	Average Grant Euro million
UK	353	383	48%	1.1
Netherlands	83	165	21%	2.0
Sweden	135	123	16%	0.9
Denmark	85	99	13%	1.2
Ireland	66	21	3%	0.3
Total	722	791	100%	1.1

17 *According to most of the Donors and to the EU, the EU coordinated intervention in Afghanistan has been limited. The EU officials, interviewed by the Evaluation, stated that the large member countries, including the UK, pursued their own policies, while the smaller Donors attached more importance to EU guidance. However, they did not provide concrete examples to support this claim.*

18 *It is therefore interesting to note that US Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress, stated in July 2005 that the USAID had not developed a performance management plan to monitor projects, nor had it focused contractors' efforts on developing project-specific performance plans and had lacked a comprehensive strategy to direct its efforts.*

19 *The 'Aid Flows to Afghanistan' study does not include funding via the World Bank and the European Commission, and also not multi-Ministry Funds in the UK.*

Figure 7: Top 12 recipients for the five Donors
(*Source: Aid Flows to Afghanistan)*

	Denmark		Ireland		Netherlands		Sweden		UK	
1	UNHCR	15.2%	ARTF	19.7%	ARTF	42.5%	SCA	17.9%	ARTF	28.6%
2	DACAAR	9.9%	GoAl	9.2%	UNHCR	13.5%	UNHCR	16.2%	UNDP	17.1%
3	ARTF	9.8%	UNICEF	9.1%	OCHA	10.7%	UNICEF	15.6%	ASP	7.6%
4	DDG	7.1%	Concern	8.2%	UNICEF	7.8%	UNOPS	9.2%	GoAF	7.2%
5	MRRD	7.0%	Trócaire	7.3%	WFP	7.5%	ICRC	7.1%	UNHCR	6.1%
6	WFP	6.7%	WFP	7.0%	UNDP	4.9%	ARTF	6.6%	WFP	5.1%
7	MoF	5.7%	UNHCR	6.2%	ICRC	4.6%	WFP	5.5%	UNICEF	4.6%
8	UNICEF	5.0%	Christian Aid	4.2%	IOM	1.2%	GoAF	5.1%	ICRC	2.3%
9	ICRC	4.9%	ICRC	3.5%	BTHW	1.2%	OCHA	2.5%	WHO	2.1%
10	DAC	4.8%	HALO Trust	3.0%	SV	1.1%	AIAF	2.0%	IOM	2.0%
11	UNDP	3.5%	LOTFA	2.4%	HNI	0.9%	Forum Syd	1.9%	UNMAS	1.2%
12	DAARTT	2.8%	AIAF	2.4%	RC-NL	0.9%	IOM	1.4%	FAO	1.2%
		82.5%		82.2%		96.8%		91.1%		85.1%

(Shows the % the recipients got of the Donors' total tracked disbursements for Afghanistan January 2001 - June 2004 inclusive).

4.2 The Approaches of the Donors

While all five Donors have given high priority to the repatriation of refugees and to support for the ARTF, there are significant contrasts in the way they have approached issues around aid provision to Afghanistan.

Ireland represents one end of the continuum, in which only civilian, that is political, humanitarian and development, parameters have been applied. The key decisions have been prepared and implemented by a small number of Development Agency staff. A large part of its aid to Afghanistan has been channelled through Irish NGOs. Ireland has not established national representation in Afghanistan.

At the opposite end of the continuum is **the UK.** Here the military and civilian components appear to have been given equal importance, and synergy between the two components, within conflict management and other sectors, has been an objective in itself. In the civilian sphere, in addition to providing support for the ARTF, the Afghanistan Stabilisation Programme, various state-building initiatives by the UNDP, repatriation efforts by the UNHCR and alternative livelihood programmes have received priority.

The UK has prioritised a visible presence in Afghanistan at embassy and DFID level, which allows it to be operational within the pursuit of overall political and poverty eradication GoAls, along with a priority for governance, counter narcotics (lead nation) and the return of asylum seekers. This is in addition to UK aid channelled through multilateral organisations. Relatively little funding has been allocated to British NGOs working in Afghanistan. At the time of the evaluation, the relevant sections of the home

ministries concerned appear to have been relatively well staffed, though mainly at a junior level.

The Netherlands decided at an early stage to channel most of its aid through the multilateral agencies, in particular ARTF, UNHCR and, in 2001, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA and later UNAMA[20]). An NGO fund was established with OCHA and later continued with UNAMA, with a preference for Dutch NGOs. The Netherlands has been a strong advocate for and supporter of coordination within the aid community. Nevertheless, the military component and its interplay with civilian aid have also received considerable priority.

An embassy was established in Kabul, apparently primarily to deal with military and subsequently also refugee and returnee matters. Together with the Dutch PRT in Baghlan, this has created visibility at both national and provincial levels. The embassy is relatively well staffed with six international staff members, of whom two work with aid. By contrast, staffing levels within the relevant departments of the Dutch MFA, including the migration department, have been low.

As far as **Sweden** is concerned, its aid has been largely delivered through multilateral channels, notably, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UNICEF, UNHCR, and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Sweden has been actively engaged in rebuilding the Kabul-Torkham highway within the context of a collaborative arrangement with the EC, and has also provided support for the ARTF. The military component has been relatively modest and without any institutionalised linkages to the civilian component.

Swedish NGOs, in particular the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA), have received considerable government support for their activities, especially within the health and education sectors, and they played an important role in the initial design of the Swedish aid. Sida has maintained a modestly staffed representation office in Afghanistan, with an equally modestly staffed backup office in Sida headquarters, Stockholm.

Turning to **Denmark**, the military component has been relatively big and attempts have been made to combine it with the civilian aid, including from Danish NGOs. The aid has been delivered through multilateral channels, in particular UNHCR and ARTF, and through direct budget support to the Afghan Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ministry for Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). In addition, Denmark has provided significant support for the promotion of human rights, de-mining and, on a smaller scale, for gender and the media. Danish NGOs, in particular the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR) and the Danish Demining Group (DDG), have received considerable support for their activities, DACAAR within water supply and integrated rural development and DDG for de-mining. Although these NGOs participated in the Danish MFA's 'Afghanistan expert group', which assisted in the initial design of the Danish aid, their sector experience was not utilised in the strategy formulation.

Denmark maintains a modestly staffed representation office in Afghanistan, corresponding with modestly staffed backup offices in its MFA. During the latter part of the period

20 *An NGO-fund was established with OCHA and later continued with UNAMA, with a preference for Dutch NGOs.*

under review, a large part of the staff resources of the Danish representation office was consumed by the issue of the return of rejected asylum seekers.

Figure 8: Rough Overview of Intervention Areas Prioritised by Donor Countries

	Main Aid Sectors	Own NGOs	Anti-Narcotics	Civil-Mil Action	Asylum Seekers	Military Interventions
Denmark	ARTF, UNHCR HR, NSP, education	Medium	Low	Medium	High	Medium
Ireland	ARTF	High	Low	None	None	None
Netherlands	OCHA ARTF UNHCR	None	Low	High	High	Medium
Sweden	ARTF, UNHCR UNICEF, health	Medium	Low	None	None	Low
The UK	State-building, econ. management, alternative livelihoods	Low	High	High	High	High

4.3 Donors' Perceptions of the Results

In retrospect, and in spite of the limited institutional memory found by the evaluation, it was the overall perception of the MFAs in all five nations that their interventions in Afghanistan had been successful, and that there was very little that could or should have been done differently.[21] This judgement was based mainly on the following observations:

- The repatriation of 3.5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran, and the return of about 1 million IDPs, were regarded as important signs of confidence amongst the population in the viability of the new Afghanistan.
- The massive reschooling of children, with increased opportunities for girls, was seen as a good omen for the future sustainability of Afghanistan as well as for progressing gender equality.
- The perceived success of the creation of the new democratic polity and the materialisation of the milestones set out in the Bonn Agreement were cited. In particular, the presidential elections in 2004 were viewed as a sign of the support of the population for the new order.
- The GoA was perceived as 'being in the driver's seat', and this in turn was perceived as a positive outcome of donor support for capacity building. The anti-NGO aid-misuse debate, initiated by the GoA**,** was seen as a minor cost. (Following the presidential elections, this has been coupled with an emerging perception among donor representatives in Afghanistan of a lack of management capacity and increasing levels of corruption, leading to a sense that 'the honeymoon is over').

21 *Within the Swedish MFA, some officials expressed regret that Sweden had chosen not to follow up on SCA accomplishments within the education sector, due to overall coordination considerations within the donor community.*

- The perception that the entrepreneurship of the Afghan people is enhancing the internal recovery processes to the benefit of the population at large.

Accomplishing the Objectives
Regarding the standard donor objectives, it was the overall perception in all five MFAs that eradication of poverty was taking place through the internal recovery processes and to some extent through the aid provision within basic services. This should be seen against the background of the perceived need to create a working polity before it would be possible to concentrate on the standard objectives.

Regarding the respect for human rights and good governance, attention was drawn to the visibility of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) and to the perceived progress of the state-building programmes sponsored by the UNDP and other agencies.

Regarding the promotion of gender equality (a problem of very high visibility at the onset of the interventions) and the protection of the environment, a typical answer was that, in the prevailing crisis situation, there had simply not been the resources available to do very much in these fields. At the same time, reference was made to small-scale actions that had been undertaken and to the growing numbers of girls enrolling in the schools, as well as to the positive environmental effects of de-mining.

When the Evaluation demonstrated the geographically restricted nature of the delivery of aid within Afghanistan, the reaction was mainly one of surprise. An analysis of the geographical patterns of assistance distribution indicated that the security situation had a negative influence on distribution to the southern and south-eastern provinces, while the Northern provinces had been rewarded for siding with the OEF from early on (see Figure 9 below). The high level of assistance to provinces such as Balkh and Nangarhar are partly explained by government salaries supported through the ARTF.[22]

When asked about the likelihood of high transaction costs within the interventions, supported by various forms of evidence relating to extra security costs and strong price inflation in Kabul city, the reaction within the MFAs was, without exception that such observations were probably correct, but that an audit of these costs had not been carried out.

The Donors have not generally applied monitoring mechanisms in relation to the effectiveness and the efficiency of the aid delivered through the various channels. Prior to the present evaluation, no donor-initiated evaluations of the full interventions had been made, with the exception of Ireland, where a Public Expenditure Review of aid to Afghanistan was carried out in 2004 with an overall positive conclusion. However, some sector reviews have been undertaken. [23]

22 *See 'Aid Flows to Afghanistan.'*
23 *In addition, the Evaluation found the following example of self-evaluation by a Danida staff member, based on his experiences in Afghanistan, very useful: Anders Tang Friborg (2004), Afghanistan Lessons Learned from a Post-War Situation, Copenhagen, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.*

4.4 Conclusion

The Donors responded swiftly and on a grand scale to the call for assistance in the reconstruction of the new Afghanistan, despite the unfamiliar and difficult conditions of the task. Although their decisions were informed by resources available at home, the design of their respective aid packages was mainly influenced by the requirements of the master plan for the new Afghanistan that had been presented by the US and the World Bank at the Bonn Conference, and that was later embodied by the influential Minister of Finance Mr Asraf Ghani. Within this master plan, there was space for individual differences, enabling particular national models to reflect different priorities in national policy environments.

Little revision of the priorities has taken place since the initial decisions were taken in 2001-02. One reason may be that, in the scarcity of adequate monitoring mechanisms and of evaluations, the Donors had a more optimistic picture of the overall development than the one met by this Evaluation. Another reason appears to be the perceived urgency of result-producing action and necessity of meeting the Bonn requirements before major changes in the interventions could be contemplated.

Figure 9: Geographical Patterns of Assistance Distribution within Afghanistan
(*Source: Aid Flows to Afghanistan)*



5. Nation-building, State-building and Stabilisation

'*During the time of communism all educated people supported the Russians, but not the rural people. Now they see the same happening again.'*

(Afghan NGO worker)

5.1 Introduction

This intervention area covers the following main objectives:
- The conduct of a political process to create a legal and viable government through a new constitution and elections.
- The rehabilitation of state structures to ensure effective state authority throughout the territory, including rule of law, respect for human rights and financial management.
- Enhancement of security and political stability.

The Donors have provided substantial financial support for these objectives, including:
- The constitutional process, voter registration, and elections (through the UNDP);
- Support for reform of the judiciary (through the UNDP);
- Strengthening of state structures (through the UNDP, large contributions to the ARTF to cover the salaries of public sector employees and to the GoA's Afghan Stabilisation Programme to support district and provincial administration development);
- The AIHRC indirectly through the UNDP in the case of all five Donors and directly in the case of the UK and Denmark (the latter through the Danish Human Rights Institute);
- The UNDP programme for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of ex-combatants (DDR).

In addition, the UK, and to a lesser extent the other Donors, have provided technical assistance to the state structures and considerable military and some civilian TA to improve stability through the PRTs. With some below mentioned exceptions, it has not been possible to obtain an exact picture of the size of the contributions. However, the order of magnitude is indicated by the support for the ARTF and the UNDP, which constitute 26 per cent and 10 per cent of the Donor total, respectively. Among the Donors, the UK has given by far the highest priority to the UNDP.

5.2 Methodology

In addition to its general observations in relation to nation- and state-building, the Evaluation focused on the following case studies within this intervention area:

- The Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice (central, provincial and district levels), regarded as essential parts of the state, whose performance gives some indication of the public sector at large.

- The AIHRC (central and regional levels)
- The DDR programme (central and regional levels)
- The ISAF PRTs, centrally, and in Balkh-Samangan (UK-led, with contributions from Denmark and Sweden) and in Baghlan (the Netherlands).

The observations on the sub-national levels were made by a sub-team in the provinces of Balkh, Samangan and Baghlan and supported by other sub-teams' findings on the above issues and in relation to other concerned ministries, including the MMRD, the MoE and the MoH.

5.3 Nation-building

> *'We are the real representatives of the people. They come to us.'*
> (Member of the *Ulema* of Balkh Province)

Observations
With the creation of a new, viable and legitimate democratic polity, an important part of the overall rationale for the international community's intervention in Afghanistan, the institution of political processes intended to achieve such a polity was given high priority from the outset.

AIA was established under the UN-facilitated Bonn Agreement, signed on 5 December 2001. According to the Agreement, the AIA was to be the repository of Afghan sovereignty, with immediate effect, thus ensuring Afghan leadership during the transitional period. This was the first time that an authority of this kind had been instituted during UN peacekeeping operations. The Bonn objective was to establish the framework for a state formation that would lead to a broad-based, multi-ethnic and representative government by 2004. It was endorsed by the Northern Alliance, the 'Rome group', and a group of Afghan intellectuals.[24] It was not a conventional peace treaty because the Taliban was excluded, but rather an agreement for building the new and unified nation and state of Afghanistan.

The Agreement made provisions for fundamental political processes including the establishment of an Emergency *Loya Jirga*, facilitated by the UN, to elect a Transitional Administration for two years. The choice of a *Loya Jirga* reflected a respect for and incorporation of the traditional highest national decision-making body and a desire to bridge tradition and modernity. Further, it had a symbolic meaning dating from 1747, when a *Loya Jirga* was convened to choose a king (Shah) for the new country of Afghanistan.[25]

Against the background of continued warfare against the Taliban, a consensus strategy was prioritised for integrating into the democratic process the informal commander structure (here used to designate both the 'warlords' with regional power and 'commanders' with local power) that had resulted from the warfare, and traditional civil society, including the Councils of Islamic scholars.

24 Ali Wardak 'Building Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,' http://bglatzer.de/arg/arp/wardak.pdf.
25 Asta Olesen (1995) 'Islam and Politics in Afghanistan'. Curzon Press: 21.

The International Presence

Early during the planning of the UN Mission, the Special Representative for the Secretary General called for a 'light footprint' from the international community in respect of leadership, policy interventions and presence. Emphasis was on national ownership and decision-making, which were successfully achieved on the Government level, in comparison with East Timor and Kosovo. In response to the policy interventions and requirements at the time, the UNAMA was created in 2001. It had a simple two-pillar structure (Political & Recovery, Rehabilitation and Relief, RRR), a relatively small number of staff at the eight regional offices and few international staff. UNAMA's main tasks were to guide and support the political development process and to coordinate recovery and relief efforts. However, the long planning process involved in an integrated mission was soon overtaken by the needs of the various agencies to establish themselves on the ground, leading to rather traditional and relatively large-scale operations.[26]

Substantial political and financial resources, including from the five Donors, were devoted to the constitutional and election processes, including the establishment of the Emergency *Loya Jirga* in June 2002 and the Constitutional *Loya Jirga* (CLJ), December 2003-January 2004. The CLJ adopted the new Constitution following a comprehensive preparation process. The presidential elections took place in October 2004, and parliamentary elections took place in September 2005. The cost of the constitutional process was 13 million USD while the election processes to date have cost a total of USD 145.4 million (of which 78.4 million was spent on voter registration and 67 million on the presidential election).[27] The Bonn process has been implemented within the projected timetable, with the exception of a three-month delay of the presidential election. Unlike the other elections, the presidential election was not funded by the General Assembly's Budget. The reliance on voluntary contributions and the UN's resource mobilisation ability together contributed to the delay.

The Constitutional Process

The development of a new constitution included popular consultations nationwide. The constitutional commission strived to engage Afghan society in the convention of the CLJ, where the constitution was adopted by consensus. Two thirds of CLJ members were elected by local districts and some 20 per cent were women. The CLJ was the forum for important negotiations between ethnicities, tradition and modernity and political factions but with limited discussion on a vision for the Afghan state. Following its adoption, some 150,000 copies of the constitution were distributed nationwide. Yet, knowledge and understanding of the constitution is relatively limited among the population, largely because the rush to embark on the electoral process has allowed for limited follow-up on the constitutional process. The constitutional committee, which was to be appointed to oversee the implementation of the constitution, including protection of human rights in support of the work of the AIHRC, has not yet been established.

The Election Processes

The system of government stipulated in the constitution requires presidential elections and Wolesi Jirga elections (the lower house of the Parliament) to be held every five years, provincial council elections every four years, and district council elections every three years. In total, the constitution requires between 8 and 10 nationwide elections every decade, depending on whether some elections can be combined. For the GoA this

26 *King's College (2003) 'Afghanistan – A Snapshot Study'. London.*

27 *Secretariat of the Constitutional Review Commission (2004) 'Final Donor Report', Afghanistan. UNDP (2004) "Annual Report – Voter Registration Project and Elections 2004". UNDP Afghanistan.*

represents an unsustainable financial burden, given an estimated national income of USD 260 million, or 11 dollars per capita in 2005.[28] A Post-Election Strategic Group was established in June 2005 'to develop a comprehensive post-election strategy for the electoral institution, and the process for which this institution will be responsible.'[29] It seems important that this Group should pay close attention to the economic feasibility of future democratic elections.

Elections to the *Wolesi Jirga* and the provincial councils took place in September 2005. These will mark the finalisation of the transitional process, with the exception that it has not been possible to hold the district elections, which formed part of the ambitious procedures for the establishment of an Upper and Lower House, as a part of this year's parliamentary elections.

Findings

> *'Karzai is our new king!'*
>
> (Beneficiary in Balkh Province)

1. The **elections** were welcomed by the population as an important sign of peace and stability following 'more than two decades of devastating war, which we detested', and as an instrument to elect a new president, Mr Karzai. Traditional civil society, including religious leaders, has helped to rally support for broad participation in the elections.
2. The **Constitution** is now visible in local administrations and is often referred to as the legal document for the nation. The constitution also has symbolic meaning as it reaffirms the principles of the nation, its flag, its official languages, the national anthem and an Afghan currency. However, the limited knowledge among the population of the Constitution is counterproductive to the practical implementation of it. Several communities in western Afghanistan argued that the main importance of the constitution was to obtain international recognition for the Afghan state, and, thus, prolonged assistance provision. Regarding the judiciary, the preamble states that all laws shall be in accordance with Islamic principles and belief. Observations indicate that judges are of the understanding that Shari'a is sufficient when interpreting the 2004 constitution in the judgement of court cases.
3. An overall challenge for nation-building in Afghanistan is to contribute to the reconciliation between existing and potential **ethnic differences and political convictions**. This challenge has been reinforced by the final emergence from the wars of 'the North' as the victor. Understandably, there is general satisfaction in the North with present developments, while resistance and resentment is more widespread in other parts of the country. The outcome of the presidential election in 2004 reflected the ethnic divisions of the country.

28 *'Securing Afghanistan's Future' calculated that economic growth (excluding the black economy) would have to average 9 per cent per annum for over a decade in order to outweigh the drug economy while supporting the institutions needed for the rule of law, including the national army. The current rate growth rate is about 4,5 per cent. For further details see Rubin, Barnett (2005) ' Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document'. Center on International Cooperation, New York University, US for the Clingendael Institute.*

29 *Post-election Strategic Group Draft Concept Paper, July 2005, Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB), Afghanistan.*

While the political government level is conscious of the need to balance power between the ethnicities, an increasing tendency has been observed to use Dari as the official language of the administration at the operational government level at the expense of Pashto.

4. Although the **commander structure** has been curtailed or co-opted by the political system, commanders still retain considerable local power, sometimes exercised from high official positions. Numerous observations indicate that commanders appointed to official positions have often exploited their status to gain illicit revenue through corruption and/or other criminal activities. This will pose serious challenges to the rule of law and risks the criminalisation and fragmentation of the state, unless the bonds between commanders and their local support and networks are effectively broken, e.g. by rotation of commanders to other parts of the country.

   There is no doubt that the co-optation of the commander structure into the new political system has been conducive to stability in the short term, thus contributing to basic preconditions for nation-building in most parts of Afghanistan. However, the commanders' abuse of their new positions offends a large part of the population, and risks jeopardising democratic nation-building in the long term.[30] One problematic event, according to many observers, was the admission of the leading warlords and heads of Mujahideen parties to the Emergency Loya Jirga. This de facto endorsed their position in the new Afghanistan, while glossing over the issue of transitional justice. Some interviewees expressed the view that unnecessary compromises had been made, and that the foundations for the state-building process were thus eroded even before the first pillars were raised. To many Afghans, militarised power-holders appeared to be legitimised by the central government and the international community. The AIHRC Transitional Justice report (2005) found that 40 per cent of the Afghans interviewed believed that the commanders received international community support.

   However, it is important to recognise the resistance that the new government potentially faced from military and factional leaders. During transition, negotiations and overlap between old and new regimes are critical and inevitable. The Afghan state has a long tradition of negotiating its legitimacy and support. In lieu of Bonn, this strategy was applied to safeguard state-building, create political space for negotiations with commanders and religious groups, and to reduce the military challenges to the OEF. In conclusion, it appears that a certain co-optation of the potential political spoilers and armed power-holders was necessary to commit to the way forward.

5. The issue of **transitional justice** remains a problem in relation to effective nation-building. Given the combination of poor judicial resources, the very large tasks involved in dealing with the innumerable consequences of the abuses perpetrated and the purges undertaken by the different regimes over more than 20 years and the current balance of power in Afghanistan, it appears unrealistic to expect full transitional justice to be achieved in the foreseeable future. From this perspective, the donor community should consider enhanced support for compensatory measures including the respect and protection of human rights, enforcement of the stipulated

30 *A lack of clear distinction was observed between the various groups of Mujahideen, militias and their leaders, referred to as either commanders or Warlords. In general, Mujahideen, here defined as those groups who fought the Soviet invaders, feel formally excluded from the political process.*

criteria for appointment of government officials, reconciliation at the local level and support for traumatised victims of torture and other abuse.

6. A growing, if belated, general recognition of **the crucial interdependence between personal and national security and justice** is emerging**.** The justice sector oversees the implementation of the constitution, provides the legal capacity of government and it is the custodian of the rule of law. Its interaction with the police is thus critical in outlawing the culture of 'rule by the gun' and because the much criticised prison conditions are under the tutelage of the Ministry of Justice (MoJ), but no institutionalised relationship has been found. Both the justice sector and the police have reputations for corruption.

The Role of the Media
The public media (State TV and radio) have become important communication channels to the majority of the population, and they have been used effectively by the regime in rallying support for the political processes. The state media are, however, under pressure from regional media controlled by local power-holders, who have either captured the public media or established private media empires.

Without studying the issue in depth, the evaluation observed the existence of private, quality print media, which promote an open democratic debate but have a limited circulation, alongside electronic media with national coverage, which are critical of the present political system. Thus, democratic pluralism is emerging in the media landscape, although the most powerful media still appear to reflect government views.

Access to the internet at the privately owned Internet cafes and at workplaces seems to have led to widespread consumption of yellow/pornographic media, particularly among youth. Together with the suddenly increased access to a wide variety of TV channels this poses a challenge to traditional norms and values.

5.4 State-building

'We always wait for something. First for a constitution, then the presidential election, then a parliament, then a reform …, eventually, almost four years after Bonn.'
(Former senior government employee.)

The Bonn Agreement called for the creation of national commissions for judicial reform, the civil service, the constitutional process, and human rights. It also called for UN support to facilitate this. All five Donor nations contributed to the (re)construction of state structures to ensure the effective authority of government throughout the territory, including rule of law, respect for human rights, local development, public administration and management of the national economy. A vital part of the international support for state-building was the re-establishment of the '*Da Afghanistan Bank*' and reform of the Ministry of Finance.

Overall Findings on State-building

> *'Democracy is not just political but is the participation of the people in all aspects of society. The political process is not alone democracy.'*
>
> (Mufti of a regional capital)

1. **The new Afghan state is working**. First, it should be noted that the Evaluation observed that local populations in the Northern provinces are increasingly looking for solutions to their problems and needs by addressing state bodies at the subnational levels, instead of the local commanders, as would have been the case a few years ago. In addition, the authority of the state is visibly exerted in the territory due to the security sector reform, supported by the ISAF PRTs.

   However, this appears to be the case to a more limited extent in other parts of the country. In addition, the ability of civil servants to respond adequately to the needs of the population is limited by the factors described below.

2. **Politicisation of public administration is a problem.** Professional civil servants, beneficiaries and key informants believe that appointments to the upper echelons of the administration, at both national and subnational levels, have become highly politicised. This has been an unintended side effect of democracy and coalition-building, and, more particularly, of an electoral process where the winner takes all, influenced by political, ethnical or tribal affiliations. It is reinforced by the general concern to maintain a balance of power between ethnic and political groups at the expense of promoting administrators on merit. This risks criminalising the political administration in the absence of functioning rule of law.

   Where commanders have been co-opted into the local administration or have penetrated it by drawing on clan structures and clientelist networks, the use of state institutions may not make much difference to the people. There are indications of positive results of new recruitment of governors and old spoilers continue to be rotated. While 'non-performers' continue to receive new positions due to their political affiliations, the Evaluation also observed cases where the activities of proactive outsiders had been curtailed by local power-holders. The inherent risks of the top posts being political merchandise tend to result in:
   - Lack of management capacity in the upper grades of the administration;
   - The existence of contending political factions within the administration;
   - Lengthy periods of inactivity before and after elections while appointments are made;
   - Appointments being subject to existing networks and vested interests.

3. **The Cabinet** has had the functions of reviewing draft legislation, defining national development priorities and corresponding national budgets. In practice, its capacity to perform them has been weak. Continued conflict between 'reformists' and ministers with military backgrounds has further undermined the management capacity of the government, causing both an apparent growth in corruption within the government and some frustration within the donor community. The legislative modus operandi has been mainly by presidential decree. Currently, there is a significant backlog of pending legislation, including a new budget law.

4. **The Civil Service Reform,** part of the Bonn process, has been slow to get off the ground, largely because in practice it has not been prioritised by the GoA, UN, and the international community. Surprisingly, UNAMA has had no advisor or focal point to provide guidance or to coordinate the assistance that could accelerate the reform process. The World Bank and DFID have been lead agencies within the civil service reform process, but over the last two years other players have entered the scene, notably, the EC and the Asian Development Bank.

5. **Capacity building** within public administration has been scarce outside the high priority Ministry of Finance (MoF), dealt with in the case study below. Even here, more often that not, capacity has been 'bought in' rather than 'built', which may have been necessary to kick-start improvements in the function of the public sector.

   Capacity building has been mainly devoted to the central level ministries led by ministers, whose importance is recognized by the international community. Priority has been given to 'getting the job done', outpacing time and resources for transfer of knowledge and skills. It is critical that the efforts in the future should focus on long-term and sustainable capacity building.

   In general, incentives to invest in civil servants with relatively low capacity have been limited, given the uncertainty about their future. Activities have mostly targeted national staff on international contracts, leaving sustainability doubtful. Technical assistance has not been monitored and evaluated in a systematic way. However, higher prioritisation of capacity building was observed from mid-2004.

   Key stakeholders speak about 'the lost generation', referring to the effect of warfare, including purges against educated so-called communists between 1992 and 1996 and the limited education held by the Mujahideen. Approximately two thirds of civil servants are over 50 years old, and few of them are educated beyond baccalaureate level. Yet, a high level of dedication and 'patriotic loyalty', combined with sound common sense and experience, was found among the rank and file civil servants. The majority had been recruited before the onset of radical Islamic rule and an estimated one third of them are women (primarily based in urban areas). So far it appears difficult to attract or recruit new professionals. Nevertheless, the dominant, if implicit, assumption in Kabul appears to be that the creation of a lean and efficient state will have to await the recruitment of a new corps of civil servants, further to the implementation of the Priority Reform and Reconstruction (PRR).

6. **Extremely different levels of remuneration** between international advisors, international projects' Afghan staff, NGO Afghan staff and civil servants is causing some resentment among the latter group, especially towards young international project Afghan staff, whose main qualifications are English and computer literacy. It is doubtful whether these young people will remain in their posts once the PRR is implemented as their salary levels will drop. The state has already suffered loss of human capital over the last three years, and there is a risk of a second round of brain drain, because their loyalty to the state administration is half-hearted and they tend to surf from one international sponsored project to another, benefiting from the skewed labour market.[31]

31 Monthly salaries of some 30-60 USD/month have resulted in a severe brain drain of civil servants to international organisations and diplomatic establishments, draining the GoA of capacity.

The 'old' state employees see themselves as the 'most marginalised group in society', unappreciated and forced to find supplementary sources of income. It is normal practice for working hours to end at 2 pm to enable civil servants to do their second job. Those with access to land are able to use it to generate income. Some civil servants seem to go to work, where they have little to do, and where it is difficult to do it anyway, in order to promote cases for family members and friends.

The evaluation did not find any evidence of a concerted effort by the international community to push for reforms and to mitigate the capacity and resource gap between the national public administration and the international humanitarian and development assistance. Donor attitudes seem to have been rather complacent and based on trust in 'national ownership' and sovereignty in prioritisation and decision-making.

> Question to a group of university students:
> *'Anyone wants to work with MoJ or MoF'?* Answer: *(Big laugh)*.
>
> An engineer student: '*When I graduate I want to serve the people and also to collect money for my own family.'*

7. **Provincial and district administration were neglected** throughout the evaluation period, leading to a highly concentrated Afghan state. Little emphasis was placed on rebuilding local administration concomitantly with the consolidation of the centre, a bias reinforced by the Kabul-centred donor perspective. The physical facilities for the local administration are in most cases very poor. There has been no comprehensive needs assessment or general strategy for capacity building.

   The local administration is a replica of the relevant line ministries, and the local departments operate in silos with limited or no devolution of fiscal or administrative authority. However, local fiscal and administrative power does not necessarily contradict centralisation. The local administration has little flexibility to respond to local needs, coordinate activities or to optimise resources because resources are controlled at the centre and channelled through the ineffective structures of the line ministries.[32] In the absence of a clear vision and structure of the local administration, the international community, including donors and PRTs, operates with their own assumptions of what is appropriate, albeit within the parameters of a rigid centralisation and their own Kabul-centric focus.

8. **Procedures for sharing information** about national development priorities, aid allocation and reform processes with sub-national administration have been ineffective. The Governor of Nangarhar was not familiar with the National Development Framework. Most information is received through the radio. Local civil servants indicated dissatisfaction and felt excluded from the decision-making process. This reflects an overall **need for a public communications policy**, the absence of which also leads to distorted conceptions about aid provision.

32 *A case in point is staff recruitment, explained by health officials in Herat. If a hospital in Herat is to recruit medical personnel (trained in Herat) these professionals are firstly required to have registered with the relevant ministry in Kabul, and, secondly, the hospital will have to await ministerial approval before employing them, which might take months.*

9. **Widespread corruption** has been observed throughout the public administration, which is vulnerable because of politicised dominance, poor financial management, and very low salaries that force civil servants to look for alternative incomes. High levels of corruption have depleted state resources: state property has been illegally occupied, licenses and contracts have been awarded without proper tendering, and assets, including natural resources, have been removed from state control.

> *'There is corruption everywhere. The commanders are ruling. They still dominate the recruitment of positions at director level. Particularly within customs, traffic police, moustifiat, and court and justice.'*
>
> (University student)

10. Through the Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development, **the National Solidarity Programme** has created a bottom-up local governance dimension by empowering local communities to define development priorities through a participatory and transparent decision-making process. Further, it enhances the linkages between the government and its citizens through the direct allocation of grants. As one beneficiary stated, '*...this is the first time ever we have received anything from the government; previously we had to provide to them.*'

The Afghanistan Stabilization Programme (ASP) was initiated early 2004 to 'rapidly and dramatically improve economic opportunity, social stability, and civil order throughout Afghanistan' (ASP Annual Report 1383-84). Almost 60,5 million USD has been allocated, incl. 40,9 million USD from NL and DFID of a total budget of USD 245 million until 2008 (1387) to equip the country's fragile district administrations (ASP May 2005). The ASP has a broad mandate to improve district administration including rehabilitation, capacity building and facilitate the reform process, by support of the newly established Training and Administration Department.

The ASP is managed by a Programme Management Unit staffed from the Ministry of Urban Development and Housing and Ministry of Interior. Some 115 districts have been surveyed (out of 364 districts in Afghanistan) for the first phase. Only 17 districts had existing administration and/or police buildings of permanent structure and 14 districts had existing administration and/or police buildings constructed in mud. The remaining districts had no existing buildings or these were destroyed. Pilot projects have been fielded in six districts at the time of the evaluation and extended twice because of problems of land ownership, lack of accessibility, and difficulties with coordination of the seven participating ministries. The ASP manages a Provincial Stabilization Fund USD 1 mio./province for development projects (max value USD 0.5 mio. on health, education, water or one other priority sector), and for capacity-building of the provincial governor's administration including local development planning and coordination. How the ASP relates to and coordinates with the provincial development committees, the PRTs, and the future district councils is at present not confirmed. A single and simplified coordination mechanism for provincial and district development would be helpful to avoid possible duplication, which would in fact not support local government but undermine it by all new and good intentions.

11. **There is general confusion about the hierarchy and relations between the different kinds of local committees and councils** that are being established as a result of specific programmes such as the Community Development Committees by the National Solidarity Programme, the Provincial Development Councils for coordination and planning of provincial development, and the councils that shall be established at district and village level to enhance local participation according to the Constitution Art. 140. The lack of clarity impacts on the prioritisation, the coordination and the effectiveness of resource use.

12. **The Priority Reform and Restructuring** programme within ministries, the so-called PRR process, promulgated in August 2003, is being implemented in a number of the central ministries and is being slowly rolled out to provincial level. The objective of the process is to restructure and reform ministries by reviewing departmental organisation and staffing. Ministries are expected to develop and submit reform proposals. Upon approval an interim additional allowance is granted while a comprehensive pay and grading reform is pending. Yet, the lack of consultation and inclusion of the local administration in design and decision-making seems to create resentment at the local level, where massive needs, in terms of salaries, work conditions and capacity building, are as yet unmet. The PRR does not specifically cater for capacity building or performance-based management. The reform thus runs a risk of resulting in mainly a technical rationalisation of functions and responsibilities. The civil servants tend to regard the reform as positive but insufficient. The PRR is not adapted to local conditions, where the civil servants seem to believe that the PRR will result in new competency requirements and recruitment procedures, which are perceived as a threat.

Figure 10: Civil Service Pay Scales Before and After the PRR in Afghani (af.)

(*Source: The AIRSCS May 2005)*

Grade Staff	Salary/af.	Total Salary	Food Allowance/ af.	Salary plus Food Allowance	Increment through PRR	Total PRR salary	Personal Contract	Salary Plus Food Allowance
High Grade	210 x*7	1470	1640	3110	8640	11750	High	2536
High	170x7	1190	1640	2830	8215	11045	First	2431
First	130x7	910	1640	2550	7790	10240	Second	2354
Second	110x7	770	1640	2410	7225	9635	Third	2291
Third	95x7	665	1640	2305	6525	8930	Fourth	2163
Fourth	78x7	546	1640	2186	6039	8225	Fifth	2116
Fifth	70x7	490	1640	2130	5390	7520	Sixth	2060
Sixth	62x7	434	1640	2074	4741	6815	Seventh	2025
Seventh	57x7	399	1640	2039	4071	6110	Eighth	1983
Eighth	51x7	357	1640	1997	3408	5405	Ninth	1941
Ninth	46x7	322	1640	1962	2738	4700	Tenth	1906
Tenth	40x7	280	1640	1920	2075	3995	-	-

*7 times increase in government employees' salary based on Presidential Decree.

Police salaries vary between 3,000-5,600 Afs./month (40-100 USD).[33] The PRR indicates increments of up to 1170 + 2536 Afs (including the food allowance), equal to approximately 290 USD for the highest grade. Mid-level civil servants (3th-7th grade) would receive between approximately 8,093-10,256 Afs. (165-210 USD)/ month. UN surveys of local living costs indicate that a minimum of 250 USD/ month is required to support a family in Kabul.[34] Understandably, therefore, civil servants perceive the PRR salary increments as generally insufficient.

Case Study: The Ministry of Finance

> *'Now the teachers receive their salary on time'.*
>
> (Village council chairman in Balkh Province)

> *'The teachers are the last to receive their salaries, first priority is for the Army and the Police'.*
>
> (Teacher in Kandahar)

Observations
For the delivery of public services, the state must be capable of planning and managing expenditure and raising revenue. Since mid-2002 the multi-donor ARTF, administered by the World Bank and significantly supported by the Donors, has funded the Government's recurrent budget, including civil service salaries. The ARTF also funds support to the public sector reform such as the Lateral Entry Programme established for quick injection of capacity from March 2004[35] and the Afghan Expatriate Programme, not yet implemented.

The National Development Budget is the operationalisation of the priorities of the National Development Framework into projects and programmes, following consultation within government and with donors through Consultative Groups (CG). A CG is established for each of the twelve priority areas defined in the three pillars of the National Development Framework: humanitarian and social and human capital; physical reconstruction and natural resources and private sector development, governance and security. The institutionalised engagement of donors in a national development budget in a post-conflict situation is unique to Afghanistan. The Afghan Government's Donor Assistance Database lists 101 separate projects funded by international donors. Some donors expressed criticism of the lack of capacity/priority within some ministries to chair and manage the CGs, leaving the process vulnerable. Yet, this may be due to the lack of sufficient qualified staff devoted fulltime to the CG process, as was pointed out at the CG workshop in 2003.

The Afghan Aid Coordination Authority was transformed in 2003 into the Development Budget of the MoF, which institutionalised the budgetary process. It has

33 *Ministry of Interior, 'Corrected Salaries for 1383 (21 March 2004 - 20 March 2005)'. Central Statistics Office (CSO).*
34 *UNU Forthcoming.*
35 *ARTF Evaluation report, March 2004, Scanteam Norway.*

attempted to incorporate the internationally sponsored programmes into the instruments of policy and align them with the twelve national development priorities through the Afghanistan Development Forum and the CGs. Institutional and capacity building, however, proved vulnerable in terms of sustainability with a loss of five senior staff members from the Budget Department after the 2004 election, leaving a reduced institutional memory. Due to limited progress in capacity building and institutional development, the MoF established a training unit staffed by Afghan advisors and staff in 2004.

Findings
The Donors have made the Ministry of Finance a consistent priority. The Netherlands have provided financial and technical assistance worth USD 240,000 through the UNDP Project for the Development Budget Department, and DFID has seconded advisors to Customs, Tax and Revenue and the recurrent budget. The immediate priorities after Bonn were to provide basic office infrastructure, establish procedures and mechanisms for managing a national development budget, for the payment of salaries and for the revitalisation of systems for generating revenue.

Efforts have been made to **build financial planning and budget capacity** through merit-based recruitment and the MoF deployed budget advisors to assist line ministries with the national budget exercise. Guidelines were developed in Dari and English, and workshops were held for government and donors.[36] Assistance to buy and subsequently build capacity has been relatively successful through individual coaching to prepare the national development budget, customs and revenues. The purely national preparation process demonstrated the achievements for year 1383 (21 March 04 - 20 March 05). Management of donor contributions has been successful, but the challenges remain in terms of building GoA capacity in financial management and tracking of spending.

Institutional development is a challenge. There are indications of a lack of harmonisation between the Development Budget and the Operational Budget. This can partly be explained by the lack of coordination between the two main providers of TA targeting different departments and by the lack of overarching management capacity. Hierarchical relationships between the international project national staff and the civil servants, and competition between international funded projects, have been unintended consequences. These reduce the effectiveness of technical assistance, the performance of departments, and the working environment.

Most allotments from **the operational budget**, including for salaries, were processed in time throughout the country in early 2005, except for delay at the beginning of the year in the North. However, delays in salary payments of up to several months, and in some cases reduced payments, have been reported from the South and West. Ordinary citizens do not yet have access to a modern banking system. International banks are subject to restrictions, and the Da Afghanistan Bank is not yet geared to operate in a client-oriented manner. Although some local banks are now able to handle salary cheques (considered important to avoid the existence of 'ghosts' on the payroll), the financial system continues to rely mainly on the *Hawala*[37] system for transfer of payment.

36 *UNDP (March 2004), 'Progress Report – Aid Coordination & Management/Making Budgets Work', UNDP Afghanistan.*

37 *The 'Hawala' system refers to a traditional and informal channel for transfering funds from one location to another, internationally or within Afghanistan, through private service providers. The system is often based on family networks and trust, where a small fee is paid for the transaction.*

State revenue collection has progressed, especially the customs. Improvements are mainly observed in the North where revenues have exceeded expectations by more than 100 per cent, whereas in the East and South support for the customs has faced challenges from lack of cooperation by the local authorities. In Kandahar the TA staff had to flee the city. A substantially increased generation of tax revenue appears to have long perspectives, even if launched in some locations.

Case Study: The Ministry of Justice

> *'We are the most marginalised group in the society'.*
> (Senior civil servant in the *Hoquq*, Samangan Province)

Observations
The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) has a multiple and critical role in upholding the rule of law. It is responsible for drafting and reviewing laws for the government, and for the provision of legal advice to it. It also includes a department of government property. The evaluation focused on the Department of the *Hoquq* due to its direct interaction with the communities. The *Hoquq* arbitrates disputes (debtor/creditor, property, and family issues) and uses Civil Law, which for the most part is a codification of Shari'a Law,[38] being a kind of nexus between statutory and religious law and informal dispute resolution mechanisms. It receives the majority of civil cases directly from representatives of the local community, as the first level of formal dispute settlement. If the *Hoquq's* mediation is unsuccessful, it refers the case to court.

