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Evaluation of the Netherlands' financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Contents

Abbreviations

AP	Anti Personnel
AT	Anti Tank
AXO	Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
BCPR	Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery of the UN
BHMAC	Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre
BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
BOD	Board of Donors
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIMAP	Community Integrated Mine Action Plan
CL	Community Liaison
DC	Demining Commission of BiH
DEU	Directie Europa [MFA's Europe Department]
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (United Nations)
DZO	Directie Zuidoost – en Oost Europa [MFA's East- and Southeast Europe Department]
DZO/WB	Directie Zuidoost – en Oost Europa/Westelijke Balkan [Western Balkan]
EC	European Commission
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
FEDMAC	Federal Mine Action Centre
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GTC	Global Training Centre
HA	Humanitarian Aid
HMA	Humanitarian Mine Action
IDA	International Development Association
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IFOR	International Force in Former Yugoslavia
IMAP	Integrated Mine Action Programme
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IOB	Inspectie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en Beleidsevaluatie [The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department]
ITF	International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance
JNA	Yugoslav National Army
LIS	Landmine Impact Survey
MA	Mine Action
MAC	Mine Action Centre
MAP	Mine Action Program
MDD	Mine Detection Dog
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPRA	Mine Protection and Removal Agency
MRE	Mine Risk Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPA	Norwegian Peoples Aid
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative
PIA	Programme Implementation Unit
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
QA	Quality Assurance

QC	Quality Control
R&D	Research and Development
RS	Republika Srpska
RSMAC	Republika Srpska Mine Action Centre
SAC	Survey Action Centre
SIDA	Swedish International Development cooperation Agency
SHA	Suspected Hazardous Area
SOP	Standing Operating Procedures
TAP	Task Allocation Priority
TTF	Thematic Trust Fund (of the UN)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAC	United Nations Mine Action Centre
USA	The United States of America
USD	United States Dollor
UXB	Name of a USA based EOD and demining commercial contractor
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

Executive Summary

Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is widely considered to be the most mine contaminated country in Europe and one of the most affected in the world. As a result of the inter-ethnic war from 1992 to 1995, following the break-up of the former Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, it is estimated that about one million mines have been abandoned. These ordnances currently block access to about 4% of the land area of the country, including economically important agricultural and forest land. However, there is a trend of decreasing casualties and Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) accidents since 1996, with now 30 people per year killed or injured.

Since the Dayton Peace agreements in 1995, the country has been marked by a complex political structure: the country is comprised of two "entities" – the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina – and one autonomous district, Brcko. It is in this context that emergency mine clearance started in 1996, including the active involvement by various NGOs and UN agencies. The Netherlands has been contributing to the initial clearance by NPA, and subsequently financed UNDP's multi-donor programmes. In this 10 year period, a total of about USD six million has been given for Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA), accounting to ca. 2% of the total contribution of the Netherlands to BiH and ca. 5% of international contributions to mine action in the country.

This report presents the findings of the evaluation mission conducted from 14 - 29 June 2007. Meetings were held with key stakeholders and field visits were made throughout the territory of BiH. Because the bulk of the Dutch money went to capacity-building, the evaluation team visited six of the regional offices of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) and meetings were held with the local staff. Additionally, the team visited 5 sites cleared with Dutch money because, although clearance was only a minor part in the total funding of Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) in BiH.

Findings

From its inception in the mid-90's, the focus of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs' demining policy was to support immediate mine clearance activities in order to reduce mine victims and to promote socio-economic development. In line with its general preference for multilateral programmes, the Netherlands decided, except for its ad hoc funding to Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) – not to engage in bilateral donorship and chose to fund a UN agency in order to execute demining activities in BiH. As part of this policy, the UNDP has since 1998 been given structural funding for its programmes on building capacity in support of clearance and other mine action activities.

The UNDP supported the development of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) and worked towards the establishment of a single national level authority by 2002. As a result of the UNDP programme, the BHMAC currently has a national office, two sub offices and eight regional offices and is responsible for planning, prioritising, mapping, quality management and hand-over of cleared areas. It also maintains the national database. Both national authorities and locals benefited from the creation of this MAC scheme. These results are notable achievements in a deeply

divided society – the more as the BHMAC is regarded as one of only three institutions capable that works in all regions of the country.

The Netherlands originally envisaged a demining programme with a primary focus on immediate mine clearance in order to improve people's livelihoods. The programmes evaluated in this report show that mine clearance has in fact taken place, but that clearance operations remained very limited in numbers. The UNDP programme in fact gave preference to institutional capacity-building activities and only started to clear – a very limited number of – mines in 2005, seven years after the programmes' initiation. In other words, the Netherlands HMA programme proved to be effective in its support to capacity-building in BiH, even though this was not the principal policy objective. Through its partnership with UNDP, the Netherlands therefore supported the creation of a high-quality institution capable of organising and quality controlling mine clearance, the BHMAC. In the medium-run, this had a positive effect on the overall post-conflict reconstruction process in BiH.

The choice by MFA to opt for UNDP resulted in a significant distance between the donor on the one hand and the executing agency on the other. This hands-off approach contributed to an efficient implementation of its demining policy. As it is outside the scope of this evaluation to provide a clear-cut assessment of the UNDP's internal level of efficiency, there are no insights as to whether performance could have been different. Also, it should be noted that there were no reviews done in the evaluation period that could have provided information about potential problems or improvements.

One of the HMA activities' major shortfalls stems from a very limited link between demining activities and a more holistic development agenda. While there are various policy documents that clearly state the intention of promoting a more integrated approach, the evaluation team did not find indications of this being implemented in practice. Related to this, there is little or no recognition of the nature of the "landmine problem" as being essentially an economic issue – and hence related to economic development, the main recipient of Dutch funding. This problem is closely connected to the issue of sustainability.

As far as capacity-building is concerned, there are positive developments. While certainly not perfect, the BHMAC can be regarded as a successful and functional national mine action centre. Indeed, the existence of a single national system working across the whole national territory is in itself a remarkable achievement which has an – albeit small – positive impact in the areas of peacebuilding and reconciliation.

In the long-term, the evolution of the BHMAC and its current prioritisation system is also at the forefront of a more general international move towards a "risk based approach" to mine action which seeks to address key risks and to establish acceptable levels of residual risk. This may, eventually, allow a reduction in casualties by allocating limited resources more quickly to where they are most needed.

The evaluation team found that both monitoring and evaluation were notably weak. There was no monitoring of any specific site that had been cleared after one or three years to find out if they were being used. At the same time, it must be noted that the overall programme monitoring was, contractually, the responsibility of the Embassy in Sarajevo. This was not done in during the evaluation period, and reporting by the UNDP itself was weak. In addition, there was no evidence found of feedback from the

experience gained in implementing the programme being used to establish lessons learned.

Conclusions

The UNDP programmes had a different focus in comparison with the Netherlands' principal demining objective. Still, the former received some 90% of the total MFA funding in the ten years up to 2006 and managed to set up an entire mine action system. However, mine clearance was in fact neglected to a large extent. This leads to the more fundamental question whether the existing MFA guidelines for demining still reflect today's development agenda. In fact, the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the undertaken activities could have suffered significantly had mine clearance been the primary focus of UNDP's engagement in BiH.

In terms of monitoring and evaluation, it is clear that the lack of monitoring activities could have been prevented. The contractual obligations on the part of the Embassy should have been communicated before the finalisation of the contract between The Hague and UNDP. The fact that the Embassy was not involved in this process resulted in insufficient staff capacity at mission level and to the virtual non-existence of any type of quality safeguard for the supported demining activities.

On a more conceptual level, it is useful to capture these findings in a simple graph. For this purpose, figure 1 (see next page) combines the four chapters on relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, dividing them into a short- and a long-term overview (left for short-term, right for long-term), and features an indicator for the qualitative 'score' on relevance (triangle below). In both upper quadrants, score indicators are given by a green cross (for mine clearance) and a blue octagon (for capacity-building). These scores show to what extent short-term goals (effectiveness in relation to efficiency) and long-term goals (effectiveness in relation to sustainability) have been achieved in the period under consideration (indicated as high versus low). In the additional graph below, a purple circle inside the triangle stands for the relevance of the evaluated activities for either donor politics, national or local interests. Even though this presentation falls short of reflecting the underlying dynamics and the unique details of this case study, it allows for a more aggregate view on the way Dutch HMA activities have turned out over the years.



Figure 1 Visualisation of findings.

Recommendations:

The evaluation team suggests to follow-up on a number of inter-linked aspects in order to anticipate future HMA activities in BiH.

– Update current demining policy: it is necessary to review the current policy framework, reflecting on the experiences gathered from past HMA activities. If not in general, this is certainly the case for BiH.

– Ensure adequate agreements on monitoring. There is no need for costly monitoring schemes, however it should be clear that the non-existence thereof certainly has negative consequences for both current and future activities. In the case of BiH, MFA today faces a ten year funding scheme with little if no institutional lessons learned that could have – in retrospect – been used for adjustments along the way.

– Innovate demining strategies. On a more general level, HMA activities will have to depart from a narrow focus on mine action per se, towards a more holistic understanding of the problem at hand. Such an integrate approach would have to acknowledge the critical link between local development needs and short-term objectives. This has thus far been a more theoretical exercise and needs a more hands-on, less risk-avert attitude by funding agencies.

I Aims, Objectives and Scope of Evaluation

The aim of this evaluation is to examine and evaluate Dutch financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in the period 1996-2006. This evaluation is the second part of a larger policy evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war which examines two types of policy instruments, political and financial. The first part, carried out separately by the Policy and Evaluations Department (IOB) of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), examines the political and diplomatic efforts undertaken by the Netherlands to expand, tighten and enforce existing international legal instruments in the area of conventional arms control. The present evaluation assesses the instrument of financial assistance for humanitarian demining in the context of humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction.

The present evaluation has three related objectives (see Annex 1A,ToR):
1 to understand how Dutch policy on humanitarian demining was formulated in the period 1996-2006;
2 to assess the way in which mine-affected countries and humanitarian demining programs eligible for financial assistance were selected;
3 to assess the effectiveness of Dutch financing efforts in this area.[1]

The criteria for the evaluation were presented in the Terms of Reference (ToR) as relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. Although IOB did not refer to sustainability, this criterion was added after subsequent discussions with IOB in which the aims and objectives of the evaluation were clarified. Together, these four criteria are commonly used to evaluate development assistance. For this evaluation the following principles were used[2]:

– *Relevance*
  The extent to which the humanitarian demining activity was suited to the priorities and policies of the target group, recipient and donor.

– *Effectiveness*
  A measure of the extent to which an aid activity attains its objectives.

– *Efficiency*
  Efficiency measures the outputs -- qualitative and quantitative -- in relation to the inputs. It is an economic term which signifies that the aid uses the least costly resources possible in order to achieve the desired results.

– *Sustainability*
  Sustainability is concerned with measuring whether the benefits of an activity are likely to continue after donor funding has been withdrawn. Projects need to be environmentally as well as financially sustainable.

Based on its three-fold objective, IOB posed three clusters of questions related to the three objectives. The specific questions are listed in the Terms of Reference.

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[1] In this section, the term "effectiveness" is used as an overarching concept and refers to all other sub-aspects addressed in this report (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability).

[2] *DAC Criteria for Evaluating Development Assistance,* OECD, Paris, 1991.

For purposes of the present evaluation, relevance of Dutch demining policy examines how the demining activities fit within the policy priorities of the donor country, policy and planning priorities of the host country and the priorities, needs and wishes of the affected communities. Effectiveness relates to whether the original objectives and goals have been achieved. Efficiency relates to cost-efficiency and timeliness of the demining activities while sustainability looks at factors that influence the durability of the humanitarian demining activities undertaken, such as capacity-building, mine-risk education and gender.

The evaluation comprised both desk-based and field components. In the first phase of the evaluation Dutch demining policy was analysed to determine the principles on which Dutch demining policy was based, how demining policy was integrated into broader policies on post-conflict reconstruction and how countries eligible for financial assistance and programmes were selected. This analysis was carried out by IOB, mainly through desk-based research. Subsequently, field teams examined the impact and effectiveness of Dutch supported humanitarian demining activities in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia. The selection of these countries was made by IOB according to the selection criteria set out in the ToR.

II Introduction

1.1 Country context[3]

The 1990 parliamentary elections in Yugoslavia led to a national assembly dominated by three ethnically-based political parties, which had formed a loose coalition to take power from the communists. Croatia and Slovenia subsequently declared independence and the situation placed Bosnia and Herzegovina and its three main ethnic groups in a position of conflict of loyalties between national identity and ethnic identity.
A significant split soon developed on the issue of whether to stay with the Yugoslav federation (overwhelmingly favoured among Serbs – largely Eastern Orthodox Christians) or seek independence (overwhelmingly favoured among Bosniak Muslims, and Croats – largely Catholic Christians). A declaration of sovereignty by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in October 1991 was followed by a referendum for independence from Yugoslavia in February and March 1992. This referendum was boycotted by the great majority of Bosnian Serbs. With voter turnout of 67%, 99% of the votes cast were in favour of the proposal that Bosnia and Herzegovina should became an independent state[4]. Following a tense period of escalating tensions and military incidents, open warfare began in the capital city, Sarajevo, on April 6. International recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina meant that the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) officially withdrew from the republic's territory; many Bosnian Serb members left JNA and joined the Army of Republika Srpska. Armed and equipped from extensive JNA stockpiles in Bosnia, supported by volunteers and various paramilitary forces from Serbia, and receiving extensive humanitarian, logistical and financial support from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Republika Srpska's offensives in 1992 managed to place much of BiH land area under its control.[3] There were no fewer than seven armies and six further armed and paramilitary groups involved in the conflict.[5]

Most of the hostilities during the war in BiH were conducted by three distinct armies: the Bosnian government army, the Bosnian Croat army and the Bosnian Serb army. In the former Republic of Yugoslavia, all men had been required to complete one year of military service. JNA military doctrine relied heavily on the use of mines as a deterrent against invasion and all soldiers were taught mine warfare doctrine and techniques (laying, recording and neutralising).[6] Yugoslavia had been a major producer of landmines and estimates of the number available for use at the start of the war range from 3 to 6 million[6]. There was thus widespread knowledge of mines and their use and also large stockpiles of mines available at the start of the war.

There was significant conflict between Croats and Bosniaks as well as between Serbs and each of these groups. By 1993, when an armed conflict erupted between the Sarajevo government and the ethnic Croat separatist area of Herzeg-Bosnia, about 70% of the country was controlled by the Serbs.[7]

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[3] Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History,* New York University Press: New York, 1994.
[4] Malcolm, Noel, *Bosnia: A Short History*, New York University Press, New York, 1994.
[5] Shrader, Charles R, *The Muslim-Croat Civil War in Central Bosnia*, A&M University Press, Texas, 2003.
[6] *Landmine Monitor Report for 1999: Bosnia and Herzegovina,* ICBL,1999.
[7] Riedlmayer, Andras, "A Brief History of Bosnia-Herzegovina," *The Bosnian Manuscript Ingathering Project,* 1993.

In March 1994, the signing of the Washington accords between the leaders of the republican government and Herzeg-Bosnia led to the creation of a joint Bosniak-Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (often known as "The Federation"). The creation of this entity reduced the extremely complex conflict with multiple players to a situation where the international community could see two opposing sides, the Federation forces on one side and the Serbian forces on the other. Together with international outrage at Serb war crimes and atrocities (most notably the genocidal killing of over 8,000 Bosniak males in Srebrenica in July 1995), international pressure eventually turned the tide of war. The signing of the Dayton Agreement in Dayton, USA, by the presidents of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Alija Izetbegović), Croatia (Franjo Tuđman), and Yugoslavia (Slobodan Milošević) finally brought a halt to the fighting, and established the complex structure of the present-day state. BiH is now comprised of two "entities" namely the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Federation has a Canton based structure (not unlike Germany's "Länder"), the Republika Srpska (RS) has a unitary structure. The three main ethnic groups (Bosniak Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs have their representation guaranteed at most levels of government. In addition, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) still retains considerable powers (similar to a Governor) and one district, Brčko, is semi-autonomous and responds directly to the OHR. The OHR has powers to make laws and over-rule the national legislation in some cases, which is very unusual for an independent country. The High Representative is chosen by the Peace Implementation Council whose Steering Board members include six western powers, Russia, Japan, European Union and Commission, and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference.[8]

The war had enormous psychological, social and economic impacts for the population of about four million people. An estimated 150,000 to 250,000 were killed and over half of the population left their pre-war place of residence, either internally displaced or refugees in other countries. More than three-quarters of Bosnia's housing stock was damaged or destroyed by the war, often as a deliberate tactic in a campaign of ethnic cleansing to prevent the return of displaced people. The opposing forces also severed electrical grids, telephone lines, water systems, and roads along the lines of confrontation. In frontline areas, the destruction of homes and infrastructure was near total.[9] In 2006 the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) remained far below the 1990 level, with official figures showing an unemployment rate of 45%, however the informal economy may reduce actual unemployment to 25-30%.[10]

Although the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina terminated almost 12 years ago, and there have been many steps since then to strengthen the peacebuilding and reconciliation process, Bosnian society remains deeply divided and without a common political vision for the future. Frustration with politicians for their failure to address the need for economic development appears to be widespread.

