

## **Annexe 1 Terms of Reference**

### **Preparing the ground for a mine save world**

#### **An evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war Terms of Reference for the evaluation of financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities in 1996-2006**

## **1 Introduction**

The Dutch government seeks to adopt an integrated approach to international issues, using an effective and efficient combination of policy instruments. This is the reason for the IOB (Policy and Operations Evaluation Department) evaluation of Dutch efforts to control landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW's). This evaluation will examine two types of policy instrument (political and financial) and how they interrelate. It will be made up of two distinct parts (study I and study II). Each of the two parts, which will be carried out separately, will focus on one of the policy instruments, including its nature, operation and effects. Study I will focus on political initiatives: the diplomatic efforts undertaken, in the various fora on conventional arms control, to expand, tighten and enforce existing international legal instruments. Study II will focus on the instrument of financial assistance, i.e. funds for mine clearance activities in countries with a mine problem, seen from the broad perspective of humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction. These Terms of Reference relate to study II.

## **2 Background**

### *Scale and nature of the landmine problem*

According to the latest (2005) edition of *Landmine Monitor Report*, in the world as a whole, there were 84 countries and 8 areas not internationally recognised as independent states that had a mine problem in 2005. The number of mines involved can only be estimated. Estimates in the literature range from 30 to 300 million. Yet what matters is not so much the precise number of mines, but the size of the contaminated area. The presence of just a single mine renders an area potentially hazardous, and even the mere suspicion that mines are present can severely disrupt local and/or regional ways of life. What ultimately matters, therefore, is the

impact of mines on the socioeconomic situation. The actual number of mines is largely immaterial.

There are enormous differences from one country to the next. In some, the location of minefields is known and they cause the civilian population little trouble. The Falkland Islands are a case in point. During the 1982 conflict, thousands of mines were laid on the beaches and moorland. According to the national authorities, there are more than 100 minefields covering 20 square kilometres and containing some 16,000 mines. These minefields are all clearly marked and fenced off, and are checked regularly (*Landmine Monitor Report 2005*). In other countries, the problems are overwhelming. In Afghanistan, for example, various army units and factions have been using mines for over twenty years, making it one of the worst affected countries in the world. Landmines and ERWs are scattered throughout the country. A Landmine Impact Survey conducted between November 2003 and November 2004 identified 4,514 risk areas (covering 715 square kilometres) in 2,368 populated areas. Some 4.2 million people live in these areas (15% of the total population), 1.6 million of whom in what the survey called 'high or medium-impacted communities'. The mines impede access to agricultural land and pastures, and hamper the reconstruction of roads, bridges, irrigation systems, schools and other public buildings. Every month, they claim between 150 and 300 victims.<sup>1</sup> In the 24 months preceding the survey, a total of 2,245 victims were recorded in 664 of the 2,368 populated areas identified.

The international community tends to see the mine issue as a humanitarian problem. Every year, an estimated 15,000 to 20,000 people are killed or injured in accidents involving mines, although exact figures are not available. Most casualties are civilians. The Landmine Monitor recorded 6,521 cases in 2005, including children (1,262 or 19%), women (239 or 4%) and military personnel (25%). Yet many mine-related accidents are not reported, because they take place in remote areas where no assistance or communication of any kind is available. Accidents occur in almost all regions of the world. In 2002 they claimed victims in 20 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, in 15 countries in Southeast Asia, in 10 countries in the Middle East and North Africa and in 5 countries in Latin and Central America (*Landmine Monitor Report 2003: 39-41*).

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<sup>1</sup> Progress in implementing Article 5: An overview of the mine-affected States Parties' problems, plans, progress and priorities for assistance, Background information compiled by the Implementation Support Unit of the GICHD to assist the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, 11 February 2004, p.3.

The landmine issue can also be defined as a socioeconomic problem:

- Mines and ERWs disrupt traditional ways of life. Social ties between relatives, families or communities are severed because roads, pastures, markets, schools, wells, riverbeds and other communal facilities and meeting places can no longer be used or can only be accessed via a circuitous route.
- Mines and ERWs impede economic development. The isolation of land, roads, bridges and markets can cut off existing local or regional sources of income. At the same time, the affected communities are confronted by a growing number of disabled people who are unable to provide for themselves. This places an increasing strain on the resources available for medical care. Not only are the operations that have to be performed immediately after an accident difficult and expensive, but also in the longer term the rehabilitation of victims demands constant medical care and attention.

