

# Review FAO and IFAD: Strengths and added value for the Dutch food security policy

A case study for the IOB evaluation of the UN for the Dutch development cooperation policy

Ferko Bodnár, IOB final version, 11 September 2017

## Table of Contents

|       |  |    |
|-------|--|----|
| 1     | Objective of this review: why FAO and IFAD? .....                              | 1  |
| 2     | Methodology: Literature review and interviews.....                             | 1  |
| 3     | Why do the Netherlands support FAO and IFAD?.....                              | 2  |
| 3.1   | Dutch food security policy .....   | 2  |
| 3.2   | The role of multilateral organisations in the Dutch food security policy.....  | 2  |
| 3.3   | Dutch funding to IFAD and FAO .....  | 3  |
| 3.4   | Expectations of FAO.....   | 5  |
| 3.5   | Expectations of IFAD.....  | 5  |
| 3.6   | Additional evaluation criteria.....  | 6  |
| 4     | Results, living up to expectations: FAO .....                                  | 6  |
| 4.1   | FAO's effectiveness and relevance for Dutch food security policy.....          | 6  |
| 4.1.1 | Global platform.....   | 7  |
| 4.1.2 | Knowledge and data broker .....  | 7  |
| 4.1.3 | Policy dialogue at national level.....   | 8  |
| 4.1.4 | Field implementation of projects .....   | 9  |
| 4.1.5 | Nutrition.....   | 10 |
| 4.1.6 | Public private partnerships.....   | 11 |
| 4.2   | Organisational functioning of the FAO.....                                     | 11 |
| 4.2.1 | Efficiency.....  | 12 |
| 4.2.2 | Sustainability.....  | 12 |
| 4.2.3 | Collaboration.....   | 12 |
| 4.2.4 | Monitoring and evaluation.....   | 13 |
| 5     | Results, living up to expectations: IFAD.....                                  | 14 |
| 5.1   | IFAD's effectiveness and relevance for Dutch food security policy .....        | 14 |
| 5.1.1 | Support to large scale field implementation, with attention for climate change | 14 |
| 5.1.2 | Targeting smallholder farmers in remote rural areas.....                       | 16 |
| 5.1.3 | Policy dialogue at national level, advocating for smallholder farmers.....     | 16 |
| 5.1.4 | Public private partnerships.....   | 17 |
| 5.1.5 | Nutrition.....   | 18 |
| 5.2   | Organisational functioning of IFAD .....                                       | 18 |
| 5.2.1 | Efficiency.....  | 18 |
| 5.2.2 | Sustainability.....  | 19 |
| 5.2.3 | Collaboration.....   | 20 |
| 5.2.4 | Monitoring and evaluation.....   | 20 |
| 6     | Dutch influence on FAO and IFAD.....   | 21 |

|         |  |    |
|---------|--|----|
| 7       | Conclusions.....   | 22 |
| 7.1     | FAO.....   | 22 |
| 7.2     | IFAD.....  | 23 |
| 7.3     | Public Private Partnerships in FAO and IFAD .....  | 23 |
| 8       | Discussion and recommendations: Dutch aid architecture and the role for FAO and IFAD ..... | 24 |
| Annexes |  |    |
|         | Annex 1. Literature .....  | 26 |
|         | Annex 2. Persons interviewed.....  | 27 |
|         | Annex 3. Overview of FAO evaluation findings .....   | 29 |

## 1 Objective of this review: why FAO and IFAD?

This review will answer the question: why does the Netherlands support the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for the Dutch food security policy objective, and do these organisations live up to the expectations?

This study serves as one of the case studies that contribute to the policy review of the Dutch contribution to the United Nations (UN) for the Dutch international cooperation priorities: food security, water, sexual and reproductive health and rights, and security and rule of law. This review should thus not be read as an evaluation of FAO and IFAD, but only as case study with illustrative examples of activities related to the Dutch food security policy. Both organisations do much more than just that.

## 2 Methodology: Literature review and interviews

An inventory was made of the expected specific strengths and roles for each organisation, as mentioned in Dutch policy documents, which could be validated and discussed in evaluation reports and interviews.

For each organisation, a very short review<sup>1</sup> was done of a limited number of evaluation reports, in 2016.

- For FAO, a selection of 13 evaluation reports was made based on the following criteria: the evaluation took place between 2012 and 2016; food security was a major project objective; the project took place in one of the 15 Dutch partner countries, or the evaluation was an organisation review or considered a ‘system function’ (knowledge, policy). Besides, a few recently evaluated Dutch-funded FAO projects in Palestinian Territories and Bangladesh were included.
- For IFAD, the IFAD-9 Impact Synthesis, the mid-term review of the ASAP programme, the Report on IFAD’s Development Effectiveness of 2014<sup>2</sup>, the Annual Reports on Results and Impact (ARRI) of IFAD’s Financed Operations 2015, and independent country programme evaluation reports for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda<sup>4</sup> were used.

A list of evaluations reviewed is presented in Annex x.

A limited number of interviews were undertaken. In Rome, interviews were held with staff from FAO and IFAD, as well as the Dutch Permanent Representation (PR) and a representative of DFID<sup>3</sup>. In the four case study countries where IOB currently evaluates the food security programme<sup>4</sup>, interviews were held with FAO and IFAD staff and with Dutch staff at the embassies. In the Netherlands, interviews were held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A list of interviewees is presented in Annex 2.

---

<sup>1</sup> The evaluation reviews of FAO and IFAD were partly commissioned to KIT and Chris Bosch respectively.

<sup>2</sup> These correspond to self-evaluations

<sup>3</sup> DFID was chosen because of the collaboration with the Netherlands, e.g. in the IFAD ASAP programme.

<sup>4</sup> IOB has chosen these four countries as case studies for the food security policy evaluation.

## 3 Why do the Netherlands support FAO and IFAD?

### 3.1 Dutch food security policy

Since 2011, food security is one of the four Dutch development policy spearheads. The food security policy letter of 2011, jointly written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, combines food security objectives with private sector development objectives. It is set around four pillars: 1) increasing sustainable agricultural production, 2) improving access to nutritious food, 3) improving markets, and 4) improving the business climate. The follow-up policy letter of 2014, also a combined effort of the two ministries, has dropped private sector development as explicit objective, but maintains a focus on private sector development in a broader ‘Dutch diamond approach’: the collaboration between governments, private sector, knowledge institutes and civil society, as an approach to achieve agricultural development and food security. This new policy letter has three sub-objectives: 1) eradicating existing hunger and malnutrition, 2) promoting inclusive and sustainable growth in the agricultural sector, and 3) creating ecologically sustainable food systems.

### 3.2 The role of multilateral organisations in the Dutch food security policy

The first food security policy letter of 2011 explains that the bilateral activities are more suitable for working on the productive, market oriented, private sector driven agricultural development, with a role for Dutch knowledge institutes and private sector, while multilateral organisations are more suitable to address acute food shortages, sustainable food production, and for targeting the less productive, poorer smallholder farmers and people, e.g. through programmes to increase their productivity and market access, and through safety net programmes. An example is the World Bank funded Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia, co-funded by the Netherlands. IFAD is also recognised as working with smallholder farmers in remote rural areas. Collaboration and synergy between bilateral and multilateral activities, at partner country level, is to be assured by the Dutch embassies. IFAD is mentioned as one of the organisations for their role in creating synergy between activities at country level. FAO is mentioned as one of the organisations that can be influenced by the Netherlands to increase its effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. Both FAO and IFAD (and WFP and WB) are mentioned for their role in the global strategic discussion about agriculture, food security and climate change, as follow up of the international conference on this subject, organised by the Netherlands. The second food security policy letter of 2014 is aligned with the Zero Hunger Challenge, plead for by the UN. UN organisations specifically mentioned that will contribute to the three Dutch sub-objectives are: UNICEF for addressing immediate nutrition problems (sub-objective 1), the Committee on Food Security (supported by FAO, IFAD and WFP) for the guidelines on responsible agricultural investments and on land tenure that should guide private sector investment (sub-objective 2), and the FAO-hosted Global Alliance for Climate Smart Agriculture (sub-objective 3).

Another distinction, not mentioned in the Dutch policy letters but explained for example in the Dutch Multi Annual Strategic Plan for Ethiopia (2012-2015), is between ‘tankers’: large national programmes, often lead by government together with multilateral organisations, and ‘speedboats’ or ‘tugboats’: flexible, innovative, often bilateral projects, with involvement of Dutch knowledge institutes, of which the results strategically feed in larger national programmes.

### 3.3 Dutch funding to IFAD and FAO

The total Dutch ODA expenditure on food security<sup>5</sup> is about €290 million per year on average (2012-2015). Of this, 55% is spent through central funding from The Hague, and 45% is delegated to the Dutch embassies, mainly in the in 15 partner countries. The division over different channels for the period 2012 – 2015 is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Division of expenditure on food security over different channels

|   | million euros | % of total |
|---|---------------|------------|
| NGO's   | 280           | 24%        |
| Multilateral organisations (incl. World Bank, international research) | 271           | 23%        |
| UN organisations  | 183           | 16%        |
| Dutch research and private sector                                     | 161           | 14%        |
| Governments   | 155           | 13%        |
| Private sector in public private partnerships                         | 108           | 9%         |
| Total   | 1,158         | 100%       |

Source Own calculations based on Dashboard/Piramide

Of the 16% spent on UN organisations, 73% is spent on FAO and IFAD (Table 2).

Table 2. Dutch ODA expenditure (million Euros) to FAO and IFAD 2012-2015 for food security<sup>6</sup>

|      | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | Total |
|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| FAO  | 3.9  | 5    | 8.5  | 7    | 24.4  |
| IFAD | 38.2 | 25.9 | 22.3 | 22.5 | 108.9 |

Source Own calculations based on Dashboard/Piramide

The Netherlands is a small donor for FAO, it ranked 19<sup>th</sup> in in 2014. Contributions consist of core and voluntary contributions. For FAO, 20% of MFA contributions under the food security policy article 2012-2015 are core contributions, the rest are voluntary contributions to various projects provided by the Dutch embassies in partner countries. FAO was chosen to implement projects in South Sudan because of the politically sensitive context, in Palestinian Territories because of good collaboration with the authorities, and in Bangladesh because a good FAO proposal fitted well in start of the Dutch food security programme.

The Netherlands is a large donor for IFAD, ranking second in 2012-2015.

