

A Review of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance Policy & Programme Support

The 2009-2012 Drought & Food Crisis in Ethiopia IOB Country Case Study

Main Report

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Responsibility for the contents of this report rests with the author.

Contents

List of Tables	iii
List of Figures	iii
Acronyms and Abbreviation.....	iv
Phrases.....	v
Executive Summary.....	vi
Chapter 1 Introduction	1
1.1 Humanitarian Assistance Policy Review 2009-2013.....	1
1.2 The Ethiopia Country Case Study	1
1.3 Report Structure	3
Chapter 2 The Context: Ethiopia's Drought and Food Crisis 2009-12	4
2.1 Ethiopia's Struggle for Food Security	4
2.2 The Humanitarian Context.....	5
2.3 Ethiopia's Food Security Programme.....	6
2.4 Humanitarian Assistance and Response	7
2.5 The 2009-2012 Drought and Food Crises and Its Management.....	8
2.6 Summary Findings.....	11
Chapter 3 Dutch Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Financing	13
3.1 Global and Ethiopia Humanitarian Assistance Financing	13
3.2 Dutch Government Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Funding Decisions	14
3.3 Dutch Government Funding Choices and Management	16
3.4 Linkage Humanitarian Assistance and Development Programming	17
3.5 Dutch Government Multi-Year Thematic Funding of Dutch INGOs	19
3.6 Summary Findings.....	21
Chapter 4 WFP: From Food Assistance to Food Security	24
4.1 WFP-Ethiopia's 2009-12 Humanitarian Crises Programming	24
4.2 WFP Financing and Dutch Government Contributions	26
4.3 Effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programmes	28
4.4 Accountability	34
4.5 WFP's Programme Recommendations	36
4.6 Summary Findings.....	37
Chapter 5 UN-OCHA's HRF: Non-Food Response to Humanitarian Emergencies.....	42
5.1 UN-OCHA Ethiopia's Country Based Pooled Fund Mechanisms	42
5.1.1 Central Emergency Response Fund	42
5.1.2 Emergency Response Fund, or Humanitarian Response Fund.....	44
5.1.3 CERF and HRF as Country Based Pooled Funding Mechanisms.....	44
5.2 HRF Financing and Dutch Government Contributions	45
5.3 Effectiveness of the HRF and Projects.....	48
5.3.1 The HRF Programme	49
5.3.2 Strategizing HRF Project Allocation	51
5.3.3 Analysis of HRF Projects.....	52

5.4 Accountability and Transparency of the HRF and HRF Projects	53
5.5 UN-OCHA's Overall HRF Performance.....	54
5.6 Summary Findings.....	56
Chapter 6 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination and Delivery	59
6.1 Humanitarian Reform and the Aid Architecture in Ethiopia.....	59
6.2 World Food Programme: Humanitarian Crisis Programming.....	61
6.3 UN-OCHA: Humanitarian Response Fund.....	65
6.4 UNHCR: The Refugee Programme.....	68
6.5 Summary Findings.....	71
Chapter 7 Main Review Findings	75
7.1 The UN's Humanitarian Assistance Response to the 2009-12 Crisis	75
7.2 The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Support.....	75
7.3 Effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming	76
7.4 Effectiveness of UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund.....	77
7.5 Humanitarian Reform: Humanitarian Assistance Coordination & Delivery	78
References	79
Annexes.....	83

List of Tables

Table 1. Humanitarian assistance facts Ethiopia, 2011-13.	8
Table 2. Dutch Government earmarked humanitarian assistance funding to Ethiopia, 2009-13.....	15
Table 3. Characteristics of WFP programmes and pathways to improved food security.....	26
Table 4. WFP humanitarian assistance- and refugee-programme beneficiaries, 2009-13.....	26
Table 5. CERF funding allocations to Ethiopia, 2006-13.	43
Table 6. HRF Ethiopia allocation by partner type, 2010-13 (in millionUSD).	46
Table 7. HRF Ethiopia administration costs, 2009-12.	48
Table 8. HRF Ethiopia project monitoring costs, 2009-12.....	49

List of Figures

Figure 1. International humanitarian funding, 2007-12 in USD billion.....	13
Figure 2. Total international humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, 2000-2010.	14
Figure 3. HRF Ethiopia donor contributions, 2006-13.	47

Acronyms and Abbreviations

CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CBN	Community Based Nutrition
CBPF	Country Based Pooled Funding
CCI	Complementary Community Investment Programme
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRMFSS	Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector
ECHO	EU Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
EKN	Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands
ERC	Ethiopian Red Cross
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
FSC	Food Security Cluster
GHI	Global Hunger Index
HA	Humanitarian Assistance
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme
HC	Humanitarian Co-ordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HRD	Humanitarian Requirements Document
HRF	Humanitarian Response Fund
IASC	Inter Agency Standing Committee
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOB	Policy and Operations Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Netherlands.
KFO	Kanaal Financierings Overeenkomst
MAM	Moderately Acute Malnutrition
MASP	Multi Annual Strategic Plan
MFS	Mede Financierings Stelsel
NGO	Non Governmental Organisation
NNGO	National Non Governmental Organisation
NRC	Netherlands Red Cross
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme
RUTF	Ready to Use Therapeutic Feeding
SHO	Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties
TSF	Targeted Supplementary Feeding
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WB	World Bank
WFP	World Food Programme

Phrases

Emergency food aid	Short-term distribution of food aid and supplementary feeding programmes (definition taken from Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2013).
Humanitarian Assistance	The assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies (definition taken from Global Humanitarian Assistance report 2013).
<i>Kebele</i>	Village
<i>Kremt / Belg</i>	Cropping season running from March to August
<i>Meher</i>	Cropping season running from September to February
<i>Woreda</i>	District

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Executive Summary

This report presents the findings of the Ethiopia country case study which was commissioned by the IOB, the evaluation department of The Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ethiopia country case study is one of the three case studies that form an integral part of the Dutch government's review of The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy 2009 – 2013. The central evaluation question of the overall policy review is the extent to which the central objective of The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy, to provide humanitarian assistance in an effective way, has been realised in a rapidly changing world.

The aim of this country case study is to provide an in-depth insight in improvements in humanitarian assistance delivery in Ethiopia and its effectiveness. The independent review took place in August - October 2014 by an evaluation team comprised of an independent international consultant and a senior policy advisor of the IOB. The team employed a mixed-methods approach to address the four main evaluation questions:

1. The extent to which the Dutch government-supported UN humanitarian assistance strategy responded to the main characteristics and challenges of the 2009-12 crisis context.
2. The operationalization of The Netherlands' humanitarian assistance policy and support to the humanitarian response in Ethiopia.
3. The effectiveness of supported humanitarian assistance interventions, in particular with regard to WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming and UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund.
4. The achievement of expected improvements of humanitarian assistance delivery in line with the humanitarian reform process.

The team conducted a short literature review of the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis, a short desk review on the delivery and impact of humanitarian assistance focusing on the period 2009-2012, and a country visit to Ethiopia in August 2014 including field visits to Somali and Tigray Regions.

Findings of the assessment were shared with key shareholders with their comments and feedback accounted for in the final report.

The UN Humanitarian Assistance Response to the 2009-12 Crisis

The UN's humanitarian assistance strategy has responded well to the 2009-12 drought and food crisis in Ethiopia. The response has been helped by Ethiopia's pre-existing humanitarian assistance infrastructure and food security policies. In particular the country's longer-term Productive Safety Net programme in response to chronic and predictable food insecurity, and the country's National Relief Programme in response to acute but transitory food insecurity.

In Ethiopia's drought affected highland areas the Productive Safety Net Programme, as a systemic response to addressing chronic food insecurity and accommodating acute needs, played a key role in addressing humanitarian needs.

The response in drought affected lowland areas has been more problematic as a result of dependency on emergency relief operations, limited understanding of agro-pastoralist livelihoods and poor humanitarian access in some areas. Relief programming did however reach most people in time saving the lives of thousands.

Despite advanced early warning the international community's response to the 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis was delayed. Ethiopia's response to the crisis, as compared to the response in Somalia and Kenya, was however strong and being helped by effective Government, donor, UN and NGO partnerships.

The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Support

In line with Good Humanitarian Donorship Principles and for reasons of assumed efficiency Dutch government policy prioritised UN channels for humanitarian assistance funding. In particular WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming (the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations) and OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund. Monitoring activities by Dutch government staff have been minimal.

Dutch government funding strategies have increased the distance between the Dutch government as donor and the funded and implementing agencies. Limited constructive engagement has resulted in a lack of critical awareness of the local context and nature of programmes, and poor institutional

memory about the performance of UN agencies and the strategic nature of their programmes in Ethiopia.

The lack of co-ordination and alignment between The Hague's direct humanitarian assistance funding and the Embassy's in-direct more developmental funding minimises Dutch contributions to a joined-up longer term food security programming and effective Disaster Risk Reduction in Ethiopia's chronically food insecure areas. The Dutch government's capacity and ability to address underlying vulnerability to Ethiopia's recurrent food crises and build resilience is institutionally fragmented between relief and development programming.

WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming

WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming, the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations, has met its goal to address critical humanitarian needs through three different pathways: the National Relief Programme, the Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).

WFP interventions were found highly relevant to the needs of emergency-affected households and the chronically food insecure households in the target areas. The timeliness of resource transfer delivery remained an issue although food delivery in Somali Region improved through the Hubs and Spokes system. Relief and PSNP resources are however insufficient to address identified needs in line with technical targeting criteria and resource allocation standards resulting in resource dilution on the ground.

WFP's lowland PSNP performance can be strengthened by linking PSNP initiatives to other poverty reduction efforts, as well as to disaster risk reduction and crisis response.

Graduation from the PSNP in Ethiopia's highland areas has been disappointing to date. Major stakeholders relate disappointing graduation figures to implementation challenges rather than to the design of the programme itself. Additionally, the experience also shows that graduation is more complex and requires a longer time frame as originally anticipated by the Government and its international partners.

PSNP IV (2015-18) will see an increase in PSNP beneficiaries to around 10 million as a result of including long-term relief beneficiaries. The increase in PSNP caseload is expected to result in a significant drop in the number of relief assistance beneficiaries.

UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund

The Humanitarian Response Fund effectively addressed acute non-food humanitarian needs, covered shortcomings and inefficiencies in Ethiopia's humanitarian system, and promoted strategic engagement and coordination between humanitarian assistance agencies.

The HRF has addressed critical needs in Ethiopia's southern, south-eastern and eastern pastoralist lowland areas during the 2009-11 crisis. Critical life-saving programmes were delivered in emergency nutrition and WASH sectors during 2011-12. HRF has also played a crucially important role in addressing emergency needs amongst severely weakened and malnourished Somali refugees, particularly during the first critical months of the 2011-12 refugee influx in Dolo Ado, Somali Region.

Humanitarian Reform: Humanitarian Assistance Co-ordination and Delivery

The humanitarian reform process has resulted in important improvements in humanitarian assistance co-ordination and delivery. In particular with regard to humanitarian financing through the creation of the Central Emergency Response Fund and the Humanitarian Response Fund.

The food security cluster approach in Ethiopia is slowed down because of WFP's dependence on sub-optimal government food management systems and delayed communication and underreporting of crucial needs and humanitarian requirements.

The HRF has made strategic contributions to cluster-wide co-ordination between government, UN and NGO partners; notably with regard to the nutrition and WASH cluster. The HRF has increased the accountability and transparency of Ethiopia's humanitarian system and contributed to delivery of timely and effective non-food emergency response.

UNHCR's coordination mechanism was weak and inadequate for an effective response to the 2011 Somali refugee influx. Emergency refugee response is not part of the cluster system in Ethiopia and this has led to confusion amongst operational and implementing partners (UNHCR, ARRA and

INGOs). UNHCR's response to the 2013-14 South Sudanese refugee influx has been much better in this regard.

The main review findings can be found in chapter 7. Each individual chapter ends with a section on 'summary findings' which enables the reader to quickly grasp the essence and key findings for each of the four main research questions.

Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Humanitarian Assistance Policy Review 2009-2013

This Ethiopia country case study report is one of three studies¹ that form an integral part of the Dutch government's review of its Humanitarian Assistance Policy 2009 – 2013.

The objective of the overall review is to render account of The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy by providing insight in: policy development, strategic policy choices and implementation, policy practice, impact of programmes, and lessons learned concerning the degree to which The Netherlands' policy has adapted to a rapidly changing context.

The central evaluation question of the overall policy review is: 'to what extent has the central objective of The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy, to provide humanitarian assistance in an effective way, been realised'.

1.2 The Ethiopia Country Case Study

Rationale and Focus

Ethiopia was selected as a case study for three reasons. Firstly, Ethiopia is one of the main countries receiving Dutch Humanitarian Assistance (HA) funding. Over the period 2004-2013 Ethiopia received almost 74 million Euros direct HA funding from The Netherlands. OCHA and WFP received the lion's share with 56.9 million and 10.5 million Euros respectively. Secondly, all direct Dutch HA funding to OCHA has been to its Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF). This allowed reviewing the HRF, a non-food emergency response fund, which is a corner stone of the humanitarian reform agenda to provide more adequate, timely, flexible and effective humanitarian financing in emergencies. Thirdly, the case study provided for an opportunity to review to the extent to which Dutch government support contributed to reforming Ethiopia's humanitarian system of annual emergency appeals for food aid towards a more structural and longer term developmental approach to food security. Key to this reform process is Ethiopia's multi-donor Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) to which the Embassy of the Kingdom of The Netherlands contributed, through its development oriented Ethiopian Country Programme, around seventy million Euros since the start of the PSNP in 2005.

The Ethiopia country case study focuses on the Humanitarian Assistance response to the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis that affected large parts of southern, south-eastern and eastern Ethiopia.