However, it was not possible for the Evaluation to undertake in-depth research on the case-flow from, for example, local *Shuras* to the *Hoquq* and to assess case management. Little documentation is available but based on interviews and field observations, the Evaluation got the impression that this basic part of the justice system has managed to continue its activities surprisingly well in spite of very poor working conditions, through flexible application of different law elements and common sense. The local communities are inclined to seek support for dispute settlement through the informal system, conducted by respected and trusted elders as opposed to the formal justice system, which is considered corrupt and as representing vested interests.

After a period of modernisation in Afghanistan in the 1960s and 1970s, Shari'a was reintroduced as state law during the rule of the Mujahideen.[39] After the Taliban, the principles and norms of international law were transplanted into state administration. International law is recognized by the new constitution and the country has signed and ratified most international conventions and treaties. As a result, the legal context in Afghanistan is a mosaic of laws emanating from different sources, though Shari'a is mostly codified in civil and criminal law. At the local level, informal justice operates more or less uninterrupted, though customary law has been eroded during the war,

38 *Islamic law is known as Shari'a. Shari'a is an Arabic word meaning the 'right path', denoting that Sharia applies to all aspects of life.*
39 *Ali Wardak 'Building Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan' available at http://bglatzer.de/arg/arp/wardak.pdf.*

resulting in a blend of interpretation of Shari'a and traditions, dominated by local commanders and religious leaders. [40]

In spite of its acknowledged importance, the justice sector is in strong need of reform and capacity building. However, it is a complicated sector to work in for internationals with limited understanding of Islamic law. The Bonn Agreement recognised the complexity and stated that the Judicial Reform Commission (JRC) would '*rebuild the domestic justice system in accordance with Islamic principles, international standards, the rule of law and Afghan legal traditions.*' However, the impact of the theological aspects on the everyday lives of the majority of Afghans, and the pivotal role of Islamic law in nation- and state-building, do not seem fully appreciated by the international community.

The difficulties of the JRC in fulfilling its mandate reveal the complexity of the sector. Its success depends on the cooperation of its three bodies (the Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the Ministry of Justice) and on guidance from Italy, the lead donor in this sector. Rivalry between national entities and lack of capacity in the JRC to develop a common vision due to substantive disagreements among donors, and rivalry between the three judicial institutions, resulted in a lack of leadership in the area of reform coordination and consequently lack of satisfactory progress.

The international community did not adequately support the reform process, due to lack of collaboration and leadership by the contributing donors and organisations. The UNAMA Legal Advisor position has been vacant since mid-2003, leaving the UN ill-equipped to facilitate consensus on the need for the reform process. UNDP supported the establishment of the JRC and a comprehensive programme additional to the bilateral support by Italy (lead donor) and the US. Absence of systematic coordination delayed implementation, caused a lengthy negotiation process and lack of synergy between interventions. The justice sector is under-funded, yet funds allocated to it have not been disbursed in full.

The work of the Consultative Group for Justice began to improve in 2004, under the new Minister of Justice and with support from Italy, the US and the UN. It meets periodically to discuss judicial system needs in relation to the forthcoming national development budget and to enhance coordination. The government-led 'Justice and the Rule of Law National Priority Programme' seeks to reform and strengthen existing justice institutions through seven sub-programmes: law reform, a justice survey, justice infrastructure, legal training, legal awareness, capacity building, and the procurement of equipment and vehicles. In 2004, the UNDP deployed capacity-building advisors to the Ministry of Justice and the Office of the Attorney General to assist with the administrative reform process, institutional development and capacity building. The US, as the other major donor, has concentrated its assistance on the Court System.

As a part of the preparation of 'Securing Afghanistan's Future' in 2003, a document was developed laying out a strategy for rebuilding the judiciary and rule of law. Insufficient reference has been made to this important document, which could have served as a point of departure for consensus building for a common vision and strategy.

40 See The International Legal Foundation (2003). 'The Customary Laws of Afghanistan'. The International Legal Foundation, US. and Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2003).' Islam, Pernicious Custom, and Women's Rights in Afghanistan', International Islamic University Malaysia

Findings
Three and a half years since the signing of the Bonn Agreement, the state of the judiciary has not experienced any significant changes. There are few signs of institutional development and capacity-building, apart from seminars and some limited reconstruction of facilities. Training has been delivered in an uncoordinated fashion because institutional and capacity needs have not been comprehensively assessed, and its impact has not been measured. The Government property units seem neglected and are severely short of capacity. There is lack of management capability to handle the steeply increasing numbers of disputes relating to state land and government assets. The lack of legal capacity opens up a severe risk of losing assets through bribery and corruption.

5.5 The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission

> *'They are reckless because they have nothing to lose! If a man is jobless, this is a major trauma for him. The children have no clothes, the land is mined, there is a drought and no water channel'.*
>
> *(*Afghan NGO worker*)*

Observations
The Bonn Agreement contained a number of human rights clauses, including the obligation for the Interim Administration to establish an independent human rights commission, which was inaugurated in July 2002. Operations started October 2002 when the joint UNAMA, Office of the High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, and Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) programme was secured funding for a period of two years.

The Commission was originally composed of eleven commissioners, of whom five were women, including the Chairperson. In April 2005, there were nine commissioners. Eight regional offices are located in Herat, Kandahar, Kabul, Kunduz, Mazar-e-Sharif, Bamyan, Jalalabad, Gardez and three provincial offices in Badakshan, Daykundi and Faryab to cover more remote areas. The AIHRC employs some 380 staff. The establishment is large and rather impressive given the time and capacity restrictions.

Capacity building has been centrally managed, mainly by the AIHRC itself. Two international advisors were selected for thematic areas by the OHCHR and UNAMA and deployed to the AIHRC without consultation, an arrangement which appears to have been unhelpful. The Chief Technical Advisor has provided constructive support to the Chairperson but given the large scale of the operation more than one advisor is needed to meet its technical assistance needs. Short-term advisors have conducted training and workshops that address immediate needs and assist with strategy development. Greater emphasis on the regional and provincial offices and on-the-job training would have been desirable. UNAMA was lightly staffed at HQ and regional level, and several human rights officer posts were vacant at various times. UNAMA was therefore unable to provide local level support to the AIHRC, to monitor human rights throughout Afghanistan, or even to integrate human rights into its own activities.[41]

41 Amnesty International (2003). 'Afghanistan – Re-establishing the Rule of Law'. ASA 11/021/2003:3

The AIHRC, costing USD 2.5-2.8 million per year, benefits from sufficient financial assistance by donors, including Denmark (2002-2005: USD 1.22 million, in addition to assistance through the Danish Institute for Human Rights of USD 0.99 million) and the UK (USD 1.6 million and DFID USD 450,000), and it has been a high priority for the international community. Observations indicate, however, that its effective outreach is constrained by a shortage of resources at the provincial level and an often less than efficient use of resources that are available due to lack of GoAl-oriented work-plans and systematic performance assessments. Strategic work-plans appear to have been limited to the national level. Yet, the donors (including Denmark and the UK) did not disburse all allocated funds for the last two years due to lower consumption than targeted, i.e. the total budget for 2004 was USD 4.252 million and total expenditure USD 2.889 million.[42]

Among donors, the Commission is considered successful, mainly due to its mere existence, the human rights protection needs and its visible advocacy of human rights. The only reservation interviewees expressed was that the chairperson was too dominant, and that to avoid dependency on one individual, other commissioners should be given more space. Yet, donors also acknowledged that the chairperson's strong vision and leadership has been critical for the Commission. One effect is that the perception of human rights issues, as met by the evaluation team at the local level, has often been identified with women's rights.

An external evaluation of the AIHRC was undertaken when the previous project period expired at the end of 2004. The result was a comprehensive assessment of internal structures and functions, which emphasised the need for continued capacity building. However, it neglected to assess the effectiveness of the Commission in relation to beneficiaries.

The Commission chairs the Human Rights Advisory Group (HRAG) that serves as the forum for the coordination of human rights, supported by the focal points, Denmark and UNAMA. HRAG organises monthly meetings at which members share human rights related information, various organisations are invited to make presentations, and discussions on current relevant topics take place. Its membership is composed by representatives of the donors, the UN, international and local NGOs and from Government ministries, including the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior, and the Ministry of Women's Affairs. Government representation on the HRAG meetings is irregular. Another key task of the HRAG is to prepare a Human Rights Position Paper to the Afghanistan Development Forum, stating current focal areas and priorities in the field of human rights.

5.6 The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme

'DDR is a joke. The government collects weapons with one hand and hands out new ones with the other.'

(Afghan medical doctor)

42 *UNDP Financial Report, 2005.*

Following a lengthy preparation process that began in 2002, the 'Afghan New Beginning Program' (ANBP) was created by UNAMA and UNDP in February 2003 to assist the GoA with the design and implementation of a comprehensive DDR programme as part of the security sector reform. ANBP is the lead agency, working under the guidance of a DDR Commission within the GoA.

The DDR programme started in October 2003 with a pilot phase in Kunduz, Gardez, Mazar, Kandahar, and Kabul; from April 2004, this was extended to include Bamyan, Jalalabad, and Herat. Activities focus on: the disarmament of the former Afghan Armed Forces (AMF); the demobilisation of an estimated 60,000 ex-combatants; and the provision of reintegration 'packages' to the ex-combatants. The UK has been among the important funding nations of the USD 167 million programme, together with Japan (lead donor), Canada and the USA. The evaluation assessed the DDR programme in the Northern provinces.

Observations

Disarmament and Demobilisation were declared completed in October 2004 and April 2005 respectively. Approximately 48,000 men had been disarmed, and 45,563 ex-combatants demobilised, out of an original target of 100,000, later reduced to 60,000.[43] Nearly 9,000 heavy weapons were collected, this being a programme priority. It is recognized by all stakeholders that the PRTs rendered important assistance to this activity. At the start of the programme, a reward of USD 200 was offered for handing in weapons, but this practice was quickly abused by commanders who ordered their men, or new recruits, to hand in old weapons of a lesser value. It was therefore stopped, and the money was spent on augmenting the reintegration packages instead. It is the assessment of all parties that only a minor part of the vast numbers of small arms circulating in Afghanistan has been collected.

> *'DDR is completed 50%. Warlords and commanders still have guns. If these are not collected there will still be tension at local level.'*
>
> (Member of the *Ulema* in the province of Balkh)

Reintegration has begun for 43,944 former AMF members. By late March 2005, 3,654 had completed the reintegration option. An additional 7,727 had completed it while still receiving IOM support. The IOM is contracted by ANBP (as a joint UNDP/GoA programme, ANBP contracts implementing partners) as the implementing partner, and the IOM in turn sub-contracts the implementation of the various packages to Afghan NGOs. The DDR programme will terminate in June 2006, when the last ex-combatant finishes reintegration.

The reintegration options consist of 'packages' of training and support in cash/kind, to a value of USD 700, for (re-)commencing farming (chosen by some 45 per cent); starting small businesses (20 per cent); vocational training (15 per cent); and other options such as teacher training and courses in English and computer literacy (20 per cent). To enhance the chances of the chosen option leading to a sustainable livelihood, candidates

43 This figure is somewhat arbitrary, since, as is commonly acknowledged, the distinction between legally armed forces (AMF) and what is referred to as 'illegal forces' is rather blurred.

are interviewed beforehand to ascertain their suitability for the particular package (for example, access to land is a precondition for the agricultural package).

Observed Criticism
However, according to an ongoing evaluation of IOM's part of the programme, this screening has been superficial, the ex-combatants being assigned to options in units rather than individually. Criticism has been voiced by stakeholders that in practice the choice of packages on offer is often more limited than those listed, and that this has resulted, for example, in an excessive number of tailors being trained.

The time-scale of one year generally allowed for implementation of this ambitious programme has been criticised by observers for being too short. Donors are also accused of complacency in monitoring this work. For security reasons, they have relied on short one-day visits to the regional centres instead of going to the field where the problems are visible. There are allegations of 'fake' demobilisation, with cases cited where ex-combatants have been re-enlisted by commanders after harvesting the DDR benefits. Some beneficiaries reported another negative impact, namely, that it is mainly 'the little man's arms that are taken away, disabling him from defending himself against commanders and crime.' A common criticism from beneficiaries was that the wrong persons were 'DDR-ed'. Many would have preferred to have joined the new Afghan army (ANA), for which they considered themselves well qualified, but this was not allowed, allegedly for political reasons – although the ANA finds it difficult to recruit and retain suitable manpower.

Another criticism, voiced by Afghan NGOs in particular, was that the DDR programme only deals with the material aspects of demobilisation and reintegration, and neglects the importance of providing moral and psychological support to the large numbers of people, many of them very young, who have been socialised into warfare as a normal way of life and suffered psychological disturbances as a result.

Possible follow-up
In addition to the AMF, a large number of soldiers and weaponry is still under control of commanders, armed gangs or groups affiliated with OEF. The exact size of this problem is unknown, but cautious estimates indicate the existence of 850 such groups, with a total membership of around 65,000. For these groups, a continuation of the Demobilisation of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) programme is currently envisaged by the ANB. A main element in the deliberations appears to be disarmament through a weapon for community development arrangement.

Findings
Despite the shortcomings described above, the DDR programme overall appears to have been relatively successful, especially in relation to Demobilisation and Disarmament. In addition to the numbers of men who have been disarmed and demobilised, another important accomplishment has been to limit the legal cover of the commanders, thus encouraging them to seek peaceful co-optation into the political system. The results obtained have, according to all stakeholders, been conditioned by the interest of the main players in becoming peaceful politicians, allowing the DDR a catalytic role in this process and by the visible background presence of the PRTs.

Stakeholders and key informants entertain no illusions about the sustainability of the results of the DDR, if these conditions do not hold. The legitimacy of the non-gov-

ernmental armed forces has been removed and the programme has curtailed the commanders' power, but they and their networks have not been dismantled completely. The underlying reasons for holding weapons have not been removed. The continued widespread availability of weapons in Afghanistan, together with the commanders and their followers, are potentially destabilising factors. The collection of heavy weapons has reduced the military capacity of potentially warring factions, but future conflicts could be fought with small arms.

The results of the reintegration are generally estimated to be limited, since there are few opportunities in the labour market and employment is not guaranteed. This reduces the sustainability and increases the likelihood of ex-combatants being recruited back into illegal armed groups. The large number of Afghans wanting to take up farming has resulted in widespread disputes over land, making it difficult to imagine that 20,000 ex-combatants could be settled as farmers.

Overall, sustainability appears not to be given a high priority in the reintegration programme, which contains no follow-up procedures. According to the DDR, a reintegration programme is considered successful when 20 per cent of its participants find sustainable livelihoods within their options. This measure appears to have been selected at random. The capacity of the DDR programme appears to have been insufficient. The Evaluation was told that weapons and ammunition stockpiles that had been identified by PRTs were often not collected by DDR workers. These armaments will remain in circulation when the DDR programme stops, unless a successor is established.

In conclusion, the Evaluation believes that the DDR programme has had positive outcomes insofar as it has contributed to making progress towards stabilisation, but it expresses serious reservations about the programme's effectiveness in terms of coverage and, more especially, regarding the sustainability of the reintegration achieved.

5.7 The Provincial Reconstruction Teams

> *'Schools are built by army groups. This is not their job. They should attend to the security.'*
>
> (CDC council member, the Northern province of Balkh)

Given the comprehensive and somewhat controversial presence of the PRTs in Afghanistan, it should be emphasised that two distinct types of PRTs operate in Afghanistan, those under the OEF (the Coalition) and those under the ISAF peacekeeping mandate. The working conditions for OEF PRTs in the Southern part of the country, where armed conflict is still rife, differ markedly from those in the North, which are the focus of this report.

Still, since January 2005, both categories have been operating under the same Terms of Reference. These include five paragraphs on 'reconstruction', including one stating that

'Reconstruction projects should be carried out in accordance with the direction of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and align their work when possible with the NPP.' [44]

This assessment only covers the (NATO) ISAF PRTs in the Northern provinces with contributions from one or more of the five Donors. Furthermore, it should be mentioned that the assessment has been restricted by the limited availability of:

- Institutional memory in the ISAF/PRT set-up;
- Accessible written documentation from ISAF/PRTs;
- PRT knowledge about the costs of the operations;
- Documentation on the PRT activities in the MFAs of the donor countries.

The findings reported below rest on three kinds of evidence: interviews with and observations of the ISAF command in Kabul; the British-led PRT in the provinces of Balkh and Samangan, including the Danish and Swedish contingents; the Dutch PRT in Baghlan; members of the PRT working group; interviews with beneficiaries and other stakeholders; and relevant research.[45] The sub-team met with cooperative responses from the staff of the PRTs visited. The observations of the evaluation sub-team were supplemented by the observations of sub-teams in other parts of Afghanistan, where the PRTs, however, were under OEF command.

Observations and findings reported concern the PRTs' contributions to stabilisation, security and development in the respective provinces through the application of military and civilian instruments. No attempt has been made to assess PRT operations from a military perspective.

5.7.1 Observations

The PRT concept was introduced by the US-led Coalition (OEF) in Afghanistan in November 2002 as a further development of models for civilian-military (CIMIC) activities applied in post-conflict locations from the 1990s, in particular ex-Yugoslavia. Initially, the teams were to have up to 100 staff members, combining combat forces, military assistance personnel and civilian expertise. The tasks were to include coordination of assistance, needs assessment, liaison with regional commanders, and the implementation of assistance and security, with an emphasis on assisting GoA to assert its authority in the provinces.

According to key informants[46] and in accordance with the overall CIMIC Policy Guidelines of the Netherlands and the UK,[47] the overall rationale of the PRTs, both then and now, can be defined as:

- Force protection, by promoting a friendly environment, typically through small-scale, quick-impact projects, often referred to as 'winning hearts and minds'.

44 The agreed TOR for the PRTs in Afghanistan (January 2005).

45 For a recent evaluation of the UK-PRTs in Afghanistan, see Dylan Hendrickson, Michael Bhatia, Mark Knight, Annabel Taylor, 'A Review of DFID Involvement in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan', International Policy Institute, King's College, London, July 2005.

46 The ISAF command in Kabul and PRT-staff from the involved donor nations.

47 Interim Joint Warfare Publications 3-90, Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC), November 2003 and Note from the Dutch MFA to the Parliament about Beleitskader Civiel-Militaire Samenwerking. In addition, the Evaluation had access to a Danish Note to the Parliament on "Samtænkning".

- Extending the effective authority of the GoA throughout the territory, thus contributing to stability and an enabling environment for development.

However, according to the official TOR of 2005, the PRTs were also given a mandate to undertake humanitarian, rehabilitation and development activities, alongside their military activities. By integrating civilian and military elements, the PRT concept inherently appears to contradict an emerging consensus within the international community that military resources should only be applied to civilian tasks when called upon to do so by the humanitarian actors. However, in the Afghan context today UN agencies, the ICRC and some of the NGOs de facto recognize the role of ISAF PRTs as a tool to increase security and to promote an enabling environment for development in a number of provinces.[48]

The International Security Assistance Force
NATO assumed command of the PRTs in central and Northern Afghanistan through ISAF. This was its first mission outside the Euro-Atlantic area, operated according to UN Security Council resolutions. The ISAF mission was initially limited to Kabul. United Nations Security Council resolution 1510 of 13 October 2003 provided a role for ISAF in supporting the GoA beyond Kabul. Subsequently, the establishment of the ISAF PRTs began, with the participation of all the Donors except Ireland.

The North Atlantic Council provides the political direction for the mission, in consultation with non-NATO nations taking part in ISAF. Strategic command rests with NATO's military headquarters. The Joint Force Commander is responsible on the operational level. A military technical agreement exists between ISAF and the GoA. The integration of PRT activities into the Afghan setting takes place in monthly meetings of the PRT 'Executive Steering Committee' (ESC), which is composed of representatives at ambassadorial level, from the PRT-contributing countries and from the GoA, NATO and the UN. Attached to the ESC is a PRT 'Working Group', which meets weekly and acts as a centre for lessons learning regarding civilian-military relations and an NGO Civil-Military Working Group, which meets monthly to coordinate the activities of the parties.

As indicated by the comprehensive high-level command structure, much political attention has been paid to the ISAF/PRT activities in Afghanistan, resulting in a level of high-ranking civilian and military visitors, which has sometimes made it difficult for the rather modest numbers of staff, generally on short assignments, to execute their duties.

ISAF troops (February 2005) numbered around 8,000 (of which around 1,000 were placed in PRTs) from 36 NATO, nine partner and two other countries. These included 461 from the UK, 311 from the Netherlands, 163 from Denmark and 75 from Sweden. Among the most important ISAF/PRT activities has been support for the GoA programme for the collection of heavy weapons for the DDR project, although not in an institutionalised and coordinated manner. Further, the ISAF PRTs assisted with security for the Constitutional *Loya Jirga* and the presidential elections. By contrast, the PRTs have not participated in poppy eradication or in the fight against other crime.

48 *There is a less positive assessment of the role of the Coalition PRTs, whose practices are often seen as having a negative impact on the activities of the aid providers, through excessive use of force.*

The ISAF PRTs
In July 2004, the PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif (UK-led, with Danish and Swedish contingents) was transferred from OEF command to ISAF. PRTs were also established by ISAF in Meymana (UK-led), followed by Baghlan (the Netherlands) in October 2004, and by Feyzabad (German-led with a Danish contingent) in early 2005. Together with a German PRT in Kunduz, ISAF thus covers nine northern provinces. Further expansion of ISAF PRTs in other parts of Afghanistan is underway, including new UK- and NL-led PRTs. In this way, NATO is gradually assuming the former responsibilities of the Coalition forces.

Only the military elements of the PRTs are formally integrated under ISAF. Yet the civilian elements work closely together with the military in the cases of the four Donor countries, as opposed to the German model, which maintains a strict separation between the civilian and military elements.

A quick turnover of staff at all levels characterises every PRT, including the ISAF command. Staff is replaced every six months (every four months in the case of the Netherlands). Yet, adequate handover mechanisms, including mechanisms for the accumulation of usable experience, were not in place during the evaluation period. However, Denmark has recently begun to deploy civilian PRT staff on longer assignments to ensure the bridging.

Donors' involvement
Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK have allocated significant military and, except for Sweden, some civilian TA resources to the PRTs, the corresponding costs being born by the donor countries' Ministries of Defence and the development budgets respectively. The UK-led PRTs have been equipped with political and development advisors, who report to the MFA and DFID respectively. By contrast, the Dutch PRT had a political advisor from the MFA who was also in charge of the development activities. The Dutch PRT hopes to supplement its civilian capacity with Officers of the reserve in possession of civilian capabilities, as it had been unable to acquire civilian reinforcements from the MFA, due to the latter's restrictive staffing policies.

The UK development advisors were given disposal of DFID funds (GBP 1 million per year, or approximately 1.5 million Euros), which have been used for quick impact projects aimed at winning 'hearts and minds' and for the reconstruction of security sector buildings (police stations). Comparable Foreign Office funding has been spent by the PRT advisors in the governance sector, mainly on the reconstruction of courthouses.

The Dutch political advisor was given limited MoD funding for quick impact projects to begin with, but was allocated 5 million Euros for an unspecified period of time under a separate MFA development budget in early 2005. The use of these funds had not been decided at the time of the evaluation. Finally, it was decided, in the context of a visit by the Dutch development minister to the PRT in March 2005, that some of the Netherlands' future contribution to the Afghan Stabilisation Fund should be directed to the provincial government of Baghlan, where earlier Dutch practice had been focussed on support for multilateral channels and the ARTF.

Denmark has from early 2004 contributed to the UK-led PRT in Mazar, with a satellite platoon in Samangan (six Danish staff members), and from early 2005 to the German-led PRT in Badakshan, with a satellite unit (40 Danish staff members). Both satellites

are provided with civilian development advisors. The advisor in Samangan also has a military background. The advisors dispose of modest funds from the MFA. Although the Baghlan advisor took up duty mid-2004, various difficulties, some relating to coordination with the British command, have delayed his work. The Badakshan advisor is only recently installed.

As a result, the first Danish PRT project was designed in March 2005, to support the establishment of a provincial civil service training institution. It is intended that Denmark will fund the refurbishment of a building provided by the Afghan government and that the Afghan Civil Service Commission will provide the training . Quick impact projects with higher visibility than the training of civil servants are expected to follow.

The institutionalised integration of civilian and military activities has led the Danish MFA in conjunction with the establishment of the Danish PRT satellite to address NGOs to explore whether extension of project activities to Badakshan would be possible. Four NGOs have responded positively and activities are ongoing or planned for.[49]

As yet, Sweden has not sent civilian staff or funds to supplement its soldiers under UK command. However, it plans to provide police advisors under military command in line with the other nations.

Figure 11: Overview of the PRT engagement of the Donors

Donor nation	Military PRT contribution	Military budget	Civilian Staff	Civilian budget p.a.	Development Activities	Governance Activities
UK	UK-led PRTs in Mazar and Maymana Some 400 staff	Not available	DEVAD* POLAD	Approx Euro 3 mio.	Rapid impact Rebuild police stations	Rebuild courthouses
The Nether-Lands	Dutch PRT in Baghlan (Some 170 staff)	Euro 17 mio. (rough estimate)	POLAD	Euro 5 mio. to date plus 1.3 mio. earmarked for Baghlan	Rapid impact projects, plans for support to NGOs	Support to the Governor
Denmark	Satellite Samangan, 6 staff Satellite Badak-Shan (German-led), 40 staff	Approx Euro 22 mio. (incl. other ISAF-related costs)	DEVAD DEVAD	Approx. Euro 400,000	Water supply	Training civil servants
Sweden	Contingent Mazar, 75 staff	Not available	None	None	None	None

*DEVAD: Development Adviser; POLAD: Political adviser.

Every PRT is Different

No attempt had been made to harmonise the activities of the PRTs beyond the overall common objective of contributing to stability, security and the effective outreach of

49 DACAAR being one of these NGOs conveyed the message to the Evaluation that they had felt under pressure from the MFA to take up this assignment.

GoA authority in the provinces concerned. According to the Evaluation's observations, the PRTs/satellites maintained by the Donors contribute to the above objective by:

- Maintaining a visible military presence;
- Gathering information for the GoA, police and intelligence service (NSD), and the Coalition forces (a US State Department political officer worked together with the British PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif);
- Providing the Afghan New Police with various forms of support;
- Supporting the provincial and local administration.

In addition, practices and priorities vary a great deal. PRT literature distinguishes between 'British', 'German' and 'US' models. A distinctive feature of the 'British' model is the practice of patrolling in small groups that interact with the social environment. In the 'German' model, patrolling is made in a heavier, and thus safer, way, paired with a higher prioritisation of the civilian element, which is kept distinct from the military element and manned with more senior staff, who undertake more demanding projects.[50] The PRT staff from the other three participating Donors used to subscribe to the British model.

However, while there is some evidence to support such a distinction, it was observed that the different nations have distinct practices originating from different arrangements in, with and between their respective MoDs, MFAs and Development Agencies. In addition, there has been an observable limited knowledge within the individual PRTs about the activities of other PRTs. The first coordination meetings between PRTs, and between their civilian advisors, were held in Kabul in 2005.[51] In fact, Dutch practices appear to bear greater resemblance to the German model than to the British model. For example, the Dutch PRT patrol in larger units comprising a medical unit, and to distinguish themselves visibly from humanitarian agencies do not use white vehicles, unlike the UK and Denmark.[52] Dutch staff were, however, unaware of German practice, having evolved these practices independently.

5.7.2 Findings

The PRTs have been criticised by INGOs for blurring the distinction between the humanitarian/development and military spheres. This criticism appears to have been taken on board in the practices of the Donor PRTs, which, with the above exception of the white vehicles, appear to be conscious of the need to avoid confusion and to provide an enabling work environment for INGOs.

However, the use of the term 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' mainly reflects a way of thinking that has proven out of touch with the experienced realities and creates confusion and some disappointment amongst some stakeholders and beneficiaries, who expect

50 *A recent study describing the different models is Peter Viggo Jacobsen: PRTs in Afghanistan, Danish Institute for International Studies, April 2005. This study was discussed when the British and Danish PRTs met.*

51 *According to information obtained from the ISAF command in Kabul. On the political level, the various steering bodies have had regular meetings.*

52 *The UK and Danish vehicles are clearly marked with a text in English and Dari stating that they are ISAF military vehicles. However, given the literacy rate in Afghanistan and indications from interviews with villagers, this measure is considered insufficient by the Evaluation.*

PRTs to make substantial contributions to development, when their main concern is with improving stability.[53]

Stabilisation and Security
Overall, the British, Danish and Dutch PRTs appear to have successfully contributed to political stability in the provinces visited through a visible and friendly presence in all corners of the provinces, and 'robust diplomacy' by a relatively small deployment compared to other post-conflict areas. The presence of the PRTs seems appreciated not only by the authorities and international aid providers but also by the population. Several communities described them as a guarantee against renewed commander atrocities. The PRTs have also promoted stabilisation through their support for the DDR programme through spotting weapon and ammunition stores, mediating between conflicting local power holders and persuading local commanders to disarm.

Support for the security sector, through strengthening the police by the reconstruction of buildings, logistics and training/mentoring of staff, has been a high priority for all the PRTs covered by this evaluation. This support has contributed to the extension of GoA authority, thereby enhancing stability. Coordination of provincial security was enhanced by PRT and UNAMA-initiated weekly security meetings between the police, the ANA and the NSD.

However, enhanced political stability does not appear to have been matched by increased personal security for Afghan citizens, in spite of the strengthening of the police force (see maps in Annex III). Widespread insecurity is reflected in the increased number of crimes reported, partly related to a newly emerging structure of organised crime, sometimes, unfortunately, within the police itself.

The local commanders are main players in relation to the PRTs. Although the PRTs have placed important constraints on their power and reduced their visible domination of public space, commanders continue to exercise considerable influence. While PRT analyses of the commander structure appear generally adequate and nuanced further to concrete experience, they tend to overlook the subtle but real influence which the commanders continue to exercise. The nature of commander structure can only be fully comprehended if account is taken of these informal networks.

> *'He receives letters in the night.'* Afghan expression for threats, used by local NGO representative about the pressure put on a new, reformist province governor by the local commander structure.

The information gathering by the PRTs seems to be based mainly on government sources, randomly selected key persons, commanders, and 'people in the street'. Lack of systematic mapping of information sources seems to result in low levels of contact between the PRTs and the local advocacy/HR NGOs, which could be significant supplementary sources of information.

Finally, the evaluation noted a tendency towards selecting the most peaceful provinces for the PRTs. This was an explicit parameter in the Danish (Samangan) and Dutch

53 *A senior civil servant in Samangan complained about his "poor" Danish PRT-friends, comparing their development activities unfavorably with those of the German PRT in the neighboring Kunduz.*

(Baghlan) cases. The location of the British PRT in Balkh province is different, given a situation verging on civil war in 2003-04. Robust diplomacy contributed to resolve this crisis, in collaboration with UNAMA. In the future, the ISAF PRTs are expected to spread over other, by now less stable, parts of the country.

Development Projects
On the development side, quick impact projects as well as most of the projects to support more ambitious development goals appear incompatible with overall national policies, about which the PRT staff are largely ignorant. The exception is the Development Advisor of the Danish PRT satellite in Samangan, who initiated the abovementioned provincial training centre for the civil service in line with the policies of the national Civil Service Commission. The UK PRTs are expected to follow this example.

At the provincial level, the PRTs participate in periodic coordination meetings for aid providers and authorities, although not very actively according to local stakeholders, from whom a typical remark was that 'they just sit silent and take notes'. The GoA envisages further institutionalisation on this level through the creation of Provincial Development Committees to align PRT priorities with its own National Priority Programme. While this long discussed initiative may prove useful, it has not yet been communicated in a clear way to stakeholders, resulting in some confusion and fear that military officers (on short rotation systems) will resume responsibility for development planning.

PRT project management, needs assessment, implementation approaches and monitoring appear to have been based on a 'common sense, bottom-up approach' rather than informed decisions and coherent strategies. These shortcomings are probably in part attributable to:

- Limited expertise on development matters among the staff, whose civilian members are often quite junior, in their first post-conflict posting, without prior development experience and tasked with a political assignment alongside with development (reflecting budgetary restrictions in home ministries and possibly, as mentioned earlier, the earlier generally low numbers of candidates for assignments in crises spots such as Afghanistan).
- Time pressure for delivery during short assignments promotes a 'just do it' approach with limited concern for long-term impacts and sustainability. For example, the ad hoc support for justice has resulted in the reconstruction of courthouses identical to those they replace, without considering possible alternatives more in line with the reform plans.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team's Role in Governance
Opinions are divided over the interpretation of the UN/NATO mandate for appropriate PRT tasks in respect of civilian work, particularly their involvement in governance. PRT sources from Scandinavian countries emphasised that they should concentrate on 'what soldiers are good at', namely providing security, gathering information and supporting the police (what is often referred to as the British model). Nevertheless, the Danish satellites under British and German command are both equipped with a development advisor.

At the same time, the UK-led ISAF command in Kabul emphasised that, in order to understand the environment in which they operate, the PRTs have to rest on three

pillars: the security sector, development and governance, depending on presence, dialogue and leverage, thus requiring 'a strong intellectual quality within the PRTs'. The Command, therefore, found a need for reinforcement by stronger development expertise, which it wanted to report directly to the ISAF command instead of the existing, somewhat confusing lines of reporting. In addition, the ISAF command appeared to be in favour of making the Executive Steering Committee more effective by limiting membership to PRT lead nations (such as the UK and the Netherlands) – thus excluding the contributing nations (such as Denmark and Sweden) – and by changing the level of representation in a more operational direction.

At the provincial level, such plans have been matched by ambitious if poorly coordinated attempts to acquire importance within development and governance. Thus, the presence of the Dutch PRT in Baghlan resulted in the abovementioned allocation of 5 million Euros from the development budget to the PRT development activities. Recently, a British officer was placed as a civilian advisor on governance to the Governor of Badakshan.

Cost-Effectiveness
While it is outside the scope of this evaluation to assess the military expenditures covered by the MoDs, there is reason to mention that a large part of the PRT activities are in one way or another of a civilian nature. It is possible that these services could have been delivered more cheaply and more efficiently by other aid providers, given the high costs of military set-up, which is unavoidable as its prime objective is to be prepared for armed conflict, the scarcity of development expertise within the PRTs and the lack of cohesion between the activities.

The evaluation has been unable to obtain the cost figures for the civilian development activities that would be needed to make a stringent assessment of their efficiency**.** Studies from other civil-military post-conflict interventions indicate that implementation by the military generally entails costs which are many times higher than normal civilian implementation.[54] However, such a conclusion has been questioned by others who argue:

- That the activities are inextricably bound up with the military presence (and serve force protection purposes).
- That the military is present anyway at a fixed cost and that it is better for the morale of the soldiers if they are occupied with activities they perceive as meaningful. In the case of Afghanistan, it is further noted that stability in the 'ISAF provinces' has been promoted by a more limited and hence less costly military presence than in cases such as Kosovo.
- Military action may be imperfect and expensive, but it is the only option in the given setting.

The evaluation team notes that the rationale for the military presence is to enhance stability and thereby create an enabling environment for development and governance. Poor cost-effectiveness further supports the conclusion that civilian activities by the mili-

54 *See for example Jane Barry and Anna Jeffery: "A Bridge too far: Aid Agencies and the Military in Humanitarian Responses", Humanitarian Practice Network, 2002; G. McHugh and L. Gostelow: Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan, Save the Children, London, 2004.*

tary should be limited to small projects of symbolic value in strengthening government capacity, which the military is able to implement with its own available resources.

Supporting evidence for this conclusion was found when a small Danish platoon, together with a UK platoon in Samangan, appeared to have a stabilising effect in the area for over one year, without the support of the delayed development advisor. In addition, this unit appears to have acquired its results more by simple force protection and patrolling than by heavy patrolling and the establishment of large compounds.

Considering the size of overall PRT funding, the Evaluation was surprised to observe that:

- The Samangan unit was sub-operational for a number of months due to the lack of a vehicle.
- Financial constraints appeared to have inhibited the development of better handover mechanisms to compensate for the rapid turnover of staff.

In conclusion, it was found that the PRTs have performed very well on the important tasks that lie within their particular expertise: provision of stability and supporting the police. The staff should be commended for its ability to combine the show of force with cultural and political sensitivity. Scope for further improvement in this respect is found in:

- Improved institutional PRT memory through more elaborate handover mechanisms;
- Greater inclusion of the local NGO community in the information gathering;
- A higher degree of realism in the analysis of the local power structures.

By contrast, they have performed less well on tasks within the civilian sphere where the staffing of the PRTs has been critically low in terms of numbers and experience in relation to professional development skills and the magnitude of the political and financial investment. This situation appears difficult to remedy, given restricted Afghanistan desk staffing in the home ministries, limited recruitment possibilities and the complicated relations with the different home ministries. In addition, there is reason to believe that the cost-effectiveness is low. Nevertheless, ambitions still seem to be high, if rather vague (at least on the part of the UK), regarding the role of the PRTs in overall societal development, in particular within the governance sector.

However, against this background the Evaluation finds that the best PRT contribution to an enabling environment for development is through the provision of security and stability, while PRT development projects, in relatively stable situations, should be limited to small quick impact projects, which can be implemented by the readily available military resources when their coherence with the national development priorities is ensured.

The Evaluation was asked by the Donor Reference Group to attempt an assessment of the congruence between the Donors' PRT practice in Afghanistan and the formal national CIMIC Policy Guidelines. While is has not been possible to establish the evidence needed to undertake a proper assessment of this issue, it has been noted that the available CIMIC policy information from Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK does not clearly address the problem of the autonomy of the PRTs in relation to other humanitarian and development actors. In the case of the Netherlands, the allocations

from the development budget to the Dutch PRT far exceed the Euro 50,000 foreseen in the policy guidelines.

5.8 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria

Overall Conclusions
The political foundation of the sovereign state of Afghanistan has been laid down, but the pace at which this has been done, given the complexity of factional politics and the poor physical infrastructure, has not allowed consolidation of the structures. The civil service remained operational throughout the decades of war and regime change, leaving in place the basic functions which still constitute the modus operandi of the day-to-day public administration. Yet, the solidity of these structures is threatened by alternative power structures and competing economic and political interests. To date these challenges have been difficult to stem, given the neglect of anti-corruption measures within the Afghan state, poor management capacity, the lack of vetting processes and transparent and accountable procedures.

Nation-building was based on the Bonn Agreement with its ambitious construction of the democratic polity, informally based on a co-optation strategy and formally secured with UNDP assistance. While the implementation thus far has been successful, the numerous elections will probably require international assistance for many years, the Afghan government being unlikely to meet the costs.

In the absence of a national vision and benchmarks for the public administration, it has been difficult to manage the transformation of the current state administration into a modern and effective public sector. This has caused some frustration among international advisors, national civil servants and beneficiaries.

The US and the World Bank had set the overall guidelines for state-building, giving priority to the minimum prerequisites for the creation of a functional, lean and efficient state. Other key donor nations took over the lead responsibility for the sub-sectors, including the UK for Counter-Narcotics, while the MoF has been a priority for several key donors, including the UK. The other Donors have contributed substantially through the ARTF, and in the case of Denmark, through management support for the MoE. While the intervention has successfully obtained the minimum requirements, the question remains whether these represented the optimal strategy choice. The Evaluation is of the opinion that it would have been wise to have placed greater emphasis on Justice and on the sub-national administration, and, more broadly, that it would have been better if the state had been more interventionist from the outset in order to service the citizens in more visible and effective ways. For aid to have been directed towards these GoAls, it would have required the Donors to take an approach that was more independent of the US and World Bank.

Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria
In respect of state-building, it was concluded that **relevance** would have been further strengthened by a stronger and earlier prioritisation of both the rule of law and efforts to improve employment conditions within sectors of the administration that were not defined as priorities (that is, other than the Ministry of Finance, army and police) in order to support the political processes with a better provision of services to citizens of the new state.

The nation-building processes have been supported by the DDR programme and by the PRTs. The ISAF PRTs have also supported state-building in the Northern part of Afghanistan as local authorities have acquired a larger outreach through the strengthening of the police and promoted the stabilisation required for the effective implementation of aid. However, their activities have had only limited **coherence** with the national development priorities, contrary to what is prescribed in the TOR for the PRTs. Coherence between nation and state-building has suffered from the slow progress made in establishing the rule of law, with the majority of citizens experiencing growing personal insecurity. Strengthening the police without strengthening the judicial process is problematic. The emphasis on the promotion of human rights and the rule of law has been at odds with the lack of emphasis on a credible and efficient state administration.

The nation-building processes have been well **connected** with the de facto power structure, in terms of the commanders, and with traditional civil society and local elites. However, the resulting relative stability has to some extent been achieved at the expense of the government, whose credibility has been undermined by the inclusion of warlords and human rights violators, including the assignment of former commanders to head parts of the police force, and by the lack of intervention in the judiciary to reduce corruption and to implement legal reform.

While state-building is well connected with the power-holding consensus coalition, the majority of the civil servants by contrast see themselves as marginalised in relation to the ongoing changes. In addition, the highly concentrated nature of the state and its lack of visible local presence have created resentment at the local level. The absence of an effective public communications policy reduces connectedness with the population.

In the justice sector, the issue of the connection between GoA, Shari'a and customary law remains a challenge to be addressed. The AIHRC appears problematically disconnected from the rest of the Afghan society, including the state and the human rights NGOs. It is critical that the work of the AIHRC is mainstreamed within the GoA and in particular in the area of rule of law, including the police and the prisons.

Coordination among donors, and between donors and the Afghan authorities, has worked well within the Ministry of Finance, but inadequately regarding most other state reforms, particularly in the Justice sector. The PRTs have participated actively in coordination institutions with other aid providers and provincial authorities, but were generally ill-informed and uncoordinated in relation to national policies and strategies as well as among themselves.

Within nation-building, the rallying of consensus around the central authority appears to have been fairly **effective** in most parts of the country. Within state-building, effectiveness varies between ministries. It has been high in relation to the central budgetary and fiscal functions, but low within the justice sector and at provincial and district levels. A seldom commented on side-effect of the political consensus building has been numerous political appointments at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, further diminishing the incentives for professional civil servants. Moreover, where political appointees have been former commanders co-opted into the political system, this has carried the risk of criminalising the state and weakening its credibility.

DDR and PRT have rendered effective contributions to the promotion of stability, often reinforcing each other. DDR effectiveness has been limited in terms of reducing the

overall numbers of arms and armed persons, and in reintegrating ex-combatants into civilian Afghan society, but high regarding the stated, but somewhat loose objectives of the programme. PRT effectiveness has been high in relation to the objective of achieving stability.

The AIHRC appears to have been very effective in terms of raising general awareness of human rights and women's rights, but achieved less even results when providing assistance to victims of human rights violations. Monitoring of the justice system and the police force is still in the early stages.

It follows from the above that the **impact** of the aid provided can be expected to be considerable, provided that there is sufficiently effective action within civil service and justice reform to curtail the risk of criminalisation of the state, that open conflict comes to an end and that public service delivery is improved significantly. These prerequisites will require the continued presence of the aid community in Afghanistan for a considerable period of time.

Provided no major negative externalities occur, there is reason to believe that the results achieved within nation-building and state-building, however restricted the latter may be at present, will have a lasting impact on the Afghan polity. This, however, depends on reducing corruption and political clientelism, and on the lasting impact of capacity building. Whether negative externalities appear will depend on the stabilising impact of the DDR and the PRTs, among other factors.