For IFAD, 69% was core contribution, the rest were voluntary contributions to a few projects, provided both from The Hague and from Dutch embassies in partner countries. See Table 3 for an overview of the FAO and IFAD projects funded from voluntary contributions. The funding to IFAD Agricultural Smallholder Adaptation Programme (ASAP) is thematically earmarked but leaves flexibility to IFAD on how to use this. IFAD is mainly the administrator of the Global Land Tool Network, transferring the Dutch contribution to UN Habitat and UNOPS to support the network.

<sup>5</sup> This is limited to the strict 'food security' labelled expenditure, and excludes expenditure on e.g. sustainable water use, private sector development, or capacity building of civil society organisations, which may also contribute to food security.

<sup>6</sup> This table excludes the 50% core contribution of 7.5m per year by the Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs to FAO that counts as ODA. Also, contributions to FAO and IFAD not contributing to the food security policy article are excluded here as well. Total MFA expenditures in the period 2012-2015 channeled through FAO and IFAD are EUR 34.6 and EUR 109.8 respectively. The percentages core financing with respect to total expenditures are 29% and 68% for FAO and IFAD respectively.



Table 3. FAO and IFAD projects funded from voluntary contributions (million Euros)

|      | Project name                                  | Country                 | Expenditure 2012-2015 |
|------|---|-------------------------|-----------------------|
| FAO  | Food Safety                                   | Bangladesh              | 10.4                  |
|      | Gaza Buffer Zone                              | Palestinian territories | 0.4                   |
|      | High Value Crops                              | Palestinian territories | 5.5                   |
|      | SPS Capacity Building MoA                     | Palestinian territories | 0.5                   |
|      | Area C Agricultural Wells                     | Palestinian territories | 1.4                   |
|      | Potato and maize value chain                  | Nicaragua               | 1.2                   |
|      | Mission MoA Program                           | Palestinian territories | 0.01                  |
| IFAD | JBA IFAD LDP S-Sudan                          | South Sudan             | 4.2                   |
|      | Agricultural Smallholder Adaptation Programme | Worldwide               | 20.0                  |
|      | Global Land Tool Network                      | Worldwide               | 9.6                   |

### 3.4 Expectations of FAO

Both FAO and IFAD have clear mandates and strategic objectives that are not contested; they clearly contribute to the Dutch food security objectives. Differences are found in the particular roles they play and their approaches to achieve these overall objectives.

Brief, FAO plays a larger role in the convening, normative and knowledge function for global agriculture and food security policies and strategies. The strengths, as mentioned in the Dutch policy documents, including a few additional points mentioned relevant for the Dutch food security policy are presented in Box 1 (FAO Scorecard, 2015).

Box 1. Strengths and roles of FAO according to the Dutch 'FAO Scorecard, 2015'

1. Global platform for policy and strategy on agriculture and food security, as neutral, honest broker (e.g. through CFS)\*. This includes assuring environmental sustainability and climate smart agriculture.
2. Knowledge and data collection, generation and dissemination. For the Dutch policy: the global alliance for climate smart agriculture, hosted by FAO; and information and analyses for international trade, are relevant for the link with trade and investment.
3. Normative: guidelines, standards (e.g. in food safety or plant disease control). \*\*
4. Policy dialogue and technical support to governments at national level, being neutral, honest broker between governments and other developing partners.
5. Implementation and / or coordination of field level projects.

\* The Committee on Food Security is hosted by FAO, and has support from, and works in cooperation with, FAO, IFAD and WFP.

\*\* FAO's normative work, includes the Codex Alimentarius with WHO, and safety standards for plant protection and animal health, are not evaluated as separate subject in this study.

### 3.5 Expectations of IFAD

Brief, IFAD, a hybrid between a UN specialised agency and an international financial institution, plays a more important role in supporting and funding national governments in field-level implementation, directly focusing on smallholder farmers. The strengths, as mentioned in the Dutch policy documents, including a few additional points mentioned relevant for the Dutch food security policy are presented in Box 2 (IFAD Scorecard, 2015).



## Box 2. Strengths and roles of IFAD, according to the Dutch ‘IFAD scorecard, 2015’

1. Support national government with large-scale, long-term implementation of agriculture development projects. For Dutch policy, climate adaptation is relevant.
2. Targeting smallholder farmers in remote rural areas, hardly served by others. For the Dutch policy, reducing rural poverty and linking farmers to markets are relevant.
3. Policy dialogue at national level. This includes advocacy for smallholders.
4. Concessional loans, with co-funding from government, result in good embedding in national policy and strong commitment of national government.\*

\* Concessional loans are discussed under ‘efficiency’ further on.

### 3.6 Additional evaluation criteria

Two points of interests for Dutch policy, not specifically mentioned in the ‘Scorecards’, are added to the Dutch expectations for both organisations:

1. Nutrition
2. Public Private Partnerships

These two points, together with the before mentioned strengths for each organisation will be reviewed under ‘*effectiveness and relevance for the Dutch food security policy*’

In addition, for each organisation the ‘*organisational functioning*’ is assessed, considering:

1. Efficiency
2. Sustainability
3. Collaboration with other development partners
4. Monitoring and evaluation

Because different people may have different opinions, these different sources are grouped and presented as 1) review of evaluations, 2) interview with FAO or IFAD staff, and 3) interview with others. In summary tables, their opinions are qualified as positive, neutral or negative.

## 4 Results, living up to expectations: FAO

### 4.1 FAO’s effectiveness and relevance for Dutch food security policy

A summary of our appreciation, based on documentation and interviews with insiders (FAO) and outsiders (Dutch ministry and embassy staff, others), is presented in the table below. In the subsequent sections, the appreciation of each function is further explained. An overview of the 13 reviewed FAO evaluations with our appreciation on the evaluation criteria is presented in Annex 3.

|                                      | Review of evaluations | FAO staff | Others      | Comment   |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------|---|
| 1. Global platform                   | ++                    | ++        | ++          | Convener, honest broker                                       |
| 2. Knowledge and data broker         | ++                    | +         | ++          | Important, requires modernisation                             |
| 3. Policy dialogue at national level | + / -                 | ++        | + / -       | Good position, not always used                                |
| 4. Field implementation of projects  | + / -                 | ++        | + / -       | Strategic, filling gaps, or fragmented?                       |
| 5. Nutrition                         | +                     | +         | +           | New on agenda; nutrition sensitive agriculture; collaboration |
| 6. Public Private partnerships       | -                     | +         | - / neutral | Slowly starting; mandate?                                     |

#### 4.1.1 Global platform

The evaluations of FAO's knowledge function (2015), of FAO's work on policies (2012), and the MOPAN review (2014) confirm and appreciate FAO's strength and unique role as a global convener, of governments, experts, scientists, private sector and civil society in the field of agriculture and food security.

FAO and development partners consider this as one of FAO's main tasks. FAO is seen as the main global convenor on food security and agriculture and food policies. FAO is a neutral partner, legitimate because of its state membership, and able to depoliticise issues by bringing together scientists and technical experts, and policy makers and NGOs.

FAO explains that the new strategic framework built around five strategic programmes, accompanied by a clear results framework, helps FAO to focus on larger, global strategic issues. Examples are the convening work on subjects as food losses and climate change. An example of a new, ambitious initiative, pointed at by FAO, is the eradication of sheep and goat plague, which will require a large budget (\$16 billion) over a long time (15 years) and complex international collaboration. During the previous strategic framework, built around 11 technical areas of work, FAO was less focused: anyone with an idea could look for funding and implement it.

The Netherlands appreciates, in addition to the aforementioned, the function of depoliticising subjects, e.g. about biotechnology or agro-ecology, by bringing together scientists and policy makers. As the world is becoming more globalised and polarised, this function remains very much needed. FAO could even show more leadership in this, e.g. on the recent discussion on anti-microbial resistance.

The Committee on Food Security is hosted by FAO, but is in principle equally supported and represented by FAO, IFAD and WFP, with membership of governments, international organisations, private sector and civil society organisations. Two recent products of a global consultation process by CFS are relevant also for the Dutch emphasis of including international private sector in trade and investment in agricultural development:

- Principles for Responsible Agricultural Investment in Agriculture and Food Systems (RAI, 2014), and
- Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forest in the context of national food security (VGGT, 2012)

#### 4.1.2 Knowledge and data broker

The review found that the knowledge function was one of the most appreciated functions of FAO. The evaluation of FAO's contribution to knowledge on food and agriculture (2015) is positive about FAO's knowledge function, the publications and databases, which serves international organisations, national governments, research and academia well, but which serves other uses in developing countries less well, because of limited internet connection and because of limited context-specific information and services. Especially FAO's technical content is appreciated and acknowledged, and contributes to national policy, strategy and programmes. FAO's learning products are also appreciated. According to the evaluation, more attention could be given to knowledge content on social issues (e.g. inclusiveness, gender) and environmental issues. Recently, FAO has given more emphasis on climate change and environmental issues.

The review and interviews acknowledge the technical support function by FAO staff that can draw from regional and Rome based expertise. Knowledge sharing within FAO has improved since it adopted a knowledge strategy in 2011. According to some, FAO risks losing credibility of its knowledge function, partly because other organisations (e.g. research institutes) have become stronger in disseminating their knowledge. There is scope for collaboration between the CG research institutes as knowledge generators and FAO as knowledge broker, because FAO has better outreach in developing countries because of its widespread network of country offices.

Both the review and all interviews stress the need for FAO to further modernise and shift from a knowledge generator<sup>7</sup> to a knowledge broker. In an era of data and information overload, FAO should play three complementary roles:

- Continue with knowledge generation, especially the flagship publications done with others, such as the annual State of Food and Agriculture, FAO's statistical database, or the new (Dutch supported) database with remote sensing data on water use in agriculture. In contrast, classic FAO publications of pure technical knowledge loses relevance because of the many other organisations (research, universities) also working on this.
- A knowledge portal, referring to credible organisations and / or credible publications of others, through a peer review process managed by FAO. This could include a database of case study experiences (or references to these cases) for exchange and learning.
- A discussion and question & answer forum, moderated by FAO. This is most likely an easy to use knowledge function for smaller organisations in developing countries. FAO has started such function, still on a small scale, for example the TECA platform, combining simple technical information documents with a Q&A function, for producer groups in the South.