There are ongoing debates on modifying the Dayton constitution, and the elections of 2006 led to a resurgence in nationalist negative-propaganda and the election of many people considered to be in favour of hard-line nationalist policies. There is still much distrust. All government institutions are separated on entity basis and the different political structures for the two entities emphasise this separation.

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[8] Office of the High Representative, http://www.ohr.int.

[9] Dahlman, Carl and Tuathail, Gearóid Ó., "Broken Bosnia: The Localized Geopolitics of Displacement and Return in Two Bosnian Places," *Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95* (3), Washington, 2005, pp. 644–662.

[10] *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, CIA World Factbook, 2004.

1.2 Scope of the mine problem

Mines were used extensively during the conflict, principally along the confrontation lines. The nature of the conflict led to some of the confrontation lines moving frequently in the course of the war and this led to new mined areas each time a new line was established. Mined areas in BiH can be found in a wide range of settings, including steeply sloping wooded hillsides, on access routes, as booby traps, to prevent re-occupation of damaged buildings, on flat agricultural land, in urban environments and even near the runway of the main airport in Sarajevo. All types of mines – blast, fragmentation and bounding fragmentation - were used (including some locally made in improvised factories).

Many of the remaining mined areas lie in, or close to, the zone of separation between the two current entities; this is 1,100 kilometres long and up to four kilometres wide. Especially in southern and central BiH, mines were often used without clear patterns and with limited record keeping. Figure 2 (see next page) shows a map of the status of the mine contamination in 2005, the confrontation lines are clearly defined by the residual contamination.

The Mid-Term Development Strategy 2004-2007 of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina[11] scores BiH among the seven most mine-impacted countries in the world and the most mine-impacted country in Europe. It states that poverty and mine-contamination are directly correlated, as 85 percent of communities affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) are located in rural areas.[12] BiH is also considered as the most mine-impacted country in Europe by the Landmine Monitor Report 2006.[13] Of documented mines laid, the BHMAC reports that 84 percent are anti-personnel mines and 16 percent are anti-vehicle mines.

In 2003, the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) was conducted by Handicap International in cooperation with the Survey Action Centre and the national mine action centre, BHMAC.[14] The main purpose of an LIS is to identify mine and UXO affected communities and provide a rapid appraisal of the impact of mines and UXO on each affected community. The BiH LIS identified a total of 1,366 communities and an estimated 1.38 million people as affected by the presence or suspected presence of mines and unexploded ordnance. More than half of the affected communities had economies linked to agriculture and use of natural resources.

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[11] *BiH Mid-term Development Strategy 2004-2007 (PRSP),* Government BiH, Sarajevo, 2003.
[12] *BiH Mid-Term Development Strategy 2004-2007 (PRSP*), *revision document for public discussion,* Government BiH, Sarajevo, March 2006, p.131 and *Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Plan for 2006*, BHMAC, 2006, p.3.
[13] *Landmine Monitor Report 2006*: *Bosnia and Herzegovina,* ICBL, Geneva, 2006.
[14] *Landmine Impact Survey*: *BiH,* SAC, Takoma Park, 2003.



Figure 2 Map of residual Mine Contamination in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2005, courtesy of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre.

Mine casualties have declined since 1996, in 2006 there were just 35 casualties in 19 incidents, 17 injured (including two deminers) and 18 killed[15]. Six years earlier in 2000 there were 100 casualties and in 1996 there were 603. However, the casualty data in 2006 shows an increase (almost double) compared to previous year (2005) when there were 19 casualties. Most of the recent casualties have been men between 30 and 50 years of age who were *intentionally taking risks for economic purposes,* i.e. they had entered an area known to be hazardous for such activities as collecting firewood or grazing animals.[15] Figure 3 (see next page) shows the downward trend in casualties.

[15] BHMAC mine casualty database information provided to Suzana Srnic Vukovic for Landmine Monitor Report 2007 by Tarik Serak, Head of Planning, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 21 March 2007.

While casualties have certainly reduced dramatically it is not possible to state with certainty which is the cause of this reduction. It could be due to HMA activities, local people and returnees themselves identifying mine locations and avoiding them, or some other cause. This is part of a larger debate - data from a number of countries shows that after IDP and refugee return is over, casualties tend to reduce whether or not there is HMA.

While any mine accident is clearly a tragedy, the relative scale of the problem of casualties in BiH is clear from a comparison with road traffic accidents. World Health Organisation data show that in 2002 there were 371 people killed and 7,230 injured in traffic accidents in BiH, and in the same year 26 mine victims were killed and 46 injured.[16] Since then, it is understood that road traffic accidents have increased as traffic has increased,[17] whereas mine casualties have decreased.

The landmine problem has changed from an issue of casualties at the end of the war into an issue of denial of resources – an economic problem.[18] This is shown by the main source of current casualties now being people deliberately taking risks for economic purposes. In addition, the casualty data shows no clear trend for the ratio of casualties to returning displaced people and refugees, compared with casualties among people who stayed in their homes. About two thirds of casualties since 1996 have been people who did not move away from their homes.[19]



Figure 3 Mine Victim data for BiH 1996 to 2006.

[16] *Bosnia and Herzegovina*, World Bank,Washington, 2004.
[17] More recent road accident data was not available.
[18] Lisica, Darvin, *Risk Management in Mine Action Planning*, Sarajevo, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2006.
[19] Lisica, Darvin, *Risk Management in Mine Action Planning*, Sarajevo, Ministry of Civil Affairs, 2006.

Figure 4 A site cleared with funding from the Netherlands' Government in Sibosnica, Celic, BiH. About 1000 square metres of unused land between the road and the bridge were cleared in four days by the commercial demining company *UXB Balkans* to give access to repair the power line.

1.3 Humanitarian demining and the national peacebuilding process

1996 – 1997 Mine Action as an emergency response and reconstruction effort

The 1995 Dayton Agreement which ended the war also initiated mine clearance. The treaty included obligations concerning the marking, removal and destruction of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). All three activities were to be completed within 30 days of the Transfer of Authority, so mine action was expected to be essentially complete by March 1996.[20]

There were few specialist demining organisations at that time and progress was slow. The former warring parties were given the obligation of using their forces to undertake mine clearance work. There were no national demining standards in place and much of the demining was "mine lifting" (clearing only the mines indicated on minefield maps) rather than demining to humanitarian mine clearance standards.[21]

Role of UN agencies 1998 onwards – capacity-building

From the start the UN agencies played an important role in coordination of mine action and capacity-building in BiH. Over 80% of Netherlands' funding for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been channelled through these multi-donor programmes. In line with its mandate at the time, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) developed a programme of emergency mine action for BiH in 1997. The one

[20] *The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, 14 December 1995.
[21] Available from http://www.mineactionstandards.org/IMAS.

year UNHDA programme included: mine awareness, marking and clearance of the most important hazardous areas, training of deminers and capacity-building. A change of responsibilities within the UN system allocated further work in developing mine action to UNDP.

A multi-year programme for 1998 to 2003 was developed by UNDP staff and focussed on capacity and institution building. It brought together donations from the international community into a single coordinated programme managed by UNDP staff. The key objectives were to set up the necessary capacities and structures to be able to effectively prioritise and implement clearance operations, mine awareness and other key activities.

One of the key achievements of this programme was support to the drafting of the Demining Law of 2002. This law was enacted by the BiH government itself and not through the Office of the High Representative. The law established a single, unitary legal framework for mine action in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in itself a real achievement given the complex governmental structure and deep divisions in society. It also set the scene for a single national mine action centre for the entire country to replace the two "entity" based mine action centres, each with a different ethnic loyalty. Successfully establishing the single national mine action centre was a notable advance and a contribution to peacebuilding and reconciliation as well as efficient mine action.

In 2003 a Landmine Impact Survey added detailed socio-economic information to the knowledge of the mine contamination and led to a review of the prioritisation system to better include economic factors. This led to a strategic review of the prioritisation system in 2004 and the introduction of some risk-based analysis.

In 2004, the link between demining and socio-economic development was established formally at the Bosnian state level with the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), although Mine Action was not mentioned in detail.[22] HMA is included as a factor in Bosnian development policy, but does not have high priority. The new Mine Action Strategy for 2005-2009 also emphasises the link with the overall national development.

Also in 2004 the next phase of the UNDP programme, a five year integrated mine action programme (IMAP) was launched. The capacity-building continued but with very concrete goals for hand-over of most of the financing of the national mine action centre by 2008, coupled to the end of expatriate technical assistance.

1.4 The link to land use

Land use is the most important criterion in the selection of clearance areas in the formal prioritisation process used by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre, the body legally responsible for this activity. By itself, mine and UXO clearance does not guarantee a change in land use, a change comes about when several conditions are met, including:

a the land or infrastructure is cleared of all explosive remnants of war (ERW). ERW is usually defined as including: mines, unexploded ordnance and abandoned

[22] Annex 12: Chapter on Mine Action from the PRSP BiH 2004-2007. The PRSP from BiH only touches the issue of mines and UXO's in connection to development in a minor way. The focus is on the organisation of mine action.

explosive ordnance.[23] Clearance is done by a clearance method or by declaring the land to be of no known risk after Area Reduction or Technical Survey. The various survey processes are described in Annex 12 of this report;

b there is a need or desire to use the land or infrastructure;

c sufficient access to additional resources that are needed for a change in land use;

d there is clarity about the ownership of the land (and its judicial status), and that the owner is prepared to invest in its use;

e sufficient level of security to encourage investment.

Change in land use is potentially a useful indicator of impact in the longer term. However, it is not necessarily easy to apply. Changing use patterns may take some time to emerge. Delays of a year in re-occupying cleared houses are not uncommon in BiH and delays of three years in starting to use cleared land. Changes in land use may not emerge until development activities take place and/or development or rehabilitation funding is available. Farmland may be cleared but without support with tools, seeds, animals, reconstruction of outbuildings, etc, the land may remain unused even though it is needed and the owner wants to use it. Also, the normal definition of land use can be misleading in this regard. For example, in Sibosnica (Celic), the BiH evaluation team visited a piece of unused land adjacent to a river, which had been cleared (see photograph on page 18). This land had not changed its apparent state of disuse, but in practice had been cleared in order to provide access for repair teams to reconnect the main electric power line leading to the community, and the reconnection of the supply reportedly had a positive impact on the community. These aspects underscore the importance of integrating mine clearance with community based development work.

1.5 Legal and institutional context

After the 1995 Dayton Agreement the United Nations Mine Action Centre in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMAC) was established in June 1996 to coordinate humanitarian demining activities in the country and to supervise the start-up of the national bodies to take over responsibility for mine action.

Also in 1996 a Bosnian Mine Protection and Removal Agency (MPRA) was set up to oversee mine action. Within each of Bosnia's Entities – the Federation and Republika Srpska – there was a Project Implementation Unit (PIU), staffed by people from the entity government, which administered funding for mine clearance. Regrettably, this system soon suffered from cronism.[24] In response to pressure from the international community, the MPRA was shut down in 1997. The International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance (ITF) was subsequently established in Slovenia with significant support from the USA to provide a transparent and accountable contract tendering and fund management facility for BiH and other south-east European countries.[25]

The London conference in December 1996 to review the Dayton Agreement required the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to use their military forces for humanitarian demining according to internationally recognised standards, to assist the United Nations Mine Action Centre (UNMAC), and to support the demining effort by

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[23] *Explosive Remnants of War and Mines other than Anti Personnel Mines. Global Survey 2003-2004*, Landmine Action, Actiongroup Landmine and Mine Action Canada, London, 2005.

[24] Bolton and Griffiths, "Bosnia's political landmines", *Landmine Action,* London, Routledge, September 2006.

[25] Full details are given on the ITF website: http://www.itf-fund.si.

exempting operations from taxes and customs duties. The use of the armed forces has continued and the national army is now one of the largest humanitarian demining operators in BiH and has substantial resources of personnel and equipment.

In October 1997, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the United Nations signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) concerning the first national Mine Action Plan. Under this MOU, all assets of UNMAC were to be handed over to the Bosnia and Herzegovina Commission for Demining (BHCD). This demining commission had three members, one from each of the major ethnic groups and each representing a different state ministry and responsibilities of overseeing the development of the mine action centre and coordinating between the centre and the Council of Ministers. Bosnia and Herzegovina ratified the Ottawa Convention on the 3rd of December 1997 and in September of the following year became a State Party to the Convention.

In July 1998 the UNMAC developed, as planned, into a national mine action centre named the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC) overseeing two "Entity" mine action centres: the Federation Mine Action Centre (FEDMAC) in Sarajevo, the capital of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the Republika Srpska Mine Action Centre (RSMAC) in Banja Luka, the capital of the Republika Srpska. Handover of responsibility for mine action occurred on 1 July 1998. The investigation into the misuse of World Bank demining funds led to the sacking and replacement of the three Demining Commissioners in 2000.

In 2002 a single national mine action centre was formed from the two entity MACs, by extending the mandate of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC). The same national legislation of 2002, the first Demining Law, defined state – level responsibility and coordination of mine action through the Demining Commission. This commission is situated within the Ministry of Civil Affairs and consist of 3 members, each simultaneously representing a ministry and one of the three main entities.[26]

The establishment of a legal framework for mine action in 2002 created a unified management structure whereby Bosnian officials responsible for mine action started planning and managing the country's mine action program, see also figure 5. There are mine action offices (previously semi-autonomous centres) in the capital cities of each of the two entities, (Sarajevo and Banja Luka), and eight regional offices. The entity offices support the regional offices on quality control/assurance, mine action planning, general/systematic survey and data storage and analysis. The quality assurance inspectors are based in the eight regional offices.[27] BHMAC has produced demining strategies and annual plans; made the transition to near-complete local management (from the 40-plus international advisors in 1998); increased local funding;[28] refined the process by which "priority lists" of tasks are established (see below); and guaranteed the quality of work (through prioritisation, quality assurance, accreditation and certification systems).[29] Until the end of 2007, the BHMAC will be supported by one part-time "strategic advisor" paid for by the MFA and contracted by UNDP. BHMAC is

[26] "Demining Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Official Gazette*, Year VI, Pursuant to Article IV.4.a of the BH Constitution, 12 February 2002.
[27] *Landmine Monitor Report for 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina*. ICBL, Geneva, 2006.
[28] Financial contributions to BHMAC come from the state. In addition, state-owned corporations (chiefly the electricity utilities) and municipalities have financed some demining and marking. An agreement is in place for the state government to cover all operating costs of BHMAC by 2008.
[29] *Landmine Monitor Report for 2006: Bosnia and Herzegovina*, ICBL, Geneva, 2006.

responsible for implementing BiH's demining plan and tasking all mine action operations, including Mine Risk Education that is supported by a UNICEF full time technical advisor. All mine action organisations must be accredited by BHMAC in order to work in BiH; new regulations for accreditation and re-accreditation of agencies were adopted by BHMAC in March 2006, although amendments on accreditation in the Demining Law remained under discussion. Currently a total of about 40 organisations (commercial, NGO and governmental) are accredited.

The Demining Law of February 2002 also re-established the Demining Commission under the BiH Ministry of Civil Affairs and Communication. The commission represents BiH in its relations with the international community on mine-related matters and is also responsible for acting as an interministerial body to ensure concerted policy and coordinated action between the nine ministries involved in various aspects of mine action. Further responsibilities include: supervising the mine action centre, BHMAC; proposing the appointment of BHMAC senior staff for approval by the Council of Ministers; approving the accreditation of demining organisations; facilitating cooperation between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and Republika Srpska (RS); submitting reports to the BiH Council of Ministers; and informing the Board of Donors about the commission's activities as well as about progress in demining.

The commission has the responsibility for seeking and obtaining donor funds for mine action, in cooperation with the Board of Donors. The board meets twice a year to coordinate donor strategy and policy. The board includes the embassies of donor governments and the European Commission (EC), as well as non-donor institutions involved in managing donor funds, including the UN and the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF).[30]



Figure 5 The current structure of mine action institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[31]

[30] "Demining Law in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *Official Gazette*, Year VI, Pursuant to Article IV.4.a of the BH Constitution, 12 February 2002.