Impact could have been greater if more time and resources had been spent on national visions and strategies for public administration and the rule-of-law sector. The lack of benchmarks for state-building leaves ambitions and accountability unclear. The ambitious democratic system, requiring between 8 and 10 nationwide elections every decade, imposes a serious economic burden on the national budget and the sustainability of this political organisation is doubtful.

Given the security problems in Afghanistan, running the elections and the PRTs have been **costly** investments. So has the provision of a large part of the operational state budget by the ARTF. However, it would be hard to suggest major savings in these areas, which are dictated by the overall model of the polity that is to be implemented as a precondition for the development of Afghan society at large.

Regarding the timeliness of aid provision, the overall picture is positive, with the notable exceptions of all civil service reform outside the Ministry of Finance in Kabul, and all justice reform, where the initiatives have been very slow in getting off the ground.

6. Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

'We cannot return home until the government uses its power to control the commanders, otherwise these will continue to punish us for our ethnicity.'
(Pashtun IDPs from Maimana)

6.1 Introduction

This section discusses the assistance and protection provided to various categories of migrants (refugees, IDPs and rejected asylum seekers). It begins by addressing issues around the return and reintegration of rejected asylum seekers and of Afghans returning voluntarily from the donor countries. It then covers in greater depth the assistance and protection provided to IDPs and refugees returning from Pakistan and Iran.

The return and reintegration of refugees, IDPs and rejected asylum seekers into Afghanistan have been prioritised by the GoA and the Donors. The high number of returns has been cited as an indicator of popular support for the Afghan peacebuilding process. All Donors have provided substantial financial support for UNHCR programmes supporting the repatriation process and providing assistance to IDPs, a support UNHCR describe as substantial and timely. Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have co-funded IOM for the Reception of Afghan Nationals to Afghanistan (RANA) with the EC,[55] and with Sweden, the Return of Qualified Afghans.[56] In addition, IOM has managed the ARTF Expatriate Service Programme.

In addition to the literature review, the evaluation sought a broad range of information internationally and in Afghanistan. Experts on IDPs and on the Afghan nomads (*Koochies)* were consulted, and individual UNHCR and IOM staff who had either worked or were working in Afghanistan during the period under evaluation were interviewed. Focus group and individual interviews were conducted with female and male IDPs residing in camps in Kandahar and Herat and with shelter beneficiaries. In addition, given the uncertainty about the permanent resettlement in home areas of returnees and IDPs, the Kabul survey sought to determine the extent of migration to the Afghan capital and its motives.

6.2 Volunteer Returnees and Rejected Asylum Seekers

Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK have promoted voluntary return to Afghanistan and have gradually started to return rejected asylum seekers. Tripartite agreements have been established with UNHCR and the GoA, and the IOM has been tasked to assist

55 *The European Commission is the main donor to the RANA programme, with a co-funding requirement met by Denmark and Germany.*
56 *DFID has funded IOM's programme for the return of qualified Afghans, but has not funded programmes for the return of rejected asylum seekers.*

with re-entry and reintegration through the RANA programme, which includes vocational training and business start-up schemes.

These three donors have allocated considerable resources to establishing the return scheme. However, Denmark has gone further than the other donors in linking aid to the issue of forced return. Denmark has discussed with the GoA its willingness to accept returned rejected asylum seekers, in line with international obligations. Denmark has here emphasised the importance of a comprehensive and consistent approach in their bilateral relations, where it is expected that Afghanistan will facilitate orderly and safe return of rejected asylum seekers in accordance with the Tripartite Memorandum of Understanding. A major concern, as pointed out in the IDP-study, is the mixed messages sent by UNHCR and other UN agencies which, on the one hand, acknowledge the difficult security situation in many parts of Afghanistan while, on the other hand, still find it feasible to return Afghans from neighbouring countries and from Europe.[57]

Findings

1. While the IOM in general is criticised by several of the Donors for spreading its activities too widely and its DDR reintegration programme receives a critical review, the **RANA programme**, which IOM has established for handling the re-entry and reintegration of voluntary returnees and rejected asylum seekers, seems to be functioning well and to be adapted to Afghan realities.

2. **Protection**, especially for rejected asylum seekers, presents particular challenges in Afghanistan as this responsibility will have to rest either with the GoA, whose ability to provide protection in the countryside is limited, or with the UNHCR, which will find it difficult to monitor returnees who are reintegrated into regions where UNHCR staff have limited access due to UN security regulations.

3. Given UNHCR warnings against a massive return to Afghanistan, it might be questioned whether a policy of returning **rejected asylum seekers** is sustainable, especially if the programme is expanded. More time is needed for Afghanistan to improve the law and order situation and the judicial system to ensure that the necessary protection tools are in place.

4. Likewise, the Evaluation questions the wisdom of **linking** the acceptance of rejected returnees to the level of assistance funding. Such an approach could prove counterproductive, despite assistance to GoA institutions handling returnees. Reduced levels of assistance might weaken the ability of GoA institutions and humanitarian actors to develop rehabilitation and development processes, and thus diminish Afghanistan's overall capacity to absorb returnees.

6.3 Refugees

There was a massive return of refugees to Afghanistan during the evaluation period: 3.5 million returnees from Pakistan and Iran alone. Many had been refugees for several decades, or had been through several rounds of displacement. From 1989 onwards, refugee movements and labour migration, often part of a survival strategy, have overlapped,

57 *See discussion in Chapter 9 'Donor strategies and policies', in Marsden, P and Turton, D (2004), 'Preliminary Study of Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan', London, Background Paper.*

often facilitated through networks established during the time spent in refuge. Voluntary return has been facilitated through a tripartite agreement between the UNHCR, the GoA, and the governments of Pakistan or Iran. Iran has also forcibly deported a substantial number of Afghans. UNHCR has had a long-term presence in all three countries, providing assistance and facilitating voluntary return and reintegration. As a result, skilled staff, established/recognized routines, and good contacts with authorities and with the refugee population were firmly in place in all three countries.

Many refugees have returned to Afghanistan voluntarily since late 2001, and many of these have settled in Kabul rather than their place of origin. Although those interviewed in the Kabul survey gave a range of reasons for this pattern, the majority cited the lack of land and housing in their home areas, and better job opportunities and security in Kabul. Some of those who were repatriated in 2002 had, as noted by the IDP study, returned to Pakistan and Iran by late 2002; the predominant pattern was for the family to stay behind while able-bodied men started a labour migration cycle to major Afghan cities or to neighbouring countries.

UNHCR has assisted returning refugees with transport to their place of origin, registration and information exchange at the border crossing (including for deportees), the provision of a return package, and targeted assistance in areas of return. The latter included a shelter package to the most vulnerable returnees, on the precondition that they possessed land, and the provision of water and sanitation. When UNHCR recognised that lack of access to land and/or to income opportunities was inhibiting permanent settlement, it introduced an income generation package. UNHCR staff identified needs and monitored the returnee process, while IOM and NGOs were contracted to organise transport and implement local projects.

The protection of returnees has been a major concern throughout the evaluation period. While threats to the lives of returnees have been declining, lawlessness and human rights violations, including land-grabbing, are on the rise. Given the dysfunctional judicial system, there is little that either the UNHCR or GoA can do in the way of offering protection other than assist NGOs, such as the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), to set up offices to monitor and report on the situation and to provide legal assistance to returnees. A Presidential Decree on the Dignified Return of Refugees was issued as early as December 2001, and the draft NDF in March 2002 signalled the high priority the GoA attached to the reintegration of refugees and IDPs. This promoted the mainstreaming of the reintegration issue in all major national programmes. The Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation (MoRR) assumed leadership of the CG on Refugee and IDPs, with UNHCR as the Focal Point. By March 2003 a National Return, Displacement and Reintegration strategy had been approved. This included the establishment of a Reintegration Unit within MRRD, to which UNHCR seconded personnel. Areas expected to experience high return of refugees and IDPs were prioritised for NSP and NEEP.

The shelter programme was examined by the Evaluation in some detail, and the following concerns were noted:

- Only 22 per cent of refugees returning between 2002-2004 had been provided with shelter. Although this exceeded the target of 15 per cent, UNHCR notes that '…some of the poorest families, however, have been missed along the way', leaving

many landless (and presumably most vulnerable) without shelter (and thus more likely to emigrate again); [58]
- Fewer available shelter packages, together with reduced content, following funding cuts, caused tension among returnees who had expected to benefit from the assistance package, and generated anger towards UNHCR staff;
- Selection of the most vulnerable among the returnees has proven a conflictual and difficult process. In some villages, it was decided to select beneficiaries by drawing names at random from among the pool of eligible candidates; as a result, it is very possible that the most deserving did not benefit from the assistance;
- Some inflexibility was noted in the approval of alternative building materials and house design, causing both resentment among beneficiaries and unnecessarily complex administrative procedures which wasted staff time.[59]

The evaluation registered two further concerns about the refugee programme. One relates to the fact that members of the remaining refugee population, 3 million in Pakistan and more than 1 million in Iran according to the latest census, are generally poorer and with less access to land and property in Afghanistan than refugees who have already returned. This poses a new challenge to both the GoA and the UNHCR. In spring 2005 the GoA initiated a land distribution scheme for the landless, but it is unlikely that the poorest segment of the population will have the financial means to be able to take up such an offer. UNHCR's budget, and thus its ability to assist, has been substantially reduced over the last two years, despite a maintained return level and a larger caseload. Cuts in the shelter package programme have caused notable tensions, with fewer returnees than anticipated being given shelter packages, and those returnees who have received shelter packages finding the content greatly reduced when compared to those their neighbours received the previous year.

The second concern is whether the returning refugees will be willing or able to sustain their lives in urban areas of Afghanistan, given the uncertain economic forecast and the fragile security situation. In recognition of Afghanistan's deficient absorption capacity, the UNHCR had already initiated, in 2003, a debate with neighbouring countries and the donor community on the need to shift focus from the policy of returning all Afghans residing abroad to the establishment of a migration management system. While there are job opportunities in Pakistan and Iran, the employment market in Afghanistan is limited outside the major cities.

Findings

1. The **UNHCR operation** has been highly relevant and timely in its implementation. The agency is commended for the way it has handled and assisted such a massive refugee movement in a volatile political and security environment. A range of interviewees emphasised the professionalism and dedication demonstrated by UNHCR staff, their management and leadership capacity and, not least, their ability to adapt to a rapidly changing environment.

2. The refugee **registration and monitoring system** established by UNHCR is elaborate and well tested. It provides a range of information enabling returnee groups, including especially vulnerable persons, to be followed closely, as well as allowing for

58 *For details see UNHCR Afghanistan (2005) 'Shelter Programme: Monitoring and Evaluation. Final Report, 28 February 2005,' Kabul.*

59 *Types of bricks were specified, and returnees were refused permission to use other kinds, even when better quality bricks could be obtained more cheaply, as was the case in areas visited in Herat.*

broader data analysis. However, individual regional offices adapted different survey strategies, so that the subsequent findings only indicated broad trends, and areas to concentrate on in the different regions. The monitoring system could be improved by developing collaborative arrangements with NGOs and AIHRC on protection issues, and with NGOs for project monitoring in insecure areas.

3. UNHCR has emphasised that the responsibility for the returning refugees rests with the Afghan government and the MoRR. To assist them to resume this responsibility, UNHCR facilitated a **capacity development programme**, including for the provincial Departments of Refugees and Repatriation (DoRR). Likewise, a UNHCR consultant was seconded to the MRRD to assist in the establishment of a more consistent return focus in their programmes. While UNHCR efforts were appreciated by the DoRRs interviewed, a concern was raised by the newly appointed Minister of MoRR that less responsibility (and a smaller budget) had been transferred to his ministry than he had been given to expect.

4. The **shelter programme** could benefit from a more thorough discussion than that initiated by UNHCR's own evaluation, in respect of the size of the programme, methods of beneficiary selection, and greater flexibility in design and material purchase.

5. **Protection** in Afghanistan has proved difficult to uphold, especially given the dysfunctional Afghan judicial system. Increased collaboration between UNHCR and the NRC on land issues and the production of a handbook on the handling of land issues, and with the AIHCR on human rights monitoring, could partly help to redress these concerns. The UNHCR's 'Handbook on Voluntary Repatriation: Internal Protection from 1996' provides very useful guidance on this issue.

6. UNHCR's determination to promote **a shift in policy** from refugee return to migration management is an encouraging sign of a proactive approach to ensuring the protection of refugees and the provision of durable solutions.

7. The decision of the UNHCR to provide identical **reintegration packages** to both returning refugees and IDPs is appropriate, as such a strategy will reduce the administrative costs and could help to reduce tensions between these two groups upon return.

8. What is of concern is the limited knowledge UNHCR field staff, DoRR employees and staff of implementing partners had of the **'Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement'**, indicating a lack of training in these important principles.

Conclusion

UNHCR has managed well the enormous task assigned it in assisting the return of the world's largest refugee population. It has been proactive in building local capacity with the MoRR and DoRRs, and has engaged with other ministries and stakeholders to ensure connectedness between refugee reintegration programmes, on the one hand, and reconstruction and development programmes, on the other hand. Strategically, the UNHCR has been in the forefront of ensuring a shift in emphasis from a purely refugee oriented programme to one focusing on migration management. Given that the refugee issue is one of the most pressing problems facing Afghanistan today, it is of concern, as both UNHCR staff and Donors noted, that the issue has not been given enough attention at high level conferences and by the GoA.

6.4 Internally Displaced Persons

This section reports on the assistance provided to IDPs and addresses the IDP questions posed by TOR. It also considers wider debates on 'lead agency' versus 'collaborative' management models of IDP assistance in the light of the Afghan experience. The analysis presented draws heavily on the Marsden and Turton pre-study, and expands on their findings with material taken from interviews with various IDP groups, GoA and UNHCR staff.

By September 2001, the number of IDPs was reported by the UNHCR to be approximately 1 million, half of this number being drought displaced. With the bombing campaign of the allied forces in October, the number of IDPs increased sharply, possibly to 1.5 million, as people fleeing Kabul and other major cities were denied entrance to neighbouring countries. These latter IDPs, however, soon made their way home and by December 2002, the number was reportedly down to 724 000, scattered all over Afghanistan. UNHCR then decided to focus on providing assistance and protection to

The Kabul Survey: Migration Patterns
A total of 212 families were interviewed (95 women). As many as 63% had other family members living in the same district. The ethnic distribution in these districts was just above 50% Tajiks, followed by 25.5% Hazaras and 24% Pashtuns. The average family size was 9.5 members, of whom 4.25 were under 15 years, and 84% of the children attended school.

Asked about family members outside Afghanistan only 45 informants responded positively; of these, 60% had family members in Iran, 15% in Europe, 13% in Pakistan, 9% in the Middle East and 2% in the USA. Only 12 admitted receiving any financial contributions from these, the highest percentage from the Middle East. Interestingly, and supporting assumptions and other studies, is the fact that only 37 families, or **17%,** of those interviewed, had lived in their present location before 2002. There had been an almost equal move to and within Kabul during recent years, with 30% arriving in 2002, 23% in 2003, 27% in 2004 and then 3% until April 2005.

The majority of those having moved came from Pakistan, a total of 59 families. The second largest movement was recorded **in Kabul**, with 39 families from 10 different districts. Returnees from Iran came in third place with 38, while the remainder came from provinces closer to Kabul. None of those interviewed in this sample came from any of the major IDP camps.

The main reason for moving to Kabul was **job opportunities**, 22%, followed by 21% referring to problems in Pakistan and Iran, 18% provided no particular reason, while 13% (internal Kabul movement) attributed it to high house rents, 15% had come due to lack of house and land, 8% gave a nationalistic reason for returning to Afghanistan and a few explained it by access to schooling for children and to tend to sick family members. The vast majority planned to stay on in the same location, indicating it to be a permanent move, and asked about the security situation 74% found it to be good, 16% fair, 7% bad and 3% stated that it was very good.

Income patterns
The majority, 40%, earned their main income from **manual labour**, followed by 34% listing different forms of self-employment and business, 21% worked with the government while only 3% with UN/NGOs. In addition, 2 reported dependency on charity and family, while one earned an income as a farmer.

Service provision and organisational knowledge and perception
A total of 63 families admitted to having received assistance over the last 3 years, the majority of 81% from UN/NGOs, 8% from the GoA and equally from ISAF, while only 3% mentioned family members.

Asked about their knowledge of the GoA and different organisations, the fewest knew IOM, UNHCR and ICRC by name, while recognition was much higher for common terms such as **UN and NGOs**. The surveyors explained that many interviewees were not able to differentiate between the various humanitarian organisations. **ISAF** was rather well known, and as many as 38% of those who knew them thought they did a good job. In comparison, 39% who knew the UN thought they did a good job, followed by 36% for ICRC, 22 for UNHCR, and 25% for the NGOs, while only 9% listed IOM as good. As many as 40% thought the GoA did a good job, though the majority here, according to the survey teams, argued that the government had ensured improved security.

Threats to reconstruction and development
The most surprising and alarming finding came when people were asked an open-ended question on what they regarded as the major threat to the reconstruction and development of Afghanistan. The majority of the replies, 63 %, related to a perceived **weakness and inefficiency of the government**, with 36% pointing to corruption. Lack of governmental plans was mentioned by 18%, weak governmental economy and money 'goes back to foreigners' pocket' was the perception held by 6%, while 'work not handed over to experienced people' was mentioned by 3%. Then 12% mentioned armed people not allowing development, 5% combined lack of security and lack of jobs, while smaller numbers, 6%, thought enmity in different forms between Afghans and the international community was the main threat and 14% stated that they did not know.

IDPs residing in camps, where a major re-profiling exercise undertaken by mid-2003 reduced the numbers of registered IDPs and directed assistance to those with major problems. By early 2004, the number of assisted IDPs had fallen to 180,000, sheltered in camps in Kandahar, Helmand and Herat provinces. Those excluded from support had by then gradually returned to their home areas or moved to the cities.

It appears, as with the returned refugees, that male IDPs who were unable to earn the necessary income to support their dependants sought work opportunities in major Afghan cities or in Pakistan and Iran, while their families remained at home. The remaining caseload of IDPs can be grouped into four categories with different protection and assistance needs. It seems to be widely accepted that all four groups were in acute need of assistance at the time of becoming IDPs, and that durable solutions will require either a political arrangement or more development oriented programmes, which are beyond the UNHCR's mandate and capacity to deliver.

The first category of remaining IDPs comprises *Pashtuns* who fled from persecution and seizure of land, livestock and other property in northern Afghanistan. They are reluctant to return so long as the power of the commanders remains unchecked, or until the GoA guarantees their personal safety and their access to land and property. The second category of IDPs, *Koochies* (nomads), for whom seasonal migration to southern/south-eastern Afghanistan was customary practice, have lost herds, tents and equipment due to the drought, and their access to former grazing land is partly blocked for historical and political reasons. Finding a solution for them will require either a political process providing them access to grazing areas or their willingness and ability to find other migration routes (or income opportunities), and then restocking. The third group, *the semi-nomadic population from Registan,* lost their livestock as water sources dried up from 1999 onwards. In their case, restocking and well deepening are required. A pilot project is underway, though this is perhaps unwisely raising expectations among the other *Koochies* that their herds will be replaced. The fourth group, *drought affected IDPs*, consists of both farmers and landless people from the 'drought belt' who were unable to sustain an income in their home areas. In their case, in the short term an end to the present drought and/or alternative income opportunities are required. In the longer run Afghanistan will need to develop strategies, including for improved water management, to counter what seems as a recurring drought problem.

In May 2002, in agreement with UNAMA and MoRR, UNHCR assumed a lead agency role for IDPs. As noted above, a CG group was established and an IDP Strategy for Afghanistan developed. UNHCR sought collaboration with the MRRD to link the return of IDPs with projects such as NSP, advocating prioritisation of districts with high IDP return. It also engaged with Ministry of Tribal Affairs on the interests of the *Koochies.* Other UN agencies, the WB and NGOs were approached to find development oriented solutions for return to drought affected areas, and possible restocking of *Koochies.* In combining refugee and IDP resettlement assistance, UNHCR was well placed to follow up on both protection issues and assistance provision.

Another UNHCR innovation was the establishment of the Return Commission, tasked to prepare the ground for the return of IDPs to Northern Afghanistan by addressing political and ethnic conflicts. The commission included both leading commanders and notables from the North and AIHRC, MoRR and UNHCR officials. Bringing these together was an achievement in itself as it established a 'political space' for discussion on return and access to confiscated property. While results so far have been limited, both the MoRR and the IDPs emphasised that there had been encouraging signs of reconciliation initiatives from both the population in the north and by the IDPs. A number of 'go and see' visits have facilitated a dialogue, while also establishing a more realistic picture of what is achievable at present.

In collaboration with the MoRR and DoRR, UNHCR has constantly monitored the IDP settlements and has held scheduled meetings with the IDP representatives to ensure that needs are met and alternative or more permanent solutions are found. The IDPs' complaints have had more to do with their demands not being fully met, and difference in strategies applied for phasing out assistance in the Kandahar and Herat camps, than about lack of attention.

Questions for Internally Displaced Persons Review:

– Have the various stakeholders adapted and made use of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and how useful have they found these in the Afghan context?
Key UNHCR staff documented knowledge of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, and confirmed that they had made use of them. By contrast, knowledge was rather limited among UNHCR field staff, DoRR representatives and even NGO implementers. But there was a common understanding among all involved in providing assistance to IDPs that any such guidelines needed adaptation to the Afghan context.

– To what extent and how have the different groups of IDPs been consulted on issues relating to assistance, protection, return, resettlement or redefinition of status?
There has been extensive, regular and formalised consultation with the IDP representatives on all aspects of their displacement and on ways of ending or altering these. Moreover, the gradual formalised transfer of responsibility for the camps from the UNHCR to the DoRR has more firmly placed the responsibility for the IDPs with the GoA and helped to inform the IDPs about the limitations of the external assistance providers.

– How were the Guiding Principles translated into practical tools?
Given the limited knowledge field staff and implementing agencies had of the Guiding Principles, such a translation has primarily taken place through policy and strategy formulation at a central UNHCR level.

– Have there been proper assessments and initiatives taken to provide alternative solutions to a continued stay in IDP camps, for permanent and temporarily drought affected Koochies **and those displaced due to ethnic persecution?**
There has been a range of assessments and initiatives, seeking political solutions for those fleeing ethnic persecution and more development oriented ones for the drought affected Koochies. The GoA and the AIHRC have been actively engaged in these initiatives, and so have development oriented agencies. What might be criticised is that these processes have yielded few empirical results, and that the difference between land ownership and the right to use land (even over the long-term) in present camp areas has either not been clearly enough explained to the IDPs or has been allowed to develop into a regional and national policy (and ethnic) issue.

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– What has been the division of responsibility and labour between the Afghan Government, centrally and local, UNHCR and other assistance providers?
As explained above, UNHCR adopted early on a policy of building the necessary capacity of the MoRR and the local DoRRs while at the same time working with other Ministries and the AIHRC to influence policy development and to ensure that the interests of IDPs were upheld as far as possible.

– Have those who left the IDP camps primarily returned to their home areas, or divided the families with women and children remaining at the home while men have moved on to the major cities? Or have they shifted the entire family to the cities, and is that then regarded as a temporary or more permanent move and do they still depend on humanitarian assistance or are they in need of protection?
Here we see a mixed picture. The urban population who had fled in fear of bombardment was the first to return and reintegrated without further problems. Otherwise, the picture is more complex, making it difficult to distinguish between IDPs, returning refugees and rural to urban migration. One clear trend identified through field interviews is for the returning families to remain in the villages with one male family member, while their able-bodied men seek work in cities or in a neighbouring country (depending on travel distance, family networks, language, religion and past refugee experience). From a gender perspective, this places a greater burden on the female population, including more and heavier work and possibly increased security vulnerability. This survival strategy did, however, reduce their families' need for humanitarian assistance.

The phasing out strategy was not welcomed by the IDPs. However, the Evaluation found that the IDPs interviewed had adapted well to new realities. In both Kandahar and Herat, they had made use of local job opportunities, including cross-border job migration, allowing them to earn higher incomes than in their place of origin and in better living conditions, economically and security-wise. This had led the IDPs to initiate a debate on alternative solutions to return, including staying permanently in the IDP camps. Many IDPs argued that they should be granted ownership of the land where they have settled rather than merely permission to use government land. This proposal encountered strong opposition within the provincial administrations, influenced by ethnic and regional tension, and in Herat the team found that it had caused neighbouring villages to demand permanent closure of the camp.

The *Koochies* are vocal and strong advocates of their interests, as they have to be to survive. With UNHCR assistance, they had travelled to Kabul to present their case to the ministries and to President Karzai, stating that '…we voted for you, now you have to assist us'. However, when the Evaluation challenged them on the realities of their present living conditions versus what they might have to return to, they engaged willingly in constructive discussions of their future options.

Findings

1. In accepting the **lead agency role** in the coordination of assistance to and protection of IDPs, UNHCR gained authority *vis-à-vis* other aid actors and governmental structures. This authority, combined with an established infrastructure, linkages with

refugee resettlement, and decades of experience, placed UNHCR in a strong position to fulfil their mandate in respect of the IDPs.

2. Rather than establish a range of assistance provisions, UNHCR decided to **focus** on the provision of shelter, water/sanitation and income generation for both returning refugees and IDPs, while encouraging other actors to address the returnees' other needs. Afghan NGOs were increasingly used for project implementation and to deliver the returnee programme. UNHCR only undertook activities itself when it was unable to find a competent implementing partner.

3. UNHCR correctly prioritised **capacity building** of MoRR and the local DoRR, enabling the Afghan government gradually to assume the responsibility it holds for IDPs. Likewise, on a policy level, seconded personnel worked in the MRRD to develop national strategies for IDPs and with the AIHRC to facilitate the establishment of Return Commissions, with representation from local and national authorities.

4. Document reviews and interviews show that UNHCR was an **effective lead agency** for IDPs, and innovative in seeking alternative solutions to problems beyond its own mandate. While maintaining an overall responsibility, camp management and assistance provision was sub-contracted to others. One weakness identified here was that wherever an implementing partner had contributed its own funds (as Medecins Sans Frontiers did in Kandahar), its withdrawal severely reduced service provision because responsibility was handed over to the local authorities without the necessary funding.

5. Questions have been raised by the IDP background study and NGO staff as to whether too few Afghans were accepted as IDPs during the re-profiling exercise and whether IDPs were encouraged to **return prematurely** to their regions of origin. The Evaluation did not find any evidence to support these two criticisms. This may be because many IDPs had joined a larger urban migration movement and no longer differed significantly from either these or the returning refugees.

6. However, the **closure of schools**, as happened in Mashlaq camp, while the IDPs were permitted to stay on, is questioned as it deprived a large number of children of education.

7. Efforts at the UNHCR Kabul office to compile a CD detailing **procedures and lessons** to be drawn from their role as lead agency on IDP issues in Afghanistan are laudable, and the resulting CD (when available) should be distributed widely.

6.5 The Lead Agency Role

The Evaluation would like to draw on the Afghan experience to comment on current international debates of appropriate management models for IDP assistance. Broadly speaking, there have been two models under discussion: one is the 'Lead Agency' model, as assumed by UNHCR in Afghanistan and previously in Kosovo, whereas the other, known as the 'Collaborative Approach', describes a context where responsibility is shared between UN organisations (such as OCHA and OHCHR) and NGOs, as is the case with the Global IDP project. The latter is now being advocated as the preferred organisational arrangement. It should here be noted that although UNAMA, as the UN coor-

dinator, approved UNHCRs lead agency role for IDPs, their involvement was marginal and as such not enough to warrant a definition of 'a collaborative approach'.

The generally positive conclusions this evaluation has drawn about the Afghan IDP experience would appear to demonstrate the advantage of a lead agency function over a collaborative approach. This is particularly so as UNAMA in Afghanistan purposely kept to their 'low footprint' staffwise, and the GoA needed time to develop their capacity to handle the IDP issue. However, the Evaluation would argue that the success of the 'Lead Agency' model in Afghanistan rests on a number of pre-existing factors. These included the fact that the lead agency role was approved by other actors, including the government; the lead agency held prior knowledge of the context and had a wide net of contacts in all parts of the country/region; was able to link IDP assistance with other ongoing activities (such as refugee return); was adequately funded; sought close collaboration with authorities who were willing to assume greater responsibility; and, last but not least, had the necessary human resources to manage the projects, develop policies and strategies, and seek alternative solutions when appropriate.

Conclusion
UNHCR performed well as lead agency for IDPs in Afghanistan in managing the overall IDP issue, the camps and in finding alternative and/or more durable solutions for the Afghan IDPs. The acknowledgement that the Afghan authorities need to assume full responsibility for the IDPs has informed UNHCR efforts at capacity building and handing responsibility to MoRR and DoRR. The majority of those remaining in the IDP camps have experienced a notable improvement in their living conditions. While assistance has been provided in accordance with the Sphere standards and the Guiding principles, many IDPs now find it difficult to leave the camps. However, some of the remaining IDPs are still extremely vulnerable and continue to require protection.

6.6 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria

The **relevance** of efforts to assist returning refugees and IDPs, including attempts to find alternative solutions for IDPs and the establishment of a more durable migration management system, is judged to have been high.

High **coherence** was noted in the provision of assistance and protection to returning refugees and IDPs, and between these two groups, facilitated by the lead agency role held by UNHCR.

Connectedness between the UNHCR and the GoA is high, though for returning refugees and IDPs and their previous livelihoods it continues to be a challenge, not least because powerful individuals and groups have taken advantage of their government affiliations and the general lack of law and order to seize land and property.

Compared to the other sectors, the **coordination** undertaken in the refugee and IDP CG was assessed as having functioned well, as the MoRR and the UNHCR have played an active role both in Kabul and in the regions, thus linking national and regional strategies.

Effectiveness is generally assessed as high for all three refugee and IDP assistance operations, largely because of the clear division of labour and the clear definition of lead agen-

cy. However, the allocation of shelter has been highly problematic: only small numbers of returnees have benefited, because those without land, arguably the most needy, were not eligible for support.

The **impact** of assistance provided to returning refugees and IDPs is deemed high, though the high degree of labour and urban migrations is a worrying indication that assistance provision in itself will not be enough to ensure permanent resettlement.

Efficiency in the refugee and IDP assistance was assessed as high, partly because the system for handling refugee and IDP resettlement and protection was already in place and had been tested over a number of years. Secondly, one organisation coordinated the different elements of the response, concentrated on sectors where it had previous experience, and delegated responsibility for tasks that others were in a better position to address. Security measures reduced efficiency to some extent, although the UNHCR partly circumvented this problem by assigning implementation and monitoring tasks to agencies not bound by UN security regulations.

7. Meeting Basic Needs and Securing Livelihoods

In this section, four main sectors supported by the Donors are examined: primary education, health, water/sanitation, and alternative livelihoods. Some of these sectors have been directly supported by individual donors, while others, such as the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP), the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and Microfinance Investment Support Facility (MISFA), have primarily been funded through the ARTF. All five Donors have contributed financially to UNHCR, UNICEF, World Food Programme (WFP) and ICRC, while NGOs such as DACAAR and SCA have received funding from single donors, and, increasingly, through GoA-administrated channels such as NSP and the Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS).

It is important to note that the official requirement to prioritise three sectors under the National Development Framework, set out by the Government of Afghanistan in early 2002, has influenced each Donor's selection of sectors, and limited their ability to fund a broader range of sectors and to continue previously funded NGO activities. In addition, the Donors have tended not to prioritise sectors which have been preferred by large donors (such as United States Agency for International Development, USAID for health), or in which other donors have assumed a lead agency role (such as Italy in the justice sector). While assisting in the harmonisation and alignment of assistance to Afghanistan, some areas have then received less attention, as the agriculture sectors, or donors have been reluctant to engage in areas prioritised by lead donors when slow progress is recorded.

7.1 The Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund

As the ARTF had undergone a major evaluation in spring 2005, the Evaluation decided that, rather than undertake a second review, it would establish a dialogue with the ARTF team, review the earlier findings, and then focus its attention on programmes funded through the ARTF mechanism, and check whether government employees in different parts of Afghanistan had received salaries (provided through the ARTF mechanism), and whether payment had been in full and on time.

The ARTF was established as a World Bank administrated multi-donor trust fund in mid 2002, succeeding the United Nations Development Programme Trust Fund. It is jointly managed by the World Bank, the United Nations Development Programme, the Asian Development Bank, and the Islamic Development Bank.

Besides funding the GoA's recurrent budget, it has increasingly been used as a mechanism to fund priority investments under the National Priority Programmes (NPPs), based on the NDF. The ARTF Programme thus contains two 'windows', the first, termed the 'Recurrent Window', for recurrent costs of the budget (including civil service salaries and operations and maintenance, paying by June 2005 the salaries of about 240,000 GoA employees each month) and the second, termed the 'Investment Window', for development projects (twelve active ones by June 2005).

To date, a total of USD 638 million has been made available for the Recurrent Window and USD 183 million for the Investment Window.[60]

The current Evaluation endorsed the main recommendations of the ARTF evaluation team, including continued support for the trust fund and the use of a Monitoring Agent. It should, though, be acknowledged that the ARTF will have to be adjusted in the future, including modification of the reporting requirements and the establishment of a GoA Policy Forum to allow the GoA greater influence over (and information about) the priorities made. Further, while the Recurrent Window should be maintained, the Investment Window needs to pay particular attention to building capacity in public financial management. This evaluation also supports the suggestion made at the report presentation that international consultants need to be placed under GoA control, and given clear performance criteria, and that their salaries need to be harmonised with local salaries. It also broadly accepts the continued principle of un-earmarking of ARTF donations, though donors with specific funding requirements to support the ARTF could be allowed to express preferences. The evaluation also supports the call for performance indicators to be established and clearer targets for poverty reduction.

7.2 The Agricultural Sector and Mine Action

There is one sector that generally seems to have received limited attention in spite of its importance and one programme that deserves special mention before presenting the four sectors.

The **agricultural sector** has not been targeted by the Donors, despite previous massive engagements and funding through the NGOs, notably Afghan Aid, DACAAR, the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan, and SCA. Nor has funding from other donors been more forthcoming. This lack of support is remarkable given that the Afghan economy has traditionally been based on agriculture, and that, while its importance has declined throughout the conflict, the agricultural sector still contributes to 52 per cent of the Afghan economy (see Figure 12 below, Structure of the Afghan Economy in 2003. Source: 'Securing Afghanistan's Future', 17 March 2004).

Figure 12



There seems, moreover, to be an increasing understanding, as pointed out by UNAMA, that the lack of investment in this sector could cause further displacement, especially given the drought's negative effects on agricultural production, and more rapid urbanisa-

60 *For further details see ARTF: 'Administrators' Report on Financial Status as of June 21st, 2005'.*

tion. Interviewees within the Ministry of Agriculture gave three reasons for the low priority given to this sector.

First, investments in the agricultural sector carry low visibility for donors and for the GoA, when compared to money spent on building schools and clinics; secondly, there was a perception of low economic and social prestige attributed to the sector; and thirdly, there was a lack of understanding of the importance of agriculture for the rehabilitation and development process, and for preventing future humanitarian emergencies.

It was suggested that the failure to attract funding was partly due to the inability of the previous Minister of Agriculture to advocate on behalf of the agricultural sector, and possibly to reluctance within the donor community to engage with a former commander. There were indications that the sector had benefited from the recent change of Minister, and that the agricultural sector is now receiving increased attention with donors supporting the development of an Agricultural Master Plan.

The **Afghan mine action programme**, which dates back to 1988, is the oldest humanitarian mine action programme in the world and is generally considered to be the best. According to the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) affect some 6.4 million Afghans living in, or who plan to return to, one of 2,400 landmine-contaminated Afghan communities. The National Operational Work Plan for 2004/2005 indicates 872 million square metres of known mined areas as of March 2004, of which 468 million square metres are classified as high priority. Mine contamination continues to be a major hindrance to economic rehabilitation and development. UNMAS anticipates that, with adequate funding, all mine- and UXO-contaminated areas with a high impact on Afghan communities can be cleared by 2007, in addition to the mapping and marking of medium and low impact areas. To demine medium and low impact areas will require further engagements over five years (2008-2012). On the positive side, the estimated number of new mine casualties has declined from between 150 and 300 people a month in 2000 to around 100 people a month in 2004, indicating the effects of the combined efforts of mine and UXO clearance and mine risk education.

The United Nations Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan has responsibility for planning, managing, and overseeing all mine action activities in Afghanistan on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan. The GoA has established a Mine Action Consultative Group (MACG) to coordinate mine action policy and to plan for the government to assume full responsibility for the Mine Action Programme for Afghanistan (MAPA). A Mine Action strategy was endorsed by the MACG in 2003.

The Land Mine Monitor lists all five Donors as financial contributors to mine action in Afghanistan; all provided bilateral support in 2003, and all, except Ireland, support UN programmes.[61] One interesting aspect of the Afghan mine action programme is the high proportion of Afghan mine clearance agencies, the only exceptions being the Danish Demining Group (Denmark) and the UK-based HALO Trust. A larger proportion of international NGOs are involved in mine risk education.

One project of particular interest is the Mine Action for Peace programme, which provides mine action training and reintegration in their home communities for demobilised

61 *For further details see Landmine Monitor Report 2004:' Towards a Mine-Free World,' available at http://www.icbl.org/lm/2004/*

soldiers. Although small in terms of the numbers demobilised, the programme appeared to have some outstanding qualities when assessed in 2003, addressing concerns identified with the general DDR process, including the importance it placed on reintegration.[62]

The Afghan mine action programme is generally believed to function well (apart from occasional management and reporting problems in the implementing agencies) and to be of crucial importance to the return, reintegration and development process. Moreover, several reports argue that MAPA produces substantial net socio-economic benefits through its mine clearance activities.[63] Together with the statistical evidence for decreasing numbers of mine victims, this provides strong arguments for continued financial support for MAPA, and for further political backing for its transformation into a mine action programme fully owned and managed by Afghans.

7.3 Education

After two decades of war and the Taliban regime, the education sector in Afghanistan faced severe difficulties. Afghanistan has one of the lowest literacy rates in the world. At the time of writing, only 28.7 per cent of the population over 15 can read and write, which places Afghanistan in the sixth lowest position in the world.[64] It was encouraging to note that parents and *shura* members interviewed in Nangarhar and Laghman provinces recognized the importance of education for their children, ranking this as their second most important need.

Demand for education has been much higher than Afghan and foreign educationists anticipated at the end of 2001. When the government launched the 'Back to School' campaign in 2002, it expected 1.7 million students to enrol in primary school, yet more than 3.0 million students were enrolled in schools at grades 1 to 12 that year. In primary education, the increase in enrolment was 50,000 in 2001,[65] 2.8 million in 2002, 3.5 million in 2003, and 3.9 million in 2004, leading to estimates of 6 million students for 2005, of whom 85 per cent are at primary and secondary level.[66] Nonetheless, there remains a great disparity in enrolment between boys and girls: only 30 per cent of the students in 2002 and 40 per cent in 2003 were girls; effectively, 1.2 million girls were enrolled compared to 2.5 million enrolled boys.[67] Significant regional disparities are noticeable: in Kabul, the rate of enrolment is 81 per cent of all girls of primary school age, whereas in other provinces (especially the south) it can be as low as 15 per cent.

62 *The programme is described in Kristian Berg Harpviken & Rebecca Roberts (2004), 'Preparing the Ground for Peace: Mine Action in Support of Peacebuilding,' PRIO report 2/2004, Oslo, PRIO.*
63 *See William A. Byrd & Bjorn Gildestad (2002) 'The Socio-Economic Impact of Mine Action in Afghanistan: A Cost-Benefit Analysis.' Internal Discussion Paper, January 2002, The World Bank.*
64 *UNDP National Human Development Report, 2004, Key Findings – Chapter 2, p.4.*
65 *Figures from Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2003, Central Statistics Office (CSO).*
66 *See Education and Vocational Training – Public Investment Program, 29.03.05, (EVT-PIP 2005).*
67 *See UNDP National Human Development Report, 2004, Chapter 2, p. 69.*

Figure 13: Student Enrolment 1940 - 2003
(Source: Securing Afghanistan's Future)



It is estimated that, during the conflict, 80 per cent of **school buildings** in Afghanistan were either damaged or destroyed. According to the Statistical Yearbook of 2003, there were roughly 2,500 schools in 2001.[68] Given that in 2002 a total of 5,063 schools existed, it was estimated that for the anticipated 3 million students a total of 7,500 schools would be necessary (i.e. 2,500 additional schools).[69] Of the 5,063 existing schools, 3,500 were identified as being in need of major repair work. The available data for 2003/04 shows approximately 7,000 schools, or so-called 'learning spaces', of which approximately 70 per cent were (formal) government schools and 30 per cent community based schools, home schools, and so on.[70] By end of 2005 there will be a need for 10,000 schools, and the rapid population growth will necessitate the continuous building or expansion of schools.[71]

Given the increase in enrolment and in the number of schools, Afghanistan faced a **shortage of teachers**. In 2001 the Statistical Yearbook listed a total of 23,276 male teachers. This rose to 74,600 teachers in 2003, of whom 27 per cent were female, according to figures from the MoE and UNICEF.[72] The MoE proposal for the Education and Vocational Training (EVT) programme for 2004 envisaged the employment of 102,000 teachers; given current student numbers, however, a total of 146,000 teachers is required to deliver a basic education to all.

From early 2002, MoE project proposals and summary papers, as well as *Securing Afghanistan's Future* and UNHDR, indicated the need for improvement in the **quality of education.** Most teachers were hired under extreme time pressure and many had little or no previous teaching experience and lacked necessary professional competence.

68 *Figures from Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2003; Central Statistics Office.*
69 *See Policy for the Rehabilitation and Development of Education in Afghanistan; MoE, 9/2002, p.6.*
70 *For details see 'A Guide to Government in Afghanistan;' AREU/World Bank, 2004 and Statistical Yearbook 2003.*
71 *EVT-PIP 2005, p. 5.*
72 *It should be noted that data in the education sector are not always coherent and reliable.*

Approximately 60,000 teachers were graduates of grade 12 and below.[73] Subsequently, 26,000 teachers received pre- and in-service training, and since 2003, some 52,000 teachers have completed short-term training courses, including pedagogy, language, arts and mine risk education.[74] An additional 50,000 are waiting to be trained in the new curriculum 1 and 4 and the new textbooks; grades 2 and 5 have recently been completed, and grade 6 will be finalised by early 2006.

Government employed teachers who are registered on the payroll of MoE are paid according to their qualification (grade). The average monthly **salary** in 2002 was USD 45, plus a food allowance, which in practice was often withheld.[75] At that time, a relatively large number of teachers received either less than the full salary or no salary at all. The GoA has considered provision of additional benefits and support for the teachers, but this has not yet materialised because of fiscal constraints.[76] While teachers are now paid more regularly, they continue to complain about salary scales, the lack of additional allowances, and, consequently, low social status.

The Afghan educational system also presents other challenges, such as improving educational equipment, infrastructure, curriculum and textbook development, functioning education management and administration, private sector participation, monitoring and evaluation. The GoA/MoE started to **develop a policy** for improving the overall educational system in 2002. The EVT programme was given the highest priority by the GoA (under Pillar 1 of the NDF, with funding secured from the Public Investment Programme (PIP) of the NDB. The EVT-PIP concerns the development budget only and is financed through the external budget. Teachers salaries and other running costs are financed partly by the core budget (derived from state revenues) and ARTF.