This report has adopted the following working definition of Humanitarian Assistance: 'the assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity during and in the aftermath of emergencies' (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013).

Review Questions

In line with the Terms of Reference for this review this study addresses four main research questions:

1. What were the main characteristics and challenges of Ethiopia's 2009-12 drought and food crisis, and to what extent did the supported United Nations Humanitarian Assistance strategy responded to this?
2. What assessment can be made of Dutch support to the Humanitarian Assistance response to address the 2009-12 drought and food crisis in Ethiopia?
3. What assessment can be made of the effectiveness of supported Humanitarian Assistance interventions, and to what extent did the improvements in aid delivery contributed to effective aid?
4. Have the expected improvements in Humanitarian Assistance coordination and delivery been achieved?

For the four main research questions and their specific research questions references is made to the Terms of Reference for the Ethiopia country case study (annex 1).

¹ The other two case studies focus on the response to the Syria crises and on Humanitarian Assistance Provision in South Sudan.

Approach and Methodology

The review consisted of three main methods:

1. A literature review of the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis.
2. A desk review on the delivery and impact of HA focusing on the period 2009-2012.
3. A country visit to interview key stakeholders and validate findings of the literature review and desk study. Apart from spending time in Addis field visits were undertaken to Somali and Tigray Region to visit HA interventions and discuss the delivery and impact of such projects with government officials, agency staff and beneficiaries.

Literature review of the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis

The literature review is particularly relevant to the first research question, that is the extent to which HA provisioning has been relevant to context. The literature review has been quite 'liberal' in order to document the main aspects of the 2009-2012 crisis, its causes and how it relates to Ethiopia's protracted food crisis and the country's evolving humanitarian and food security system.

Desk study on the delivery and impact of HA in the period 2009-2012

The desk review is particularly relevant to the second, third and fourth research question which focus on Dutch HA policy and programme support, on the delivery, effectiveness and impact of HA provisioning, and on improvements in HA coordination.

Dutch HA funding is primarily un-earmarked which makes it hard to link findings of the desk study directly to Dutch funding. The desk study therefore focused on HA programmes and projects to which The Netherlands' has made significant financial contributions.

The desk study made use of scientific journals and peer reviewed papers (accessed via SCOPUS), as well as reports and documents sourced through policy research institutions, aid and development institutions, NGOs and intermediate portals such as ELDIS and Relief Web.

Two types of criteria were used to select the desk study documents: criteria related to the review subject and criteria related to the quality. The criteria related to the review subject included the delivery, effectiveness and impact of HA in Ethiopia, and the linkage between HA and other forms of more structural development support to improve food security and end hunger in the country. Quality criteria included a robust research or study design, appropriate data retrieving methods, high reliability of data sources and relevance of findings with regard to the purpose of the Ethiopia country study.

Country Visit

During the two-week country visit key stakeholders in HA policy and programming were interviewed, two field visits undertaken and debriefing sessions organised with selected agencies.

A number of key stakeholders were visited in Addis Ababa, including the Government of Ethiopia (Government of Ethiopia), the WFP, OCHA and the World Bank. A range of INGOs were visited in particular those which benefitted from OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund including and selected Dutch INGOs which received multi-year programmatic funding by the Dutch government.

Two short field visits were undertaken to look at the impact of the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis and the humanitarian assistance response. The first field visit was to Somali Region² in Ethiopia's eastern agro-pastoralist/pastoralist lowland areas, with a second visit to Tigray Region³ where livelihoods are characterised by highland agricultural systems.

Drought response systems and options differ significantly between food insecure highland and lowland areas. In the chronically food insecure parts of the Ethiopian highlands the systemic response to address chronic as well as acute food insecurity (through the safety net and relief programme) is

² With respect to the drought affected lowland areas the Jijiga Zone of Somali Region was selected. The most important reasons for this included easy access (travel by plane to Jijiga and car to out-lying areas), possibility to combine visit of drought affected Ethiopian communities with visiting one of the refugee camps (protracted refugee crisis with large new influxes as a result of drought and internal conflict over the period 2009-2012) and the possibility to talk with a relative wide range of stakeholders within a short timeframe.

³ Southern and Eastern Tigray Zone in Tigray Region was selected because of good accessibility with daily flights between Addis Ababa and Mekele.

robust and strong. The relief response in the agro-pastoralist and pastoralist lowland areas in the southern, south-eastern and eastern parts of the country is less robust and more erratic⁴.

During the field visits to Somali and Tigray Regions a range of actors were met. These included representatives of the Regional and Local Government, WFP and INGO staff as well as HA beneficiaries. Discussions focused on design, co-ordination, delivery and impact of HA programmes on the lives and livelihoods of HA beneficiary households and communities at large.

Debriefing sessions with the Government, WFP and OCHA were organised in Addis Ababa at the end of the country visit.

See annex 2 for the country visit itinerary and annex 3 for the list of key Dutch government staff interviewed on Dutch humanitarian assistance policy and programming as relevant to Ethiopia.

1.3 Report Structure

The report structure follows the main research questions in line with the ToR.

Chapter 2 presents the context of Ethiopia's 2009-2012 drought and food crisis in respect to Ethiopia's evolving humanitarian and food security system.

Chapter 3 focuses on Dutch government humanitarian assistance policy and funding decisions.

Chapter 4 reviews World Food Programme's humanitarian food assistance programming and safety net contributions to address humanitarian needs and move away from food aid to food assistance and food security (reflecting important developments in the country's evolving food security system).

Chapter 5 reviews OCHA's HA interventions, in particular through its non-food Humanitarian Response Fund.

Chapter 6 looks in particular at the UN's Humanitarian Reform and its Transformative Agenda and its contribution to HA coordination and delivery.

Chapter 7 presents the main findings and conclusions in line with the four main research questions and specific research issues.

Each chapter ends with 'summary findings' which capture the essence and key findings of the chapter. These 'summary findings' can be read in isolation of the respective chapters and allows for a quick but comprehensive grasp of the review and its findings.

⁴ The Productive Safety Net Programme was initiated in pilot lowland *Woredas* starting in 2011.

Chapter 2 The Context: Ethiopia's Drought and Food Crisis 2009-12

This chapter provides an introduction to Ethiopia's 2009-12 drought and food crisis. The chapter describes to what extent the United Nations humanitarian assistance strategy responded to the key characteristics and challenges of the crisis context.

The chapter seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Ethiopia's progress and challenges to achieving food security (section 2.1).
2. Key characteristics of Ethiopia's humanitarian context (section 2.2).
3. Evolvement of Ethiopia's Food Security Programme in response to repeated food crises (section 2.3).
4. Provision of humanitarian assistance and the complexities associated with response (section 2.4).
5. The 2009-12 crisis and the management of the humanitarian assistance response (section 2.5).

The chapter ends with the summary findings as presented in section 2.6.

2.1 Ethiopia's Struggle for Food Security

Progress towards Food Security

Ethiopia, currently home to an estimated 85 million people (UNOCHA, 2014), has made considerable progress towards food security since the 1984 famine captured worldwide media attention. Almost 30 years after Ethiopia's great famine, the country's per capita income has increased, poverty has fallen, food security has improved, and the groundwork has been laid for sustained economic growth (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013).

Ethiopia has experienced rapid political, economic, and agricultural changes in the past two decades contributing to growth and improved human well-being (Hallowel, 2013). Global economic-, food-, and energy-crisis are accelerating transformations in Ethiopia's agrarian sector. This has promoted smallholder commercialisation and created large-scale mechanised farming, predominantly by foreign investors, in lowland areas displacing the subsistence sector (Makki, 2012).

A key reason for Ethiopia's recent economic success has been sustained agricultural growth, which averaged 2.9 percent in the 1990s and 6.2 percent in the 2000s (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013). Productivity of cultivated land in Ethiopia is however still among the lowest in Africa.

Food Security Challenges

Despite recording double-digit economic growth over the past decade, more than 20 million Ethiopians are living below the poverty line (UNDAF, 2012). Nearly 10 per cent of the population remains chronically vulnerable to food insecurity and dependent on national safety-net programmes. Every year several million Ethiopians require emergency assistance to meet their basic survival needs (UNOCHA, 2014).

Due to the protracted nature of Ethiopia's food crises both safety nets (to address chronic food insecurity) as well as emergency relief (including food aid to address acute but transitory food security) are seen as essential elements to achieve household and national food security (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013):

'The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), introduced in 2005 as an alternative to annual emergency-food-aid distribution, has proven very effective in targeting poor households with food and cash transfers, as well as building local infrastructure through a work requirement for those recipients who are able to work'.

'While it may not be the dominant policy instrument to address major production shortfalls, emergency food aid likely will still be required in some years. A decentralized public response system is also necessary to ensure timely responses to serious hunger threats before dire famine conditions emerge'.

Achieving Food Security

According to Dorosh and Rashid (2013) building on Ethiopia's progress made towards national and household food security involves investing in agricultural productivity and non-farm economic opportunities, promoting efficient markets, expanding the transportation and communications infrastructure and maintaining macro- economic stability.

Sustaining and building on the progress made toward food security does however also require further improving social safety nets and disaster response mechanisms. According to Dorosh and Rashid both must be seen as longer term instruments.

The need for rapid and flexible humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia is not only expected to continue for the foreseeable future, needs are also likely to continue to outstrip the capacity of government to respond (DFID, 2013).

2.2 The Humanitarian Context

Ethiopia's Protracted Food crisis

In 2010 Ethiopia was amongst 22 countries worldwide considered to be in a protracted crisis (FAO, 2010). Protracted crisis situations are characterized by recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, long duration and re-occurrence of food crises, and the breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to these crises (FAO, 2010).

The key criteria for countries to be in protracted crisis are longevity of the crisis, aid flows and the country's economic and food security status. During the period 1996-2010 Ethiopia experienced 15 major disasters requiring external assistance. Humanitarian aid was 21% of total Overseas Development Aid to the country for the 2000-2008 period (FAO, 2010). And Ethiopia was included in FAO's list of Low Income Food-Deficit Countries.

Ethiopia is facing high levels of food insecurity. In 2005-2007 the proportion of undernourished population was 41% and the 2009 Global Hunger Index score was 30.8 (FAO, 2010). Ethiopia is however making significant progress in reducing hunger with the GHI showing a consistent downward trend since 1995. The proportion of undernourished in the population, the prevalence of underweight in children under 5 years, and the under-five mortality rate show a downtrend trend.

In 2014 Ethiopia ranked 70 out of 76 on the 2014 GHI rank with a score of 24.4 down from 30.8 in 2009 (IFPRI, 2014). Over the 2009-14 period the proportion of undernourished in the population, the prevalence of underweight in children under 5 years, and the under-five mortality rate all showed a downtrend trend. The 2014 GHI score of 24.4 is however still being labelled as 'alarming'.

The Humanitarian Setting

Vulnerability is widespread throughout Ethiopia due to high levels of chronic poverty as well as chronic and acute food insecurity. Ethiopia, as a populous and landlocked country with a diverse range of agro-ecological zones and livelihoods, makes for a complex humanitarian environment.

Over eighty per cent of the population live in rural areas and rely on rain-fed agriculture for their livelihood. Vulnerability is frequently exacerbated by natural and man-made hazards, including drought, flooding, disease outbreaks, and inter-communal conflict and refugee influxes from neighbouring states (OCHA, 2014). The key hazards that contribute to crises and disasters are drought and internal as well as external conflict (DfID, 2013).

Drought

Ethiopia has a long history of droughts but since the 1970s, their magnitude, frequency and impact has increased. The areas and numbers of people affected by drought are increasing as a result of soil degradation, rapidly increasing populations and climate change (DFID, 2013).

Ethiopia is characterised by longstanding pockets of chronic food insecurity. Particularly in areas where rural people are dependent on rain-fed agriculture in marginal environments affected by land degradation and water scarcity. Such areas face high levels of weather and climate risk associated with recurring droughts and floods, making them the most affected by food insecurity (LEAP, 2012).

Conflict

Conflict is a key hazard due to both internal and external factors. Internally, militant groups in several regions contribute to instability as do inter-ethnic and inter-clan clashes, particularly in Ethiopia's conflict-affected Somali Region. Ethiopia has a sizeable population of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), whose needs are not officially acknowledged (DFID, 2013). Humanitarian access to some parts of the country and persons affected by crisis remains difficult due to insecurity but also to poor transportation infrastructure (OCHA, 2014).

Humanitarian needs in Ethiopia also stem from conflict and droughts affecting its neighbours: Somalia, Eritrea and the Sudans. Persistent drought conditions and insecurity in neighbouring Somalia, turmoil in Eritrea and insecurity along the border between Sudan and South Sudan have resulted in large influxes of asylum-seekers into Ethiopia (OCHA, 2014).

Underlying Stressors

The hazards Ethiopia is exposed to are exacerbated by underlying stressors such as land degradation, decreasing soil fertility and population increase resulting in smaller farm sizes in the rural highlands (DFID, 2013). Ethiopia's natural resource base is heavily degraded from unsustainable farming practices and deforestation, and abetted by growing population pressure.

Home to an estimated 85 million people Ethiopia's population is one of the fastest growing in the world: the population has doubled since 1984 and is projected to more than double again by 2050 (UN OCHA, 2014). This underscores the importance to not only invest in improved natural resource management and increasing returns from agricultural land but also to decrease the rate by which the population is growing (Robertson et.al., 2010).

Ethiopia is considered to be at risk of climate change impacts. Climate change is likely to contribute to increased water stress and flooding as a result of longer dry periods and more intense rainfall (Petersen, 2012)⁵. This will add to stresses on the farming population in large parts of the country lowering crop yields, reducing water availability and increasing food insecurity (DFID, 2013).