#### 4.1.3 Policy dialogue at national level

The review and interviews confirm FAO's role in policy dialogue at national level. FAO is in good contact with national government, seen as neutral and honest broker. FAO often has staff within ministries and other government offices, and often co-chairs agricultural technical working groups, in which government and other developing partners meet. FAO brings up new issues under the attention of government, such as climate smart or nutrition sensitive agriculture. Sometimes, the government sets policy and asks FAO for practical advice how to implement this. FAO has also supported national government decision support by setting up strategic information systems. The evaluation of FAO's role and work in food and agricultural policy (2012), which was very positive about FAO's role in the global policy debate, was critical about the role FAO had played in national policy dialogue (in the period before 2012). The evaluation concluded that, although FAO was better positioned than any other organisation for policy dialogue, it did not always play the leading role it could and should play. Policy work was of uneven quality, due to a limited willingness and ability at country level, and insufficient 'policy intelligence' at FAO HQ that the country teams could rely on. There was limited accountability and incentives to deliver on policy advice at country level, according to the evaluation. Since then, the situation has improved and FAO has put more emphasis on national policy dialogue: the EU-funded FIRST project has placed policy experts in 34 country offices; and the strategic programmes, 1, 3 and 5 put more emphasis on policy dialogue.

---

<sup>7</sup> FAO still has a 'knowledge generation' role to play as well, valuing the experiences in the application of projects and policies. This requires a good internal knowledge management system.

During country visits, FAO explained that, because of its status, it cannot use a confronting style of dialogue towards governments as some of the other development partners can. This is sometimes mentioned as a weakness by other development partners. In some cases, the World Bank, the EU, or IFPRI, are more important in policy dialogue than FAO.

At the same time, development partners could involve FAO more strategically addressing policy issues that an individual development partner cannot easily address. For example, in Bangladesh it was difficult for the Dutch embassy to get the government interested in discussing the poor performance of the Bangladesh Water Development Board, actually hampering field implementation of several water management projects. The Dutch embassy could ask FAO to bring up this same issue, that would likely find a more willing and receptive government. In other words, developing partners could make more use of FAO, and complement bilateral operational field work with strategic policy dialogue through FAO.

The EU-funded FIRST project allows FAO to assist governments in setting policies, after which these governments could apply for larger grants for implementation. The World Bank has a similar policy – investment strategy with FAO. The Monitoring and Analysing Food and Agricultural Policies project (co-financed by the Netherlands) assists national governments also to analyse (simulate *ex ante*) the consequences of policy options, and thus to better inform policy making.

#### 4.1.4 Field implementation of projects

These include projects with direct impact on final beneficiaries, e.g. farmers, and projects working on capacity building, e.g. government or non-government organisations, with hopefully indirect effects on final beneficiaries. The review of evaluations is generally more positive about the capacity building projects than about the projects working directly with beneficiaries. The review is partly positive about the field implementation, e.g. where FAO responds well in emergencies, or where others leave an implementation gap. FAO country programmes are well aligned with national government policies. Several project evaluations show limited attention to gender and inclusiveness, which had the lowest score of all criteria reviewed, in spite of the FAO network of gender experts and gender focal points. The review is also partly negative about field implementation because of the large number of fragmented and scattered projects, many of which are not clearly contributing to national level results. This fragmented approach partly caused by the different requests from different donors. From the review and interviews it becomes clear that other donors are especially positive about FAO's role in emergencies, bridging relief to development, and working on resilience of vulnerable farmers.

At country level, most FAO staff is in favour of fieldwork if it contributes to national strategies and policies. (Note that the majority<sup>8</sup> of FAO staff depends on voluntary project financing) A practical example: in Rwanda, cassava brown streak disease was found in 2014. FAO discussed with government, brought in tolerant varieties from Uganda, and tested and disseminated these in the subsequent years. However, a Dutch funded, IFDC implemented cassava project was unaware of this and still struggled with this disease in 2016. In is unclear who was not being attentive: FAO, the government or IFDC.

---

<sup>8</sup> The non-project FAO country budget only covers core office staff: a representative, two national assistant representatives, and admin staff.

The Dutch embassy in Bangladesh supported FAO to develop a food safety policy, support a modernised, risk based food inspection system, and operationalise the food safety laboratory funded by a previous EU project. This was piloted this with a limited number of food enterprises and municipal authorities – a good example of how field-level work combines global normative work, national policy dialogue and capacity building, and strategically chosen work on-the-ground.

The balance between FAO's global strategic work and FAO's country level project implementation on the ground is much debated.

- On the one hand, some would like to see FAO focusing on the strategic global tasks that other organisations are not performing. FAO would be too expensive and bureaucratic to do field work that other, national or local organisations can do as well.
- Others see a role for both types of work, as long as the relatively small scale, innovative fieldwork has a clear link with, and informs strategic and policy related work, at least at national level. According to some, the half-a-million budget projects under FAO core finance are too small for this. Since FAO adopted the strategic framework, smaller fieldwork projects that do not clearly fit in FAO's strategies are no longer be pursued.
- There might be a role for FAO (and for UN organisations in general) in larger scale field-level projects, for two reasons:
  - to coordinate and manage between government, donors, and implementing organisations – in case the government does not play that role – bringing in management, technical expertise and financial accountability;
  - to fill implementation gaps left by others, e.g. in relief work in certain areas.Bottom line for some respondents is: whoever can do the job best, rather than whose mandate is it, should do the job. 'With the 2030 SDG we are in a post-mandate world'.

The discussion has also changed over time. Some years ago, typically the OECD countries wanted FAO to focus on global strategic issues, while the G77 countries were more interested in country level projects concretely improving their situation. This has converged, since several middle-income countries share, and take a larger role in, global strategic concerns as well.

#### 4.1.5 Nutrition

FAO now has a clear view on nutrition sensitive agriculture. In their document 'Designing nutrition-sensitive agriculture investments' (2015) they rightly start with an analysis of the nutritional situation, then analyse broader causes, including health, sanitation, and food safety, gender and care practices, and only later consider what should be done about it, which may include agriculture besides many other activities. This is a very new approach, and we did not see this yet in the review or in discussions with FAO at country level. In Bangladesh for example, FAO sees production diversification as the practical solution for nutrition sensitive agriculture, which happens to be useful for adapting to climate change as well, but that reasoning had not started with an analysis of nutritional status and broader binding constraints.

It is questioned by some whether FAO should do this food security<sup>9</sup> work beyond agriculture itself, or whether FAO could better collaborate with others, e.g. UNICEF and WHO, that may be more specialised in the food security aspects beyond agriculture. FAO is rightly claiming space for agriculture in the nutrition debate, so far dominated by ministries of health and

---

<sup>9</sup> Food security is defined as food availability, access, utilisation and stability.

related UN organisations such as UNICEF or WHO (for example in Ethiopia). This calls at least for coordination, possibly collaboration. In Rwanda, FAO and the Dutch embassy have lobbied for a food and nutrition secretariat that should connect the silos of the ministry of agriculture and the ministry of health. For the implementation, the Dutch embassy in Rwanda contracted UNICEF for a nutrition programme, in which UNICEF sub-contracted FAO for some of the agricultural activities - a good example of the 'One UN' idea of working.

#### 4.1.6 Public private partnerships

The MOPAN review (2012) found FAO inadequate for its progress towards its objective related to private and public investments in agriculture and rural development. This has changed over the last five years.

According to FAO, it now works in many occasions with private sector, for example with large seed and fertiliser companies, complementing FAO work with public agencies and with farmers in value chain development projects. FAO also works with the private sector in EBRD-funded value chain development projects. FAO is careful not to accept funding from private sector if this could cause a conflict of interest. But there are examples, e.g. Google financing an FAO programme on forest mapping. Private foundations such as BMGF pay FAO for their technical input. An important point in PPP for FAO is to assure the public interests and the interests of small producers, who by nature have a poor negotiating power compared to the private sector.

In Ethiopia, the government is planning 'agro-industrial parks', implemented by the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Agriculture. UNIDO is the lead UN organisation supporting this; FAO does the agriculture and agro-processing feasibility studies.

In Uganda, FAO does not expect too much from public private partnerships and the jobs private sector can create with public funds. It would be better to use public funds to improve the business environment, the basic conditions (e.g. property rights) after which the private sector can develop without subsidies or PPP. FAO in Rome confirms that without a pro-business policy in country, PPP will not be successful. The Dutch embassy in Uganda wanted to work with private sector (and preferably directly with Dutch private sector) for the 'from aid to trade' policy agenda, and therefore preferred not to work with FAO.

Many outside the FAO would like to see FAO more actively collaborating with the private sector. An example of a PPP facility that FAO is already involved in is the recent EU agriculture financing initiative 'AgriFI'. The EU pays FAO for feasibility studies and an analysis of the policy and business environment, then the EU opens a tender for European banks and private sector to invest in agriculture PPP, after which the EU pays FAO for capacity development.

## 4.2 Organisational functioning of the FAO

A summary of our appreciation, based on documentation and interviews with insiders (FAO) and outsiders (Dutch ministry and embassy staff, others), is presented in the table below. In the subsequent sections, the appreciation of each function is further explained.

|                              | Review of evaluations | FAO staff | Others      | Comments                                   |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------|-------------|--|
| 1. Efficiency                | +/-                   | +         | -           | - Scale and outreach;<br>+ improving       |
| 2. Sustainability            | + / -                 |           |             | + Environment;<br>- continuation           |
| 3. Collaboration             | +                     | +         | - / neutral | Limited;<br>country level                  |
| 4. Monitoring and evaluation | - / +                 | +         | -           | - Monitoring;<br>- Evaluation independence |

#### 4.2.1 Efficiency

Generally, the evaluation reports provide little information for a judgment on efficiency. The review shows several examples of low cost-effectiveness of field-level projects due to the small number of beneficiaries. On the other hand, pilot projects that feed strategic discussions should not be judged on the number of direct beneficiaries. The knowledge function evaluation concluded that greater user orientation would increase outreach and cost-effectiveness.

Most respondents are of the opinion that it should be possible to improve FAO's efficiency, but there have been significant improvements since a critical review in 2011. According to FAO, much has improved indeed, and FAO will be forced to improve its efficiency, because funding sources are changing. Core contributions have remained constant, while voluntary contributions, even from middle-income countries, are increasing. Some countries, e.g. Cameroon, Morocco, Emirates, are paying FAO to open up a country office, for technical assistance that complements government investment programmes in agriculture.

#### 4.2.2 Sustainability

The review scores environmental sustainability as good. There is coordination between the technical departments for sustainable natural resource management across the organisation, and FAO promotes environmental sustainability in agricultural production.

However, the sustainability of benefits is questioned. There is uncertainty about continued donor support, lack of an exit-strategy, and lack of a good M&E, partly due to the fragmentation of projects. The review showed examples of low expected sustainability due to low involvement, low capacity, or low commitment of public organisations that were supposed to continue the efforts. A positive example is the food safety project in Bangladesh, where the government progressively took over funding for the laboratory in 2016-2017.