[31] A full description, in English, of the BHMAC, its structure, activities and objectives can be found on the BHMAC website at http://www.bhmac.org/.

1.6 Dutch-supported humanitarian demining activities

Dutch support to mine action between 1996 and 2006 consisted of the following components

1996-1997 Support to NPA (direct funding)

From 1996 until the end of 1997, the amount of USD 310,000 was given to Norwegian's People's Aid[32] for two purposes.

The first was mine clearance activities in the Modrica and Vozuca municipalities, the latter being a village where refugees from Srebrenica were temporarily resettled.[33] Secondly, a part of this contribution went to the costs of capacity-building for the NPA Global Mine Detection Dog School.

Despite enquiries by the evaluation team the exact clearance sites in Modrica could not be identified. Record keeping in the early years of mine action, in the immediate post-war crisis, was considerably less thorough than it is now and tracking which donation had funded exactly which piece of cleared land proved impossible. Clearance records (exact details of the area cleared) were available but could not be definitively linked to a specific donation.[34] However, it was possible to visit Modrica and conduct a focus group interview with people who had benefited from demining activities.

1997 Support for UNDHA programme of emergency mine action and training

In line with its mandate at the time, the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UNDHA) developed programme of emergency mine action for BiH in 1997. UNHDA appealed for support for this programme from the international community and the Netherlands responded with both financial support of over USD 600,000 and with a programme of secondment of military personnel to at as technical advisors and trainers at the newly started UN mine action centre and the emerging national mine action centres. The UNHDA programme included: mine awareness, marking and clearance of the most important hazardous areas, training of deminers and capacity-building.

A change of responsibilities within the UN system allocated further work in developing mine action to UNDP.

1998-2003 Support for the UNDP multi-year multi-donor mine action programme

This programme was developed by UNDP staff and focussed on capacity and institution building. It brought together donations from the international community into a single coordinated programme managed by UNDP staff.

In the first two phases of the UN Assistance Program the effort was on capacity development and support to operational costs. Although Dutch advisors where attached to demining teams in the very early days, those teams had been removed from the MA structure by 2000 in a move to separate planning, supervision and quality control from

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[32] NPA is a NGO founded in 1939 as the humanitarian organisation of the Norwegian labour movement. Today, NPA is one of the 5 biggest humanitarian organisations in Norway, with operations in some 30 countries throughout the world.

[33] *Contribution NPA*, NH/480, MFA, The Hague, 31 May 1996.

[34] See also *Final Report to the Dutch Government on Grant No: BA002801*, NPA, Sarajevo, 1997.

actual clearance activities. As has been noted, from the start there was strong support for the principle of involving commercial clearance operators and for a tender process for all clearance contracts. The programme was a multi-donor activity with most of the international support coordinated through the Board of Donors (BOD) established at the same time as the UNDP programme. UNDP was a co-chair of the BOD. Over time, the BOD broadened its mandate to include the support of mine action as a whole, and not just the specific support of the national structure for coordination.[35]

From 1998 until 2003 47% of the total amount spend on mine action in BiH over the ten years 1996 to 2006 was channelled through this UNDP programme which had the intention of supporting development of the national capacity and structures.[36] The Dutch MFA saw the MAC having a "central role in the demining process in BiH" and "the transfer of this centre to the Bosnian authorities could be seen as an important step to reduce the dependency on foreign countries."[37]

During these years, the Dutch funding included the salary of the international UNDP Mine Action Strategic Advisor to BHMAC, as well as other UNDP staff salaries. There was also a personnel contribution in the early years by means of a fulltime (military) technical advisor to the management of BHMAC, as well as several supervisors and military instructors.[38] These military advisors were seconded (i.e. salaries still funded by Ministry of Defence) but local costs such as housing were met from the UNDP programme funding.

Part of the Dutch funding was also directly spent by UNDP on the regional office in Banja Luka, the former regional Republica Srpska Mine Action Center (RSMAC) headquarter (1998- 2002). This contribution was used for a number of purposes including: salaries for staff and deminers, demining equipment, travel costs and furniture.[39]

2003 – 2006 Support for the Global Mine Detection Dog centre through NPA (5 year programme)

In 2003, NPA, received Dutch funding again for the MDD centre: 200,000 dollars over five years. This can be seen as an indirect contribution to mine clearance, although Bosnia and Herzegovina did not benefit directly from these funds because all the dogs trained by NPA are used outside the territory of BiH. Funding such a programme may seem somewhat anomalous, but could be justified given that the project is based in BiH and that, with positive consequences, the detection dogs are exported to a number of other countries. [40]

2004 – 2006 Support to UNDP IMAP program: capacity building and clearance activities

The Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP) began in 2004 and was in effect the third phase of the original UN Mine Action Assistance Programme, with minor

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[35] Personal communication David Rowe, UNDP Sarajevo, 27 July 2007.
[36] *Contribution UNDP Demining Programme BiH,* MFA, HH-2208/98/hw, DMV/HH, The Hague, 17 August 1998.
[37] *Contribution UNDP (demining) Former Yugoslavia*, HH 1009/99/mvm, MFA, The Hague, 31 May 1999.
[38] *Note UNDP Contribution PV NY*, MFA, The Hague, 25 August 1998.
[39] Financial data BHMAC Banja Luka.
[40] See also NPA GTC MDD: http://www.npa-gtc.org.

additions to broaden the potential for donor interest. Those additions were specific and limited clearance objectives where, in addition to national priority, UNDP could support specific developmental actions in a move to give some support to linking mine action and development. The UNDP programme also brought in potential for limited assistance to Bosnian Military capacity where such capacities could be very clearly identified. However, it remained centred on capacity development within the MA structure and provided some (steadily diminishing) financial support of operational costs.[35]
Developing the methods and structures in support of clearance prioritisation was a long term objective of the original and IMAP programmes.[35]
The funding for IMAP is given in detail below, table 1. It can be seen that the Netherlands contribution represents 22.5% of funding in 2004, and about 13% of the overall funding for all years (this may change if further donations are forthcoming before the end of the programme).

Table 1 Funds received for IMAP 2004-2006.

FUNDS RECEIVED FOR IMAP 2004-2006[41]

Year	Donor	Amount Received US$
2004	Canada-CIDA	1,096,071
2004	Sweden-SIDA	666,667
2004	Netherlands	555,000
2004	UK	150,000
	TOTAL for 2004	2,467,738
2005	Canada-CIDA	707,134
2005	Sweden-SIDA	666,667
	TOTAL for 2005	1,373,801
2006	Canada-CIDA	765,914
2006	Sweden-SIDA	666,667
2006	Netherlands	602,000
2006	BCPR/Sweden	150,000
received in 2006 for 2007	Netherlands for 2007	602,000
	TOTAL for 2006	2,786,581
2007	Canada-CIDA	622,207
received in 2007 for 2008	Canada-CIDA	444,434
	TOTAL for 2007	1,066,641
TOTAL received IMAP		$ 7,694,761

The Dutch MFA support for the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme was USD 555,000 in 2004. Of this, about USD 164,000 was for capacity and institution building of BHMAC,[42] USD 65,000 for technical support to the programme, and 300,000 USD, over half of the total, was earmarked for mine clearance in support of the restoration of socio-economic activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina.[43]

Thus, in 2004, the financial contribution of the Netherlands included substantially more funding for mine clearance tasks than in previous years.[44] This was in agreement with

[41] Interview UNDP Sarajevo, 30 July 2007.
[42] *Memo Contribution IMAP BiH 9685*, MFA, The Hague, 8 June 2004.
[43] *IMAP,* UNDP, New York, 2004.
[44] *IMAP: Distribution of Dutch Funds 2004-2005,* UNDP, Sarajevo, 2006.

the UNDP IMAP framework that identifies the clearance of 4,000,000 square meters of economically significant land as a priority.

The Dutch funds supported the following mine clearance activities.[45]

Table 2 Overview of Dutch supported clearance activities.

Microlocation	Macrolocation	Square meters	Start – Finish date	Company
Sarici	Teocal	18,457	27/07/05 – 06/09/05	UXB Balkans
Bucje Visori	Celic	4,997	08/09/05 – 22/09/05	UXB Balkans
Sibosnica	Celic	1,021	24/08/05 – 27/08/05	UXB Balkans
Krusevas preko pot	Banovici	24,011	21/07/05 – 26/08/05	UXB Balkans
Ugorska 3	Vogosca	9,672	08/08/05 – 06/09/05	Mechem
Katulje	Vogosca	39,354	21/07/05 – 15/09/05	Mechem
Pribicevac	Srebrenica	31,222	18/07/05 – 15/08/05	Detektor

[45] *The Use of the Dutch Contribution for IMAP Project Mine Clearance Activities*, UNDP, Sarajevo, 2005.

Table 3 Overview Dutch supported HMA activities in BiH.

Year of Budget Allocation	Dutch project no.	Purpose	Location	Start	Finish	Administered by	Final recipient	Amount in USD	%
1996	BA002801	Clearance	Modrica/Vozuca	1996	1997		NPA	309.704	4.7
		Global Training Centre Mine Detection Dogs (GTC MDD)	Borci						
1997	BA007101	Mine awareness Marking/clearance Training deminers by NL instructors Capacity building		1997	1997	UN/DHA	DHA	619.584	9.5
1998	WW135106	Capacity/institution building	Sarajevo	1998	1998	UNDP	BHMAC	1,123,716	17.1
1999	WW152707	Capacity and institution building	Sarajevo Banja Luka	1999	1999	UNDP	BHMAC RSMAC	1,179,245	18.0
2000	WW152707	Capacity- and institution building	Sarajevo Banja Luka	2000	2000	UNDP	BHMAC RSMAC	963,422	14.7
2001	WW185811	Capacity- and institution building	Sarajevo Banja Luka	2001	2002	UNDP	BHMAC RSMAC	614,432	9.4
2002	WW185811	Capacity- and institution building	Sarajevo Banja Luka	2002	2003	UNDP	BHMAC	385,568	5.9
2003	6608	GTC MDD	Borci	2004	2007		NPA	200,000	3.1
2004	9685	Clearance/	Sarici (Teocak)	2004	2005	UNDP	UXB Balkans	300,000	4.6
			Bucje Visori (Celic)				UXB Balkans		
			Sibosnica (Celic)				UXB Balkans		
			Krusevas preko pot (Banovici)				UXB Balkans		
			Ugorsko 3 (Vogosca)				Mechem		
			Kaulje (Vogosca)				Mechem		
			Pribicevac (Srebrenica)				Detektor		
		Capacity – and institution building	Sarajevo			UNDP	BHMAC	163,571	2.5
		Technical support to IMAP				UNDP	UNDP	65,000	1.0

								555,000	9.2
2006	12545	For 2007 activities		2007		UNDP		602,000	
							total	6.552.671	

III Findings

1 Relevance

1.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the relevance of the Netherlands funded HMA activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It starts by providing an overview of how the HMA activities fit within the overall policy priorities of the Netherlands and elaborates on the overall aid relationship between the Netherlands and BiH. Subsequently, it addresses the policy and planning priorities of the Bosnian government and how the Netherlands funded HMA fit the priorities, needs and wishes of the affected communities.

1.2 How did humanitarian demining relate to Dutch overall development assistance?

Since 1996, the Netherlands has been one of the ten biggest donors in the field of humanitarian demining.[46] [47] Between 1996 and 1999, the Dutch government earmarked some USD 12,5 million annually for humanitarian demining.[48]

Until the end of 2000, financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities came under the budget article for emergency aid. In November 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a separate article in its budget for humanitarian demining, and increased its annual contribution to USD 18,7 million, to emphasise "the importance of humanitarian demining to re-establishing a safe living environment in post-conflict countries and the Netherlands' specific expertise in demining and the contribution it can make."[49]

In the autumn of 2003 the government decided to set up the so-called "Stability Fund" in order to provide rapid, flexible support for activities at the interface between peace, security and development in countries and regions emerging from or at risk of sliding into armed conflict. The funds previously set aside for demining are now allocated to this Fund.[50]

In 2003 the government formulated the following principal policy objective for humanitarian demining: "Dutch policy focuses on clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in order to reduce the number of mine accident victims and foster

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[46] This section is based on the study of IOB *Preparing the ground for a mine safe world. Dutch Interventions on landmines and explosive remnants of war in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Ottawa Convention 1996-2006,* The Hague, 2007.

[47] During this period the Netherlands has fluctuated between sixth and tenth place. The United States was the number one donor in BiH for HMA, with 25% of the total BiH HMA donor budget for the period 1996-2006. The US is closely followed by the European Union with 20% Norway and Canada are also large contributors. UNMAS Mine Action Investments website: www.un.org/d-demin.

[48] *Approval of the Oslo Convention 1997 [Goedkeuring van het op 18 september 1997 te Oslo totstandgekomen Verdrag inzake het verbod van het gebruik, de aanleg van voorraden, de productie en de overdracht van anti-personeelsmijnen en inzake de vernietiging van deze wapen]* 26137. R1620, no. 5:1. MFA, Houses of Representatives, The Hague, 2003.

[49] *Amendment to the budget for the expenses en incomes of the MFA for the year 2000 [Wijziging van de begroting van de uitgaven en de ontvangsten van het Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (V) voor het jaar 2000]* 27162, no. 6, The Hague, 2000.

[50] *Stability Fund*, 2603, MFA, House of Representatives, The Hague, 2003.

socio-economic development. The Netherlands seeks to establish cost-effective mine-clearing operations that mobilise local workers and can be taken over by national bodies as quickly as possible."[51]

In principle, only countries that have signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention (and actually comply with it) are eligible for Dutch assistance. Financial assistance for demining activities is channelled through the UN (UNMAS and UNDP) and a group of trusted NGO's. Organisations that perform mine-clearing activities on a commercial basis are not eligible for assistance.[52] Demining programmes must also comply with the following UNMAS mine action guidelines, which are to be coordinated at national level.

In awarding grants, the Netherlands gives priority to:
1 actual mine-clearing projects in areas where landmines present the greatest risk to the population;
2 demining activities in countries with which it maintains bilateral aid relations, or in which it contributes to activities relating to human rights, peacebuilding and good governance;
3 the continuation of projects that have already received grants (as opposed to new activities);
4 capacity-building and training so that mine-clearing operations can be taken over as quickly as possible by the national authorities in the countries affected.[53]

As far as techniques are concerned, manual detection is the preferred method. The Netherlands prefers the deployment of large mine-clearing teams to the funding of heavy machinery because of the resultant opportunities for engaging the local population and promoting employment. No grants will be made available for the development of new detection and clearance techniques.[54]

Funding decisions are currently guided by whether an area has been accorded priority in the context of the Stability Fund (Stability Fund Assessment Framework). The priority areas are the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, the Great Lakes Region and Afghanistan.

Dutch Policy and BiH

No specific Dutch HMA policy for BiH exists. Objectives of the overall Dutch HMA policy are the clearance of land mines and UXO, in order to decrease the number of victims of accidents and promote socio-economic development. The Netherlands strives for cost-effectiveness, and aims at building national capacity at all levels for effective mine clearance operations.[55]

The policy execution at the ministry functions on a demand led basis for example by reacting to HMA proposals of NGOs and proposals of the UN organisations. In order to

[51] *Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, Theme-based Cofinancing*," MFA, The Hague, 2003.
[52] 27162, no. 8:6, MFA, The Hague, 2000.
[53] 27162, no. 8:4-6, MFA, The Hague, 2000.
[54] 27162, no. 6.
[55] *Preparing the ground for a mine safe world. Dutch Interventions on landmines and explosive remnants of war in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Ottawa Convention 1996-2006,* IOB, The Hague, 2007.

come to well founded and coherent choices concerning the funding of programmes, different sets of priorities and criteria were formulated over time.

Before 1999: no policy framework for HMA

BiH funding was channelled through the trusted organisation, NPA, and UN institutions (DHA, UNDP). This is well in agreement with the criteria for funding through humanitarian assistance, especially in the case of aid relief for refugees, IDPs and returnees which is one of its main objectives.[56]

1999, 2001 and 2004: Policy Framework for Humanitarian Demining

BiH funding was channelled through UNDP within the framework of the Consolidated Appeal for Former Yugoslavia. It's strategy was to consolidate the peace process in the region in a way that is complementary to the role of other important actors present, like the OHR and the World Bank. The key objective was finding sustainable solutions for IDP's and refugees.[57] This is in agreement with the priorities for the programmes which require that the activities in question are in line with existing plans for the socio-economic rehabilitation of the post-conflict community.[58] The UN Consolidated Appeal is specifically mentioned for this purpose.[59] The building of demining capacity in Bosnia and Herzegovina was seen as part of a broader Dutch policy on the return of minority and rehabilitation: "actual mine-clearing projects command the highest priority in the allocation of grants, with preference going to areas where landmines present the greatest risk to the population."[60]

2004 – present: Stability Fund

BiH funding was awarded to the "preferred" NGO, NPA, through the Thematic Co-financing (TMF) and was also channelled through the UN Thematic Trust Fund to the UNDP, for the IMAP programme.