The Ethiopian economy, and poor households in particular, are at risk from broader economic factors such as high inflation and the country's dependence on imported food and oil. The resulting high food and fuel prices increase the vulnerability of poor households (DFID, 2013).

2.3 Ethiopia's Food Security Programme

Ethiopia's History of Crises

Since the 1970s, the severity, frequency and impacts of drought have increased and the areas affected by drought are expanding. Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable to weather related shocks with rain not only varying greatly by region but also being particularly unpredictable (World Bank, United Nations, 2010).

The 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 Crises

Ethiopia was brought to the edge of a major disaster during 1999-2000, with some 10 million people estimated to be in need of food assistance at the height of the crisis. A repeat of the catastrophic famine of 1984-5 was avoided, but the numbers of people affected, the loss of life and the destruction of livelihoods made it one of the most serious crises in the Horn of Africa since Ethiopia's 1984-85 famine (Hammond and Maxwell, 2002).

The 1999-2000 crisis occurred despite extensive investment in famine prevention measures by the government and the international community. Explanations of why the crisis was not prevented included logistical and bureaucratic problems, information issues, institutional mistrust among international partners, Ethiopia's war with Eritrea, and the failure to address the underlying famine process (Hammond and Maxwell, 2002; White, P., 2005; Dagne, 2000).

⁵ In explaining the 2011-12 Horn of Africa drought from a climate perspective Petersen observes that research has suggested that continued warming in the IPWP will likely contribute to more frequent East African droughts during the boreal spring and summer.

The 2002-3 drought affected over 14 million people in Ethiopia with relief organisations and UN officials describing the situation as a famine (Dagne, 2004). The scale of the crisis outstripped existing response capacity in Ethiopia and required additional efforts by the international community. Initial response was slow but accelerated as the crisis grew to avoid mass starvation. Humanitarian agencies reported pockets of acute distress in some hard-hit localities and sharp increases in child deaths (De Waal, 2006).

The 1999-2000 and the 2002-3 crises triggered a profound realisation that the underlying impoverishment of whole populations was increasing making it more difficult to distinguish between humanitarian crises triggered by external shocks and those resulting from chronic poverty (Maxwell, 2003).

Emergency Interventions & Safety Nets

Both crises demonstrated that while emergency food aid is often a necessary part of humanitarian response (in address of acute food insecurity) it is by itself not sufficient to build the foundations of longer-term food security (Barrett, 2006; FAO, 2010). In situations of chronic vulnerability and/or protracted food crises, interventions must extend beyond survival, through emergency interventions, and include safety nets and development interventions (Maxwell, 2003; Flores et al, 2005).

In 2003 humanitarian and development actors joined hands in Ethiopia's New Coalition for Food Security. They recommended a gradual transition from humanitarian assistance to a system of productive safety nets as a bridge between emergency and development in disaster-prone food insecure areas. This resulted in Ethiopia's new Food Security Programme introducing the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in 2005.

The 1999-2000 and 2002-2003 crises thus initiated a fundamental break between Ethiopia's institutionalised relief-oriented emergency system into a more developmental-oriented predictable safety net to address chronic and seasonal food insecurity (van Uffelen, 2013).

The PSNP: from Relief Emergency System to Developmental Safety Net

The PSNP, started in 2005, is a multi-donor programme implemented by the Government of Ethiopia and its international partners. The programme targets chronically food insecure households and facilitates a gradual shift away from a relief system dominated by humanitarian aid to a multi-year safety net programme addressing the problem of chronic and seasonal food insecurity. Acute food needs are partly absorbed through the PSNP's contingency budget⁶ of 20%. Acute food needs following external shocks are primarily addressed through Ethiopia's National Relief Programme in line with humanitarian needs as documented in the country's twice annual Humanitarian Requirements Document.

The Productive Safety Nets Programme is a core component of Ethiopia's Food Security Strategy. Other components are the so-called Other Food Security Programmes and the Voluntary Resettlement programme. During the third phase of the PSNP (2009-2014) the OFSPs were replaced by the Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) and the Complementary Community Investment (CCI) programme.

The PSNP in tandem with the HABP and CCI is expected to result in graduation from the safety net and out of poverty. Evaluations of the PSNP demonstrate significant programmatic impact (Berhane et.al., 2013; Gilligan, et.al., 2009). Progress towards graduation from the safety net has however been disappointing with the expected graduation at scale out of the safety net not taking place.

2.4 Humanitarian Assistance and Response

Humanitarian Assistance

In order to address the humanitarian challenges Ethiopia has received very significant amounts of humanitarian assistance. In the period 2004 – 2012 total official humanitarian assistance has been between 0.3 billion USD in 2007 to 0.9 billion USD in 2008.

⁶ The PSNP's contingency budget to address acute, but transitory needs, covers PSNP *Woredas* only and does not cover non-PSNP *Woredas* that may suffer from acute transitory needs. PSNP IV (2015-2018) will address this geographical anomaly.

In 2012 Ethiopia received a total of 3.2 billion USD in Overseas Development Assistance of which 484 million USD in official humanitarian assistance. Table 1 provides some key facts characterising the scope of humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia.

Table 1. Humanitarian assistance facts Ethiopia, 2011-13.

-
- 1 Ethiopia received the equivalent of 11.9% of its gross national income (GNI) as aid (ODA) in 2011
 - 2 GNI rank in 2011: 79 of 215
 - 3 Ethiopia has experienced active conflict in each of the ten years between 2002 and 2011
 - 4 Classified as a fragile state, 2012
 - 5 Vulnerability index score, 2012-2013: High
-

Source Fast Facts <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/ethiopia>

Source: <http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/countryprofile/ethiopia>

Humanitarian Response

Humanitarian response in Ethiopia is complicated by historical and political sensitivities. The Government of Ethiopia is intensely focused on achieving and portraying growth and development, with a resulting tendency to play down the extent of emergency needs (DfID, 2013).

The Government of Ethiopia and its humanitarian partners work jointly to provide emergency assistance to disaster-affected populations⁷. Emergency needs are identified through the twice-yearly national needs assessment process. Annual humanitarian requirements for food assistance, health and nutrition; water and sanitation, agriculture and livestock, and emergency education are presented in the Humanitarian Requirements Document (UNOCHA, 2014).

Accurate humanitarian needs assessment data is often made available only when needs become critical (DfID, 2013). For example, the Government of Ethiopia's Humanitarian Requirements Document launched in February 2013 underestimates the scale of relief food needs by some one million beneficiaries compared with data obtained during joint assessments. Fast and flexible humanitarian funding is therefore vital in this context (DFID, 2013).

Humanitarian preparedness and response are coordinated by the Government's Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS), a directorate within the Ministry of Agriculture. Sector-specific response is coordinated by the respective line ministries. The humanitarian response system is organised according to global norms, with a UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator and a Humanitarian Country Team to promote a coordinated response.

2.5 The 2009-2012 Drought and Food Crises and Its Management

Drought Re-Appearing in Ethiopia in early 2008

Severe drought re-appeared early in 2008 in the eastern half of Ethiopia; particularly in Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region, Somali, Afar, eastern Oromiya and eastern Tigray Regions. Drought conditions continued into 2009 while at the same time inflation increased food prices significantly⁸.

In Ethiopia, the failure of the rains and the ensuing drought manifested itself in three distinct ways (Slim, 2012). Firstly, the impact of three successive rain failures in Ethiopia's southern lowlands was both extensive as well as complex. Secondly, the failure of the short *Belg* rains in the traditionally food insecure Southern highlands led to many people losing their main crops, putting vulnerable and poor families under huge stress. And thirdly, the same rain failures in Somalia (in neighbouring areas across the national frontier) led – with the further complication of the escalation of Somalia's

⁷ The GoE and its development partners work together on the national Productive Safety Net Programme.

⁸ Prices of food in 2007 in both rural and urban markets was 40% above the average for 2002-2006 and in mid-2008 reached levels of 200% above 2004-2008 averages; in 2009 they were still above the longer-term average.

insurgency – to famine and the mass movement of the population. Many of those found sanctuary in Ethiopia as refugees.

These three impacts, plus Ethiopia's far higher population density, meant that the country registered the largest number of people affected (4.8 million) of the four countries in the Horn of Africa regional appeal (UN, 2011).

The Horn of Africa Food Crisis

The 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis affected 13 million people. The main focus of the crisis was across southern Ethiopia, south-central Somalia and northern Kenya. Regional drought came on top of successive bad rains and rising inflation. It deepened a chronic livelihoods crisis into a tipping point of potential disaster by putting extreme pressure on food prices, livestock survival, and water and food availability. Armed conflict across the region compounded chronic ecological and economic vulnerability, which escalated the crisis and limited people's survival and recovery choices (Slim, 2012).

The crisis led to famine in Somalia⁹ and is estimated to have claimed 257,500 lives between October 2010 and March 2012¹⁰, half of which were children under the age of five. Famine was declared in Somalia in July 2011, the month with the highest number of access deaths recorded at 33,000. The UN declared an end to famine in February 2012 but an estimated 3.8 million people were still in need of life-saving assistance (Slim, 2012).

The International Community's Delayed Response

Despite advanced warnings the international community's response to the 2011-12 food crisis was delayed. A 2013 Global Humanitarian Assistance Report attributes part of the slow response to complex crises to a culture of risk aversion:

'There is huge pressure on those allocating resources to avoid waste and investments that put taxpayers' money at risk. Consequently donors often demand hard evidence – that cannot be given – of a crisis before authorising a response and are reluctant to commit funding to something that remains a possibility' (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013: p 85).

Late humanitarian response was a problem in Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. But the effects were most disastrous in Somali where 'humanitarian response only got to scale when the worst had past. Famine could have been prevented'¹¹ (Slim, 2012: p5).

The delayed response led to a number of changes in humanitarian policy and practice in situations of forewarned emergencies. The most important of these has been the announcement in 2012 of a three-year Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) for Somalia, the first of its kind (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013). Donor policy commitments were geared towards supporting longer-term flexible financing to Somalia's chronic crisis with a focus on building resilience to shocks.

The response to the Somali refugee influx in Dollo Ado in Ethiopia's Somali Region was also delayed. An independent review found two distinct phases to the Dollo Ado refugee response during 2011: from January to June there was no emergency declaration and subsequently there was a limited response, while from early July a large scale emergency was declared and scale up of response and service delivery began (Richardson et.al., 2012: p 7).

⁹ According to Slim responsibility for failings in Somalia must be shared by the politicized aid strategies of al-Shabaab, Western counter-terrorist policy and the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). The HCT's misreading of the crisis led to insufficient urgency, an inappropriate strategy and a late response. However once famine was declared Islamic States, UN agencies, NGOs and Islamic humanitarian organizations became dynamic and effective. Source of information: Slim, 2012.

¹⁰ It was only in 2013 that the true scale of the 2010-2012 food insecurity and famine in Somalia was revealed (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2013). GHAR quotes a FAO Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit for Somalia (FSNAU) which found that approximately 4.6% of Somalia's population died as a result of the severe food insecurity.

¹¹ According to the report the responsibility for failings in Somalia must be shared by the politicized aid strategies of al-Shabaab, Western counter-terrorist policy and the Humanitarian Country Team' (Slim, 2012: p5).

Horn of Africa Crisis Response

The Inter Agency Standing Committee's real time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Horn of Africa crisis is the main evaluation of the humanitarian assistance response. Its findings and recommendations have been widely acknowledged and accepted.

The IASC¹²'s real time assessment described the crisis as follows:

'The crisis was regional across three countries because drought and food price rises were regional, but also because interlocking regional conflict affected people's choices, restricted humanitarian aid, and created internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. Successive rain failure made people dangerously vulnerable to the El Niño affect that hit the region in 2010-11. Actions by all warring parties in the region inhibited and greatly complicated the humanitarian response'.

The IASC's real time assessment described impact of the crisis and the humanitarian response as:

'Tens of thousands of people died, hundreds of thousands were displaced, and millions suffered deep erosion of livelihoods and assets in the 2011 drought crisis. However, the majority of the 13 million people affected received life-saving aid that prevented disaster. Suffering and mortality were most extreme for people in Somalia, and for Somali refugees moving to Ethiopia. Humanitarian response reached most people in time in Ethiopia and Kenya, but it failed to prevent a famine in Somalia'.

Management of Ethiopia's Food Security Crisis

The IASC real-time evaluation of the humanitarian response to the Horn of Africa Crisis in Ethiopia found that the Ethiopian Government strategy was 'successful over a range of life-saving operations in a mix of food and cash support, therapeutic feeding and water supply' (Slim, 2012: p11):

The PSNP's food-and-cash safety net routinely covered 7.6 million people and comprehensively prevented their slide from vulnerability into disaster. This core number was extended by 3.1 million extra relief cases, while 6.5 million existing PSNP clients also received a three-month surge ration. The Outpatient Therapeutic Programme system in Ethiopia swung into action and gave therapeutic feeding to 329,535 severely acutely malnourished children in 7,479 village-level sites. A massive water trucking operation reached 4 million people. (Slim, 2012: p 11).

The IASC evaluation also found that 'UN agency and NGO strategic support to Ethiopia's food security and relief system was essential and effectively leveraged Government strategy and capability' (Slim, 2012: p. 11).

Key findings with regard to the management of the food security crisis in Ethiopia were:

- Humanitarian response: late response was a problem in all three countries however 'Ethiopia's sophisticated food security and humanitarian system ultimately responded well and saved many thousands of lives'.
- Early warning: was accurate and timely across the region and 'prompted some early action in Ethiopia but not in Somalia and Kenya'.
- Humanitarian strategies, planning and resource mobilization: were very strong in Ethiopia, weak in Kenya and initially failed in Somalia; 'famine prevention in Ethiopia built on strong Government, donor, UN and NGO partnerships'.
- Coordination and connectedness: worked well in Ethiopia¹³, except around the refugee acute emergency response, but were uneven in Kenya and weak in Somalia.