Mines and ERWs pose the additional problem of hampering peacebuilding in post-conflict areas. After a conflict, refugees and displaced persons are unable or unwilling to return to their original homes because they know or suspect that the area is mined. This can slow down the process of reconciliation between the former warring parties.

#### *Mine clearance jargon*

‘Humanitarian demining’ usually refers to the sum total of activities relating to the clearance of mines and ERWs. These include: 1) examination of the nature and size of a minefield; 2) preparation of a general plan of action; 3) clearance of mines and ERWs; 4) marking of minefields; 5) follow-up inspections; 6) involvement of the local population in mine clearance activities; and 7) transfer of demined land (GICHD, 2004:64). Humanitarian demining should not be confused with military demining. The aim of humanitarian demining is to remove *all* mines and ERWs, so that it is safe for the civilian population to start living and working again in the affected areas. Military demining is designed to create narrow corridors through minefields for troops and equipment. Since speed is crucial to the success of a military operation of this kind, no attempt is made to clear all the mines. The risk of remaining mines is factored into the equation (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1:16).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> The UN norm for the accuracy of humanitarian demining is 99.6%. On the other hand, the Dutch military, for example, consider 80% accuracy to be adequate for military demining (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).

Humanitarian demining is only one component of what is referred to in international land mine parlance as ‘mine action’. Mine action is an umbrella term that covers a range of activities designed to reduce or completely eliminate the effects of landmines and ERWs on civilians in their living environment. These include: 1) victim support and social rehabilitation; 2) mine risk education and mine awareness for the local population; 3) mine clearance; 4) data management; 5) training for mine clearers; 6) technical research into better detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:1).<sup>3</sup>

### *Development of the mine action sector*

The international community’s activities in the field of mine action started out in Afghanistan. In October 1988, in view of the problems the country faced because of landmines, the UN called for funds for humanitarian mine clearance. Until then, mine clearance had been the exclusive preserve of national armed forces. In the case of Afghanistan, however, there was no functioning national army, and the retreating Soviet troops were unable or unwilling to clear the mines that had been laid. This prompted the UN to develop and promote activities of its own. Initially, the UN’s humanitarian mine clearance activities in Afghanistan were limited to providing demining training. Subsequently support was given by a number of mine-action NGOs specially set up for this purpose in Afghanistan. This initiative in turn triggered the establishment of the first international NGO for mine action (HALO Trust), and activities were extended to other countries with mine-related problems. These included Angola, Cambodia, Iraq, Kuwait and Mozambique.

Not all demining activities were entirely successful. In the mid-1990s there was a growing realisation that, in order to discover why previous programmes had succeeded or failed, a common basis for the development of new programmes was needed. In 1997, a study by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) was published which examined the factors underlying the success or failure of the first demining programmes in four countries. The study concluded that demining operations suffered from a chronic lack of organisation, commitment and vision. These conclusions, combined with proposals put forward by a

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<sup>3</sup> The UN defines mine action as ‘activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of mines and unexploded ordnance’. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) identifies five clusters of activities: 1) awareness and education; 2) humanitarian demining; 3) victim assistance and rehabilitation; 4) stockpile destruction; 5) advocacy against the use of anti-personnel mines (GICHD, 2004:20).

number of working groups that had been dealing with the question of standardisation since 1996, led to the establishment in 1997 of the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Since then, UNMAS has been the central contact point within the UN for all landmine-related activities and initiatives. In 1997 it published its first list of standards, the International Standards for Humanitarian Mine Clearance Operations. At the same time, UNICEF devised the first series of international guidelines on education and awareness programmes.

Starting in the late 1990s, more attention was paid to: 1) changes and shifts in mine action procedures, practices and standards and how they are perceived; 2) streamlining of mine action in the wider context of sustainable development and capacity building. For example, the scope of the UNMAS standards published in 1997 was extended. In 2000 the first edition of the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) was issued by UNMAS. IMAS contain more elements of mine action than the original standards, which dealt exclusively with mine clearance. Their aim is to make mine action more secure and efficient by defining a number of internationally accepted principles, procedures and minimum requirements for national authorities, international donors and organisations in this field. IMAS are reviewed every three years in order to incorporate developments in the field (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, 2004). Mainly because of its traditional isolation, the biggest challenge currently facing the mine action community is the streamlining of mine action (point 2 above). In the last few years, not only have initiatives been developed to incorporate mine action into specially devised national strategies, but there has also been more cooperation with actors operating in this area (GICHD, 2004:21-27; Danida, 2003:9).

