



**Annexes of HCSS-07-002r**  
**Evaluation of Netherlands' financial  
assistance for humanitarian demining activities  
in 1996 – 2006: Republic of Angola**

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## Annex 1A – Terms of Reference

## **Terms of Reference**

### **Preparing the ground for a mine save world**

#### **An evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war Terms of Reference for the evaluation of financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006**

## **1 Introduction**

The Dutch government seeks to adopt an integrated approach to international issues, using an effective and efficient combination of policy instruments. This is the reason for the IOB (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department) evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW's). This evaluation will examine two types of policy instrument (political and financial) and how they interrelate. It will be made up of two distinct parts (study I and study II). Each of the two parts, which will be carried out separately, will focus on one of the policy instruments, including its nature, operation and effects. Study I will focus on political initiatives: the diplomatic efforts undertaken, in the various fora on conventional arms control, to expand, tighten and enforce existing international legal instruments. Study II will focus on the instrument of financial assistance, i.e. funds for mine clearance activities in countries with a mine problem, seen from the broad perspective of humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction. These Terms of Reference relate to study II.

## **2 Background**

### *Scale and nature of the landmine problem*

According to the latest (2005) edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*, in the world as a whole, there were 84 countries and 8 areas not internationally recognised as independent states that had a mine problem in 2005. The number of mines involved can only be estimated. Estimates in the literature range from 30 to 300 million. Yet what matters is not so much the precise number of mines, but the size of the contaminated area. The presence of just a single mine renders an area potentially hazardous, and even the mere suspicion that mines are present can severely disrupt local and/or regional ways of life. What ultimately matters, therefore, is the

impact of mines on the socioeconomic situation. The actual number of mines is largely immaterial.

There are enormous differences from one country to the next. In some, the location of minefields is known and they cause the civilian population little trouble. The Falkland Islands are a case in point. During the 1982 conflict, thousands of mines were laid on the beaches and moorland. According to the national authorities, there are more than 100 minefields covering 20 square kilometres and containing some 16,000 mines. These minefields are all clearly marked and fenced off, and are checked regularly (*Landmine Monitor Report 2005*). In other countries, the problems are overwhelming. In Afghanistan, for example, various army units and factions have been using mines for over twenty years, making it one of the worst affected countries in the world. Landmines and ERWs are scattered throughout the country. A Landmine Impact Survey conducted between November 2003 and November 2004 identified 4,514 risk areas (covering 715 square kilometres) in 2,368 populated areas. Some 4.2 million people live in these areas (15% of the total population), 1.6 million of whom in what the survey called 'high or medium-impacted communities'. The mines impede access to agricultural land and pastures, and hamper the reconstruction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, schools and other public buildings. Every month, they claim between 150 and 300 victims.<sup>1</sup> In the 24 months preceding the survey, a total of 2,245 victims were recorded in 664 of the 2,368 populated areas identified.

The international community tends to see the mine issue as a humanitarian problem. Every year, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people are killed or injured in accidents involving mines, although exact figures are not available. Most casualties are civilians. The Landmine Monitor recorded 6,521 cases in 2005, including children (1,262 or 19%), women (239 or 4%) and military personnel (25%). Yet many mine-related accidents are not reported, because they take place in remote areas where no assistance or communication of any kind is available. Accidents occur in almost all regions of the world. In 2002 they claimed victims in 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 15 countries in Southeast Asia, in 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa and in 5 countries in Latin and Central America (*Landmine Monitor Report 2003: 39-41*).

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<sup>1</sup> Progress in implementing Article 5: An overview of the mine-affected States Parties' problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance, Background information compiled by the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD to assist the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 11 February 2004, p.3.

The landmine issue can also be defined as a socioeconomic problem:

- Mines and ERWs disrupt traditional ways of life. Social ties between relatives, families or communities are severed because roads, pastures, markets, schools, wells, riverbeds and other communal facilities and meeting places can no longer be used or can only be accessed via a circuitous route.
- Mines and ERWs impede economic development. The isolation of land, roads, bridges and markets can cut off existing local or regional sources of income. At the same time, the affected communities are confronted by a growing number of disabled people who are unable to provide for themselves. This places an increasing strain on the resources available for medical care. Not only are the operations that have to be performed immediately after an accident difficult and expensive, but also in the longer term the rehabilitation of victims demands constant medical care and attention.

Mines and ERWs pose the additional problem of hampering peacebuilding in post-conflict areas. After a conflict, refugees and displaced persons are unable or unwilling to return to their original homes because they know or suspect that the area is mined. This can slow down the process of reconciliation between the former warring parties.

#### *Mine clearance jargon*

‘Humanitarian demining’ usually refers to the sum total of activities relating to the clearance of mines and ERWs. These include: 1) examination of the nature and size of a minefield; 2) preparation of a general plan of action; 3) clearance of mines and ERWs; 4) marking of minefields; 5) follow-up inspections; 6) involvement of the local population in mine clearance activities; and 7) transfer of demined land (GICHD, 2004:64). Humanitarian demining should not be confused with military demining. The aim of humanitarian demining is to remove *all* mines and ERWs, so that it is safe for the civilian population to start living and working again in the affected areas. Military demining is designed to create narrow corridors through minefields for troops and equipment. Since speed is crucial to the success of a military operation of this kind, no attempt is made to clear all the mines. The risk of remaining mines is factored into the equation (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1:16).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The UN norm for the accuracy of humanitarian demining is 99.6%. On the other hand, the Dutch military, for example, consider 80% accuracy to be adequate for military demining (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).



Humanitarian demining is only one component of what is referred to in international land mine parlance as ‘mine action’. Mine action is an umbrella term that covers a range of activities designed to reduce or completely eliminate the effects of landmines and ERWs on civilians in their living environment. These include: 1) victim support and social rehabilitation; 2) mine risk education and mine awareness for the local population; 3) mine clearance; 4) data management; 5) training for mine clearers; 6) technical research into better detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:1).<sup>3</sup>

#### *Development of the mine action sector*

The international community’s activities in the field of mine action started out in Afghanistan. In October 1988, in view of the problems the country faced because of landmines, the UN called for funds for humanitarian mine clearance. Until then, mine clearance had been the exclusive preserve of national armed forces. In the case of Afghanistan, however, there was no functioning national army, and the retreating Soviet troops were unable or unwilling to clear the mines that had been laid. This prompted the UN to develop and promote activities of its own. Initially, the UN’s humanitarian mine clearance activities in Afghanistan were limited to providing demining training. Subsequently support was given by a number of mine-action NGOs specially set up for this purpose in Afghanistan. This initiative in turn triggered the establishment of the first international NGO for mine action (HALO Trust), and activities were extended to other countries with mine-related problems. These included Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait and Mozambique.

Not all demining activities were entirely successful. In the mid-1990s there was a growing realisation that, in order to discover why previous programmes had succeeded or failed, a common basis for the development of new programmes was needed. In 1997, a study by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was published which examined the factors underlying the success or failure of the first demining programmes in four countries. The study concluded that demining operations suffered from a chronic lack of organisation, commitment and vision. These conclusions, combined with proposals put forward by a

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<sup>3</sup> The UN defines mine action as ‘activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) identifies five clusters of activities: 1) awareness and education; 2) humanitarian demining; 3) victim assistance and rehabilitation; 4) stockpile destruction; 5) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines (GICHD, 2004:20).

number of working groups that had been dealing with the question of standardisation since 1996, led to the establishment in 1997 of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Since then, UNMAS has been the central contact point within the UN for all landmine-related activities and initiatives. In 1997 it published its first list of standards, the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. At the same time, UNICEF devised the first series of international guidelines on education and awareness programmes.

Starting in the late 1990s, more attention was paid to: 1) changes and shifts in mine action procedures, practices and standards and how they are perceived; 2) streamlining of mine action in the wider context of sustainable development and capacity building. For example, the scope of the UNMAS standards published in 1997 was extended. In 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) was issued by UNMAS. IMAS contain more elements of mine action than the original standards, which dealt exclusively with mine clearance. Their aim is to make mine action more secure and efficient by defining a number of internationally accepted principles, procedures and minimum requirements for national authorities, international donors and organisations in this field. IMAS are reviewed every three years in order to incorporate developments in the field (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, 2004). Mainly because of its traditional isolation, the biggest challenge currently facing the mine action community is the streamlining of mine action (point 2 above). In the last few years, not only have initiatives been developed to incorporate mine action into specially devised national strategies, but there has also been more cooperation with actors operating in this area (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Danida, 2003:9).

#### *International coordination of mine action activities*

The international mine action network is made up of national, international and non-governmental actors. Mine action activities are coordinated by the following horizontal and vertical mechanisms:

- The Mine Action Support Group (MASG), which was set up in 1998, is the primary coordinating body for donors. It is an informal forum of 27 donors who meet three times a year in New York and Geneva to share information on mine action activities and humanitarian demining policy. In 2003 Norway initiated the establishment of the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group (RMCG) in the margins of the meeting of the parties to the Ottawa Convention. The RMCG provides an opportunity for international

consultations and the exchange of information between mine action donors and the principal stakeholders in the margins of the various meetings of the parties.

- UNMAS plays a pivotal role in UN mine action activities. A number of other UN bodies also operate in this area. These include UNICEF (mine risk education), UNHCR (mine risk education and safe food supplies), UNDP (socioeconomic consequences of the presence of mines), UNOPS (integrated mine action and capacity building programmes) and UNOCHA (humanitarian consequences of mines). The Inter-Agency Group on Mine Action is responsible for coordination between the various UN bodies. The Steering Committee on Mine Action coordinates the mine action activities of UN and non-UN bodies. NGOs (including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)), the ICRC and the GICHD, among others, are represented on these committees.
- The most important umbrella organisation for NGOs is the ICBL. The ICBL owes its origin to an initiative by six humanitarian NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Mines Advisory Group, Medico International, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Physicians for Human Rights) who joined forces in the 1990s to work for an unconditional ban on the production, possession, trade in and sale of landmines and other remnants of war. Since the inception of the Ottawa Convention in 1996, the ICBL has worked to promote the universalisation of and compliance with this agreement. Over 1,400 NGOs in more than 90 countries are currently affiliated.
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was established in 2000 to support the UN's work. The GICHD is an independent centre of expertise that provides a platform within the international mine action network for international consultation and information exchange. It was the driving force behind the development, distribution and maintenance of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was introduced in mid-1999.

### *National organisation*

In most mine-affected countries, demining activities are managed centrally by a national mine action authority. This is a national government body – a ministry, for example – that is responsible for the regulation, management and interministerial coordination of national mine action activities. In addition, there is generally a mine action centre (MAC) that acts as national operator. MACs have a number of tasks: managing the national database, adopting national mine action plans and priorities, accrediting non-governmental and commercial demining organisations, coordinating local mine action plans with the activities of demining

NGOs and other outside bodies and local deminers, drawing up national mine action standards and monitoring the quality of demining activities. In some countries, the national mine action centre is the equivalent of a national mine action authority (GICHD, 2004:118).<sup>4</sup> Immediately after the end of a conflict, before a government has been installed, the MACs are run by the UN. They are subsequently integrated into the national government structure (Danida, 2003:57).