Technical needs assessments and early warning worked well in Ethiopia before being 'stalled by political negotiation of needs at federal level' (Slim, 2012). The report mentions that needs were well understood at the local level but then negotiated at the federal level, causing delays in early action. Although response remained behind the crisis-curve disaster was prevented.

¹² The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. The overall objective of the IASC is to improve delivery of humanitarian assistance, including the protection of the rights of affected people.

¹³ Ethiopian inter-agency coordination was improved by a new high-level mechanism co-chaired with the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC).

In summary the IASC report states that 'the prevention of deaths is a major achievement of the Ethiopian Government and OECD donor investment in national, long-term and predictable systems to manage chronic and acute food security needs' (Slim, 2012: p5).

2.6 Summary Findings

Ethiopia's Struggle for Food Security

1. Ethiopia, currently home to an estimated 85 million people (UNOCHA, 2014), has made considerable progress towards food security since the 1984 famine captured worldwide media attention. Almost 30 years after Ethiopia's great famine, the country's per capita income has increased, poverty has fallen, food security has improved, and the groundwork has been laid for sustained economic growth (Dorosh and Rashid, 2013).
2. Due to the protracted nature of Ethiopia's food crisis both safety nets (to address chronic food insecurity) and emergency relief systems (including food aid to address acute but transitory food security) are essential longer-term instruments to achieve household and national food security.
3. The need for rapid and flexible humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia is not only expected to continue for the foreseeable future, needs are also likely to continue to outstrip the capacity of government to respond (DFID, 2013).

The Humanitarian Context

4. Since the 1970s, the severity, frequency and impacts of drought have increased and the areas affected by drought are expanding. Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable to weather related shocks with rain not only varying greatly by region but also being particularly unpredictable (World Bank, United Nations, 2010).
5. Ethiopia is characterised by longstanding pockets of poverty and chronic food insecurity. Particularly where rural people are dependent on rain-fed agriculture in marginal environments affected by water scarcity and land degradation.
6. The key hazards that contribute to crises and disasters are drought and conflict (DfID, 2013). The hazards Ethiopia is exposed to are exacerbated by underlying stressors such as a degraded natural resource base, as a result of unsustainable farming practices and deforestation, and a strong population increase (DFID, 2013).

Ethiopia's Food Security Programme

7. The Productive Safety Net Programme is the core element of Ethiopia's Food Security Strategy and aims to address chronic and seasonal food insecurity. Started in 2005 the PSNP has transformed an institutionalised humanitarian food aid response, based on annual emergency relief appeals, into a system of multi-year productive safety nets with predictable and timely resources transfers (food and cash).
8. Acute food insecurity as a result of external shocks, in particular drought, is primarily addressed by Ethiopia's National Relief Programme and through the PSNP's contingency fund.

Humanitarian Assistance & Response

9. Humanitarian response in Ethiopia is complicated by historical and political sensitivities. The Government of Ethiopia is intensely focused on achieving and portraying growth and development, with a resulting tendency to play down the extent of emergency needs (DfID, 2013).
10. Accurate humanitarian needs assessment data is often made available only when needs become critical (DfID, 2013).

The 2009-2012 Drought and Food Crises and its Management

11. The management of the 2009-2011 drought crisis in Ethiopia has been helped by the country's pre-existing humanitarian aid infrastructure and food security policy developments. In the southern highland areas the PSNP, as a systemic response to addressing chronic food insecurity and accommodating acute needs, played a key role in addressing humanitarian needs.

12. In Ethiopia's drought affected lowland areas response has been more problematic as a result of dependency on emergency relief operations, limited understanding of agro-pastoralist livelihoods and lack of or poor humanitarian access in some areas. Ethiopia's National Relief Programme has however been instrumental in reaching most people in time saving the lives of thousands (Slim, 2012).
13. The 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis affected 13 million people, out of which 4.8 million in Ethiopia. Regional drought came on top of successive bad rains and rising inflation and deepened a chronic livelihoods crisis into a tipping point of potential disaster by putting extreme pressure on food prices, livestock survival, and water and food availability.
14. Persistent drought conditions and insecurity in neighbouring Somalia and Eritrea resulted in large refugee influxes into Ethiopia. The Somali refugee emergency response in Ethiopia was weak and did not work well, particularly in Dollo Ado *Woreda* in Ethiopia's Somali Region (Slim, 2012).
15. Despite advanced early warning the international community's response to the 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis was delayed. Compared to Somalia and Kenya, Ethiopia's response to food insecurity was strong and helped by effective Government, donor, UN and NGO partnership (Slim, 2012).
16. The IACS's policy lessons from the 2011-12 Horn of Africa Regional crisis highlighted the importance of anti-famine governance, improvements in the management of 'aid risk' in conflict, multi-year funding cycles, cash transfers, and more-refined pastoralist responses (Slim, 2012).

Chapter 3 Dutch Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Financing

This chapter looks at the Dutch government policy choices with regard to Humanitarian Financing to Ethiopia.

The chapter provides answers to the following questions:


1. The scale and nature of global humanitarian assistance financing to Ethiopia (section 3.1).
2. The Dutch government's contribution to humanitarian assistance and types of funding provided to Ethiopia (section 3.2).
3. The Dutch government's management of its humanitarian assistance funding to Ethiopia (section 3.3).
4. The Dutch government's management of the link between humanitarian assistance provision and developmental programming for food security (section 3.4).
5. The contribution of Dutch government multi-year un-earmarked thematic funding for INGOs to strategic relief-development programming with demonstrated thematic add-on value (section 3.5).

The chapter ends with the summary findings on Dutch government HA policy and programming as relevant to the IOB review (section 3.6).

3.1 Global and Ethiopia Humanitarian Assistance Financing

Global HA Financing

Global humanitarian assistance funding amounted between 13.0 and 17.9 billion USD per annum over the period 2007-12. Government donors, which include European institutions such as ECHO, provide the largest share of the total international response. Private voluntary contributions however are becoming very significant (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2013; Stoianova, V., 2012). See figure 1.



Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance Report, 2013.

Figure 1. International humanitarian funding, 2007-12 in USD billion.

HA Financing to Ethiopia

Ethiopia is a major recipient of humanitarian aid. In the period 2001-10 Ethiopia received 6% of total international humanitarian assistance from governments and private donors. Ethiopia has been consistently in the top ten humanitarian aid recipient countries over the 2001-10 period (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011a). In 2011 Ethiopia was the fifth largest recipient of international humanitarian assistance (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2014).

Peaks in humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia coincide with severe droughts affecting large numbers of people. Peaks were recorded in 2003 (842 million USD in humanitarian assistance), 2008 (921 million USD), and 2011 (681 million USD) – see figure 2. In 2003, 12.6 million people were affected, while the drought in 2008 affected 6.4 million. The most recent 2011 drought across the Horn of Africa affected 4.6 million people in Ethiopia. Of the 644 million USD emergency humanitarian funding requested for the crisis 512 million USD was received (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2014).

The contribution of humanitarian assistance finance to Ethiopia by private donors is still very small but increasing in line with the global trend. Governments, in particular OECD-DAC governments, are Ethiopia's main humanitarian aid donors. The United States is the leading government donor of humanitarian aid over the period 2000-2009. During that period the US contributed 63.1% of all humanitarian aid provided to Ethiopia; a combined total of 3 billion USD (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011b).




Figure 2. Total international humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia, 2000-2010.

NB Aid from governments and private donors combined.

(Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011a).

The overwhelming majority of humanitarian funding to Ethiopia is in the form of emergency food aid. Just 3% of humanitarian assistance was spent on disaster prevention and preparedness in 2011¹⁴

The Dutch government, although a relative small donor compared to overall HA funding to Ethiopia, has made important contributions to HA provisioning in Ethiopia

3.2 Dutch Government Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Funding Decisions

Funding Policy and Management

The Netherlands does not implement humanitarian aid directly but, as a donor, enables humanitarian organisations to do so. Dutch government policy emphasises the importance of a strong central coordinating role of the UN in humanitarian crisis situations. In line with Good Humanitarian Donorship principles (Good Humanitarian Donorship, 2013), and in line with the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid (ECHO, 2008), The Netherlands in principle prefers the UN channel for humanitarian assistance (BuZa, November 2011). Only in cases where this is not suitable the government may channel funding through the Red Cross or INGOs.

Dutch funding of HA is centrally administered in The Hague and managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the authority of the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Co-operation. The management of The Netherlands' Development Cooperation with Ethiopia is delegated to the Embassy.

Humanitarian Financing

The Dutch government finances HA interventions in Ethiopia through un-earmarked contributions to HA organisations, as well as through earmarked contributions to OCHA and WFP in Ethiopia.

Most of Dutch multi-lateral humanitarian financing is through UN agencies in the form of un-earmarked funding: UNOCHA- (CERF and HRF), WFP- and UNHCR-Head Offices receive annual un-earmarked

¹⁴ Although investments in humanitarian disaster risk reduction are low non-humanitarian assistance (such as donor investments in Ethiopia's PSNP) is also used to address the root causes of humanitarian needs. The global humanitarian assistance website therefore states that humanitarian assistance should be considered in this wider context of humanitarian and non-humanitarian aid investments in both impacts and causes of humanitarian crises.

contributions for their programmes. Part of these contributions have been used to pay for programmes in Ethiopia. The Netherlands also provides un-earmarked funding to the ICRC and contributes to ECHO's humanitarian work through the general EU contribution.

Dutch earmarked humanitarian financing to Ethiopia for the period 2009-2013 amounted 31.5 million Euros¹⁵. The majority of this funding was channelled through OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund and the WFP with contributions of Euro 28,5 million and 3,0 million Euro respectively. See table 2 for an overview.

Table 2. Dutch Government earmarked humanitarian assistance funding to Ethiopia, 2009-13.

Type of Organisation	Type of Assistance	Year	Budget (Euro)
WFP			
DMH/HH ET WFP	Emergency food aid	2011	€ 1.500.000
DMH/HH ET/WFP/2.3/food assistance	Emergency food aid	2009	€ 1.500.000
Total WFP Funding			€ 3.000.000
OCHA			
DSH HO ET HRF	Material relief assistance and services	2013	€ 1.000.000
DMH/HH ET HRF	Material relief assistance and services	2012	€ 4.500.000
DMH/HH ET HRF	Relief coordination; protection & support serv.	2011	€ 5.500.000
DMH/HH ET OCHA/2.1/HRF	Material relief assistance and services	2010	€ 7.000.000
DMH/HH ET OCHA HRF	Material relief assistance and services	2009	€ 10.500.000
Total OCHA Funding			€ 28.500.000
Total Direct Funding 2009-2013			€ 31.500.000

Source: Dutch Government's Pyramid administrative system.

The Red Cross and (I)NGOs in Ethiopia did not receive any earmarked HA funding from the Dutch government over the period 2009-2013¹⁶.

Dutch government direct funding contribution to provision of humanitarian assistance in Ethiopia over the period 2004-2013 has been 73,9 million Euro and Dutch government indirect HA funding to The Netherlands Red Cross and selected INGOs 1,2 million Euro. See annex 4 for details.

Development Financing

The amount of development financing provided by The Netherlands to Ethiopia has been far more significant as compared to HA financing. Humanitarian assistance financing is relative small as compared to overall Dutch government contributions to Ethiopia. For the period 2009-14 Dutch government contributions, including humanitarian and development assistance, has been a total of 203.7 million Euros.

In line with the Embassy's Multi Annual Strategic Plan 2012-15 Dutch government ODA contributions to Ethiopia (excluding in-direct and direct HA funding) will be 234,7 million Euro out of which 131,3 million Euro will be made available to the Food Security Spearhead (BuZa, 2011).

Programmes by the Dutch Embassy

The Dutch government has delegated its developmental Ethiopia Country Programme to the Embassy in Addis Ababa. Some of the Embassy's programmes are in principle closely associated with HA programming, in particular those programmes that fall under the Food Security Spearhead¹⁷. However, only 2 out of in total 23 projects delegated to the Embassy under this spearhead are implemented in Ethiopia's chronically food insecure areas:

¹⁵ Dutch HA financing to Ethiopia for the period 2004-2013 amounted 74,0 million Euros: OCHA 56,9 million Euros, WFP 10,5 million Euros, UNICEF 4,5 million Euros and FAO 2,0 million Euros. Annex 4 provides an overview.

¹⁶ Over the period 2003 to 2008 they received a very modest contribution of 1,2 million Euros in total. See annex 4 for an overview.

¹⁷ The IOB is currently undertaking a separate impact evaluation of the Dutch Food Security Spearhead in Ethiopia. This report will be released in 2015.

- The multi-donor Productive Safety Net Programme (phase 3, 2009-14) with a Dutch contribution of almost 44 million Euros¹⁸; the PSNP is co-ordinated by the World Bank and implemented by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MoARD) and INGO partners.
- The Community Based Nutrition (CBN) programme receiving a Dutch contribution of 4,25 million Euros for the period September 2011 to December 2015; the CBN programme is being implemented by UNICEF and the Ministry of Health.

In the context of this study the PSNP is most relevant, it is also the Ethiopian Government's flagship programme to addressing chronic food insecurity in the country.

Programmes by INGOs

The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs manages, in close co-operation with the Embassy in Addis Ababa, a number of relief-development oriented interventions designed and implemented by INGOs. The Embassy plays an important role in these interventions as specified in the Embassy's Multi Annual Strategic Plans (BuZa, 2011). Support in the form of direct funding to INGOs comes in various forms and focuses on longer-term rehabilitation and recovery rather than directly addressing humanitarian food and non-food needs. This will be further discussed in section 3.5.