#### 4.2.3 Collaboration

The review gave a few positive examples of collaboration with other development partners. However, there is room for improvement in the collaboration between FAO, IFAD and WFP. More recently in 2016-2017, collaboration between FAO, WFP and IFAD is taking more shape: a joint collaboration pater was presented, and an MoU between FAO and WFP was signed and will be expanded to include IFAD.

Some would like to see at least more collaboration in the country-level food security analysis and strategies, after which each organisation could play their role in further implementation and support to the government. On the other hand, as some others argue, this should not be limited to the Rome based agencies. Other organisations, such as the World Bank or

UNICEF, would be equally important to involve. There is good collaboration on the SDG discussions. A joint paper on the ‘Collaboration among the UN Rome-based agencies delivering on the 2030 agenda’ (2016) confirms their intention to improve on this.

Most agree that collaboration would be useful, but that forcing collaboration at the head quarter level will be too difficult, because of different bureaucratic systems. It will be easier to work together at country level: focus on implementation. There is agreement that collaboration should be result driven; collaboration is not an objective in itself. IFAD confirms this: collaboration does happen at country level and depends on persons’ willingness to collaborate; not on donor incentives. Examples are the cereal initiative in Kenya, where WFP, FAO and IFAD collaborate; and there is FAO-IFAD collaboration on rural finance, gender and land tenure issues. There is even an award for the best collaboration project. At country level, FAO often provides technical support through the FAO ‘Investment Centre’ that complements the financial investments made by the World Bank or IFAD.

There is some frustration at FAO that other UN organisations such as UNDP implement agricultural projects while they could better delegate this to FAO. FAO would like to be hired for IFAD programmes, but that is to be decided by the IFAD loan-taking government, who can hire cheaper consultants. Within FAO there are different opinions about to what extent FAO should market its services and compete with other service providers. Some say FAO can compete, because it serves a niche with a broader view on (complex) agricultural development and has a longer time horizon than consultancy companies.

#### 4.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The review was critical about FAO’s monitoring and reporting. MOPAN, reviewing the period 2010-2013 and thus only looked at result indicators of FAO’s *previous* strategic framework, found that at country level there was limited use of indicators, targets and baseline data, and there was no plausible contribution analysis towards national level results. The strategic and thematic evaluations show good and bad examples, but generally there is a lack of a theory of change and outcome level results. There is inadequate evidence about progress towards organisation-wide results. However, the situation has improved: FAO’s current strategic framework, with its results framework (since 2013), has all elements for a much better M&E.

The review was positive about FAO’s evaluation function. An earlier peer review of FAO’s evaluation function (2011) was positive about the sector wide and policy evaluations, but found that country evaluations were hardly used strategically. In 2014, MOPAN found that the evaluation function was good, independent from technical and operational line mgt. with policies in quality evaluation and good evaluation coverage. The thematic and strategic coverage by evaluations was good; the coverage through country programme evaluations was limited. Note that since 2014, this coverage has increased with FAO’s stronger focus on country programme evaluations.

Before 2005, evaluations were conducted and led by FAO staff. As evaluations became more strategic, member representatives perceived the need for increasing independence in the conduct evaluation. A number of measures were taken, among which, the decisions to have strategic evaluations conducted by external and independent consultants. However, recently,



FAO decided to revert and use FAO in-house evaluation managers<sup>10</sup> for strategic evaluations, in order to increase the relevance of recommendations, and acceptance and use of evaluation results within FAO. However, according to some interviewees, maintaining a high cadre of evaluators as staff may in the end be more expensive than having a smaller evaluation unit commissioning external independent teams. Some interlocutors also raised the risk of losing independence.

Finally and on a positive note, FAO has recently moved from a simplified logframe to a more realistic theory of change approach in its evaluations.

## 5 Results, living up to expectations: IFAD

### 5.1 IFAD's effectiveness and relevance for Dutch food security policy

A summary of our appreciation, based on documentation and interviews with insiders (IFAD) and outsiders, is presented in the table below. In the subsequent sections, the appreciation of each function is further explained.

|   | Review of evaluations | IFAD staff | Others    | Comments                               |
|---|-----------------------|------------|-----------|--|
| 1. Support field implementation; climate change                   | +                     | +          | +         | + Scale, + climate change              |
| 2. Targeting rural smallholders                                   | ++                    | ++         | ++        | + Pro-poor, changed focus              |
| 3. Policy dialogue at national level, advocating for smallholders | + / -                 | + / -      | - neutral | +/- Policy in practice, - invisible    |
| 4. Public private partnerships                                    |                       | +          | +         | + Public Private Producer Partnerships |
| 5. Nutrition  |                       | +          |           | (+) New; nutrition sensitive agric.    |

#### 5.1.1 Support to large scale field implementation, with attention for climate change

IFAD's emphasis is on large-scale field implementation and results for smallholder farmers, which makes it relatively easy to aggregate results. For example, the ongoing projects in 2014 add up to reaching 2.4 million people trained in crop practices, 1.1 million trained in entrepreneurship, 4.8 million active borrowers, 191,000 ha constructed or rehabilitated irrigation scheme and 2.3 million ha common land under improved management (IFAD, 2014). Annually reported results cannot be added up over several years: the same people may be trained again. There is also no aggregation possible over all closed projects, again because the same people may participate in two succeeding projects.

The country evaluation reports for Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda, which are based on available project documentation and evaluations, and additional qualitative field work, score relatively well on impact (score 4 for Uganda and 5 for the other three countries, out of 6). In Bangladesh, positive results were found on production and income. In Ethiopia

<sup>10</sup> Although these are FAO staff, behavioural independence of evaluation managers and evaluators is protected, and their reports are not subject to management clearance.

positive results were found for livestock and agricultural production, but no assessment was done on income or wealth.

The Synthesis of lessons learned from the IFAD-9 Impact Assessment Initiative (2016) tries to aggregate results from about 38 impact evaluations, and link these with the ambitiously formulated indicator: pulling 80 million people out of poverty. It shows on the one hand that indeed results can be aggregated and extrapolated using impact evaluations, but on the other hand that the indicator of pulling x people out of poverty is difficult to report on. Some of the aggregated results confirm the large scale that IFAD programmes work on, between 2010 and 2015 (closed and ongoing projects). Aggregated results have two dimensions: number of beneficiaries, and average effect size per beneficiary (Table 4).

Table 4. Reach and effect size of IFAD programme 2010-2015

| Reach in number of beneficiaries              |             | Effect size*           |        |
|---|-------------|------------------------|--------|
| Persons                                       | 139 million |                        |        |
| Households                                    | 14 million  |                        |        |
| Active borrowers                              | 18 million  |                        |        |
| Voluntary savers                              | 26 million  |                        |        |
| Trained in:                                   |             |                        |        |
| • Crop prod.                                  | 4.4 million |                        |        |
| • Livestock                                   | 1.6 million |                        |        |
| • Business                                    | 1.4 million |                        |        |
| Increased agric. revenue                      | 44 million  | Yields                 | +3.8%  |
|   |             | Agric. Income          | +18.0% |
|   |             | Income                 | +4.0%  |
| Improved assets empowerment, resilience, diet | 10 million  | Asset index            | +6.6%  |
|   |             | Reduced shock exposure | -4.5%  |
|   |             | Diet diversity         | +4.6%  |

\* This selection of impact evaluations have made an effort to quantify the effect that can be attributed to the IFAD intervention. The modest effect found in the year of evaluation may continue in subsequent years, and is hoped to assist producers to move out of poverty over time.

IFAD responds well to changes in donor objectives, e.g. to the desired emphasis on climate smart agriculture (DFID, Netherlands, other donors) and on nutrition (Canada). In both cases, additional funds were made available as grant to pilot and streamline climate and nutrition in their loan-financed programmes.

The Mid Term Review (2015) and many of the interviewed people are very positive about the Adaptation of Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP). IFAD was initially not that interested in climate adaptation. IFAD strategically uses grants from the ASAP, to make the loan-funded programmes more climate smart. For example, ASAP was used in Bangladesh to add a project component on a flood early warning system to a large infrastructure programme. In Ethiopia, an ASAP project component cares for 5 ha watershed protection for each 1 ha (loan funded) irrigation work. In Northern Uganda, ASAP funded a component on soil and water conservation and a drought/flood early warning system, as additions to a (loan-funded) agricultural production project. The ASAP grant gives the flexibility to IFAD to add issues on the agenda that the government is initially not very interested in such as climate change, or to hire external expertise for studies that will benefit a loan programme.

### 5.1.2 Targeting smallholder farmers in remote rural areas

The review confirms IFAD's focus on remote rural areas, targeting smallholder farmers, as highly relevant. IFAD spends 53% of its resources in the countries that are in the top quartile of the poverty index including large amounts to big countries with high absolute poverty such as India, Ethiopia and Pakistan.

IFAD often works in remote and difficult areas, where others often don't work, for example the flood prone areas in Northeast Bangladesh where IFAD works on village level protection, while others work on large scale infrastructure. Another example is the pastoral area in Ethiopia, where other development partners don't work. In principle, IFAD works with smallholder farmers. In a few exceptional cases, IFAD works in estate – out-growers schemes, e.g. with oil palm in Uganda. The target group has shifted a little, from the ultra-poor subsistence farmers to poor but productive farmers, with a per capita income of 1-4 \$ per day. This means that social safety nets will be needed for (non-productive) ultra-poor. IFAD supports smallholder farmers in the formation of groups and cooperatives, more than FAO or the World Bank do.

Currently there is a debate about whether IFAD should attract additional funding which it could lend to middle-income countries. These loans would be less concessional and costs less ODA. (The most concessional loans have a 60% ODA cost). This may leverage other additional funds. According to IFAD, this should increase the availability for poorest countries of IFAD's core resources. Some fear that this could undermine the focus on smallholder farmers in poor countries. Others welcome the idea to serve middle income countries as long as this does not reduce the loans available for poorest countries, for example by having different types of loans for different types of countries as the World Bank has. ASAP-2 is being used as grants for the poorest countries only. The Green Climate Fund will be initially a source of co-financing for technical assistance grants- in the future IFAD may also seek access to its loans.

The review mentions the emphasis IFAD gives to gender. There is a gender strategy (2011). Data about beneficiaries are gender disaggregated and show that the majority of beneficiaries are women.