In BiH, NPA is one of the "preferred" organisations of the Dutch government which is eligible for TMF.[61] TMF was introduced in 2003 as a policy vision for NGOs and social organisations and aimed at streamlining the operation by the Ministry, and the promotion of transparent and uniform decision making on theme and/or target group specific subsidy proposals.[62] Reasons for introducing TMF on demining were based on intensive long term cooperation and dialogue with a limited number of higher quality

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[56] *Budget Realisation Emergency Aid* , MFA, The Hague, 1996, p. 6 and *Budget Realisation Emergency Aid*, MFA, The Hague, 1997, p.4.

[57] *Policy Regulations HMA 1999, 2001, 2004,* MFA, The Hague.

[58] *Policy Regulations HMA 1999, 2001, 2004,* MFA, The Hague.

[59] For more information on the UN Consolidated Appeal for Former Yugoslavia see also "UN Consolidated Inter Agency Appeal for Bosnia and Herzegovina et all," New York, 1998.

[60] *Policy Regulations HMA 1999, 2001,2004* and *Subsidy Policy Regulations Humanitarian Aid. [Beleidskader Subsidie Humanitaire Hulp],* 2004, p. 2.

[61] *A World Free of Mines – The Dutch Strategy*, MFA: The Hague, 2003, p.10. The Policy Framework for Theme-based Cofinancing became effective in 2003. Theme-based Co-financing is a system for awarding grants. Its aim is to use central funds to support initiatives pursued by specialised organisations (i.e. those specialising in a certain theme) that work together with local organisations. These initiatives should seek to build up civil society and achieve long-term reductions in poverty in several developing countries, while strengthening the local organisations with which the specialist organisations cooperate. Grant applications for demining programmes should be compatible with both the Policy Framework for Theme-based Co-financing and the more specific Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action.

[62] *Policy Regulations Thematic Co Financing for Subsidy Period 2004-2007*, MFA, The Hague, 2003, pp. 2-3,

NGOs and the desire to decrease management load for DMV/HH.[63] NPA was awarded a total amount of 8 million euros (project number 6608) through TMF for their worldwide programmes for the duration of the period 2003-2007. The amount spent from this contribution in BiH amounted 200 thousand euros and was applied principally to funding expatriate support for a global mechanical demining coordination and advice service in support of NPA operations in Angola, Mozambique and elsewhere.

In the period between 1996 and 2006 the Dutch government spent USD 6.5 million on financial assistance to Humanitarian Mine Action for BiH. Nearly 80% of this total was used for capacity and institution building, less than 12% for clearance, about 5% in support of the NPA Global Mine Detection Dog training school and about 3% for contributions to mine awareness campaigns and in local costs in support of Netherlands Military Personnel on secondment as trainers and advisors to the mine action centre.[64]

Dutch aid relationship with BiH

Humanitarian mine action has comprised less than 2 % of the total Dutch aid budget for BiH. The Netherlands was a medium contributor to the Bosnian Humanitarian Mine Action programs, providing 4.6% of the total donor budget in the period 1996-2004.[65]

The Dutch funding came primary from the Humanitarian Aid (HA) budget; these contributions were channelled through the multi-donor UN Consolidated Appeal for former Yugoslavia. Tracking the individual Netherlands donations in not possible due to the consolidation of all contributions. In 1999 the amount given to this fund was USD 13.7 million. This UN fund was focussed on supporting the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Further objectives were to support human rights and good governance, the latter also being incorporated in the very large World Bank program.[66] The funding was dispersed through the relevant specialised UN organisations such as UNHCR, and UNICEF who acted as implementing agents for the projects.[67]

Additionally, the MFA had a substantial bilateral aid relationship with Bosnia and Herzegovina in the years 1996 to 2006. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreements in 1995 the Dutch Government funded post conflict reconstruction as a donor to the very substantial World Bank programme. This seven year-long, five billion dollar, programme had the objectives of establishing a base for sustainable economic growth, employment generation and poverty alleviation; all within the central challenge of transforming the country from a centrally planned to a market economy.[68] The Dutch contribution to the World Bank programme was funded from the ODA budget[69] during the period 1996-2003. The financial assistance from the Netherlands was substantial. For example, it was USD 55 million in 1998[70] and USD 80 million in 1999.[71] [72]

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[63] *Policy Regulations HMA 2004,* p. 2 and *Memorandum DMV/HH-0592 – TMF-financiering 2004-2007. Demining. Contribution to activity number:6608*, MFA, The Hague, 8 June 2003.

[64] See also II, 1.6.

[65] *Preparing the Ground for a Mine Safe World,* IOB, The Hague, 2007.

[66] *Annual Report 2000*, MFA, The Hague, 2001.

[67] *Contribution UN Consolidated Appeal Former Yugoslavia WW152707,* MFA, The Hague, 31 May 1999.

[68] Ingramm, K et al., *Bosnia and Herzegovina Post-Conflict Reconstruction and the Transition to a Market Economy. An OED evaluation of World Bank Support,* Paris, 2004.

[69] *Annual Report 1998*, MFA, The Hague, 1999.

[70] *Annual Plan 1998*, MFA, The Hague, 1997.

[71] *Annual Report 1999,* MFA, The Hague, 2000.

[72] The total Dutch spending on the World Bank program not incorporated in any of the other annual plans and reports of the MFA.

Since 2003, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been a partner country of the Netherlands.[73] Bosnia and Herzegovina satisfies the IDA eligibility criteria of being a *poor country*,[74] and forms part of the group chosen by the IMF and World Bank.

For the years 2003-2006, the total Netherlands' budget for BiH, of both ODA and HA together, was in the order of USD 20 million per year. Of this, about USD 7 million per year was intended for Srebrenica.[75] Programme objectives were again primarily to support the return of IDPs, as well as supporting good governance. Additionally there was significant support for the economic development of the country.[76]

Funding Mechanisms

The funding from the Netherlands government has been channelled to the UNDP in Sarajevo through the Thematic Trust Fund (TTF) of the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the UN in New York. The TTF can receive three types of donations: completely un-earmarked; earmarked at Service Line level; or fully earmarked to country, region, programme or project.

The funds from the Netherlands have been used to support UNDP mine action programmes. The UNDP undertakes programme design, management and reporting in return for a service fee – in the case of BiH this is done by UNDP in Sarajevo who charge a fee of 5%, – this is unusually low compared to UNDP charges in some other countries.[77] One reason for this low percentage is that the Netherlands' contribution is used to fund the salary and overheads of an expatriate technical advisor based in Sarajevo as well as local staff. If these salary costs are included the total administration and salary cost of UNDP rises to around 16% of the Dutch contribution.

The Netherlands government relationship with UN agencies is regulated by an overall Framework Agreement between The Hague and New York. This agreement takes a "hands off" approach to the extent that such activities as financial audit can only be conducted by the UN's own services. At a local level, there is a contractual agreement between the Netherlands government and the local UNDP office in Sarajevo which makes the Embassy responsible for monitoring the projects.

The chosen mechanism potentially offers a number of advantages to the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs: it is straightforward, reduces risk and offers some financial advantages, as UNDP can act as an *agent* for a number of donors thus sharing some of the *transaction costs*. It also allows the MFA to pass implementation work and in particular the need for specialist technical knowledge to recognised international institutions in return for a management fee.

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[73] The idea behind the concept of Partner countries was to spend the budget for development cooperation as effective as possible. In 2003, the former Minister of Development Cooperation, Agnes van Ardenne presented the policy note "Aan elkaar verplicht. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op de weg naar 2015." [Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities, development cooperation on the way to 2015] This policy document mentioned the decrease in the number of bilateral cooperation with countries from 49 to 36, to concentrate the aid en make better use of the capacity and means available.

[74] *From Project Aid towards Sector Support: An Evaluation of the Sector-Wide Approach in Dutch Bilateral Aid 1998–2005*, IOB, The Hague, 2006, pp. 41-44.

[75] *Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dutch Budget*, MFA, The Hague, 2006.

[76] *Annual Plan 2003-2004-2005-2006*, MFA, The Hague, 2003-2006.

[77] Personal communication Turkovic of UNDP Sarajevo, supported by the experience of evaluation teams in other countries.

Multilateral aid – impact on policy

The decision to participate in a multi-donor programme inevitably involves compromises in the overall strategy in order to coordinate the policies of different donors. However, this multilateral approach stems from the overall policy strategy that prefers the multilateral channel for an efficient management capacity, a concentration of knowledge and assets, substantial scale advantages and lower transaction costs.[78]

In deciding to work with other donors in supporting the UNDP plan the Netherlands did in fact – as the use of a specialised implementing partner is intended – hand over a significant part of the technical decision of what to fund and how to implement the programme to specialists with strong in-country experience and knowledge. The UNDP in BiH was notable for its extremely close cooperation with the BHMAC, and this appears to have been an important factor in the success. UNDP, and later BHMAC, had similar, but by no means identical, policy goals as MFA of linking demining to development and promoting economic recovery, as well as prioritising the return of IDPs and refugees. Essentially, activity was driven by the UNDP from the implementation level and not by the policy choice of MFA at a strategic level. UNDP informed MFA of the "vital" need to fund the support activities as early as 2001[79] but this was not reflected in a change to MFA policy or to have received a response. There appeared to be no link from this indication of the implementing partner re-orientating the programme goals to informing consideration of future donor policy.

Whereas the MFA continued to identify mine clearance activities as its priority, the UNDP programme put more emphasis on creating the capacity to effectively manage clearance. This difference could stem from a different understanding of what clearance is trying to achieve. Output of clearance activities conducted in accordance with international standards is land that is known (with very high confidence) to be as close as possible to 100% clear of all types of ERW to a certain depth. The area cleared must have accurately defined boundaries, which are recorded (and marked if necessary) and all the records permanently kept in a known and accessible database. States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention (the Ottawa Convention) have additional international reporting obligations. UNDP and BHMAC prioritised the whole “clearance system” over the “mine clearance” objective of the Netherlands. There appears to be sound technical justification for this. Without knowing the exact location of the clearance, and without a full quality management and reporting process, mine removal is of little long-term value and can increase risk by giving the local population a false sense of security and encouraging the use of land, which has a significant residual hazard.

In practice, the evaluation team concludes that in BiH the intervention of the UN with a suitable capacity development plan was able to make good use of the clearance funding.

Despite these positive results, bilateral donors such as the Netherlands should be aware of the possible shortfalls of multilateral mine programmes. In the case of UNDP’s BiH programme, it is clear that there was limited attention to the economic consequences of

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[78] *Mutual Interests, Mutual Responsibilities, Development Cooperation on the Way to 2015. [Aan elkaar verplicht. Ontwikkelingssamenwerking op de weg naar 2015*], MFA, The Hague, 2003.

[79] “The Netherlands contribution in year 2000/2001 directly supported operations for quality assurance and general survey operations, in-service training and technical assistance provided by international experts. It is needless to say that all of these operations are vital to the implementation of mine clearance activities.” Extract from UNDP *Final Progress Report on the Results of Activities Conducted under the Government of Netherlands Contribution to MAP in 2000/2001*, 2003.

hazardous areas for the locals. Until today, there remain rather few linkages to the much larger goal of supporting the economic development of the country. In retrospect, a better integration of UNDP programmes on the one hand and the national PRSP's on the other could have prevented this.

1.3 Did the activities fit the priorities of national and local authorities?[80]

One of the key characteristics of the UNDP multi-donor programme was the very close cooperation between the UNDP and the BHMAC. At an institutional level this was reinforced by having a key strategic advisor to the BHMAC funded through the UNDP programme and working with both organisations. Further close links were apparent between senior staff in the BHMAC and the UNDP staff. This appears to have been a balanced and extremely useful partnership which ensured that there was close coupling between the needs of the BHMAC and the priorities of the UNDP programme.

1.4 Did the activities reflect the needs of affected communities?

Prioritisation

One of the clear objectives of the UN support to mine action was to establish a prioritisation for clearance task allocation. In examining the *effectiveness* of the prioritisation system the question is whether or not the system was established as planned, not whether the chosen system delivered the desired results.
Prioritisation starts with a request for clearance at the local level. Each municipality is required to appoint a person to be Municipal Mine Action Coordinator (MA). In about 80% of cases the person appointed is the local Civil Protection Coordinator. In both the Federation and Republika Srpska there are well developed Civil Protection services which extend to having a Civil Protection representative in every municipality. The effectiveness of the Mine Action Coordinator depends very largely on two factors: if the municipality provides access to the necessary resources to do the job and some payment (salary or expenses), and the abilities of the individual person. Very poor municipalities, or those who do not consider mine action as important are likely not to allocate resources and little action may be taken. In other areas, for example Srebrenica, it was reported to the team that a local NGO has taken on an advocacy role to ensure that the Mine Action Coordinator is provided with support by the municipality.

The process was described to the evaluation team by the focus group in Celic as follows:

- "Prioritisation is done at municipal level in the following way:
  - People inform the MA Coordinator about the mine problem;
  - The MA Coordinator visits communities with the biggest problems and collects all available information (number of population, number of returnees, etc); he collects as much as possible in the way of arguments in favour of putting the particular land on the priority list;
  - He does not visit all communities he receives the mine information from, but only the most seriously affected communities;
  - The collected information is discussed with municipality officials and the list of arguments updated and developed as far as possible;

[80] See also sections 1.3 and 1.5.

  - The priority list goes than to Cantonal level; MA Coordinators from all 13 municipalities together with Cantonal MA Coordinator and BHMAC representatives meet together and draw up the priority list at Cantonal level; This list then needs to be validated and verified by the Cantonal government.

- Since BHMAC sends an annual operational plan to each regional office detailing how much funding is available for how many square metres to be cleared in each canton (quota), the priority list for demining at cantonal level usually has more needs than can be met by the operational plan for demining. The needs and priority list can be much bigger than the resources the plan allows."

The prioritisation system depends on allocating land for which clearance has been requested into one of three categories:
- Category 1 includes locations in everyday use, and reconstruction of housing, infrastructure and economic resources.
- Category 2 refers to areas partially used already, but in contact with Category 1 areas, as well as agriculture and forest areas.
- Category 3 is the remaining suspect area.

This information is brought to the Canton level meeting by the specialist BHMAC staff.

Initially, from the start of the concept in 1999 until the LIS results were available in 2003 the prioritisation system depended entirely on this technical land use categorisation, and competing priorities with the same categorisation were settled by debate at local and regional level. In 2004 BHMAC produced a *Strategic Analysis*[81] based on extensive analysis of the Landmine Impact Survey (LIS) conducted by Handicap International (HI) for the Survey Action Centre (SAC). The new strategy proposed an approach of prioritisation based on *reduction of suspected risk* and prioritisation of areas with greater economic potential over those which were unlikely to be economically exploited. The options for this reduction of suspected risk were based on impacted communities (as defined by the LIS) and existing categories of economic development priorities. The LIS refers to the classification of communities as high, medium and low impacted communities, thus placing assessment of communities (and not individual households or parcels of land) at the centre of the process.
The categorisation of development priorities into 1, 2 and 3 makes possible a re-classification of suspected areas by community impact and national priority.[82]
This community based approach was developed into a Task Assessment Priority system by the BHMAC working together with NPA who had already trialled a similar approach under the name of Task Impact Assessment in Angola.

The net result is a clear focus on clearing a number of key suspected hazardous areas in one community and, where appropriate, extending this to clearing an entire community at a time, including the land that would formerly have been considered as category 3 and hence low priority. NPA have named this concept of clearing a community and land to meet its economic needs "integrated clearance."

An alternative to the standard process arises when urgent clearance is funded outside the standard prioritisation mechanism. One example of this is the electricity company

[81] Darvin, Lisica and Rowe, David, *Strategic Analysis of Mine Action in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, Sarajevo, p.10.
[82] Roberts and Littlejohn*, Maximising the Impact*, Prio Report 5/2005. International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2005.

who have funding to pay directly for the clearance of access to power lines for emergency repairs. In this case the task is automatically accepted but all the technical planning and quality control is undertaken by the BHMAC as usual.

There are indications of various cases of cronism regarding the selection of to-be cleared areas – but not that it was out of line with the way that decisions in all spheres of life can be open to influence in BiH.

As has been noted, local demand for clearance outstrips the available resources and a convincing case has to be made for a task to receive approval. the process of interfacing the task requests from local communities with the TAP process, which is initially done at regional level and then passed to the national BHMAC office for approval, was not clearly explained to the evaluation team. Staff in two of the regional offices expressed their satisfaction that the final decision was taken at national level as it relieved them of the final responsibility for difficult decisions of the relative merits of different clearance requests.