3.3 Dutch Government Funding Choices and Management

Content of this section is based on internal documentation and interviews with senior policy advisors of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

WFP

Allocation of direct and earmarked funding to WFP requires Dutch BuZa staff to submit a BEMO (BEoordelings MEmorandum) for final approval by senior BuZa policy officers. The organisational check, which is part of the BEMO, identifies as strong point WFP's knowledge, HA expertise and the ability to deliver HA: 'WFP is met kennis en expertise in staat om voedselhulp bij de hulpbehoevenden af te leveren' (BuZa, 2009: p 7). The organisational check also identifies challenges, most notably WFP's poor monitoring and lack of cooperation with other actors ('Monitoring en samenwerken met andere organisaties'). The BEMO furthermore mentions concerns with alignment of WFP's programmes with other more developmental interventions.

The BEMO's main conclusion is that the WFP is 'best placed to deliver food aid to all those in need in all parts of Ethiopia' ('WFP is in Ethiopië het beste in staat om voedselhulp aan hulpbehoevenden in alle gebieden van Ethiopië te verlenen').

The Dutch government does not request WFP narrative reporting to account for its funding contributions. WFP routinely commissions external evaluations and these are seen as sufficient by Dutch government staff for accountability purposes. In the words of a senior Dutch policy officer: *'in essence financial donations are on the basis of trust ...but of course we read the relevant reports by WFP and the external evaluation reports. We visit WFP meetings in Rome three times a year and ask questions on the basis of the reports that we receive'*.

WFP-Ethiopia is seen as having a good and established track record and is valued for its direct operational presence on the ground. WFP also works with large appeals which is attractive to the Dutch government as 'our *administrative capacity to follow up on funding decisions is limited*'. WFP is also an attractive option as in times of emergencies The Hague can claim that: *'The Netherlands gives food to starving people in Ethiopia'*. Amongst senior BuZa staff there is a however also a recognition that UN agencies, including the WFP, are *'slow, not easy to move and expensive ...'* ('traag, log en duur').

FAO

FAO's interventions in times of crises and emergencies are seen as important by BuZa staff but not as life-saving. FAO Ethiopia is not receiving direct funding as, according to a well-informed senior BuZa staff member *'FAO does not have the field presence in Ethiopia, they are not hands-on during emergencies'*. And *'FAO is not alert, FAO isn't there ... when there is an emergency there are no FAO appeals'*. More recently co-ordination amongst the UN Rome based food agencies (WFP, FAO and

¹⁸ The total contribution is 43,980,036 million Euros for the period November 2009 – December 2014 (Dutch government Pyramid administration system; project number 20775).

IFAD) has improved with a strategic framework of cooperation signed in 2011 and with joint appeals during emergencies¹⁹.

OCHA

Funding UN-OCHA through the CERF and HRF is, according to a senior Dutch government official, made available in line with GHD principles: *'the UN is best positioned and able to decide priority humanitarian needs in countries and to make funding available accordingly'*. The CERF is also seen as instrumental to enhance *'greater transparency of resource allocation'*²⁰.

The Netherlands is a relative large donor to CERF and HRF (see section 4.2) but not all Dutch HA funding is channelled through CERF and HRF. This is, according to a senior BuZa staff member to keep the image of *'Nederland geeft ... political visibility during emergencies and crises is important'*.

INGOs

Senior BuZa staff are of the opinion that individual INGOs do not have the large scale HA delivery capacity and programme continuity needed to respond at-scale to Ethiopia's chronic and acute food security crises.

INGOs can make strategic contributions particularly at the interface of HA and rehabilitation and recovery in line with the Dutch government's thematic multi-year Reconstruction Programme and the Strategic Partnership Chronic Crises programme.

3.4 Linkage Humanitarian Assistance and Development Programming

This section looks at the linkage between humanitarian assistance and development programming to enhance food security in Ethiopia. The content of this section is based on the Multi Annual Strategic Plans of the Dutch Embassy in Ethiopia (BuZa, 2011; BuZa, 2014) and interviews with senior policy and programme staff of the Embassy and at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague.

Programming

The Dutch Embassy's Multi Annual Strategic Plans

The central objective of the Dutch Embassy's 2012-2015 Multi Annual Strategic Plan (BuZa, 2011) pre-supposes a direct link between humanitarian assistance and development for improved food security: 'In 2015 Ethiopia will be more food secure, experience more equitable and sustainable economic and social development and will be less vulnerable to disasters and conflict'.

A central component of the Embassy's Multi-Annual Strategic Plan is the Food Security Spearhead (the other two spearheads are 'Security and Rule of Law' and 'Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights'). The Strategic Plan defines its overall objective as: 'In 2015 Ethiopia will have achieved increased food security and agricultural growth within an improved business climate; Ethiopians will have better access to more and better nutritious food'.

In programmes under its Security Spearhead the Embassy actively promotes the integration of Disaster Risk Management, such as for example in programmes like HOAREC and BERSMP.

The Food Security Spearhead: Programmes in Food Insecure Highland Areas

The Dutch Embassy's Food Security Spearhead targets three different areas each having a particular set of sub-objectives (BuZa, 2014):

- Food insecure highlands: reduce household vulnerability, improve resilience to shocks and promote community-based nutrition in food insecure areas of rural Ethiopia.
- Surplus producing areas: increase agricultural productivity and market access in surplus producing areas with increased participation of women and youth.
- Market integrated/semi-commercial: increase the competitiveness and business climate for a number of agri-business subsectors.

¹⁹ For example, the joined appeal following the November 2013 typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines. No joined appeals have been submitted for Ethiopia so far.

²⁰ The WFP is the largest grant receiving organisation of CERF, but agencies like FAO and UNHCR have access to CERF funding as well. See also section 5.1.

The Food Security Spearhead consists of 23 projects delegated to the Dutch Embassy in Addis Ababa. Out of the 23 projects only the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) and the Community Based Nutrition Programme (CBN) fall under the sub-objective 'food insecure highlands'.

The Productive Safety Net Programme

Safety nets are highly relevant for Ethiopia's chronically food insecure areas, both in parts of the highlands as well as in parts of the agro-pastoralist and pastoralists lowland areas.

Since its start in 2005 the Embassy has contributed a total of around 70 million Euro. In practice the yearly financial contribution to the PSNP was based on a minimum commitment of 5 to 6 million per year topped up by the amount left over from the Embassy's annual budget. The Dutch are a relative small donor to the PSNP as the financing needs are very large²¹.

The Dutch Embassy's long-term commitment to contribute to the PSNP is, according to former Embassy staff, based on a number of considerations:

1. Engagement of the Embassy with the PSNP before the food security theme re-emerged in The Hague. PSNP contributions before 2012 fitted with Dutch policy at the time which was aimed to reduce poverty. PSNP contributions before 2012 also fitted with bi-lateral development co-operation between Ethiopia and The Netherlands.
2. The PSNP is based on a broad donor basis and The Netherlands' saw its contributions in line with aid harmonisation.
3. The PSNP does not require Dutch staff for M&E; quality is looked after through Joint Review Missions and evaluations.
4. The PSNP is a multi-annual strategy and can act as '*financiële sluitpost in order to use up budgetary space*' (hence the range between 5 to 15 million annually).

Dutch Embassy's contributions to the PSNP are not earmarked. The Embassy has been approached by the World Bank's PSNP coordinator to request Dutch government funding to pay for PSNP elements for which WB funding allocation was problematic.

Findings

Poor Linkage between Relief and Development

The PSNP and the Community Based Nutrition programme are the only projects that fall under the food security spearhead sub-objective 'food insecure highlands'. All the other projects delegated to the Embassy are longer term developmental projects falling either under the sub-objectives 'surplus producing areas' or 'market integrated / semi-commercial'. There are no structural links between the sub-objective 'food insecure highlands' and the other two sub-objectives.

Apart from the PSNP and Community Based Nutrition programme the Dutch Embassy's development oriented programming and The Hague's Humanitarian Assistance programming had very limited practical and concrete links. In the words of one of the former Embassy staff involved in programming the '*linkage in terms of Linking Relief to Rehabilitation to Development as well as Linking Emergency Aid to Food Security has been a non-issue*' and also that '*no adequate attention was given to building resilience*'.

The lack of alignment and co-ordination between Dutch humanitarian and development funding also relate to the nature of the 2009-2012 drought and food crisis. The 2009-2012 crisis was most severe in Ethiopia's southern and south-eastern lowland areas as compared to the Ethiopian highlands where the Embassy funded the PSNP and the CBN programmes. Insecurity in Somalia and north Kenya resulted in a large refugee influxes during 2011-12; but according to former Embassy staff refugee programming offers '*limited scope to align humanitarian and development funding*'.

Embassy staff believe that Humanitarian Assistance did not receive the attention at the Embassy as it should have. Staff is of the opinion that there is a need to better link relief and development programming in food insecure areas in order to build resilience and reduce disaster risk.

²¹ In its first year (2005) the PSNP did cost 225 million USD and by supporting 4.83 million people the cost per beneficiary was 46.6 USD. The PSNP budget has since increased to include scaling-up mechanisms for times of increased need and to support greater numbers of people. The 2010 budget is estimated to have been 347 million USD and with the programme supporting 7.4 million people the cost per beneficiary was 47 USD. (Source: Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2012).

Humanitarian Assistance: Role of the Embassy vis-à-vis The Hague

According to former staff the Embassy did not aim to align its development funding, including its funding of the PSNP and the CBN programmes, with Humanitarian Assistance funding as centrally decided by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague. In terms of funding strategy there exists a gap between centrally allocated Humanitarian Assistance funding (the prime responsibility of The Hague) and longer term developmental funding and programming (the prime responsibility of the Dutch Embassy in Addis Ababa).

The communication between the Embassy and The Hague to increase complementarity of direct and indirect funding was mentioned to be poor. Former Embassy staff relate the constant turn-over of people in The Hague for poor communication and for creating frustration: *'steeds andere mensen draaien aan de knoppen ... dit resulteerde in een houding van ze bekijken het maar in Den Haag'*.

3.5 Dutch Government Multi-Year Thematic Funding of Dutch INGOs

In pursuing Humanitarian Assistance financing The Netherlands has consistently prioritised UN agencies over INGOs (see also section 3.2 'funding policy and management'). More recently however the Dutch government has increased direct INGO relief-development financing including to Dutch INGOs in Ethiopia. The Dutch government's direct multi-year thematic funding typically focuses on longer-term rehabilitation and recovery rather than on directly addressing humanitarian needs.

Dutch government thematic funding tenders are open to Dutch as well as international NGOs and consortia. INGOs' track records and comparative advantages in delivering strategic programmes are key selection criteria.

The most important thematic programmes through which selected INGOs in Ethiopia receive direct Dutch government funding are:

- The Reconstruction Programme (2012-2015): an INGO grant aimed at strategic contributions to reconstruction and development in post-conflict areas. The focus is on improving human security, developing legitimate government structures and achieving peace dividend. In Ethiopia this grant finances programmes implemented by the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development, OXFAM and the Dutch INGOs CORDAID and ZOA.
- The Strategic Partnership for Chronic Crises (2014-2016): an INGO grant of 30 million Euros for the period 2014-16 with a geographic focus on the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes. Programmes are expected to contribute to security, food security and/or the integration of internally displaced people and refugees. Programmes focus on transitioning away from relief with a maximum of 10% of the budget to be used for providing humanitarian assistance. Three Dutch INGOs operating in Ethiopia received un-earmarked funding under this initiative; DORCAS, The Netherlands Red Cross and TEAR.

This section focuses on the Dutch INGOs that receive funding as part of these programmes.

The Reconstruction Programme (2012-2015)

Both CORDAID and ZOA qualified for the Reconstruction Programme in line with their track record in Ethiopia on rehabilitation, recovery and disaster risk reduction work. CORDAID is in essence a funding agency working through national NGOs supporting them with organisational capacity building as well as technical and thematic programming advice. ZOA is a direct implementing agency which, in some areas, works with and through local partners.

CORDAID

CORDAID has a long tradition and good reputation in community based disaster risk reduction and resilience building²². CORDAID has, amongst others, promoted drought cycle management in Ethiopia's southern and south-eastern pastoralist areas in partnership with the International Institute of Rural Reconstruction.

²² CORDAID has been a member of the Partners for Resilience programme implementing programmes in Ethiopia through ACORD. The Partners for Resilience (PfR) is an alliance of the Netherlands Red Cross (lead agency), CARE Netherlands, CORDAID, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Climate Centre, and Wetlands International. PfR has been funded by the Dutch government MFS II thematic programme.

Being in essence a funding agency CORDAID relies on working through local NGOs. This has created a challenge as the Government of Ethiopia does not regard CORDAID as an implementing INGO. This created a situation whereby CORDAID, in September 2014, was not sure whether or not the Ethiopian Government would renew CORDAID's registration in Ethiopia for another three-year term.

For CORDAID to secure its status as an INGO in Ethiopia the organisation has to profile itself as an implementing organisation. In September 2014 CORDAID started elaborating a joined project proposal with Jesuit Refugee Council, ZOA and the local NGO Pastoralist Refugees in Support of the South Sudanese Refugees in Ethiopia's Gambella Region.

ZOA

The Reconstruction Programme funds ZOA's 'Hope and Recovery on the Ethiopia-South Sudan Border' programme. The programme builds on ZOA's long-term operational presence in the volatile Ethio-Sudanese border area which dates back to 1994 when the organisation started working with Sudanese refugees and local host populations. The cross border programme supports the implementation of local peace agreements (building on and promoting 'peace dividend'), and promotes forms of cross-border cooperation between various groups with a focus on inclusive food security and peaceful coexistence and stability. The programme engages with various ethnic groups in particular locations.