Problems can arise when investments in land are made and where land tenure is unclear. IFAD is collaborating with the International Land Coalition to address land tenure issues including in Uganda where former landowners contested the ownership due to increase in the value of the land after they sold it to the new owners.

### 5.1.3 Policy dialogue at national level, advocating for smallholder farmers

The review mentions that IFAD's programmes contributed to significant changes in national development policies and programs (policy impacts), and/or system reforms. IFAD works with government and other stakeholders on a Country Strategic Opportunity Programme (COSOP), assuring alignment of the IFAD programme in a broader government for poverty reduction and rural development. IFAD has successfully mainstreamed gender, environment, climate change, and food and nutrition security. IFAD in Ethiopia sees itself as easily approachable and flexible. Policy dialogue, or engagement, is something that IFAD has recently given more emphasis to, and all draft COSOPs are reviewed to ensure that they contain a strategy for policy engagement. That policy engagement is usually in relation to the implementation of programmes, so on a more practical and strategic level than the more normative policy level FAO works on. Typically, FAO is more present in UN working

groups, and IFAD (if at all present) more in technical working groups. For example, when developing the COSOP in Ethiopia, an inventory was made of policy gaps, making use of experiences in other countries. Some suggested that IFAD could perhaps better partner with others with better in-country presence, e.g. the World Bank or FAO, to work on policy dialogue. IFAD could then bring in specific smallholder interests and issues e.g. policies on farmer cooperatives or rural finance. IFAD is asked by governments (especially of middle-income countries) for its technical expertise that accompanies the loan.

Although IFAD spends enough time (often 1-2 years) with government on a new IFAD programme, IFAD plays a minor role in coordination with other donors and the broader policy dialogue, simply because of their limited presence in country. This limited presence is a deliberate choice that improves IFAD's efficiency: IFAD does not have an in-country office in all countries, and even where they have, this is often limited to 1-3 people. The 2015 ARRI showed that programme performance was better in countries with an IFAD country office than in countries without a country office.

IFAD would like to influence government policies, for example creating more space for private sector in Ethiopia, which would need joint development partner lobbying at the government. IFAD strives to represent the interest of smallholder farmers in the discussion with government.

Some suggest that IFAD could do more on policy dialogue, especially when linked to the implementation of their programmes. For example, when working on (local) value chain development, IFAD could contribute to the creation for more space for the private sector and a better business climate (bureaucracy, taxation). When working with private sector, IFAD could do more to pull the CFS guidelines (Responsible Agricultural Investment, Voluntary Guidelines on Land Tenure).

#### 5.1.4 Public private partnerships

IFAD has moved from supporting smallholder subsistence farmers to productive small farmers that can be linked to the market. For value chain development, IFAD does work with farmer organisations, business and even a few international companies, assuring the market demand. IFAD had developed a private sector strategy. The current IFAD president is in favour of PPP. It now has adopted the Public Private (smallholder) *Producer* Partnership (PPPP) concept. IFAD also works with NGOs, for example in South Sudan, but experiences have not always been good, because NGO also have their own interests.

An example of a PPPP is the development of the oil palm sector on Kalangala Island in Uganda, training smallholder farmers and financing oil mills and a processor. IFAD has recently signed an MoU with Unilever, which seems to work since it went beyond the CSR intentions to practical procurement and implementation. Some emphasise considering also partnerships with local private sector, which are easier to develop than PPP with multinationals. IFAD has started using other funds, e.g. KfW, and is working with private foundations and the private sector. IFAD is working with the Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) in the Better Cotton Initiative in India, and is exploring opportunities in Nigeria and Ghana. Key is to ensure a proper balance towards the interests of the private sector and of smallholder farmers, in which IFAD is often playing a role of broker. IFAD has also explored ways to attract resources from new donors t however, it is not in a position to provide them with some kind of representation similar to traditional donors.

### 5.1.5 Nutrition

IFAD responded quickly to the request and funds from Canada to pay more attention to nutrition, in 2013. There was some reluctance at IFAD initially, but it quickly became clear that nutrition was already a logical part in IFAD's mandate, referred to in its Basic Texts, the Agreement Establishing IFAD, a 'missing link' between agriculture and rural development, and reducing hunger. Nutrition sensitive projects would not be that much different, but simply cleverer, from what IFAD was doing already. IFAD employed two additional staff and pays for training of the pool of consultants working for IFAD to pilot and streamline nutrition in IFAD's portfolio. All projects will be screened on nutrition effects, and 33% of the portfolio should clearly contribute to improved nutrition. IFAD projects can contribute to nutrition by choosing nutritious crops, e.g. orange flesh sweet potato instead of tobacco; by increasing income; by reducing postharvest losses; and by creating nutrition awareness, also through other organisations. IFAD collaborates with research (CG, WUR) on 'Agriculture for Nutrition and Health'.

Countries, especially in Africa, have already policies in place for nutrition, but lack practical strategies and programmes to work on it. For example, in many countries the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Agriculture are not working together on nutrition. In some cases, IFAD can refer governments to commitments they have already made, e.g. for Scaling Up Nutrition. In the new IFAD-10 programme, more emphasis will be given to youth, climate/environment, and nutrition. The latter means that less emphasis be given on oil palm and sugar, and at least a clearer justification be given of how a programme will contribute to nutrition.

In country, opinions may be different for this new subject. For some IFAD staff, maximising farmer income is still the best, possibly complemented by awareness about nutrition by others.

## 5.2 Organisational functioning of IFAD

A summary of our appreciation, based on documentation and interviews with insiders (IFAD) and outsiders, is presented in the table below. In the subsequent sections, the appreciation of each function is further explained.

|                              | Review of evaluations | IFAD staff | Others | Comments                               |
|------------------------------|-----------------------|------------|--------|--|
| 1. Efficiency                | +                     | ++         |        | + Loans,<br>+ cost-benefit analysis    |
| 2. Sustainability            | + / -                 | +          | +      | + Environment,<br>+/- continuation     |
| 3. Collaboration             | +                     | +          | -      | + co-finance;<br>- in-country presence |
| 4. Monitoring and evaluation | +                     | +          | +      | + Reporting,<br>+ impact evaluation    |

### 5.2.1 Efficiency

The review found the transparent decisions on funding, through the performance based allocation system, as one of IFAD's strengths. The review shows an improvement over time, due to better financial mgt. The loan portfolio increased while administrative costs remained stable. IFAD trains partners in financial management, encouraging a focus on value for money.

IFAD recons its programmes are efficient. IFAD is less efficient than the World Bank, because of the smaller loan portfolio and the specific nature of that portfolio, but more efficient than other UN organisations. The fact that programmes are financed by a loan, negotiated with the Ministry of Finance, assures a more careful budgeting than when providing a grant to the Ministry of Agriculture. The total budget in 2016 was about 1 billion Euros, of which 14% was overhead costs; there are about 600 staff at IFAD. IFAD is well aware of costs per beneficiary, and makes ex-ante calculations of the economic and societal costs – benefits (IRR, ERR) for all programmes. Planning and progress can be slow, often due to a lengthy process of dialogue with government, resulting in delayed disbursements, but this does not necessarily mean that programmes are inefficient.

Interestingly, there is no discussion () about to what extent IFAD loans should contribute to increasing government revenue that can be used to pay back the loan. This is not a discussion with World Bank loans either.

The IFAD results 2010-2015, presented under 5.1.1, can be used to estimate the average benefits per reached beneficiary, and compare this to the average costs per beneficiary (not reported in IFAD report). The costs over the preceding 6 years include the investments by IFAD 8 and 9 plus co-financing. This rough estimate serves as simple illustration of the costs effectiveness (Table 5). The average investment of \$130 per beneficiary would result in an additional income of \$29 per beneficiary, which should sustain over several years. This is considered a reasonable rate of return. As a comparison, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Programme had estimated the needed investment at \$250 per person, based on various (USAID) benchmarks of previous agricultural projects, and hopes to achieve an income increase of 20%.

Table 5. Estimated costs and benefits per benefiting person (2010-2015)

| Costs                                      |                    | Benefits                                 |                |
|--|--------------------|--|----------------|
| IFAD 8 and 9:<br>\$7b + co-financing \$11b | \$18 billion       | Assumed per capita<br>income (\$2 pp pd) | \$730 per year |
| Number of beneficiaries<br>reached         | 139 million        | Income increase after 6<br>years project | 4%             |
| Costs per beneficiary*                     | \$130 over 6 years | Additional income per<br>beneficiary*    | \$29 per year  |

\* This is a representative average from the included impact studies. Some projects made substantially more efforts per household, e.g. the Char Development and Settlement Programme in Bangladesh, which was justified because the benefits were also substantially larger. There are also projects with hardly any or no measureable effects on household income.

### 5.2.2 Sustainability

Environmental sustainability is certainly addressed by IFAD. The annual Results and Development Impact reports show e.g. that 2.3 million ha communal land is under improved management in the projects running in 2014. Besides, IFAD is giving climate change adaptation more emphasis, using the ASAP fund.

About the sustainability of results after IFAD support stops: the review shows that some of IFAD's projects are continued by the government, or receive continued support from the World Bank. Continuation can come from commitment and capacity from government, for example for maintaining infrastructure, but also by setting up commercially interesting activities as value chains and saving and loan schemes. Only in very unusual circumstances

does IFAD support government programmes with free or subsidised products, e.g. fertiliser subsidies, to improve sustainability.

### 5.2.3 Collaboration

Funds invested by IFAD are often being matched by funds from recipient government and from other international finance institutes – an important multiplier effect.

Because IFAD is only modestly present in country, for efficiency reasons, there is limited collaboration with other development partners, and IFAD is not very visible. The Dutch Embassy is sometimes unaware of IFAD's programme even when IFAD implements projects that use ASAP funds to which the Netherlands contribute. In Rwanda, this was also due to the government that decided that it was no longer necessary to discuss IFAD's programme with other development partners. The Dutch embassy in Ethiopia sees possibilities to link up bilateral innovative projects to IFAD's large-scale projects. Coordination with other development partners will improve with in-country offices that IFAD has planned to set up in more countries. This will also help knowledge sharing.

FAO does help IFAD in the design phase of programmes. Once a government implements a programme with an IFAD loan, it is up to the government to hire FAO expertise if they wish. IFAD has asked FAO in a number of fragile states to build capacity in the government / ministry. There is hardly collaboration between FAO and IFAD on climate. There have been attempts to have all UN organisations work together in country analysis and strategy formulation, but results were disappointing. Ideally, coherence and synergy should be assured by the national governments, not only between FAO and IFAD, but also with other development partners.