Two important issues arise:

i. Clearance has focussed on Category 1 tasks together with a limited number of category 2. This has led to a situation where returnees have their houses cleared, plus an access strip of two metres or six metres width around the house. This is insufficient space for cultivation in order to sustain a family, and far too little for any animals. This increases the pressure on returnees to intentionally take risks for economic purposes either by using uncleared land or by attempting “local clearance”. This is starting to be addressed by some demining organisations (notably NPA) and UNDP in increasing the resources allocated to TAP or "integrated demining" approaches.

ii. The team were informed by BHMAC regional staff that the possibly very long delays before clearance of agricultural land have led to significant amounts of “local clearance” in some areas, usually without adequate tools and knowledge, and with no safe way of destroying any ERW found before moving them (which can be very hazardous). Apart from the obvious risks from handling mines and UXO and from non-expert persons missing items which subsequently detonate during agricultural activities, this artesanal clearance causes a loss of confidence in mine records (when they are available) and distorts clearance statistics making analysis and prioritisation more difficult.

Agricultural land which is cultivated for several years is usually regarded as non-hazardous during the Technical Survey process. If, subsequently, a missed mine detonates then there is considerable loss of confidence in the Technical Survey process and possibly a need to re-clear substantial land areas.

1.5 Conclusion

Even though the policy choice for multilateral support to HMA in BiH is valid and in line with existing Dutch development policy, the UNDP approach did in fact not concur with the set policy objectives (mine clearance)[83]. According to its institutional mandate,

[83] *Policy Framework Humanitarian Demining,* MFA, The Hague, 1999, p.4.

the UNDP had a different idea about how to go about demining in BiH, namely with a strong focus on capacity building. Despite these differences between the overall goals of the programme and the primary goal of the MFA there was no response and no change of policy on the part of the MFA.
As a result, all decisions were effectively taken by the implementing partner in close cooperation with the BHMAC and eventually led to different outcomes. The prioritisation system was a key achievement in this and meets the requirements of the BHMAC. However, its major limitations are –i- providing sufficient resources at the municipal level (rather than at the cantonal level only) to enable local people to register their need for clearance and –ii- the lack of overall resources which causes long waiting lists for clearance. The first of these was not addressed in the UNDP programme and might be of interest for future funding.

The prioritisation system has undergone considerable development, especially since the LIS results became available in 2003. Thereafter, there are indications of more community involvement. A next step would need to address a better integration of demining with development.

The absence of monitoring and evaluation of the UNDP programme could have led to serious problems but was in practice mitigated by the professionalism and hard work of the UNDP and BHMAC staff. Yet, this does not bode well for a more structural solution. This issue should therefore be addressed as a matter of urgency.

In the end, the evaluation team concludes that the HMA in BiH scores well in terms of “relevance” for the BHMAC and the development of national capacity in the country. Despite the mismatch between Dutch and UN objectives, the overall results are acceptable for both donor and end beneficiaries.

2 Effectiveness

2.1 Introduction

As has been noted in the section on *relevance*, the overall objectives set by the MFA were primarily mine clearance in order to reduce casualties and foster socio-economic development.[84] These objectives differed from the programme priority – capacity-building – of the implementing agent, UNDP, who had developed their multi-donor programme in close consultation with BHMAC.

Consequently, two issues arise in reviewing effectiveness: first, the proposed strategic policy, or the explicit objectives of the programme, should be used as a benchmark. Secondly, it is necessary to address the reasons for the discrepancy in focus between donor and UN priorities and why reporting from the field was not effective to drive strategic decisions in the Ministry.

Participation in a multi-donor programme inevitably involves compromises and programme objectives of one donor are unlikely to match exactly the policy of all participating donors.

This chapter starts with examining if the Dutch supported humanitarian demining activities reach its objectives. Subsequently, it looks into factors that contributed to reaching these objectives and if there were any more effective alternatives. It concludes with the outcomes of Dutch supported demining activities, which are divided in short term (return and resettlement) and long term (land use, security of affected communities, peacebuilding and reconciliation and economic development) outcomes.

2.2 Did Dutch-supported humanitarian demining reach its objectives?

The overall Dutch objectives evolved throughout the period 1996 to 2006, especially in response to the Ottawa process and AP Landmine Ban Treaty. Since 2000 Dutch policy frameworks have underscored the need for a comprehensive approach to humanitarian demining. Recognising that humanitarian demining is a prerequisite for humanitarian assistance, resettlement of IDPs and rehabilitation, all demining activities should be integrated with other aspects of humanitarian assistance[85] as well as with social-economic rehabilitation plans, such as UN Consolidated Appeals or national Poverty Reduction Strategies.

The most recent policy framework (2004) broadly defines the primary objective of humanitarian demining as “mine clearance in order to reduce casualties and foster socio-economic development”. The use of local workers and transfer of mine-clearance responsibilities to the national authorities (including capacity-building and training) were listed as corollary policy priorities.

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[84] *Thematic Policy Regulations HMA*, MFA, The Hague, 2001. *Policy Regulations HMA 2004*, MFA, The Hague, 2003.

[85] *Amendment to the Annual Budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Year 2000*, House of Representatives Document no. 27 162, no. 8.

Capacity-building

The support for capacity building of the BHMAC in general and the prioritisation mechanism in particular has given generally good results which are sustainable. However, questions were raised as to the possible over-centralisation of the support in the national and entity offices. There seems some evidence to support this, and this seems to be justified given the key role played by both the regional offices and municipal representatives in the prioritisation process.

Especially in the early years of the BHMAC, the immediate post-war needs for urgent clearance led to a focus on "getting the job done quickly" – this has been seen in a number of mine-affected countries and is a normal response to a situation with compelling humanitarian needs. The large number of foreign technical experts arriving to support mine clearance was evidence of this. However, this tends to distort the overall perspective of the mine action centre in favour of a technical approach to demining and reduces the key linkage to development which appears to give more effective long term results. Evaluation of the longer term needs would possibly have benefited from a more strategic overview based more on the overall needs of communities than the need to demine. This situation was effectively addressed and by the start of the second UNDP programme in 2004 by undertaking the Landmine Impact Survey and using the results to review the strategy, especially with a view to introducing socio-economic data into the planning process.[86]

The prioritisation system is, despite some limitations, a significant achievement. A single nation-wide prioritisation system is in place and widely respected by respondents the team met in BHMAC offices and in the focus groups, across all three of the main ethnic groups. The system is fully functional in the sense that it provides a mechanism for selecting which areas are to be cleared according to a defined set of criteria, and has a comprehensive administration and record keeping system. The record keeping is of particularly good quality. The national and regional BHMACs were able to produce good quality maps and provide detailed clearance information for the evaluation team without advance warning. The database appears to be comprehensive and well maintained, and in all the offices visited, staff appeared to trained and skilled in its use.

Clearance operations

"Humanitarian Demining" (direct clearance) has formed only a small part of the overall Netherlands' funding in BiH, somewhat 10%. Table 3, in section 1.6 above, gives full details of funding allocation. About half of the clearance funding was direct funding to NPA shortly after the end of the war and record keeping was not well established. The other part was earmarked funding for clearance within the UNDP IMAP. These later clearance operations were technically successful in that the proposed areas were cleared as planned and in accordance with international standards. However, as noted above, in half of the limited number of sites visited the strategic aim of clearance was not achieved. This was primarily due to the effective separation of the *technical goal* of clearing a piece of land from the *overall developmental goal* of using the land to improve the safety or living conditions of the local people. While the prioritisation process can take this into account by examining the proposed purpose of clearance, it is

[86] Darvin Lisica, *Strategic Analysis*, p. 10.

not at present able to ensure that funding is properly in place for the full development cycle.

The UNDP tendering policy, in line with overall UN guidelines, has a policy of *open tendering* for all eligible organisations. This includes commercial as well and NGO clearance organisations. The ITF, who were subcontracted by UNDP to undertake the tendering process are able to accept any type of tender: open, closed or restricted. The Netherlands' policy is to support only non-commercial companies for clearance. In practice an open tender process was used in 2004 and only commercial companies submitted bids. In order to let the contracts for clearance being activated, derogation of the rule preventing the use of commercial operators by The Hague was required.[87]

The development objectives were not completely achieved in three of four sites visited. These sites included:

- Bucje Visori, Celic. An area of land adjacent to a small stream which was cleared in order to install pipes for a new water supply system for the village. Further along the proposed pipeline route a second suspected hazardous area was identified after clearance of the first area was complete, and it had proved impossible to install the pipes because there was no budget for clearing this additional area. The view was expressed that it should have been possible to identify the second area (located on a former conflict line) at the time of General Survey for the first clearance work. Due to the annual demining cycle there was no possibility of entering the second area clearance into the prioritisation system for the same year, and possible that a delay of two more years would take place, the first year to undertake a General Survey and then issue a bid for the clearance work the following year. As a result, the clearance already done had no impact and local people were worried about the possible deterioration of the plastic water pipes being held in storage.

- Pribicevac, Srebrenica. A small settlement of seven houses had been cleared in order to permit their repair and the return of the former inhabitants, and a small area of agricultural land adjacent to the houses had been cleared. The former residents had decided that they did not want to return; only one house had had any repair work done and the owner, who arrived during the team visit, was very doubtful about his permanent return. The land that had been cleared was not being used for agriculture – though the possibility that in a year or two one or more families might consider some summer cropping on this land cannot be entirely ruled out.

- Krusevas preko pot, Banovici. A steeply sloping densely wooded hillside behind a row of houses had been cleared. This is the most expensive type of manual clearance and technically difficult. The aim was to reduce the threat to children from mines possibly falling down the slope (most likely during the spring snow-melt) or from children exploring. Adjacent areas were also contaminated and had been marked. Local people, in a focus group, appreciated the clearance but were insistent that so little land area had been cleared that there was an economic necessity to enter the marked and known hazardous land adjacent in order to graze animals and collect forest products (including firewood and mushrooms). Most recent mine accidents in BiH involve exactly this type of activity. One part of the

[87] *Communication MFA – Embassy: IMAP funding request*, MFA, The Hague, 13 July 2005 *Communication Embassy - MFA: IMAP funding request*, Sarajevo, 12 July 2005.

cleared area, on the edge of the dense woodland, had been turned into an intensive vegetable garden with potatoes, pumpkin and other crops.

One site showed the achievement of the development objectives:

- Sibosnica, Celic. An area of unused land which had been cleared to give access to electric power lines for repair crews. The repair of the power lines was considered as having a significant positive impact on the local population.

2.3 What factors contributed to reaching the objectives?

The support for capacity building of the BHMAC in general and the prioritisation mechanism in particular has given generally good results which are sustainable. The BHMAC is now an established institution and sustainability has been addressed by the national government agreeing to take on funding salaries and some other costs in a series of steps. This transition will be completed next year, 2008, when the government will become responsible for 100% of these costs.

This local funding does not appear to include the necessary capital costs for vehicles and for computer equipment, both of which are essential to the functioning of the BHMAC.

In terms of "demining" (direct clearance) which forms only a small part – less than 15% – of the overall Netherlands' funding, then the proposed areas were cleared as planned. However, as noted above, the strategic aim of clearance was not achieved on more than half of the limited number of sites visited. This was primarily due to the effective separation of the *technical goal* of clearing a piece of land from the *overall developmental goal* of using the land to improve the safety or living conditions of the local people. While the prioritisation process can take this into account by examining the proposed purpose of clearance, it is not able to ensure that funding is properly in place for the full development cycle.

It is the opinion of the evaluation team that *effectiveness* could potentially have been improved.

One key area to be addressed is monitoring and evaluation, and the use of the information from these activities to inform policy-making. The outputs of the UNDP programme, accounting for over 90% of Dutch funding, were essentially not subject to external evaluation by the Netherlands. Demining funded by the Netherlands has come from the Central budget and not from a delegated budget, so the involvement of the Embassy has been limited. It appears that the division of responsibilities between the Embassy and the Ministry based in The Hague has led to insufficient monitoring of the funding by the donor. Contractually, the programmes of UNDP funded by the Netherlands were, and are, to be monitored by the Embassy. Furthermore, the over-riding agreement between The Hague and the UN for all funding from the Netherlands government to UN bodies does not provide for audit during the programme and only allows for *ex post facto* audit by UN auditors. This leaves the Embassy as the sole entity in charge of the HMA monitoring. According to their own accounts however, this responsibility does not match with either internal priorities or staff capacity at the Embassy.[88]

[88] Personal remarks by Head of Embassy's Development programme, Willem van Rossem, Sarajevo 15 June 2007.

The resources allocated to the Embassy in Sarajevo do not include a specialist in mine action. For some time, 1998-2004, the Netherlands' donations included staff seconded to the BHMAC to act as technical advisors – in 1998 this included, for example, one officer training advisor, two demining supervisors and 11 instructors. These were military personnel who would normally be funded by the Defence budget and not the ODA budget but would be available to offer expert technical advice to the Embassy staff. This support was discontinued in April 2004, as it was not felt to be effective any more and has left the Embassy without direct access to technical expertise in humanitarian demining. In addressing this issue, the Embassy reported collaboration with Sweden and Canada, both larger donors to mine action and both countries which were "like-minded" in their approach to development cooperation. The Embassy also reported regular attendance at the *Board of Donors for Mine Action in BiH* which meets twice each year.

In this context, the decision to participate in the multi-donor projects using UNDP staff to manage the projects and hence to provide technical management skills appears entirely sound, however monitoring and evaluation of the Netherlands contribution should have been built in to the mechanism. Furthermore there is little or no use of contracted specialised technical expertise in these areas. The Embassy noted that DFID, the UK overseas development ministry, have been far more successful in this regard.

There are further issues regarding the schedule of financial reporting being so delayed that staff turnover at the Embassy means that reports may be presented to incoming staff who have little knowledge of the programme and do not feel competent to monitor activities they know little about.

In addition to the lack of monitoring of the UNDP activities, and generally weak reporting by UNDP,[89] there was no clear evidence of feedback from these programmes being used at policy level in order to base future policy on previous experience. No response was received to the UNDP report stating how they had amended the objectives of the programme. Indeed, there is no evidence that an effective mechanism currently exists to use monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian demining programmes, or even the reporting provided by these programmes, to inform policy. There has thus been little incentive to undertake such actions as field-monitoring of mine clearance to discover the subsequent land use.

The potential impact of this lack of review of UNDP could have been serious. However, it was mitigated by the individual staff working for the UNDP in Sarajevo and BHMAC who showed a high degree of competence and professionalism. The evaluation team members who have undertaken similar evaluations in other countries note that this level of dedication and skill is well above the usual and certainly could not have been guaranteed.

Alternative strategies to clearance have been implemented gradually as the true scale of the task became clear and the inflated estimates of possible clearance per year have given way in the last two or three years to more realistic planning. This move, in itself, can be seen as a successful impact of the support to the building of BHMAC. However,

[89] See for example the *Final Progress Report on the Results of Activities Conducted under the Government of Netherlands Contribution to MAP in 2000/2001* which is both brief and general, and makes no mention of the overall context of this contribution being part of a multi-donor programme.

this impact had less success at the higher, ministerial level, and at the lowest, municipal levels, of government.[90]

The Demining Commission (DC) does not appear to have effective strategy in place for mobilising either national or donor funds. The proposal that 50% of funding should in the longer term come from national resources was not supported by analysis when it was presented to the evaluation team by the DC. The role of the DC as an interministerial body to ensure concerted policy and coordinated action between the nine ministries involved seems to be particularly poorly developed. The evaluation team heard that this is not unusual in BiH and the DC in many ways reflects the larger structural political problems facing the country today. Intervention in support of good governance in general may be considered useful, but the team was reminded that such actions need carefully balanced with the perceived obstacle to developing independent national institutions presented by the current structures with the OHR able to override many national decisions and the ITF duplicating the development of national procurement capacity.

Whether there is any useful strategic action which could be taken to be taken to strengthen mine action at this level remains doubtful, respondents were unable to suggest any concrete actions.

At the lowest municipal level there is a clear need for training, support and empowerment of municipal mine action coordinators. This is an area where developing strategic input in coordination with the BHMAC and Civil Protection authorities might be able to provide a high impact for relatively modest outlay.

At times criticism was heard that the presence of mines was used as an excuse for lack of action on development and that mine clearance would achieve little as no development plans were in place. This was particularly evident in the focus group and the local advocacy NGO (Drina Srebrenica) in Srebrenica.