#### *International coordination of mine action activities*

The international mine action network is made up of national, international and non-governmental actors. Mine action activities are coordinated by the following horizontal and vertical mechanisms:

- The Mine Action Support Group (MASG), which was set up in 1998, is the primary coordinating body for donors. It is an informal forum of 27 donors who meet three times a year in New York and Geneva to share information on mine action activities and humanitarian demining policy. In 2003 Norway initiated the establishment of the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group (RMCG) in the margins of the meeting of the parties to the Ottawa Convention. The RMCG provides an opportunity for international

consultations and the exchange of information between mine action donors and the principal stakeholders in the margins of the various meetings of the parties.

- UNMAS plays a pivotal role in UN mine action activities. A number of other UN bodies also operate in this area. These include UNICEF (mine risk education), UNHCR (mine risk education and safe food supplies), UNDP (socioeconomic consequences of the presence of mines), UNOPS (integrated mine action and capacity building programmes) and UNOCHA (humanitarian consequences of mines). The Inter-Agency Group on Mine Action is responsible for coordination between the various UN bodies. The Steering Committee on Mine Action coordinates the mine action activities of UN and non-UN bodies. NGOs (including the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL)), the ICRC and the GICHD, among others, are represented on these committees.
- The most important umbrella organisation for NGOs is the ICBL. The ICBL owes its origin to an initiative by six humanitarian NGOs (Handicap International, Human Rights Watch, Mines Advisory Group, Medico International, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation and Physicians for Human Rights) who joined forces in the 1990s to work for an unconditional ban on the production, possession, trade in and sale of landmines and other remnants of war. Since the inception of the Ottawa Convention in 1996, the ICBL has worked to promote the universalisation of and compliance with this agreement. Over 1,400 NGOs in more than 90 countries are currently affiliated.
- The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) was established in 2000 to support the UN's work. The GICHD is an independent centre of expertise that provides a platform within the international mine action network for international consultation and information exchange. It was the driving force behind the development, distribution and maintenance of the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), which was introduced in mid-1999.

### *National organisation*

In most mine-affected countries, demining activities are managed centrally by a national mine action authority. This is a national government body – a ministry, for example – that is responsible for the regulation, management and interministerial coordination of national mine action activities. In addition, there is generally a mine action centre (MAC) that acts as national operator. MACs have a number of tasks: managing the national database, adopting national mine action plans and priorities, accrediting non-governmental and commercial demining organisations, coordinating local mine action plans with the activities of demining

NGOs and other outside bodies and local deminers, drawing up national mine action standards and monitoring the quality of demining activities. In some countries, the national mine action centre is the equivalent of a national mine action authority (GICHD, 2004:118).<sup>4</sup> Immediately after the end of a conflict, before a government has been installed, the MACs are run by the UN. They are subsequently integrated into the national government structure (Danida, 2003:57).

### **3 Dutch policy**

Financial assistance for mine clearance operations has been part of Dutch government policy since 1992. At first the Netherlands' stand on the issue was a cautious one. On 25 August 1995, as part of the preparations for the first review conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the first policy memorandum on the problem of landmines was published. In it the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Defence and the Minister for Development Cooperation acknowledged the gravity of the landmine problem and gave their backing to a total ban on anti-personnel mines in the long term, but argued that for the time being landmines were indispensable part of the Dutch army's arsenal. A general ban on the use of landmines would only be attainable, they wrote, once fully fledged, humane alternatives to landmines had been developed (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 1). In March 1996, however, defence minister Joris Voorhoeve announced that the existing stockpile of anti-personnel mines would be disposed of and that such weapons systems would not be used in the future (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 4:1). This decision cleared the way for the Netherlands to play a more active role in combating the problem of landmines in the framework of the CCW and the Ottawa process (House of Representatives, 24292, no. 15:2). On the basis of the decision, over a three-year period, almost 440,000 superfluous landmines (235,000 anti-personnel mines and 203,000 anti-tank mines) belonging to the Dutch armed forces were destroyed. The Netherlands retained up to 5,000 anti-personnel mines for the purpose of training mine clearers, studying better ways of detecting landmines and rendering them harmless, and testing equipment developed to do so (House of