From a state of emergency in late 2001 with more or less ad hoc planning activities, the MoE, with external assistance, gradually developed planning strategies and education programme proposals. The EVT programmes documents for 2004 and 2005 addressed and covered all the required educational sub-programmes and laid the foundation for long-term planning in this sector. This prepared the ground for more coherent, GoA-led development within the education sector. This contrasts with the situation before and during the Taliban regime, when NGOs filled the gaps in state educational provision.[77] There are ongoing discussions within the GoA concerning the future use of NGOs as implementing agencies in the education sector, linked to the broader NGO legislation debate. Some argue for a total phasing out of NGOs, on the grounds that they lack qualifications to provide proper educational services.[78] However, it is recognised that since 2002 NGOs have assisted in repairing or constructing approximately 3,000 school buildings and in training 27,500 teachers.[79]

The Ministry of Education, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs and the Ministry of Women's Affairs have a joint mandate to steer the EVT programme. An Education Consultative Group (E-CG), headed by the MoE, is

73 See Education and Vocational Training; Public Investment Program, 2004, p. 6.
74 See EVT – PIP, 29.03.05, p.15.
75 See AREU/WB (2004) 'A Guide to Government in Afghanistan', p.159 n. 19.
76 See MoE: Education Project Profiles – Major Projects of One Year Duration; 10/2002, p.33.
77 For further details see WB, Afghanistan (2005)' State Building, Sustainable Growth and Reducing Poverty';.
78 This debate arose because some NGOs involved in the construction sector were found to have misused funds.
79 See ACBAR Statement for the Afghanistan Development Forum; Kabul, 4-6 April 2005.

assigned an important role in deciding and steering the EVT process. With a membership drawn from representatives of donors, UN agencies, INGOs and international organisations, the E-CG participates in policy decisions, budgetary planning, and the identification of implementation needs.[80] In practice, however, the coordination ECG mechanism has proved non-functioning, with lack of ministerial leadership, infrequent meetings inhibiting coordination and policy planning, although some improvement was noted by late spring 2005.

In addition, Technical Working Groups (TWGs) have been involved in the more detailed planning and preparation of the necessary implementation steps in the education sector. According to NGO sources, the TWGs have functioned far better than the CG, possibly because of the more practical orientation of its meetings and because, in addition to the central departments at MoE, a greater range of actors on different levels and with different functional responsibilities are involved.

Donors, particularly Denmark, and UNICEF, have invested in capacity building within the MoE to enhance its ability to direct and develop the education sector. Donors expressed a marked concern that thus far the overall implementation processes have not yielded the expected results. This raises questions of how best to engage with the MoE to develop the educational sector. Perceptions of what could have been achieved over this period of time seem to vary between MoE employees and external consultants, which seems to be typical for other ministries as well, and causes some tension.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the investments in capacity building and added management capacity through external consultants have yielded important results. The Danish model stands out here for its emphasis on establishing benchmarks for GoAl achievement, thereby facilitating an ongoing debate on further improvements.

An overview of the available outcome and service delivery that has been achieved in the education sector up to 2003 and the big challenges the country faces in reaching MDG targets in 2015 is shown below:[81]

	2003	Target 2006	Target 2010	Target 2015
▪ Primary net enrolment rate (all)	54%	70	85	100%
▪ Primary net enrolment rate (female)	40%	60	75	100%
▪ Girls primary enrolment share	34%	40	45	50%
▪ School hours spent per year, primary	632	680	672	750

The government's EVT programmes (through MoE, Ministry of Higher Education, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs) consist of six sub-programmes, which are supported by a relatively large number of projects (unfortunately, not listed by priority). A review of the financial figures for the EVT-PIP programmes throughout the evaluation period indicates that the GoA has had limited financial resources available. In 2004, funding requirements for existing projects were USD 278.6 million, of which USD 172 million remained unfunded. The financial gap for newly planned projects amounted

80 *See 'Draft ToRs for E-CG', dated January 28, 2003 and mentioned representatives in CG-minutes of 2003.*

81 *An indicative table of MDG targets and Afghanistan's key outcome and service delivery indicators and targets is shown in Securing Afghanistan's Future, pp. 26and 27.*

to roughly USD 149 million; all in all, unmet expenditure requirements amounted to USD 321 million at the time of programme publication.[82]

The EVT programme for 2005 (dated 3/2005) indicates a total funding requirement of USD 611 million, of which only USD 44 million had been met by March 2005, leaving USD 566 million of financing still to be secured. In addition to shortcomings in funding, it is reported that procedural difficulties between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance have prevented proper functioning of the fund flow mechanism, including unallocated disbursements from ARTF. This obstruction, combined with a concern about a rather unrealistic budgeting practice and MoE's management capacity, could explain why some donors suggested that the main problem for the education sector is not a lack of funding, but the ability to implement existing programmes effectively and to plan future programmes.

The role of the Donors
In the education sector, the Donors have mainly funded UN agencies, international and national NGOs, and, in a few cases, directly through Ministries. Sweden spent 10 per cent of its overall assistance to Afghanistan on the EVT programme of the NDB, Denmark 6 per cent, Ireland 5 per cent, the UK 3 per cent, and the Netherlands 1 per cent.[83]

Denmark's assistance focused on projects and programmes undertaken by UNICEF [84] and by DACAAR/Danish Assistance to Afghan Rehabilitation and Technical Training; it also made a substantial financial contribution through direct budgeting support of USD 18.3 million for the MoF/MoE (as an aid channel) in the EVT sub-sectors, of which USD 11.2 million was disbursed by the end of this Evaluation. The latter included support for a) curriculum development; b) teacher education and development; c) educational material development; and d) physical infrastructure. A fifth component is for assisting the MoE to increase its management and coordination ability to utilise external aid, and assist in building the ministry's planning and management capacity. Ireland supported UNICEF and Irish NGOs; the Netherlands and the UK supported UNICEF; while Sweden channelled its funding through UNICEF and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan.[85]

Donor	Approximate Amount in Million Euro
Denmark	26.5 [1]
Sweden	23.6
UK	13.6 [2]
Ireland	2.3
Netherlands	1.4
Total	**67.4**

1 Of this amount, 14.6 mill. Euro took the form of bilateral support for the MoE's EVT programme.
2 The UK contribution includes support for ISAF's school rehabilitation programme.

82 See "Education and Vocational Training"; Public Investment Program, 2004, p.19.
83 See J. Cosgrave and Rie Andersen: Aid Flows to Afghanistan, December 2004, Danida, p. 49.
84 UNICEF normally receives its funds from UN member countries directly; only earmarked funds were included in the databank of the Aid Flows Study.
85 All data extracted by the Evaluation from the Aid Flows Database.

7.4 Health

23 years of war have left the Afghan health sector critically damaged, and have meant that little progress has been made in improving health service delivery. The health system is too small and fragmented, grossly gender and urban biased, used only by a minority of the population and unevenly distributed across the country.[86] The gravity of the situation is reflected in some of the worst health indicators found anywhere in the world. The under-five and infant mortality rates are the highest in Asia, very high compared to most other developing countries, and three to five times higher than in neighbouring countries.[87] The maternal mortality ratio, estimated at 1,600 per 100,000 live births, is the highest in the world and reflects the low status of women.[88] The rate of chronic malnutrition (moderate and severe stunting) remains around 50 per cent, reflecting a combination of poor caring practices, micronutrient deficiency, and chronic food insecurity.[89] Most of the burden of disease results from infectious causes, particularly among children where diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections, and vaccine preventable illnesses have been estimated to account for 60 per cent of deaths. Among adults, tuberculosis accounts for an estimated 15,000 deaths per year, with 70 per cent of detected cases being among women.

There is **great inequity** in the distribution of health facilities and services throughout Afghanistan, between provinces and between districts in the same province.[90] Where health facilities exist, they often lack basic utilities, such as access to safe water. To address the challenges of health service delivery, the ATA started a process of making essential health services available to all Afghans through the introduction of a BPHS in 2002. This process was driven by the World Bank, with a first WB/Asian Development Bank/UNDP preliminary assessment in December 2001/January 2002.[91] Recognising the lack of capacity within the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), they looked for an opportunity to harmonise NGO resources, the de facto bodies responsible for delivering most health services.

A woman in Rabat Sangi, Herat said:
'We have lots of problems in reaching the clinic. We have one doctor for more than 30 villages. When we reach, there may be 100 people waiting, and only 50 get help. We are told to come back another time and then it is the same. Emergency cases cannot be helped. We have to go to the city, and this is more difficult and too expensive.'

Under the BPHS, actual **health service delivery** is contracted to NGOs and private actors, based on a bidding process facilitated by the three main donors (USAID, EC, WB) that results in signed, time-limited 'Performance-based Partnership Agreements' (PPA).

86 *See Ministry of Health 'Project document for Integrated Primary Health Care Programme AFG/00831'*
87 *See WHO 'Afghanistan Country Brief.' November 2004.*
88 *See Ahmed A, Edward A, Burnham G, (2004)' Health indicators for Mothers and Children in Rural Herat Province, Afghanistan.' Prehospital and Disaster Medicine; 19(3):221–225.*
89 *See Ministry of Health,' Public Nutrition Policy,' November 2003.*
90 *See Transitional Islamic Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health (2002) 'Afghanistan National Health Resources Assessment.' Prepared for the Ministry of Health by MSH, HANDS, and MSH/Europe.*
91 *See Daly E (2003) 'Discussion Paper: Performance Based Partnership Agreements in the Transitional Context of Afghanistan.'*

Around 30 NGOs are involved countrywide in delivering BPHS services, enforced through vertical programmes (EPI, malaria, TB). Approximately 70 per cent of districts are currently covered by the BPHS, providing primary health care to 50 per cent of the Afghan population.[92] The MoPH considers this development to be a substantial and important achievement. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that even in 2001 primary health care, the training of local staff, the supply of medicines and vaccines, outreach activities and water/sanitation programmes were already ongoing in most of Afghanistan. The control of communicable diseases, such as the eradication of polio, had progressed steadily in Afghanistan from 1996 onwards.[93] The greatest change has been in the establishment of a comprehensive national health plan and a framework of optimism and stability, allowing all the actors to work towards the declared overall objectives.

Implementers such as Ibn Sina and SCA report substantial progress in respect of achieving the following GoAls: expansion; a more equitable health service; high quality provision; and good access. At the same time, they recognise that unmet needs remain huge, that progress has been slow in some areas, and that the ultimate GoAl of improving the health status of the people will take a long time.

There are four BPHS levels:
- One Health Post per 1,000-1,500 Afghans.
- One Basic Health Centre per 15,000-30,000 population.
- One Comprehensive Health Centre per 30,000-60,000 population.
- One 50-bed District Hospital per 100,000-300,000 population.

Although the MoPH remains responsible for health service delivery in some provinces, its primary role is to develop strategies, GoAls and objectives, set indicators, and monitor, supervise and control the performance of the implementing partners.[94] A third party evaluator monitors the providers' performance on the basis of agreed national indicators.

In this BPHS system a user fee may be levied at the point of delivery. This is a significant change of policy, although unofficial payment for services in public clinics was already pervasive. The new Constitution states that: *'The state is obliged to provide free means of preventive health care and medical treatment, and proper health facilities to all citizens of Afghanistan in accordance with the law.*[95] The following paragraph reads: *'The state encourages and protects the establishment and expansion of private medical services and health centres in accordance with law'.* According to the MoPH, there is currently no active **legal regulation of the private health sector**, but traditionally doctors need to be employed in the Government sector to operate private services after working hours. Given the under-funded Government system, most doctors do so.

92 *See WHO 'Afghanistan Health System Update', November 2004.*
93 *See CDC (2001) 'Progress Toward Poliomyelitis Eradication – Afghanistan, 1999-2000'. MMWR weekly March 02, 2001.*
94 *See Transitional Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Health, 'A Basic Package of Health Services for Afghanistan', March 2003/1382.*
95 *The Constitution of Afghanistan Year 1382 Chapter Two – Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens. Article Fifty-Two. First part. Unofficial Translation. Taken from The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan Assistance, AREU, 3rd Edition 2004.*

The important fields of **disability and mental health** were not seen as priorities in the first stage of the BPHS; programmes aimed at reducing the excess preventable mortality were prioritised. However, such aspects are being phased into the mid-term and long-term plans, as well into new policies being developed regarding the essential hospital package.

The paucity and unreliability of **health statistics** do not yet permit a proper coverage analysis of the GoAls of mortality and morbidity reduction. The results can be measured on the basis of number of clinics, number of patients treated in the clinics, number of children vaccinated and similar quantitative data. Alternatively, assessments can be made from smaller cluster or household surveys. There is still huge uncertainty related to the projections of data from individual patients to percentages of the population.

National Health Priorities (2002)
- Reduction of under five mortality.
- Reduction of maternal mortality.
- Addressing malnutrition.
- Prevention and control of communicable diseases.
- Addressing inequitable distribution of health services.
- Capacity building.

It is difficult to distinguish **the emergency, rehabilitation and development phases** in the health sector because they are all interlinked. The human development indicators[96] within health (and other sectors) are still so poorly developed that, even in the 'normal context' of current Afghanistan, they do not meet the minimum standards for disaster response outlined by The Sphere Project.[97] Several informants and stakeholders still define the health situation as an emergency, but with considerable geographical and urban/rural variation. But interventions to establish infrastructure for health services (excluding city-based hospitals) clearly count as development rather than rehabilitation.

The MoPH expects technical assistance to move from the immediate post-conflict phase to long-term development, and that donors and technical agencies will increasingly harmonise their inputs.[98] It, however, has set **development planning** in a perspective of reaching targets within the MDG by 2015, a commitment the donors need to bear in mind.

A consensus was noted about the value of GoA's efforts to establish **a coherent national health system**, although concerns were raised by interviewees about the short funding commitment for such a massive expansion. Initial caution about the PPAs was summed up as 'too fast, too soon, on too large a scale, with limited experience to draw from'.[99] Insufficient account appears to have been taken of the beneficiary perspective. In some provinces, responsibility for the operation of clinics and the implementation of services was transferred between NGOs, without necessarily improving either quality or access.

96 See UNDP (2004) 'Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004. Security with a Human Face: Challenges and Responsibilities', Kabul.
97 See the Sphere Project (2000) 'Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster.'
98 See Securing Afghanistan's Future (2004) 'Accomplishments and the Strategic Path Forward. Health and Nutrition. Technical Annex.'
99 See Daly, E (2003) 'Discussion Paper. Performance Based Partnership Agreements in the Transitional Context of Afghanistan.'

Expansion plans may also be unrealistic due to the lack of qualified medical staff. The effects of free market competition for scarce human resources led to very high staff turnover between agencies in 2002.[100]

The role of the Donors
The Donors have contributed through the ARTF towards the salaries of governmental health sector employees, and provided general contributions to UN agencies involved in health, such as UNICEF, WHO and UNFPA. They have also supported Red Cross and Red Crescent health programmes through ICRC and IFRC, and made direct contributions to NGOs involved in health programmes, especially SCA, Danish Afghanistan Committee (DAC) (and DACAAR through the rural development programme), and Christian Aid (CA). However, these contributions remain small compared to those of the main donors to the health system (WB, USAID, and EC), and Japanese grants.

7.5 Water and Sanitation

Water is doubtless the most important natural resource for Afghanistan, an arid country divided by the big rivers and the snow-covered mountains feeding the old irrigation systems and replenishing the aquifers. Traditionally, the population of Afghanistan has depended on surface water, from rivers or canals and to a lesser extent ground water extracted through springs and *kareezes*.[101] The community well (serving around 20 families) constructed by the NGOs is not conventional practice for Afghan families, and the impression gained from interviews was that it is also not the desired standard for families who traditionally have shallow wells equipped with reel and buckets in their backyards.[102] This does not, however, imply that the strategy to construct communal wells to provide drinking water has been wrong as provision of individual wells is not economically feasible.

Sanitation in rural areas rests on traditional latrines, open fields and/or designated places within the family compound. Key figures from 2001 indicate sectoral challenges:

- Only 19/11 per cent of the urban/rural population had access to an improved water source.[103]
- Only 25 and 8 per cent of urban/rural population used adequate sanitation facilities.
- In 2001 25. 7 per cent of children died before the age of five (latest surveys in 2003 show this had fallen to 17.2 per cent).
- Diarrhoea is one of the major causes of mortality among children.[104]

Afghanistan's water sector (within the humanitarian assistance sphere) has historically been dominated by DACAAR, UNICEF and SCA; together with MRRD and UNHCR, these are the key organisations examined by this Evaluation. DACAAR[105] and UNICEF assumed lead agency roles in the 1990s, initiating the development and pro-

100 See Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Annual Donor Report 2002.
101 Traditional underground water channels tapping into aquifers.
102 This is most likely one of the reasons why common wells are never duplicated and why repairs are unusually slow, another is a general difficulty in mobilising for communal work.
103 Source: http://www.unicef.org/sowc01/tables/table3.htm Unicef, MICS 2001.
104 Source: UNICEF, MICS2 – 2000, Section E, Child health.
105 The existence of a lead agency is one of the main reasons why well construction and the materials used are almost standardised throughout the country.

duction of a common hand pump, establishing common standards, leading coordination within the field, and preparing a comprehensive database.[106] The drought that began in 1998 had a major impact on these interventions.

The activities of these organisations have focused on **rural water supply**, leaving ICRC, UN-Habitat and WHO to undertake only emergency rehabilitation in urban areas. The technology used has been straightforward: either wells have been dug and lined with concrete rings or tube wells have been drilled with percussion rigs. Both types are constructed with a concrete apron and a channel to drain surplus water. One of three types of hand pump has been installed, depending on ground water level (Kabul, Indus, and Pamir). Where a cost-benefit analysis has justified it or the terrain has necessitated it, gravity schemes were constructed, though never in great numbers.[107] Water quality testing has been restricted to ensuring the handover of a hygienically safe well, and no water quality monitoring system has been established.

As a result of the drought, wells, especially dug wells, have been prone to failure. According to a DACAAR report, approximately 25 per cent of the dug wells are presently dry.[108] Organisations have responded to the drought by deepening the wells.

Based on figures supplied by the main actors (DACAAR – 25,380 wells, SCA – 9,050 wells), and adding an estimate for the number of wells constructed by other organisations, approximately 36,000 water points (WP) had been constructed by organisations in the water and sanitation sector by the end of 2001.[109] From 2002 to 2004, approximately 29,000[110] wells were constructed through the activities of the humanitarian organisations.[111] The primary focus of interventions during this latter period was on improving access to safe drinking water and increasing the volume of water available rather than on improving environmental health.

Figures for the number of sanitary installations constructed were difficult to obtain, but estimates would be around 75,000 latrines and a similar number of baths. Activities in terms of sanitation have consisted of latrine construction (single/double vault), mostly in connection with an implemented water supply project, and also for demonstration purposes. Four to six compartment latrines have been built in every school (UNICEF, SCA). More refined sanitation technologies, such as septic tanks and/or sewage systems, have not been used.

Aid providers introduced health and hygiene campaigns at an early stage, but these were not fine-tuned to assessments of behavioural change and thus have had a rather limited effect.[112] Similarly, the impacts of well and latrine construction have never been measured against baseline surveys, using practical indicators.

106 None of the 12,673 wells built by SCA are in the DACAAR database.
107 3.8 per cent of WP in the DACAAR database are stand posts.
108 These wells were usually constructed with an available water column of a 1.5 to 2.0 m in the well.
109 DACAAR has constructed 25,300 and SCA more than 9,000 alone.
110 MRRD estimates there are a total of 45,000 wells constructed until end of 2004; the Evaluation finds a figure of 65,000 wells as more realistic.
111 For details on this calculation, see the water and sanitation annex on the CD-ROM.
112 None of the persons interviewed remembered any of the topics taught. Some did not even recall the campaign itself.

Village elders and farmers interviewed in 16 villages in 7 districts of Nangarhar Province gave very straightforward answers when asked whether women have been involved in the projects: *'No'*. The response of a village headman in Shinwar district illustrates the challenge: *'You know our (Pashtun) culture, women are not included in things like that.'*

Water resource management emerges as an issue of particular importance. The construction of water points needs to be seen within an overall framework of water resource management – the management of surface water and groundwater and its use for human consumption, agriculture and to water stock. A crucial problem at the moment is the absence of any clear responsibility for the management of water; the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Urban Planning, the Ministry of Power and Water, and the Ministry of Mines all claim responsibility.

The Jalalabad office of the Food and Agricultural Organisation confirmed that at present Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) assessments are not carried out, largely because the necessary data collection tools (e.g. devices to record precipitation, gauges to measure intake and run-off data from rivers, and tools to monitor water consumption by rural and urban population etc.) do not exist. Farmers interviewed and the Food and Agricultural Organization in Jalalabad reported that in reality, as was explained by a farmer, *'…everyone with enough money can contract the drilling of a deep well equipped with a submersible pump'.* This has reportedly resulted in a lowered ground water table in many parts of Afghanistan (including Kabul), causing wells and karezes to run dry. The MRRD confirmed that, while it is illegal to drill a well without submitting an application to the relevant ministry, the legislation is almost impossible to enforce.

It is difficult to say precisely when donors and implementing organisations should have turned to funding and implementing more medium- to long-term orientated projects, considering the impediments presented by the security situation. However, the following projects certainly need to be initiated now:

- Planned interventions in water and sanitation using the ECOSAN principles, trying to avoid mistakes made by developed countries; this will require cultural studies and substantial awareness campaigns.
- Comprehensively designed, implemented, followed up and evaluated health and hygiene training campaigns to boost awareness among the population (accompanied by a study to measure the extent of behavioural change and to collect health data in parallel).

It is very clear that the issue of IWRM and the establishment of a database for water sources and water points should have been given more serious consideration by the Donors at an early stage. This work is a prerequisite for the sustainable management of water, one of Afghanistan's most important commodities.

It would have been better if a percentage of the funding assigned to well construction had been diverted to IWRM, an absolutely essential activity for a more economic and sustainable use of Afghan water resources. As things now stand, it is only a matter of

time before the detrimental effects of not investing in IWRM become visible. It is of the utmost importance that Donors recognise the importance of water resource management and make funding available.

The role of the Donors
Around 65 million Euro, or roughly 8.2 per cent,[113] has been spent on activities in the water and sanitation sector (see below).

Donor	Approximately Amount in Million Euro
Sweden	22,3
UK	16,5
Denmark	14,9
Netherlands	9,8
Ireland	1,5
Total	**65,0**

The Donors appear to have funded 31 per cent (or around 9,000) of the approximately 29,000 water points constructed, with the majority (40 per cent) provided by Sida through SCA, this NGO being the main recipient of Sida funding in this sector.[114] Denmark funded mainly DACAAR, which in turn included coordination of the sector, technology development and operation and maintenance systems especially for hand pumps, but also UN agencies and the MRRD. The Netherlands supported mainly UNHCR water and sanitation activities, while Ireland prioritised Irish NGOs. ICRC interventions in urban water supply systems were mainly funded by Sida, DFID and the Netherlands. None of the Donors was found to have been actively involved in policy making or to have taken special initiatives to boost interventions in the water and sanitation sector, although the importance of the sector is recognised by all five.

7.6 Livelihoods

Livelihood support has a long history in Afghanistan. From late 1980s onwards, NGOs engaged in a number of district-based integrated rural development programmes as a continuation of their emergency assistance schemes implemented through local commanders. These projects, often aimed at bypassing the commander structure, supported crop improvement, income generation through craft production and infrastructure projects, such as the cleaning and repair of *karezes* and the building of irrigation and road structures, as well as support to education and health care facilities. Most interventions were planned in a top down manner, often from offices based in Peshawar. To ensure community involvement, they were heavily subsidised. Virtually all of the early interventions were initially successful but ultimately failed due to their lack of a genuine community buy-in and any underlying commercial rationale. Issues such as local community responsibility for the ongoing repair and maintenance of irrigation networks and roads were often addressed in a cursory manner by NGO staff, and projects were fre-

113 Information from the Aid Flow database.
114 Precise figures are extremely difficult to establish because of cross-financing and conflicting figures in documents from the different UN agencies and NGOs.

quently described by Afghans as '*throwing money in the kareez*'. By the mid to late 1990s, awareness of the shortcomings had resulted in moves towards a more sophisticated delivery mechanism, focused on securing the direct engagement of traditional community structures (such as village or district *shuras*) or the establishment of village development councils. These councils were, for example, invited to discuss and select their own priorities for assistance, provided they were willing to contribute to implementation and to subsequent maintenance by drawing on their own resources.

In addition to these integrated approaches, there were many discrete programmes, particularly popular with some UN agencies that worked on the reconstruction and rehabilitation of infrastructure, seed multiplication, locust control, primary health care, and much more. In some ways these activities have changed little until now, and the NSP in particular has benefited from the improved delivery system piloted in the late 1990s. The most obvious change has been in the dramatically increased levels of funding now available, at least for infrastructure creation. There is also a growing realisation that market forces are paramount in determining the final outcomes of livelihood interventions.

The shift towards more genuine community participation is not apparent throughout the sector and donors still fund activities that bear a striking resemblance to the earlier failures. This might be explained by the haste in which most early interventions were planned and the lack of obvious alternatives. The absence of institutional memory due to very high staff turnover and the employment of younger, inexperienced staff are also factors in this slow learning process.

The period under review began with a complex emergency scenario, influenced by the drought that had lasted from 1999, which rapidly moved to the consideration of medium-term reconstruction-type interventions, so the primary focus of this evaluation has been on short-term responses in the livelihoods sector. Early priorities of assistance provision to central and northern Afghanistan, and later problems with assistance provision due to increasing security problems caused an uneven geographical assistance distribution – including for national programmes. That resulted in limited support for the poorest and least developed provinces, as Farah, Ghor, Uruzgan and Zabul, which had also been severely hit by the drought. A few development orientated initiatives are now at an early stage of implementation, for example, the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and Microfinance Investment Support Facility (MISFA). Other longer-term interventions remain on the drawing board or were in the initial start-up phase by early 2005. For instance, economic and social protection programmes under the International Labour Organisation, and inward investment supported by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit and USAID are two areas of long-term intervention where considerable donor-funded activity is now beginning to materialise. Given this wide variety of livelihood activities, it was decided to look more specifically at the largest projects funded through the ARTF, where the major GoA-run programmes considered were the NEEP, NSP and MISFA. To a lesser extent, the work of the Humanitarian Aid Department of the European Commission (ECHO), WFP and the more recent focus on alternative livelihood activities have been addressed.

A **brief presentation of the national programmes**, all managed by the MRRD, follows. Together with the MoF, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) has been the ministry that has attracted a relatively large share of funding and has been able to employ a large number of external consultants, Afghans and internationals.

The objectives of the National Emergency Employment Programme (**NEEP)** are: to achieve national coverage and to provide a safety net for the most vulnerable people by creating productive employment opportunities; to establish effective mechanisms for developing public and productive infrastructure assets, through labour-based methods and a private sector-led approach; and to develop public sector capacity and systems for delivering various community services. The total budget for NEEP is USD 127 million.[115]

NEEP has been criticised for operating within a policy vacuum during its first two to three years of implementation. Its programme was not part of any national rural development strategy and there was no overall or rural transport policy. NEEP did, however, attempt to dialogue with local communities in order to prioritise its interventions.

In response to criticism, NEEP has developed a strategy that will see it maturing into a programme focused on rural access, and so will be renamed the National Rural Access Programme (NRAP). The management structure is based within the MRRD and Ministry of Public Works (MOPW), though the respective and separate mandates of these two ministries have yet to be agreed.[116] UNOPS and International Labour Organization (ILO) support will be phased out as skills are transferred to permanent civil servants.

The GoA has defined the National Solidarity Programme (**NSP**) as the primary vehicle for social capital building by promoting good local governance through the establishment of Community Development Councils (CDCs), for both men and women. It empowers these to formulate Community Development Plans, through capacity building and consultative decision making and through allocations of block grants to their selected projects. NSP is implemented through 21 Facilitating Partners with an Oversight Consultant to manage the process, approve community identified projects, and disburse funds through Da Afghanistan Bank. NSP's overall plan is to achieve national coverage (estimated to be 20,000 communities). By April 2005, a total of 6,985 CDCs had been established, following a slow start, and USD 76 million of a total grant of 120 million had been disbursed.[117]

NSP has been criticised for its high initial costs and was subject to a close examination by the MoF in early 2005, following the change of minister. However, these concerns appear to have been addressed following a number of donor supervision visits and continued dialogue between donors, the World Bank (which administers the programme), MRRD and MoF, and World Bank planning for the second phase of the programme is reportedly underway. The funding shortfall by mid 2005 was USD 35 million.[118]

115 For details see http://www.mrrd.gov.af/prog/neep.htm
116 See National Rural Access Program Strategic Framework and Workplan SY 1384 (April 2005 to March 2006) NEEP JPMU March 2005.
117 MRRD presentation to Afghan Development Forum, April 2005.
118 According to MRRD Deputy Minister Mohammed Ehzan Zia, 27.07.2005.

Bamyan Centre's market road constructed under NEEP is a good illustration of people's expectations running directly contrary to the organisational mandate of the concerned authority (in this case, MRRD with UNOPS supervision). UNOPS engineers justified their choice of a cobbled road surface in terms of a combination of criteria that were in accordance with NEEP's mandate. These included the fact that the stones were locally available, local labour could be used to dress and place the stones, the surface would be highly durable, and resistant to extreme winter temperatures, and could be repaired with local labour. They also stated that the stones would provide a solid subsurface for subsequent treatments, if and when further funds became available in the future.

However, local people were unanimously furious over what they considered to be the imposition of a totally unacceptable, low quality road, which damaged their vehicles and created endless dust. It seems that they expected tarmac or concrete surfacing. According to UNOPS engineers, however, this would have required specialised equipment to be brought from Kabul for a road that was less than half a kilometre long. Furthermore, the NEEP budget was insufficient, whilst its mandate was to undertake labour intensive works to provide emergency employment, as well as to upgrade infrastructure to support other livelihood activities. They also commented that the local labour had been very reluctant to utilise effective stone dressing techniques (hence the uneven surface), despite all their efforts to provide training along with arranging a field visit to another project using the same method.

It is difficult to see how such considerations can be effectively communicated in an environment where existing communications are poor and where numerous accusations concerning the misuse of funds are fuelling distrust between the parties.

The Microfinance Investment Support Facility (**MISFA**) set out to be the national conduit for wholesale financial intermediation (i.e. to provide funds for loans offered by NGOs), for which it received international loan finance. In addition, grant funds were provided through the ARTF to provide capacity building to these same NGOs. MISFA is owned and controlled by the GoA and aims to take financial services to the people, particularly the poor and most vulnerable, in order to promote enhanced and sustainable livelihoods and to improve people's risk management.

MISFA's NGO partners, eight to begin with, have now risen to twelve. The micro-loans provided vary between NGOs and range from USD 50 to USD 1000 for periods of three to twelve months. MISFA report that a total of 140,000 clients (nearly 90 per cent of whom were women) in 15 provinces were supported in the period to March 2005, and that an average repayment rate of 98.5 per cent has been achieved to date. Trades financed include: shopkeepers, bakers, hairdressers, electricians, plumbers, tailors, embroiderers, carpet makers, blacksmiths, carpenters, stock farmers, and orchard establishment.

A major actor in the livelihood sector has been the World Food Programme (WFP). Through its Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation, it has supported: a) recovery activities focusing on community-level rehabilitation of infrastructure; b) Food for

Education; and c) relief activities (consisting of one third of the planned assistance), which include support to returning refugees, IDPs, acutely malnourished, vulnerable households, and social institutions. Throughout 2001 and 2002, WFP saw its role as one of meeting immediate food needs and assisting in the prevention of large-scale migration. Since then it has gradually increased its support for Food for Work and Food for Asset Creation (FOODACC). The agency was criticised in 2002 and 2003 for working independently of the GoA and failing to coordinate with other agencies; this can partly be explained by the time it took them to alter staffing profiles from experts on emergency relief provision to more development oriented staff. Likewise, Afghans farmers in Herat and Badghis interviewed by team members in 2003 and 2004 were critical of WFP's continued distribution of wheat, arguing that this was depressing prices for locally produced wheat to the extent that it was not harvested, and in 2004 the GoA argued for a move towards cash for work.

The WFP appears to have taken some of these criticisms on board. According to recent information, it is looking into the possibilities of purchasing wheat locally in 2005.

The role of the Donors
All Donors have contributed to the ARTF, ECHO and the WB, while individual donors have made additional bilateral contributions to the national programmes.

Based on the Aid Flow Study, by June 2004 total Donor funding of ARTF had been:

Donor	Approximate Amount in Million Euro
UK	109.7
Netherlands	70.0
Denmark	9.7
Sweden	8.3
Ireland	4.06
Total	**201.76**

For the WFP the Donors have contributed:

Donor	Approximate Amount in Million Euro
UK	19.6
Netherlands	12.4
Denmark	6.7
Sweden	6.8
Ireland	1.4
Total	**46.9**

7.7 Conclusions Related to the Evaluation Criteria

Relevance
Interventions regarding the provision of services to meet the **basic needs of the population** were generally found to have been relevant, but their relevance would have been enhanced by a more even distribution of aid throughout the country, with less concentration on Kabul, and by instituting systems of monitoring and evaluation at an earlier stage.

Support for **primary education,** including the emphasis on girls' education and the effort to increase the MoE's managerial capacity, has been highly relevant, though a shift in orientation from quantity to quality will be needed in the future.

The interventions in the **water and sanitation** sector have generally been relevant, though with some question marks over the building of latrines. Since the provision of drinking water emerged as the first priority in the village interviews and is rated as important within the National Development Framework and Budget, it was surprising to find that a relatively small proportion of funding had been allocated to this sector. This can be expected to change as the Rural/Urban Water and Sanitation Programme has now been made a GoA priority.

Within the **health** sector, interventions by the donors were limited but relevant. However, the magnitude of needs has made it difficult for implementers and Donors to keep to their priorities. The problems were so pervasive that systems were often overloaded before adequate capacity had been built. The key donors in this sector may have been too quick to inject funds into an immature system, and held unrealistic expectations of the short-term results.

With regard to **livelihoods**, the short-term focus on rapidly implemented infrastructure projects, combined with cash and/or food for work schemes to meet the beneficiaries' immediate needs, was assessed as relevant. By contrast, the Evaluation found that the medium-term interventions were less relevant, as MISFA and NEEP did not always target the most vulnerable sectors of Afghan society, and therefore failed to contribute to the social protection of these groups. In terms of providing future economic drivers, livelihood activities have been relevant and have bridged emergency and development activities. However, many of the small-scale projects to promote supplementary income-generating activities have been ill conceived in terms of business planning, market potential and sustainability. While some differences were observed in the degree of local community involvement and in the focus on sustainability, the NSP appears promising.

Coherence
Within the **education** sector, coherence existed wherever INGOs and International Organisations (SCA and IOM) and the UN (UNICEF, WFP, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) cooperated at the national level in research and surveys. However, a lack of policy development within the MoE limited the ability to generate coherence between donors and the MoE.

The national **health strategy** and the national policy on health and nutrition were parts of the first pillar of the National Development Framework, on which the BPHS was based. Monthly meetings of an inter-departmental Consultative Group on Health and Nutrition help to ensure a coherent approach.

In general, interventions in the **water and sanitation** sector have been coherent. Aid providers have undertaken complementary activities targeting different vulnerable groups. The dominance of two actors in this sector in Afghanistan since 1990 (UNICEF and DACAAR) has had a positive effect. The interventions have been coherent with respect to the implementation strategies of different aid providers. Nevertheless, targeting and needs assessment strategies have varied.

In respect of assistance for service provision in the **livelihoods** sector, a lack of coherent policy within the donor community and the GoA was apparent during the period under review, although individual players did have well defined strategies. Allowance should, however, be made for the emergency nature of most of the early programmes, whose approaches understandably often lacked the level of coherence to be expected from more mature interventions. One concern with respect to the NSP is the limited coherence between the various ministries involved, and between the CDCs and other community and governance structures.

Connectedness

Within **education**, connectedness has been observed between societal structures and governmental educational institutions, symbolised by the willingness of communities to contribute towards school building costs and maintenance. The connectedness between the MoE and the Donors has been low due to lack of policy planning and functional coordination, and poor information sharing has had a negative influence on relations between MoE in Kabul and MoE provincial departments.

The ability of provincial **health** authorities to assume a planning, coordinating and monitoring role varies by region. Some of the NGOs with a long history as health providers are well connected with the communities and are used to interacting with local *shuras* and provincial authorities. When PPA contracts are provided for organisations without any previous experience of working in either the health sector or in Afghanistan, the team found that they tended to be less connected to the communities.

Within **water and sanitation**, the problem of cultural connectedness is frequently met. Rural communities still see it as the desired living standard to have 'their own well in their backyard'. Latrines are still not given high priority in rural areas, and introduction of communal latrines has been met with strong cultural resistance. In this respect, there appear to have been unmet challenges to connect intervention strategies with local traditions. On the other hand, the strategy of communal wells was certainly the best socio-economic solution and reflected national policy on water and sanitation interventions.

Within **livelihoods,** poor communication appears to have been a significant shortcoming at all levels. In none of the infrastructure projects visited had the issue of ongoing asset management and maintenance been discussed with the community members. This also applied to some extent to the NSP-funded community projects. This aggravated the more general problem of widespread public expectation that assistance 'was to be provided', reinforced by free assistance distribution from both military and humanitarian actors, especially in 2001 and 2002.

Coordination

In the **education** sector, CG meetings have been few and far between. Donors have, however, countered this by taking initiative to coordinate among themselves. Although NGO representatives report that some TWGs functioned well, coordination between aid

providers at the regional level has been rare. Although ACBAR meetings were attended by Provincial Board Educators and NGOs in Nangarhar, their outcomes often appeared ineffective. By contrast, the long-standing coordination between Board and District Education Officers and UNICEF has been extended and effective.

In the **health** sector, most actors adapted their aid to national standards and facilitated the collection of data through the Health Management Information Systems. Some of the NGOs participated in MoPH consultative groups; the SCA has been key in representing the NGO community. To ensure coordination between central and sub-national levels, MoPH established the Grant and Contracts Management Unit. However, from the periphery the process still appears to be Kabul-centred, and the provincial MoPH departments have limited knowledge of policies and minimal resources to fulfil their monitoring roles.

The main coordination tool with respect to **water and sanitation** is the Water and Sanitation Working Group, which meets monthly in Kabul. All main actors participate in this meeting, which attempts to harmonise, synchronise and coordinate all national activities in this sector. On the provincial level, these basic functions are performed by the TWG (water and sanitation). These coordination fora are sufficient to deal with the task at hand.

Under the ARTF, the consultative group mechanism for **livelihood** incorporated all twelve sectors. While this was excellent in principle, all actors conceded that it has not worked in practice. Even within the MRRD, where three major programmes are managed, each works in isolation and the end result is duplication of projects. Alternative livelihoods coordination is poor, and divergent policies and strategies evident, while in the Ministry of Agriculture a lack of policy coordination between the majority of donors and the Ministry is reported.

Effectiveness

In the **education** sector, the effectiveness of the management of the state school system was judged weak. Although recently established, the Ministry of Education is in need of more professional capacities, the low number of supervisors and their lack of professionalism caused concern, as did the very high teacher to student ratio and the teaching environment, with many open-air classes and schools (and teachers) running double shifts. Teacher-parent associations rarely seemed to function well, and a major concern was the lack of a modern functional national monitoring system.

The expansion of **health services** to rural areas has proven effective when combined with community-based services. However, improving institution-based services will not improve the situation for those who cannot reach these services or who need referal. The focus on improved obstetric care in health facilities will probably have only a limited effect on maternal mortality rates, unless linked with those assisting with home deliveries.[119] Within the BPHS, it is not possible to treat all the conditions or provide medicines for all the common problems to the specified standards and with available drugs. Moreover, the referral system often fails to function in practice, with the result that the patient is treated by local health workers rather than by the appropriate level of the BPHS.

119 According to research commissioned by UNICEF, 93.1 per cent of rural women, who had given birth during a two year period, had been assisted during the birth by an untrained birth attendant (UNICEF MICS 2003).

Effectiveness for the core activities of aid providers within the **water and sanitation** sector varies considerably. The construction of water-pumps has been effective and timely; a response time of 2 to 4 months is good by any standards. The situation is slightly different for gravity schemes, where sustainability is a crucial issue, although the absence of effective operation and management training and routines, and the lack of tools, has reduced the overall effectiveness. *Kareezes* rely on traditional and proven techniques and here interventions have been effective. However, the absence of operation and management training and routines, and the lack of tools seriously reduce the overall effectiveness of the system.

Little information is available concerning latrine construction. The main argument for building latrines is that they improve public hygiene and reduce diseases. However, whether the appropriate technology has been applied, and whether traditional techniques have been sufficiently taken into account, have never been tested. The same applies to health and hygiene education, where no assessment has been made of any degree of behavioural change triggered by the campaigns.

The results in the **livelihood** sector are impressive, not least because of the work of NGOs. However, given the large sums of money spent and the absence of needs assessment data, monitoring of delivery and measurement of impact, it is hard to determine the effectiveness of the end result. The major programmes considered by the evaluation appear to have responded flexibly to changing circumstances and to have conducted effective reviews of their delivery mechanisms. However, the high funding available, and the pressure to show immediate results, resulted in the shortcutting of procedures, so that not all contracts have been effectively monitored and some infrastructure was of substandard quality.

While WFP prove effective in meeting basic needs during 2001 and 2002, their slow and less transparent change from an emergency to a development orientation has been questioned – as has their continued distribution of imported wheat. MISFA is still at a pilot stage, but for it to work effectively and reach its full potential a strong and well-focused management seems essential. NSP shows encouraging signs, though concern was noted in the field about the Oversight Consultant's lengthy project approval process and the slow disbursement of funds.

Impact

At the national level the impact of assistance for the **education** sector is deemed relatively high, notably the ability to fill the Taliban gap in female education and building of schools. Two concerns are noted, however. First, the low ability of the MoE to assume responsibility for policy formulation and sector coordination may have reduced the impact of the assistance. Secondly, Afghans may become reluctant to send their children to school if the quality of the education provided is not improved.

In the **health** sector, the focus on health education is important, but its success in altering behaviour has not been adequately investigated. Preventive services may be neglected in a system where interventions are evaluated on performance indicators that measure effectiveness in terms of costs per patient treatment. However, the impact in vaccination coverage of polio has proven positive, making it realistic to believe that polio can be eradicated from Afghanistan by the end of 2010.

Within the **water and sanitation** sector, the impacts have not been measured systematically, even by NGOs with the means to do so. Nevertheless, the following impacts were listed by beneficiaries: the reduction of diseases; encouraging people to remain in the village and others to return; reduction of time spent on water collection, thereby freeing women to perform other work (impact depended on the particular alternatives); and making water available for festivities and guests.

The wells have certainly had a great impact on local communities, but people seemed happy to resume their former practices of taking drinking water from the irrigation canals. A significant quote in this respect was '*…our forefathers have drunk that water. Why should we not drink it?'* As a result, the assumption that safe wells have reduced water-borne diseases is impossible to verify as health data have not been collected before and after the interventions.

In the **livelihoods** sector the immediate impact of the roads programme was enthusiastically described by the *shuras* visited. They had now access to market centres, children could reach schools further up the valley, and family members, especially women, could obtain medical treatment. They also reported better contact with the authorities and neighbouring villages. The NSP programme was credited with bringing villages together and settling old enmities, as they had to work together within, or between, CDCs, and for allowing women to participate in formal decision making and local governance.