IFAD acknowledges that technical capacity in government is less a constraint than management capacity and culture. It seems the management and a more meritocratic culture gradually improves with the implementation of IFAD programmes, due to training, exchange and cross country study visits.

IFAD spends 10% of its grants to CGIAR research, for agricultural innovation. EU allocates some research funds through IFAD, that then sets the research agenda. IFAD will move from projects to programmes, with more synergies and more aligned with government policies.

### 5.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation

The review found the reporting discipline as one of IFAD's strengths. IFAD has the Results and Impact Management System (RIMS), which also includes internal evaluation results. IFAD considers its financial accountability system as rigorous, and dares to be more critical to government than other development partners. Because IFAD's programme is relatively homogeneous, in the sense that most projects target final beneficiaries, the annual Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (RIDE) is able to aggregate some of the results organised around the areas of thematic focus. A difficulty is how to aggregate results over different years: beneficiaries may have been trained twice, or may even have benefited of two succeeding projects. IFAD's ambition is to report on cumulative results, and explain the issue of double counting.

The review found an improvement in the evaluation function, with more emphasis on impact evaluation. Results of the Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE) are presented in the Annual Report of Results and Impact (ARRI), with aggregated results, lessons, and

recommendations. IOE has a good reputation, and often give more critical evaluations than external evaluators. IFAD follows the standards of the UN Evaluation Group (2016). In general, ARRI 2015 was critical about the internal M&E system of projects. Evaluation also looks at unintended effects, e.g. smallholders using increased income for the education of their children, or investments by others in roads, clinics and other services, around certain value chain development projects (oil palm in Uganda).

IFAD plans to monitor a panel of beneficiaries for a longer period of 10-15 years, to see longer-term impact.

IFAD has similar discussions about indicators and sample sizes as IOB and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has in the Netherlands. IFAD's RIMS has been simplified from 127 to 45 indicators, up to early outcome level. An impact evaluation is done for 15% of the projects, about 6 each year, with a relatively small sample including a control group (200+200, used to be 450+450). Indicators as child stunting are left out because this is too remote from IFAD's activities and too difficult to attribute to the intervention. Nutrition is now captured by diet diversity. Consumption and expenditure are more interesting – IOB uses this to assess nutrient adequacy – but are considered too much work. The highest level impact used to be the number of people lifted out of poverty, but this turned out a problematic indicator, and has been replaced by 'economic mobility': an increase by at least 10% of income, assets, consumption, or nutrition (depending on the project). There is a small number of thorough impact valuations with a larger sample size (2000 in total), with 2 RCT and 6 quasi-experimental set up.

IEO is not yet satisfied about how evaluations feed in knowledge management, but is positive about how they are used in new programmes. IOE prepares comments on new IFAD policies and countries strategies to the Evaluation Committee and Executive Board when these policies and strategies have been the object of an evaluation. Respondents confirm that IFAD's evaluations function works well: results are more used by management for strategic learning than before. Board and Council do ask questions after an evaluation has come out. All agree that the independence is crucial.

## 6 Dutch influence on FAO and IFAD

The Dutch Ministry and its Permanent Representative in Rome has helped in bringing several issues relevant for Dutch policy, such as climate change, environment, and public private partnerships, under the attention of FAO and IFAD. Before, lobbying by OECD countries could create friction, but that is much less the case now, as the same issues are shared more now among both richer and poorer countries.

FAO. The Netherlands, recognised for its agricultural development, innovation and export, are seen by FAO as an important partner, in spite of the Netherlands being a very modest donor to FAO. For some subjects, the Netherlands collaborate with other donors or through the EU to influence FAO. For example, The Netherlands has been an active member of the EU Working Group on Land which was very instrumental in 2011 and 2012 in a range of negotiations on land governance principles between FAO member states, the Civil Society Mechanism and the Private Sector Mechanism of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS). The Netherlands has played an important role as chair of the CFS in 2013-2014. With the help of FAO, these negotiations resulted in May 2012 to the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Forests, Fisheries in the context of National Food Security.



IFAD. IFAD initiated the ASAP fund, which was welcomed and supported by the UK (DFID), The Netherlands, and others, to add climate change adaptation project components to loan-financed agricultural development projects. This has convinced first IFAD and later national governments of the relevance of climate change adaptation. It is expected that future loan-funded project will include climate change adaptation activities even without an ASAP grant.

Within the Dutch ministry and embassies there is agreement about the importance of collaborating with private sector for food security, but there is no agreement about to what extent and how we should steer UN organisations towards public private partnerships, and what the partnerships should look like. According to some, the Netherlands should steer FAO and IFAD towards PPP, pooling resources for a common goal. According to others, if each donor starts pushing its own development agenda, this would be against the Paris agreement of donor harmonisation and country ownership. Ministry staff (PR and HQ) prefer avoiding too much earmarked funds. Besides, the Netherlands has several other instruments and funds to work with private sector on PPP. It is also possible to work with FAO and IFAD on the business environment, without pooling resources with the private sector in joint programmes. Thinking of the distinction between innovative bilateral pilot projects and large-scale multilateral projects, the Dutch could showcase bilateral PPP as examples to UN organisations.

Most do agree that donors should steer UN organisations on results: provide more funding to those that are more effective and more efficient. More in general, donors can hold UN organisations accountable for results, and also ask UN organisations to hold national governments that they work with accountable, and criticise if government are poorly performing.

## 7 Conclusions

### 7.1 FAO

1. Overall: FAO is relevant for the Dutch food security objectives and lives up to the expectations especially in their role as global platform and knowledge and data broker. FAO could perform better, and is making progress, in policy dialogue at national level and in evaluation. There is less agreement on to what extent FAO should work beyond the strategic level and implement or coordinate field-level projects in country, and to what extent FAO should work on PPP.
2. FAO is important and unique for its neutral convening role in the global debate about agriculture and food security. It is playing that role convincingly in various forums, including the committee food security, and this contributes to the Dutch food security objectives.
3. The knowledge function of FAO is important and appreciated, relevant for the Dutch policy objectives, but needs to be further modernised and expanded from a knowledge generator to a knowledge disseminator and broker.
4. The role FAO plays in partner countries varies, from policy dialogue, strategic coordination, to field-level project implementation.
  - a. FAO is in a unique position for policy dialogue with national governments. This role is appreciated, although there is some room for improvement, and the Netherlands does not always make use of FAO's position in policy dialogue.

- b. FAO also implements a large number of field-level projects, which can be a useful input for strategic and policy dialogue, but which sometimes also has objectives for direct impact on beneficiaries. The latter type of projects have a risk to become fragmented and of limited impact. Most Dutch ministry staff prefer FAO to limit fieldwork to what is really needed for strategic input.
- c. FAO plays a coordination and management role in programme implementation, between government, other donors, and implementing organisations.

## 7.2 IFAD

1. Overall: IFAD is relevant for the Dutch food security objectives and lives up to the expectations, especially in reaching smallholder farmers on a large scale, in working through governments, in being aware of costs-effectiveness, and in monitoring and evaluation. It is relatively small and flexible and responds well to issues brought forward by donors, such as climate change adaptation. IFAD could do better in policy dialogue and coordination with other development partners, which is now constraint by limited in-country presence, and although its performance is improving, one could also argue that these roles be better played by others.
2. IFAD's financing approach, mainly through loans to governments, assures ownership by the government and alignment with national policies, includes a critical review of costs and expected benefits, and has a reasonable rate of return.
3. IFAD's approach is delivering convincing results on a large scale at smallholder farmer level. It contributes to the Dutch objectives agricultural production and markets (sub-objective 2), sustainable agriculture (sub-objective 3) and very likely soon also to nutrition (sub-objective 1). These also contribute to the SDG 1: no poverty, 2: zero hunger, and 13: climate action. IFAD is willingly involving private sector, an approach encouraged by the Netherlands.
4. IFAD responded well to the British and Netherlands concerns about climate change adaptation, and is responding well to Canada's concerns about nutrition. The grant funds established for these issues are a welcome addition to the loans, and enable IFAD to address new issues that are not yet priority for host country governments, and to mainstream these issues in their loan portfolio.

## 7.3 Public Private Partnerships in FAO and IFAD

The Netherlands would like to see a larger role for the private sector. FAO is slowly moving in that direction; IFAD has made more progress already. Some would like to see FAO and IFAD working more with private sector. These paths may be pursued, but there are also other Dutch private sector development instruments to support the private sector. For policy dialogue on improving the business climate, others like the World Bank have much more experience in this and may be more fit for purpose than FAO or IFAD.

## 8 Discussion and recommendations: Dutch aid architecture and the role for FAO and IFAD

One could classify the Dutch activities for food security in four groups that complement each other. The potential role for FAO and IFAD in this aid architecture varies:

1. Activities contributing to international policy dialogue, food security strategies, and an enabling environment for others to work on food security. Although this work is distant from the direct impact on final beneficiaries, the scale of the indirect impact may eventually be large. UN organisations such as FAO, but also trade organisations as WTO, play important roles at this level.
2. Large (national) programmes with direct impact on the rural population, often smallholder farmers. These programmes are often implemented by the government, co-managed by a multilateral organisation, and funded by several donors. IFAD and the World Bank often play such a co-management and funding role, while FAO often plays a technical assistance role. Whether the Netherlands wants to fund such programmes from central funding or from delegated funds, in both cases it makes sense to involve multilateral organisations for a larger impact.
3. Projects working on the enabling environment, not directly working with final beneficiaries, but for example working on national policy, strategic coordination, or business environment. FAO could be a suitable partner for supporting policy and coordination, while improving business environment may be better supported by the World Bank.
4. Innovative projects, testing new practices on a small scale. These will not – and should not try to – impact large numbers of beneficiaries directly, but proven results can be fed in the larger programmes described above. This combination is in Dutch policy language referred to as speedboats (or tugboats) and tankers. These projects are best implemented by research institutes, e.g. CG institutes or universities, and not by a UN organisation. If the Netherlands wants to influence the direction of innovations, e.g. towards more private sector development, or if the Netherlands wants to involve Dutch knowledge and Dutch private sector, bilateral programmes and PPP will be more suitable.

The optimal balance between the latter three types of projects at country level, and the role FAO and IFAD could play, will vary by country. It will depend on the country's and government financial resources, and the government capacities for setting policies and coordinating donors.