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<sup>4</sup> The principal non-governmental demining organisations include: DanChurchAid (DCA), the Danish Demining Group (DDG), HALO Trust (HALO), the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) (LMR, 2003:25). Since the first Gulf War, various commercial organisations have also been active in the field of humanitarian demining. These include BACTEC, European Landmine Solutions, Mechem, Mine-Tech International, Royal Ordnance, Ronco and Dyncorp International (GICHD, 2004:22, Wikipedia, 2006) In some countries, demining is performed by a combination of NGOs and the national army or the police.

Representatives, 25000 V, no. 72:7). Although landmines had not been produced in the Netherlands for almost 20 years, the production of anti-personnel mines was prohibited by law at parliament's request in 1996.

Since 1996, the Netherlands has been one of the ten biggest donors in the field of humanitarian demining.<sup>5</sup> Between 1996 and 2005, the number of countries to which the Netherlands donated funds varied between six and thirteen (see diagram 1). Since signing (3 December 1997) and ratifying (12 April 1999) the Ottawa Convention, it has also been obliged to contribute to efforts to clear mines across the globe and provide assistance for the care, rehabilitation and social reintegration of mine victims. Between 1996 and 1999, the Dutch government earmarked some NLG 20 million annually for humanitarian demining (House of Representatives, 26137 (R1620), no. 5:1). Until the end of 2000, financial assistance for humanitarian demining activities came under the budget article for emergency aid. In November 2000 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs created a separate article in its budget for humanitarian demining, and increased its annual contribution to NLG 30 million, to emphasise 'the importance of humanitarian demining to re-establishing a safe living environment in post-conflict countries and the Netherlands' specific expertise in demining and the contribution it can make' (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 6). In the autumn of 2003 the government decided to set up a Stability Fund in order to provide rapid, flexible support for activities at the interface between peace, security and development in countries and regions emerging from or at risk of sliding into armed conflict. The funds previously set aside for demining are now allocated to this Fund (DBV/CV-262/03).

In 2003 the government formulated the following central aim for humanitarian demining: 'Dutch policy focuses on clearing landmines and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in order to reduce the number of mine accident victims and foster socioeconomic development. The Netherlands seeks to establish cost-effective mine-clearing operations that mobilise local workers and can be taken over by national bodies as quickly as possible.' (Policy Framework for Humanitarian Mine Action, Theme-based Cofinancing, 15 February 2003. In principle, only countries that have signed and ratified the Ottawa Convention (and actually comply with it) are eligible for Dutch assistance. Financial assistance for demining activities is channelled through the UN (UNMAS and UNDP) and NGOs (in particular the Mines Advisory Group,

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<sup>5</sup> During this period the Netherlands has fluctuated between sixth and tenth place.

Handicap International, HALO Trust and Norwegian Peoples Aid). Organisations that perform mine-clearing activities on a commercial basis are not eligible for assistance. The same applies to organisations that are – or used to be – involved in the illegal trade in anti-personnel mines or arms (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:6).

Demining programmes must comply with the following UNMAS mine action guidelines, which are to be coordinated at national level:

- promoting awareness of the presence of mines and UXO and reducing the risks to the inhabitants and users of the area concerned;
- carrying out surveys to determine the location and size of minefields and facilitate their marking and clearance;
- providing assistance to victims of accidents involving mines and UXO and fostering their rehabilitation and reintegration;
- stigmatising the use of landmines and supporting a total ban on landmines;
- building local capacity through education and training so that mine clearance can be transferred to a national agency;
- carrying out quality control checks on the above-mentioned activities.