### **3 Dutch policy**

Financial assistance for mine clearance operations has been part of Dutch government policy since 1992. At first the Netherlands' stand on the issue was a cautious one. On 25 August 1995, as part of the preparations for the first review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the first policy memorandum on the problem of landmines was published. In it the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation acknowledged the gravity of the landmine problem and gave their backing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines in the long term, but argued that for the time being landmines were indispensable part of the Dutch army's arsenal. A general ban on the use of landmines would only be attainable, they wrote, once fully fledged, humane alternatives to landmines had been developed (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1). In March 1996, however, defence minister Joris Voorhoeve announced that the existing stockpile of anti-personnel mines would be disposed of and that such weapons systems would not be used in the future (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 4:1). This decision cleared the way for the Netherlands to play a more active role in combating the problem of landmines in the framework of the CCW and the Ottawa process (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 15:2). On the basis of the decision, over a three-year period, almost 440,000 superfluous landmines (235,000 anti-personnel mines and 203,000 anti-tank mines) belonging to the Dutch armed forces were destroyed. The Netherlands retained up to 5,000 anti-personnel mines for the purpose of training mine clearers, studying better ways of detecting landmines and rendering them harmless, and testing equipment developed to do so (House of

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<sup>4</sup> The principal non-governmental demining organisations include: DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust (HALO), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) (LMR, 2003:25). Since the first Gulf War, various commercial organisations have also been active in the field of humanitarian demining. These include BACTEC, European Landmine Solutions, Mechem, Mine-Tech International, Royal Ordnance, Ronco and Dyncorp International (GICHD, 2004:22, Wikipedia, 2006) In some countries, demining is performed by a combination of NGOs and the national army or the police.

Representatives, 25000 V, no. 72:7). Although landmines had not been produced in the Netherlands for almost 20 years, the production of anti-personnel mines was prohibited by law at parliament's request in 1996.

Since 1996, the Netherlands has been one of the ten biggest donors in the field of humanitarian demining.<sup>5</sup> Between 1996 and 2005, the number of countries to which the Netherlands donated funds varied between six and thirteen (see diagram 1). Since signing (3 December 1997) and ratifying (12 April 1999) the Ottawa Convention, it has also been obliged to contribute to efforts to clear mines across the globe and provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of mine victims. Between 1996 and 1999, the Dutch government earmarked some NLG 20 million annually for humanitarian demining (House of Representatives, 26137 (R1620), no. 5:1). Until the end of 2000, financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities came under the budget article for emergency aid. In November 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a separate article in its budget for humanitarian demining, and increased its annual contribution to NLG 30 million, to emphasise 'the importance of humanitarian demining to re-establishing a safe living environment in post-conflict countries and the Netherlands' specific expertise in demining and the contribution it can make' (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 6). In the autumn of 2003 the government decided to set up a Stability Fund in order to provide rapid, flexible support for activities at the interface between peace, security and development in countries and regions emerging from or at risk of sliding into armed conflict. The funds previously set aside for demining are now allocated to this Fund (DBV/CV-262/03).

In 2003 the government formulated the following central aim for humanitarian demining: 'Dutch policy focuses on clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in order to reduce the number of mine accident victims and foster socioeconomic development. The Netherlands seeks to establish cost-effective mine-clearing operations that mobilise local workers and can be taken over by national bodies as quickly as possible.' (Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, Theme-based Cofinancing, 15 February 2003. In principle, only countries that have signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention (and actually comply with it) are eligible for Dutch assistance. Financial assistance for demining activities is channelled through the UN (UNMAS and UNDP) and NGOs (in particular the Mines Advisory Group,

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<sup>5</sup> During this period the Netherlands has fluctuated between sixth and tenth place.

Handicap International, HALO Trust and Norwegian Peoples Aid). Organisations that perform mine-clearing activities on a commercial basis are not eligible for assistance. The same applies to organisations that are – or used to be – involved in the illegal trade in anti-personnel mines or arms (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).

Demining programmes must comply with the following UNMAS mine action guidelines, which are to be coordinated at national level:

- promoting awareness of the presence of mines and UXO and reducing the risks to the inhabitants and users of the area concerned;
- carrying out surveys to determine the location and size of minefields and facilitate their marking and clearance;
- providing assistance to victims of accidents involving mines and UXO and fostering their rehabilitation and reintegration;
- stigmatising the use of landmines and supporting a total ban on landmines;
- building local capacity through education and training so that mine clearance can be transferred to a national agency;
- carrying out quality control checks on the above-mentioned activities.

In awarding grants, the Netherlands gives priority to: 1) actual mine-clearing projects in areas where landmines present the greatest risk to the population; 2) demining activities in countries with which it maintains bilateral aid relations, or in which it contributes to activities relating to human rights, peacebuilding and good governance; 3) the continuation of projects that have already received grants (as opposed to new activities); 4) capacity building and training so that mine-clearing operations can be taken over as quickly as possible by the national authorities in the countries affected (House of Representatives, no. 8:4-6). As far as techniques are concerned, manual detection is the preferred method. The Netherlands prefers the deployment of large mine-clearing teams to the funding of heavy machinery because of the resultant opportunities for engaging the local population and promoting employment. No grants will be made available for the development of new detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:5-6).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The Policy Framework for Theme-based Cofinancing became effective in 2003. Theme-based cofinancing is a system for awarding grants. Its aim is to use central funds to support initiatives pursued by specialised organisations (i.e. those specialising in a certain theme) that work together with local organisations. These initiatives should seek to build up civil society and achieve long-term reductions in poverty in several developing countries, while strengthening the local organisations with which the specialist organisations cooperate. Grant applications for demining programmes should be compatible with both the Policy Framework for Theme-based

Funding decisions are currently guided by whether an area has been accorded priority in the context of the Stability Fund (Stability Fund Assessment Framework). The priority areas are the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, the African Great Lakes region and Afghanistan.

#### **4 The study: objective, evaluation criteria, questions and structure**

##### *Objective*

The objective of study II is threefold:

- 1 to understand how Dutch policy on humanitarian demining was formulated in the period 1996-2006;
- 2 to assess the way in which mine-affected countries and humanitarian demining programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected;
- 3 to assess the effectiveness of Dutch financing efforts in this area.

##### *Evaluation criteria*

The study can be seen as a combination of a policy review and a product evaluation. The applicable evaluation criteria are the relevance and effectiveness of the policy.

**Relevance:** Relevance is gauged by the degree to which the activities in question help achieve the aim in question. The main aim of humanitarian demining is to prevent new mine-related casualties. From this perspective, the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands are by definition relevant and the question of relevance can be disregarded in the study. In the case at hand, however, it is important to scrutinise the policy relevance of the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands. It is necessary to ascertain whether the activities are a logical corollary of Dutch policy and whether they tie in with the policy of the recipient country. Both aspects of this question are covered in the study (see the first and second cluster of questions addressed by the study).

**Effectiveness:** IOB guidelines define the criterion of ‘effectiveness’ as follows: ‘Effectiveness concerns the degree to which the direct results of the activities carried out (i.e. the ‘output’) contribute to the sustainable achievement of the programme objectives (i.e. the ‘outcome’).’

Because of the nature of humanitarian demining, the effectiveness of humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands can be accurately measured in terms of outputs. Accurate data on the resources employed – both financial and manpower – (inputs) and on the number of landmines cleared, the number of hectares demined etc. (outputs) are recorded and published. Both the periodic progress reports of demining organisations and the annual reports by mine-affected countries mandated by the Ottawa Convention represent comprehensive, reliable and accessible sources of information. But less is known about the actual use of demined land and the extent to which humanitarian demining programmes benefit the communities involved (outcomes). For this reason, the evaluation method used here mirrors as closely as possible the one employed in previous evaluations incorporating land use.<sup>7</sup>

**Efficiency:** The IOB guidelines cite ‘efficiency’ as a third evaluation criterion after ‘relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’. Efficiency refers to the degree to which the results achieved (output) are in proportion to the cost of the resources used (input) and their application. This is a question that cannot be answered in the case of humanitarian demining (and indeed no attempt should be made to do so), since every mine that is cleared equals a human life saved. The evaluation will therefore only ask whether the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands were completed on time and within budget. This is a narrow definition of ‘efficiency’, generally referred to in the literature as ‘cost effectiveness’ (see the third cluster of questions).

### *Questions*

Based on its threefold objective, the evaluation will focus on the following three clusters of questions:

#### Dutch demining policy

- Underlying principles:

On what principles was Dutch policy based?

Was demining policy incorporated into general policy (e.g. development policy, humanitarian aid policy or post-conflict reconstruction policy)? If so, how?

- Objectives:

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<sup>7</sup> Of particular relevance in this regard are Danida’s evaluation ‘Danish Support to Mine Action’ (2003) and a GICHD evaluation of land use in Yemen which should be complete by the end of 2006.



What were the Netherlands' demining objectives in the period 1996-2006?

- Strategies:

How did the Netherlands endeavour to achieve these objectives?

- Activities:

Were the activities undertaken by the Netherlands a logical corollary of Dutch policy?

#### Selection of countries and programmes

- Consistency:

What criteria played a role in determining a mine-affected country's eligibility for financial assistance?

What criteria played a role in the acceptance or rejection of grant applications?

Was decision-making on this matter consistent?

Was decision-making on this matter transparent?

- Coordination:

Were the activities coordinated with other activities supported by the Netherlands?

Were the activities coordinated with other donors and/or aid organisations?

Did the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands meet national needs in the area of demining?

#### Effectiveness

- Nature and extent of the landmine problem:

How did the mine problem develop in the countries and regions assisted by the Netherlands between 1996 and 2006? In what respects has the problem lessened or deteriorated?

- Effectiveness of the programmes:

To what extent did the programmes supported by the Netherlands achieve their objectives?

Were the programmes carried out on time and within budget?

How did the programmes contribute towards the Netherlands' aims as regards capacity building?

Is land that has been cleared of mines being used again? If not, why not? If so, is it being used for the purpose envisaged?

What is the opinion of the national, regional or local authorities and the affected local communities on the effectiveness of the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands?

- Effectiveness of Dutch policy efforts:

Did the programmes supported by the Netherlands help reduce the annual number of victims of accidents involving landmines and UXO?

Have the programmes supported by the Netherlands contributed as envisaged to socioeconomic development?

### *Structure of the study*

The study comprises both desk-based and field components.

#### 1. Desk-based research

The first phase of the study will give an overview of Dutch humanitarian demining policy and establish how countries and programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected on the basis of this policy. This will involve studying the relevant literature, examining parliamentary papers (policy documents, theme-based policy frameworks, committee reports, etc.) and consulting recent evaluation reports on humanitarian demining by other donors. The first phase will also include interviews with various stakeholders both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (representatives of the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV), the Security Policy Department (DVB) and the relevant regional departments) and external bodies (representatives from UNMAS, GICHD, donors represented in the Mine Action Support Group and others). The desk-based component of the study will be conducted by the IOB-evaluation team.

#### 2. Field research

An international consultant will be contracted to perform field research at locations in three countries where programmes supported by the Netherlands are being carried out. The field research will focus on gathering information on the use of demined land. The remit of the team of evaluators that will perform the field research is twofold.