The long-term impact of the programmes might be compromised by the low quality of some of the infrastructure built, and by the inability of the community to maintain what has been built, For NSP, supply of project funds and further facilitation will need to continue to provide a rationale for the CDC meetings and further consolidation.

Efficiency

The efficiency of the **educational** programmes has been hampered by the lack of teaching material, qualified teachers (resulting in an immensely high teacher/student ratio), and reliable information data systems to facilitate analysis of learning achievements.

As for **health,** the cost per capita of the BPHS is estimated at 4.4 USD, while some providers are down to 3.5-3.7 USD and others are substantially higher. There is, however, an efficiency/equity dilemma regarding the MoPH objective of equity of health services. In pursuing fairness in access, geographical and demographic differences between provinces have to be considered. Per capita allocations will not solve access or equity constraints.

Some case studies indicate that preventive health initiatives such as vaccination,[120] latrine introduction[121] or de-worming campaigns for children[122] are cost-effective. Some of these estimates may, however, have limited relevance in Afghanistan.

In the **water and sanitation** sector, efficiency differed between aid providers and even between their regional offices depending on, among other factors, the professionalism,

120 *Fox-Rushby J.A, Kaddar M, Levine R, Brenzel L (2004), 'The economics of vaccination in low- and middle-income countries'. Bulletin of World Health Organisation. Sept 2004, 82 (9).*

121 *See Meddings D.R, Ronald L.A, Marion S, Pinera J.F, Oppliger A (2004), 'Cost effectiveness of a latrine revision programme in Kabul, Afghanistan'. Bulletin of World Health Organisation April 2004, 82 (4).*

122 *See Government of Afghanistan/WFP/UNICEF: 'De-worming Campaign' Documentation CD 2004.*

dedication and training of staff, the equipment available, an applied management information system, and economic procurement regulations.

The evaluation was unable to collect financial data/project proposals that were sufficiently detailed and comparable to allow a detailed analysis of the overheads and running and administrative costs involved in the interventions. This made it extremely difficult to assess how economically resources and inputs have been converted into results[123]. However, based on the proposals reviewed, the following percentage relations between support costs and total costs were established: UNHCR, between 18.5 and 30 per cent; DACAAR, 20 per cent; MRRD (1 proposal), 9.5 per cent; and Afghan Non-Governmental Organisations (ANGO), 9 per cent. No data were available for UNICEF, nor was it possible to conduct an audit of SCA on the basis of its annual donor report.

Wells and latrines built by projects were cost-effective in comparison with international figures. A well in Afghanistan is financed on average at a cost of 4.8 Euro per beneficiary and a tube well at between 7 and 14 Euro/beneficiary.[124] A latrine would be between 6 and 12 Euro/beneficiary. Even if this represents material cost only, using 100 per cent support costs per structure, this would still be within acceptable limits. The gravity schemes visited had invested 18 Euro/beneficiary, a very economical value[125].

The evaluation found that, with respect to cost and quality, INGOs are generally the most efficient for the construction of water points and latrines, surpassed on cost only by committed and experienced ANGOs. UN organisations were generally found to be 10 to 20 per cent more expensive than other implementers.[126]

In the **livelihood** sector, WFP and ECHO worked well through their established NGO partners for food delivery and cash for work projects. This seems to have been efficiently managed in accordance with their established working practices. In the case of **NEEP**, the challenge was far greater, since this programme was implemented through the MRRD and the MOPW funded by the World Bank through the Ministry of Finance. All internal procedure systems had to be established, introduced and understood by both staff and potential bidders, requiring a great deal of senior management time.

The same was noted for the **NSP**, where the rather high investment cost during the establishment phase is expected to fall as the number of CDCs increases. **MISFA** appears to have functioned in an efficient manner during its short period of operations.

With all livelihood programmes, the absence of monitoring data and corruption prevented the evaluation from making a clear assessment of efficiency. Efficiency gains from human resource development by NGOs and implementing agencies have been negated by the **poaching of staff** by better resourced programmes, often UN agencies or contractors working on bilaterally funded programmes.

123 According to Sida Evaluation Manual.
124 Assuming 1 well serves 20 families or 120 persons.
125 An ECHO evaluation in Sri Lanka had min 18 Euro and max 130 Euro investment cost per beneficiary.
126 More elaborate security and travel regulations, salary levels and the system of rest and recreation for UN staff, which is not the case with other implementers, are contributing elements.

8. Cross-Cutting Issues

Four cross-cutting issues were addressed in this evaluation: gender issues; environmental issues; needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation; and the application of the Guidelines for Good Humanitarian Donorship.[127]

8.1 Gender

> *'Violence against women remains dramatic in Afghanistan in its intensity and pervasiveness, in public and private spheres of life.'*
>
> (Professor Yakin Ertürk, Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights on Violence Against Women)[127]

In the general development cooperation policies of the Donors, gender and environment are among the key criteria to be mainstreamed and present in all activities. Gender inequality was a highly publicised background factor in the Afghanistan intervention, and was highlighted in the Bonn Agreement, where it was stated that *'the participation of women and attention to their rights and status are both a requirement and a vision of the national peace and reconstruction process.'*

In Afghanistan, the term 'gender' does not easily translate into the local languages, and some Afghan groups regard the concept with considerable suspicion. At the same time, gender continues to be seen as a 'women's issue', and advice from experts such as Nancy Hatch Dupree, cautioning that in Afghan society it is essential to include men in any gender development work, has frequently gone unheeded. Unfortunately, understanding of gender issues is weak among all humanitarian actors, as is awareness of their importance. The GoA ministries and their provincial departments have no real strategy, and some donor agencies demonstrate little sense of direction.

The Bonn Agreement led to the establishment of the Ministry of Women's Affairs (MoWA) and the AIHRC. These two bodies work to ensure the equal participation of men and women in the nation-building and peace processes, and AIHRC has been increasingly involved in judicial matters involving women's rights.

The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women [129] was signed and ratified by the GoA in March 2003. The new Afghan Constitution makes discrimination on the basis of gender illegal and provides for equal rights and duties before the law. It also guarantees women's participation in governance, education, health, and other sectors. An average of two female parliamentarians will be elected in each province at the Parliamentary elections, and one half of the representatives in the Upper House, to be selected by the President, must be women.

127 *Multilateral donors. International Meeting on Good Humanitarian Donorship. Stockholm, 16-17 June, 2003.*
128 *Statement made in Kabul, 18th July 2005.*
129 http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm

Since the transitional government took office in early 2002, many strategy documents have been written which include references to gender. However, knowledge and ownership of these strategies are limited because they were developed by international consultants and not usually translated into national languages. Moreover, some of the objectives of these documents reflect a Western perspective on gender equality, which may clash with Afghan values, particularly those prescribed by Islam.

The lives of women in rural areas have not changed as much as the lives of women in urban areas. Social and cultural norms, which influence a woman's ability to exercise her rights, present major constraints throughout the countryside, albeit to differing degrees. Women in urban areas have far greater freedoms and opportunities by comparison. There appears to have been an imbalance in funding of gender-oriented projects in favour of urban areas, compounded by a lack of local expertise beyond the urban centres.

The main priorities expressed by women interviewed during the evaluation were for education, health, legal assistance, and security. At the project level, women expressed priority for access to clean drinking water, close to (or preferably within) their home compounds; for the building of bridges across water channels in order to ease their access to health facilities, etc.

Security is particularly important for women and girls, because if they do not feel safe moving around their neighbourhood, they cannot contribute meaningfully to the economy. If girls cannot go to school for fear of abduction, and women cannot travel to health clinics or hospitals due to limitations imposed by men, then improvements in service delivery will not benefit them. Poor enforcement of the rule of law impacts upon both men and women and undermines their quality of life. Individual security includes issues pertaining to inheritance and property rights; these are national issues that need to be addressed through the judicial reform.

It is therefore worrying that there is no legal assistance available for women other than that provided by the AIHRC. Women are suffering in prison often for no reason other than internal family disputes. The family court exists to solve these problems but its judgements are neither reliable nor consistent throughout the country, and most women have little chance of receiving true justice. High levels of domestic violence against women also impact on their psychological health and their potential to contribute to the economy. This is demonstrated by the high number of attempted female suicides in Herat province, where more than 380 cases were recorded at hospitals in 2003, caused by a combination of domestic violence, disappointed expectations of improved women rights and influence, and limited ability to influence decisions regarding their own lives – very contrary to what has been projected by the international community.

Achievements

The MoWA was established as a ministry in 2002. It has established a political structure, but its administrative organisation is weak and it has few consultants to support its work. Having initially attempted to implement projects at the provincial level, MoWA now focuses upon four areas for policy development, these being: female education, health, law and political rights (including constitutional issues and economic empowerment). The ministry has received little support from GoA, and other ministries tend to expect MoWA to solve all women's problems. In the provinces, the most notable activity of MoWA has been the provision of women's literacy training.

AIHRC has fallen into the same trap as MoWA, namely, of trying to solve empirical problems by action rather than by disseminating understanding. However, it has earned respect and is often resorted to by women seeking redress for family or social problems.

The advisory group on gender, whilst considered to be perhaps the best of the AGs, is not a stable body with a fixed membership, but rather an open forum, and therefore has been unable to develop a consistent policy or strategy.

The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has lacked a strategic vision in the period under review and has tended to operate more like an NGO, implementing small projects scattered across the country, often with little effective coordination with other donors.[130] These projects have included skills training courses and support to women's centres. UNIFEM/UNDP are working closely with MoWA to provide capacity building on strategic planning and in advocacy and by convening workshops and seminars.

On the positive side, the Ministry of Finance has introduced a very simplified form of gender budgeting into the National Development Budget process. All ministries are required to indicate which of their programmes relate to gender and this information is then collated by the Ministry of Finance to assist with programme prioritisation. This represents an encouraging step, and constitutes a form of gender training, though the lack of understanding within some ministries makes it difficult to monitor.

The National Development Framework and the work plan of the Afghan Government both insist that all programmes must pay special attention to gender. The NDF also refers to the need for communal dialogue to enhance the opportunities for women and to improve cooperation between men and women. However, 'Securing Afghanistan's Future'[131] published in March 2004, was disappointing in gender terms. Written by foreign consultants, with minimal inputs from Afghans, it was intended as a twelve-year forward looking document, but it shows very little foresight concerning the role of women beyond target setting for enrolment in primary and secondary education.

It is particularly disappointing that no overall needs assessments have been done on gender. Amongst the NGOs the most concerted attempts to deal constructively with gender issues have been directed at their own organisational structures. The Oxford Committee on Famine Relief (Oxfam) has conducted a gender mapping exercise and DACAAR and SCA are both working to develop internal staffing guidelines on gender. Likewise, while donors such as Sweden and Denmark have been prepared to support some gender awareness, this is primarily limited to the work of their own national NGOs. It was striking that recent programme documents produced by DFID, under its livelihoods sector for capacity building in the Ministry of Agriculture, made no reference to gender, despite assurances that this issue has been mainstreamed throughout DFID. Donor organisations that wish to promote gender awareness need to be more proactive in this area and must be prepared to make available the additional funding required to ensure that the issue is mainstreamed or specifically prioritised, rather than allowing it to become sidelined.

130 *UNIFEM has suffered from a rapid turnover of Directors, causing difficulties for policy and planning contingency.*

131 *http://www.af/resources/mof/recosting/SECURING%20AFGHNAISTANS%20FUTURE.pdf*

Ad hoc gender monitoring and evaluation systems have been developed by some individual NGOs, such as Oxfam, but beyond that there is no national baseline information upon which to establish future monitoring and evaluation surveys.

Intervention Impact
At the national level there are discernable impacts from gender related interventions, particularly with regard to the increased number of girls attending school, the drafting of a new constitution, attempts to raise awareness of gender issues within the GoA, and the work of the Ministry of Finance in establishing a gender budgeting process. Efforts made to ensure female participation in the presidential election also constituted a good starting point, although the number of women voters could have been increased if polling stations had been located in areas where women had easy and safe access.

Among the national programmes the NSP is securing women's representation at community level; this is a very big step forward which needs to be built upon. The microfinance institutions supported by MISFA have considerable potential in providing large numbers of female clients with cost-efficient access to loan finance.

Projects such as food and cash for work have found little opportunity to involve women, since the work offered was mainly manual construction, which is considered culturally inappropriate for women.

Conclusion
Afghanistan is a fractured and transitional society where local communities have yet to be re-established and where there is confusion over social values. This is aggravated by the extensive western influence entering the country through electronic media (violent films and the proliferation of pornography being prime examples). Afghan women report that they feel uncomfortable when trying to use the Internet cafés for email communication. This disjunction between traditional values and modern influences needs to be addressed, because the resulting confusion is threatening social norms and values, and is likely further to undermine gender relationships.

Before, and immediately following, the fall of the Taliban regime, much emphasis was placed on the need to improve the lives of women in Afghanistan. But since then other priorities have taken centre stage, and the issue of gender mainstreaming has been increasingly marginalised. Donor organisations, as well as human rights and advocacy groups, must ensure that pressure is placed on the Government to continue to build on the momentum established so far. One lesson that could be drawn from these first years is that mainstreaming of gender is not enough; a specific strategy needs to be developed to ensure the rights of women and their involvement in all political and development processes. However, any such strategy would need to include a working plan on how to include men and boys to ensure their support and avoid obstruction.

8.2 Environment

Afghanistan is facing critical and unprecedented environmental problems.[132] These have been aggravated by the immense environmental scarcity[133], which in turn is affecting the livelihoods of millions of people. It is important to note that environmental damage not only threatens the carrying capacity of land in Afghanistan, but also the Afghan people's coping capacity. Studies of the quantitative impacts of environmental degradation on GDP growth indicate the substantial adverse consequences of air and water pollution on public health and the adverse impact of deforestation and soil degradation on productivity in the agriculture sector.[134]

Although environmental issues tend to figure highly on agenda in their own countries, the Donors did not have a clear policy on their interventions in the environment sector in Afghanistan. However, they have indirectly provided some assistance for environment-related projects through UN, ICRC, ECHI, and EU involvement in humanitarian assistance and development projects that may have positive impacts on the environment, e.g., reference to water and sanitation sector, or the UN Green Afghanistan Initiative Network, as well as the UNEP environmental capacity building assistance to National Environmental Protection Agency (NEPA) and Ministry of Agriculture Food and Animal Husbandry (MoAFAH). However, the Donors do not appear to have earmarked funding specifically for the environment sector during the evaluation period. Thus, it was not possible to measure their direct contribution spend on the environment.

State of Affairs
There are real concerns over the environmental crisis in Afghanistan. Statements about the scale of environmental degradation are not exaggerations. Shockingly, the facts speak for themselves:

- With poor sanitation and lack of solid waste management, garbage is mixed with human excreta and left on most of the 16,000 streets of Kabul;
- On average, only 23 per cent of the population has access to safe drinking water;[135] and groundwater levels are uncertain;
- Air quality in the major cities, particularly in Kabul, is poor, causing considerable health threats;
- The poorest Afghans live in the most ecologically vulnerable areas;
- Persistent drought over the past few years has forced hundreds of thousands of people to abandon their self-sustaining life styles and become environmental refugees or IDPs;
- In 2002-2003, dust storms destroyed the livelihoods of tens of thousand of Afghans, and buried more than 100 villages in the provinces of Farah and Nimruz;
- Wetlands in southwest Afghanistan have been shrinking, and could turn into deserts if nothing is done to intervene;
- The fragile mountain forests are disappearing at a phenomenal pace;

132 For more details see: Saba, S. Daud, (2001), 'Afghanistan: Environmental Degradation in a Fragile Ecological Setting'. International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology. Volume 8, pp.279-289.

133 This is discussed by Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, (1999), Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Princeton University Press, p.253.

134 For comparison see: Pakistan NHDR, (2003): Pakistan National Human Development Report: Poverty, Growth and Governance. Oxford University Press, UNDP, New York.

135 Information based on 2003 figures from UNICEF, Kabul.

- In the past 30 years, almost 70 per cent of the natural forest cover of the country has been lost, and the remaining cover is severely degraded;
- Biodiversity is in decline and many endemic species of flora and fauna are endangered or on the brink of extinction.

The environmental priorities of the country are short-sighted. Afghans are currently more concerned with the basic elements of human survival, i.e. access to safe water and fertile land resources. Polluted water poses a threat to life. Each year thousands of Afghan children suffer from acute diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, tuberculosis, and trachoma, and 85 per cent of child mortality is due to preventable diseases related to environmental degradation.[136] The provision of safe drinking water and sanitation, together with some elementary education in hygiene, can dramatically help to alleviate these environmental problems and relieve much human suffering.

Soil erosion poses a threat to the livelihoods of almost 80 per cent of the Afghan population, reducing agricultural production and increasing the risks of floods and avalanches.

Poverty is one of the greatest threats to the environment, as people make use of all available natural resources in an unsustainable manner. If development policies aimed at reducing poverty are not adopted, the poor will continue to overuse their natural habitat merely to survive. The consequent environmental depletion will affect generations to come. The lack of national environmental management capacity and poor air and water quality in both cities and rural areas lead to health problems and substantial economic losses. Likewise, natural capital in the form of cultivable land, forest and biodiversity is in long-term decline.

These factors combine synergistically to affect human health and welfare negatively, and hinder development. They increasingly constrain economic prospects and growth, and so pose a serious threat to Afghanistan's mid- to long-term stability, and sustainable development. Yet, there are alternatives. Air and water resources could be slowly restored, forest and land degradation could be interrupted and even reversed, and biodiversity losses could be halted if adequate and timely interventions were made. Thus, in the short-term, interventions in the environmental sector should be focused on remedying more localised phenomena, such as air or water pollution, soil degradation, and deforestation. National as well as donor priorities for spending should be redirected to the most basic environmental needs and capabilities of Afghans.

It is obvious from this discussion that the issue of environmental security should be a major concern in the overall national strategy for sustainable development in Afghanistan, and that Donors should be prepared to give substantial long-term support to interventions in the environmental sector. All investment planning should incorporate a model of sustainable development that deploys environmentally safe technologies, and decision-making should seek ways to reflect the scarcity value of environmental resources so as to ensure the sustainability of development.[137]

136 *ANHDR (2004), 'Afghanistan National Human Development Report 2004: Security with a Human Face', UNDP, Kabul.*

137 *Johnson, et al., (1997): World Bank. Quoted in: China Human Development Report 2002, UNDP, Oxford University Press. New York.*

Conclusion
Over the past three years, only a tiny fraction of the Donors' assistance has been indirectly allocated to environment-related projects in Afghanistan. Action in the environmental sector has been negligible, on the part both of the Afghanistan central and provincial governments and of the international donors. However, the successful reconstruction of Afghanistan based on a sustainable development and environmentally aware agenda is possible. It is a matter of making the right choices to help make this happen. To achieve these GoAls, the establishment of frameworks is insufficient. Action is needed, and this requires a major effort and commitment by all actors, including the five Donors.

Current trends of environmental degradation in Afghanistan are leading the country deeper into poverty and dependency on external assistance, and if not reversed, might further increase human insecurity and social conflict. As noted in the water and sanitation section, the introduction of an Integrated Water Resource Management assessment is long overdue, not least as it will hold major importance in particular for the agricultural sector. Although the Donors have indirectly provided some assistance in environment-related sectors such as water and sanitation, direct funding to the government of Afghanistan earmarked for environmental sector has been scant or non-existent, and the **impact** negligible. Donors have not **coordinated** their activities in this sector, whether among themselves, or with the government of Afghanistan; the best way to make environmental interventions effective would be to assist the GoA to develop its environmental sector capacity by providing direct support.

Arguably, it is time for the Donors to change their attitudes to environmental issues, to understand the environmental sector requirements of Afghanistan, and to respond to them more **efficiently** and **adequately**. Environmental needs in Afghanistan are dire, and donors should not continue to neglect this sector, as they have done over the past.

8.3 Needs Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation

Donor guidelines emphasise the use of participatory needs assessments, solid monitoring processes, and evaluations of projects and programmes. These guidelines have, however, not been observed in full in the case of assistance provision during the evaluation period.

Needs Assessment
The Evaluation has identified two general types of needs assessment. One is what might be termed a rights-based assessment, where it is accepted that intended beneficiaries are entitled to various types of assistance or service, for example, provision of basic education for children or of health services. Here the needs assessment process seeks to determine the number of students or patients, the need for provision of schoolbooks or medicine, and construction of teaching or health facilities. The other type of assessment is more specifically related to the needs of single beneficiaries or groups of beneficiaries, where different communities and/or groups are requested to identify and prioritise their specific assistance needs. Their prioritisations will then depend on a range of variables, including their vulnerability, local priorities, available resources and communal preferences. The distinction between these two forms of needs assessment is not always evident.

At the national level, the most reliable assessment of needs and risks has been WFP's Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM), which has been instrumental in identifying and establishing the extent of the drought. From 2002, the VAM unit was incorporated into MRRD's Vulnerability Analyses Unit and termed a National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment. The main objective has been to collect better information about the livelihoods of rural people, both male and female. Questions include food consumption, health, education, water, markets, transport, agriculture, livestock, migration, income generation, assets, risks and shocks. UNICEF's Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) has been used since the late 1990s to assess children's situation in Afghanistan, including their health and education.

Traditionally, NGOs have used various forms of rapid or participatory needs assessment methodologies, ranging from decision-making processes that exclude beneficiaries to more extensive participatory processes that include both women and men. Humanitarian assessments have usually been undertaken in a less than thorough manner for rehabilitation and development programmes.

From the sector studies it is evident that more beneficiary-oriented needs assessments have not been prioritised. The water and sanitation study found that no needs assessment had been undertaken, except by DACAAR, and reported that service providers limited themselves to responding to community requests. And as the livelihood study pointed out that, even when a vulnerability assessment was made, the linkage between assessment and programming remained weak. The PRTs in general had no system for needs assessment, nor much knowledge of how to undertake one. The most beneficiary-oriented process seems to have been performed by NGOs involved in integrated communal development programmes, and by the NSP, for whom a rather extensive needs assessment, including separate assessments for male and female Community Development Councils, is mandatory as part of the preparation of a Community Development Plan (CDP). And, on the environment and gender issues, there have been no national environmental or broader gender studies.

The explanation frequently provided of the low priority given to needs assessments was that 'needs are so evident' and that 'there is a need to respond to everyone'. While this might have been the case during the early humanitarian phase in 2002, it cannot be justified for the situation in Afghanistan after 2003. Moreover, lack of proper needs assessments inhibits monitoring and proper evaluations as there are no benchmarks against which to assess the achievements.

Monitoring

Most Donors acknowledge that only a limited degree of monitoring has been undertaken during the evaluation period. None of the five Donors has been in a position to undertake regular monitoring of supported projects or to establish monitoring routines. There have been irregular project visits, mostly as invitees of the implementing agency. Certainly, security concerns have played a major role here, as a World Bank official pointed out, making it difficult for the donors to demand that NGOs monitor in areas where they themselves would not venture.

The exceptions are those NGOs that have made monitoring an integrated part of their project cycle (typically, DACAAR, SCA, CA, and the larger Afghan NGOs), as well as the role held by the Oversight Consultant in the NSP project. UNHCR has contracted

NGOs to monitor their shelter programme when its own staff was prohibited access by UN security rules.

Denmark has established a set of indicators with the MoE for reviewing support for the primary education sector, and had discussed plans with the ministry for an annual review.

The lack of monitoring has been a major factor in corruption. At times projects were not completed, such as a well in Zabul commenced by an unidentifiable NGO, or the quality of the construction work was far below the agreed standard. Moreover, the lack of monitoring has reduced the interaction between the intended beneficiaries and the donors, thereby weakening an invaluable security mechanism in the needs assessment process and in curbing corruption.

Evaluations
Likewise, evaluations have been rare throughout this period. With the exception of Ireland, none of the Donors had undertaken any major reviews of their assistance provision prior to this current study. Some UN agencies had undertaken internal evaluations, and the NSP has been externally evaluated and supervised by donors (and a major external evaluation is scheduled for mid 2005), but larger evaluations started to be implemented only in early 2005, and in the case of UNDP, UNHCR, and UNICEF these were mostly internally initiated reviews. Externally initiated reviews have been rare, although this evaluation was judged as very timely by implementers and beneficiaries.

Again, the professional NGOs appear to have been in the forefront, possibly as a fulfilment of their contractual obligations but also because evaluations are deemed a useful tool for project development.[138]

8.4 Good Humanitarian Donorship

The 'Good Humanitarian Donorship' guidelines consist of: a set of objectives and definitions of humanitarian action; a statement of general principles; and a list of good practice in donor financing, management and accountability, regarding funding, promoting standards and enhancing implementation, and learning and accountability.

The overall objectives listed by 'Good Humanitarian Donorship' have been generally followed by the Donors. However, in the highly politicised contexts of Afghanistan, with the ongoing 'War on Terror' and the overall aim of strengthening the position of the GoA, the impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian action certainly is challenged. In this case, geographical bias in assistance distribution and the military's involvement in assistance provision (except for Ireland and Sweden) are indications that the objectives have not been followed in full.

Turning to the general principles, the lack of needs assessments to allocate the proportions of humanitarian funding has already been noted; this results in minimal involvement of beneficiaries in deciding the humanitarian response. Typically, there is a difference between emergency oriented activities and rehabilitation and development oriented

138 Action of Churches Together (ACT) undertook a major evaluation of its emergency assistance in early 2003.

activities, with more emphasis on proper needs assessments and beneficiary inclusion in the latter. NGOs that are active in rural development and the NSP constitute good examples of how this principle can be observed, while building local organisational capacity to counter further humanitarian crises and, as the guidelines state, *'…in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development.'* In the case of Afghanistan, the principle of supporting and promoting the role of the United Nations (and the ICRC and NGOs) had to be balanced with the overall aim of strengthening the GoA, causing the Donors to perform a delicate balancing act symbolised by debates on the NGO legislation.

When it comes to good practice on funding, the 'Good Humanitarian Donorship' guidelines have been generally followed; the ARTF offers one example of a transparent and longer-term funding arrangement. As for Denmark the Aid Flow study observed that : *'…lack of flexibility means that aid administration officials may not be free to select the best channel for Danish assistance in dynamic situations like Afghanistan, but have to adhere to a plan made on an apparently arbitrary basis in early 2002.'* [139] The Evaluation has brought out differing views on this statement, indicating a need for Denmark to study the issue.

With regard to promoting standards and enhancing implementation, widespread ignorance of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement among UNHCR field staff and implementing NGOs indicates that greater effort is required. However, the main concern under this heading is whether humanitarian or military organisations should play the lead role when it comes to the prioritisation and implementation of humanitarian assistance. With the introduction of the PRT concept, the various guidelines on the use of military and civilian assets in disaster relief and complex emergencies have been bypassed. Humanitarian organisations are no longer the ones to invite the military in to support their humanitarian operations, as prescribed by the guidelines; rather, the PRTs (with the exception of the Swedish PRT) have defined the provision of humanitarian assistance as an integrated part of their (military) mandate. This is of major concern for all humanitarian actors, and warrants a wider debate on either the implementation or the revision of both the guidelines and PRT practice. Without this, the value of such (albeit voluntary) guidelines will be reduced.

Finally, in respect of learning and accountability, the Donors should be praised for being in the forefront in evaluating their performance in Afghanistan, although, as indicated, more could have been done in the way of monitoring and various assessments at an earlier stage.

In general, the Evaluation considers the guidelines to be a useful set of humanitarian principles agreed by all the donors and aid providers involved. Like the Code of Conduct and the Sphere Project, they encode a set of common values to which all donors and implementing agencies should be accountable. However, for these guidelines to have any value, each donor must respect and adhere to them, or, alternatively, initiate a process to modify and update them if they are deemed to be obsolete.

139 See 'Aid Flows to Afghanistan', p.60.

9. Assessment of Main Implementing Channels

9.1 Introduction

In this section, the main implementing channels will be assessed first on performance rated through the programmes and processes evaluated by the team before the thorny question of cost-effectiveness is addressed. The assessment includes the ARTF, UN agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the WFP, the ICRC, IOM and the NGO sector with a particular focus on DACAAR and SCA as the largest recipients of Donor assistance.

It has proven impossible to obtain a comprehensive overview of funding channelled through the various channels in order to make comparisons with the assistance provided by the Donors; different actors held very different perceptions and quoted conflicting figures and sources. The most reliable and up to date assessment of overall assistance provision is probably that done by ACBAR for the April 2005 Afghanistan Development Forum, based on official GoA statistics, showing that from January 2002 to September 2004:[140]

- 45.5 per cent of donor funding went directly to the UN;
- 28.5 per cent of donor funding went directly to the Government;
- 16.4 per cent of donor funding went directly to private contractors;
- 9.6 per cent of donor funding went directly to NGOs.

Excluded from the ACBAR assessment is funding subcontracted to NGOs from the other recipients; this is expected to be rather high for the UN and the GoA.

In comparison, the Aid Flow study identified that the five Donors contributed 40.2 per cent for the UN, 24.4 per cent towards the ARTF, 20.6 per cent for INGOs, 6 per cent for the ICRC, 4 per cent for the GoA and 4.8 per cent for others, leaving them with a substantially higher contribution for NGOs than recorded by ACBAR.

9.2 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

There is widespread agreement that the ARTF has been a very useful funding channel, reducing each Donor's administrative costs while ensuring compliance with GoA policy priorities. The transaction cost is low, while transparency is high. Three concerns were noted, however. One relates to the increasing sums of money spent on paying salaries, reducing the funding available for rehabilitation and development projects. The second is the donors' increased use of preferred funding allocations, (although this is a necessity for some donors due to more rigid budget allocation procedures), and the third is the minimal Afghan involvement in setting policy directions.

140 See ACBAR (2005), Background Information: Breakdown of Aid Flows and NGOs Accomplishments, Kabul.

9.3 The Government of Afghanistan

More concern was expressed about the GoA, which was found to be generally weak and with a low management capacity at all levels. There are, though, major differences between ministries, inducing a few Donors to concentrate on particular ministries, such as MRRD, as their preferred implementation channels, possibly overstretching the latter's capacity and certainly increasing inter-ministerial tension. Denmark's direct budget support to MoE, combined with secondment of consultants, allows for dialogue on priority settings, benchmarking and closer follow-up in that ministry. However, it may also have caused resentment within the GoA and in ministries not benefiting from similar arrangements, and undermined the principle of expanding GoA influence over priorities. Thus, the direct budget support system should be carefully reviewed, in collaboration with the MoF and the assigned consultants, before it is expanded or adopted by other donors.

9.4 The United Nations Agencies

A generally positive impression was formed of the UN agencies examined by this Evaluation.

The **UNDP** has been the main implementing agency for support to the Bonn process. The scale of the organisation has been impressive, but there has been criticism of its levels of efficiency and effectiveness, not least in the justice sector and in the DDR programme, and of low visibility and lack of transparency such as in relation to its support to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission. The voter registration and electoral support programme, an integrated UN project, was successful, and could serve as a model for future elections.

UNHCR has held the lead agency role for refugee return and IDPs, a role the team found it to have handled both efficiently and effectively. The procedure of allowing the Representative to handpick staff at the start of the operation could be usefully applied by other agencies and in other complex situations.

UNICEF has been involved in three sectors: education, health, and water and sanitation. The implementation of the 'Back to School' campaign is regarded as a success, although quality and training now need to be prioritised in the education sector to sustain the initial results. The health and nutrition programme used proven and cost-effective interventions, but staff shortages in the water and sanitation sector reduced the ability for close monitoring of assessments and implementation.

WFP has played a major role in emergency and rehabilitation efforts, and its importance in keeping alive millions of Afghans in need of food and work should not be underestimated. The key role that the VAM has played in establishing needs and prioritising areas for assistance provision should also be acknowledged. However, its continued distribution of wheat has been criticised, as have its slowness in orienting WFP towards rehabilitation and development GoAls and its unwillingness to coordinate efforts and establish a dialogue with the GoA.

9.5 International Organisations

Among the international organisations, ICRC and IOM projects have been reviewed. While the overall quality of **ICRC** activities was highly appreciated by all stakeholders, its justification for involvement in urban water projects is questioned. Regarding the **IOM**, there is a strong concern that its activities are spread too widely and that there are marked differences in quality between its various programmes.

9.6 Non-Governmental Organisations

Turning to the NGO sector, it should be noted that much of the success in humanitarian and rehabilitation, and even development interventions, has been based on foundations the NGO sector has established over decades. These include organisational structures covering most areas of Afghanistan, trained staff, community links, high flexibility, and a degree of risk acceptance unmatched by any other implementation channel. Thus, despite some criticisms, the NGOs continue to be the main implementing channel of the GoA and the UN, and the beneficiaries interviewed cited INGOs as the most reliable implementers.

Assessments differ more significantly when it comes to **Afghan NGOs**, many of which should not have been classed as NGOs. Afghan NGOs have been affected by the loss of key staff and their capacity has often been overstretched. However, the largest and most professional of those examined by this Evaluation stood out as highly professional and able to run programmes in high-risk zones (such as the Afghan Development Association in Zabul province) due to their long-term involvement with local communities, which guarantees them a degree of security, and to staff accustomed to working in difficult and changing circumstances (as is also the case for the senior INGOs). The societal connectedness varies largely for all NGOs, though the financial sustainability of the Afghan NGOs is generally weak.

The **SCA** receive high rating in every sector it is involved in, and is moreover regarded as a very important knowledge bank and is influential in policy setting. Over the past few years, it has shifted its previous solidarity role and become an important civil society actor.

DACAAR, an organisation whose name literally stands for water in Afghanistan, but which can also draw on extensive experiences with rural development assistance, is lauded for its professionalism and for its extensive monitoring and supervision system that ensures quality. Likewise, **DAART's** work in the education sector is praised, as is **DAC**'s in the health sector in Herat. Another model, adopted by **Ecumenical Office/Christian Aid**, is for partnership with Afghan NGOs, which enables them not only to follow the funding more closely, but also to add value through capacity building and to take on an active advocacy role.

The **Irish NGOs** are covered by the Irish Public Expenditure Review (2004), though those contacted through the evaluation provide a solid impression, though without the same history and influence of those NGOs discussed above. However, all of these NGOs continue to provide skills and standards in areas where such skills and standards are in high demand, including by the GoA, UN agencies and international organisations.

Given that this Evaluation has been favourable overall, it has been noted with regret that the whole NGO sector has been targeted as the main culprit in the aid misuse debate opened by representatives of the GoA, to the extent that the very concept of the NGO has been discredited among the public at large. This evaluation feels that, while commercial enterprises may have indeed abused the NGO name, the 'real' NGO community has not been proactive enough in counteracting threats to its reputation and in managing its public image.

9.7 Cost-effectiveness

Cost-effectiveness has been difficult to measure, for three reasons: first, some organisations were not very forthcoming with information about their administrative costs; secondly, there were very different ways of accounting expenses; and, thirdly, a high degree of sub-contracting made it virtually impossible to establish actual administrative costs.

What is certain is that security concerns leading to additional safety measures and higher frequency of staff leaving frequently Afghanistan for rest and recreation, high living/management costs, the extensive use of consultants, and the high transportation costs to/from Afghanistan have increased the costs for the UN agencies and the ICRC. This increase is estimated to constitute at least 20 per cent on top of normal expenses. While the well established INGOs are to a certain degree also affected by higher costs, these are minimised by the fact that they already have a structure in place in Afghanistan and have much less elaborate staff benefit systems. An ACBAR survey of 23 member organisations indicated administrative expenses were below 15 per cent.[141] The ANGOs are least affected by the security threat. Although they must bear increased salary costs, they do not need to invest in high security offices and staff houses.

On the other hand, cost-effectiveness is also about ensuring that assistance is implemented in the most effective way; responds to actual beneficiaries' needs; is monitored, evaluated and guarded against corruption; and is reported on in a transparent and controllable manner. In this respect, experienced and tested INGO as well as ANGO might be the most cost-effective in the longer run, as they already have structures and procedures in place, and can be held accountable by both beneficiaries and donors.

9.8 Interaction with and Support for the Indigenous Recovery Processes

Regarding economic recovery, team observations overall indicated, however unsystematically obtained, a considerable proliferation of economic activity, particularly in the capital and the North. This 'spirit of economic growth' does not appear to be closely connected to the aid provided, though road improvement was cited as important in many villages. It is rather perceptions of increased political stability that seem to be the main engine of economic growth.

141 ACBAR (2005), ACBAR Statement for the Afghanistan Development Forum, Kabul 4-6 April 2005.

Two further aspects of recovery will be addressed here. The first aspect concerns the recovery from conflict, where people strive to live safer lives, deal with past conflicts, and seek to prevent new ones. The second is recovery from the physical effects of conflict, which includes addressing their ability to rebuild and develop physical constructions, rebuild communal structures and practices, gain economic recovery and avoid aid dependency.

In support of increased security, the first aspect, AIHRC's recording of human rights violations and communal peacebuilding activities, including the establishment of peace committees, could prove instrumental in enabling local communities to recover from local conflicts. Further progress in this area, allowing people greater control over the recovery process, will depend on improving law and order and achieving a functional judicial system.

The second aspect will to a large extent depend on local communities' involvement in and control over the recovery processes. Aid dependency was noted in many communities visited, though less so in more remote and underserved areas and in areas where NGOs and the NSP established and worked through community organisations and demanded their involvement in decision making and contribution through communal work (*ashar*).

Still, economic recovery has been largely confined to the major cities, accompanied by mass migration from the rural areas. While rural exodus is a commonly observed trend in many developing countries, the team questions whether the low priority accorded to agricultural projects and the limited international presence outside the cities have exerted negative influences on settlement patterns and economic recovery in Afghanistan.

In sum, assistance has partly helped people in their recovery, but a higher degree of beneficiary involvement and a rural focus is needed in order to strengthen indigenous processes of recovery.

10. Conclusions

10.1 Related to the Evaluation Criteria

This section evaluates the assistance (humanitarian, rehabilitation and development) provided by the five Donors to Afghanistan between 2001 and 2005 in terms of the seven evaluation criteria specified by the TOR. These criteria are: relevance, effectiveness, impact, efficiency, coherence, connectedness (including sustainability) and coordination.

Overall, the interventions by the five Donor countries are considered highly **relevant,** given the prevailing context, to the needs of the beneficiaries, to GoA policies, and to the donor countries' own priorities, with the exception of the relatively low priority given to support for agriculture, women and the environment, and some components of the civilian aid provided by the PRTs.

Achieving **coherence** among the different aid instruments – political, humanitarian, rehabilitation, development and peacekeeping – and between donor policies and GoA policies under rapidly changing, difficult conflict conditions has been a great challenge. However, the Donors have been largely successful in supporting GoA priorities and in showing the necessary flexibility in relation to the provision of the aid needed at different periods of time. The interplay between ISAF PRT contributions towards political stabilisation and the creation of an aid-enabling environment has been a particularly sensitive issue, but grosso modo synergy between these two processes was achieved.

The Evaluation finds that aid overall has been rather well **connected** with the longer-term development needs identified by the GoA as well as with interconnected problems of the policy of Afghan authorities, with the partial exception of the justice sector. As concerns capacity building of local structures at provincial and district levels, a more mixed picture was observed. Sustainability is difficult to measure at this early stage. However, the absence of a serious attempt to strengthen and connect with the justice sector, as well as the lack of effective protection of human rights and personal security, pose a threat to the future stability of the new Afghanistan. The financial sustainability of the various interventions is another major concern, in the light of the expected future income of the Government and its consequent ability to assume greater responsibility for functions presently covered through the ARTF. The lack of substantial capacity building might threaten the sustainability of the GoA and donor investments. However, there is considerable variation between ministries. Positive results are documented for capacity building in respect of the MoRR's ability to handle refugee and IDP return.

One aspect is certain: environmental sustainability is at risk. Even the de-mining programmes, whose impacts might have been expected to be wholly positives, have had deleterious environmental consequences by opening up new areas to logging and to the unsustainable exploitation of natural resources. Even more alarming is the totally unsustainable use of scarce water resources resulting from the lack of planning for proper water resource management.

A comprehensive GoA-led **coordination** structure was established in early 2002. This included Consultative and Advisory groups for the main areas of the NDF. Their performance differed depending on leadership and agencies' willingness to participate. There is no centralised information about the humanitarian or development activities of international agencies or the main NGOs[142] apart from the Donor Assistance Database, which itself provides only a partial overview of activities by province or district. Coordination between Kabul and provinces has been poor, the only formal linkages and/or exchanges of information being those facilitated by UNAMA or NGOs. While the CG process and the National Development Forums have been successful innovations, there is no mechanism for coordination between the GoA, multilateral organisations, donors, INGOs and national NGOs at a national level. This has excluded the NGO community from the national development budget process and from discussions on national development priorities.

While several ministries lauded the Donors, and European countries more generally, for their willingness to coordinate their activities and to keep the GoA informed, they were rather negative towards US attitudes and practices, complaining that they felt overrun and ill informed about both US policy and programmes. Within different ministries, poor communication was noted between externally contracted local consultants, at times working on different donor-funded programmes, and the permanent civil servants. This hampered both programme and overall co-ordination. Although the donor community and the GoA should be complimented for realising large joint initiatives under difficult conditions, the acknowledgement of the above shortcomings has led to an ongoing review of the whole system.

Overall, **effectiveness** presented a mixed picture. The most positive results relate to the provision of humanitarian aid, in particular regarding the return of refugees and IDPs and the rehabilitation of the water supply. By contrast, the education assistance has been more effective in terms of quantity than of quality, while coverage in the health sector has been low. PRT and DDR contributions to stabilisation and the strengthening of the state have been effective, as shown by the absence of major upheavals to which they were vulnerable.

It follows from the above observations that the **impact** of the aid provided can be expected to be considerable, provided that there is sufficiently effective action within civil service and justice reform to curtail the risk of criminalisation of the state and that open conflict comes to an end. Both prerequisites will require the continued presence of the aid community in Afghanistan for a considerable period of time.

Regarding **efficiency** in respect of cost-effectiveness, it has been difficult to obtain exact information, but most indicators point to a downward trend: logistics, security overheads, inflated prices for support costs and high manpower expenses related to capacity buying. The return of rejected asylum seekers and the civilian aid provided by the PRTs appear to have been particularly expensive in relation to their outcomes.

A general observation from several sectors and regions was that the influx of aid appears to have had a negative effect on the willingness of communities to take development into their own hands – 'they sit back and wait'. Communities in remote areas who had received less assistance overall were noticeably more willing to participate in devel-

142 *See WSP International (2004) 'Internal and External Actors and the Quality of Their Dialogue in Post-Conflict Countries – Afghanistan Case Study'.*

opment initiatives than were better provisioned areas close to the major cities. Further, the GoA's general criticism of donors for not delivering assistance on time, and for the NGOs of assistance misuse, will generate a harmful disconnection between the Afghan population and the international community.

10.2 Comparative Conclusions Regarding Sectors

The starting point for the intervention was, from a humanitarian viewpoint, among the worst in the world, and was aggravated by the drought. Thus, the interventions were in general highly needed, appropriate and timely. It was acknowledged from the start that the GoA had limited capacity, that there was an absence of reliable data, that the UN was struggling to balance its 'light footprint' against the need to intervene, and that the role of NGOs as independent assistance providers and development actors would have to change. From there on, the situation evolved differently within the various ministries, depending on their commitment to the state-building process, support within their own ministry (and from the Ministry of Finance), funding availability and the Ministries' (and Ministers') ability to gain the trust of the Donors and to engage in a dialogue with other actors.