The programme is strategic in that it builds on ZOA's long term presence in the area and ZOA's functional relationships with key actors and stakeholders in Ethiopia and across the border in South Sudan. The cross border programme operates out of strategically selected locations such as for example a field office in Tergol at the remote border crossing between South Sudan and Ethiopia's Gambella Region.

During the 2013-14 South Sudan refugee influx ZOA could play a strategic role because of its unique presence and contacts for example in working with UNHCR concerning South Sudanese refugees crossing into Ethiopia via Tergol.

ZOA has been trying to directly access UNCHR funding in 2013 and 2014 to gear up its refugee programme in Ethiopia's Gambella Region. This has however proved to be very difficult. ZOA therefore tried to access Dutch government's bilateral funding to UNHCR Geneva through the UNHCR Ethiopia office. This, according to ZOA, proved to be a time-consuming and cumbersome process as well. After almost half a year of negotiations ZOA finally signed a funding contract with UNHCR in December 2014. In the light of this experience UNHCR Ethiopia mentioned it preferred bilateral funding used for funding UNHCR Ethiopia's implementing INGO partners not to be channelled through UNHCR Geneva.

The 2009-12 Drought and Food Crisis

CORDAID's and ZOA's projects funded by the Reconstruction Programme did not address the 2009-12 drought and food crisis which affected large parts of Ethiopia, particularly in the southern and south-eastern lowlands. Both organisations did however respond to the 2009-2012 crisis initiating a variety of programmes.

CORDAID started projects funded through financial contributions from the Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties (SHO), using Mede Financierings Stelstel (MFS) funding to fill gaps, and later on from ECHO. CORDAID worked through a variety of local NGOs including ACORD, SOS Sahel, APDA and CIFA. CORDAID also received funding from OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund for a programme in Afar Region with the project being implemented by the Afar Pastoralist Development Agency.

In response to the 2009-2012 crisis ZOA developed programmes aimed at the return and reintegration of internally displaced persons in Somali Region. The programme was co-funded by UNDP and implemented on the basis of a partnership agreement between ZOA, UNDP and the Somali Region Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Bureau. ZOA also received HRF funding for refugee and IDP programming in Somali Region (Jijiga, Hudet and Dollo Ado).

In meeting with ZOA the organisation mentioned that sourcing humanitarian finance in support of Somali refugee and IDP programming has been very difficult, certainly so at the beginning of the

Somali refugee and IDP crisis²³. With donors now focusing increasingly on the refugee influx in Gambella ZOA expects that less money will become available in support of the Somali refugees.

Strategic Partnership for Protracted Crises (2014-2016)

An important aim of the Dutch government's Protracted Crises initiative is to promote strategic partnerships to bridge the gap between acute relief and more developmental aid. In Ethiopia three INGOs and their local partners benefit from the initiative: Dorcas, the Netherlands Red Cross and TEAR.

Dorcas

Dorcas's Strategic Partnership for Protracted Crises programme was elaborated with strong involvement of Dorcas Head Office in The Netherlands. DORCAS main local partner in the implementation of the programme is the Ethiopia Mulu Wongel Amagnoch Church Development Organization (EMWACDO). This is a relative large Ethiopian NGO which has around 100 staff and which received funding from several donors.

To implement the programme Dorcas-Ethiopia did not have sufficient in-house technical and operational capacity. DORCAS thus had to hire additional staff, including technical staff such as veterinarians. DORCAS Head Office staff undertake regular field visits to provide direct programme support, advice as well as project monitoring services.

The Netherlands Red Cross

The International Federation of the Red Cross has shifted away from Geneva centralised funding of country programmes to more autonomous funding policies by national organisations such as the Netherlands Red Cross (NRC). The Netherlands Red Cross provides funding to and works through the Ethiopian Red Cross (ERC). The ERC receives funding from four other national Red Cross societies: Spain, Austria, Canada and Switzerland.

The Ethiopian Red Cross does not fall under Ethiopia's strict NGO law and is seen as having a good image by the Government of Ethiopia. The ERC therefore enjoys relative easy access and room for manoeuvring as compared to many other Ethiopian NGOs. The ERC has however little implementation capacity and is seen as a weak organisation by observers in the field of humanitarian assistance provision in Ethiopia.

At the time of the August 2014 country visit the Netherlands Red Cross and the Ethiopian Red Cross still had to develop their programme based on the NRC's general project proposal. Relationships between the NRC and ERC are good but a challenge in developing and implementing the programme is the ERC's limited expertise and poor implementation capacity on the ground.

TEAR

TEAR's successful submission for the Protracted Crises partnership is based on a proposal to extend the successful Self Help Group (SHG) programme of Tearfund UK. TEAR's programme seeks to extend the Self Help Group approach into crisis-affected and drought prone areas in Ethiopia, Somaliland and northern Kenya. The programme builds the capacity of local partners to improve food security through introducing or strengthening the SHG to build resilience. TEAR's aim is to introduce or strengthen the SHG approach into chronically food insecure areas as a means to diversify and strengthen livelihoods of poor and food insecure households.

3.6 Summary Findings

Scale and Nature of Global Humanitarian Assistance Finance to Ethiopia

1. Ethiopia is a major recipient of humanitarian assistance: over the 2001-10 period Ethiopia received 6% of total international humanitarian assistance (Global Humanitarian Assistance,

²³ To raise awareness amongst the Dutch public and BuZa government staff in The Hague about the plight of Somali refugees and IDPs in Somali Region ZOA has been involving Dutch politicians (Arie Slob in Hartisheik, 2009-11).

2011a). Ethiopia has been consistently in the top ten Humanitarian Assistance recipient countries over the 2001-11 period.

2. Peaks in humanitarian assistance to Ethiopia coincide with severe droughts affecting large numbers of people in 2003 (842 million USD in humanitarian assistance), 2008 (921 million USD), and 2011 (681 million USD).

Dutch Government Humanitarian Assistance Contribution and Types of Funding

3. Dutch policy emphasises the importance of a strong central coordination role by the UN in humanitarian crisis situations. For reasons of assumed efficiency and in line with Good Humanitarian Donorship principles the Dutch Government prioritises UN channels for HA funding. Only in cases where this is not suitable the Dutch Government channels funding through the Red Cross or INGOs.
4. Most of Dutch multi-lateral humanitarian financing is through UN Head Offices (OCHA, WFP and UNHCR) and is in the form of un-earmarked funding.
5. The Dutch government's direct HA funding to Ethiopia prioritised WFP and OCHA and is based on their track record to deliver HA interventions 'at-scale'.
6. Only 2 out of 23 projects under the Dutch Embassy's Food Security Spearhead (part of its developmental Ethiopia Country Programme) are implemented in Ethiopia's food insecure areas: the Productive Safety Net Programme and the Community Based Nutrition programme.
7. The Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy jointly manage longer term thematic INGO programmes focusing on rehabilitation and recovery: the Reconstruction Programme and the Strategic Partnership for Protracted Crises.

Management of Dutch Government Humanitarian Assistance Funding

8. Monitoring and follow up of direct HA funding to agencies like WFP and OCHA is limited and to significant degree based on 'trust', also because of BuZa's limited technical and human resource capacity.
9. In-country monitoring and follow up of in-direct HA funding to the PSNP and Community Based Nutrition projects by the Embassy is almost non-existent. Embassy staff is being overburdened by managing a wide project portfolio which is primarily geared towards development in surplus producing areas (non-food insecure highland areas).
10. There is little strategic co-ordination and alignment between BuZa's central allocation of direct HA funding and the Embassy's in-direct funding to enable for joined-up longer term food security programming in Ethiopia's chronically food insecure areas.

Alignment of Dutch Humanitarian Assistance Support and Developmental Programming for Food Security

11. With the exception of contributions to the PSNP, the CBN programme and the thematic multi-year support to INGOs, Dutch Government capacity to address underlying vulnerability to food crisis and increase resilience is fragmented institutionally between relief and development programming.
12. The lack of alignment between The Hague's direct humanitarian assistance funding and the Embassy's in-direct more developmental funding minimises Dutch contributions to disaster risk reduction in Ethiopia's food insecure areas.

Dutch Government Multi-Year Thematic Funding of Dutch INGOs

13. Dutch government tenders for the Reconstruction Programme and the Strategic Partnership for Protracted Crises award funding to INGOs on the basis of their track record and added value in terms of thematic expertise and geographic focus.
14. In line with the Reconstruction Programme (2012-15) both CORDAID and ZOA have developed longer term programmes in remote volatile areas presenting humanitarian as well as rehabilitation and reconstruction needs. Both agencies offer specialised expertise. CORDAID offers community based disaster risk management and resilience building. ZOA offers support to refugees and internally displaced people and local host populations with programmes incorporating food- and livelihood-security and community based peace and conflict transformation initiatives.

15. With regard to the Strategic Partnership for Protracted Crises a critical question is the degree to which the winning Dutch INGOs and their Ethiopian partners do build on thematic expertise and technical competence. The ability to provide programmatic added value by the Dutch Red Cross and its partner the Ethiopian Red Cross, over other INGOs and their partners appears to be very limited. The strategic nature and added value of the programme by DORCAS and its Ethiopian counterpart appears to be somewhat questionable.

Chapter 4 WFP: From Food Assistance to Food Security

This chapter reviews WFP's food assistance response to address acute as well as chronic food and nutrition insecurity in Ethiopia. The focus of the chapter is on the 2009-2012 food security response in line with the ToR of this review (see annex 1).

The chapter looks at WFP-Ethiopia's Humanitarian Crises Programming and its key pathways to respond to food and nutrition insecurity in Ethiopia: the National Relief Programme, Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) programme, and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). WFP's School Feeding Programme receives some attention as it has received earmarked funding from the Dutch government; the School Feeding programme falls under WFP's regular country programme.

The characteristics of each of the above mentioned programmes is being described on the basis of project evaluations complemented with information from interviews with key stakeholders and observations as part of the August 2014 country visit. This detailed programme information can be found in annex 5.1. The chapter presents the overall findings of the different programmes and their significance to move from food assistance to food security. The key questions to which this chapter seeks an answer are:

1. The main elements of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programming in Ethiopia and their relevance to addressing the 2009-2012 food and drought crisis (section 4.1).
2. The financing of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programming in Ethiopia and Dutch government funding contributions (section 4.2).
3. The effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programming in addressing the 2009-2012 crisis and in moving from food assistance to food security (section 4.3).
4. Accountability and transparency of WFP programmes (4.4).
5. Overall performance of WFP and future role to move from food assistance to food security (4.5).

The chapter ends highlighting the most important findings to the above questions (section 4.6).

4.1 WFP-Ethiopia's 2009-12 Humanitarian Crises Programming

Corporate WFP Programmes

Depending on the nature and scale of humanitarian crises WFP can initiate different types of programmes (WFP Operations Database, 2014):

- Emergency Operations (EMOPs): to assist disaster-hit communities that need help for a period of 3 to 12 months.
- Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO): to help sustain disaster-hit communities as they re-establish livelihoods and stabilise food security; PRROs last between 1 to a maximum of 3 years.
- Development Operations (DEVs): WFP's development aid temporarily frees the poor of the need to provide food for their families, giving them time and resources to invest in lasting assets such as better houses, clinics and schools, new agricultural skills and technology and, ultimately, a better future. DEVs typically take place in WFP's Country Programmes (CPs); CPs last for at least 5 years.

WFP Operations in Ethiopia

With regard to the IOB review the most relevant WFP-Ethiopia programmes in the period 2009-13 are PRRO 10655.0 (2008-10/11), PRRO 200290 (2012-2013) and DEV 10430.0 (2007-2011).

WFP-Ethiopia's PRROs consist of four components: Relief, Targeted Supplementary Feeding, PSNP and HIV / AIDS^{24 25}.

²⁴ PRRO 10655.0 (2008-2011): Relief - 6.4 million people; PSNP - 2.46 million; Targeted Supplementary Feeding - 737.000 people, and; Urban HIV/AIDS - 164.000 people.

²⁵ PRRO 200290 (2012-2013) saw in total six budget revisions adjusting beneficiary target numbers and supplies requirements to context and assessment of humanitarian need. Beneficiary numbers peaked under budget

The Relief and Nutrition/TSF component are aligned with WFP's Corporate Strategy Objective 1: 'save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies'²⁶ (WFP, 2008: p13-14). The aim of the relief component is to 'help emergency-affected households reduce the impact of shocks by addressing their food needs'. The aim of the nutrition/TSF component is to 'support the most vulnerable and food insecure households in reducing or stabilising Moderate Acute Malnutrition among children under five and pregnant and lactating women'.

The PSNP component is aligned with WFP's Corporate strategy Objective 2: Prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures (WFP, 2008). The aim of the PSNP component is to 'support PSNP households and communities in improving food security, resilience and recovery from disaster'.

Ethiopia's Humanitarian Assistance system is highly centralised with the Government playing a central role. WFP's main implementing partner is the Government of Ethiopia which is responsible for targeting of beneficiaries and the delivery of resource transfers to them. WFP's key role is to support the Government implement these programmes through monitoring and evaluation.

Pathways in Humanitarian Crises Programming

WFP-Ethiopia's Humanitarian Crises Programming aims to respond to humanitarian crises and chronic food insecurity through 3 different programmes or pathways²⁷:

- The National Relief Programme: provision of emergency food assistance to people facing acute/transitory but frequent food insecurity caused by shocks such as drought and flooding.
- Targeted Supplementary Feeding: treatment of Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) among children under 5, pregnant women and nursing mothers in 'priority 1 hotspot' *Woredas*.
- PSNP: smoothing food consumption and prevention asset sale amongst chronically food insecure households.

The overall context of efforts by the Government and its humanitarian and development partners is to move from food assistance to food security. In this regard the PSNP is playing a critical role in WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programming. And also WFP's more developmental programmes which fall in WFP's Country Development Programme which is made up of the School Feeding Programme²⁸, Urban HIV/AIDS, Managing Environmental Resources to Enable transitions (MERET) and the P4P (Purchase for Progress).