First, they will collect information on the envisaged use of the land that has been cleared of mines with Dutch financial assistance. They will be instructed specifically to:

- Prepare an overview of the various assessments of the nature and extent of the landmine problem that served as a baseline for the demining programmes. These include at a minimum the Landmine Impact Surveys, the General Mine Action Assessments or Level One Surveys, and the Technical Surveys or Level Two Surveys.
- Examine how the competent demining authorities determined which countries were eligible for mine clearance. To this end they will have to identify the selection procedures that were followed, the stakeholders involved in the selection procedures, and the data that prompted the demining authorities to initiate mine clearance activities.

Second, they will provide an overview of how, once a mine clearance programme has been completed, the land in question is actually being used. They will be asked to:

- Investigate what demined land is being used for in practice and collect written and photographic evidence of their findings. Investigate, if relevant, how intensively the land in question is being used for the purpose designated.
- Gauge opinion on the actual land use among representatives of the population groups and communities involved. Previous evaluations have shown that focus groups drawn from community leaders, users of demined land, women, children and mine victims constitute an important instrument in gauging opinions.

In the context of the field research, files will also be examined at the relevant embassies, and interviews will be conducted with representatives from 1) the Dutch missions in the countries concerned; 2) the demining organisations supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 3) public officials from the competent national ministries and regional and local authorities who are directly involved; 4) the national coordinating bodies in the area of humanitarian demining; 5) NGOs (e.g. ICBL and Human Rights Watch); 6) the ICRC; 7) UN bodies involved (including UNDP, UNOCHA and UNICEF); and 8) other donor countries.

#### *Parameters and scope of the study*

The field research to be undertaken was selected with reference to the following factors:

1. the scale of Dutch commitments to the recipient country;
2. the duration of Dutch assistance (continuous or ad hoc);

3. the method by which the Netherlands delivers its aid (direct to the demining NGOs and/or via multilateral channels);
4. the nature of the activities supported by the Netherlands (mine clearance only, or other forms of mine action, or both);
5. the scale of the problem in the recipient country (geographical, number of victims, urgency);
6. the nature of the mine problem in the recipient country (landmines and/or ERWs);
7. the organisation of humanitarian demining in the recipient country (UN-run mine action centre or national demining authority);
8. the political situation in the recipient country (e.g. relatively stable political situation and constructive climate for humanitarian demining vs. political instability);
9. whether the country has signed/ratified the Ottawa Convention;
10. whether the Netherlands has bilateral development relations with the country.

Based on factors 1 and 2 (see diagram 1), concise country analyses have been performed for Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique (see diagram 2). In consultation with DMV, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia have been selected for field research. The locations to be covered by the field research have to be selected by mutual agreement on the basis of an inventory of activities in Angola (see diagram 3), Bosnia & Herzegovina (see diagram 4) and Cambodia (see diagram 5).

## **5 Organisation**

The study of how the Netherlands has employed the instrument of financial assistance is the second part of the IOB evaluation of the Dutch efforts to control landmines and ERW's. The evaluation is carried out under the responsibility of inspector Yvonne Kleistra. Michiel van Bokhorst, who worked on the preliminary study as an IOB trainee, will also work on study II, as a research assistant. A senior researcher is hired to conduct and supervise the evaluation in conjunction with the inspector.

An international team of highly qualified independent evaluators will be hired to perform the field research. The evaluation team should consist of a team leader and two team members. Given the nature of the subject, the team of evaluators will have to be multidisciplinary and should include personnel with professional background and extensive experience in humanitarian demining and humanitarian aid and/or reconstruction actions, the work of

national and international agencies, gender expertise, and experience in the countries covered by the field research. The team leader should have extensive experience in conducting evaluations of the provision of humanitarian aid and socio-economic reconstruction activities. The timetable for the evaluation work in the three countries selected for field research will require the creation of three separate field study teams. The team leader of the evaluation team and the two other members of the evaluation team each will direct a field study team. The field study teams should include local evaluation expertise. Part of the international consultant's remit will be to recruit local consultants for the field missions in the three countries selected.

It is estimated that the field research in the three countries selected may require nine person-months work. The evaluation team should conduct the field missions at least in part analogously and preferably on the basis of tested methods.

During the course of the field research the following outputs will have to be produced: three field mission reports, a draft final synthesis report of the field research to be submitted within one month upon completion of the field work. The draft synthesis report will be finalised following review by IOB. The results of the field research will be incorporated into the final IOB-evaluation report of study II.

A sounding board group has been set up including representatives of the policy departments involved and three outside specialists. The group will hold three meetings to give its opinion on study I, study II and the synthesis study of the IOB evaluation.

## **6 Proposal**

The proposal to undertake the field research for this evaluation should be fully responsive to the Terms of Reference outlined above. The proposal should indicate clearly the methodological approach to be used, along with the rationale for the overall evaluation strategy. The proposal should furthermore indicate how questions and issues will be dealt with, as well as which sources of information will be used. It should also indicate clearly the strategy for involving the agencies implementing the humanitarian demining activities, local institutions and beneficiaries in the evaluation.

The review and assessment of proposals will be guided by four criteria: 1) quality of the evaluation team, 2) overall approach and evaluation strategy, 3) understanding of the assignment, and 4) the financial offer.

## **7 Reporting schedule field research**

Submission of three field mission reports	June- July 2007
Submission of draft synthesis report	31 July 2007
Review of draft synthesis report	15 August 2007
Submission of final synthesis report	31 August 2007

## **8 Products**

The evaluation will produce reports on studies I and II (incorporating the results of the field research) and a synthesis report. Studies I and II will be published as IOB working documents. The results of these studies will be incorporated into a synthesis report, which is primarily intended for parliament

## Abbreviations:

CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
RMCG	Resource Mobilisation Contact Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	unexploded ordnance





## Annex 1B – Composition of the Teams

**Team leader** of the field evaluation is Mr. Ferko Öry. Mr. Öry worked 20 years in international development cooperation, including evaluation of large projects in the field of humanitarian aid. He was 8 years a member of the board of *Medicine sans Frontières* (MSF) and worked with MSF in six countries during armed conflicts. Ferko Öry was coordinator of MSF in Bosnia during the war. He was advisor to the Minister of Development Cooperation at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands and worked from 1995-1998 as first secretary at the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Harare, Zimbabwe. In Harare Mr. Öry was responsible for the Netherlands' international development cooperation in health, population and nutrition in 8 countries in the Southern African region. During this assignment, he discussed with the Ministry of Finance the contribution of the BNP to the health sector and stimulated the use of Public Expenditure Reviews (PER) as an instrument to assess the influence of donor contribution to the distribution of financial means to the public sector and has experience in institutional assessment of government institutions and NGOs in low-income countries.

### **Bosnia-Herzegovina field team**

Mr. Öry is team leader of the team in Bosnia Herzegovina.

Team members are Russell Gasser, Jacqueline Dees and locally hired expertise. Russell Gasser is an independent consultant. He authored several mine action evaluations, among which a global assessment of the European Commission's mine policy and action over the period 2002 to 2004.. Jacqueline Dees holds a Bachelor Degree in 'English Language and Culture' with a minor Conflict Studies and Human Rights. Currently, she is enrolled in a Master Programme in International Relations and is an intern at the HCSS since February. Suzana Srnic Vukovic has seven years experience in mine action. She worked for BHMACE, UNICEF and Handicap International (during the LIS.) Currently she is a research consultant for the Landmine Monitor reports in the Balkan region. Almedina Music has ten years experience in mine action. She worked for CARE International and Handicap International, (during the LIS). Currently, she is a Landmine Impact Survey Trainer for the Survey Action Centre.

### **Angola field team**

Team leader of the Angola team is Mr. Arnold Schoolderman. Arnold Schoolderman is a senior researcher and project and programme manager for TNO Defence, Safety and Security. The majority of his projects deals with mines and current and future sensor technologies. His projects on humanitarian demining are part of the Work Plan of International Test and Evaluation Program on Humanitarian Demining (ITEP).

Team members are Guus Meijer, Haweya Abdillahi and locally hired expertise. Guus Meijer works as a freelance consultant and has more than 20 years of professional experience in post-conflict peacebuilding, particularly in Africa and former Portuguese colonies. In recent years, he has been working on various policy evaluations in Africa (a.o. Angola, West Africa, DR Congo, CAR) and Europe (the Netherlands and European Commission). Haweya Abdillahi, holds a Bachelors degree in Dutch law and is currently a Master student International Public Law at the University of Utrecht. She

has relevant work experience in the field of small arms and light weapons, due to an previous internship at the Security Department Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

### **Cambodia field team**

The team leader of the Cambodia team is Mr. Govert Gijsbers. Govert Gijsbers is a senior advisor with the TNO policy innovation group. He has authored a number of evaluations, including for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Govert developed impact assessment methods, project management and rural – and institutional development for the EU and the UN. Team members are Adrian Sprangemeijer, Tim Sweijs and Mao Vanna. Adrian Sprangemeijer is a senior researcher with 16 years of experience in research on mines and humanitarian demining. He was an army officer with experience in mine clearance and explosive devices. Tim Sweijs is a recent graduate of King's College where he earned a MA-degree in War Studies. Mao Vanna has been involved in the in the Cambodian HMA field for many years, working for CMAC and Geo Spatiale International. He is an expert in issues relating to the integration of demining and development.

## Annex 2 – Field Visit Reports

Menschen gegen Minen (MgM)

### **Bengo province**

After the war broke out again in 1992 and UNITA occupied the area when they fled Luanda, large part of the population of various municipalities in the interior of Bengo province took refuge in Luanda or ended up in the IDP camp of *Boa Esperança*, situated along the road between Caxito and Luanda. At its height the camp hosted some 80,000 IDPs. After UNITA was driven back by Government forces, people couldn't move back as the only access road was mined and bridges destroyed, some of them over rather deep gorges. At the initiative of WFP and DWHH, which ran the *Boa Esperança* camp and were looking into ways for the population to return, MgM was given the task of demining the road in 1997, starting out with funding from the Dutch and German Government. When the German funding terminated, the Dutch continued on their own and the Embassy in Luanda was monitoring the work closely, visiting the ongoing work virtually every month.

What was originally planned as a 12 months project clearing 75 kilometres turned into 2 years and around 260 kilometres of mine free road that was immediately usable again. Relatively few mines and explosives were found on the roads themselves, but mountains of explosives and mines in and around the abandoned towns along the routes were disposed of. Wells, water holes, schools, churches, health posts, soccer fields and residential areas were verified and cleared if necessary, and MRE was given along the way. When UNITA re-occupied part of the area, the work was suspended and equipment was diverted to tasks in safer areas along the Bengo coast, in and around Ambriz, till the security situation improved.

Eventually, some 260 kms. of road were cleared and, crucially, MgM fixed the bridges, using pontoons left on the roadside when a FAA convoy was ambushed by UNITA. The task was finished in December 1998, allowing thousands of IDPs to return, resettle and freely move around the area. Currently, around 56,000 people are living in the area previously without access. The *Boa Esperança* camp has been transformed into a relatively little settlement of people who for whatever reason have not returned, while other former IDPs are still living in Luanda or elsewhere. One of the reasons given for the refusal to return (in this case and elsewhere) is fear for the upcoming elections – not surprising in the light of the fact that the 1992 peace process and elections led to the most destructive period in the whole of Angola's civil war and central Bengo province carried a large part of the burden at that stage of the war.