In awarding grants, the Netherlands gives priority to: 1) actual mine-clearing projects in areas where landmines present the greatest risk to the population; 2) demining activities in countries with which it maintains bilateral aid relations, or in which it contributes to activities relating to human rights, peacebuilding and good governance; 3) the continuation of projects that have already received grants (as opposed to new activities); 4) capacity building and training so that mine-clearing operations can be taken over as quickly as possible by the national authorities in the countries affected (House of Representatives, no. 8:4-6). As far as techniques are concerned, manual detection is the preferred method. The Netherlands prefers the deployment of large mine-clearing teams to the funding of heavy machinery because of the resultant opportunities for engaging the local population and promoting employment. No grants will be made available for the development of new detection and clearance techniques (House of Representatives, 27162, no. 8:5-6).<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> The Policy Framework for Theme-based Cofinancing became effective in 2003. Theme-based cofinancing is a system for awarding grants. Its aim is to use central funds to support initiatives pursued by specialised organisations (i.e. those specialising in a certain theme) that work together with local organisations. These initiatives should seek to build up civil society and achieve long-term reductions in poverty in several developing countries, while strengthening the local organisations with which the specialist organisations cooperate. Grant applications for demining programmes should be compatible with both the Policy Framework for Theme-based

Funding decisions are currently guided by whether an area has been accorded priority in the context of the Stability Fund (Stability Fund Assessment Framework). The priority areas are the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, the African Great Lakes region and Afghanistan.

#### **4 The study: objective, evaluation criteria, questions and structure**

##### *Objective*

The objective of study II is threefold:

- 1 to understand how Dutch policy on humanitarian demining was formulated in the period 1996-2006;
- 2 to assess the way in which mine-affected countries and humanitarian demining programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected;
- 3 to assess the effectiveness of Dutch financing efforts in this area.

##### *Evaluation criteria*

The study can be seen as a combination of a policy review and a product evaluation. The applicable evaluation criteria are the relevance and effectiveness of the policy.

**Relevance:** Relevance is gauged by the degree to which the activities in question help achieve the aim in question. The main aim of humanitarian demining is to prevent new mine-related casualties. From this perspective, the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands are by definition relevant and the question of relevance can be disregarded in the study. In the case at hand, however, it is important to scrutinise the policy relevance of the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands. It is necessary to ascertain whether the activities are a logical corollary of Dutch policy and whether they tie in with the policy of the recipient country. Both aspects of this question are covered in the study (see the first and second cluster of questions addressed by the study).

**Effectiveness:** IOB guidelines define the criterion of ‘effectiveness’ as follows: ‘Effectiveness concerns the degree to which the direct results of the activities carried out (i.e. the ‘output’) contribute to the sustainable achievement of the programme objectives (i.e. the ‘outcome’).’

Because of the nature of humanitarian demining, the effectiveness of humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands can be accurately measured in terms of outputs. Accurate data on the resources employed – both financial and manpower – (inputs) and on the number of landmines cleared, the number of hectares demined etc. (outputs) are recorded and published. Both the periodic progress reports of demining organisations and the annual reports by mine-affected countries mandated by the Ottawa Convention represent comprehensive, reliable and accessible sources of information. But less is known about the actual use of demined land and the extent to which humanitarian demining programmes benefit the communities involved (outcomes). For this reason, the evaluation method used here mirrors as closely as possible the one employed in previous evaluations incorporating land use.<sup>7</sup>

Efficiency: The IOB guidelines cite ‘efficiency’ as a third evaluation criterion after ‘relevance’ and ‘effectiveness’. Efficiency refers to the degree to which the results achieved (output) are in proportion to the cost of the resources used (input) and their application. This is a question that cannot be answered in the case of humanitarian demining (and indeed no attempt should be made to do so), since every mine that is cleared equals a human life saved. The evaluation will therefore only ask whether the humanitarian demining programmes supported by the Netherlands were completed on time and within budget. This is a narrow definition of ‘efficiency’, generally referred to in the literature as ‘cost effectiveness’ (see the third cluster of questions).

### *Questions*

Based on its threefold objective, the evaluation will focus on the following three clusters of questions:

#### Dutch demining policy

- Underlying principles:

On what principles was Dutch policy based?

Was demining policy incorporated into general policy (e.g. development policy, humanitarian aid policy or post-conflict reconstruction policy)? If so, how?

- Objectives:

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<sup>7</sup> Of particular relevance in this regard are Danida’s evaluation ‘Danish Support to Mine Action’ (2003) and a GICHD evaluation of land use in Yemen which should be complete by the end of 2006.