Specifically about FAO. The Netherlands and other donors could play a role in encouraging and facilitating the modernisation of the global knowledge function. At country level, the Netherlands (through its embassies) should discuss and decide which role of FAO is advantageous for the Dutch programme in that country, considering the strategic role FAO could play in national policy dialogue<sup>11</sup>. Acknowledging that a coordination role is important, and should ideally be played by the host government, the Netherlands embassy should judge whether such a role (for FAO or any other UN organization) is desired and justified, e.g. in fragile states or in countries with poorly performing governments. Finally a discussion is needed about to what extent the Netherlands would like to support this role, keeping in mind that the Netherlands is a very modest donor of FAO.

---

<sup>11</sup> However, we should not overestimate the role of the Dutch embassies, or other individual donors, in influencing FAO's national policy dialogue. FAO has its broader consultation process with government, beneficiaries, and developing partners.

Blending objectives of innovation and scaling up in one single project can be problematic. Too many projects, including PPP, are supposed to be innovative and to achieve impact on a large scale, in a relatively short project period (3-5 years). This is not realistic and has the risk: on the one hand, large scale projects promote unproven technologies and approaches; and on the other hand: too many small and short duration innovative projects are fragmented, don't feed in larger programmes, and will not achieve impact.

In spite of being slow or bureaucratic, implementing food security programmes through multilateral organisations has the advantages of being better aligned with government policies, embedded in the local context and culture, better targeting smallholder farmers, pooling donor funds and working on coherence within a large scale programme. This will eventually lead to a greater impact than a large number of individually funded, fragmented bilateral projects. The bilateral private sector development channel results in activities of limited scale, usually focussing on one value chain, sometimes even one lead company, with the risk of market distortion, and a risk of not reaching smallholder producers well. Nevertheless, for innovations that require a flexible project approach, bilateral programmes are suitable.

## Annex 1. Literature

### FAO

- FAO 2012. Improvement of food security in cross border districts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, in support of the modernization of agriculture under the NEPAD-CAADP framework – GTFS/RAF/391/ITA [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oed/docs/GTFSRAF391ITA\\_2012\\_ER.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/GTFSRAF391ITA_2012_ER.pdf)
- FAO 2012. Evaluation of FAO's role and work in food and agricultural policy. [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oed/docs/1\\_Evaluation%20of%20FAOs%20role%20and%20work%20in%20food%20and%20agriculture%20policy\\_2012\\_ER.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/1_Evaluation%20of%20FAOs%20role%20and%20work%20in%20food%20and%20agriculture%20policy_2012_ER.pdf)
- FAO, 2013. Evaluation finale de l'Initiative Eau et Sécurité Alimentaire en Afrique (IESA). GCP /RAF/428/SPA, GCP /BKF/049/SPA, GCP /GUI/018/SPA, GCP /MLI/030/SPA, GCP/MLI/029/SPA, GCP /NER/048/SPA, GCP /SEN/059/SPA. [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oed/docs/1\\_IESA%20Evaluation\\_2013\\_ER.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/1_IESA%20Evaluation_2013_ER.pdf)
- FAO, 2013. Support to household food security and livelihood of vulnerable and food insecure farming families - GCP /AFG/061/LUX [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oed/docs/1\\_GCPAFG061LUX\\_2013\\_ER.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/1_GCPAFG061LUX_2013_ER.pdf)
- FAO, 2014. Improving the abilities of Regional Organizations to develop, implement and monitor food security training programs, GCP /GLO/279/GER. [http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd069e.pdf /](http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd069e.pdf/)
- FAO, 2014. Supporting Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa GCP/RAF/454/GER. Final Evaluation Report. [http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/oed/docs/GCPRAF454GER\\_2014\\_ER.pdf](http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/oed/docs/GCPRAF454GER_2014_ER.pdf)
- FAO 2015. Final evaluation of Agriculture and Food Information Systems for Decision Support in South Sudan (AFIS) <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd435e.pdf>
- FAO, 2015. Evaluation of FAO's contribution to knowledge on food and agriculture. <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd904e.pdf>
- FAO, 2016. Final evaluation of the project Education for Effective Nutrition in Action (ENACT) <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd516e.pdf>
- IOB 2016. Evaluation of Dutch Development Cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014 – How to Break the Vicious Cycle. <https://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/publicaties/evaluaties/2016/04/01/412-%E2%80%93-evaluation-of-dutch-development-cooperation-in-the-palestinian-territories-2008-2014-%E2%80%93-how-to-break-the-vicious-cycle>
- Mokoro, 2015. Joint Evaluation of Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and under-nutrition (REACH) 2011-2015 Volume I: <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd907e.pdf> II (Annexes): <http://www.fao.org/3/a-bd906e.pdf>
- MOPAN, 2014. Multilateral Organisation Performance Network. Synthesis report. Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO). [http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/fao2014/FAO-2014-Synthesis\\_Report-eng.pdf](http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/fao2014/FAO-2014-Synthesis_Report-eng.pdf)

### IFAD

- IFAD, 2012. Rwanda Country Programme Evaluation <https://www.ifad.org/evaluation/reports/cpe/tags/rwanda/y2012/1856667>
- IFAD, 2013. Uganda Country Programme Evaluation. <https://www.ifad.org/evaluation/reports/cpe/tags/uganda/y2013/1858123>
- IFAD, 2015. Report on IFAD's Development Effectiveness (2014). <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/116/docs/EB-2015-116-R-10.pdf>
- IFAD, 2015. Adaptation for Smallholder Agriculture Programme (ASAP) Progress review. <https://webapps.ifad.org/members/eb/116/docs/EB-2015-116-R-10.pdf>
- IFAD, 2016. Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia Country Programme Evaluation. <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/355d4949-9949-4d1c-b48f-417ab0f59a7a>
- IFAD, 2016. Bangladesh Country Programme Evaluation. <https://www.ifad.org/evaluation/reports/cpe/tags/bangladesh/y2016/12697919>
- IFAD, 2016 Synthesis of lessons learned from the IFAD-9 Impact Assessment Initiative. <https://www.ifad.org/documents/10180/355d4949-9949-4d1c-b48f-417ab0f59a7a>
- MOPAN, 2013. Multilateral Organisation Performance Network. Institutional Report. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Executive summary. [http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/ifad2013/Mopan\\_IFAD\\_report\\_ExecSum\\_Eng\\_1.pdf](http://www.mopanonline.org/assessments/ifad2013/Mopan_IFAD_report_ExecSum_Eng_1.pdf)

## Annex 2. Persons interviewed

### **Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Netherlands**

Hans Raadschilders, DMM  
Joke Baak, DMM  
Jeroen Rijniers, IGG

### **Dutch Permanent Representative in Rome**

Hans Hoogeveen, Permanent Representative / Ambassador  
Wierish Ramsoekh, deputy Permanent Representative  
Klaas Pieter van der Veen, trainee

### **Dutch embassy staff** (not all participants in group discussions are included)

#### ***Bangladesh:***

Laurent Umans, food security  
Arman Khan, food security  
Khaled Khaleduzzaman, water  
Peter de Vries, water

#### ***Ethiopia***

Jan Willem Nibbering, food security  
Worku Tessema, policy officer food security and sustainable development

#### ***Rwanda***

Pieter Dorst, head of development cooperation  
Brechtje Klandermans, regional programme  
Deo Musabyimana, food security  
Jan Vlaar, water  
Teddie Muffels, agricultural counsellor

#### ***Uganda***

Anno Galema, food security  
Josephat Byaruhanga, food security  
Hans Peter van der Woude, head development cooperation

### **FAO staff in Rome**

Masahira Igarashi, Director of Evaluation,  
Daniel Gustafson, Deputy Director-General (Operations)  
Alexander Jones, Director a.i., South-South Cooperation and Resource Mobilization Division  
Rachel Sauvinet Bedouin, former staff of OED, currently Head of IEA-CGIAR

### **FAO staff in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda**

Bangladesh: Mike Robson, representative  
Ethiopia: Amadou Allahoury Diallo, representative  
Rwanda: Attaher Maiga, representative; Sanne Holtslag, associate professional officer  
Uganda: Alhadji M. Jallow, representative

### **IFAD staff in Rome**

Willem Bettink, Program and Change Officer, Program Management Department (PMD)  
Luis Jiménez-McInnis, Director, Partnership and Resource Mobilization Office (PRM)  
Paul Winters, OIC Associate Vice-President, Strategy and Knowledge Department (SKD)  
Hisham Zehni, Senior Results Specialist, Project Management Department (PMD)  
Sana F. K. Jatta, Regional Director, East and Southern Africa Division (ESA)  
Shirley Chinien, Regional Economist, East and Southern Africa Division (ESA)  
Henrik Franklin, Portfolio Adviser, East and Southern Africa Division (ESA)  
Thierry Benoit, Country Programme Manager, Asia and the Pacific Division (APR)  
James Garret, Lead Nutrition Specialist, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA)  
Juliane Friedrich, Senior Technical Specialist, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA)  
Oscar Garcia, Director, Independent Office of Evaluation (IOE)  
Adolfo Brizzi, Director, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA)

Edward Heinemann, Lead Technical Specialist-Policy, Policy and Technical Advisory Division (PTA)

**IFAD staff in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda**

Bangladesh, a govt. rep. for IFAD project: Mr Gopal Chandra Sarker, Project Director, HILIP/CALIP

Ethiopia: Han Ulaş Demirag, country director and representative East and Southern Africa division