Before travelling above-mentioned road, the team visited a recently completed task of MgM on another stretch of road close to Caxito, where a bridge over the Dando river has been cleared of mines. The population used to walk on a narrow footpath through the minefield, closely passing by mines on either side, surprisingly without ever having caused an accident.

Norwegian People's Aid (NPA)

### **Kwanza Norte province**

**Tenga:** This is an area behind the hospital of the provincial capital Ndalatando, quite close to the city centre and surrounded by huts and cultivated plots, as well as a cemetery. As it is on a low hill overlooking the city, during the war there were military installations surrounded by minefields. Ndalatando was the focus of heavy fighting between UNITA and Government forces, so the place is also spread with UXO. Remnants of military equipment, such as mortar firing installations, can still be found here.

Demining was started by MgM in 2001 but they were called to other places and now NPA is finishing the clearance, which should be done by mid-August 2007. The NPA field camp is next to the hospital and we spoke with the supervisor and other NPA personnel. In April 2007, a first stock of over 1,000 UXO and mines was destroyed, which was given publicity in the *Jornal de Angola*, and many more items were collected in the period since April.

The Provincial Government is said to have planned a five-star hotel at the centre of the area to be demined, details unknown (e.g. why this area is not demined by a commercial organisation, since there is apparently a commercial interest). The resident population wants to enlarge the area that can be safely accessed and thus cultivated. The cemetery is gradually expanding and its borders are coming close to where mines are suspected. Clearance is thus in everyone's interest and the different intended uses of the cleared land don't have to clash. A higher hilltop nearby is also suspected to contain mines, but its clearance is not part of the current task.

**Gazela and Km. 11:** Two villages or neighbourhoods along the road from Ndalatando to the airport (and further to Malanje etc.), belonging to the municipality of Ndalatando. The locations were mined because of their strategic position close to Ndalatando airport and the access road into the city. We spoke to the *sobas* (traditional chiefs) and some other inhabitants. During the war, everyone was displaced to Ndalatando, but in 1999 NPA started demining, at the request of the Provincial Government. Over 6 months, an area of 400 m. deep and 300 m. long was cleared in Gazela; 1 APM and 2 UXO were found. A little secondary road leading to the airport and frequently used by the population, was also demined, which allowed World Vision to rehabilitate a water well. Gazela now has 60 resettled people and the cleared land is in use for housing and agriculture. The village at Km.11 has many more people, but the story is basically the same and clearance took place around the same time. There is still mined land right next to the village (explosions occurred when the vegetation was burned down) but the people know about the danger and marked it with stones. The people, represented by the *soba*, have requested clearance of this land as well, but it is not known when this will be done.

## **Malanje province**

**Kudielela orphanage and school:** Some 3 kms from Malanje city along the main road to the east. We were received by sister Dolores Beira, who is one of a staff of 8 working in the orphanage which houses 27 children. The area was mined as it protected an artillery position in the war. When the peace agreement was signed in 2002, there were many street children and orphans in the area for whom the Catholic Church wanted to build an orphanage and so it requested mine clearance. NPA cleared the area in 2000 with funding from the Dutch government. The task took some 3 months. The school itself was built by JVC from Italy with funding from Spain; the ground is owned by the bishop. The sisters not only run the orphanage but also a school, which is attended by some 780 children from neighbouring areas (in two shifts).

Outside the perimeter fence is a further field that has been demined of approx. 500 m. wide and 800 m. deep. This is partly used to grow food for the orphanage (children work one hour a day here). Other projects of the sisters (brickmaking, saw mill) had to be abandoned or suspended because of lack of funds and the same applies to the cultivation of the remaining part of the demined fields. In 2005-06, still some UXO and an anti-tank mine were found by the population, not where the orphanage is located but along the stretch of road between the orphanage and the city. NPA was informed and immediately removed these items and destroyed them. MRE is given since 2002, starting shortly after the demining task was completed.

**Kinguila school:** We did not speak with anyone there because nobody was present, but passed the area where a new school has been built by the Danish Refugee Council, after part of the area was cleared by NPA in 2006, with funding from the EU. The area is some 5 kms out of the city of Malanje on the main road to the east and is located where the frontline was between Government and UNITA forces in the years between 1992 and 2002, so there were and are still mined areas on both sides of the road.

Not only was the place strategic for the defence of Malanje city, but there is also a big fuel depot of Sonangol (national oil company) which had to be protected from UNITA attack. The rather numerous population living around the area (167 families) needed a school and had asked for mine clearance to make that possible. The cleared area is rather limited (some 25-30 m. on each side of the school as well as the area between the school and the road), with surrounding fields still signposted as NPA knows there are mines. These signposts are concrete block, painted white on the safe side and red on the dangerous side. No physical barrier to prevent people (such as playing children from the school) to go into unsafe land. The school is finished and fully equipped (quite uncommon in Angola where most schoolchildren carry their plastic chairs to and from school on their head) but not in use yet. The reason is unclear to the evaluation team.

**Cucalama mission and school:** Cucalama became the administrative capital and military headquarters of UNITA for Malanje province when it took most of the country after the elections of October 1992. It lies along the main road that links Malanje to the provinces in the east such as the Lundas and Moxico, and to Zambia and other countries, at a distance of 56 kms from the city of Malanje. It obviously had a number of minefields, mainly around military installations and other strategic targets. When the Government troops advanced on Cucalama in the post-1998 offensive, UNITA retired after having destroyed most of the infrastructure and leaving behind even more mines. Most of the population of the town had fled to Malanje or other safe areas but many

inhabitants did not survive the many years of military confrontation and displacement. Although some return did take place and the town also houses over 300 demobilised UNITA soldiers, who benefited from DDR and are still being supported, the current population of Cucalama is estimated to be less than half of that from before the war. The infrastructures of the Catholic mission, in existence since the 1960s, were destroyed. Since 2002, many of the buildings have been rehabilitated and a new school has been built, after NPA demined the area over a period of 2,5 years (2003-05), using also mechanical demining equipment (Aardvark).

We were received by father Eduardo, a Polish missionary who has lived in Angola for over 11 years and by two municipal education officials. The new school belongs to the mission but is also used by the state education system, with 39 and over 170 pupils in the higher grades, respectively. There were no classes while we visited, the reason given being that sometimes the teacher is ill or doesn't turn up, but we were assured that there had been pupils in the morning and there would be again later that day. A smaller mission school on the same premises caters for younger kids and lessons were in fact going on in both of its classrooms. The plan to construct a football pitch and improve the schoolyard, all on cleared land, had to be postponed for lack of funding. There are still uncleared areas around the school and other mission infrastructure. These areas are marked. However, there is no well-defined mine awareness education, neither by NPA nor by the education authorities. All children were born and grew up during the war and are supposedly sufficiently aware of the danger of mines and UXO and know the areas where one shouldn't enter, is the general reasoning.

**Quissole-Caribo:** This project involves the clearance of the road which connects Malanje city with the southern parts of the province, to Caribo and further. In addition to the NPA supervisor at the Quissole operational base and some of the other NPA personnel, we spoke with several people living along the road and the following information is extracted from these conversations. The road clearance operation is ongoing, since there are areas and villages in the south still virtually without access. NPA has been working on this project on and off since 2002, now clearing the last stretch of 18 kms from the bridge over the Cuije river to Caribo and planning to have finished by the end of November 2007. Clearance takes place manually over a width of 9 m and progress is slow as many metal items are found, but in the coming months mechanical clearing equipment will also be used (Aardvark).

NPA started to demine close to Malanje at the request of MINARS who wanted the IDP population living in the city to move back as much as possible when the peace agreement had been signed in April 2002. Their first huts however were set on fire by the FAA, as they were too close to the city in the opinion of the authorities. The first village is Zela and is located some 8 kms from Malanje; it now houses only a few dozen inhabitants. The first task of NPA here was the demining of a location for a water well; the water well was built by Oxfam. NPA not only cleared the road here but also an area of 400 m deep on either side, by 300 m long, which is used to grow crops (cassava and beans). As there have been many military activities around the area, many more mines are known to exist beyond this area, but despite this the people still go there in search of firewood. No recent accidents have been reported and a few 'spot tasks' (demolition of individually found mines and UXOs) were done by NPA. The *soba* has requested many times to MINARS to do further clearance, so far without any result. Further down the road, more people have resettled but the overall population is still much inferior to the original figures. Two small bridges and a larger one were rehabilitated by the Provincial

Government after demining. Construction of the last one forced NPA to interrupt its work for 8 months, till March 2007, when the new bridge was ready and demining of the road continued on the other side. One anti-tank mine was found near to the old bridge. Since the remainder of the road (the last 18 kms. to Caribo) is not yet demined, cars can not be used and many people now use this road on foot, by bicycle or motorcycle, passing over a narrow track in the middle of the road.

**Cambaxi:** During the years 1992-2002, the village changed hands very often and for some time, UNITA had its provincial headquarters established here. Part of the population was displaced in Malanje city (some 27 km away) while others stayed under UNITA control. Mines were used by both sides as an alarm system. The road to Cambaxi (and further up north, eventually going to the DC) was demined from the junction with the main road (15 kms), 4 mines were found. Recently a tractor was demolished by a AT-mine on another, secondary road near the village. The agricultural land is not mined, and is used for cattle (mainly goat) and gathering firewood. In 2002, the Government called on the population to return and MRE was given by World Vision and *Palancas Negras* (an Angolan NGO), but only a few people went. Now approx. 8750 people live here, according to the Administrator. A school and medical post were built by UNICEF and DRC, after demining by NPA (only UXO was found). UNICEF will construct a water supply system for the village (with EC funding), using an old water tank on an elevation near the village centre. NPA will be asked through the formal channels to demine the area for the tubing, as the villagers suspect the area around the tank to be contaminated.

#### The HALO Trust

Since it started working in Angola, the HALO Trust has concentrated on the three central provinces of Huambo, Bié and Benguela, while more recently it extended its area of operation to the province of Kuando Kubango to the south, in particular the area around Cuito Cuanavale. The evaluation team visited HALO Trust bases and tasks in Bié and Huambo.

#### **Bié province**

**Kuito:** When the HALO Trust started work in in 1994 (in fact, the first Angolan province it moved into), its first task was the demining of a primary school along the road to the Kuito airport (*Escola Primária no.13*), followed by the clearance of adjacent neighbourhoods in 1995-96. As it established an operational base right next to the airport, the terrain had to be cleared first, since it was heavily mined, as were all areas around the airport. We did not as such visit any of the demined areas within Kuito (with the exception of this HALO Trust base and the prison, see below), but passed by several of the completed tasks, such as the school mentioned above, a government orphanage and a power station (both cleared in 1996). Around the same time, HALO Trust also cleared 600 pylons of the power line from Kuito to Camacupa, removing between 10 and 12 mines from each pylon. In these first years of HALO's Angola programme, it did not receive any Dutch funding.