Beneficiaries indicated that three major concerns had diminished their appreciation of the assistance that had been provided. The first was the increase in corruption at all levels, limiting their access to assistance and service delivery as bribes had to be paid, even to ambulance drivers in the case of hospital referral. The second concern related to clientelism, which has had a serious impact on aid distribution. Powerful individuals directed the aid flow towards their clientele, and as a result, aid was not distributed according to need. Thirdly, there was a growing feeling that NGOs and the UN, and the GoA in Kabul, were wasting and misusing the funds for their own purposes, diverting resources intended for ordinary Afghans.

Given the situation in Afghanistan at the onset of the period covered by this evaluation, and the broad areas covered here under this heading, it is more an underpinning and a framework for all other interventions than a 'sector'. Nation-building was based on the Bonn Agreement with its ambitious construction of the democratic polity, informally based on a co-optation strategy and formally secured with UNDP assistance. While implementation thus far has been successful, the financial sustainability of the numerous elections will probably require international assistance for many years.

The US and the World Bank had set the overall guidelines for state-building, giving priority to the minimum prerequisites for the creation of a functional, lean and efficient state. Other key donor nations took over the lead responsibility for the sub-sectors, including the UK for Counter-Narcotics, while the MoF has been a priority for several key donors, including the UK. The other Donors have contributed substantially through the ARTF, and in the case of Denmark, through management support for the MoE. While the intervention has successfully obtained the minimum requirements, the question remains whether these represented the optimal strategy choice. The Evaluation is of the opinion that it would have been wise to have placed greater emphasis on Justice and on the sub-national administration, and, more broadly, that it would have been better if the state had been more interventionist from the outset in order to service the citizens in more visible and effective ways. For aid to have been directed towards these goals would

have required donors to take an approach that was more independent of the US and World Bank.

In respect of the programmes for **refugees and IDPs**, the Evaluation concluded that the UNHCR has played an instrumental role in all aspects of the programmes for the returned refugees and IDPs. It handled its responsibility in an innovative and committed manner, by focusing its efforts on those activities it was capable of handling. UNHCR workers acknowledged that the responsibility ultimately rests with the GoA and assisted the various Afghan ministries gradually to assume this role. All Donors provided substantial and prolonged financial support for UNHCR's programmes and, according to UNHCR, Donors based in Kabul were supportive and followed their operation closely.

UNHCR was quick to take on board the specific resettlement and protection challenges posed by Afghanistan, and began to develop a durable and alternative strategy for both remaining refugees from Iran and Pakistan and IDPs. In the light of this observation, the Evaluation questions whether it was right to commence forced return from Europe, and suggests that the momentum of voluntary return may have yielded better results in the longer run as many Afghans seem to have relocated within Europe rather than be returned.[143]

The education sector has rightly been given a high priority, resulting in a massive increase in number of enrolled students. Particularly encouraging is the increase in number of girls attending school, though lower enrolment in rural areas is an area that will require further attention. There has also been notable work underway to introduce new teaching materials, training of teachers and not least, building of schools. There is however a major concern about the quality of education and a felt need to engage MoE in a dialogue on how to ensure further capacity development within the ministry, policy and strategy development and ways to document, analyse and further the achievements in the education sector.

The health sector has undergone major changes with the introduction of the BPHS. However, there are still important limits on the capacity and ability of central and provincial authorities to assume their stewardship roles. The NGOs have been transformed from independent developmental agents into service delivery contractors, while private actors play an increasing role without being subjected to regulation or GoA control. Any measurement of PPA performance criteria is lacking or unreliable due to the scarcity of baselines and projectable population data. There are still huge unmet needs for preventive and curative services, and important sectors of mental health, disability and hospital referral services need to be phased in and financed. There is a shortage of health professionals willing to work in rural areas, and fierce competition and salary discrepancies have led to a massive turnover of employees and declining competence. The introduction of 'cost recovery' and other payments for services may adversely affect access for the poor.

Considering its importance, the support the health sector has received from the Donors has been low. It may be possible to effect further improvements in this sector given the competencies developed by NGOs (especially SCA, DAC and Christian Aid) and BPHS reforms.

143 *Interviews with asylum seekers in Norway indicate that a large percentage of them came from other European countries (including Denmark and the Netherlands) as they feared being sent back to Afghanistan, a trend confirmed by the Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board.*

The water and sanitation sector has not been a priority for the Donors, receiving 8-9 per cent of total funding, despite the acknowledged need for drinking water and a shared assumption that clean water and improved sanitation practices help to improve public health. Ministries and implementers involved in this sector have done a commendable job, largely based on standards and coordination arrangements in place well before 2001.

The Evaluation wishes to record two serious concerns, however. First, the large number of dry wells leads the team to question whether the technology applied by the implementers was appropriate and whether the implementers could have done more to develop adequate technical solutions. Secondly, the lack of early and systematic needs assessments, of elaborated monitoring and supervision strategies, and of effective and efficient coordination have reduced the implementers' and donors' ability to ensure the needed quality of assistance provision.

Within the **livelihoods sector** the quantity of aid delivered is impressive, and the sector been a high priority for the Donors. However, numerous constraints affected the quality of aid delivered. Security was a major issue in some areas, as was the availability of reliable information, the time available to undertake proper assessments prior to design and planning, the shortage of skilled and competent human resources, and the pressure to deliver rapid solutions in support of the political process. As a result, despite the relatively high levels of funding to this sector, many designated beneficiaries expressed anger that they had not experienced tangible benefits. The constraints also influenced financial and cost management, with inevitable accusations of corruption now becoming rife. Of the programmes reviewed by this Evaluation, the NSP and MISFA stand out positively, both taking a more long-term approach with greater involvement of the beneficiaries.

While the livelihoods interventions have had some positive impact on the rural economy as a whole, the **agricultural sector** has not been targeted by the Donors, despite previous engagements and funding through the NGOs. Nor has funding from other donors been more forthcoming. Provided the importance of this sector for the poorer part of the Afghan population, it has apparently fallen victim to the difficulty in prioritising several sectors at the same time. However, increased recognition of the needs in the sector seems to be underway in the donor community.

Gender was very high on the agenda of all donors from the start of the intervention. The strong focus on women's situation in Afghanistan, and the denial of their basic rights (access to education, health services and job opportunities), led to massive and sustained support for education programmes, women's entrance into the political sphere, emphasis on gender mainstreaming and projects with a specific women focus.

In practice, less has been achieved on the policy front, and many Afghan women question the impact of many projects. The high rates of both successful and attempted suicides among women recorded in Herat are one dramatic consequence. These appear to reflect a more general problem as many women explain that they had expected major changes after the overthrow of the Taliban, but find that they are still forcedly married, treated inhumanely and denied access to jobs. For many women the gap between expectations and reality has become very hard to handle.

Environment has not been a top priority for any actor, including the Donors and the GoA. While Sida made a deliberate choice to prioritise other issues, other agencies have

simply overlooked the environment. Threats to the environment in Afghanistan, and to the long-term quality of life and sustainability of a number of interventions, include poor water resource management, polluted water and air (especially in Kabul), logging, and long-term effects of the recent drought. Refugee return and urbanisation have aggravated these environmental problems. There is an urgent need to address these issues in a substantial manner.

10.3 Comparative Conclusions Regarding Individual Donors

Denmark made significant contributions to the joint international endeavours within nation- and state-building, stabilisation and the return of refugees and IDPs through its support for the UNHCR, ARTF, WFP, UNICEF, UNDP, PRTs and the MoE. Denmark also took an active role in supporting human rights and mine actions. The assignment of civilian staff to work in Afghanistan has been small.

While still supporting the work of the Danish NGO, DACAAR, Denmark chose not to prioritise what it had accomplished within water supply and rural development prior to 2001. This contrasts with Sweden's policy, which has been at least partly to build on the important work of the SCA, and with the priority given by the DCI to Irish NGOs.

The Evaluation found that the Danish contributions have had a positive effect on primary education provision, and will continue do so in the future, given that a substantial part of the aid has been invested in improved teacher training provision and teaching materials. Both of these were much needed. However, poor management capacity within the Afghan MoE has been a hindrance to progress. Denmark assigned only one Danish educational expert to work in this Ministry. The effect of Danish assistance to primary education would have been enhanced if Denmark had assigned a greater number of expert staff to work in the sector, in line with UK staff deployment in the MoF.

Similarly, it appears the AIHRC could have benefited from closer involvement by Denmark; this would have required Denmark to assign additional representation office staff or an expert to the work.

Given the importance of the water, agricultural and rural development sectors for Afghans and the relatively low donor priority these sectors received during the evaluation period, the Evaluation believes that Denmark would have been in a position to make a greater contribution to improve the living conditions for potential beneficiaries if it had utilised the existing Danish resource base in these sectors to a greater extent.

The contributions from **Ireland** were mainly directed through the ARTF and Irish NGOs such as Concern, Ecumenic Office/Christian Aid, GoAl and Trócaire, covering a range of sectors and implementation modes. Ireland did not maintain a representation office in Afghanistan, and took a purely humanitarian approach. But it has also contributed substantial support to UNICEF and UNHCR and support for de-mining action through the British NGO Halo Trust.

By applying this model, the DCI has, according to the recent Public Expenditure Review of the Irish aid, obtained 'good value for money' in Afghanistan, while economising on manpower and transaction costs. The price has been lack of influence on developments within the respective sectors in Afghanistan, since Ireland has had very

limited engagement in policy debates with other donors and the GoA, and as the NGO community has not been involved in the overall coordination and decision making bodies. However, some of the Irish NGOs have made significant contributions to policy debate – e.g. on the PRT issue – and been innovative in their capacity building of Afghan NGOs and civil society organisations.

The **Netherlands** quickly adopted and has consistently pursued the policy of advocating and practising multilateralism in Afghanistan. By prioritising state-building through the ARTF, which receives 42 per cent of Dutch funding, the resolution of the refugee and IDP problems through the UNHCR and stabilisation through ISAF contributions, including the establishment of a PRT, the Netherlands has rendered important contributions to the joint intervention, supported by a relatively well staffed embassy.

While only prioritising the Dutch NGOs through the UN administred NGO fund, the only recent bilateral initiative of the Netherlands has been a separate allocation for civilian PRT activities in the province of Baghlan, which appears somewhat out of line with the overall policy of multilateral coordination, since these activities do not fit into existing development priorities.

Given the size of the Dutch contributions, its model for aid provision differs from the other Donors in its consistent simplicity, influencing development in Afghanistan through efforts to establish an aid benchmarking system and systematic dialogue with GoA officials.

Sweden has also supported the multilateral joint interventions within state-building through the ARTF, within stabilisation through ISAF/PRT, regarding refugees and IDPs through the UNHCR, and within education through UNICEF. However, Sweden's single largest financial contribution has been to the Swedish Afghanistan Committee (SCA). SCA engagement and influence in coordination bodies and general policy debates, combined with the high number of former Afghan SCA staff members holding ministerial posts, has afforded Sweden greater influence over policy formulation than might be expected from such a modestly staffed representation office. The high proportion of staff, both in Kabul and at home in Sida and the MFA, with previous Afghanistan experience has reinforced this advantage.

Sweden's participation in Afghanistan has differed from that of the other four Donors in two ways. First, it has systematically supported the health sector by continuing to support the work of the largest Swedish NGO, the SCA, in this sector. By contrast, Sweden's support for SCA work in the education sector was discontinued for coordination considerations. Secondly, Sweden has drawn on its comparative expertise in road construction to undertake building projects in conjunction with the EC; this makes it the only Donor to have worked directly with the EC.

The UK has been a major player in Afghanistan. On the military side, it has been the nation with the largest engagement after the US. On the bilateral, civilian side, it has been the lead donor in the difficult area of Counter-Narcotics, particularly alternative livelihoods, and a major donor within state-building, including considerable support for the MoF, police reform and the Civil Service Reform Commission. Multilaterally, the UK has been in line with the other Donors with the support for the ARTF (the single largest channel), for nation-building and refugees/IDPs through UNDP, the GoA and UNHCR. By contrast, British NGOs active in Afghanistan have received little govern-

ment support. The UK has been equipped with well-staffed sections within the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and DFID to carry out these activities.

The UK intervention has been consistent in its prioritisation of the political, administrative and stabilisation framework. However, given the size of the British contributions as well as the scale of the human resources devoted to their management, more visible outcomes for the UK engagement in state-building might have been expected. The UK lead has succeeded in mustering donor support for initiatives within counter-narcotics, but has found it difficult to exercise strategic leadership in this domain owing to strong US engagement in the issue. US policy in this domain has been unstable, with an early emphasis on poppy eradication, while the UK approach has consistently emphasised the need to develop alternative livelihoods. Within PRTs, the UK has had an important, informal lead role for the military contributions from Denmark and Sweden.

10.4 Overall Conclusions

The Afghanistan intervention has been a high priority for the Donors, and has presented important new challenges for the provision of international aid. Donors have had to respond to an urgent need for humanitarian and development aid under continued conflict conditions while also supporting the reunification of the Afghan nation and the creation of a functioning democratic polity. This required the five Donors to act quickly to mobilise political priority and financial resources in line with the overall parameters outlined by the international community and as requested by the GoA.

In financial terms, Afghanistan became a major recipient of humanitarian and development aid from the Donors. Pledges were fast forthcoming, and in general allocated funds have been disbursed in an effective and timely manner, contrary to GoA criticism of other donors.

Donor resources: manpower and experience
Decisions about the practical deployment of allocated funds were affected by the perceived urgency of responding simultaneously to humanitarian, rehabilitation, development and security imperatives under unfamiliar and difficult conditions. Although the donors relied heavily on the international aid providers, they also had their own needs and priorities, whose fulfilment required adequate human resources in the respective home ministries/aid agencies and in Afghanistan.

The Evaluation found, however, that the human resources allocated by the Donors for the identification and implementation of their Afghanistan policies have not matched the political and financial prioritisation of these policies and the aid environment in Afghanistan, with its complex interplay between humanitarian, development and military instruments. Inadequate staffing in the home ministries and at the representation offices/embassies in Kabul was frequently cited as a bottleneck in relation to the elaboration and implementation of strategies, not least regarding co-ordination with the GoA and the large donor community present. A large proportion of staff assigned to the Afghanistan interventions by all five Donors was quite junior and/or without prior Afghanistan experience, and the turnover rate appears to have been high.

In designing their humanitarian interventions, Denmark, Sweden and the UK drew, to a certain degree, on advice from NGOs with substantial Afghanistan experience,

although Denmark did not prioritise areas of previous NGO engagement. By contrast, NGO advice appears to have had little or no input into the design of the Netherlands' intervention; however, the Netherlands' strong focus on directing its aid through a few multilateral channels reduced the need for aid management. Ireland has chosen to channel much of its comparatively small contribution through Irish NGOs with Afghanistan experience and was not represented at the state level in Afghanistan. Finally, the UK, the largest Donor, stood out by devoting considerable manpower resources to its embassy and the DFID office in Kabul.

None of the home ministries in the Donor countries appear to have made a systematic attempt to draw on the experience of earlier complex emergencies. Potential sources of knowledge were not exploited either because of the haste with which the Afghanistan interventions were designed, or because of a lack of knowledge management capacity within the ministries. This is lamentable because earlier experiences could have enabled the Donors to anticipate some of the problems described below.

The Present Situation

The Evaluation finds that the aid interventions, in combination with internal Afghan political stabilisation and economic recovery processes, have produced successful responses to the humanitarian challenge, to the need to rehabilitate vital parts of Afghan society and polity, and, to a certain extent, to the onset of sustainable development processes. In particular, the following accomplishments are noted:

- The realisation of the political process, which has seen a visible and self-conscious government installed, the new constitution adopted, and a president elected in a way that promoted peace, political stabilisation and regime legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the population.
- The promotion of stability by the DDR Programme and the PRTs.
- The promotion of return, agricultural development and of the potential for environmental protection through significant progress in the de-mining activities.
- The establishment of basic requirements for a working state apparatus in terms of
  - A Ministry of Finance able to manage budgetary and fiscal functions in cooperation with the ARTF.
  - The exercise of effective state authority over most of the territory through the ANA and the new police corps.
- Mainly adequate responses to the humanitarian imperative in terms of
  - Emergency aid through shelter and food for work programmes, and especially;
  - The fast and successful resolution of a large part of the refugee and IDP problem.
- Some progress in meeting the basic needs of the population, most notably within primary education and improved access to water and sanitation; by contrast, progress within health and sustainable livelihoods still leaves much to be desired.
- In addition, large infrastructure projects are supposed to lay the foundations for the enhancement of the already ongoing economic recovery in the society at large.

Interviewees within the relevant authorities in the five Donor countries stressed the above accomplishments, along with others, especially the existence of the AIHCR and the work of the Civil Service Commission. There seemed to be a general conviction that 'Afghanistan is on the right track, although there may still be a long way to go'. Without wishing to question the commendable results achieved under very difficult conditions,

the Evaluation has found progress in rehabilitation and development less stable than perceived by the Donors, for the following reasons.

Unintended consequences of democracy
Below the surface, political stabilisation is less firmly rooted than at first appears. Open conflict with the 'Neo-Taliban' still continues. Endeavours to unite the nation through an all-encompassing coalition building according to democratic procedures have had unintended consequences. One is that parts of the state have been captured by political appointees, some of whom are former warlords and commanders; they lack the needed management motivation and capacity and are prone to corruption and crime, thus jeopardising the credibility of nation- and state-building. In addition, the numerous elections required by the new system seem to lead to long periods of impasse, as they entail the replacement of the higher echelons of the civil service.

While such 'democratic excess' may be unavoidable in a difficult transition period, it would have been highly desirable to have given higher donor priority to efforts to strengthen the justice sector, which has received limited support. It appears that the donor community has been satisfied in this respect with the existence of the AIHRC, despite the fact that AIHRC's operational capacity is constrained by its lack of connectedness with the Afghan polity, including the justice sector, law enforcement and corrections, and with the NGO community. Thus far, the donors have also failed to develop explicit anti-corruption policies in relation to the functioning of the Afghan state.

Parallel State-Building
A reform of the civil service towards a merit-based system that is able to manage effectively service delivery in all sectors where the Donors have provided aid is needed. While reform is now underway through the PRR process, it appears questionable to the Evaluation whether its content will be adequate in relation to needs it has identified. Rather obvious possibilities for strengthening the existing civil service have not been utilised. Simple and visible improvements in the facilities and work conditions at the subnational levels, and of communications between the different levels of the civil service, and between these and the citizens, have apparently not been attempted.

Instead, donor emphasis has focused on the provision of the minimum requirements for the work of the MoF, army and police, through the establishment of 'parallel systems' of internationally paid and funded project staff. To a certain extent, this has been more about capacity buying than capacity building, and overall the result has been to create extreme discrepancies in the remuneration of staff supposedly doing the same work. In general, internationally funded staff, including Afghans and the staff of internationally funded Afghan NGOs – often rather young people, whose main qualifications are command of English and computer literacy – receive salaries which are many times higher than those of experienced Afghan civil servants, who, in order to be able to support a family, are forced to look for supplementary incomes. This has bred widespread resentment, whose full importance the donor community has been slow to comprehend.

The Aid Misuse Debate
The GoA has been very outspoken in its criticism of aid manpower costs, directing some highly publicised criticism at the international NGOs especially. As a result, the Evaluation found a widely shared picture in the population at large of a group of culprits called NGOs (a term including the UN agencies), who earn ridiculously high salaries, drive expensive cars, and live in expensive houses. In addition, it is a common

perception that aid providers often make big and easy money by chain-outsourcing tasks to sub-contractors, with each of the 'Chinese boxes' keeping an overhead for itself, leaving an anecdotal 10 per cent of the original grant to its intended recipients.

While this discourse highlights some genuine serious core problems about high transaction costs, and misuse of the NGO concept, it also carries the risk of turning responsible and honest NGOs into scapeGoAts with a 'public enemy' reputation.[144] This is to the detriment of their potential to deliver aid more effectively, including on cost, than other aid providers and reinforces GoA control of aid delivery at a time when the GoA has not always had the capacity to handle it well. Among the Donors, the prevailing response to this problem was to voice satisfaction that the Afghan government is demonstrably in the driver's seat, and to express the conviction that the NGOs have to get used to the new realities that will reduce the freedom of action they enjoyed under Taliban rule.

This attitude overlooks the organisational memory of professional NGOs, their technical know-how, and, above all, the high levels of trust they established with local communities during the decades when they were the sole assistance providers. Moreover, it underestimates the need for an active civil society as a counterbalance to the state and for a proper debate on the appropriate role of the NGOs, international and national, in civil society.

However, a recent tendency has been observed within the donor community in Afghanistan to take a more critical attitude towards the GoA's management capacity and towards the problems of corruption, accompanied by a more cautious attitude towards the limitations of NGO capacity. This rethinking has been fuelled by criticism emanating from key Afghan informers of alleged donor complacency in relation to assuming responsibility for the use of the aid.

The Impact of Insecurity on Effectiveness and Efficiency

At present, political stability has not been matched by security. The effects of continued warfare has been accompanied by an apparent growth in various types of crime, which can only be effectively curtailed by the availability of alternative employment opportunities, given the large number of small weapons in circulation combined with the fact that activities associated with the production and distribution of the opium poppy currently constitute the only avenue to substantial incomes for many Afghans.

Insecurity has impacted negatively on the geographical distribution of aid, resulting in a gross concentration of aid in the most secure parts of Afghanistan (the capital and the central and northern regions), at the expense of some of the neediest parts of the country. This imbalance has reduced the overall effectiveness and coverage of the aid provided.

Moreover, the security problems have entailed significantly increased transaction costs for aid delivery. The Evaluation did not come across any attempt to detail the scale of these costs, apparently because the aid providers did not generally perceive lack of funds as a problem. However, an unofficial estimate is an average 'security overhead' of 20 per cent. In respect of Kabul, this figure excludes indirect costs resulting from the high security environment of the aid community, time lost because of the limited freedom of movement in the city, and very high accommodation and other costs as a result of

144 It should be noted that the rural population does not differentiate between NGOs and UN agencies; the term muzzesi (organisation) is used for both.

accelerating inflation. More generally, countrywide security problems have reinforced the tendency towards urbanisation, causing the population of Kabul to quadruple over the evaluation period. These trends are undesirable and costly for the whole economy.

Crisis Spirit
A marked tendency was observed within the donor community to evaluate aid in terms of its quantity at the expense of its quality. This was particularly evident within primary education where the impressive enrolment figures have not been matched by improvements in the quality of education offered or in the facilities provided. More broadly, the weighting towards quantity over quality seems to reflect the haste with which a large number of interventions were implemented as a result of the pressure to produce demonstrable results in the light of the high political priority attached to the conflict in Afghanistan. This perceived pressure also seems to account for the surprisingly low priority that has been devoted to the promotion of gender equality (originally cited as one of the major reasons for the intervention in Afghanistan) and to the agricultural and environment sectors, other traditional donor priorities.

In conclusion, the Evaluation finds that aid to Afghanistan has produced important results, but at a high cost, caused by security and logistical constraints. Aid has been unevenly distributed between regions and communities, and has sometimes failed to target the most needy. Moreover, for achieved impacts to be sustainable, it will be necessary to continue development and peacekeeping support to Afghanistan over the long term and be prepared for different peacebuilding and conflict scenarios. Future donor interventions should prioritise the promotion of the rule of law, measures against corruption and effective service delivery by the state.

11. Recommendations

11.1 Overall Recommendations for Complex Emergencies, including Afghanistan

1. The knowledge management capacity of the MFAs/aid agencies of Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden should be strengthened to make them able to accumulate and use experiences from complex emergencies. The Donors should ensure that sufficient and adequately skilled manpower is available in the home offices and in the field to:
   a. Manage donor participation in costly and complicated aid interventions
   b. Enhance the coherence between the use of political, military, humanitarian and development instruments
   c. Ensure realistic political analyses of the local contexts
   d. Deliver greater emphasis on needs assessment and stocktaking.

This recommendation addresses needs arising from the relative novelty of complex multi-dimensional interventions, as elaborated in 'Lessons Learned', Section 12 below. In the smaller donor nations, the recommendation may imply some reorganisation within the concerned offices, and possibly the application of additional recruitment criteria, given that staffing levels are unlikely to be expanded.

2. The Donors should address the problem of their image in the local environment in order to avoid counterproductive clashes between the objectives of international community presence and the local population's perceptions of its actual role.

In Afghanistan, the international community is perceived by local people as enjoying excessively high housing and living standards, their symbolic large vehicles contributing to permanent traffic congestion in the capital and to security-imposed closure of some main routes. A rethinking of the needs of the international community might lead, for example, to the use of smaller cars and to lower cost housing.

3. The donor community at large should closely coordinate their practices in relation to the recruitment and remuneration of staff in order not to out-compete local government and to avoid the creation of a skewed labour market. The Donors should bring up this issue in the relevant fora, underlining the proven gravity of the problem, since it cannot be solved by individual donor action, however commendable the attempt.

Financially, it is estimated that the above recommendations all contain a potential for significant savings. In the case of recommendation 1, however, these will occur only in the medium to long term.

11.2 General Recommendations Regarding the Afghanistan Intervention

4. The Donors should reaffirm their long-term commitment to support the development of Afghanistan for at least the next ten years. Their interventions should be connected with the Millennium Development GoAls and take into account Afghanistan's income generation potential as well as need for flexibile aid provision in the case of new, major changes in the political and security environment in Afghanistan.

This commitment is already underway in at least two of the five Donors. Denmark has elaborated a Draft Strategy for continued aid at existing levels for the next five years. In Sweden, a new five-year strategy is under elaboration, pending this evaluation.

5. High priority should be devoted by the Donors to the effective installation of the rule of law and to the fight against corruption. This should be combined with the full implementation of the constitution and with its further dissemination to the public.

6. To enhance the ability of the GoA to assume full responsibility for future development, the Donors should link aid, with consequent benchmarking of results to be obtained within fixed time-limits, to the existence of adequate management capacity at all levels of government. This then should be combined with support for the formulation of an interim National Development Strategy, capacity building and institutional development and for meeting immediate needs at the sub-national levels.

7. The Donors should endeavour to achieve a more even geographical distribution of aid with particular emphasis on vulnerable and high-risk areas that are easily neglected. They should investigate whether factors other than security are creating obstacles to even distribution and seek alternative implementation channels such as civil society organisations and local entrepreneurs.

8. In order to safeguard the humanitarian and development contributions of the NGOs working in Afghanistan, the Donors should actively continue to counter unwarranted criticism, correct misinformation and use their influence to ensure that adequate Government supervision and self-regulation of the NGO community is put in place.

9. The Donors should continue to provide support for the ARTF, ensure a formal inclusion of the GoA in a policy forum, and gradually hand over increased financial control to the government.

Recommendation 4 entails significant future costs, to be regarded as unavoidable when embarking upon multidimensional system change in a large and poor country. Recommendations 5-9 probably entail modest cost increases in the short run, but with the potential to make large savings in the longer term. Essentially, all six recommendations (4-9) are more demanding politically than financially.

11.3 Cross-cutting Sector Recommendations

The Donors should:

10. Prioritise support for research and the collection of reliable statistical data on Afghanistan, including further support for the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit.

11. Insist on proper needs assessments and the setting of benchmarks to enable progress monitoring, evaluations and impact assessments, when considering project proposals.

12. Demand increased transparency from UN agencies in the form of detailed reporting on how funds were spent, including a breakdown of the costs of sector interventions and of administrative expenditure.

13. Ensure, together with all stakeholders, that pressure is placed on the GoA to continue to build on the momentum established in improving the situation for women and girls, and that implementing organisations include women in project planning and prioritisation in a culturally acceptable manner, bringing the men along.

14. Pay attention to the serious environmental problems in Afghanistan, which pose a grave threat to future livelihood and sustainable development, and support, financially and morally, the establishment of an Afghan Environmental Policy and capacity building in the GoA.

Cost-wise, recommendations 13-14 entail extra costs, whereas there is a potential saving in nos. 11-12.

The implementers (UN, NGOs and IOs) should:

15. Recognise and respond collectively to the need to:
    - Review their profile;
    - Harmonise salary payments;
    - Increase capacity building of their Afghan staff and the GoA;
    - Present their aims and activities to the GoA and the Afghan public;
    - Assess whether alternative security measures or implementation channels or methods might be used to ensure a more even distribution of assistance;
    - Address corruption and refuse to pay or accept bribes, be that during bidding processes, when obtaining governmental services or on demand from commanders/warlords;
    - Adopt a more uniform, beneficiary oriented and regular needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation practice, where results are shared, changes made to the programmes when warranted and actions coordinated.

16. Acknowledge that security will continue to be a challenge, that natural disasters will occur and that organisations will need to maintain a high degree of flexibility in years to come and to develop a consequent preparedness.

These recommendations will not contribute to any major increase in project implementation costs.

11.4 Nation- and State-building and Stabilisation

The donor community at large should prioritise support for:

17. The Ministry of Justice in leading the CG effectively in order to promote a comprehensive reform of the justice institutions, including:
    - The reconciliation of the application of different sources of law, including customary and religious law;
    - The establishment and enforcement of merit-based criteria for the appointment of judges;
    - The improvement of institutional relationships between the police, the justice sector and the AIHRC;
    - Capacity building and reform of the judiciary sector.

For the Donors, this implies that Italy as lead donor in the Justice Sector should be encouraged to take a more active stance and be offered assistance, if needed, to do so in collaboration with the UN.

18. The Donors should prioritise support for the GoA in:
    - The fight against corruption and the protection of state assets and resources;
    - The enforcement of a reliable system of vetting candidates for government posts;
    - Improving communications between the national, provincial and district levels of the civil service and between the authorities and the citizens;
    - Improving the infrastructure of the sub-national administration;
    - Bridging the gap between the two parallel public sectors (the GoA and the international organisations) by ending inflated salary levels and downscaling international operations in favour of assisting the government directly;
    - Combining capacity building with civil service career plans and employment contract commitments in order to achieve long-lasting impacts.

In the absence of an existing body mandated to cover all the above issues, it is recommended that the UK, as a major donor in this field, initiate a forum of concerned donors to find ways of mounting a concerted attack on the problems, including those mentioned in recommendation 6. It is recommended that Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden participate actively in this forum.

Some of the proposals under recommendations 17-18 imply modest additional expenditure; this is more than outweighed by the potential savings.

The Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

19. The Donors should adopt a more active stance with regard to enhancing the effectiveness, connectedness and impact of the AIHRC through:
    - Fostering partnerships and strengthening the capacity of potential partners that can expand implementation of project activities, including Afghan human rights NGOs;
    - Utilising its resources better to interact with and oversee government performance, and human rights violations by non-state actors, in a systematic way;
    - Supporting its capacity to monitor the performance of the judiciary and the police from an international human rights law perspective.

This recommendation is particularly directed towards Denmark and the UK as active donors in the human rights field and especially as donors to AIHRC.

The recommendation is considered cost-neutral.

The Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme

20. The Donors should strongly support, through advocacy and assistance to the ANB-UNDP, a DIAG programme which will continue the DDR process but incorporate:
    - A longer time perspective;
    - A stronger focus on reintegration and on community involvement;
    - An element of moral/psychological support for ex-combatants.

This recommendation implies the allocation of resources of a similar magnitude to the costs of the DDR programme.

The Provincial Reconstruction Teams

The PRTs from Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK should:

21. Concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage: provision of stability and support for the security sector. Engagement in development activities should be restricted to small projects in support of establishing a government presence and which can be implemented by available military resources.

22. Enhance their use of accumulated experience, and counteract the negative effects of rapid staff turnover, by developing better handover mechanisms.

23. Advocate within NATO that the name 'Provincial Reconstruction Teams' be changed to 'Provincial Stabilisation Teams'.

24. Refrain from the use of white vehicles.

25. Include traditional civil society and relevant national NGOs more actively in their local information gathering.

In accordance with the existing PRT practices, recommendations 21, 22, 24 and 23 can be implemented by the concerned Donors without further procedures.

It is estimated that the materialisation of recommendation no. 21 will imply significant savings, while recommendation no. 22 contains the potential for significantly improved efficiency.

11.5 Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons

The Donors should:

26. Continue their support to UNHCR's and MoRR's return and reintegration programme to ensure that the remaining caseload is able to return and that the (increasingly) vulnerable refugee population is assisted.

27. Provide political support and financial backing for UNHCR's efforts to establish a more permanent migration system between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran, and make efforts to ensure that migration issues get the deserved attention by the GoA.

28. Assist the GoA and UNHCR in the process of enabling permanent return, protection and reconciliation for IDPs displaced from northern Afghanistan, and in finding alternative solutions for the *Koochies* and drought-displaced IDPs.

29. Ensure that the MoRR and the UNHCR maintain a long-term focus on the protection needs of the remaining IDPs, such as unaccompanied women and children, dissemination of the IDP Guidelines and staffing and financial ability to respond to new displacements in a still fragile situation.

The materialisation of the recommendations under section 11.5 implies costs of a considerably smaller scale than the expenditures hitherto incurred in this sector.

11.6 The Education Sector

30. Donors, UN and NGOs should address the quality aspects of education, while maintaining the steady progress in the construction of schools.

31. Donors' existing support for institutional and capacity building at MoE should be increased after a thorough review, accompanied by the full implementation of a transparent benchmarking system, and extended to the provincial directorates.

32. The Donors should support and fund implementation of a common monitoring system to be used by all actors in the education sector.

33. UNICEF and the SCA should initiate steps to improve the professional capacity of supervisors to enforce teaching standards.

Given its high commitment within the education sector, it is recommended that Denmark initiate action on recommendations nos. 30-32.

The recommendations under section 11.6 are considered cost-neutral in relation to present costs.

11.7 The Health Sector

34. The Donors should plan for long-term commitment to avoid wasting initial investments, including support for the consolidation and expansion of the BPHS, if needed, in order to keep pace with population growth.

35. The Donors should initiate as soon as possible an assessment of the impact of the BPHS on the beneficiaries, including clarification of its (intended and unintended) impacts and of the need for the government to be involved in service delivery in the future.

36. Donors should initiate a debate with the relevant Ministries on how to improve the linkage between the NSP and the health programme (and other national programmes).

Given its high commitment within the health sector, it is recommended that Sweden initiate action on recommendations nos. 34-36.

The recommendations under section 11.7 are considered cost-neutral in relation to the present.

11.8 The Water and Sanitation Sector

37. The Donors should give the highest priority to water resource management and the protection of the groundwater aquifer against over-exploitation and pollution, including active steps to curb the drilling of wells.

38. The Donors should fund the immediate development of a long-term strategy for integrated water resource management in Afghanistan and research on adequate alternative latrine design and composting technology.

39. Donors should demand and support systematic impact measurements, as these are crucial for activities and programmes with behavioural change objectives (health and hygiene education), even against an emergency/relief background.

Recommendations 37-39 imply modest extra costs.

11.9 The Livelihood Sector

40. Donors should plan for a long-term commitment to the NSP to ensure national coverage, and for further development of the CDCs as an entry point for all rural services, and especially to enhance the capacity of the female CDCs. NSP should increasingly be linked to and coordinated with other rehabilitation and development programmes and strategies. However, the NSP should maintain its core objective of combining community-based development with nation-building, and should not be used in more politicised or short-term processes.

41. For MISFA, Donors should support the establishment of a strong management to ensure a first-class micro-finance industry based on international best practice, and thus avoid MISFA being drawn into the alternative livelihoods sector.

42. Donors should engage the WFP in a discussion of how best to reassess their food support strategy, as cash or food may be preferred at different times of the year, and to avoid harmful effects on local food production.

43. Donors should support the replacing of opium production. It should be acknowledged that it requires a long-term and multidimensional strategy, with sustainable livelihood interventions, based on community mobilisation processes and prioritising agricultural infrastructure and rural job generation.

44. Donors should take a more critical approach to small-scale livelihood interventions, demanding business planning and realistic assessments of sustainability.

Given its high commitment within the livelihood sector, it is recommended that the UK initiate action on recommendations nos. 40-44

Overall, it is estimated that the above recommendations do not entail extra costs compared to the present level, with the exception of the recommended overall long-term commitment to assistance to Afghanistan.

11.10 Suggested Issues for Further Study and Consideration

45. Finally, it is recommended that the Donors should initiate follow-up studies in ten key areas where the Evaluation identified important issues which it was unable to pursue in depth due to the paucity of available information or the lack of mandate. The suggestions included in Annex IV will all help to inform future decisions by applying comparative analyses of relevant cases. They include:
    1) The lead agency model for IDP assistance;
    2) Tendering processes and national synergies;
    3) Gender mainstreaming versus targeting;
    4) Cost-effectiveness of military versus civilian implementation;
    5) NGO definition and supplementary role in relation to national government and international organisations;
    6) Cost-effectiveness under crisis situations;
    7) Needs assessment under crisis situations;
    8) Resource assessment;
    9) Countermeasures to crime and corruption in conflict and post-conflict areas;
    10) Return of rejected asylum seekers and the use of diaspora human resources.

12. Towards a New Paradigm: Lessons Learned

Introduction
The Afghanistan intervention is unique in addressing a complex emergency within the context of an ongoing state- and peacebuilding process. However, it takes place within a new, supplementary framework paradigm that began to emerge in the early 1990s and reached its peak after 11 September 2001. While earlier interventions related either to the humanitarian imperative of helping disaster victims or to the accommodation of the poverty-related needs of economic and social development, the new paradigm for donor action typically includes a comprehensive set of political, economic and military imperatives:

International political imperatives:
- The 'war'/struggle against terror;
- The wish to avoid large movements of refugees arriving in the donor countries;
- The struggle against organised, international crime, including the drug trade.

National political imperatives:
- The introduction of democracy into the recipient country, often equating to the creation of a new polity;
- The enforcement of respect for human rights;
- The promotion of gender equality.

Economic imperatives:
- The creation of an open market economy, integrated into the globalisation process;
- A corresponding lean and efficient state.

The military imperative:
- The use of armed forces and combined civilian-military activities (CIMIC) activity to enforce peace and to promote humanitarian, rehabilitation and development action.

This new paradigm implies interventions that are both more ambitious and more complicated than the humanitarian response to a disaster or the strengthening of ongoing development processes. Given the prevalence of preconditions similar to Afghanistan, it would not be surprising if further interventions of this type were to occur.

Evidently such interventions have to cope with novel problems on different levels, for which ready answers are as yet scarce. These include: how to deal with 'spoilers', where the main options are either to co-opt them or to fight them; how to rally support for a new and different political system; what to do with transitional justice and how to deal with crime and corruption resulting from the breakdown of norms that typically accompanies multidimensional systemic transition.

In addition, there are questions of how the international community can best organise joint interventions; how civilian and military interventions can be coherently combined; and, in participating donor nations, how to organise interventions involving cooperation between agencies that have little or no previous experience of cooperating and that often lack the knowledge and analytical capacity that are required to deal adequately with unfamiliar local settings.

In the light of this perspective, it appears that the following lessons from Afghanistan will be useful for the donor community.

1. Equip Home Offices for the New Paradigm

There is a strong need for:

- Strengthened knowledge management and analytical capacity to deal with multi-dimensional crisis-related interventions in the responsible agencies in the donor countries. This includes maintaining sufficient numbers of adequately experienced staff; developing mechanisms for the accumulation and transformation of experience into usable knowledge; strengthening contacts with relevant external resources and exploiting the potential for synergy with earlier interventions, even when these have been performed by other actors, such as NGOs.
- The establishment of adequate and constructive cooperation procedures between the relevant home agencies in the donor nations, including those responsible for foreign affairs, development, humanitarian aid, defence and immigration.

2. An Efficient Justice System is Required to Counteract Risks of Transition

There is an inherent risk of a steep increase in corruption, political clientelism, national and internationally organised crime as a result of regime change and the breakdown of social norms following violent conflict. As a result, it is not enough to concentrate the most urgent state-building efforts on creating the traditional minimal prerequisites for a lean and efficient state: budgetary and fiscal administration and state coercive powers. It is equally important to create an impartial, equitable, transparent and efficient justice sector, which requires a minimum of connectedness with prevailing religious and customary law. A well working police force requires a functioning judiciary.

While transitional justice is desirable following atrocities under prolonged conflict, this has proved difficult to initiate under several crisis interventions, including in the present Afghan political reality. However, given this limitation it becomes of prime importance to prioritise the effective rule of law and respect for human rights and human security in order to rally support for the new polity.

3. Efficient Law Enforcement and Employment is Needed to Counteract Organised Crime

Furthermore, concrete measures against the likely proliferation of organised crime, often with international repercussions, appear necessary. The breakdown of the formal economy and of social norms, combined with the widespread availability of arms and men skilled in their use and the presence of the 'raw material' for criminal incomes, create the conditions for black economies to proliferate. Widespread trafficking of drugs, humans and arms has occurred in several West Balkan states and territories as well as in Afghanistan. However, the Afghanistan example suggests that the strategy of co-opting potential spoilers into the new system because of a perceived need to fight terrorism may also carry an inherent risk of promoting the growth of crime.

However, without employment opportunities for ex-combatants, the struggle against crime becomes difficult. Some prudence in imposing radical economic changes combined with a lean state is therefore called for. The immediate priority should be to promote alternative employment initiatives in order to limit the numbers of the population returning to the gun.

4. State-building Is of Primary Importance

State-building is of primary importance in multi-dimensional interventions such as Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq, where existing regimes have been ousted and replaced by new regimes. New regimes may be recognized by the international community, but lack legitimacy in the eyes of their own populations. In these circumstances, there is an understandable focus on the political processes of nation-building to restore peace and unity. However, more humble state-building processes are also necessary for the creation of a working polity which can respond to the needs of its citizens, and these can be easily overlooked in the eagerness to portray the new regime as a new, independent, and worthy representative of the nation.

One of the consequences of the 'political rush' is the excessive neglect of civil servants and other public employees, who, especially given coercive state powers, are identified with the ancien regime and perceived as illegitimate and, more often than not, as failing to live up to the standards of the new paradigm. This may be harmful to state-building. In the first place, the effect may be that ambitious state-building objectives become more cumbersome since the new incumbents often lack the professional skills to match their political credentials. Citizens may therefore experience a long period during which basic public services do not function very well, and this experience may be detrimental to the viability of the new regime.

Other consequences of the emphasis on politics, which are often pushed aside, are that the new regime is prone to corruption and lacks management capacity. It may be implicitly believed that the substantial influx of aid compensates for the lack of management capacity within the regime. However, the effectiveness of the aid is reduced if the state is not working well. While there is now growing awareness within donor community of the problems in Afghanistan, recognition of these problems has been delayed partly because of the donor community's general satisfaction with the new Afghan government being visibly in the driver's seat. For the donor community to assume responsibility for problems related to state-building, some challenging rethinking of its relations to the GoA and how best to engage in difficult debates while respecting the latter's national authority is required. It is much easier to offer the observation that things are broadly moving in the right direction than to acknowledge that a professionally demanding and politically delicate task lies ahead.

New ways of thinking about the conditionalities and rewards of aid will be required in the new paradigm of donor intervention. Professional and good governance must be prioritised. This may require a revision of the current insistence on the need for a modern, lean state and of prevailing attitudes to the use of the human resources of the ancient regime.