2.4 Were there more effective alternatives?

All areas where mine clearance is to take place in BiH are selected according to the prioritisation system established by the BHMAC. This system, although capable of improvement, is one of the notable successes of the UNDP programme, and one which the Netherlands has supported. The alternative to using a nationwide single system would appear to involve very significant problems in ensuring fairness of allocation of scarce resources and would probably result in a large increase in transaction costs due to fragmentation. There is thus no real alternative at present.

The BHMAC, in the opinion of the evaluation team, is aware of some of the shortcomings of the current prioritisation process and interested in dialogue and assistance to address these issues. The need to integrate socio-economic priorities was recognised in 2004 and the system modified to start to do this, though much still remains to be done.

[90] These are areas which have not been addressed by Netherlands funding, but which may be of interest for future strategic interventions.

2.5 Outcomes of Dutch supported Humanitarian Demining activities

Return and resettlement

The return, as well as temporarily relief, of refugees in Bosnia and Herzegovina is impossible without demining. According to UNHCR, demining was not a driving force for return, but indeed a major prerequisite for return.[91] BHMAC has put this at the top of their prioritisation list to make reconstruction and eventual return possible. However, as has been noted, changing the land from contaminated to mine-free is not sufficient to ensure that land is used as anticipated.

In two cases clearance with Dutch funds was directly aimed at the return of refugees. The Modrica community benefited from the Dutch contribution when NPA (programme number 002801) cleared houses for the return of a number of Bosniak refugees. This was part of a larger programme run by NPA to clear a total of 500 houses. The focus group respondents in Modrica reported that the return had been successful, and there were no security worries for the returnees. Children from the families were attending the local school. There were a number of outstanding economic problems, principally the very high rates of unemployment. This again highlights the need for linking clearance to broader economic and development goals.

However, another clearance project of the Pribicevac community (Srebrenica) did not have any impact on the refugee return process because the community did not want to return to this remote area. Consequently only one of the seven houses was inhabited part-time. The small community had moved to urban Srebrenica and did not want to return to a very small and isolated rural community, with very poor transport links, where they would have faced a struggle to both rebuild severely damaged houses and undertake subsistence agriculture with a number of hazardous areas and only limited amounts of cleared land nearby. Security may have been a factor but was not reported by the one respondent from the community that the evaluation team was able to interview.

Land use

One of the possible measurements of the outcomes of mine clearance is changing land use. However, in BiH there is currently no monitoring undertaken of land use after clearance. Furthermore, there is no mechanism in place for using this information to inform future policy decisions of either the BHMAC or of donors. It is simply not known what clearance choices produce the best and the worst *impact* in terms of land use.

The absence of monitoring of land use post-clearance means that the amount of land which is cleared but then not used is unknown. This clearance without the land being used appears to be a real problem as two of the four sites visited by the team were found to have been cleared but no, or very limited, land use change had occurred. A fifth site – Modrica had apparently successful land use change some eight years after clearance of houses for returnees. The team was informed by several respondents in regional BHMAC offices that the time delay in bringing land into use is typically up to a year for houses and up to three years for agricultural land.

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[91] Remarks Inge Colijn, UNHCR. Through email: 11 July 2007.

An exception to the need for resources, and associated delay, appears to be the clearance of forest land which is used for grasing, gathering forest products (firewood, mushrooms, fruit) and for hunting wild animals. Some HMA such as Mine Risk Education and marking high risk areas, may cause a change in land use *away* from productive (but clearly high risk) use of suspected hazardous areas.

Following the large-scale ethnic cleansing that took place in BiH (by different ethnic groups) there may be some reluctance to rebuild housing until the owner feels secure. The owner would probably be interested in having the site cleared of mines and UXO even if he or she decides that the investment in re-building is too risky or of lower importance than other uses of limited resources. The Netherlands Embassy in Sarajevo confirmed[92] that some people who receive donor aid to rebuild, subsequently sell their houses. This would permit a real valuation of the economic benefit of clearance of the house and hence some objective measure of the impact of clearance.

Land use, food production and infrastructure

From the start, the prioritisation system considers infrastructure as belonging to the highest priority category for clearance. Significant attention has also been given to mine clearance in support of reconstruction.

The effects of mine clearance on food production remains a difficult issue. The rural population in the areas visited where Dutch funding was used for clearance depends on subsistence and cash crop agriculture, but resources are not available to clear sufficient agricultural land fast enough to make safe subsistence farming a reality for many people. As has been noted, this is reflected in the dominance of the casualty figures by intentional risk taking for economic purposes, usually by entering forest land.

The key area which has resulted in a loss of positive effect appears to have been the poor linkage of demining with development due to an over-technical focus of the UNDP programme which the Netherlands supported. There was very clear understanding of this issue in very practical terms at local level. Questions were raised about: clearing only housing but not enough land for agriculture, or clearing some agricultural land which could not then be used as families did not have the necessary resources to start farming, or perhaps did not even have the resources to make their housing habitable.

However, this issue has now been widely recognised and over the coming years it is to be hoped that it will be addressed the re-focussing of the prioritisation system after the availability of the LIS data, and the move towards Task Allocation Planning are evidence in favour of this view. BHMAC and other agencies are at the stage of acknowledging the problem and drawing up concrete proposals for mine clearance being used as a component part of developing communities. There is now clear recognition of the need to support to agriculture and employment as well as reconstruction and rebuilding infrastructure.

It seems likely that outcomes could have been improved by greater focus on the over-arching goals of the MFA policy which include linkage to development; the dual-goal strategy of supporting clearance as a priority while also seeking to link demining to development may have resulted in loss of impact.

[92] Remarks by Willem van Rossem during the debriefing at Netherlands Embassy Sarajevo, 27 June 2007.

The lack of monitoring of the UNDP programme also appears to have contributed to the less positive outcome as does the absence of any feedback on land use after clearance. Without this information it is difficult to measure impact and adjust policies and implementation accordingly.

Given the complex, weak and fragmented political structures of BiH, and the high levels of ERW contamination, together with the enormous damage to the housing stock (over 75%) and infrastructure, the problems of food production and urban unemployment, remain extremely difficult. The success of implementing a prioritisation system at national level is in itself a very significant impact even though it is clear that the system itself requires further development to properly realise its potential.

Security of affected communities

The affected communities which the team visited did not perceive the presence of mines as a security threat beyond the obvious personal risk – and in particular the risk for their children. The continued political uncertainty, the strong recent memories of inter-ethnic strife and ethnic cleansing (especially in Srebrenica) and economic insecurity were the dominant factors. Mine clearance as a route to improving economic security was acknowledged.

The acceptance of a national level prioritisation system appears to have contributed significantly to reducing concerns that other ethnic groups were unfairly advantaged in terms of clearance. This concern was heard informally, but given the divisions in Bosnian society, it was not as common as might have been expected. The team heard many informal accounts of how people were “not interested in returning” to villages. The enormous scale of the ethnic cleansing which took place and the complexity of trying to relocate families who wish to return but are unable to do so because their house is occupied by another family from a different ethnic group, contribute to mistrust and ethnic tensions. In this atmosphere there is a natural tendency to fear that scarce resources are being unfairly used. Instead, the team heard frequent complaints about the delays in demining but also positive remarks about BHMAC being a national organisation working in all parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Security appears to be an issue in demining in BiH. However the issue is paradoxically that security impacts demining. Take-up of cleared land, and especially houses which need rebuilt, was reported as being negatively impacted by feelings of insecurity delaying or preventing the return of former owners. This poses problems for the prioritisation system in that it is hard to accommodate. Should clearance be undertaken in the hope that it encourages return and development, or should clearance wait until the security situation improves – and discover that the situation is not likely to improve without clearance.

Peacebuilding and reconciliation process

Almost all governmental institutions in BiH are still separated across entity lines, BHMAC is a notable exception in being a governmental institution with a unified central management structure, with representatives of all three main ethnic groups. This organisational structure is an example of the BHMAC being a contribution to the peacebuilding process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This view is supported by the comments of all regional BHMAC directors who the evaluation team met. Without prompting, they all affirmed the absence of any entity boundaries within BHMAC, and described working together cooperatively and effectively in all levels of the organisation and in some instances even operating across territorial boundaries. Given the difficult and highly fragmented political situation in BIH, setting up a successful, functional single BHMAC capable of managing prioritisation and clearance is a significant achievement and an example to others seeking to promote such an approach as viable in the face of entrenched opposition. The financial assistance of the Netherlands to the capacity-building of BHMAC contributed therefore indirectly to the peacebuilding process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The impact of Dutch supported clearance activities on the beneficiary/community level shows little obvious visible impact on the wider peacebuilding and reconciliation process. In one case the team was informed that refugee return after clearance encountered some ethnic tensions (Modrica), but the focus groups interviews with local community clearly indicated the desire to live in peace and put the responsibility for such tensions onto people with a political agenda.

Economic development

The Mid-Term Development Strategy 2004-2007 of the government states that poverty and mine-contamination are directly correlated with 85 percent of communities affected by mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) being rural.[93]

The scale of the economic outcomes is such that the limited amount of clearance funded by the Netherlands – while potentially important at a local level – will not have a measurable outcome at national level. The absence of follow-up, to the extent that land use in cleared areas is not known, makes analysis of local economic impact difficult.

As has been noted, the outcomes of the sites cleared which the team visited was very varied. Repairing an electric power line was reported as having an positive outcome, clearance at the other sites had either no or limited positive outcome.

Attention is given in the prioritisation system to supporting investment which requires mine clearance in order to develop infrastructure such as factories or agricultural processing plants. Mechanisms already exist whereby such projects can pay for clearance to be undertaken rapidly within the BHMAC task planning, quality management and record keeping systems.

However, as has been noted, the overall outcome of the prioritisation system which gives highest priority to sites for economic investment projects is where the real advantages may be felt. It is not perfect but can be regarded as a successful and

[93] *Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Plan for 2006*, BHMAC, Sarajevo, 21 March 2006, p. 2.

functional national priority setting mechanism which is reasonably transparent. Questions regarding the outcomes of Netherlands funding according to the priorities can therefore be better assessed by asking if the priority system is functioning well or not.

2.6 Conclusion

The Netherlands programme proved to be effective overall in supporting capacity-building, though this was not a principal policy objective[94]. The Netherlands gave crucial financial support to the building of a high-quality institution capable of organising and quality controlling mine clearance, and this support has had a multiplier effect. Good personnel selection led to the BHMAC having sufficient skills to develop and implement a high-quality prioritisation programme.

The multi-donor multi-year UNDP mine action programmes proved to be effective, the choice by the Netherlands to use UNDP as implementing agent was appropriate and UNDP staff demonstrated a good degree of competence in designing and implementing the programme. However, joining a large multi-donor programme inevitably involves some degree of compromise of objectives. In this sense the choice reduces the *effectiveness in achieving the original Netherlands policy objectives*. The evaluation team consider that this was definitely a compromise which gave access to other significant benefits. However, in the case of BiH, there appears to have been no discussion at all on the relative merits of bilateral versus multilateral approaches to HMA and how each one could best benefit the policy of the Netherlands.

There were a number of other issues which negatively impacted the effectiveness. There was some difference between the strategic, development orientated goals and the technical demining goals. There was apparently little or no monitoring and evaluation of the programme by – or on behalf of – the Netherlands government and no effective mechanism to use the results of the programme (as reported by UNDP) to inform future policy development. The Embassy in Sarajevo had a contractual obligation to monitor but was not provided with the resources to carry out this obligation. No use was made of independent experts to provide technical evaluation. When the UNDP specifically reported how it intended to use the funds in variance from the stated Dutch policy (for capacity-building rather than clearance) there was apparently no response from The Hague, nor was policy amended to give more priority to this type of activity which the UNDP had stated was “vital”. Not using the reports reduces the value of the services provided by the implementing agent.

Overall, the diligence and professionalism of the key staff at UNDP and BHMAC was a key factor in ensuring the effectiveness, without this the results might have been different. There were no formal mechanisms in place to identify if the outcomes had been achieved.

The Demining Commission (DC) does not appear to have effective strategy in place for mobilising either national or donor funds. The proposal that 50% of funding should in the longer term come from national resources was not supported by analysis when it was presented to the evaluation team by the DC. The role of the DC as an interministerial body to ensure concerted policy and coordinated action between the nine ministries involved seems to be particularly poorly developed. The evaluation team

[94] *Policy Regulations HMA*, MFA, The Hague, 1999. *Thematic Policy Regulations HMA*., MFA, The Hague, 2001. *Policy Regulations HMA 2004*, MFA, The Hague, 2003.

heard that this is not unusual in BiH and the DC in many ways reflects the larger structural political problems facing the country today. Intervention in support of good governance in general may be considered useful, but the team was reminded that such actions need carefully balanced with the perceived obstacle to developing independent national institutions presented by the current structures with the OHR able to override many national decisions and the ITF duplicating the development of national procurement capacity.

3 Efficiency

3.1 Introduction

This chapter considers if the Dutch support to HMA in BiH was efficient. It looks at whether the objectives were cost efficient and achieved in time. Additionally, the evaluation reflects if, given the local situation and compared to potential alternatives, the demining activities in BiH were implemented in the most efficient way.

3.2 Have financial resources been used in an adequate manner?

Direct support to demining, early on in the time frame (1996 and 1997), was perhaps not as cost efficient as current clearance activities, but was undertaken as an urgent post-war response in a country lacking in the institutions necessary for efficient implementation. Although the exact site locations of this clearance could not be identified the team was able to meet local representatives in the area and was not informed of any suggestion of misuse of the funds.

Tender and contract services offered by the ITF

The 2005 mine clearance contracts were let through the International Trust Fund For Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), a humanitarian, non-profit organisation.[95]

One of the key characteristics of demining in BiH has been the very significant involvement, since the start, of commercial operators and the use of a bidding process to award clearance contracts. This initially led to some serious problems of insider involvement in allocating contracts, poor accountability and very low standards.[96]

Following the very serious financial scandal when several million dollars of World Bank funds for mine clearance were unaccounted for in 1996-97, there was international pressure to establish a transparent and efficient tendering and contract letting service for mine clearance in BiH, including strong support for a completely new institution from the USA.[97]

Slovenia offered to host a suitable institution[98], the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victim Assistance, and the USA offered the incentive of doubling funds that were contracted through the mechanism, up to a maximum of 10 million dollars per year. This is set to fall to 8 million in 2008. This means that "doubling" is only possible for about one half of the roughly 20 million dollars per year from other donors which passes through the ITF mechanism.[99] In the case of large donations the matching funding is separately allocated, with a focus on victim assistance, and does not automatically pass to the original beneficiary. For small projects it can be used to double the size of the original donation to the same project or programme. As the

[95] The International Trust Fund For Demining and Mine Victims Assistance. http://www.itf-fund.si.
[96] Roberts and Littlejohn, *Maximising the Impact*, 2005.
[97] See http://slovenia.usembassy.gov/itfcontribution.html.
[98] Details of the ITF and its activities, objectives and procedures can be found on the website http://www.itf-fund.si.
[99] Financial data taken from the ITF Annual Report 2006.

matching funds are already over-subscribed, and for large donations the matching funds do not go to the same project, the value of the ITF to the Netherlands is for the financial services it offers and not the matching funds.

The cost of using the ITF to manage a tender process has been 3% but is set to rise in 2008. The ITF is extremely flexible about the types of tenders it can offer. UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina have used the ITF for tendering; although the initial IMAP proposal included developing tendering arrangements these were subsequently dropped in favour of using the ITF.[100] The potential negative impact of such a service on developing contract management skills in BiH was mentioned by some respondents but dismissed by others.

The ITF mechanism, like the use of UNDP as an implementing agent, offers the prospect of reduced transaction costs for an individual donor (due, for example, to sharing the cost of staff and services between donors on a multi-donor project). They also offer an opportunity to reduce risk as they can share the costs of technical expertise required to overcome the *asymmetrical information*[101] when dealing with technical requirements in contracting. Thus, they allow the MFA to pass the specialist implementation work and in particular the need for expert technical knowledge to recognised international institutions in return for a management fee.

After some hesitation on the side of the Embassy and the Dutch MFA[102], because of allegations of fraud within the ITF in 1999, they decided in 2004 to let UNDP allocate the Dutch contribution through ITF. Subsequently, ITF managed the tender process for the clearance activities that were conducted in 2005.

Unfortunately, the Dutch tender was released in the middle of the demining season when many organisations would usually be at their busiest.[103] No NGO's submitted bids, but only commercial companies. Three of these commercial companies (UXB Balkans, Mechem and Detektor) won the tenders and executed the mine clearance activities. This is in conflict with Dutch policy priorities that "mine clearance activities; are not performed by commercial companies."[104] However, the contract between the Netherlands and UNDP contained wording allowing deviation from this rule[105] and the UNDP consulted the Embassy to request derogation in order to proceed with the tender process.[106] Had the tender process been opened at the start of the year then it would have been –i- possible (perhaps probable) that at least one bid from an NGO would have been received and –ii- possible that a better offer overall might have been obtained.