**Catala:** The area is around 7 km from Kuito, at the outskirts of Kunje, which was the main Government military base when Kuito was under siege by UNITA for 18 months in 1993-94 (it was besieged again in 1998). The demining task involved a stretch of road and surrounding strip of land where mines had been laid in defence of a military unit. At the time of demining, in 2001, there was an IDP camp nearby, but the displaced

have virtually all gone home or settled elsewhere, and nowadays there are settlements a bit further away of returned refugees from Zambia and the DRC. The request for demining came from CARE which was running a seed reproduction and agricultural extension centre further down the road and needed safe access, but now that most IDPs have left the centre is not functioning anymore.

**Seilunga road:** At 2 km northwest from Kunje, along the road to an old forestry and to Seilunga, the FAA had laid mines in 1998 in order to prevent UNITA from advancing with tanks and other heavy armour towards Kuito. It is here that several of UNITA's tanks hit AT-mines in December 1998, forcing Savimbi's generals to halt their attack and retreat towards Andulo – which according to many observers marked a crucial turning point in the war, putting UNITA definitively in the defensive. At the request of the Kunje Administration, the road and surrounding fields were demined in 2002-03 and 62 ATM were found and destroyed. Part of the area is being cultivated, mostly by people living rather far away, in Kunje or even Kuito. According to some of them who were interviewed, there are still suspicions with regard to part of the land. They also mentioned an ATM which had yet been removed from a riverbank nearby where people go to wash and fetch water.

**Comarca:** The *comarca* (=main prison) of Kuito lies at the outskirts of the city, along the road to Huambo. It is being rehabilitated by the Provincial Government, which also requested demining, as there was a defensive minefield laid by the police protecting the prison during the war. For now, the prisoners have temporarily been transferred to an old grain mill at the other side of town. The demining task was realised between March and November 2006, the mine lines by hand and the surrounding area mechanically (rolled), which does not provide a 100% guarantee but only 'reduced threat'. The terrain will be used for cultivation by prisoners as soon as the rehabilitation is finished. Clearance was also urgent as there is an old people's home further down the little side road that passes by the prison and new houses are being built all around, so more and more people move in and though the area.

**Trumba:** Along a secondary road from Kuito to Andulo, past the former Portuguese forestry mentioned above, and at a distance of approx. 27 kms from Kuito, lies Trumba, a village (*comuna*) containing 18 smaller villages or settlements. During the civil war, the place changed hands several times: in 1975, it was occupied by UNITA, to be conquered by FAPLA in 1979 and retaken by UNITA in their 1992 post-election offensive; finally, in 1998, it was reconquered by the FAA. As a consequence, the village was surrounded by a defensive belt of trenches and minefields. The civilian population had virtually all left, only to return after 2002, with the support of UNHCR. Trumba now counts almost 9,000 inhabitants, much less than the original population, as many who had taken refuge in Zambia and the DRC have not returned yet and are still in Kuito waiting for better times and economic opportunities.

The road and the school area have been demined in 2003 at the request of the Provincial Government, who then rehabilitated the school and built a new office and a residence for the Administrator. The American NGO Africare built a health post with funds from the oil company Exxon-Mobil. According to the Administrator and other locals interviewed, the greatest impact of the demining has been that people can now cultivate their own plots and move freely around the area. Food aid from WFP to Trumba has terminated. The only remaining problem is that two smaller roads in the area, linking



Trumba to the Chilunda Mission and to Belo Horizonte, have not been cleared yet, so circulation is still not fully secure.

**Kunhinga:** The municipality of Kunhinga, on the road from Kuito to Andulo, at some 30 kms. from Kuito, is known throughout Angola because of a mission hospital which in the old days used to be top of the bill for ophthalmology. According to the Administrator, the area in and around the town used to be one of the most mine-affected zones in Bié, as it was a strategic defensive position for the FAA and the *Ninjas* (riot police) against the UNITA advance from Andulo in the north. A low hillside overlooking a road crossing near the town was heavily mined in 1998 and the village itself also contained minefields. HALO demined the hillside in 2003, but there is not much activity at the moment.

In the village itself, the situation is very different. It was virtually abandoned during the war as most of the people had fled to the municipality of Mungo in neighbouring Huambo province. They started to return in 2001-02, when the FAA had secured the area and emergency aid was brought in, despite serious restrictions on circulation because of mines; the town could only be reached from Kuito by a long detour. Nowadays, people can freely move around and access their plots, and the village is, in the words of the Administrator, now 'open' where it used to be 'closed'. Clearance in the village has made it possible for returnees to build a whole new *bairro* (neighbourhood), where also an old watertank has been cleared. HALO Trust is still working on a number of tasks along the road from Kuito to Kunhinga which is therefore full of markings.

### **Huambo province**

**Sacahala forestry:** The Agronomy Institute and forestry are at the outskirts of the city of Huambo, to the west. It belongs to the Ministry of Agriculture, but people are allowed to have plots there, as the land pressure in and around Huambo is acute. We visited the site because it figured on two aerial photographs we had (from 2002 and 2005, respectively), although the task in question was not the one that had previously been identified and that had been the reason for bringing the satellite photos. In fact, the task we visited had been discredited in 2000, after it was established that the whole of the previously suspect area was under cultivation for some years by the local population and that no mine accidents had happened. The story was confirmed by the Vice-Director of the Forestry and some women working on the land with whom we spoke. They were not aware of any further mine problems and only mentioned a fatal accident with a child some kilometres away and several years ago. An access road into the forestry which was visible on the 2005 photo but not on the one from 2002, had according to the Vice-Director's account been rehabilitated in 2004, but this was completely unrelated to any mine problem or demining activity. The HALO Trust copied the 2000 report of the discrediting for us (see translation in Annex C).

**San Luís/Fátima:** This is a *bairro* in the city of Huambo next to the airport. It was mined by FAA in 1998 as part of the defences of the airport. In fact, its clearance is part of a list of more than 10 tasks situated around the airport on which work is still ongoing, with funding from the EC, the Swiss and the US Department of State. This one was urgent, because the minefield was situated next to the densely populated neighbourhood of San Luís and opposite the road is a primary school. As there is a lack of latrines, people were regularly penetrating the area.

Clearance took place between August 2005 and March 2006 with a combination of mechanical and manual methods. Four APM, 4 ATM and some UXO were found. The area is now divided in neatly demarcated plots where people are constructing their own houses. Rumours that some air force personnel based at the airport had taken advantage of their foreknowledge and position could not be confirmed.

**San Antonio:** Along the road to Kaala, near the Angolan Institute for Veterinary Science (IIVA), destroyed and sacked in 1992-93, there are a number of military barracks and installations. In the 1980s, the main Cuban contingent on the Central Highlands was based here and laid hundreds of mines to protect itself. As it is at the outskirts of the city, people have been encroaching on the land to build houses, cultivate small plots and raise cattle and small animals. Most people are not peasant farmers, however, but rather small traders in the city. Many mine accidents happened over the years, especially with children (one involving three members of the same family, living just 5 m away from a minefield) and the population pressured the authorities to take action. Clearance took place in various rounds, the first one between November 2002 and March 2003, the second one between March and December 2005, and the last one in 2006-07.

**Chicala-Tchiloanga (Vila Nova):** The town lies at some 45 km to the east of Huambo, along the road to Kuito. It greatly suffered from the war as it lies on a crossing with a road to Bailundo, UNITA's capital in the years 1992-94, and heavy battles were fought in and around it. HALO Trust has an operational camp there as it is currently finishing a task at some 4 km distance, a minefield laid by FAPLA in 1988 to protect two telecommunication antennas (now defunct) on a low hill. The field was not included in the LIS, but its clearance soon became a priority, as people living in two nearby villages were encroaching on the field, using footpaths close to and even through the mined area and cultivating very close to its perimeter. Two accidents in 2006 alerted the authorities, HALO arrived on the spot in late 2006 and started surveying and marking the minefield. The whole zone had been totally abandoned till 2004-05 when former inhabitants started to return and rebuild their houses. They were aware of a military unit having been based there, yet the minefield was not marked before HALO's arrival. The demining task itself started in January 2007 and will be finished in August. To date, over 1,200 APM were found, in clear lines forming a square around the antennas, as well as 15 UXO. Over 19,000 m<sup>2</sup> has been manually cleared in 99 working days using two sections of 7 deminers each, at a width of 5 m either side of the mine line. The inner area won't be cleared as there is no indication there are any mines there. Some people living nearby indicated that the impact on the inhabitants of the two villages (over 120 people) as well as more distant settlements will be enormous: more land for cultivation and housing, and in particular free movement without fear of mines. With the exception of the supervisor, the deminers were recruited locally and live in their own homes, not at the HALO camp.

At the edge of Vila Nova itself, HALO Trust already completed another task, involving the demining of 85 pylons of a power line linking Vila Nova to Belo Horizonte. This was a priority since people started building houses closer and closer to the mined pylons and using a road alongside the power line. Close by and alongside above-mentioned road to Bailundo lies another minefield, around a former FAPLA position defending the town. This field is clearly marked and will be demined as soon as the current task has been completed. It is thought to display a similarly clear structure of mine lines. Clearance will allow the town to grow further along the road and people to have plots to cultivate

which are closer to their houses and move around freely; many now cultivate at distance of up to 7 km (also due to the fertility of the soil lower down the hill, the so-called *nakas*). This task, the continuation of the powerline demining and another nearby field along the Huambo-Kuito road will guarantee employment for the local deminers for quite some time.

Mines Advisory Group (MAG)

### **Moxico province**

Demining in Moxico is done by a number of organisations. NPA has been working in the province for many years but had to close its Luena base and withdraw all of its staff and equipment in 2006 due to lack of funding and the high operating costs. MAG has now concentrated all its effort in Moxico, where it first started in 1996 (when MAG had to suspend its Moxico operations in 1998 as all its tasks had become inaccessible due to the war, it set up operations in Cunene province in the south, but in 2001 it reopened the Luena base). More recently, in 2002, LWF, which has been involved in humanitarian and development activities in Moxico since the early 1980s, called upon DCA to start HMA in support of their rehabilitation projects (e.g. level 1 surveying, clearance of school areas, water wells, etc.). Currently, DCA is mostly doing MRE, in one case in an area where MAG is the demining operator (Lucusse, see below).

Both FAA and INAD are involved in clearing parts of the Benguela railway, to the west of Luena (towards Camacupa and Kuito) and to the northeast (towards Zambia), respectively, as well as in some road clearance.

Finally, several commercial operators are said to have begun working in Moxico. The Dutch company REASeuro is conducting a level 1 survey of a diamond concession area, to be exploited by a Brazilian mining company, and the Angolan security company CAMBOJA is also reported to have started demining operations.

**Alto Campo 1 and 2:** Luena airport is surrounded by a ring of minefields, laid by FAPLA in the mid-1970s. The total contaminated area is more than 180,000 m<sup>2</sup>, but the two tasks that MAG has been realising only covers two areas which were identified as presenting high risk: the first one (Alto Campo 1) because the population has been constructing houses very close to its perimeter, and the second one, situated at the opposite end of the runway and further away from any residences (Canyenge or Alto Campo 2), because a busy road is passing next to it, people are using it to collect firewood and even hunting, and 75 (!) mine accidents have already been reported there over the years, some recently.