5. Long-Term Thinking to Supplement Short-Term Action

The multi-dimensional transformation of a polity and an economy is a major endeavour. It is therefore necessary to anticipate and confirm long-term commitments and to take a long-term perspective alongside required short-term action. Long-term solutions may imply the prioritisation of:

- Maintaining the working parts of the existing state rather than displacing them in favour of a provocatively expensive parallel system. This means working systematically on capacity building and skills training for rehabilitation and development processes, improved working conditions and facilities, and a salary level which does not

automatically lead to corruption, in order to enhance performance for the benefit of society at large.
- Interventions to enhance the legitimacy of the new system with effective service delivery and employment programmes. While considerable effort has been devoted to the provision of basic public services in Afghanistan, internal economic recovery processes could have been supplemented with a higher priority for employment creation programmes.

6. Silent Victims Are Easily Forgotten in Political Crises

Under a complex and somewhat chaotic crisis regime, where high priority is given to political and market economy imperatives, the conventional priorities in development cooperation for poor and vulnerable sections of the population – and for environment and human security – can be easily bypassed. In Afghanistan, this has been the case in relation to the relatively low priority assigned to the emancipation of women, as well as the agricultural sector, which so far has only been addressed indirectly through livelihood interventions with some benefit for the rural economy. Environmental problems, which are normally severe after many years of war, have also been given low priority.

7. Professionalism Under Crisis Conditions

The distribution of aid in an insecure conflict area can easily become geographically skewed to the detriment of its long-term impact. Awareness of the problem within donor agencies may be limited because the assessment and monitoring of needs are themselves limited. Furthermore, aid provision easily becomes accompanied by steep cost inflation and tough competition for limited staff resources to the detriment of the local public sector.

Sound professional awareness of these problems, and appropriate and adequate countermeasures on the part of the whole donor community, are therefore important. The cost-effectiveness of the operations should also not be overlooked in spite of the politically decided availability of funds and the pressure for quick results. Funds for international development cooperation are limited; when used in one place, they will be missed somewhere else.

8. The Military Works Best in its Core Areas

The overall rationale for the foreign military presence in crisis situations is that the military can:
- Fight spoilers who have not been co-opted into the power-holding coalition;
- Enforce stability, extend government authority, and assist in the creation of an enabling work environment for the humanitarian and development agents;
- Implement various civilian projects, either because the military is the only actor in place or to win hearts and minds in order to enhance force protection.

Regarding the second task, the performance of the ISAF PRTs in Northern Afghanistan appears to have been instrumental in producing the desired results. However, performance has been relatively poor and expensive when the PRTs have taken on development activities. In addition, beneficiaries in the Southern parts of Afghanistan often claimed that the behaviour of the Coalition-led PRTs had been conducive to more warfare in their region, not less.

The lessons from Afghanistan in this field, therefore, appear to be that:

- Military intervention works best when it sticks to its areas of comparative advantage. Armed forces should, therefore, only embark on civilian activities upon request and in relation to small, quick impact projects. The chief exception is emergency situations, where the armed forces may be the only possible aid providers. Even so, one should avoid the pitfall of letting military considerations determine humanitarian and development action.
- Excessive use of military power can easily prove counterproductive in relation to peace enforcement.

9. The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations

The new paradigm also requires a working international and national NGO community. Interventions should draw on NGOs' past project experiences, staff, networks and community acceptance and, in the early transition period, explore the possibility of their inclusion within government plans to assist in capacity development (instead of external consultants, as is currently the case). The aim should be to develop voluntary and constructive synergies between NGO and state interventions, while avoiding the creation of a local NGO elite which out-competes the public sector for staff because of its better remuneration.

Donors, the international and local NGO communities, as well as local civil society organisations (CSOs), need to find ways of regulating NGOs, of fostering self-regulation, and of developing the profiles of NGOs and CSOs in order to avoid misuse of the NGO concept. Priority should be given to the development of genuine, self-reliant NGOs and CSOs, which are at least partly independent of donor funding.

A certain tendency towards a strategic substitution of the NGO sector with CIMIC activities has been identified amongst the donor decision-makers. This calls for prudent awareness of the simple question of what these different players do best.

10. Utilise the Diaspora

Before a prolonged conflict leads to an international crisis response, millions of people have normally become refugees. While the vast majority of these generally remain in neighbouring areas, a substantial minority makes its way to more distant and more affluent countries. With immigration increasingly a key issue for their electorates, European governments tend to impose stricter asylum and immigration rules. This is leading them to prioritise interventions that ensure that

- Refugees remain in areas neighbouring their country or region of origin;
- They return as soon as possible, from neighbouring areas and from Europe, including by providing them with various financial incentives to go back;
- Rejected asylum seekers are returned to their country of origin, although this may be difficult when identification and security concerns are respected.

While some diaspora people return to attractive positions in their country of origin, the prevailing tendency is for refugees who have reached affluent countries to remain there. Financial incentives seem to be relatively ineffective in this context. From a capacity building point of view, this is regrettable since refugees often possess skills that are badly needed in their country of origin. However, allowing them to stay on for a limited period of time to obtain higher education or specialised job experience could help to generate valuable human resources for the home country.

Financial remittances often become an important additional source of income for their country of origin. However, while these are important for the relatives in the country, the overall balance of their contribution to the economy has been disputed. The diaspora often spends vacations in their country of origin and undertakes construction and business activities. This can have a positive impact on the economy, but also cause inflation and have distorting effects on productive activity. In addition, the creation of a new 'local, global elite' has important societal effects, by defining young people's aspirations and encouraging further emigration. Recognising the opportunities and limitations of the diaspora will remain a major challenge, and further understanding of the complex pros and cons is needed to make use of the human resources it possesses.

Annexes

ANNEX I: Terms of Reference – A Scope of Service

Terms of Reference
Evaluation of Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan Provided by Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the UK between October 2001 and early 2004 with a Special Focus on Internally Displaced Persons.

1. Introduction

Five bilateral donor organisations, namely Danish MFA, Netherlands MFA, Development Cooperation Ireland, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID), have agreed to cooperate on an evaluation of their assistance (humanitarian, rehabilitation and development) to Afghanistan from January 2001 to early 2004 reflecting the ousting of the Taliban regime in October 2001. The evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and connectedness of the assistance provided and will identify lessons for improving the response by donor organisations in future complex security, humanitarian, rehabilitation and development situations.

This evaluation was initiated as part of the so-called 'IDP Framework Process, a wider multi-country exercise, focusing on lessons about the handling of the particular needs of IDPs within larger international humanitarian and rehabilitation programmes[145]. While addressing the overall humanitarian, rehabilitation and development assistance to Afghanistan, a special focus within the evaluation will be on the degree to which the assistance was cognisant of, and responded to the needs of, IDPs within Afghanistan.

The IDP component of the evaluation will be approached in two steps. Because of timing required by the IDP Framework Process and the need to avoid visiting Afghanistan during the planned elections in September 2004, a Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance will be undertaken during July and August 2004, whilst the fieldwork phase of the main evaluation will only commence in the first half of 2005. The Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance will be undertaken in parallel with the preparation of a background paper for the main evaluation: an analysis of aid flows to Afghanistan, including mapping of the location of the programmes and projects funded by the five donors. The Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance and the background paper will both feed into the main evaluation as will a Public Expenditure Review, currently being undertaken by one of the five donors participating in the evaluation (Development Cooperation Ireland).

145 *Responding to a request in 2003 by the EU's Humanitarian Aid Committee a group of donors decided to conduct a number of evaluations with a special focus on IDPs. In order to facilitate common approaches and comparisons between the studies a common framework was prepared. (Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assista nce to IDPs. Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering, Danida file no. 104.A.1.E.39, 20 October 2003). In addition to the planned Afghanistan study, evaluations seeking to focus on IDP issues have been, are being or are planned for Angola (Denmark and ECHO), Democratic Republic of Congo (USAID/OFDA), Sudan (ECHO), Kosovo (Denmark), and Indonesia (Sweden).*

To facilitate direct comparison of the results from both steps of the IDP component of the Afghanistan evaluation, with the results from the other country studies being carried out under the IDP Framework Process, the Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance and the IDP component of the main evaluation will be conducted in accordance with the 'Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs: Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering' (Danida, 2003).

The current Terms of Reference (ToR) are based on the common evaluation framework. They benefit from background work undertaken in the summer of 2003 by Kings College, London. This work included the holding of a Workshop of Specialists on Afghanistan and post-conflict reconstruction, the preparation of an Annotated Bibliography; an analysis of Aid and Resource Flows and suggestions for Key Components for the Evaluation. The scope of the current ToR is narrower than the key components suggested by Kings College but is regarded as being more feasible.

This document provides:

A brief overview of the assistance provided to Afghanistan by the five bilateral donors;

The main evaluation questions and issues;

The methodological approach, organisational framework and projected timetable for the Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance, the two background papers, including the Public Expenditure Review made by DCI and the main evaluation;

Some background information on the context in Afghanistan; an overview of the response by the international community to address the security, humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building needs; and an overview of the situation of IDPs in the country from readily available sources (Annex I).

2. Overview of Assistance Provided by Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the UK 2001-2003

A provisional overview of expenditures and the main channels of assistance used by Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the UK is provided in Table 2.[146] Though care is needed in aggregating this data due to differences in the periods covered by the different data sets, the total volume of assistance provided by the five donors has been approximately Euro 670 million. Total disbursements since 2002 recorded by the Afghan Ministry of Finance's Donor Assistance Database are approximately $2.9 billion. Thus it would appear that the combined contributions of the five bilateral donor organisations represent roughly 25% of the total aid flows since 2001.

Table 2 also reveals significant differences in the scale of the assistance provided by the five donors and the relative emphasis given to different channels. Unfortunately information on the activities funded is not currently available for all five donors. Assembling the data revealed differences in the way the different donors record and collate their allo-

146 *This provisional overview was prepared using data submitted to Danida's Evaluation Department by the Humanitarian and Asia Desks within the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) in the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI), by the Asia Department in Sida and the Evaluation Department in DFID. Differences between the five donors in their categorisation and presentation of the data necessitated some interpretation of the data.*

cations. Such differences suggest that the evaluation will need to identify a common way of classifying funds by the five donors and should also propose ways in which greater standardisation might be achieved in the way donor databases are maintained.

Table 1. Provisional Overview of Assistance Provided by the Five Bilateral Donor Organisations
(Millions of Euro)

Donor	Period	All Channels	Bilateral	NGO	Red Cross	UN + IOM	Trust Funds
Denmark							
Humanitarian[1]	10/01-3/02	13.25	0.67	4.64	1.33	6.61	0
Humanitarian Frame	4/02-2/04	24.33	0	4.95	2.73	16.65	0
Reconstruction Frame	4/02-2/04	34.05	15.89	0	0	6.78	11.38
NGO Development Fund	2002-03	7.13	0	7.13	0	0	0
Denmark Total		**78.76**	**16.56**	**16.72**	**4.06**	**30.04**	**11.38**
Proportion of Total		100%	21%	21%	5%	38%	15%
Netherlands							
Humanitarian	2001-2003	84.6	0	5.62	9.06	69.9	0
Reconstruction	2002-2003	93.2	0	0	0	0	93.2
Netherlands Total		**177.8**	**0**	**5.62**	**9.06**	**69.9**	**93.2**
Proportion of Total		100%	0%	3%	5%	39%	53%
Ireland							
Ireland Total	2000-03	**19.27**	**0**	**8.21**	**1.42**	**6.09**	**3.56**
Proportion of Total		100%	0%	43%	7%	32%	18%
Sweden[2]							
Sweden Total	2001-2003	**88.69**	?	?	?	?	?
Proportion of Total		100%					
UK							
Humanitarian[3]	2001-2004	142.0		?	?	?	
Reconstruction	2001-2004	164.2	97.0	0	0	0	67.2
UK Total	2001-2004	**306.2**	**97.0**	**?**	**?**	**?**	**67.2**
Proportion of Total		100%	31.7%				22%

1 This line refers to amounts granted and not to actual disbursements.
2 A breakdown of the total by channel of assistance was not available at the time of writing
3 A breakdown of the total humanitarian assistance by channel was not available at the time of writing

3. Purpose of the Evaluation and the Evaluation Questions

The evaluation reflects the intention of donor evaluation cooperation with the objective to extract a broad range of lessons learnt to improve future assistance, not only in Afghanistan but also in other countries emerging from prolonged complex emergencies. However, the various interventions should not be treated as one collective or combined effort. Each donor's own objectives and policies should be recognised and the selection of case studies

should therefore also reflect the relevant dimensions of each donor as regards sector, channel, partners etc. The selection criteria should be described in the inception report.

3.1 The Evaluation in the Context of Available Evaluations of the Response in Afghanistan

A substantial analytical literature already exists on the military, humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building efforts of the international community in Afghanistan since October 2001. Kings College London prepared an annotated bibliography of key sources up to August 2003 as part of its earlier background work for this evaluation. Since then there have been significant additional contributions to the literature[147]. In addition, at least a dozen evaluations of agency humanitarian and reconstruction assistance have already been completed and are currently being reviewed by Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action as part of its Annual Review 2004 publication due for publication in the late summer[148]. So far, however, it appears that no evaluations have been commissioned of the response by bilateral donors and apart from a joint evaluation involving UNICEF and World Vision, no other joint evaluations have yet been undertaken. As noted above, one of the five donors participating in the evaluation (Development Cooperation Ireland) is currently undertaking a public expenditure review of its support to Afghanistan and has indicated its wish to use the results to inform the larger, multi-donor evaluation.

The proposed evaluation of the assistance provided by Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the UK would therefore add value to the existing body of evaluative work, in that it will:

a) Examine the provision of recent assistance to Afghanistan from the perspective of bilateral donors, which together appear to have contributed approximately 25 per cent of total aid flows to the humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in the country since 2001.
b) Facilitate a comparison of approaches by five different bilateral donors, which should provide valuable insights into the challenges faced by and practices of donors providing support to complex situations such as Afghanistan.
c) Provide an unprecedented opportunity to examine how the needs of IDPs as a specific vulnerable group within a larger international response are perceived and approached by bilateral donor organisations and the partners they support.

The evaluation is not intended as an evaluation of the response by the entire international community. By maintaining a focus on the assistance provided by the five bilateral donors it is anticipated that the evaluation will avoid being spread too broadly whilst benefiting from the comparative perspective afforded by the involvement of five different donors.

147 *For instance Donini A et al. eds (2004) Nation-Building Unraveled? Aid, Peace and Justice in Afghanistan, Bloomfield: Kumarian Press; and assessment and publication associated with the Donor Conference for Afghanistan held in Berlin 31st March to 1st April 2004.*

148 *These include evaluations undertaken by CARE, WFP, Tearfund, UNICEF/WorldVision, the US General Accounting Office, OCHA, Concern Worldwide, Islamic Relief, ECHO, Oxfam and ICRC. Furthermore, the European Commission has completed external reviews of several NGO programmes, including those of DACAAR, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan, Afghanaid, HealthNet International and German Agro Action.*

3.2 Purpose of the Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation is to undertake an independent assessment of the results of the response by the MFA Denmark, MFA Netherlands and Development Cooperation Ireland, Sida and the UK DFID to the needs of Afghanistan since January 2001 with a special focus on the situation of IDPs. The evaluation will assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact, coherence and connectedness of the assistance provided by the five bilateral donor organisations in the overall context of the Afghanistan and in relation to the perceived needs of IDPs, returnees and remainees. The IDP aspect should provide an Afghanistan case perspective for the multi-country, multi-donor IDP Framework exercise and will provide an opportunity to ascertain the degree to which the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement[149] (adopted in 1998) have been followed and met in this case.

The evaluation will identify lessons for improving the response to the humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building needs (and also those of the IDPs) by the five bilateral donor organisations in future complex security, humanitarian, rehabilitation and development situations. By virtue of the variety of approaches represented by these five organisations, the evaluation should provide a basis for a more generalised understanding of approaches by bilateral donor organisations to relief and reconstruction needs in countries emerging from prolonged periods of conflict and instability. As such, the evaluation will explore a number of issues that appear to be highlighted by the experience so far in Afghanistan, including:

- The factors contributing to the response by the international community to the emerging reconstruction needs in Afghanistan and the extent to which bilateral donors have learnt from earlier experiences in the provision of post-conflict reconstruction and development assistance in other contexts such as Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda and East Timor.
- The extent to which bilateral donors took into account the experience and capacity established through provision of assistance to Afghanistan during the years **prior** to September 2001.
- The ways in which the security context affects, and is affected by, assistance provision and the extent to which assistance provision is able to combine the roles of addressing humanitarian needs at the same time as supporting nation-building objectives.
- The relative role of aid supported and indigenous recovery processes and the extent to which external assistance has supported and amplified the indigenous recovery processes.
- The overall impact of external assistance provision and how it is perceived by the Afghan population.
- The relative performance, effectiveness and efficiency of the different channels (bilateral, Trust Funds, UN, NGO, etc.) available to, and used by, bilateral donor organisations.
- The impact of the rapid increase in staff in already established organisations as well as the arrival of a large number of new aid organisations on provision of assistance in general, and on coordination efforts in particular.
- The impact of repatriation on assistance policies.
- The extent to which IDPs were 'visible' to bilateral donors as a group with particular needs from the needs assessments and in the funding proposal submitted to them.

149 http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/7/b/principles.htm (viewed 24.06.2004).

- The extent to which the needs of IDPs have been addressed in the Afghanistan context by the five donors in particular and by the international community in general and the degree to which the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have been met and adhered to.

Though the 'Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship' endorsed in Stockholm in June 2003[150] emerged after the start of the period to be considered by the evaluation, they provide a useful normative framework for the assessment of the assistance provided by the five bilateral donor organisations. It is hoped that use of the Principles during this evaluation in turn will enable an assessment of their relevance and application in this particular case.

3.3 Intended Users of the Evaluation

The evaluation is intended for use by the following audiences:

- The five bilateral donors participating in the evaluation;
- The organisations and agencies participating in the wider IDP Framework exercise;
- The Afghanistan Transitional Administration (and the Government of Afghanistan that emerges from the elections planned for October 2004 and April 2005);
- The wider assistance community, providing support to Afghanistan and to other countries emerging from prolonged conflict and instability.

In addition, the evaluation can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the wider literature on the provision of humanitarian, reconstruction and nation-building assistance by the international community. Finally, it is likely to be used by a wide range of policy makers and scholars.

3.4 Evaluation Questions

Relevance

Was the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance provided to Afghanistan in line with the policies of the five donors as well as the needs and priorities of Afghanistan? To what extent did the assistance correctly identify and respond to the needs, priorities and rights of IDPs in Afghanistan?

Main Evaluation

- What were the policies of the five donors towards Afghanistan immediately prior to September 2001 and how have they evolved since?
- Have all five donors shared the same interpretation of the situation in Afghanistan, or have there been variations in emphasis?
- In what ways have these interpretations mirrored or differed from those of the UN, the multilateral development banks and the ATA?
- How did the donors regard the humanitarian and reconstruction needs assessments undertaken by the UN and the multilateral development banks?
- To what extent did they seek to complement such assessments with their own assessment and/or assessments undertaken by their operational partners?
- To what extent were assessments informed by political analysis (including analysis of conflict, power relations and rights violation)? Did appropriate vulnerability assessments of different groups take place?
- Were the underlying assumptions about the Afghan economy appropriate?

150 http://www.sida.se/content/1/c6/02/18/82/Meetingconclusions.pdf (viewed 24.06.2004).

- What levels of need were regarded over time as the 'trigger' for the provision of humanitarian assistance? Did needs assessments take into account the humanitarian principles of impartiality and humanity?
- How is targeting being carried out by the operational partners in Afghanistan? For example, is it being done according to pre-determined categories of vulnerable people (e.g. separating out returning refugees, single heads of households, elderly people, IDPs etc.), and/or is it being done according to a comparative assessment of need? How appropriate and relevant is this approach to targeting?
- To what extent did the repatriation of refugees from neighbouring countries impact on assistance policies and strategies?
- Have issues of gender and generation been adequately addressed in the provision and distribution of assistance to Afghanistan?
- To what extent were target groups consulted about their needs and about appropriate response? To what extent do they feel that the assistance has been relevant?
- How does the scale and role of external assistance compare to and interact with indigenous recovery processes? What were the underlying perceptions about the nature and dynamics of Afghan society in the development plans of the UN, the multilateral development banks and the bilateral donors? To what extent did the five donors identify and seek to amplify indigenous recovery processes?
- By what process and using which criteria have the five donors translated their policies and interpretations of the need assessments into the allocation of funding for Afghanistan?
- What were the decision-making processes within the five donors that led to the selection of particular channels and particular projects? To what extent did concerns for national profile or other domestic policy considerations influence decision-making?
- What programmes have been funded, directly as well as through the Trust Funds, and what were their objectives? For those that have been completed what were their achievements? What lessons have been learnt from the implementation of these programmes and how have these fed into subsequent programme designs?
- Was the assistance provided proportionate to the overall humanitarian and reconstruction needs of Afghanistan? Is the ATA justified in its view that there has been an overemphasis on humanitarian assistance relative to reconstruction assistance and the development of the capacity of state apparatus?
- To what extent have the five donors learnt from their experience in earlier complex emergencies and nation building interventions? How does the degree of learning differ between the five organisations and what lessons can be drawn about the most effective ways of translating lessons from previous cases into actual practice?
- To what extent have the five donors sought to incorporate lessons learned and experience gained from provision of assistance through NGOs and the UN during the decade prior to September 2001?
- How does the approach of the five donors and the assistance they have provided compare to the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship endorsed in Stockholm in June 2003?

IDP Theme

- To what extent were the needs, priorities and rights of IDPs identified by the humanitarian and reconstruction needs assessments undertaken by the UN and multilateral development Banks? Were the underlying causes of vulnerability and displacement in Afghanistan taken into account? How has this understanding of the

vulnerability of IDPs affected provision of assistance and how appropriate is this to the context and needs of IDPs in Afghanistan?
- If IDPs are being targeted as a separate category of vulnerable people, is there any evidence that this is at the expense of other vulnerable groups, or is it proportionate to the vulnerability and needs of other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan?
- Are the programming choices of operational partners appropriate to the needs and rights of IDPs in Afghanistan? To what extent have issues of protection been addressed (directly or through advocacy)? Do programmes and projects combine an appropriate mix of material assistance and other protective activities, e.g. lobbying, advocacy, etc? Do they promote durable solutions for IDPs?

Effectiveness
To what extent has the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance provided by the five donors achieved its purpose? To what extent has it succeeded in addressing the needs, priorities and rights of IDPs in Afghanistan?

Overall Evaluation
- How clearly stated were the overall objectives and desired outcomes of the strategies and programmes for responding to the needs and priorities of Afghanistan on the part of the donors and the ATA?
- Has progress towards achieving the objectives and outcomes been carefully and consistently monitored informing subsequent modification of programming? Who was involved in monitoring and impact assessments, if any, and were appropriate indicators used?
- What has been the interplay between security and aid effectiveness given the involvement of both civilian and military actors?
- Has the humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance been provided to vulnerable people including IDPs and returnees in Afghanistan in an effective and timely manner? To what extent have the protection needs as well as the material relief needs of the population been met?
- How quickly have the pledges and commitments at Bonn and Tokyo been translated into actual disbursements and implementation on the ground? What have been the principal factors affecting the speed of aid provision and how have any delays in the provision of assistance affected the overall efforts on the international community and the ATA?
- What has been the role played by the Trust Funds in supporting the ATA? Could the effectiveness of the Trust Funds have been greater and if so how?
- To what extent have donors and operational partners taken the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief[151] into account?

IDP Theme
- Did operational partners have access to IDPs within and outside conflict zones, and if so, how was it secured?
- To what extent have operational partners the Sphere standards[152] into account in their interventions?

151 http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp *(viewed 24.06.2004).*
152 *The Sphere minimum standards in the sectors water, sanitation and hygiene promotion; food security; nutrition and food aid; health services; and shelter, settlement and non-food items were developed and adopted by a coalition of European and North American NGOs. http://www.sphereproject.org/ (viewed 24.06.2004).*

Impact
What changes (positive or negative at the macro or micro-level) may be attributed to the assistance provided by the five donors and their operational partners? Were the needs of IDPs, returnees and remainees specifically addressed, what have been the outcomes and how have the indicators of material and protection needs of these groups been altered?

Main Evaluation

- What changes (positive or negative) in socio-economic, political or security conditions have occurred at the macro level since October 2001? To what extent have these resulted from externally supported and/or indigenous recovery processes?
- To what extent is it possible to identify the routes and degrees to which the assistance provided by the external assistance has influenced the changes identified? Are there instances where assistance provided by the five donors (individually or collectively) directly contributed to changes at the macro level?
- What changes (positive or negative) in socio-economic conditions and the protection of target populations occurred at the micro level in areas directly benefiting from assistance provided by the five donors? In what ways might the assistance provided have contributed to these changes?
- What has been the impact of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in terms of their objectives and effect on other aid activities going on in the same areas? Have the approaches, composition and operating styles of different PRTs had a discernible effect on security and on the effectiveness of aid provision in their respective areas?
- To what extent has the assistance promoted human rights and gender equality?
- To what extent has the assistance supported the livelihoods of the affected/target populations?
- To what extent has the assistance resulted in improvements in the functioning of the public sector on the national as well as provincial level?
- How do the different types and channels of assistance used compare in terms of their ability to reach out and benefit the target population?
- How is external assistance and the role of the international community perceived by the Afghan people? Does the affected/target population feel that their lives have improved as a result of the assistance provided? Do such views differ by socio-economic group, sex, age, ethnicity or geographic location?
- What lessons can be drawn about maximising the impact of external assistance? What approaches and conditions are most likely to achieve an impact?

IDP Theme

- What are the implications of the choices of operational partners for channelling funds to address the needs of IDPs in Afghanistan?
- Were the needs of IDPs and returnees specifically addressed? What have been the outcomes and how have the indicators of material and protection needs of the IDPs been altered?
- What have been the effects of the provision of assistance to IDPs on relations between IDPs and other vulnerable groups? For example has it resulted in exacerbating or reducing conflicts?
- Has the assistance resulted in durable solutions for IDPs and returnees?

Efficiency
Were the financial resources and other inputs efficiently (i.e. most economically) used to achieve results?

Main Evaluation
- What has been the comparative performance of the different channels (e.g. bilateral, Trust Funds, UN, NGO, Red Cross etc.) and modes of delivery through which assistance was provided?
- How efficient have the different channels been in terms of their use of resources to achieve results? How do staff, administration and transport costs compare between the different channels? What steps might be taken to increase their efficiency of resource use?
- Where civil and military channels were used to achieve very similar objectives (e.g. rehabilitation and reconstruction projects), how did their performance and efficiency in the use of inputs compare? What conclusions can be drawn about their comparative advantage?

IDP Theme
- Where material and protection assistance was provided directly to IDPs, how does the efficiency of resource use compare between different projects? What lessons might be drawn for the provision of similar assistance in future operations?

Connectedness
To what extent has the assistance provided taken into account the specific context in Afghanistan with its longer-term and interconnected problems? To what extent have the material and protection needs of IDPs been addressed on a basis that is sustainable in the longer term?

Main Evaluation
- To what extent has the assistance provided taken into account the specific context in Afghanistan with its longer-term and interconnected problems?
- To what extent have the material and protection needs at the start of the period been addressed on a basis that is sustainable in the longer term?
- Has capacity building of local structures and organisations been part of the interventions? If so, to what extent has capacity been built?
- To what extent has external funding had positive or negative impact on the capacity of local organisations?
- To which extent has a transfer of ownership of assistance efforts to ATA effectively taken place? To the extent this has happened, what has been the impact on aid effectiveness?
- To what extent have interventions exacerbated, or reduced the likelihood of violent conflict?

IDP Theme
- Has the design of interventions by operational partners taken into account and attempted to minimise the potential negative impact on vulnerability of IDPs in Afghanistan in the longer-term?
- Have the five donors attempted to address the root causes of displacement and vulnerability? Have they sought to ensure that short, medium and long-term objectives of assistance has been geared towards creating lasting solutions for IDPs?

Coherence

Are the policies and programming of each of the five donors coherent with those of other donors and with those of the ATA, whether in relation to overall needs of Afghanistan and the specific needs of IDPs?

Main Evaluation

- To what extent has there been a shared assessment of the needs and a common strategy for Afghanistan among the international community? Where there have been differences in needs assessment and strategy, how have they influenced the effectiveness of the overall response? What steps have been taken to overcome such differences?
- To what extent have the aid, military and diplomatic instruments (including PRTs) been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of Afghanistan? To what extent have the different aid instruments been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of Afghanistan?
- What lessons can be learned about undertaking reconstruction and nation building activities in a context of poor security and ongoing operations against 'spoiler' groups such as the Taliban and al Qa'ida?
- What has been the relation between the civil and military mandates and implementation strategies in the light of the overall objectives of the international community and the ATA?
- To what extent did the five donors take into account the position of and situation in Pakistan and Iran, in particular with regard to Afghan refugees? To what extent were issues such as the scope of repatriation and the absorption capacity of Afghan society factored into overall planning of assistance?

IDP Theme

- To what extent have different aid instruments (i.e. humanitarian and development aid) been used coherently and effectively to address the needs of IDPs in Afghanistan? Have there been any gaps?
- Are operations on the ground consistent with the donors' policies on IDPs and the Guiding Principles?

Coordination

How effective has co-ordination been in Afghanistan at the macro level and at the micro-level – in general and in relation to IDPs?

Main Evaluation

- To what extent has coordination mechanisms been in place to guide the provision of assistance to Afghanistan? Have they linked all relevant stakeholders – i.e. the ATA, donors, UN agencies, Multilateral Development Banks and NGOs – in a balanced manner? What was the role and functioning of UNAMA in this regard? What were the principal gaps or weak points in the various mechanisms?
- To what extent were operational partners encouraged to engage with co-ordination mechanisms and processes? Was there an appropriate level of coordination between operational agencies at the Provincial and project level? How might any problems have been overcome?
- To what extent have weaknesses in donor coordination contributed to atomistic behaviour of implementing partners?
- To what extent the rapid increase in and turn-over of staff in already established organisations as well as the arrival of a large number of new aid organisations has impacted on coordination efforts and through that on provision of assistance in general.

- What has been the impact of PRTs on coordination arrangements in those Provinces where they have been deployed? How does this compare to coordination arrangements in other Provinces? In those Provinces where they were deployed, how effective was the coordination between the PRTs, the Provincial authorities and aid agencies in the area?

IDP Theme
- How have donor agencies engaged with mechanisms and processes to achieved coordinated response to the material and protection needs of IDPs?

4. Scope of the Evaluation
The evaluation of assistance provided by the five bilateral donor organisations coupled with a special focus upon their response to the needs of IDPs will cover a broad range of activities and operational partners. It will be necessary to select a sample of programmes and partners to assess for the main evaluation and for the special focus on IDPs.

Main Evaluation
The sample frame will include all humanitarian and reconstruction activities (sectors, programmes, Trust Funds, coordination mechanisms etc.) that have received support from the five donors. The following objectives and criteria will guide the process of selecting the actual sample of projects and programmes from within the sample frame:
- The mix of activities should be representative of the overall pattern of activities and sectors funded by the five donors. This will require the inclusion of projects and programmes from all relevant sectors of the Afghan National Development Framework (NDF). The NDF is based on the following sectoral structure: Refugee & IDP Return, Education & Vocational Training, Health & Nutrition, Livelihoods & Social Protection, Culture, Media & Sport, Transport, Energy, Mining & Telecoms, Natural Resources, Urban Management, Trade & Investment, Public Administration, Justice, National Police & Law Enforcement, Afghan National Army, Mine Action**,** as well as Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration. The mix of channels and partners will be representative of the overall pattern of channels and partners funded by the five donors.
- The mix of projects and programmes to be examined in detail will be as representative as possible of the overall geographical spread of activities funded by the five donors in the light of the prevailing security situation and restrictions on travel by the Evaluation.

Special Focus on IDPs
Due to the difficulty of knowing the extent to which IDPs were included as targets of certain interventions, it will be necessary to compile an inventory of programmes and projects supported by the five donors. This will serve as a basis for more accurately identifying those that did in fact specify IDPs within their target groups. The inventory will be compiled during the first phase of the evaluation by way of the construction of an activity portfolio for each donor and interviews/correspondence with key informants at their headquarters and country level offices.

Activities to be covered by detailed field analysis in Afghanistan in relation to both the main evaluation and the special focus on IDPs will be selected to represent a cross-section of the various types of interventions financed. Furthermore, they will have to be representative in terms of covering programmes and/or projects carried out by or channelled through UN-agencies and non-governmental organisations. In view of the

expected difficulties in gaining access to many parts of Afghanistan, activities located in two or three geographical areas will be selected. When choosing the sample, previous evaluations of specific programmes and projects should be taken into account as well. In sum, the selection of activities will not be statistically representative, but will be carried out in a way as to provide a sufficiently illustrative sample of the humanitarian and reconstruction activities funded by the five donors and a sufficiently illustrative sample of those involving IDPs.

5. Approach and Methodology

The evaluation must be carried out in accordance with the Danida "Evaluation Guidelines" (February 1999), "Guidance for Evaluating Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies" (OECD/DAC 1999) and the 'Framework for a Common Approach to Evaluating Assistance to IDPs: Protecting Lives and Reducing Human Suffering' (Danida, 2003). "Evaluating Humanitarian Action" (ALNAP, 2003) and "The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship" will provide normative reference frames for the evaluation.

Pre-Studies

To facilitate the evaluation, two preparatory studies will be undertaken whilst the tendering process for the main evaluation is underway: an Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan and a Preliminary Study on IDP Assistance. In addition, a Public Expenditure Review by DCI will feed into the evaluation. The two preparatory studies will be separately contracted using a shortlist of candidates to be drawn up by Danida. The three pieces of work will be timed to ensure that they are completed before the main evaluation commences and all material collected through the two preparatory studies will be made available to the main evaluation team. To help ensure that the results of the studies are effectively transferred to the main evaluation team, time will be provided for those involved in preparing the studies to brief the main evaluation team.

Background Paper 1: An Analysis of Aid Flows to Afghanistan

This study will focus on the five bilateral donor organisations participating in the evaluation whilst seeking to locate their contributions in the overall flows of aid to Afghanistan. It will track the pledges, approvals, disbursement[153], implementation and reporting chain for all of the assistance provided after January 2001. It will identify the key individuals involved at each point and their current co-ordinates (including those that have since been re-deployed or left the organisation). It will attempt to analyse the performance of the donors in approving and disbursing funds to Afghanistan. This will involve comparison of the actual timing of the process with:

a) Any timetables set out and agreed upon at the pledging conferences;
b) Any statements made by the donors at the time the pledge was announced or the funding approved;
c) The average elapsed time taken by other donors to approve and disburse comparable funds;
d) The individual donors' own original and possibly revised timetable.

Factors serving to accelerate or delay the process will be noted.

153 *"Disbursement" may be a rather unclear indicator. If funds are disbursed to ARTF there is no guarantee that they have been used within the intended time frame. The study should look at this aspect and suggest a valid approach for the main evaluation.*

Furthermore, the paper will identify the geographic location and sector of programmes and projects undertaken by the Government, UN, NGOs and other operational partners funded by the five donors. All programmes and projects will be identified to the extent possible. The location will be identified as specifically as possible to the district level (in accordance with the list of district maintained by Afghanistan Information Management Service in Kabul). This information will assist the Evaluation identify and select the sample of programmes and projects to be visited.

This study will make use of the Donor Assistance Database maintained by the Development Budget and External Relations Unit within the Ministry of Finance in Kabul. It will therefore be necessary to assess the strengths and weaknesses of this database in terms of the quality of the data and the robustness of any analysis made of the data. A visit to Kabul by the person preparing Study 1 would be desirable.

The ToR for the analysis of aid flows is available as a separate document.[154]

Background Paper 2: Public Expenditure Review by Development Cooperation Ireland (DCI)

This review has already been completed and includes a desk study of funding to all DCI partners in Afghanistan as well as findings from field visits to a limited number of partners. While the current donor joint evaluation has a larger scope than the review, the latter, however, is very relevant as it addresses the following in relation to the Irish assistance to Afghanistan: Relevance, effectiveness, cost efficiency, sustainability, key cross-cutting issues, management issues, performance indicators and lessons learnt. The review will be available in June 2004.

Background Paper 3: Preliminary Study of IDP Assistance

The Preliminary Study on IDP Assistance is intended to:

1. Prepare a case study on assistance to IDPs in Afghanistan as part of the wider IDP Framework Process that will be available for inclusion in the Synthesis Study to be prepared as the final stage of the IDP Framework Process.
2. Provide an overview of IDP assistance issues in Afghanistan and make a preliminary assessment of the approach and provision of assistance by the five bilateral donor organisations and their partners to addressing the material and protection needs of IDPs in Afghanistan.

It is envisaged that two researchers will undertake the Preliminary Study during the period July to September 2004. The work will involve a documentation review phase followed by interviews with key informants selected from within the five donors, their partner organisations and other organisations specialising in IDP issues. This will involve travel to the head offices of the donor countries, to Afghanistan and to selected organisations based in other locations. The Preliminary Study may undertake limited field visits to projects and programmes funded by the five bilateral donor organisations in Afghanistan if security allows.

The ToR for the Preliminary Study is available as a separate document.[155]

154 Terms of Reference for An analysis of aid flows to Afghanistan, dated 24 June 2004

155 Terms of Reference for a Preliminary Study of Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons in Afghanistan, dated 24 June 2004.

Main Evaluation Phases 1-5

Phase 1 – Desk Study: Review of documentation and visits to Donor and Aid Agencies in Denmark, Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden and the UK
The Evaluation will review relevant documentation. A member of the Evaluation will visit the head office of each donor participating in the evaluation to undertake preliminary interviews and collect and review documentation. Evaluators should be allowed full access to relevant files. In the case of DCI the evaluators will meet with those involved in the Public Expenditure Review to be completed in May 2004. A member of the Evaluation will also visit the head offices of NGOs working in Afghanistan and receiving support from the donor. These visits coupled with the contact information generated by Pre-Study 1 will help identify key individuals to be interviewed and their current location.

Phase 2 – Visits to Head Offices of Key Operational Partners, interviews with key informants and elaboration of field study
Visits will be made to the offices of OCHA, UNHCR, UNDP, World Bank, ECHO, the Global IDP Project and other key informants/specialists on either Afghanistan or IDPs located in Geneva, New York/Washington, London, Paris and Brussels. Face to face or telephone interviews will also be undertaken with key informants on the principle programmes to be evaluated. The plan for the field study will be submitted to the five donors for comment by their staff.

Phase 3 – Field Study in Afghanistan
Field studies will be conducted in Afghanistan. The Danish NGO DACAAR will provide various practical support services during the field study as detailed below. Additional support will be provided by the Danish representation office and the Netherlands embassy in Kabul. Where applicable, fieldwork in Afghanistan may also be supported by the staff of agencies supported by the five donors. Time will be allowed for full interaction with the Afghan Research and Evaluation Unit in Kabul, which is a principle source of research studies on aid provision to Afghanistan. A workshop will be held for organisations funded by the five donors. The team will provide feedback on the preliminary findings of their analysis before leaving Kabul.

Phase 4 – Analysis and Production of Report
Following analysis of the findings resulting from the desk study, interviews and fieldwork, the Evaluation will produce a draft report. This report should be presented in English and be no longer than 40,000 words (approximate 80 pages), plus appendices. The Evaluation will respond to comments received on the draft report and a final report will be completed in MS Word and Acrobat (pdf) versions.

Phase 5 – Dissemination of findings
Three dissemination workshops are to be held as follows:

- A first workshop is to be held in Kabul upon completion of the field mission (expected in April 2005) with participation of key stakeholders, including the ATA, the UN, international financial institutions, NGOs, and the local offices of involved donors. The purpose is to discuss key findings of the Evaluation.

Another two workshops are to be held in Copenhagen once the final report has been completed.

- One is include representatives from the headquarters of involved donors and implementing partners as well as other authorities, networks, scholars with an engagement in respect of Afghanistan.
- The other workshop is to focus specifically on the findings related to IDPs and as such it is to gather representatives of all agencies involved in the IDP Framework process.

The structure of the report should be as follows:
- An executive summary with main findings and issues for consideration, max 6 pages;
- The main body of text should include the methodology and analytical approach used by the Evaluation, a description of the context of the Afghanistan since January 2001, a description of humanitarian and reconstruction interventions covered by the evaluation, coverage of the evaluation questions and issues to be addressed, and analysis and conclusions;
- Appendices, including the terms of reference for the evaluation, sample framework, overview of the humanitarian and reconstruction activities carried out in Afghanistan, statistics, references and bibliography.

6. Consultant input

The Consultant shall provide an evaluation team consisting of:
1. A team leader for 10 person months;
2. A team of evaluators (4-6) for a total of 16 person months;
3. Support staff as required up to 15 person months.

The organization of the team's work is the responsibility of the Consultants and should be specified and explained clearly in the proposal.

The team leader should be a permanent employee with the lead company of the Consultant and should have extensive experience from project management, preferably in the field of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction. Furthermore, experience in conducting evaluations of aid provision (reconstruction and development as well as humanitarian) in the context of complex crises is required. In addition, the team leader should also possess knowledge about donor systems (including grants mechanisms and donor priorities etc.) and preferable have experience from assignments in Afghanistan. Fluency in English, orally as well as in writing, is required.

The team of evaluators (four to six as found appropriate by the Consultant) should have experience from conducting evaluations and should include personnel with professional background and extensive experience in:

- Humanitarian and reconstruction actions, preferably with IDPs,
- Evaluation of humanitarian, reconstruction and nation building activities,
- The work of national and international humanitarian and reconstruction agencies,
- Gender expertise,
- PRA/RAP techniques.

The Team of evaluators should furthermore cover experience from at least the following sectors:
- Food;
- Health;
- Education;

- Livelihoods;
- Water & sanitation;
- Shelter/housing;
- Multi-sector;
- Protection/human rights/rule of law;

Previous experience from Afghanistan is preferable. Fluency in English, orally as well as in writing, is required for all team members.

While the Consultant will have significant latitude in the design and organisation of the work, it is estimated that Phases 1 and 2 will require 6-8 person-months' work, Phase 3 10-12 person months' work, and analysis and reporting 6-8 person-months' work of the professional key staff. In addition support staff will be available within a total of maximum 15 person months.

The Consultant shall also provide the required home office support and quality assurance, including audits. Person months and cost for such services should be included in the consultant's overhead.

A native English-speaking copy editor shall prepare the final draft report as well as the final report. The expenses for the editor will be covered as a reimbursable cost.

The consultant will be fully responsible for the conduct and content of the evaluation and shall follow the Evaluation Guidelines by Danida. The evaluators shall also be fully responsible for the ensuring quality assurance (QA) of the Evaluation and shall in the inception phase set up appropriate QA mechanisms to be documented in the inception report. Quality control (QC) is the responsibility of the Evaluation Department.

7. Overall management and support

General supervision and management of the evaluation process will be carried out by the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of an external consultant. This may include oversight during field visits.

Furthermore, a Reference Group consisting of representatives from each of the participating donors will monitor the evaluation process, provide general guidance and support as appropriate, and comment on the draft versions of the team's reports.