Table 3 provides the key characteristics of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programming.

The 2009-2012 drought and food crisis, and in particular the 2011 drought, affected large parts of Ethiopia notably Ethiopia's eastern and southern lowland areas. WFP's primary response to the 2009-2012 crisis has been the scaling up of its existing Humanitarian Crises Programming in those areas most affected by the drought.

By design the National Relief Programme allows it to expand in response to the impact of both economic and climatic shocks. The 2010 evaluation (Robertson et. al) found that the relief programme *'effectively responded to a significant increase in demand for food aid transfers, although the programme did experience delays in food distribution'*.

revision three in 2012 with a total of 5.228.000 WFP beneficiaries out of which 3.0 million relief and 1.136.000 TSF beneficiaries (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

²⁶ The goals under this objective are (WFP, 2008): 1) to save lives in emergencies and reduce acute malnutrition caused by shocks to below emergency levels; 2) to protect livelihoods and enhance self-reliance in emergencies and early recovery, and; 3) to reach refugees, IDPs and other vulnerable groups and communities whose food and nutrition security has been adversely affected by shocks.

²⁷ A fourth programme is a separate PRRO providing Food Assistance to Refugees.

²⁸ WFP's School Feeding Programme has received earmarked Dutch government funding but is not humanitarian programming. The aim of the School Feeding programme is to increase school enrolment and reduce gender disparity in primary education in chronically food insecure areas of Ethiopia

Table 3. Characteristics of WFP programmes and pathways to improved food security.

Type of Intervention	Type of Beneficiary	Type of Transfers
Relief Programme	Address acute and temporarily food-insecurity due to external shocks (number of beneficiaries identified by the Government's)	WFP food basket and cash distributions
Targeted Supplementary Feeding	Treat acutely malnourished children under 5, pregnant women and nursing mothers.	Super Cereal (on the basis of Corn Soy Blend reinforced with vitamins and prepared with oil reinforced with micronutrients.
Productive Safety Net Programme	Smooth food consumption and prevent asset sale amongst chronically food insecure	Food or cash, or a combination.

In the face of the 2009 drought and food crisis the National Relief Programme and the TSF programme thus saw an increase in the number of beneficiaries and necessitated subsequent increases in PRRO budgets (section 4.2).

Table 4 provides an overview of beneficiary numbers.

Table 4. WFP humanitarian assistance- and refugee-programme beneficiaries, 2009-13.

Type of Intervention	Number of WFP Beneficiaries (in thousands)				
	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Relief Programme	5693	5283	3886	3100	1892
Targeted Supplementary Feeding	1111	651	905	900	740
PSNP	1379	2548	1114	1400	1102
Refugee Programme	115	142	281	340	385

(Source: WFP Annual Reports).

4.2 WFP Financing and Dutch Government Contributions

Cost of Humanitarian Crises Programming

Beneficiary numbers for the Relief Programme and the Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme are based on identified needs through the twice yearly multi-agency needs assessments. Beneficiary numbers are published as part of Ethiopia's Humanitarian Requirements Document and in line with this WFP mobilises resources for the National Relief Programme and the TSF. Figures are adjusted twice a year (on the basis of *Kremt* and *Meher* agricultural seasons) and explain why PRROs for the period 2009-2012 are characterised by frequent budget increases.

PRRO 10665 (1 January 2008 to December 2010) was originally designed to address food needs of up to 3.8 million beneficiaries a year requiring a total food allotment of 959.327 MT at a cost of 561.9 million USD for the period January 2008 to December 2010.

The drought and the international food and oil price crises of 2008 prolonged the emergency requiring a 1 year extension of the programme and a significantly increased number of relief beneficiaries. The situation resulted in a total of eight budget increases with total food allotments in November 2009 being nearly 1.6 million MT at a total cost of almost 1.3 billion USD (Robertson et.al., 2010).

The initial budget for PRRO 200290 was 814.995.412 USD for the period 1 January 2012 till 31 December 2013²⁹. The budget was later revised to 1.488.010.736USD in line with the 1.5 year extension of the programme to 30 June 2015 (an extension of 1.5 years)³⁰.

²⁹ The carry-over budget from previous operations – PRRO10655.0) was 111.298.692 USD.

³⁰ A total of 46.5% of funding requirements was met by 11May 2014 46.5% (shortfall of 53.5 percent). Current funding received based on to date value -28 months- shows 69.8 percent funding against appeal and 30.2% shortfall³⁰.

Sources of Humanitarian Funding

Stable multilateral WFP donors are the US, Canada, UK and Germany. CERF and HRF monies are important as well, for example in 2013 CERF and HRF were WFP-Ethiopia's 6th largest donor. Access to CERF money is easier as compared to in-country HRF funding as mentioned by WFP's Deputy Head: *'HRF monies are an option but requires a lot of consultation ... HRF's review board members decided on UN access'*.

Money can be borrowed from WFP's Corporate Working Capital Fund (500 million Euro) when having 'medium probability' that the amount borrowed will be replenished by donor commitments.

Rome based donors do not bring in enough financial resources and therefore WFP Ethiopia is increasingly pro-actively contacting in-country donors, in particular embassies.

Major donors like the US provide WFP with in-kind donations. WFP-Ethiopia does however prefer cash donor contributions, such as by DFID and ECHO, as these increase flexibility and can pay for non-food response options (cash transfers instead of food transfers). For example, of the 1.9 million people reached by WFP's relief programme in 2013 255.000 people received cash distributions (WFP, 2014).

Cash contributions by donors also allow WFP to procure food regionally. In 2013 regional purchase for WFP's Ethiopia programmes totalled more than 330,000 tons. This food came from 15 countries with almost half (46%) coming from Ethiopia^{31 32}! Ethiopia was thus placed among the top five countries where WFP procures its food in 2013 (WFP, 2014).

Dutch Government Contributions

Funding Strategy and Consequences

The Netherlands is a relative small donor to the WFP. Most of Dutch government contributions to WFP have been un-earmarked.

Dutch funding to WFP is channelled through the following channels:

- Dutch multilateral contributions to WFP; becomes visible as WFP HO core funding to the WFP Ethiopia budget.
- Dutch indirect funding to WFP through ECHO (The Netherlands contribute proportionally to ECHO HO in line with EU criteria).
- Dutch government contributions to pooled funding channels: CERF and HRF.

The Dutch government expects that multi-lateral contributions to WFP HO contribute to more flexibility for WFP to decide aid priorities across and within countries to address critical humanitarian needs³³. This, according to WFP-Ethiopia officials, is indeed the case. Dutch government contributions are in cash which provides further flexibility as it allows for WFP's non-food response options and regional or in-country food purchases.

The Dutch government expects that its contribution of core funding to WFP HO improves WFP's internal coordinated funding policy and decisions. The reasoning for this that donor government contributions to WFP HO enables WFP to decide its funding priorities in line with identified humanitarian needs rather than individual donor governments prioritising particular WFP country programmes and individual projects). Coordinated funding policy, as a Good Humanitarian Donorship principle, risks being undermined by WFP-Ethiopia's increased focus on in-country resource mobilization. This is an important finding particularly so as Ethiopia is the WFP's largest country operation.

Provision of non-earmarked core funding to UN WFP results in increasing the 'distance' between the donor at one hand and WFP's country programme and project implementation at the other. In the case

³¹ Most of these food purchases were made through the Ethiopian Grain trade Enterprise.

³² According to the WFP 2013 annual report local procurement saved WFP almost 27 million US D. The savings being the difference between average price per ton of food purchased in Ethiopia as compared to the import parity price per ton (import parity price is the price at the border of an imported good, including international transport costs and tariffs).

³³ The Netherlands' has encouraged WFP to take a more developmental approach by highlighting the importance of food assistance, promotion of cash resource transfers and support for successful pilots as well as soft earmarking of up to 10% of WFP funding for 'developmental' purposes (pers. com. Senior BuZa official).

of Ethiopia this has resulted in minimal monitoring by the Dutch other than existing, and rather limited, instruments like MOPAN.

Another important consequence of non-earmarked core funding is that the participation of The Netherlands' government in dialogue at WFP headquarters runs the risk of being insufficiently nourished by knowledge on what happens on the ground. This certainly holds for Ethiopia where monitoring and engagement with WFP by The Netherlands Embassy has basically been non-existent.

Funding of Programmes

PRRO 10655.0 (2008-10/11) has benefitted from Dutch multilateral WFP contributions, indirect funding through ECHO, HRF and a direct earmarked funding of 1 million Euros for the emergency aid component of PRRO 10665.0.

PRRO 200290 (2012-2013) has benefitted from Dutch multilateral WFP contributions, indirect funding through ECHO and the HRF pooled funding channel.

WFP's CP 10430.0 (2007-2011) has benefitted from Dutch multilateral WFP contributions, indirect funding through ECHO and a direct earmarked funding of 0,5 million Euros to the CHILD-FFE (Child-Based Food for Education) component of the CP 10430.0³⁴.

Dutch government contributions to the PSNP have been around 26 million Euros for the period 2005-2009. PSNP commitments by the Dutch Embassy are almost 44 million Euros for the period November 2009-December 2014. The Embassy however funds the PSNP through the World Bank and not the WFP which implements the PSNP in Ethiopia's lowland areas.

WFP and EKN Engagement

During the August 2014 country visit senior WFP staff mentioned that although WFP did not receive direct funding from the Embassy, the WFP and the Dutch Embassy had lots of direct contacts in particular through the Donor Working Group on Nutrition. Senior WFP-Ethiopia officials mentioned that such engagement no longer existed. Embassy has become less pro-active and visible as member of the donor working group for reasons not known by WFP. According to former Dutch embassy staff direct contacts have become less in line with Dutch embassy priorities although strong engagement will remain with regard to nutrition.

4.3 Effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programmes

This section provides the overall findings on the effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crises Programmes: the National Relief Programme, the Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme and the Productive Safety Net Programme.

This study adopts the OECD-DAC working definition of effectiveness: 'Effectiveness measures the extent to which an activity achieves its purpose, or whether this can be expected to happen on the basis of the outputs. Implicit within the criterion of effectiveness is timeliness' (OECD-DAC, 2006).

Detailed information on each of the 3 WFP Humanitarian Crises Programmes can be found in annex 5.1. This annex describes the programmes on the basis of project evaluations complemented with information from interviews with key stakeholders (WFP, Government and beneficiaries) and observations as part of the August 2014 IOB country visit.

4.3.1 Operational Performance

According to WFP's evaluation report (Frankenberger et.al., 2014) internal and external factors affected WFP's PRRO results. The main internal factors affecting the operation's performance include:

- Low levels of WFP staffing in relation to resources managed.
- Low resource levels.
- Inadequate capacity-building strategy for establishing sustainable government food management systems.
- Lack of a strong M&E and quality control system.
- Ongoing progress and challenges in food logistics.

³⁴ This is a one time donation out of the Dutch Government Humanitarian Assistance Budget ; BEMO Activity number 20768, DMH/HH-450/09, page 5 (BuZa, 2009).

- The lack of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy informed by a resilience lens and experience with MERET.
- Need for enhanced WFP strategic positioning.

The evaluation report highlights that the key external factors affecting WFP's operational performance is government staffing (low capacity and high staff turnover particularly in rural areas) and lack of policy development (Frankenberger et.al., 2014: p viii).

The 2014 evaluation recommends that in the light of the high cost of relief and the overlap in some areas between relief and PSNP households such households should be priority for inclusion in the expanded PSNP (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

4.3.2 Meeting Humanitarian Needs

Are Donor Resources addressing Critical Humanitarian Needs?

The evaluation studies by Robertson et.al. (2010) and Frankenberger et.al. (2014) clearly established that relief operations were appropriate to emergency food needs: Robertson et.al. found that *'households utilized almost all their food transfer for household consumption, suggesting that transfers were sufficient to meet household demand and address the "saving lives" objective'*; Frankenberger et.al. found that *'the relief rations have enabled households to overcome major food shortages'*. The report however also notes that *'the gain is tenuous as coping strategies have increased since baseline'*. Frankenberger et.al. observed also that *'the relevance of needs during hungry season in lowland areas is hindered due to unaligned timing of the Humanitarian Requirements Document'*.

The 2014 evaluation study established that TSF met all outcome indicators in line with SPHERE standards.

The 2014 evaluation report found that PSNP food transfers in Somali and Afar were highly relevant given the context and difficult operating environment. The report also established that the target for reducing coping strategies was achieved and that progress was made toward improving community assets and food consumption for PSNP participants. The report does however explicitly state that *'outcome targets to significantly improve food security were not met'*. While PSNP have improved the frequency and mean number of payments, predictability and targeting were still found to be key issues.

The above evaluation findings suggest that donor resources have addressed critical needs and that WFP interventions have been relevant to the needs of food insecure and emergency-affected households in target areas. See annex 5.1 for more information on WFP's National Relief Programme, TSF and PSNP. See also annex 5.2 for a summary of WFP outcome indicators PRRO 200290 (2012-2013).

The Dilution of Resource Transfers: Are Programmes Under-Resourced?

It is however striking to find that all WFP programmes face a shortfall in planned budget figures (see annex 5.1 for figures for each of WFP's PRRO programme components). Although this appears part and parcel of WFP's funding strategy - setting a planned budget and securing donor commitments over the course of the multi-annual programme - it is obvious that on the ground HA resources are spread thin. It is evident that resources do not address identified needs in line with technical targeting criteria and resource allocation standards. In this regard most of WFP's interventions are under-funded resulting in resource dilution on the ground³⁵. WFP field staff in Somali Region, interviewed during the August 2014 country visit, mentioned that they regularly have to address beneficiary discontent and explain to beneficiaries as to why entitlement dilution takes place.