MAG uses aerial photographs and other information, collected by the community liaison teams, to construct what they call a 'conflict analysis', which maps the area in question and visually presents the location of (former) military installations, trenches, etc., making it easier to find the mine rows once the technical teams enter the area. Demining of around 10,500 m<sup>2</sup> at Alto Campo 1 has been completed, but the area is still marked with sticks and warning signs. Clear mine rows were found throughout the zone, these are cleared and the remaining ground is divided in small blocks for visual inspection and removal of UXO, by cutting safe lanes through it.

At Alto Campo 2, the work is still ongoing. The area is now clearly marked with sticks and warning signs. The same method of opening up safe lanes from the inside out is being used, till the mine rows are found. Three rows have so far been identified and the

mines removed, and the small blocks in between safe lanes have been verified. It is possible that one or two more rows will be found, given the pattern laid bare so far. Other parts of the Alto Campo minefield are presenting less immediate risks, as they are not being penetrated by the population. DCA is involved in clearing one more area and MAG may do further work there in future.

**Bridges and road to Lumbala N'guimbo:** Of the road from Luena to the southeast, eventually leading to Kuando Kubango and to Zambia, via Lumbala N'guimbo, the first 76 km were cleared by MAG in 1996. MAG had to suspend its operations in Moxico in 1998 but returned in 2001, and work on the road restarted in 2002, with a new round of surveying, analysis and verification. The stretch of road cleared in 1996 was verified and the clearance started from the point where it had previously stopped.

The clearance of this remaining part of the road, some 200 km up to Lumbala N'guimbo (the roads further to the south are said not to be contaminated), and currently in its final phase, is integrated into an EC-funded bridge rehabilitation project in Moxico, Bié and Lunda Sul provinces (implemented by WFP). The objective is to reconnect Moxico to its neighbouring provinces and to Zambia. All bridges were destroyed and mined, principally by UNITA, as this was a heavily contested area, with many military battles and ambushes, leaving not only all these minefields, but also many UXO and a large number of burned and wrecked tanks and trucks along the roadside, sometimes with ERW in or around it.

MAG is demining the road and its verges, as well as 12 bridge sites, and when those are cleared, SRSA is putting metal bailey bridges in place. The priority is to open the road again for traffic as quickly as possible. That means that for the moment only the road and the verges are cleared, using a combination of mechanical and manual clearance, and as much of the bridge sites as is necessary for the SRSA engineers to safely build the bridge and put it into place. At the time of the visit, only 6 km was left to be finished, including one bridge (and another two on the first stretch of road, which have provisional wooden structures). The bridge project has been considerably delayed (the original duration of 18 months has been extended to almost double, ending on 30 November 2007) due to the slow progress of the demining by MAG.

All river crossings, as well as a number of other areas are known to be heavily mined, so large tracks of land are still unsafe and only marked with sticks and warning signs. Where necessary, safe footpaths have been cleared and marked for the population to fetch water from the rivers, but in other cases settlements have been built in unsafe terrain or very close to contaminated areas. In several cases, people left their recently built huts after mine accidents had occurred, and moved further up or down the road to start building new ones. There are currently hardly any brick buildings or houses, except in the larger and older villages or towns such as Lucusse. Most of the (tarred) road is in relatively good condition, since it has not been used for many years, while the worst part is the 76 kms cleared in 1996, which has been intensively used both by the general population and by military forces from both sides.

Along the road, we visited the villages of Chicololo and Louveia, both still without any brick buildings or other permanent infrastructure, but with growing populations. Chicololo grew from a small resettlement area with five families in 2004 to a village of 97 families, mostly refugees returned from Zambia. The area was indicated for resettlement by the municipal authorities, despite being close to minefields. In 2005-06

five mine accidents occurred, four involving people, and large areas still need to be surveyed and cleared, as the current NPA task only involves the road and its verges, and the bridge sites.

In Louveia more than 1.000 families have resettled since 2002, after having spent several years as IDPs in Luena. The recent opening of the road will allow the transport of building materials and other supplies (the village currently possesses neither a school, nor a health post or administration building), as well as the marketing of peoples' crops in Luena. The old administration buildings, the landing strip next to the village as well as one field further down the road are currently still inaccessible because of mines, yet the unsafe areas are not marked as such.



## Annex 3 – Matrix for Analysis

	RELEVANCE	EFFECTIVENESS	EFFICIENCY	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
	<p><b>WHO ?</b></p> <p>Suited to priorities and policy of:            - target recipient            - donor</p>	<p>Attains objectives?            - Are objectives likely to be achieved soon ?            - What are/were key blockages/problems and success factors?</p>	<p>Outputs + inputs, time</p> <p>+ve and -ve changes</p>	<p>Longer-term effect of Humanitarian Demining activity</p>	
POLITICAL (DONOR and UN, etc)	<p>NL FOREIGN MINISTRY</p> <p>How does Humanitarian Demining fit in with overall policy priorities of NL gov and NL-govt integrated approach (if any)?            What is duration, scale, method of Humanitarian Demining assistance ?</p>	<p>What are the objectives of Dutch Humanitarian Demining activities? (implementation Dayton, return and resettlement, peacebuilding, humanitarian assistance, sq. Km clearance etc.)</p>	<p>How does NL ensure that Dutch funding for Humanitarian Demining is used efficiently? Is there a favoured mechanism for the use of funds for this activity?</p>	<p>+ve and -ve changes</p>	<p>Is there a feedback mechanism so that NL foreign ministry            - can identify sustainable practice in Humanitarian Demining            - can use field experience to improve strategy for sustainability?</p>
COUNTRY LEVEL STRATEGY (RECIPIENTS)	<p>NL Embassy, UN agencies, National Govt, National Mine Action Authority, National Civil Protection, etc</p> <p>Is there a clear and well-understood authority for Humanitarian Demining in the country? What is its structure? What is the division of responsibilities? How does this authority link to authorities for reconstruction and development?</p> <p>Is Dutch Integrated Approach reflected at country level?            How? What are the national policy priorities in the area of Humanitarian Demining and how are these determined?            How do Dutch funded activities suit policy priorities of the host country?</p>	<p>Are the NL policy objectives in the area of Humanitarian demining known and understood in country?            Are they different from other donor objectives?</p> <p>Analysis question: was local understanding of NL objectives same as NL understanding ?</p>	<p>Do efficiency considerations determine policies at the national level?</p>	<p>Has Dutch funding for Humanitarian Demining contributed to a national strategic and/or legislative framework for Humanitarian Demining?            What are the developments/trends over the 10 year-period?</p> <p>Is Humanitarian Demining part of a strategy of national peacebuilding, or return of IDPs-refugees?</p>	<p>Has sustainability of Humanitarian Demining been included in national policy? How does the policy define "sustainability"?            Are there any identifiable lasting results of Humanitarian Demining policies, programmes and projects?            Has capacity been build at the national level?            What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Humanitarian Demining activities?</p>
IMPLEMENTING ACTION PROGRAMME IN COUNTRY	<p>NMAA, National and Regional Authorities in country, major NGOs, etc</p> <p>What are priorities used to select/define programmes and how are these determined?            Decisionmaking authority? How do NL-funded activities suit regional or local programme priorities? Are Humanitarian Demining programmes linked to reconstruction and development programmes?</p>	<p>What were the objectives of Humanitarian Demining programmes? Have they been achieved or will be soon? What were key problems/hindrances and success factors to achieving these objectives?            Were results of action as expected at policy level?            If not, – what was not attained?            – Key mitigating factors?</p>	<p>Was efficiency considered at programme level?            Was efficiency a criterion in selecting projects?</p>	<p>What impact is the programme aiming to achieve? (purely technical, return, reconciliation, stimulating economic activity, etc.)            How is impact measured?            Who has decided on impact criteria (local/national/donors/others) ?</p>	<p>Is sustainability included in programmes?            How does prog. define "sustainability"?            Has there been any lasting effect or impact of the Dutch-funded programmes in the 10-year period?            What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Dutch funded Humanitarian Demining programmes?</p>

	RELEVANCE	EFFECTIVENESS	EFFICIENCY	IMPACT	SUSTAINABILITY
<b>PROJECT PLANNING</b>	<p>Regional and Local authorities in country, project implementers, local Civil Protection, etc</p> <p>NMAA, National and Regional Authorities in country, major NGOs, etc</p>	<p>What were objectives of project? Have they been achieved or will they be soon? Key problems/ hindrances and success factors to achieving objectives? Were results as expected by planner? If not, – what was not attained? – key mitigating factors?</p>	<p>Was efficiency considered in planning the activities? Would another approach have been more efficient?</p>	<p>What impact is the project aiming to achieve? (purely technical, return, reconciliation, stimulating economic activity, etc.) How is impact measured? Who has decided on impact criteria(local/national/donors/ot hers) ?</p>	<p>Has sustainability been included in project design? How? What were the major factors influencing the sustainability of Humanitarian Demining projects?</p>
<b>PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION</b>	<p>Project implementers, local community, etc</p> <p>NL-govt integrated approach reflected at this stage? How do demining activities fit the priorities, needs, wishes of affected communities? Are humanitarian development projects linked to reconstruction and development activities by other organisations?</p>	<p>Has implementation of the project lead to use of the cleared land? Has land-use and users changed as compared to before clearanc? What were the major factors negatively or positively influencing the achievement of the objectives over time? Was the project implemented in the most effective way given the local situation?</p>	<p>Was implementation of the demining activities on schedule? Within budget? Cost-effective? Key problems for efficient implementation? Were demining activities implemented in the most efficient way given the local situation and possible alternatives?</p>	<p>What has been the actual or expected impact on land use? Food production, agriculture, infrastructure, retrn/resettlement, reconciliation, sense of security, relations with neighbouring communities, peacebuilding, social, livelihood etc. How was this measured?</p>	<p>To what extent did the benefits of the project continue after the project has been completed? Is sustainability due to - inherent nature of activities? - planning and design? - implementation? - local circumstances? Key obstacles to sustainability? Key successes in sustainability?</p>



## Annex 4 – Schedule of Activities

Note: The composition of the Angola field team did not remain the same during the course of the visit. The following table indicates which members were part of the team on which days:

Days	Guus Meijer (consultant)	Haweya Abdillahi (HCSS)	Arnold Schoolderman (TNO)	Irene de Castro (Angolan consultant)	Christa Meindersma (HCSS)
1 - 3	X	X			
4 - 14	X	X	X		
15 - 17	X	X	X	X	
18 - 22	X	X		X	
23 - 26	X	X		X	X
27 - 30	X	X			X

### Day 1: Monday 18 June

19.05 Departure of GM and HA from Amsterdam Schiphol Airport to Lisbon and Luanda by TAP Portuguese Airlines

### Day 2: Tuesday 19 June

Arrival at Luanda International Airport, met by Nelson Domingos (NPA)  
 Passing by offices of NPA and SNV  
 Checking in at Sara's House guesthouse  
 12.00 Shopping for lunch, SIM-card, etc. and having lunch at guesthouse  
 Phone calls etc. in preparation of meetings and travel to provinces  
 16.00 Meeting at UNDP with Marc Bonnet and colleagues  
 19.00 Dinner with Nelson Domingos at Restaurant Chamavo