What were the Netherlands' demining objectives in the period 1996-2006?

- Strategies:

How did the Netherlands endeavour to achieve these objectives?

- Activities:

Were the activities undertaken by the Netherlands a logical corollary of Dutch policy?

#### Selection of countries and programmes

- Consistency:

What criteria played a role in determining a mine-affected country's eligibility for financial assistance?

What criteria played a role in the acceptance or rejection of grant applications?

Was decision-making on this matter consistent?

Was decision-making on this matter transparent?

- Coordination:

Were the activities coordinated with other activities supported by the Netherlands?

Were the activities coordinated with other donors and/or aid organisations?

Did the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands meet national needs in the area of demining?

#### Effectiveness

- Nature and extent of the landmine problem:

How did the mine problem develop in the countries and regions assisted by the Netherlands between 1996 and 2006? In what respects has the problem lessened or deteriorated?

- Effectiveness of the programmes:

To what extent did the programmes supported by the Netherlands achieve their objectives?

Were the programmes carried out on time and within budget?

How did the programmes contribute towards the Netherlands' aims as regards capacity building?

Is land that has been cleared of mines being used again? If not, why not? If so, is it being used for the purpose envisaged?

What is the opinion of the national, regional or local authorities and the affected local communities on the effectiveness of the demining programmes supported by the Netherlands?

- Effectiveness of Dutch policy efforts:

Did the programmes supported by the Netherlands help reduce the annual number of victims of accidents involving landmines and UXO?

Have the programmes supported by the Netherlands contributed as envisaged to socioeconomic development?

### *Structure of the study*

The study comprises both desk-based and field components.

#### 1. Desk-based research

The first phase of the study will give an overview of Dutch humanitarian demining policy and establish how countries and programmes eligible for financial assistance were selected on the basis of this policy. This will involve studying the relevant literature, examining parliamentary papers (policy documents, theme-based policy frameworks, committee reports, etc.) and consulting recent evaluation reports on humanitarian demining by other donors. The first phase will also include interviews with various stakeholders both at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (representatives of the Human Rights and Peacebuilding Department (DMV), the Security Policy Department (DVB) and the relevant regional departments) and external bodies (representatives from UNMAS, GICHD, donors represented in the Mine Action Support Group and others). The desk-based component of the study will be conducted by the IOB-evaluation team.

#### 2. Field research

An international consultant will be contracted to perform field research at locations in three countries where programmes supported by the Netherlands are being carried out. The field research will focus on gathering information on the use of demined land. The remit of the team of evaluators that will perform the field research is twofold.

First, they will collect information on the envisaged use of the land that has been cleared of mines with Dutch financial assistance. They will be instructed specifically to:

- Prepare an overview of the various assessments of the nature and extent of the landmine problem that served as a baseline for the demining programmes. These include at a minimum the Landmine Impact Surveys, the General Mine Action Assessments or Level One Surveys, and the Technical Surveys or Level Two Surveys.
- Examine how the competent demining authorities determined which countries were eligible for mine clearance. To this end they will have to identify the selection procedures that were followed, the stakeholders involved in the selection procedures, and the data that prompted the demining authorities to initiate mine clearance activities.

Second, they will provide an overview of how, once a mine clearance programme has been completed, the land in question is actually being used. They will be asked to:

- Investigate what demined land is being used for in practice and collect written and photographic evidence of their findings. Investigate, if relevant, how intensively the land in question is being used for the purpose designated.
- Gauge opinion on the actual land use among representatives of the population groups and communities involved. Previous evaluations have shown that focus groups drawn from community leaders, users of demined land, women, children and mine victims constitute an important instrument in gauging opinions.

In the context of the field research, files will also be examined at the relevant embassies, and interviews will be conducted with representatives from 1) the Dutch missions in the countries concerned; 2) the demining organisations supported by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 3) public officials from the competent national ministries and regional and local authorities who are directly involved; 4) the national coordinating bodies in the area of humanitarian demining; 5) NGOs (e.g. ICBL and Human Rights Watch); 6) the ICRC; 7) UN bodies involved (including UNDP, UNOCHA and UNICEF); and 8) other donor countries.