The clearance was planned and quality monitored by BHMAC. No problems in the field were reported.

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[100] Meeting with UNDP staff in Sarajevo, 18 June 2007.
[101] In economics, information asymmetry occurs when one party to a transaction has more or better information than the other party. It has also been called asymmetrical information. Typically it is the seller that knows more about the product than the buyer.
[102] *Communication Embassy – MFA Sarajevo*, 28 August 2002.
[103] *Evaluation Report Tender 29-06-2005, ITF-019-021/05 – UNDP*, ITF Sarajevo, 2005.
[104] *Preparing the ground for a mine safe world,* IOB, p.11.
[105] *IMAP Contract 2004*, UNDP, New York, 2004.
[106] *Communication between UNDP – Embassy: IMAP Commercial Clearance*, UNDP, Sarajevo, 7 July 2005.

Fragmentation

The efficiency of the clearance operation itself was negatively influenced by the current use of prioritisation system which results in deeply fragmented clearance. This is not an inherent property of the system but the way it is used to prioritise local *impact,* and *relevance* to a set of objectives which may need revision, more than *efficiency.*

Most land, including the contracts funded by the Netherlands in 2004, has until very recently been cleared in small patches of a few hundred to a few thousand square metres. This was aimed at dealing with the most urgent tasks first, but goes against economies of scale and in particular makes the efficient use of mechanical support to demining and mine detection dogs difficult to achieve. Once again, this is an argument in favour of approaches like NPA's "Integrated demining" which aims to clear one village at a time, and CIMAP where an entire village is cleared and development assistance is integrated to promote use of the cleared areas and resources; the larger clearance area in one location can offer lower costs per square metre, and also some increase in efficiency in the planning and quality control processes.

Other approaches to clearance

The BHMAC has addressed efficiency in a number of other ways through a more strategic approach: there has been a move towards releasing land through technical survey wherever possible as this is substantially cheaper than clearance. In addition, BHMAC is following a policy of marking hazardous areas which are considered to present less risk instead of clearance, in order to achieve rapid risk reduction. Mine Risk Education has been supported as a possible way to reduce casualties. Whether these last two activities have in fact made a difference is not known (even without intervention, the local population tends to reduce casualties as they learn about their situation – no-one intentionally steps on a mine or allows their children to do so but the marking has been ineffective in eliminating intentional risk taking due to economic needs.) UNICEF evaluations have noted that there is not established quantitative link between MRE and casualty numbers.[107]

3.3 Did humanitarian demining achieve the envisaged objectives in time and within budget?

Once again, the proposed technical results were achieved – UNDP was generally timely in delivering what it had proposed to undertake with the Netherlands' funding. Whilst reporting was not detailed and could have been improved, it was provided as required.

As has been noted, the timing of the tender for the mine clearance contracts in 2004 was poor. The mid-season tender led to few bids and non from NGOs. However, clearance was obtained on time from commercial operators, with planning, supervision and quality management being provided by BHMAC.

The overall time-sequence for planning and implementing clearance of a specific hazardous area can be slow, due to the way that the prioritisation and implementation system is designed. This reflects the limited transition away from a centrally planned society that has taken place in BiH and the weakness of current structures at all levels of government administration.

[107] *External Evaluation of Supported Mine Action Projects,* UNICEF, New York, 2000.

It is more difficult to explore if the envisaged objectives were achieved within budget. The bulk of the Dutch money went through a UNDP multi year multi donor programme. The MFA decided on the volume of the contribution and subsequently tracking the individual Netherlands donations is to not possible due to the consolidation of all contributions.

3.4 Were there more efficient alternatives?

It is difficult to indicate if there could have been any more efficient alternatives. The choice of clearance sites reflects the prioritisation system, and it is precisely this system which the Netherlands' funding was used to establish. Thus the question of which sites were chosen becomes, in the case of BiH, also an issue of *relevance* and *effectiveness*.

The approach initially established by the BHMAC was to identify small individual tasks for clearance in order to address the most urgent needs first. This small-scale clearance of a few tens of square metres to a few thousand square metres is considerably less economically efficient than clearing larger areas.[108] However, this loss of efficiency may be acceptable in order to address clearance with a higher *impact* (such as power line clearance, or clearance of individual houses).

The increasing focus on linking demining to development is likely to show a significant increase in efficiency. First, demining teams, mechanical assets and mine detecting dogs can be more economically employed if they are clearing an entire community than isolated small areas. Secondly, the uptake of cleared assets is likely to be very substantially improved if resources are available to develop them.

3.5 Conclusion

The efficiency of the clearance operations themselves satisfies – clearance was well managed at a competitive price. However, the prioritisation system favoured (at least up to 2004) piecemeal clearance of small areas in response to urgent needs such as repairing a damaged local power line or village water supply. Such scattered small-area clearance is not efficient in the use of deminers, mechanical assets or mine detection dogs.

However, the larger issue of the overall efficiency of prioritisation and eventual land use was also mixed. The lack of linkage of clearance to development led to clearance of land that was not immediately used, and clearance of houses without sufficient land for the owners to have a livelihood was also problematic.

From 2004 onwards there was increasing recognition of the value of clearing an entire village and sufficient agricultural land and also of the need to link demining to development aid. Without development support returning displaced people may not have the resources to be able to use land they urgently need.

The main activity of capacity-building and institution building appears to have yielded results commensurate to the inputs, though given the lack of monitoring and evaluation

[108] In addition to the obvious economies of scale in logistics, there are specific issues. The minimum safety distance of 20 metres (depending on the threat) between deminers means that on a small site only an uneconomically small number of deminers can work. No matter how few people are working, the overheads of emergency medical support vary little. On a small site, locating a mine or UXO may mean that work has to stop until it is detonated or removed, on a large site the deminer would re-deploy to a new demining lane.

(see *effectiveness)* there is little real evidence to support conclusions beyond the observations of the evaluation team and an *ex post facto* analysis of *efficiency* is therefore very difficult.

4 Impact

4.1 Introduction

A distinction needs to be made between the sustainability of the Netherlands' supported HMA activities through capacity-building and the sustainability of the outcomes of other activities, namely clearance activities and land use and Mine Risk Education (MRE).

4.2 BHMAC

The main thrust of Netherlands' funding in BiH has been the development of the sustainable capacity of the BHMAC. The number of technical advisors has steadily reduced over the last six years, from a total of over 40 at one time, to the point that the last part-time advisor will leave at the end of 2007. In 2008 the national government will take on responsibility for paying 100% salaries and running costs of the BHMAC, in four years the government contribution has increased in steady steps. This is a very significant achievement and such a rapid and complete hand-over of a national mine action centre is unusual.

The evaluation team agrees with respondents who stated that skill levels in the BHMAC are sufficient to continue the current work – in fact the key staffing problem lies in retaining some of the most senior and highly skilled local staff as the national salaries offered are not attractive compared to the commercial sector. This is an unexpected negative impact of the successful move towards sustainability as government salaries are significantly lower than those in the commercial sector or those paid by international organisations such as the UNDP.

The BHMAC has for some time been technically self-sufficient and has undertaken then accreditation of mine clearance organisations, the entire quality management process for clearance (including testing and accreditation of mine detection dogs), and runs the database where information about suspected hazardous areas (from the LIS and other sources), and cleared areas is stored.

The team noted the high quality of clearance records and maps which were provided for the site visits and which were in full compliance with international reporting standards.

4.3 Clearance activities and land use

The clearance operations funded with Netherlands financial assistance were technically successful in that the proposed areas were cleared as planned and in accordance with international standards.

However, as noted above in the chapter on Effectiveness, in half of the limited number of sites visited the strategic aim of clearance was not achieved. This was primarily due to the effective separation of the *technical goal* of clearing a piece of land from the *overall developmental goal* of using the land to improve the safety or living conditions of the local people. Related to this, there is little or no recognition of the nature of the

"landmine problem" as being essentially an economic issue – and hence related to economic development.

Additionally, the absence of monitoring of land use post-clearance means that the amount of land which is cleared but then not used is unknown. This clearance without the land being used appears to be a real problem as two of the four sites visited by the team were found to have been cleared but no, or very limited, land use change had occurred.

4.4 Mine Risk Education

Mine Risk Education (MRE) formed only a very limited part of the HMA funded by the Netherlands. In 1997 it formed part of the multi-donor programme of the UNDHA in response to the immediate post war needs.

In general, the need for MRE in BiH has been addressed by UNICEF and other agencies (e.g. Handicap International). After protracted discussion it appears likely that MRE will be included in the school curriculum from 2007 or 2008. This mainstreaming of MRE puts it on a permanent sustainable basis.

The dominance of intentional risk taking in recent casualties suggests that any further development of MRE should be carefully considered and specifically targeted. The aim of MRE is to modify risk-taking behaviour, however UNICEF reports on MRE in a number of countries have continued to highlight that – although it is considered that MRE may well be effective in changing knowledge, attitudes and practices (KAP) there is no quantitative evidence that it results in fewer casualties.[109] [110] The KAP studies required to demonstrate this would be costly and difficult.

4.5 What factors contributed to sustainability?

For end-beneficiaries (as opposed to the BHMAC which has benefitted from support to capacity-building) two factors can be identified:

- prioritisation of areas which are likely to be sustainable and
- close linkage of demining to development.

The establishing of a single national prioritisation process in BiH was in itself a notable success. The results of this process were initially based strongly on technical considerations and the linkage to development was not given enough priority. By 2004 this was recognised and a detailed study produced to propose new ideas for the integration of the LIS socio-economic data from 2003, and to work towards a stronger and much more comprehensive linkage to development goals. There is clear need for further work in this direction and the BHMAC, at central level, appears to have interest in continuing this development.

However, the key local link in prioritising areas to be cleared, is the person responsible at municipal level and there is a very important difference in the skills and enthusiasm between different people. The focus group at Krusevas preko pot, Banovici, reported

[109] See *An Evaluation of the Mine Risk Education Programme in Ethiopia*, UNICEF, 2005, available at http://www.unicef.org/evaldatabase.

[110] This does not mean that MRE should be abandoned – it is a relatively low cost intervention which is believed to be effective, and which only requires low efficiency in order to provide a positive cost-benefit. See Keeley, R., *The Economics of Landmine Clearance,* 2006.

they were unaware of the existence of such a representative and had not had contact from the municipality regarding Mine Risk Education, despite living adjacent to a number of contaminated areas. In contrast, the representative from Srebrenica accompanied the evaluation team on their field visit and was able to provide from memory detailed information about communities passed on the road and their mine problems. He had apparently visited adjacent communities widely and taken time to learn about their needs. (See section 1.4 above for further information about the role of municipal representatives in prioritisation). In two of the field visits the team was able to directly observe that a dynamic and motivated local representative, supplied with essential resources by a progressive municipality, was able to achieve far more than an unmotivated and isolated representative. If demining is to be sustainable then increased support at this local level may be necessary to ensure that site selection and follow up is to a consistent high standard.

The linkage of demining to development has been discussed in depth in this report. It is clear that clearing land or buildings is not enough. Local people, especially returned displaced people who have had their lives disrupted and lost everything they own, require assistance to make use of demined land and buildings (which are an expensive resource).

An unexpected consequence was heard, especially in Srebrenica, where the team was told that the presence of mines was used as an excuse for lack of action on development. Respondents were apparently convinced that if the mines were to be cleared then the promised development assistance would not materialise and suggested that the regional authorities did not have any real development plans. The evaluation team was unable to verify these opinions, but if they accurately reflect the situation then there is in fact a negative incentive to request mine clearance, it is easier to blame the lack of development support on the presence of mines than to take responsibility for failing to plan and implement projects.

4.6 Conclusion

The support to the BHMAC in capacity-building and developing the prioritisation process has achieved sustainability in most aspects. This is a significant success. The prioritisation process itself is still under development and will require changes to make the linkage to development stronger, but these changes are within the scope of the BHMAC.

The BHMAC is now an established institution and sustainability has been addressed by the national government agreeing to take on funding salaries and some other costs in a series of steps. This transition will be completed next year, 2008, when the government will become responsible for 100% of these costs.

This local funding does not appear to include the necessary capital costs for vehicles and for computer equipment, both of which are essential to the functioning of the BHMAC.

The sites which have been cleared of mines and UXO with Netherlands funding are much less successful in demonstrating sustainability through long term change of land use. In addition to changes to the prioritisation process, the introduction of such models as Community Integrated Mine Action is required to link demining to development.

IV Conclusions

Policy concerning HMA issued and followed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not kept up with developments in international HMA policies and their implementation:

- The selection of land-use as an indicator is not useful if it is used in isolation without concomitant monitoring of economic activities and without providing the population the necessary means to bring land into production or to start other economic activities;

- The "politically correct" statement of combining HMA and development remains an empty phrase if it is not based on comprehensive risk assessment and providing local communities access to means of economic subsistence without taking high risks;

- There was an "old-fashioned" emphasis on mine clearing, without taking risk assessment and reduction of unsafe areas into due consideration, nor was capacity-building acknowledged as an essential element of policy, even though it was funded.

- The direct link between the department of Humanitarian Affairs at the ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague and UNDP, resulted in by-passing the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Sarajevo, and led to an absence of monitoring of the Netherlands' funded (UNDP) programme, its impact and its (cost-)effectiveness. The outputs of the UNDP program, accounting for over 90% of Dutch funding, were essentially not subject to external evaluation by the Netherlands. Demining funded by the Netherlands has come from the Central budget and not from a delegated budget, so the involvement of the Embassy has been limited. It appears that the division of responsibilities between the Embassy and the Ministry based in the Hague has led to insufficient monitoring of the funding, notwithstanding that contractually, the programs of UNDP funded by the Netherlands were, and are, to be monitored by the Embassy.

- In addition to the lack of monitoring of the UNDP activities, and generally weak reporting by UNDP, there was no clear evidence of feedback from these programmes being used at policy level in order to base future policy on previous experience. No response was received to the UNDP report stating how they had amended the objectives of the programme. Indeed, there is no evidence that an effective mechanism currently exists to use monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian demining programmes, or even the reporting provided by these programmes, to inform policy. There has thus been little incentive to undertake such actions as field-monitoring of mine clearance to discover the subsequent land use.

- The requirement to exclude commercial companies from HMA activities is not realistic in view of the required quality and time constraints of HMA work. Moreover, The Netherlands could not in practice implement it due to the absence of bids by non-commercial operators like NGOs. There is no evidence in Bosnia and Herzegovina that commercial demining operators fail to meet international standards.

- The decision to participate in a multi-donor program (through UNDP) inevitably involves compromises in the overall strategy in order to coordinate the policies of different donors. However, this multilateral approach stems from the overall policy strategy that prefers the multilateral channel for an efficient management capacity, a concentration of knowledge and assets, substantial scale advantages and lower transaction costs and is therefore justified.

- UNDP (and later BHMAC) had similar, but by no means identical, policy goals to the MFA in terms of linking demining to development and promoting economic recovery, as well as prioritising the return of IDPs and refugees. Essentially, activity was driven by the UNDP from the implementation level and not by the policy choice of MFA at a strategic level.

- The decision to support the two central BHMAC offices should have been accompanied by concomitant support to the regional offices, with specific support to the collaboration between the regional BHMAC offices and municipality mine action coordinators who form a vital link to local people in mine affected communities.

- In view of the change in the category of mine victims, now dominated by deliberate risk taking by men aged 30 to 50 due to economic pressure, support by the Netherlands to mine awareness activities should have been replaced over time by support to economic activities combined with HMA, aimed at reducing the economic necessity to take risks.

V Recommendations

Netherlands policy on *mine action* needs to be substantially clarified and modified.

- Update current demining policy: it is necessary to review the current policy framework, reflecting on the experiences gathered from past HMA activities. If not in general, this is certainly the case for BiH.

- Attention should be paid to the timing of the shift from emergency clearance and victim support to risk assessment and management.
  Immediately after conflicts, due to human suffering, emphasis is, understandably, on emergency clearance and victim support. However, once the immediate crisis is over this strategy should be changed to risk assessment and management, taking a risk approach to area reduction and prioritisation which also uses socio-economic information. Where methods are specified their use should be based on evidence of their meeting objective criteria. The use of risk analysis, cost efficiency analysis and needs analysis to identify what activities should be supported, and where, should become part of the established implementation of the policy.

- The Netherlands should strive for the strengthening of institutions and local community support. This is essential for implementing a mine action programme and for gathering and managing the necessary information. At present the goals include both strategic outcomes (e.g. reduction in casualties, improved economic situation, improved security) and specific methods which are believed to be suitable for achieving these outcomes (e.g. mine clearance, MRE).