### Day 3: Wednesday 20 June

9.00 Meeting at Netherlands Embassy with Ambassador Jan Gijs Schouten and 2nd Secretary Dimitri Vogelaar  
 10.30 Meeting continued with Dimitri Vogelaar  
 12.00 Walk to and lunch at Restaurant Rialto  
 15.00 Return to guesthouse for logistical and other preparations  
 20.30 Dinner at Restaurant Quais de 4 with Deven Gengan (MAG) and Becky Thomson (NPA)

### Day 4: Thursday 21 June

9.00 Work at guesthouse  
 13.00 Lunch  
 15.00 Arrival of Arnold Schoolderman (AS) and colleague Yolanda Barrell and check-in at CEAST guesthouse  
 18.00 Meeting with Becky Thomson (NPA)  
 20.00 Dinner at Restaurant Panela do Barro

**Day 5: Friday 22 June**

- 9.00 Meeting with Leonardo Sapalo (INAD)
- 11.30 Meeting with Balbina da Silva (CNIDAH)
- 13.00 Lunch at Restaurant Pinguim
- 14.30 Meeting with Angolan consultant Irene Castro at Sara's House
- 19.00 Dinner at various places

**Day 6: Saturday 23 June**

- 10.00 Change to guesthouse Sara's House 2 (GM and HA)
- 11.00 Meeting with Deven Gengan and Mark Naftalin (MAG)
- 13.00 Lunch at Restaurant Panela do Barro
- 19.00 Dinner at various places

**Day 7: Sunday 24 June**

- 13.00 Lunch at Restaurant Rialto and meeting with MgM team
- 16.00 Departure by car to Caxito (Bengo province) with MgM team, passing by Boa Esperança former IDP camp
- 18.30 Check-in at Hotel *Bengo* and briefing by MgM Director Hendrik Ehlers
- 20.30 Dinner in hotel

**Day 9: Monday 25 June**

- 8.00 Visit to roads, bridges and other sites demined by MgM + short meetings with officials and other people along the way
- 23.00 Return to hotel

**Day 10: Tuesday 26 June**

- 7.30 Departure by car to Ndalatando with NPA's José Mussango
- 14.00 Arrival in Ndalatado and check-in at hotel
- 14.30 Lunch at Restaurant Ritz
- 15.30 Visit to NPA base and demining site at Tenga
- 19.00 Dinner

**Day 11: Wednesday 27 June**

- 8.00 Departure to sites demined by NPA at Gazela and Km.11 and short meetings with sobas and other people
- 9.00 Departure by car to Malanje
- 14.00 Arrival in Malanje, briefing by NPA base manager Graça Monteiro
- 15.00 Check-in and lunch at Hotel Palanca Negra
- 16.30 Meeting with Director of ADRA-Malanje
- 19.30 Dinner in Hotel Palacio Regina

**Day 12: Thursday 28 June**

- 8.00 Visit to orphanage and schools demined by NPA at Kudiedela, Kinguila and Caculama
- 14.30 Return to Malanje city and lunch at Restaurant Marco
- 16.00 Return to hotel and work on report
- 19.30 Drinks with Luís Augusto Monteiro (Director of Planning, Provincial Government)
- 20.30 Dinner in hotel

**Day 13: Friday 29 June**

- 8.00 Visit to road, bridges and land cleared by NPA at Quissole-Caribo, followed by visit to road, school and other infrastructure in Cambaxi
- 13.30 Return to Malanje city and lunch at Restaurant Kukina
- 15.00 Return to hotel and work on report
- 20.00 Dinner in hotel

**Day 14: Saturday 30 June**

- 6.00 Departure by car to Luanda
- 13.30 Lunch at Restaurant Ritz in Ndalatando
- 19.00 Arrival in Luanda and check-in at Dona Judith guesthouse

**Day 15: Sunday 1 July**

- 7.30 Check at Luanda International Airport for flight to Huambo with R26 (9.40 am) with Angolan consultant Irene de Castro
- 11.15 Arrival at Huambo Airport, met by The Halo Trust (Kiflu)
- 12.00 Check-in at Hotel Konjevi
- 14.30 Lunch at Halo Trust ex-pats residence
- 20.00 Dinner in hotel

**Day 16: Monday 2 July**

- 8.30 Briefing at Halo Trust base by Programme Manager Southern Craib
- 10.00 Departure by car to Kuito
- 13.30 Arrival in Kuito, briefing at Halo Trust base by location manager Tomé Sandombe and lunch at ex-pats residence
- 15.00 Visit to demined sites near Kunje
- 18.00 Check-in at guesthouse O Successo and dinner at Restaurant MNE  
Drinks with Carlinda Monteiro (formerly CCF-Angola)

**Day 17: Tuesday 3 July**

- 8.00 Checking maps, aerial photographs and coordinates at Halo Trust base
- 9.00 Visit to demined sites at Trumba and Kunhinga
- 14.00 Lunch at ex-pats residence  
Departure to Huambo
- 18.30 Arrival in Huambo, check-in at Hotel Nino and dinner

**Day 18: Wednesday 4 July**

- 8.00 Checking maps, aerial photographs and coordinates at Halo Trust base
- 10.00 Visit to demined sites in and at the outskirts of the city of Huambo
- 11.20 Departure of AS by plane to Luanda (R26)
- 13.30 Lunch at Halo Trust base
- 14.30 Passing by offices of development agencies in Huambo to arrange meetings for following days
- 16.00 Work at report in hotel
- 19.30 Dinner in hotel and work at report

**Day 19: Thursday 5 July**

- 8.00 Departure to Halo Trust base and Chicala-Tchiloanga (Vila Nova)
- 9.30 Visit to various tasks in and outside Vila Nova
- 12.30 Return to Huambo
- 14.00 Meeting with Sheena McCann and Michele Mazzaroli (CONCERN Worldwide)
- 15.00 Lunch at Pasteleria Central
- 16.00 Meeting with Inácio Marcelo and colleagues (GAC)
- 17.30 Meeting with Miguel dos Santos and Balthasar Ussaca (HI)
- 19.30 Dinner in hotel

**Day 20: Friday 6 July**

- 9.00 Meeting with Alberta Gomes (ADRA)
- 11.00 Meeting with Cupi Baptista (DW)
- 13.00 Lunch at Restaurant Pasteleria Central
- 15.00 Meeting with Southern Craib and Roland Clarke (The Halo Trust)
- 18.30 Dinner in hotel
- 20.30 Drinks with Beat Weber (DW)

**Day 21: Saturday 7 July**

- 11.20 Departure by plane to Luanda (R26)
- 13.30 Arrival in Luanda
- 14.00 Check-in at guesthouse Sara's House 2
- 14.30 Lunch at snackbar
- 19.00 Dinner with Carlos Figueiredo and others (SNV)

**Day 22: Sunday 8 July**

- 9.00 Work on report and logistics in guesthouse
- 14.00 Lunch
- 17.00 Drinks with Gita Honwana Welch (UNDP) and George Welch
- 19.30 Dinner

**Day 23: Monday 9 July**

- 7.05 Arrival of CM at Luanda International Airport
- 9.30 Check-in at Sara's House 2 and update on field visit so far by GM and HA
- 12.30 Lunch at Restaurant Rialto
- 15.00 Visit to Internetcafé, Chá de Caxinde and other bookshops
- 19.00 Dinner in guesthouse

**Day 24: Tuesday 10 July**

- 6.30 Departure by plane to Luena (TAAG Angolan Airlines)
- 8.30 Arrival in Luena, met by Dion du Plessis (MAG)
- 9.00 Check-in at Hotel Luena
- 10.00 Briefing at MAG base by J.P. Botha (MAG)
- 12.30 Lunch at ex-pats residence
- 14.00 Work at MAG base and passing by offices to arrange meetings
- 17.00 Meeting with Adão Mateus (LWF)
- 17.30 Meeting with Manuel dos Santos (UNHCR)
- 20.00 Dinner at ex-pats residence

**Day 25: Wednesday 11 July**

- 5.30 Departure by car to visit bridges and road to Lumbala N'guimbo + short meetings with people, officials, MAG demining team and others along the road
- 19.00 Return to Luena and dinner at ex-pats residence

**Day 26: Thursday 12 July**

- 8.00 Meeting with Landon Shroder (MAG)
- 13.00 Lunch at ex-pats residence
- 14.00 Meeting with Chili Manuel Chicanha (CNIDAH)  
Departure to Luanda (by military plane)
- 19.00 Arrival at Luanda International Airport and check-in at Sara's House 2
- 21.00 Dinner at

**Day 27: Friday 13 July**

- 9.00 Meeting with Rogério Neves e Castro (UTA)
- 11.00 Meeting with Allan Cain (DW)
- 13.00 Lunch at Restaurant Rialto
- 16.00 Drinks and debrief with Dutch Ambassador
- 19.00 Dinner in Restaurant Quais de 4

**Day 28: Saturday 14 July**

- 10.00 Meeting with Becky Thomson (NPA)
- 14.00 Work at guesthouse with Irene de Castro
- 19.00 Dinner at various places

**Day 29: Sunday 15 July**

- 9.15 Departure from Luanda International Airport to Lisbon and Amsterdam by TAP – Portuguese Airlines
- 18.12 Arrival at Lisbon Airport (missing connection to Amsterdam)
- 20.30 Check-in at Hotel VIP-Arts
- 22.00 Dinner in Restaurant A Brasileira (Lisbon)

**Day 30: Monday 16 July**

- 7.45 Departure from Lisbon Airport to Amsterdam by TAP - Portuguese Airlines
- 12.15 Arrival at Amsterdam Schiphol Airport + dealing with missing luggage



## Annex 5 – Organisations and Individuals Interviewed

(NB. Where the team met and/or interviewed a local official such as a municipal administrator or a *soba* (= traditional chief), or visiting a team of deminers at a site there were almost always more people present than the ones listed below. This list only contains the names of the ones who served as the main spokespersons. In most cases, the names of drivers and other support staff that helped the team to get around, are not included either, except when they served as a substantial source of information)

### ***LUANDA (Capital)***

Marc BONNET, Chief Technical Advisor, CNIDAH-UNDP (leaving)

Allan CAIN, Director, DW-Angola

Nelson DOMINGOS, Information Officer, NPA

Suzete FERREIRA, UNDP

Carlos FIGUEIREDO, Portfolio Holder, SNV-Angola

Deven GENGAN, Country Programme Manager, MAG (leaving)

Gita HONWANA WELCH, Country Director, UNDP

José MUSSANGO, Transport Coordinator, NPA

Mark NAFTALIN, Programme Manager, MAG

Rogério NEVES E CASTRO, Technical Adviser Demining, UTA, ACP/CE

Geir ØYE, Finance Officer/Acting Country Director, NPA

Leonardo Severino SAPALO, General Director, INAD

Jan Gijs SCHOUTEN, Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

Balbina da SILVA, National Programme Coordinator, CNIDAH

Rebecca THOMSON, Mine Action Programme Manager, NPA

Dimitri VOGELAAR, Second Secretary, Royal Netherlands Embassy

George WELCH, Consultant

***BENGO Province***

Hendrik EHLERS, Chairman & Director Operations, MgM

Sr. LITO, Vice-Administrator, Kimanoze Municipality

Kenneth O'CONNELL, Country Director, MgM

Sr. VAN-DUNEM, Administrator, Muxaluando Municipality

Mark WHITESIDE, Technical Adviser, MgM

***KWANZA NORTE Province***

Adriano GONÇALVEZ, *Soba* of Km. 11 Village, Ndalatando Municipality

João Manuel de Sousa SALAVISA, *Soba* of Gazela Village, Ndalatando Municipality

Victor VINCENTE, Team leader, NPA-Ndalatando

***MALANJE Province***

Sister Dolores BEIRA, Kudiedela orphanage

Joaquim da COSTA, Administrator, Cambaxi Village

Geraldo António DOMINGOS, Director of Education, Caculama

Father EDUARDO, Caculama Catholic Mission

Agostinho GOMES, *Soba* of Pata Village

Vincente Nhanga LUCALA, Head of the Municipal Education Department, Caculama Municipality