#### *Parameters and scope of the study*

The field research to be undertaken was selected with reference to the following factors:

1. the scale of Dutch commitments to the recipient country;
2. the duration of Dutch assistance (continuous or ad hoc);

3. the method by which the Netherlands delivers its aid (direct to the demining NGOs and/or via multilateral channels);
4. the nature of the activities supported by the Netherlands (mine clearance only, or other forms of mine action, or both);
5. the scale of the problem in the recipient country (geographical, number of victims, urgency);
6. the nature of the mine problem in the recipient country (landmines and/or ERWs);
7. the organisation of humanitarian demining in the recipient country (UN-run mine action centre or national demining authority);
8. the political situation in the recipient country (e.g. relatively stable political situation and constructive climate for humanitarian demining vs. political instability);
9. whether the country has signed/ratified the Ottawa Convention;
10. whether the Netherlands has bilateral development relations with the country.

Based on factors 1 and 2 (see diagram 1), concise country analyses have been performed for Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, Eritrea, Laos and Mozambique (see diagram 2). In consultation with DMV, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia have been selected for field research. The locations to be covered by the field research have to be selected by mutual agreement on the basis of an inventory of activities in Angola (see diagram 3), Bosnia & Herzegovina (see diagram 4) and Cambodia (see diagram 5).

## **5 Organisation**

The study of how the Netherlands has employed the instrument of financial assistance is the second part of the IOB evaluation of the Dutch efforts to control landmines and ERW's. The evaluation is carried out under the responsibility of inspector Yvonne Kleistra. Michiel van Bokhorst, who worked on the preliminary study as an IOB trainee, will also work on study II, as a research assistant. A senior researcher is hired to conduct and supervise the evaluation in conjunction with the inspector.

An international team of highly qualified independent evaluators will be hired to perform the field research. The evaluation team should consist of a team leader and two team members. Given the nature of the subject, the team of evaluators will have to be multidisciplinary and should include personnel with professional background and extensive experience in humanitarian demining and humanitarian aid and/or reconstruction actions, the work of

national and international agencies, gender expertise, and experience in the countries covered by the field research. The team leader should have extensive experience in conducting evaluations of the provision of humanitarian aid and socio-economic reconstruction activities. The timetable for the evaluation work in the three countries selected for field research will require the creation of three separate field study teams. The team leader of the evaluation team and the two other members of the evaluation team each will direct a field study team. The field study teams should include local evaluation expertise. Part of the international consultant's remit will be to recruit local consultants for the field missions in the three countries selected.

It is estimated that the field research in the three countries selected may require nine person-months work. The evaluation team should conduct the field missions at least in part analogously and preferably on the basis of tested methods.

During the course of the field research the following outputs will have to be produced: three field mission reports, a draft final synthesis report of the field research to be submitted within one month upon completion of the field work. The draft synthesis report will be finalised following review by IOB. The results of the field research will be incorporated into the final IOB-evaluation report of study II.

A sounding board group has been set up including representatives of the policy departments involved and three outside specialists. The group will hold three meetings to give its opinion on study I, study II and the synthesis study of the IOB evaluation.

## **6 Proposal**

The proposal to undertake the field research for this evaluation should be fully responsive to the Terms of Reference outlined above. The proposal should indicate clearly the methodological approach to be used, along with the rationale for the overall evaluation strategy. The proposal should furthermore indicate how questions and issues will be dealt with, as well as which sources of information will be used. It should also indicate clearly the strategy for involving the agencies implementing the humanitarian demining activities, local institutions and beneficiaries in the evaluation.

The review and assessment of proposals will be guided by four criteria: 1) quality of the evaluation team, 2) overall approach and evaluation strategy, 3) understanding of the assignment, and 4) the financial offer.

## **7 Reporting schedule field research**

Submission of three field mission reports	June- July 2007
Submission of draft synthesis report	31 July 2007
Review of draft synthesis report	15 August 2007
Submission of final synthesis report	31 August 2007

## **8 Products**

The evaluation will produce reports on studies I and II (incorporating the results of the field research) and a synthesis report. Studies I and II will be published as IOB working documents. The results of these studies will be incorporated into a synthesis report, which is primarily intended for parliament

## Abbreviations:

CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Danida	Danish International Development Agency
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs (UN)
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
HALO	Hazardous Area Life-Support Organisation
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
RMCG	Resource Mobilisation Contact Group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	unexploded ordnance