- Ensure adequate agreements on monitoring.
  The use of *implementing agents* such as UNDP offers advantages in terms of technical expertise and local knowledge and improved coordination where various donors are involved. UNDP in Bosnia and Herzegovina has demonstrated the value of this. It is crucial however, that there are monitoring and evaluation schemes in place, both in terms of the technical and developmental aspects of the programme. If an Embassy is contractually responsible for monitoring it should be provided with the adequate resources (including human resources) in order to follow through. Otherwise, there should be no contractual reference to monitoring by the mission. Instead, this could be done by one of the other 'like-minded' donors that already have that capacity and mechanism in function. The lack of monitoring of activities extends in BiH to not verifying the land use of cleared areas one (or three) years after clearance is complete. There is thus no mechanism to allow policy to be based on evidence of which methods and approaches are most successful. “Closing the loop” so that policy is based on information should be addressed.

- Where a clear case for capacity-building can be established, such as in BiH (typically this is the case for a highly contaminated country with high “resilience” – i.e. infrastructure, human resources and financial resources) then this offers one of the most advantageous ways of supporting mine action and should be prioritised. BHMAC can usefully serve as an example of the way that capacity can be built and handed over.

- Land release – whether by clearance or by survey – should be prioritised where the use of the land can be supported by an integrated programme to put the land to use with sufficient investment funding available, or where there is exceptional need (e.g. to access infrastructure for repair).

- Innovate demining strategies. On a more general level, HMA activities will have to depart from a narrow focus on mine action per se, towards a more holistic understanding of the problem at hand. Such an integrate approach would have to acknowledge the critical link between local development needs and short-term objectives. This has thus far been a more theoretical exercise and needs a more hands-on, less risk-avert attitude by funding agencies.

- The Netherlands could consider economic development by seeking to attract foreign investors by offering mine clearance of their area of preference, if these investors are willing to sign contracts to remain there for at least a period of perhaps three – four years.

VI Methodology

Evaluation approach and methodology

The evaluation of Dutch financial assistance in the area of humanitarian demining involved three stages: (1) a preparation stage to collect relevant documents and make practical arrangements for the field visits; (2) field visits and (3) report writing. The schedule followed is given in figure 6.



Figure 6 Time Schedule.

The preparatory stage involved two separate processes: desk-based research by the IOB consultant into Dutch demining policy and the collection of relevant written source material, including evaluation reports, landmine impact surveys and country-specific information. The second stage involved field-research in three countries: Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia. In the third stage three country reports and a synthesis report were drafted and submitted to the IOB.

In Angola, remote sensing techniques were used to enhance the field-analysis.

The evaluation team

The evaluation team consisted of three field teams and a project leader. Each field team composed of a team leader and two team members. Each team as well as the overall team was multi-disciplinary in that it combined technical, military, developmental, political as well as country-specific expertise. In addition, the field teams hired local expertise in country. Detailed requirements as to the team's expertise and composition were given in the ToR. The profiles of the evaluation team are attached in Annex 1B.

The TNO field teams were supported and backstopped by a "home team". The home team participated in desk research, data analysis, organising field trips, acted as sounding board for the field teams, ensured consistency between the approaches taken in Angola, Bosnia, and Cambodia, and participated in drafting the reports.



Figure 7 The Evaluation Team.

Stage 1

The preparatory stage involved two separate processes: desk-based research by the IOB consultant into Dutch demining policy and the collection of relevant written source material, including evaluation reports, landmine impact surveys and country-specific information.

The questions for the IOB-led analysis of Dutch demining policy were set out in the ToR and concerned primarily the underlying principles of Dutch demining policy, criteria for selection of countries and programmes eligible for financial assistance and coordination with other policies and donors. The IOB research was intended to clarify how Dutch policy on humanitarian demining was formulated and the manner in which mine-affected countries eligible for financial assistance were selected. Its findings would form the basis for the field evaluation and form a chapter of the overall evaluation report. Unfortunately, though the evaluation teams received some policy documentation from the IOB, the research was not completed before the teams proceeded to the field or before the write-up of the final reports.[111] This hampered the evaluation by the field teams. In fact, in stage 3, the teams collected and analysed many of the available policy-documents themselves to complete their reports.

Simultaneously, the evaluation teams collected and analysed relevant documentary information resulting in site-selection for field-visits and an agreed outline for the final reports. In addition, this stage involved substantial logistical preparation to get the teams on the ground, establish contact with demining organisations to facilitate the team's visit and hire qualified local expertise as required by the ToR.

[111] See email exchange IOB – HCSS, 30 July 2007.

Stage 2

The field visits to Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia took place between 15 June and 15 July. The amount of time spent in each country varied according to the circumstances. These countries had been selected by IOB based on 10 criteria listed in the ToR. The ToR stated that field analysis should focus primarily on the use of demined land. Through discussions with IOB, it was clarified that the evaluation should be non-technical, that the use of land should be interpreted broadly and that the teams should in fact examine as much as feasible the impact of Dutch-financial assistance in humanitarian demining on the ground. Given the short timeframe, this was done through a selection of, at a minimum, 4 sites per country. The criteria used for site selection are listed in Annex 5. A Matrix was developed to represent a systematic approach to examining the findings according to the five evaluation criteria (efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact, sustainability), along with Questionnaires for Focus group Discussions (see Annex 3 and 6).

The field analysis involved visits to selected demining sites, interviews with relevant national, regional and local authorities, demining organisations supported by the Netherlands, national coordinating bodies, other relevant organisations and diplomatic representations, documentary research at Royal Netherlands' Embassies and focusgroup discussions with key stakeholders and communities. This resulted in Summary Field Notes and Notes of Focus group Discussions. A list of people interviewed and sites visited in included in Annex 8.

Focusgroup discussions were conducted using the DANIDA method, which was especially recommended in the ToR for the evaluation (DANIDA, 2003). Focus group discussions were conducted by a local facilitator, involving not more than 7-10 persons at the time representing a cross-section of members of a particular community. Participants in focus group discussions were selected based on the following criteria: participants live or work in a community affected by landmines; are resettled because of mines; have had family members injured or killed by landmines; or live in a community where mine action was undertaken.

An additional characteristic of the DANIDA evaluation is that it viewed mine action from the broader perspective of international development co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Consequently, following the DANIDA approach, the present evaluation included an emphasis on the institutional factors that have contributed to the success or failure of humanitarian demining programs.

Interviews with key interlocutors were conducted broadly following the CIIP approach. Thus the evaluation reviewed not only immediate outputs generated but attempted to assess the longer-term results (impact), the processes through which these results were produced and the post-conflict context in which the humanitarian demining activities took place.

In Angola, in addition to methodology explained above, remote sensing imagery was used to obtain additional information on the actual use of demined land. The use of satellite data served to corroborate through scientific data gathered in the field and to extend the local observations to larger areas that were not visited.

In Angola and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Embassy was briefed on the preliminary findings of the team before departure. In Cambodia, the Netherlands does not have an Embassy. In both cases, the opportunity to have a frank discussion about the impact and effectiveness of Dutch financial assistance for humanitarian demining was highly appreciated.

Stage 3

Drafting of the country reports took place following the return of the field teams. Field findings were analysed and correlated with the outcome of documentary research. Where necessary, additional documentary research was undertaken. This was particularly necessary because the A number of internal consultations were undertaken. An external TNO-staff read the draft reports as an independent quality assurance.

The findings in the country reports are presented following the outline agreed with IOB in advance. The findings, conclusions and recommendations provided in the report are objective, verifiable and based on the field observations of the evaluation teams. Given the policy focus of the evaluation, the absence of quantitative baseline data and the requirement to use the DANIDA methodology, the findings presented in the country reports are largely qualitative. Where the findings are subjective, this is clearly stated in the report and supported by arguments.

Limitations of the methods used

The main limitations on the evaluation were time constraints and the non-availability of the preliminary policy research.

1 **Timelines**
The timelines set for this evaluation were extremely tight. Moreover, the evaluation had to be conducted over the summer period. This posed a number of serious challenges. The timeframe allowed very little time to select and hire qualified consultants and make the requisite logistical arrangements for the teams to travel to Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia (visa, vaccinations, travel arrangements). Contacting the relevant organisations in the three countries, making a site selection and practical arrangements to visit these sites posed a real challenge in this short timeframe, particularly given the fact that these are countries that have recently emerged from violent conflict. Making the necessary practical and logistical arrangements in time for the field visits to proceed according to the schedule set by IOB left little time for documentary research and analysis preceding the field visits. Time constraints also meant that not all sites where Dutch-supported humanitarian mine action had taken place could be visited in the countries selected. Therefore, the evaluation results are not based on a comprehensive analysis of the impact of Dutch-funded activities in the 1996-2006 period but on a sampling.

Given the short timeframe, and the requirement that each team be composed of a team leader and two team members, in practice nine persons were engaged to conduct the evaluations in three countries at the same time. It would possibly been more effective to have one core team, consisting of 2 persons of complementary skills and expertise, complemented with country-specific and local expertise, evaluate the countries consecutively. This would have enhanced consistency of approach and analysis and facilitated report writing and synthesis.

2 **IOB research**

The methodology of the field visits was based on the assumption that the research into the priorities of Dutch humanitarian demining policy and eligibility of organisations and programmes would be available to the teams before proceeding to the field. In fact, a rudimentary draft was provided to the team. However, this draft proved to be incomplete, lacking analysis and containing mistakes. The policy documents were provided to the team but these proved not to be complete. Therefore, the field teams did not have a clear picture of priorities in Dutch demining policy before proceeding to evaluate the effectiveness of the use of Dutch financial assistance in the field. In the field, and also in the report-writing stage, the evaluation team spent much time and effort trying to complete and verify the accuracy of the findings of the preliminary IOB policy research. Finally, the evaluation team itself wrote this part of the evaluation report, which is included in the introduction and the chapter on relevance. This required extra time and effort and was contrary to the stated phasing and division of work agreed in the ToR.

3 **Use of satellite imagery (Angola only)**

Remote sensing imagery is commonly used for applications in cartography, forestry and agriculture. Images are obtained by radar or camera systems at several wavelengths, from both satellites and airborne platforms such as helicopters and fixed-wing planes. In the past ten years, the application of remote sensing imagery has increasingly been researched in the context of humanitarian demining. These projects focused mainly on the possibility to detect mine fields and individual mines (directly or by the presence of minefield indicators) from remote sensing images by the application of hyperspectral techniques, both in the visual and infra-red spectrum. For the purpose of this evaluation, TNO had proposed to use remote sensing images as a method to obtain additional information on the post-clearance use of demined land, complementary to documentary research, interviews with stakeholders, focus group discussions and field visits. For this evaluation, no new techniques were developed; the remote sensing images were available from existing archives.

The team adopted a two-folded approach. First, individual images of the existing archives would be interpreted and compared with the facts on the ground. Second, changes that occurred over time would be detected by the evaluators, and would then trigger more accurate inspections of the area in question, by either using satellite images with a higher resolution or by field visits.

The major impediment for the team to analyse this kind of data in Angola stemmed from the erratic national data. In the provinces of Bié, Huambo and Moxico, the evaluation team intended to compare the actual situation at the location of the demining tasks with the information from the remote sensing images. During preparatory discussions with demining organisations however, it became clear that the site selection had been based on in correct data from CNIDAH, the national organisation that maintains the IMSMA demining database; these did not match the site information of the demining organisations. Especially the mismatch between the task IDs and the coordinates affected the use of the image maps, since the actual locations of these tasks were not covered by the image maps. Further enquiries led to the conclusion that this mismatch was not due to a systematic error. Rather, it might have occurred through the mixing up of task IDs and GPS coordinates in the CNIDAH data base.

Minor issues concerned the limited amount of data that was available for the remote regions under evaluation. One limiting factor was cloud cover, which is a common problem in tropical regions. Angola is only sparsely covered by high resolution satellite 'cloud free' (less than 20% cloud cover) data. A number of 'cloud free' images were available from the Ikonos, Quickbird and EROS satellites, in addition to multispectral data (including information on vegetation) for Ikonos and Quickbird. A second issue concerns the period from 1996 onwards: even though the number of available images has been increasing since 2002, there are only low resolution images of African countries available for the period before 2002 (due to the lack of ground stations). The exact developments between 1996 and 2002 could therefore not be confirmed by remote sensing for this report.

Despite the incorrect data, one image map did in fact contain (apart from the task with the incorrect ID as provided by CNIDAH) the location of the task the evaluation team had selected: task BE277 in the province of Bié. This task was performed by HALO Trust and funded by the Netherlands. Also, the image maps of 2 June 2002 and 27 April 2005 contained the locations of a demining task in the province of Huambo (HU194 - task ID according to CNIDAH), also performed by HALO Trust. The findings from the visits to both of these sites are included in chapter 4.

In all, the use of remote sensing images still contributed to the findings of this report, despite the erratic data archives. Although the evaluation team was not able to perform this investigation in the way it was intended, it was possible to demonstrate changes over time, and satellite data also served as a confirmation to findings from the field visits in two of the inspected sites. As presented in this report, the use of remote sensing imagery can lead to additional insights, given that a sufficient amount of correct data is available. Coupled with the appropriate interpretation, satellite images do provide valuable information on land use and socio-economic developments in a specific area.

VII Photographs

1 The Netherlands Embassy, Sarajevo.
2 Mine signs outside BHMAC headquarters, Sarajevo.
3 Mine Awareness poster at BHMAC headquarters, Sarajevo.
4 Collection of mines at NPA headquarter, Sarajevo.
5 Mine sign along the road near Sarajevo.
6 Head Office Civil Protection Republica Srpska.
7 Travnik.
8 BHMAC regional office Travnik.
9 Interview director BHMAC Travnik.
10 BHMAC Travnik office.
11 BHMAC Travnik office.
12 Information on casualty rates at BHMAC Travnik.
13 Director regional BHMAC office Travnik.
14 Mine detection equipment.
15 Deminer equipment.
16 Travnik.
17 Interview director headquarters of BHMAC Republica Srpska. Banja Luka.
18 Mign sign near Modrica.
19 Focus group discussion with municipality, Celic.
20 Mine coordinator pointing at cleared site, Sibosnica, Celic.
21 Mine coordinator in cleared site, Sibosnica, Celic.
22 Evaluation team at cleared site. Objective of clearance was the repair of a power line, Sibosnica.
23 Power line with underneath the Dutch funded cleared site, Sibosnica.
24 Other site cleared with Dutch money in Celic. Objective: installation water pipe line.
25 Almedina Music conducting a focus group interview and working with the flipchart, Sibosnica.
26 Focus group discussion, conducted in a gas station, Sibosnica.
27 Focus group discussion, Sibosnica.
28 Regional office BHMAC Mostar.
29 Provisional map. Suspected area between the dotted lines, BHMAC Mostar.
30 Survey map at regional BHMAC office, Mostar.
31 Mine nibbled at by a fox, BHMAC Mostar.
32 Remnants of war, Mostar.
33 Famous (rebuild) bridge, Mostar.
34 Mostar.
35 Old City, Mostar.
36 Mostar Bridge.
37 Employee of Regional BHMAC office Tuzla explains about the cleared site, Krusevas Preko pot.
38 Cleared site, Krusevas Preko pot.
39 Mine map from BHMAC Tuzla, Krusevas Preko pot.
40 Detail of mine map, Krusevas Preko pot.
41 Houses of focus group interviewees in front of cleared site, Krusevas Preko pot.
42 Number of mines and UXO’s found, Krusevas Preko pot.
43 Former Dutchbat compound, Potocari, Srebrenica.
44 Graveyard at Potocari Memorial.

45 Names of victims at Potocari Memorial.
46 Memorial Stone, Potocari.
47 Focus group discussion municipality, Srebrenica.
48 Remote area at cleared site, 8km off road, Pribivaci.
49 Cleared hillside near abandoned houses, Pribivaci.
50 Mine map of cleared site, Pribivaci.
51 Abandoned house next to cleared site, Pribivaci.
52 Abandoned house next to cleared site, Pribivaci.
53 Provisional marking, Pribivaci.
54 Abandoned houses Srebrenica.


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

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
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
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

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VIII Annexes (delivered separately)

Annex 1A	Terms of Reference
Annex 1B	Composition of the Teams
Annex 2	The Field Mission
Annex 3	Matrix for Analysis
Annex 4	Schedule of Activities
Annex 5	Site Selection Criteria and Site Visits
Annex 6	Questionnaires
Annex 7	Field Notes
Annex 8	Bibliography
Annex 9	Debriefing (PowerPoint)
Annex 10	The Demining Law
Annex 11	Technical and General Survey
Annex 12	Mine Action in the BiH PRSP
Annex 13	Chronological Overview