Rwanda: Aimable Ntukanyagwe, country programme officer East and Southern Africa

Uganda: Pontian Muhwezi, Country Programme Officer

**Other experts**

Liz Nasskau, Deputy Permanent Representative to FAO and IFAD

Bart de Steenhuijsen Piters, KIT

## Annex 3. Overview of FAO evaluation findings

### Distinguishing FAO as organisation, specific functions, and projects

| Evaluation   | Type of intervention              | Project name, objective, activities. Author and year evaluation  | Performance on FAO strengths: 1. Global platform, 2. Knowledge, data, 3. National policy, 4. Field projects: 5. Nutrition, 6. PPP.   | Performance on FAO organisational capacities: 1. Efficiency, 2. Sustainability, 3. Collaboration, 4. M&E, 5. Inclusiveness and gender.   |
|--|-----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| MOPAN, 2012*   | FAO functioning in general        | FAO work in general, case studies: Bangladesh, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Tanzania. | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform: ++ relevant mandate and clear strategy; ++ global normative work, forum (CFS), policies, conventions;</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: ++ knowledge generation and dissemination; + technical expertise; - / + knowledge sharing within FAO is improving.</li> <li>3. National policy: + programmes aligned with national policies; + national policy dialogue</li> <li>4. Field projects: + planned results achieved; - unclear link to national-level objectives; - lack of impact from scattered small projects; + emergency response</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP: - inadequate in PPP</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: - many fragmented field projects; - admin and operational efficiency can improve.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: +environment; - continuation after project.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: + better since decentralisation; + harmonised procedures with IFAD and WFP. FAO-WFP co-led global FS cluster, since 2012, country-level coordination.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: - poor link FAO results to national outcomes/MDG; - lack of ToC. -/+ strategic eval; + thematic eval.; - country eval.</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: + FAO gender staff.</li> </ol> |
| Evaluation of FAO's Role and Work in Food and Agriculture Policy, FAO 2012 | International and national policy | FAO forum and policy work  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform: ++very relevant, + contribution to Committee on Food Security products: guidelines land tenure, responsible agri. investment. +policy issues: food price crisis, climate change, trade / WTO. +codex alimentarius.</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +flagship products: SOFA, SOFI;</li> <li>3. National policy: - no leadership role FAO, in spite of FAO's good position for policy dialogue; - lack of policy support from Rome, -/+variable policy quality in country offices, -apparent lack if willingness to engage in policy dialogue,</li> <li>4. Field projects:</li> <li>5. Nutrition: - no leading role for FAO</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency:</li> <li>2. Sustainability: +/- assure that new products are equally good, for FAO to remain relevant.</li> <li>7. Collaboration: + Countries feel represented, +with other UN organisations; + convening role.</li> <li>3. +with other UN organisations; + convening role.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender</li> </ol>  |
| Evaluation of FAO's contribution to Knowledge on food and agriculture      | FAO system function               | FAO knowledge and services   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: ++ very relevant mandate, ++ much used by int. org, nat. govt. research and academia; +/- less used by local org, due to poor internet and local context relevance. – requires more QA.</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: +/- can be improved by better user orientation.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: +/- FAO needs to shift approach in era of info overload (from generator to portal)</li> <li>3. Collaboration:</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> </ol>  |



|                                    |                             |  |   |  |
|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|--|---|--|
| Final Report, 2015*                |                             |  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>3. National policy: + FAO knowledge has affected national policies;</li> <li>4. Field projects: + FAO knowledge has affected field projects</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: - relative to technical content, less attention to environment, social and gender content.</li> </ul>   |
| Evaluation report, FAO 2014*       | Capacity building, regional | Improving the abilities of Regional Organizations to develop, implement and monitor food security training programs. (4 regional organisations in Africa and Asia) | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: ++ very relevant, + TA for capacity building for producing and analyzing FS data, set up FS programmes, and respond to emergencies.</li> <li>3. National policy: ++ relevant, + aligned with CAADP and ASEAN int. FS framework. + nat. govt. capacities.</li> <li>4. Field projects: + capacity building regional intra govt. org.</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: ++ scale, + project mgt, +regional programme captures regional dimension of food insecurity, - with more on-line participants would have been more efficient.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: + leveraged funding, +/- mixed capacity of regional organisations;</li> <li>3. Collaboration: ++ regional org, nat. gov, research. – No formalised relationships.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: poor link regional with FAO country CPF.</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: - lack of attention to gender and right to food.</li> </ul> |
| Final evaluation report, FAO 2014* | Capacity building, regional | Supporting Food Security, Nutrition and Livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa (input for policies, FAO and other projects.)  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: + TA</li> <li>3. National policy: + nutrition in agricultural policies, CAADP, +relevant input in (follow-up) REACH programme.</li> <li>4. Field projects:</li> <li>5. Nutrition: + mainstreaming nutrition in agriculture policies and projects</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: + project mgt, - outputs achieved</li> <li>2. Sustainability: - outputs not sustainable yet. + institutional capacity; + results used in follow-up projects.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: + lead in REACH collaboration; + in network.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: weak logframe at outcome level</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: - little attention to gender; + men and women participated.</li> </ul>   |
| Joint Evaluation, FAO, 2015*       | Capacity building, global.  | Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger and under-nutrition (REACH) 2011-2015 (in 20 countries)   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform: -no influence on global policies; REACH unknown</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +TA from Rome, +knowledge sharing,</li> <li>3. National policy: +country-level priorities; +consensus; -not always owned by govt. (over-complex methods)</li> <li>4. Field projects:</li> <li>5. Nutrition: ++ on policy agenda</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ul>   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: +/-results achieved slower but with lower budgets;</li> <li>2. Sustainability: +/-unclear financially, +institutional capacity; +/- commitment;</li> <li>3. Collaboration: + Within REACH: FAO-WHO-UNICEF, support to SUN; -Outside, few knew REACH, reduced influence.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: + learning: good analyses; exchange visits</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: +in design; -in implementation; +in monitoring</li> </ul>   |

|   |   |   |  |   |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| Final evaluation, FAO 2015*   | Capacity building, national                       | Agriculture and Food Information Systems for Decision Support in South Sudan (AFIS)                             | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +TA from Rome, crops, weather; - TA knowledge gaps on livestock, health, migration.</li> <li>3. National policy: +very relevant, information system to inform policy and action, and humanitarian response</li> <li>4. Field projects: + capacity building.</li> <li>5. Nutrition: -/+ was missing, added later</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol>  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: + (relevance / costs)</li> <li>2. Sustainability: +institutional embedded.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: +WFP, FEWSNET, UNICEF</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, - gender: data not gender disaggregated, - 10-15% trainees are women; - little attention to livestock sector.</li> </ol>  |
| Final evaluation, FAO 2016*   | Capacity building, global                         | Education for Effective Nutrition in Action (ENACT) (capacity building at Universities in 13 African countries) | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +relevant, edu capacity in Africa, - local context; +tutors and students satisfaction. – limited online course expertise,</li> <li>3. National policy: -governments not involved, -no link with FAO country programme framework,</li> <li>4. Field projects:</li> <li>5. Nutrition: + in curriculum universities.</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol>  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: -disproportionally large input FAO HQ + consultants; (no involvement FAO country staff, no institutional memory)</li> <li>2. Sustainability: -no link with govt or other org involved in nutrition, - less institutional than individual capacity building.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: - missed opportunities</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: -insufficient attention</li> </ol>  |
| IOB, in press. Evaluation of the Dutch food security policy 2012-2016                           | Capacity building, national                       | Food Safety Project, Bangladesh.  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: + relevant, analysis food safety issues</li> <li>3. National policy: + national capacity food safety regulation, inspection</li> <li>4. Field projects: + combining strategic and operational: pilots with producers, processors, and exporters of fish, poultry, horticulture</li> <li>5. Nutrition: +food safety</li> <li>6. PPP: + capacity building of both public and private sector</li> </ol>       | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: +strategic combination with govt capacity, and capacity of private sector and producers; -scale is still small.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: + well embedded in national org. capacity building (will depend on profitability for PS)</li> <li>3. Collaboration: (+see PPP)</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender:</li> </ol>   |
| IOB, 2016. Evaluation of Dutch Development Cooperation in the Palestinian Territories 2008-2014 | Field projects with impact on final beneficiaries | Several Dutch-funded food security projects in Palestinian Territories.   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +TA</li> <li>3. National policy: + FAO in good position to assure collaboration with govt.</li> <li>4. Field projects: double objective in very difficult context: economic development farmers and peace building. +outputs achieved, but – impact very limited. + production, - access to markets. –food production not most relevant for population;</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: - difficult context and limited scale: high costs per beneficiary; +FAO better project mgt than NGO.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: -little attention to political and social context, economic viability questionable; little ownership by coops.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: FAO was in good position for collaboration with Palestinian Authorities.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: - doubts about targeting and gender.</li> </ol> |

|                               |  |  |  |   |
|-------------------------------|--|--|--|---|
| Evaluation finale IESA, 2013* | Field level Project, direct impact on final beneficiaries.                                   | Initiative Eau et Sécurité Alimentaire en Afrique (IESA). Agriculture and irrigation water in West Africa.   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: - FAO TA too little, little responsive.</li> <li>3. National policy: – project not anchored in national or regional policies or programmes, or in FAO West Africa strategic framework.</li> <li>4. Field projects: + small husbandry, women group credits, rice storage and huskers; - professionalization producer groups, marketing, capacity building of local technical agents; - irrigation, poor design and context analysis.</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol> | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: - inefficient mgt by FAO; - inefficient many small pilots in several countries; scattered.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: - poor irrigation, - capacity building local agents, - capacity building producer organisations, - unsustainable subsidies; -no attention environmental sustainability.</li> <li>3. Collaboration:</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: - M&amp;E not integrated in national govt systems.</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: + women participation, improved access to land; + inclusive to poor; + community participation.</li> </ol> |
| Evaluation report, FAO, 2012* | Field level Project, direct impact on final beneficiaries.                                   | Improvement of food security in cross border districts of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, in support of the modernization of agriculture under the NEPAD-CAADP framework | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: + TA from sub-regional office; +/- many technical reports, sometimes inconsistent</li> <li>3. National policy: +/- project aligned with policies, except for environmental issues; - no effect on policies for cross border trade, no link with regional govt org.</li> <li>4. Field projects: value chains: + for inputs, - for farm outputs; + increased farmer income; - only few coop enterprises;</li> <li>5. Nutrition:</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol>                              | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: + project budget well managed; + project mgt.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: - use agro-chemicals; - risk of overproduction certain products.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: + good with local govt org.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E:</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: + women participation; - no focus on gender; - not all farmers benefit from market-oriented ag.</li> </ol>  |
| Evaluation report, FAO 2013*  | Field level Project, capacity building local govt. and direct impact on final beneficiaries. | Support to household food security and livelihood of vulnerable and food insecure farming families, Afghanistan  | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Global platform:</li> <li>2. Knowledge, data: +competent FAO staff, practical knowledge.</li> <li>3. National policy: + aligned with FAO country prog.</li> <li>4. Field projects: + relevant, capacity building, - but not accompanied by (e.g.) IPM capacities; +6500 hh improved income and FS; - too limited scale for impact.</li> <li>5. Nutrition: -not yet, recommended.</li> <li>6. PPP:</li> </ol>   | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Efficiency: +efficient FAO and project mgt.</li> <li>2. Sustainability: + expected continuation; 0 no environmental harm expected (+IPM); + institutional (coops) expected.</li> <li>3. Collaboration: +good with (govt) partners.</li> <li>4. M&amp;E: - little done with lessons learnt yet; no representative sample survey.</li> <li>5. Inclusive, gender: + in design, but – in implementation, no women extension workers</li> </ol>  |

\*These judgements were extracted from evaluation assessments, commissioned by IOB to KIT.