Pedro Augusto MAGALHÃES, Caspir driver, NPA

Domingas MANUEL, wife of *Soba* of Zela Village

Augusto Luís MONTEIRO, Director of Planning, Provincial Government

Graça MONTEIRO, Malanje Base Manager, NPA

Marcia RODRIGUES, Paramedic, NPA Quissole-Caribo

Rui Manuel ROQUE GONÇALVEZ, Director, ADRA-Malanje

Timóteo TCHILIMUNGUI, Teamleader, NPA Quissole-Caribo



***BIÉ Province***

Ernesto JONAS, Administrator, Village of Trumba

Carlinda MONTEIRO, former Vice-Director, CCF-Angola

António PINTO, Chief of Operations, Bié Province, The Halo Trust

Israel VALÉRIO, Administrator, Village of Kunhinga

Tomé Florindo SANDOMBE, Kuito Location Manager, The Halo Trust

***HUAMBO Province***

António ALÍPIO, Vila Nova Supervisor, The Halo Trust

Cupi BAPTISTA, Representative, DW-Huambo

Paulino BOMBO, Vice-Director, Sacahala Institute for Agricultural Science

Roland CLARKE, Senior Field Officer, Huambo and Benguela Provinces, The Halo Trust

Southern CRAIB, Angola Programme Manager, The Halo Trust

Waldemar FERNANDES, Huambo Location Manager, The Halo Trust

Domingos FLORINDE, Supervisor, The Halo Trust

Alberta GOMES, Director, ADRA-Huambo

Inácio MARCELO, Secretary-General, GAC

Michele MAZZAROLI, Vice-Director, CONCERN Worldwide

Sheena McCANN, Country Director, CONCERN Worldwide  
Miguel dos SANTOS, Manager MRE Project, HI

Balthasar USSACA, Technical Advisor MRE, HI

Beat WEBER, Consultant Urban Planning, DW-Huambo

***MOXICO Province***

J.P. BOTHA, Technical Operations Manager, MAG

Marcelo CAMBEMBE, Regional Liaison Coordinator, MAG

Lourdes CANDEIAS, Administrator, Ninda Municipality

José Eduardo CAPETULA, Vice-Administrator, Louveia Village

Chili Manuel CHICANHA, Provincial Coordinator, CNIDAH

Frederico CUAMBO, Interpreter, MAG

Janne HINDERS, Bridge Engineer, SRSA

Jesper JOHANSSON, Bridge Engineer, SRSA

João KAOMBA, Administrator, Lucusse Municipality

Mutepe MAHINA, Member of Community Liaison Team, MAG

Adão MATEUS, Programme Coordinator, LWF

Daniel MUZANGUENO, Technical Supervisor, MAG

José MOGUMBA, Teamleader, MAG

Samalesso MUCUMBI, *Soba* of Chicololo Village

Dion du PLESSIS, Technical Field Manager, MAG

Mike ROWLAY, Senior Operations Supervisor, MAG

Jonathan SALVADOR, Head of Administration, Louveia Village

Manuel dos SANTOS, Community Development Officer/Acting Representative,  
UNHCR-Moxico

Landon SHRODER, Community Liaison Manager, MAG

## Annex 6 – Site Selection

### 18 - 29 June

- Bengo
- Cuanza Norte
- Malange

### Programmes

AO006803 Bengo III, road clearance in support of the resettlement of IDP's  
AO008501 Bengo VII, road clearance in support of the resettlement of IDP's  
WW152717 Demining infrastructure Bengo X  
WW165516 Mine action and UXO-clearance Bengo Region  
WW165518 UXO-clearance and battle area clearance in Malanja, Uige, Ndatalando  
and Hulla, mechanical clearance by Aardvark team Hulla

### 30 June - 6 July

- Lubango + province Huila and/or the adjoining province Cunene
- Huambo (province + capital)
- Bie (capital of the province Bie = Kuito)

### Programmes

WW152716 Battle area clearance by explosive clearance teams in southern Angola  
WW185810 Mechanical support to manual demining  
WW192404 Halo Trust Appeal 2002  
6323 Global Appeal Halo Trust 2003

### 7 - 15 July

- Moxico (Luena)

### Programmes

6609 Multi-year funding Mines Advisory Group, contribution for 2004-2007



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## Annex 8 – Report HUU12

**THE HALO TRUST**  
**Discrediting Report**  
**Locality: Bom Pastor**  
**Date of discrediting: 29/04/2000**

**Task:** H012

**Map section:** 256

**Map title:** Huambo

**Grid R of the Map:** 844 867

**Map scale:** 1:100.000

**Name of supervisor:** Luciano Rufino

**Assistants:** Domingos Justino

**Sources of contact:** Former military of the unit in question and population

**History of the area:** It is an area that used to belong to the Sacahala forestry at which it had been necessary to base a military unit during 16 years, which defended the Northeastern side of the city and the surroundings of the airport.

**Mine information:** The information indicated that mines had been planted in defense of the military unit, no accident has been reported.

**Conclusion:** After the reconnaissance team went to the area to assess the situation, it was found that it did not present any danger of mines, given that the whole area that had been indicated in the previous report was currently under cultivation. The discredited area's surface is approximately 104.000 m<sup>2</sup>. Among the sources that were contacted are former military of the unit in question and the very people that use the terrain for cultivation. Until the day of this discrediting report no device has been found and a guarantee was given that as soon as something strange would be found after this job, this should immediately be communicated to the Halo Trust office.

**Compiled by:** (signed Luciano Rufino)



## Annex 9 – LIS Map Impacted Communities




There is no national map available that shows the extent of the mine problem in Angola. This LIS map indicates the impacted communities in Angola






## Annex 10 – MAG Strategic Mapping Alto Campo






## Annex 11 – MAG Tchwia






## Annex 12 – MAG Conflict Analyses



### Conflict Analysis: Luculo



## Annex 13 – MAG Impact Assessment Luangrico



**Impact Assessment: Luangrico**  
**56,000 Square Meters**







## Annex 14 – Remote Sensing

### Remote sensing as an analytical tool for demining evaluation

#### Introduction

Remote sensing imagery is commonly used for applications in cartography, forestry and agriculture for the last twenty years. The images are taken with radar or camera systems at several wavelengths, from both satellites and airborne platforms such as helicopters and fixed-wing planes.

For the purpose of this evaluation TNO had proposed to use remote sensing images as a method to obtain additional information on the actual use of demined land, complementary to documentary research, interviews with stakeholders, focus group discussions and field visits. In the past ten years the application of remote sensing imagery in humanitarian demining has been the topic of a number of research projects. These projects focused mainly on the possibility to detect mine fields and individual mines (directly or by the presence of minefield indicators) from remote sensing images by the application of hyperspectral techniques, both in the visual and infra-red spectrum.

An example of such a project is the Airborne Minefield Area Reduction (ARC) project that was finalized in 2003. TNO participated in this EC-funded project. More information can be found on the project's website<sup>1</sup>.

A current project on remote sensing that applies remote sensing techniques is the STREAM project, that started in December 2004 and will be ended mid 2008. This project aims at "integration of existing relevant information gathering and processing techniques, including the use of advanced Information Communication Technologies (ICT) to improve humanitarian crisis response in risk management"<sup>2</sup>. Two main humanitarian crisis applications will be addressed, namely Displaced Populations and Mine Action.

For the use of remote sensing images in this evaluation no new techniques were developed. The remote sensing images that were used were readily available from existing archives.

#### Methodology

The first method was the interpretation of the individual images comparing them with images of known areas. For purposes of this evaluation, the information on the images was compared with the actual situation in the field by the evaluation team.

The second method was the detection of changes in the course of time. For the application of this method images before and after the execution of the demining task were compared. Changes in satellite imagery can be detected automatically and can be a trigger for a more accurate inspection of the area, either by a field visit or by using satellite images with a higher resolution.

Unfortunately, for Africa no high resolution images before 2002 were available due to the lack of ground stations. Since 2002 the number of images has been increasing. Another limiting factor was cloud cover. This often hinders the observation in tropical regions.. Angola is only sparsely covered with high resolution satellite data from the

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<sup>1</sup> <http://www.arc.vub.ac.be/html/overview.htm>

<sup>2</sup> <http://stream.etro.vub.ac.be/home.html>

archive, which have less than 20% cloud cover. For the current project 'cloud free' images were used from the Ikonos, Quickbird and EROS satellites, which have resolution of ca meter. In addition multispectral information was available for Ikonos and Quickbird, so that information on vegetation could also be obtained.

### **Results: general**

During the field visits in the provinces of Bié, Huambo and Moxico the evaluation team intended to compare the actual situation at the location of the demining tasks as given in Table 1 with the information from the remote sensing images. The image maps were available both electronically (on laptop computers with an appropriate viewer) and as hardcopy (A1 format). Figure 1 shows an example of a remote sensing image as used for the field visits. During preparatory discussions with demining organisations it appeared however that the information used for the site selection obtained from CNIDAH did not match the site information of the demining organisations. Especially the mismatch between the task IDs and the coordinates affected the use of the image maps, since the actual locations of these tasks were not covered by the image maps. Analysis learned that the mismatch was not due to a systematic error, for instance in the transformation of one coordinate system to another. The evaluation team assumes that task IDs and GPS coordinates are mixed up in the CNIDAH data base.

However, by change one image map contains, apart from the task with the incorrect ID as provided by CNIDAH, the location of the task the evaluation team had selected: task BE277 in the province of Bié. This task was performed by HALO Trust and funded by the Netherlands. The image maps of 2 June 2002 and 27 April 2005 contained the locations of a demining task in the province of Huambo (HU194 - task ID according to CNIDAH), also performed by HALO Trust. The findings from the visits to these sites are discussed in the following paragraphs.


### **Conclusion**

In the framework of the evaluation of the financial assistance of demining activities by the Netherlands government in Angola, the use of remote sensing imagery for the assessment of land use was investigated. Mainly due to the limited availability of appropriate remote sensing images and the incorrect information on the locations of the demining activities, as provided by CNIDAH, the evaluation team was not able to perform this investigation in the way it was intended.

However, the locations of two demining tasks were present on the image maps, so that both the interpretation of an individual remote sensing image and the interpretation of changes in the course of time could be demonstrated. From this demonstration we conclude that the use of remote sensing imagery in an evaluation of land use can have an added value, since the images can give, with the appropriate interpretation, information on the past changes, and thus developments, in the area.

## Annex 15 – Chronological Overview

# Republic of Angola



## Annex 15 – Chronological Overview