The team of evaluators will have access to documentation and support as follows:

a. The donors involved in the evaluation will be required to submit the following material (in both hard copy and electronic format) to the Evaluation Department of the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the Evaluation commences its work:
   - Information on supported humanitarian and reconstruction activities in Afghanistan since 2000 including general information on these activities (objectives, organisations involved, financial data, progress reports and where relevant programme and project reviews);
   - Key documents on the donor's response to the humanitarian and reconstruction needs in Afghanistan in general, and – wherever possible – on the situation of IDPs in particular;
   - Contact details of key agency personnel both in headquarters, regional offices and at field level.

b. The draft reports covering the Preliminary study of assistance to internally displaced persons in Afghanistan, Analysis of aid flows to Afghanistan, and the DCI Public Expenditure Review will be availed to the team from the outset. This will be followed up by briefings, conducted by the team leaders responsible for the three studies.
c. The participating donors will make all other relevant documentation available to the team of evaluators in a timely manner. To facilitate this, however, requests for documentation and meetings should preferably be submitted well in advance and in sufficient detail.
d. Prior to Phase 1 being initiated, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will seek to inform the offices of relevant UN organisations, multilateral finance institutions and NGOs in Europe and the United States about the evaluation.
e. Similarly, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs will seek to ensure that key interlocutors in Afghanistan, including relevant embassies and donor offices as well as UN organisations and multilateral finance institutions are informed about the evaluation well in advance of Phase 3.
f. During the field mission, the Danish NGO DACAAR will provide practical support services. The services will include the following (with approximate costs provided in brackets to facilitate budgeting):
    - Provision of vehicles with drivers (either DACAARs or rented, at USD 35 per day per vehicle);
    - Arranging the services of interpreters and other assistants, e.g. to arrange meetings etc. (USD 75 per day in Kabul, USD 85 per day outside the city);
    - Booking of hotel (approximately USD 75 per night, including breakfast, dinner and laundry);
    - Provision of limited office space, access to photocopying, booking of internal flights, and other similar practical arrangements;
    - Accommodation at DACAAR field offices or camps during field trips (USD 10 per person per night, including dinner and breakfast). It is expected that similar arrangements can be made with other NGOs outside DACAARs area of operation, if required.

DACAAR will charge an overhead fee amounting to USD 10 per day for the above services. All costs are based on the going rates as of August 2004 and therefore subject to change. DACAAR assistance (including provision of transport and accommodation in field camps) during field trips will be subject to security being satisfactory. The decision in this regard is made by the DACAAR Director.

8. Proposal

Consulting firms and institutions with considerable experience and expertise in the evaluation of humanitarian activities will be invited to tender for the evaluation, following Danida's Guidelines for Tendering and Award of Larger Contracts. Applications for the pre-qualifications will be open to all consultants and organisations irrespective of country of origin.

The proposal to undertake this evaluation should be responsive to the Terms of reference outlined above. It should also reflect awareness of and sensitivity to the complexities of the provision of humanitarian and reconstruction assistance in the context of Afghanistan.

The proposal should indicate clearly the methodological approach(es) to be used, along with the rationale for the overall evaluation strategy. It should also indicate clearly the evaluators strategy for involving the donors involved in the evaluation, the agencies implementing the humanitarian activities, Afghan institutions and beneficiaries in the evaluation.

9. Projected Timetable

It is anticipated that the evaluation will be initiated in December 2004 and completed by September 2005, as indicated below. Evaluators may include a revised timetable in their proposals, accompanied by a rationale for the modification of the proposed schedule.

Approximate Timetable	
1) Circulation of invitations to pre-qualification 2) Public Expenditure Review of DCI	June 2004
3) Pre-studies 1 and 2	July-September 2004
4) Invitation to tender dispatched	September 7, 2004
5) Draft pre-study reports available	September 20, 2004
6) Submission of tenders	October, 18, 2004
7) Meeting with and briefing of first ranked Tenderer	Late November/early December
8) Contract awarded	December 2004
9 Phase 1: Desk study and visits to donor and aid agencies in Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, United Kingdom and Ireland	January 2005
10) Phase 2: Visits to Head Offices of key operational partners; key informant interviews outside Afghanistan; submission of inception report, including plan for field study.	February 2005
11) Phase 3: Field study, concluded with a dissemination workshop with participation of key stakeholders, discussing key findings	March-April 2005
12) Phase 4: Analysis and report writing	April-May 2005
13) Submission of draft final report	June 2005
14) Submission of Final report	August 2005
15) Arrangement of two dissemination workshops in Copenhagen	September 2005

10. Other Conditions

The Consultant to conduct this evaluation shall provide proof that none of the proposed team members have any current or any previous assignment in relation to implementation of any projects and programmes on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan since 2001 funded by the five donors, incompatible with the requirements of full independence for this evaluation or any other relation that would create a conflict of interest.

ANNEX II: Key Concepts

The Evaluation has used the following definitions of the key concepts. These definitions are based on mainstream thinking in post-war reconstruction and development practise.

1. Humanitarian assistance refers to assistance that is provided in an emergency in order to save people's lives and/or to meet their daily basic needs without necessarily redressing the root causes of the threats to life and livelihood. The time perspective of humanitarian assistance is the here and now, and the criterion for measuring success is relief from life-threatening misery for all exposed.

2. Rehabilitation assistance refers to broader types of assistance that are provided in order to create a sustainable livelihood for the communities concerned or for society at large. The term **Reconstruction** will be reserved for the tangible reconstruction of physical infrastructure. Rehabilitation will often include reconstruction, but reconstruction is only one of a range of activities that rehabilitation subsumes. The time-perspective for successful rehabilitation is that results should be achieved within a short span of time, at most a couple of years.

3. Development assistance aims at the creation of new opportunities to improve the future situation for communities or for society as a whole. Activities may range from short-term operations aimed at producing rapid results (for example, the construction of a bridge) to long-term investments (for example, schooling of children). The criterion of success here is that a positive impact can be either identified or is almost certain to occur. The term 'Development' has a very broad range of possible referents, but for practical reasons it is here reserved for economic and social development.

4. Nation-building is understood as the creation of an effective Afghan citizenry, meaning that people will identify themselves first and foremost as citizens of Afghanistan rather than as belonging to ethnicities, regions, clans or political parties. In development terminology, this is described as 'ownership' to the country. Nation-building is decisive for the legitimacy and, consequently, the long-term sustainability of the regime and its development model. On the one hand, successful nation-building depends on the effectiveness of civic education, national symbols such as a flag and a king, or the impact of state controlled media. On the other hand, it depends on the citizens' participation in democratic processes and their experience of state-derived benefits, such as development and security.

5. State-building is used to designate interventions aimed at constructing a democratic state exercising legitimate and effective authority throughout its territory. Such a state will have a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force (the police/military will be stronger than criminals/insurgents) and the ability to raise necessary revenues. Decision-making is based on the rule of law, assuming the existence of a democratic legislative, a judicial system, which applies national and international law (including human rights), and an accountable executive (requiring a certain minimum of transparency and communication with the citizens

The sequencing between the above stages should start with 1, move on to 2, which gradually gives rise to 3, 4 and 5, simultaneously. However, in the Afghanistan case, it generally makes little sense to try to distinguish between 2 and 3-5. For this reason, the sequencing is conceptualised in terms of three basic categories: Humanitarian assistance; Rehabilitation and Development; and Nation and State-building.

ANNEX III: Contrasting Security Perceptions

The two maps reproduced below are taken from a report undertaken for USAID by the Feinstein International Famine Center (2004), drawing on the 2003 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment with data from 1850 villages, supplemented by 350 in-depth interviews.



The Expatriate Perspective
The first map is the UN security map, indicating areas with high levels of insecurity for international staff, limiting access and assistance provision. It is based on military activities and reported incidents.



The Local Perspective
The second map represents the Afghan rural population's perception of insecurity in their livelihoods, which then differ significantly from where international staff is deemed insecure.

ANNEX IV: Suggested Issues for Further Study and Consideration

1. **The Lead Agency Model**
Review, with the UNHCR, the Lead Agency model for assistance and protection of IDPs in the light of the Afghan experience, and invite OCHA to debate the relative merits of the lead agency and the Collaborative Approach models in different contexts.

2. **Tendering and National Synergies**
The introduction of tendering for government services led some NGOs to close down their operation in a province, after decades of work, trust and capacity building with local communities, and relocate their activities elsewhere. At the same time, one organization implemented a NSP and a BPHS programme in the same province for different ministries. One can question whether this is the most effective way of organising assistance and whether more could be done to link activities at provincial and district levels. Test provinces could be selected, for example, where the same agency is responsible for both the NSP and the BPHS, to evaluate whether synergy between the two programmes can be achieved.

3. Mainstreaming or Targeting?
Does mainstreaming of i.e. gender issues lead to ignorance about issues, which are politically or culturally difficult to handle? When it comes to gender issues in Afghanistan, it would be appropriate to explore whether the impact of policy development and practical programmes could have been enhanced by defining them as specific women issues, with benchmarks and dedicated budgets, to be addressed by ministries and donors rather than as a mainstreamed gender issue.

4. Cost-effectiveness of Military vs. Civilian Implementation
While a mutual understanding of a more appropriate division of labour between military and civilian crises agents is emerging, the Afghanistan Evaluation has illustrated that certain elements are still open to interpretation. An under-explored element is the cost of civilian activities performed by the military, since it is often assumed that 'money does not count' when it comes from other budgets. However, in the border area, the choice between civilian and military agents should be influenced not only by effectiveness, but also by comparative cost, since funding in both cases ultimately originates from the same source.

5. NGO Definition and Supplementary Role in relation to government and international organizations
The evaluation has uncovered problems at various levels regarding the activities of NGOs in crises:
- They receive levels of funding that enables them to act as an elite rather than as classic NGOs.
- They are expected to undertake activities which the international and government organizations refuse for security reasons.
- They are sometimes criticized unfairly when undertaking important entrepreneurial tasks.

The study should identify the cost levels of international and national non-governmental operations compared to government organizations and local government. Another objective should be to contribute to the establishment of security standards for NGOs and consultants.

6. Cost-effectiveness under Crisis Conditions
Under political and media pressure, results are required swiftly, no matter what the financial cost. This can lead to rampant inflation in logistical and local staff costs, thereby not only reducing the funding available for the intended beneficiaries, but also with negative consequences for capacity building in public institutions. In the absence of proper accounting and auditing systems, an additional study is needed to identify the magnitude of the problem. An objective for the study would be to establish a sound basis for decisions on future procedures, including agreed ceilings for specified expenditures and salaries.

7. Needs Assessment under Crisis Conditions
Another question arising from this evaluation that needs further study is whether some needs are so evident that there is no need for a more detailed needs assessment. If this were the case, would it apply to all sectors? Or is it possible to establish cut off points at which needs assessments become necessary? Is it possible to develop different needs assessment methods for emergency, rehabilitation and development contexts, thus acknowledging different levels of urgency.

8. Resource Assessment
When starting a complex assistance process, such as was undertaken in Afghanistan, where the national government is to be in 'the driving seat', how can available human resources within the various Ministries and Commissions be assessed? And what would be the best way of performing such an assessment? What form of management strategy best serves to enable a targeted and national comprehensive capacity development plan and facilitate interministerial exchange of resources?

9. Countermeasures to Crime and Corruption in Conflict and Post-conflict Areas
Several experiences, including Afghanistan, show that the combination of widely available arms, men skilled in their use, unemployment, and the breakdown of norms and structures under prolonged conflict and systemic changes leads to organized crime with international repercussion. The international community needs to be more proactive in organizing concerted action with inputs from police, military, justice and aid sectors. In addition to exploring possible designs for such an action, the study should identify practical measures for short-term state and justice reform, including traditional justice, to establish rule of law, to counter corruption and suggest quick-impact livelihood and employment programmes.

10. Return of Rejected Asylum Seekers and the Use of Diaspora Human Resources
Present donors practice of returning rejected asylum seekers underlines the need for a broader discussion on migration management, as initiated by UNHCR for Iran and Pakistan. This applies especially to countries, with weak legal structures and poor economic prospects requiring massive capacity building in the governance sector. One option to explore further is the possible location of this capacity building outside the country of origion, and utilizing human resources from within the Diaspora.

ANNEX V: Interview List

Name	Agency, Location	Position
A. UN AGENCIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS		
Yvan Hildebrand	EC	Refugee, Returnees and Migration
Julian Wilson	EC, Brussels	Head of Dept., DG
Ruth Albuquerque	ECHO, Brussels	Head of Unit
Peter Cavendish	ECHO, Brussels	Evaluation Unit
Matthew Sayer	ECHO, Brussels	Afghanistan Desk
John Mayor	ECHO, Brussels, Kabul	Head of Delegation, Kabul
Jonathan Hatwel	Europe Aid, Brussels	DG External Relations
Joachim Knoth	Europe Aid, Brussels	Administrator, Afghanistan, DG
Paul Turner	EuropeAid, Brussels	DG External Relations
Sari Kouvo	EU, Kabul	Gender Advisor
Eng. Taher Khalil	FAO	Irrigation engineer
Eng. Omari	FAO	Irrigation engineer
Eng. Laurent Lemers	ICRC, Kabul	WatHab Coordinator
Shir Shah Ayobi	ICRC, Kabul	WatHab Project Manager
Philip Spoerri	ICRC, Kabul	Head of Delegation In Afghanistan
Christoph Luedi	ICRC, Geneva	Head, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
Pascal Duport	ICRC, Geneva	Advisor, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit
Giuseppe Renda	ICRC, Geneva	Deputy Head of Operation, Central, South Asia
Mark Steinbeck	ICRC, Geneva	Health Service Unit, Eastern Europe and Middle East Asst. Division
Judith Greenwood	ICRC, Geneva	Head of Unit, External Relations Division
Dr. Katiby	IFRC, Herat	Regional Health Officer
Dr. Sefatullah	IFRC, Kandahar	Regional Health Officer
Shengjie Li	ILO	Liaison Officer
Richard Danziger	IOM, Geneva	Head, Counter Trafficking Service
Nicoletta Giordano	IOM, Geneva	Head, Assisted Voluntary Return, Migration Management Section
Marco Tulio Boasso	IOM, Geneva	Chief, Emergency and Post-Conflict Division
Yvonne Mortlock	IOM, Geneva	Senior Admin Finance Officer
Clarissa Azkoul	IOM, Geneva	Head, External Relations Section
Matt Huber	IOM, Kabul	Chef of Mission
Tajma Kurt	IOM, Kabul	Project Manager, RANA
Alexandre Coissac	IOM, Kabul	Programme Manger, IDP
David Labrador	IOM, Kabul	Quip, PRT Programme support officer
Jean Kutumbakana	IOM, Kabul	Technical Coordinator (Water & Sanitation)
Simonetta	IOM, Kabul	
Martin OCAGA	IOM, Kabul	Head of Sub Office Northern Region
M. Profazi	IOM, Kabul	Programme Manager
Gary Littlechild	OCHA, Geneva	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
Chuck Royce	OCHA, Geneva	Humanitarian Affairs Officer
Susanne Kristensen	OCHA, Geneva	Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Karim Ullah	UN Habitat, Bamyan	Director
Nadera	UN Habitat, Saighan Bamyan	Program Organizer
Najib Amiri	UN Habitat, Kabul	M&E Coordinator NSP
Abdul Popal	UN Habitat, Kandahar	Regional Manager
Dr. Amaad	UNAMA, Bamyan	National Prog. Officer
Amira Haq	UNAMA, Kabul	Deputy Director
Guy Griffin	UNAMA, Kabul	Political Affairs Officer
Corey Luvine	UNAMA, Kabul	Gender Advisor
Hassan	UNAMA, Eastern Zone	Office manager
Guang Cong	UNAMA, Northern Region	Head of Office
Corluka Davor	UNAMA, Northern Region	Regional Security Officer
Jens Norman Hahne	UNDP	Ammunition Survey Team Leader
Abdul Bari	UNDP	Assistant Country Director
Dinara Rakhmanova	UNDP	Senior Program Officer Governance Unit
Stephan Massing	UNDP	Program Officer & Sate Building Gov. Support
Karen Jorgensen	UNDP	Senior Deputy Country Director (Programme)
Peter Babbington	UNDP	CBE MC Acting Programme Director
Larry Taman	UNDP	Senior Institutional Development Specialist, MoJ
Rajula Atherton	UNDP	Counterpart Chief Financial Officer, MoJ
M. Ibrahim Hassan	UNDP	Senior Programme Associate, Governance Unit
Ezzatullah Saeedi	UNDP	Senior Programme Associate
Knut Østby	UNDP, New York	Evaluation Advisor
Yasumitsu Doken	UNDP, New York	Regional Programme, Specialist – BCPR
Yoshiyuki Oshima	UNDP, New York	Programme Specialist – RBAP
Hameed Quraishi	UNDP, ANBP, DDR	Deputy Officer Manager
Mrs. Fauzia	UNESCO, Kabul	Education Specialist
Lutfullah Safi	UNESCO, Kabul	Education Specialist
Eng. Adbul Haq	UN-Habitat	Engineers for Programmes, water supply
Najib Amiri	UN-Habitat, Kabul	M&E Coordinator, NSP
Gedlu Sima	UNHCR	Field office Kabul, WatSan Coordinator
Malangh Ibrahim	UNHCR	National Reintegration Officer
Jalil Sahibzada	UNHCR	Programme Assistant
Flory Balaga Kaboyi	UNHCR	Shelter, water Co-ordinator
Oscar Safari	UNHCR	
Salvatore Lombardo	UNHCR, Geneva	Head of Asia Section
Paul Stromberg	UNHCR, Geneva	Adviser to HC Lubbers
Francois Reybet-Degat	UNHCR, Geneva	Afghanistan Desk Officer
Philippe Leclerc	UNHCR, Geneva	Protection officer
Ewen Macleod	UNHCR, Geneva	Senior Advisor
Pablo Mateu	UNHCR, Geneva	Chief, Reintegration and Local Settlement Sect.
Felipe Camargo	UNHCR, Geneva	Senior Rural Development Officer
Bernard Doyle	UNHCR, Herat	Head of sub office
Mahdi Hussaini	UNHCR, Herat	IDP Program Officer
Fraidoon Kakar	UNHCR, Herat	IDP Program Officer

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Abdul Karim	UNHCR, Herat	Programme Officer
Wakil Habiti	UNHCR, Herat	Programme Officer
Mohammad Osman	UNHCR, Herat	Programme Officer
Shoko Shimozawa	UNHCR, Kabul	Assistant CoM
Jacques Mouchet	UNHCR, Kabul	Representative
Katarina Lumpp	UNHCR, Kabul	Protection Officer
Elisabetta Brumat	UNHCR, Kabul	Associate External Affairs Officer
Abdul Jalil	UNHCR, Kandahar	Assistant Reintegration Officer
Ousseni Compaore	UNHCR, Kandahar	Head of Sub Office
Sara Abdullah Omar	UNHCR, Kandahar	Deputy head of sub-office
Massoda	UNHCR, Kandahar	Project Officer
Dr. Amiri	UNICEF	Regional Manager
Dr. Saeed	UNICEF	Education Officer
M. Rahman	UNICEF	Education Officer
Mr.F. Haq	UNICEF	Education Officer
Mr. Ghafuri	UNICEF	Education Officer
Samay Saquib	UNICEF	Project Officer
Mohammad Amiri	UNICEF	Project Officer
Saifullah	UNICEF	Board Head, Curriculum
Daisuke Kanazawa	UNICEF	Coordination & Planning Officer
Gulam Sakhi Sahak	UNICEF	Assistant Project Officer, Kunar
Degeuene Fall	UNICEF Kabul	Head of Plan, Monitoring and Evaluation unit
Barbara Atherly	UNICEF, Herat	Project officer
Dr. Ghulam Rabbani Wardak	UNICEF, Herat	Project officer
Dr. Aisha	UNICEF, Herat	Provincial project officer, Herat
Dr. H. Amiri	UNICEF, Jalalabd	Regional Manager
Dr. Abdul Wahid Wahidi	UNICEF, Kandahar	Provincial Project Officer Helmand
Meriam Aslan	UNIFEM, Kabul	Director
Huma Sabri	UNIFEM, MoWA, Kabul	Consultant
Joanne Sandler	UNIFEM, New York	Deputy Executive for Programme
Socorro L. Reyes	UNIFEM, New York	Chief, Asia and Pacific section
Mr. Rafael	UNOPS, Bamyan	Head of UNOPS
Eng. Vatt	UNOPS, Bamyan	
William A. Byrd	WB, Kabul	Lead Economist
Carol Le Duc	WB, Kabul	Senior SocialDevelopment Specialist (Gender)
Ann Tully	WB, Washington	Afghanistan desk
Benjamin S. Crow	WB, Washington	Communication Assistant
Charles Vincent	WFP	Director
Hugo Botha	WFP	Program Officer
D. Molla	WFP	Head of Progamme
D.J. McLoughlin	WFP	Coordinator, PCU-FFE
C. Naumann	WFP	Research & Project Manager
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Name	Agency, Location	Position
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Dr. Musa	WHO	Water Supply, Metharlam
B. DONORS, EMBASSIES & CONSULTANTS		
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Nathalie Kelderman	Asia dept., The Hague	Policy Officer Afghanistan
Marit Boumans	Asylum and Migration Dept., The Hague	Afghanistan desk
Dirk-Jan Brouwer	Asylum and Migration Dept., The Hague	Policy Officer
Emma Fraser	CHAD, UK	Programme Officer
Michael Vinding	Danish MFA, Asia Dept., Copenhagen	Head of Danish Kabul representation 2002-2004
Susan Ulbæk	Danish MFA, Asia Dept., Copenhagen	Head of Department
Pernille Dueholm	Danish MFA, Asia Dept., Copenhagen	Head of Section
Nanna Skrumsager-Skau	Danish MFA, Asia Dept., Copenhagen	Head of Section
Henrik Jespersen	Danish MFA, Humanitarian and NGO Department, Copenhagen	Senior Advisor
Stefan Islandi	Danish MFA, Humanitarian and NGO Department, Copenhagen	Head of Section
William Carlos	Development Cooperation, Ireland	Senior Development Specialist Audit
Aina Hearns	Development Cooperation, Ireland	
Fiona English	Development Cooperation, Ireland	Senior Development Specialist Audit
JZS Ereck	DFID, Kabul	Livelihood Advisor
Marianne Olesen	Rep. Office of Denmark, Kabul	First Secretary
Charlotte Olsen	Rep. Office of Denmark, Kabul	Deputy Head of Mission
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Julie Skone	DFID, UK	Deputy Programme Manager – Afghanistan
Jackie Creighton	DFID Afghanistan	Deputy Head of Kabul Office
Harald Boerekamp	Humanitarian and Reconstruction Dept., The Hague	Policy officer Afghanistan
Aftab Hossain	JICA, Bamyan	Program Officer
Mariana Noteboom	Royal Netherlands Embassy, Kabul	Deputy Head of Mission
Zeno Van Dorth	Royal Netherlands Embassy, Kabul	First Secretary
Jan Bjerninger	Sida, Asia Dept., Stockholm	Head of Department
Thomas Bergenholz	Sida, Asia Dept., Stockholm	Country Strategist, Afghanistan
Anna-Klara Berglund	Sida, Humanitarnan Dept, Stockholm	Programme officer

Name	Agency, Location	Position
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Peter Tejler	Swedish MFA, Asia Dept., Stockholm	Ambassador, Asia Dept.
Oscar Schlyter	Swedish MFA, Asia Dept., Stockholm	Desk Officer
Stefan Dahlgren	Sida, Department for Evaluations and Internal Audit	
C. AFGHAN GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS & CONSULTANTS		
Dr. Sima Samar	AHIRC	Chair
Ahmad Fahim Hakim	AIHRC	Deputy Chair
Azim Ahid	AIHRC, Herat	Deputy Manager
Abdul Qader Noorzai	AIHRC, Kandahar	Regional Programme Manager
M. Is-haq Sarwari	Balkh Mostofiat	Mostofy
Shasurahman Habib	Balkh Mostofiat	Chief of Administration
Habiba Sohrabi	Bamyan Province	Governor
Peter Muir	Bearing Point, MoF	Project Manager Financial Management Agent
Shamsu Rahman Shams	Court, Mazar	Chief of Court
S. Rahmann	DEO	Laghman, Quarghai
Abd. Saeedi	DEO	Nangarhar, Soarkhrod
Amina	DOWA, Bamyan	Health Officer
Shah Jahan	DOWA, Parwan	Head of DOWA
Waheed Ahmad Alkozia	Department of Hoquq	Chief of Administration
Gul Mohammed	Department of Hoquq	Hoquq staff
Moh. Ali	Distr. Govern.	Nangarhar, Kama
Ghulam Farooq	DoRR, Herat	Camp Manager
Amina	DOWA, Bamyan	Health Officer
Shah Jahan	DOWA, Parwan	Head of DoWA Parwan Province
Eng Ahmed Shah	DRRD, Kandahar	Director
Abdul Wahab Mohammad	Dur Baba	District Governor
Haji Habibullah	Goshta	District Governor
Atta Mohammad Noor	Balkh Province	Governor of
Manuel R. Morga	IARCSC, Civil Service Commission	Public Administration Specialist, M.P.A., Ph.D
Haji Mir Jan	Herat Province	Deputy Governor
Dr. Mohammad Humayoom	Kandahar Province	Deputy Governor
Haji Ghalam Dastagir	Jalalabad	Home Ministry Crime Branch
Dr. Mohammad Asif	Jalalabad	Assistant Provincial Governor, Nangarhar
Ms. Zaifinon Safi	Metharlam	Department of Women Affairs
Ms. Moniem Amina	Metharlam	Head Mistress, Laghman
Mollana Abdul Jabar	Metharlam	Chair Person High Court, Laghman
Haji Amishah Gul	Lalpur	District Governor Lalpur
Dr. Jafar	Metharlam	Assistant Governor, Laghman

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Dr. Nematullah Bishan	Ministry of Finance	Acting Director, Department of Budget
M. Anwer Akbar	Ministry of Finance	Deputy Chief Administration
Muhammad Seddiq	Ministry of Finance	Training & Development Advisor
Mary Venner	Ministry of Finance	Budget Advisor, Baering Point
Meer Habiburahman	Ministry of Justice	Chief of Administration
Dr. M. Qasim Hashimzai	Ministry of Justice	Deputy Minister
Dr. Ahmadzai	Mirwais Hospital	Director
Arbab Amjad	MISFA	Director
Abdul Ghafoori	MoA, Kabul	Special Advisor
Farouk Baroukzai	MoA, French Embassy, Kabul	Advisor
Gitte Stilling	MoE	Management Advisor, Grant Management Unit
M.A. Karbolai	MoE	Director of Planning
Mr. Wahidullah	MoE	Head of Monitoring & Supervision
Mr. S. Nazir	MoE	Deputy Monitoring & Supervision
Mr. Bakhtari	MoE	Head of Supervison Section
B.A.Amin	MoE	Head of Admin & Finance
Ian Holland	MoF, Kabul	Advisor
Aziz Babakarhel	MoF, Kabul	Advisor
Dr. Raofa Niazi	MoPH, Herat	Director
Dr. Mir Omar Masoud	MoPH, Kabul	Acting Director, Policy and Plan
Hashim Alkozai	MoPH, Kandahar	Deputy Director
Dr. Dadfar	MoRR, Kabul	Minister
Nooria Banwal	MoWA	Deputy Director
Haneef Atmar	MRRD	Minister
Svein Stoveland	MRRD	Policy Advisor
Abdul Wahid Nabiyar	MRRD	Director for WATSAN
Dr. Omar Zakhilwal	MRRD	Senior Advisor
Mohammad Ehsan Zia	MRRD	Deputy Minister
Wais Ahmad	MRRD	Chief, NEEP, NRAP
Hajji Din Mohammad	Nangarhar Province	Governor
Simon Burdett	NSP Oversight Consultant Team	Regional Support Manager
Mr. Mojadedi	PEO, Laghman	Head of PEO, Metharlam
M.J. Taslim	PEO, Nangarhar	Head of PEO, Jalalabad
Abdul Majid	RRD, Herat	Director
Aminuddin Biddar	RRD, Laghman	Director
Engineer Torab	Sokhrod District, Nangarhar	District Governor
Abdul Rahim	Shari Safa District, Zabul	Deputy Woleswal
Mohammad Ali	Kama District, Nangarhar	District Governor
S. Rahman	Quarghai District, Laghman	District Education Officer
D. NGOs		
Shulla Sakhizada	ACBAR, Herat Office	Admin Officer
Anita De Beer	ACBAR Kabul	Director

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Azadullah Fallah	ADA, Farah	Logistic Officer
Esmatullah Haidary	ADA, Kabul	Director
Eng. Zhakeer	ADA, Kandahar	Province Manager
Fraser Malcom	Afghan Aid	Director
Eng Abdul Aziz Sarwan	AHDAA, Herat	Director
Dr. Mohammad Kabir	AHDS, Kandahar	Provincial Health Manager
Zulfi	AKDN, Bamyan	
Melissa Ong	ANSO, Kabul	Program Offiser
Dr. Jami	ARCS, Herat	Regional Health Officer
Noruddin Ahmedi	ARCS, Herat	Branch President
Heba Tarzi	AWN, Kabul	Office Manager
Mary Akrami	AWSDC, Kabul	Director
Jamal Uden	BRAC	Director
Shahid Ullah	BRAC, Bamyan	Office Manager
Basheer Ahmad	CAWC, Bamyan	Office Manager
Haydatullah Mushkani	CHA, Kandahar	Provincial Manager
Habiburahman	CHA, Kandahar	Chief, Agriculture department
Eng. Mohammed Zaman	CHA	
Wali Mohammed Farhodi	CHA	Dep. of Education
Naaem Salimi	CoAR, Kabul	Director
Aine Fay	Concern	Country Director
Luke Stephen	Concern	Assistant Country Director
Anne O'Mahony	Concern, Ireland	Regional Director
Mohammad Suleman	CPAU, Kabul	Program Manager
M. Humayoun	DAARTT	Operation Manager
M. Humayoun	DAARTT	Community Worker
Eva Søvre	DAC	Director
Gorm Pedersen	DACAAR	Director
Eng. Shah Wali	DACAAR	Head of Regional Office, Jalalabad
Mohammad Aqa	DACAAR	Programme Manager Rural Development
Leendert Vijselaar	DACAAR	Water and sanitation manager
Kerry Jane Wilson	DACAAR	Chief of Programmes
Eng. Shah Wali	DACAAR	Regional Director
Shakila Assad	DACAAR	Senior Social Organiser, HQ
Maliha	DACAAR	FCW Pashtun Zargon north
Susan	DACAAR	FCW, Pashtun Zargon south
Eddi Oerpe	DACAAR	Chief Administration
Alexandra Strand Holm	DACAAR	Public Information Officer
Mohd. Shah Rauf	DACAAR, Herat	Head RDP Section
Dr. Shams	DACAAR, Herat	Administrator
Kataibullah	DACAAR, Herat	Community Worker
Mohammed Yousuf Ittehad	DACAAR, Herat	Deputy Director

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Eng Abdullah	DACAAR, Herat	Engineering Manager
Gullam Ghaus	DACAAR, Herat	Social Worker
Abdul Rashim	DACAAR, Kwaja Gir	Social Worker
Ghulam Sarwar Karim	DACAAR, Rabate Sangi	Office Manager
Shafiqa	DACAAR, RabatSangi	Trainer, RDP program
Laurent Viot	EO, CA	Programme Development Officer
Robin Greenwood	EO, CA	Programme Officer
Laurent Viot	EO, CA	Programme Development Officer
Dr. Qaisani	EO, CA, Herat	Programme Officer
Eng. Fazil Rabi	EO, CA, Herat	Programme Manager
Niamh Carty	EO, CA, Ireland	Programme Officer
Teena Roberts	EO, CA, Kabul	Country Representative
Abdul Karim Mirzazada	GAA	National Country Representative
Raymond Jordan	GoAL, Ireland	Emergency Coordinator
Ernst Bentzien	GTZ	Regional Director GTZ, NSP
Hendrikk Linneweber	GTZ	Director
Ernst Benzin	GTZ	Regional Director GTZ, NSP
A. Majeed	GTZ, NSP	CDC
H. Linneweber	GTZ-IS	Regional Director
Abdul Mohammad	Handicap International	Mine awareness officer, Zabul
Sidiqullah Shinwarie	Ibn Sina, HQ Kabul	Program Development Director
Dr. Abdul Majeed Sidiqi	Ibn Sina, HQ Kabul	Director General
Dr. Fazul Omar	Ibn Sina, Zabul	Doctor, Shari Safi clinic
Marco Rothelli	Intersos, Kandahar	Project Manager UNHCR project
Francesca Mangia	Intersos, Kandahar	ECHO project manager
Habibi	NNC, Bamyan	In charge
Dr. Mhm Ismael Sadiqi	NPO, RRA HC Rabat Sangi	CHC doctor
Gulam Sarwar Karim	NPO, RRA, Rabat Sangi	Office Manager
Said Abdul Hakim	NPO, RRAA, Herat	Regional Manager
Jasteena Dhillon	NRCl, Mazar	Programme Coordinator
Peer Mohammad Noori	MSI	Senior Project Analyst
Brian Doran	MSI	Court Administration Specialist
Lubna Ihsan	Oxfam, Kabul	Gender Advisor
J.Cl. Marie	SAB	Child Advisor
Engr. Hafizullah	SAB	Operation Director
Terence O'Mally	SAFE, Ireland	Board Director
S.H. Hashimi	SCA	Education Coordinator
M. Taheer Ismet	SCA	Regional Administrator
Rahman Gul	SCA	Office Manager
Mr. Rasfanullah	SCA	Education Supervisor
Mrs. Shogufta	SCA	Education Supervisor
S.H. Hashimi	SCA	Education Coordinator
Eng. Abdullah Aini	SCA	Water and sanitation manager
Dr. Shah Mahmood	SCA	Financial Administrator

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Abdul Qudoos Qateh	SCA	CDAP Regional Program Officer
Jesper Frovin Jensen	SCA, Kabul	Country Director
Wiiu Lillesaar	SCA, Kabul	Gender Coordinator
Dr.Hadi Qubadi	SCA, Kabul	Laboratory advisor
Dr. Mohammad Saeed	SCA, Kabul	Health Services Advisor
Dr. Mohammad Wazir	SCA, Kabul	EPI advisor
Dr. Ahmed Abd El Rahman	SCA, Kabul	Senior Health Advisor
Anne Hertzberg	SCA, Kabul	RAD Programme Senior Advisor
Zamarai Sayeb	SCA, Kabul	Programme Coordinator RAD
Shrin Persson	SC-SWE	Programme Manager Afghanistan
Mrs. Sharifa	SC-SWE	Programme Officer
Dr.S. Renew	SC-UK	Country Director
Abdul Khalid Stanakzai	SDF, Herat	Regional Manager
Raz Mohammad Dalili	SDF, Kabul	Director
Haji Naimullah Naimi	SWABAC	Executive coordinator
Eileen Kingston	Trocaire, Ireland	
Suraya Pakzad	Voice of Woman, Herat	Director
E. COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES AND ORGANISATIONS		
Abdul Latif	Achin	Malik, Community Kaz, Achin – N
Asadullah	Achin	Malik, Community Pakhel, Achin – N
Taj Mohammad Shinwari	Achin	Head of CDC, NSP Project – Pakhel
Khaista Noid, Malik	Behsood	Community Council Girdikaz, Behsood – N
Khaidar Mohammad	Behsood	Community Council, Chowi Panza, Behsood
Malik Asmatullah	Deh Bala	Shura of Elders Gorgoro,
Mir Saiful	Dur Baba	Community Council, Lower Amar Khil
Malik Mohammad Haidar	Dwala Mena	Community Council, Pachir wa Agam
Haji Dost Moh. Khan	Goshta	Shura head, Khawjazai – N
Abdul Wahab	Gozara	Head of Farmers Shura
Haji Shir Mohammad	Kama	Head of CDC, NSP Project – Anarbagh – N
Hajji Mudir Mahmadullah	Metharlam	Malik, Community of Quddub-Saji – L
Gul Wais	Sokhrod	Community Council, Lower Nachrak
Abdallah Gul	Sokhrod	Community Council, Qualay-i-Khun
Malik Yussuf	Sokhrod	Malik, Gheirabad
Abdul Nasser Mir Aian	Sokhrod	Community Council, Gulay-chadkhara
Alhaj Maulaway Rahmatullah	Ulama Shura	Chief of High Madrasa
Alhaj Maulaway M. Seddiq Sadeqyar	Ulama Shura	Deputy chair of Ulama Shura
Alhaj Maulaway M. Aslam	Ulama Shura	Chair of Ulama Shura

Name	Agency, Location	Position
Alhaj Maulaway Abdurahman Rahmani	Ulama Shura	Mofty of Ulama Shura
Alhaj M. Gul	Ulama Shura	Member of Elders Shura
Alhaj Abdul Fatah	Ulama Shura	Secretariat of Elders Shura
Alhaj Khuaja Azizullah	Ulama Shura	Member of Elders Shura
Alhaj M. Anwer	Ulama Shura	Member of Elders Shura
Alhaj Wakeel Abdul Ahmad	Ulama Shura	Deputy Chair of Elders Shura
Hafez Muhebullah	Ulama Shura	Chief of Darulhefaz, Madrasa Asadia
Hafez Abdul Basir	Ulama Shura	Member of Ulama Shura
Group interview	Elders Shura	Balkh, Mazar
Group interview	University Students Male	Balkh, Mazar
Group interview	University Students Female	Balkh, Mazar
Group interview	CDC Bala Karza	Dand district, Kandahar
Group interview	CDC Mushkezi	Dand district, Kandahar
Group interview	CDC, Shari Safa	Zabul province
Group interview	CDC District Shura Shari Safa	Zabul province
Group interview	CDC Jelatkhankali,	Zabul province
Group interview	CDC female, Chell dochtaran	Rabat Zangi, Herat
Group interview	CDC female, Kwaja Gir	Rabat Zangi, Herat
Group interview	CDC male, Chell dochtaran	Rabat Zangi, Herat
Group interview	CDC male, Kwaja Gir	Rabat Zangi, Herat
Group interview	CDC, Balakarz	Pashtun Zargon, Herat
Group interview	CDC, Mushkazi	Pashtun Zargon, Herat
Group interview	CDC, Sara-e-Naw village	Enjil Disrtrict, Herat
Group interview	CDC, Ishaq Suleman village	Enjil District, Herat
Group interview	Focus Group Male	Qultaq Village in Dawlatabad District
Group interview	Focus Group Female	Qultaq Village in Dawlatabad District
Group interview	Female Beneficiaries, BRAC	Dashte Barshi, Kabul
Group interview	Female IDP shura	Maslak IDP Camp, Herat
Group interview	IDP shura	Maslak IDP Camp, Herat
Group interview	Female IDP shura	Zalmay Dasht IDP camp, Kandahar
Group interview	IDP shura	Zalmay Dasht IDP camp, Kandahar
Group interview	Peanut factory workers (IDPs)	Zalmay Dasht IDP camp, Kandahar
Group interview	Shelter beneficiaries (4)	Old Kandahar City, Kandahar
Group interview	Shelter beneficiaries (3)	Ishaq Suleman village, Enjil District, Herat
Group interview	Teachers, principle	Secondary School, Centre, Laghman
Group interview	Teachers, parents	Middle School, Centre, Jalalabad
Group interview	Parents	CBS School, Behsood, Qalaish, Nangarhar
Group interview	Parents, Shura member	Suhrkrod, Katapoor, Nangarhar
Group interview	TWG, Watsan, chaired by RRD	Jalalabad

Name	Agency, Location	Position
F. MILITARY PERSONNEL		
Brig Gen. David R Potts MBE	ISAF	PRT
Catherine Womble	PRT Nangarhar	Major of PRT Nangarhar
Col Russell Beatie	PRT Mazar	Commander PRT
Susan Crombie	PRT Mazar	UK Foreign & Commonwealth Rep.
Patricia McArdle	PRT Mazar	US Department of State Representative
Nicklas Bromark,	PRT Mazar	Major
Morten Nielsen	PRT Denmark, Samangan	Captain
Casper Fink	PRT Denmark, Samangan	Sergeant
Rasmus Ulfeldt	PRT Denmark, Samangan	Lieutenant
Yvonne Stassen	PRT NL Baghlan	Political advisor
Robert A.A. Dankers	PRT NL Baghlan	Major, Mission Commander
Gerard W.J. Hendriks	PRT NL Baghlan	Lieutenant, Police LSO
H. Events	PRT NL Baghlan	Lieutenant Colonel, Mission Commander
R. Baksteem	PRT NL Baghlan	Mission Commander
G. KEY INFORMERS & RESOURCE PERSONS		
Mr Ghulam Naby Khuraby	Chief of Police	Hazrate-Zoltan, Samangan
Mr A Azizullah	Chief of Administration	Hazrate-Zoltan Uluswali, Samangan
Montazar Shah	AREA	Regional Director
Andrew Wilder	AREU	Director
Stefen Schoter	AREU	Consultant
Kjeld Elkjær	ARTF-evaluation team	Team Member
Peter Marsden	BAAG, UK	Advisor
Elizabeth Winther	BAAG, UK	BAAG Special Advisor
Barnett Rubin	CIC	Director of Studies
Thomas Thomsen	DRC, Copenhagen	NGO Resource Person
Karl Harbo	EC	Head of Delegation
Philip Rudge	IDP reference group, UK	Consultant
Margie Buchanan-Smith	IDP reference group, UK	Consultant
Gulam Rasul Rasikh	Nangarhar Press	Chief Editor
Prof. Samiullah Hayat	Faculty of Medicine, Nangarhar	Professor
Mr. Ammanullah	Mullah	Bahsood, Nangarhar
Mullah Spin Gul	Mullah	Gheirabad, Nangarhar
Turabi	Afghan Mellat Party, Kandahar	Province leader

ANNEX VI: References

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Afghanistan was a troubled country in 2001. Not only is Afghanistan one of the poorest countries in the world, but protracted armed conflict since 1978 had forced 6 million out of a population of some 25 million people to flee to neighbouring countries, caused massive destruction of infrastructure and paved the way for warlords to rule over large parts of the country. The 2001 11 September attack by Al Qaeda placed Afghanistan at the centre of international politics and provoked the US-led 'Coalition of the Willing's attack on 7 October on Al Qaeda bases in Afghanistan in collaboration with a loose alliance of Northern Afghan groups and the subsequent overthrow of the Taliban regime.

After the international military operation and up to mid-2004 Afghanistan received close to Euro 3.2 billion in total of humanitarian and development aid to rebuild the country. Of this, 25 % - Euro 791 billion came from five bilateral donors: the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland. In 2004 the five donors decided to commission a joint evaluation of their aid programmes 2001-2005. The evaluation was carried out by a consortium led by Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, contracted by Danida's Evaluation Department on behalf of the five donors.

The donors' support to Afghanistan was not just another humanitarian operation. It was a multi-dimensional intervention combining the objectives of development co-operation with broad foreign and domestic policy objectives, where the donors – of whom some had taken an active part in ousting the old regime – also aimed at supporting Afghanistan's new start through putting into place a new and democratically elected government and market economy. Bosnia, Kosovo, Cambodia, East Timor and Iraq have seen similar interventions and more are likely to follow. Evidently such interventions have to cope with novel problems, for which ready answers are as yet scarce. The findings of this evaluation regarding a range of central issues can serve as lessons learnt in the process of developing adequate answers to the new challenges.

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