Both the Relief Programme as well as PSNP suffer from significant resource dilution. Critical observers blame the Government as unwilling to put out realistic figures in the Government's HRD. According to these observers the Government of Ethiopia tries to keep numbers of relief low in line with the Government's interest to present a positive image internationally: the focus is on growth while

³⁵ Apart from resource dilution caused by a shortage of resources vis-a-vis the number of identified beneficiaries (or the number of people qualifying as beneficiaries in line with targeting criteria) resource dilution also takes place after distribution by people themselves. It is however not known what impact ration dilution through cultural sharing has on households. The TANGO evaluation report recommends an improved targeting strategy for the lowlands (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

trying to keep expenditures on addressing food insecurity and vulnerability limited in line with ambitious planning figures (PSNP graduation at scale and overall economic growth).

In discussing this critique with senior Government officials in Addis Ababa they claimed that: *'donors anyway are not going to fund on the basis of needs... so why increase the numbers; it is better to reduce the number and to get the fund'*.

Evaluation reports of WFP's interventions do not provide quantitative verifiable data to establish whether or not identified relief needs have been met. WFP's lowland PSNP programme is being externally evaluated by IFPRI once every two years. IFPRI's 2013 PSNP lowlands outcomes report (IFPRI, 2013) does provide quantitative verifiable data in the form of a cross-sectional survey carried out in late 2012 in the Afar and Somali regions of Ethiopia. And while WFP Ethiopia claims that PSNP lowland humanitarian needs are being met the IFPRI report found that the impact of participation in the PSNP on the food gap in Afar and Somali Region was essentially zero. Receipt of payments for Public Works however were found to raise livestock holdings by a large amount in Afar but not in Somali Region (IFPRI, 2013: p. iv and 9)³⁶.

Under- or late-reporting of humanitarian needs, in combination with resource dilution, makes it difficult to measure the degree to which relief and PSNP needs have been met. It is for example difficult to measure projected impact of the PSNP programme when resources fall short and far more people would qualify as PSNP beneficiaries in line with the technical selection criteria of the PSNP's Project Implementation Manual. . How to measure projected impact of the relief programme when relief needs are under or late reported and the programme in essence is under-resourced?

This discussion is also relevant to the PSNP IV (2015-2018): in line with the admission criteria to the programme some observers estimate that up to 23 million Ethiopians will qualify as beneficiaries. Donors informally voice to be very concerned about these large numbers and consider 13 million beneficiaries as a maximum acceptable number. The Government of Ethiopia voices that 10 million PSNP beneficiaries is the maximum at any given time.

Timeliness of Resource Transfers

Early Warning Systems

Early Warning Systems and HA assessment results 'have not always been consistent with regional beneficiary numbers' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). The evaluation recommends greater advocacy by WFP and, in collaboration with other agencies, strongly advocacy for timely and consistent EWS and communication of assessment results.

Frankenberger et.al. also observed that EWS is not working well in lowland areas: community-level capacity to monitor, analyse and use data is needed, and shocks need to be identified more quickly. The INGOs met in Somali Region during the August 2014 country visit are in agreement with these observations and recommendations.

Delays in Resource Transfers

Evaluations of WFP's interventions (section 5.3) show that the timeliness of resource transfers is an issue: for the relief programme, TSF and PSNP!

Challenges to the timely delivery of relief are funding cycles for WFP donors and the issuance of HRD are not aligned and after HRD figures are released WFP requires four weeks to deliver food to affected areas (Frankenberger et.al., 2013: p 18-19).

During the visit of the IOB team to Ethiopia there was a very serious delay in the relief programme distributions: distributions were very late due to a break in the pipeline³⁷ with only the second 2014 relief round, out of six in total, being distributed in August.

³⁶ The IFPRI report notes that the PSNP is poorly targeted in both Afar and Somali Region with a large percentage of wealthy households taking part in the programme. Restricting the sample to the poorest half of the sample, IFPRI found that participation in the PSNP reduced the size of the food gap by approximately 0.5 months and increased livestock holdings by 0.4 to 0.5 Tropical Livestock Units (IFPRI, 2013: p 8-9).

³⁷ The national relief pipeline is broken and the GoE has therefore triggered the Risk Financing Mechanism under the PSNP in order to cover relief needs in PSNP *Woredas* through that channel. The DRM-FSS handled pipeline services 1 million people, the WFP pipeline 600.000 people in Somali Region and JEOP 400.000 people out of which 300.000 in Tigray.

The 2014 evaluation report also states that the general food management process takes very long³⁸ and that *'timeliness of TSF is hindered by pipeline breaks'* necessitating *'strategies for prepositioning and securely storing food should be explored'* (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

The 2014 evaluation report also found that while PSNP had improved the frequency³⁹ and mean number of payments, predictability and targeting were still key issues. With regard to challenges included insufficient local transport capacity, security escort requirements, poor road networks, limited access in the rain season and remote delivery points (Frankenberger et.al. 2014: p25).

Hubs and Spokes

In Somali Region the government used to distribute food resource transfers to Food Distribution Points but this regularly caused long delays. USAID and WFP initiated the Hubs & Spokes distribution system in order to pre-position food in remote locations.

Substantial progress has been made in food delivery through Hubs and Spokes. The 2014 evaluation report found that WFP's PRRO continued to face logistical and bureaucratic challenges to timely assistance delivery: *'The time lag between assessment and distribution is not acceptable'* (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

In Somali Region WFP monitors a percentage of total food / cash distributions through the Hubs and Spokes system. WFP prioritises areas for M&E that are seen as 'sensitive' with WFP being required to inform the regional and local government when and where it will monitor. WFP's experience is that in absence of regional government officials food / cash distributions are less well organised.

During the August 2014 assessment mission WFP staff mentioned that humanitarian access in parts of Somali Region has improved as a result of *'pacification through government led sedentarisation and villagisation'*.

4.3.3 Linkage between HA and Development

National Relief Programme

Linkage with Poverty Reduction & DRR Programmes

The relief programme as such does not link with longer term more developmental objectives. The programme responds to acute, but often frequent, food insecurity caused by external shocks such as drought.

The 2014 evaluation report of WFP's PRROs recommends WFP to link its food security initiatives to other poverty reduction efforts, as well as to DRM⁴⁰ and disaster response (Frankenberger et.al, 2014). In practice this could be achieved through linking to USAID PRIME, ADB Resilience Programme and NGO Programmes. By strengthening programmatic linkages WFP can contribute better to resilience in the lowland pastoralist areas.

NGOs, like CORDAID, have developed programmes in the pastoralist areas based on the concept of Drought Cycle Management to reduce people vulnerability in the face of recurrent drought. These programmes however do not structurally link with WFP's PRROs.

In-country Food Purchases & Purchase for Progress (P4P)

WFP has significantly increased its in-country food purchase to resource its relief and PSNP programmes. The bulk of the in-country food purchase is done via Ethiopia's Grain Traders Association thereby stimulating agricultural production in Ethiopia's food surplus producing regions.

The WFP also purchases food from Ethiopian farmer co-operatives in food surplus producing areas through its P4P programme. The P4P is part of WFP-Ethiopia's Country Development Programme (as are the School Feeding programme, the Urban HIV / AIDS programme and MERET).

³⁸ The food management process takes an estimated 37 days minimum (Frankenberger et.al., 2013:p 21).

³⁹ Frankenberger et.al. report an increase in number of payments from 2.9 to 5.0 within a six-month timeframe (2014: p 24).

⁴⁰ The evaluation report recommends to bridge HA with development by developing a comprehensive approach to building resilience across the PRRO components.

In 2013 WFP purchased 19.000 MT more than doubling that amount to 40.000 MT in 2014. WFP invests in capacity development of farmer co-operatives and provides credit to co-operatives through Commercial Bank of Ethiopia on the basis of so-called Forward Delivery Contracts signed with cooperative unions representing P4P farmers. Credit is used to purchase required agricultural inputs.

Targeted Supplementary Feeding programme

The TSF addresses moderate to severely malnourished children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Food and nutrition insecurity in children may affect brain development and lead to physical and social-emotional impairment. The importance of TSF for child development is undisputed.

Although TSF for children is an appropriate response to Moderate Acute Malnutrition other educational messages are needed to help ensure the non-recurrence of MAM. Through WFP's TSF programme women get advice and practical demonstration on food preparation and improved sanitation practise to prevent re-occurrence of malnutrition in children.

The Dutch Embassy's through the Community Based Nutrition programme supports UNICEF and the Ministry of Health to take a development approach to avoid malnutrition in children. Women groups get practical training on gardening, food preparation and improved sanitation practises to avoid malnutrition in children.

4.3.4 The PSNP: From Food Assistance to Food Security - Graduation

The PSNP is an effort by the Government of Ethiopia and its international partners to move away from an ad hoc emergency appeal system to a predictable safety net to tackle chronic and seasonal hunger. The PSNP, in tandem with the Household Asset Building Programme and the Complementary Community Investment programme, is designed to lead to graduation. A household has graduated when 'in the absence of receiving PSNP transfers, it can meet its food needs for all 12 months and is able to withstand modest shocks'.

Introduced in the chronically food insecure Ethiopian highlands in 2005 the PSNP in 2013 provided support to 5.8 million people in six Regions of Ethiopia: Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya, SNNPR, the Harari Region and Dire Dawa administrative State.

The PSNP has been introduced in Ethiopia's lowland Afar and Somali Region over the period 2009-14 by WFP. WFP's PSNP assistance in 2013 focused on the 1.1 million PSNP's most vulnerable and food-insecure beneficiaries located in the pastoral Afar and Somali Regions.

The WFP is not directly involved in the PSNP outside Somali and Afar Regions. The PSNP in the highland areas has however extensively benefitted from WFP's experience with the so-called *Managing Environment and Resources to Enable Transitions to More Sustainable Livelihoods Through Partnership and Land User Solidarity (MERET-PLUS) project*⁴¹. The PSNP has adopted to considerable extent the type of Public Works as promoted by the MERET-PLUS programme.

PSNP in Lowland Pastoralist Areas

Is PSNP Improving Food Security?

The 2013 evaluation report on the PSNP in Afar and Somali Regions assessed the impact of the PSNP on improved food security (Hoddinot, J. and J. Lind, 2013). The evaluation found, across the full-sample of beneficiaries, no impact of participation in Public Works on household food security (as measured by the size of the food gap). Participation in Afar raised livestock holdings but this was not observed in Somali Region.

Looking at the poorest half of the sample the study found that participation in the PSNP reduced the food gap by approximately 0,5 months and raised livestock holdings by 0,4 to 0,5 TLU (Tropical Livestock Units; a measure of livestock holdings).

⁴¹ *The MERET-PLUS programme helps households increase their ability to manage shocks, meet necessary food needs and diversify livelihoods, through improved, sustainable land management and community based approaches and strengthening of community-based solidarity mechanisms and the implementation capacity of counterparts. MERET-PLUS is a continuation of the MERET programme which commenced in the 1990s and aimed to improve agricultural productivity and household income in selected food-insecure areas.*

Qualitative data collected with focus group were found consistent with the Propensity Score Matching. Focus groups highlighted improvements in beneficiaries' access to food, increased consumption, and modest improvements in asset holdings (Hoddinot, J. and J. Lind, 2013).

Developmental Aspects

The PSNP was introduced to lowland pastoralist areas in Afar and Somali Regions in 2009 and 2010 by means of a pilot in 18 pastoralist lowland *Woredas in Afar and Somali Region*. WFP supported the roll out of the PSNP in 2010-14 to cover chronically food insecure parts of Afar and Somali.

A persistent issue has been to make the Public Works component sensitive towards the agro-pastoralist and pastoralist livelihood systems of people in the area. The lack of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy informed by a resilience lens and WFP's experience with MERET has been identified as an important factor affecting WFP's PSNP performance (Frankenberger et. al, 2014).

It is interesting to note that WFP in the design and implementation of the PSNP in lowland pastoralist areas is not having a functional relationship with specialised institutes doing long term research in the pastoralist areas such as Tufts-Feinstein's research 'Pastoralism & Policy in Ethiopia' and work by the CORE group (Pantuliano, S. and M. Wekesa, 2008).

In the pastoralist areas the PSNP is not supposed to result in graduation as the required complementary programmes - the Household Asset Building Programme and the Complementarity Community Investment programme – are not in place.

According to WFP staff interviewed during the August 2014 country visit the development aspects of the PSNP in Somali and Afar Regions have been challenged by the limited capacity of the Government of Ethiopia to implement the Public Works component, the high government staff turnover and getting the targeting right '*as people's way of life is mobility*'.

The PSNP in Highland Agriculturalist Areas

Is the PSNP Improving Food Security?

The most recent PSNP evaluation finds that the PSNP and the Household Asset Building Programme have contributed to improved food security. The key evidence-based findings over the 2004-2010 period are (Berhane et.al, 2013: p3):

- Beneficiary households' primary source of food constitutes food needs from own production; however, the fraction of own production has steadily declined while the fraction sourced from the PSNP has steadily increased.
- The food gap, measured by the number of months that the households is unable to satisfy its food needs fell from 3.6 months to 2.3 months among all households.
- Asset levels of FSP beneficiary households have increased although not at a fast pace, and;
- There has been a decline in distress sale of assets, irrespective of beneficiary status.

In terms of the implementation of the PSNP and the HABP important findings in the light of the IOB review are (Berhane et.al., 2013: p3):

- Targeting remains good, administrative structures exist and beneficiary participation in Public Works has improved in some regions (as compared to earlier evaluations).
- Capacity strengthening initiatives have been paying of such as, for example, the increased number of development agents which have led to improvement of support services.
- There are considerable regional differences in PSNP implementation with Amhara and Oromiya being outperformed by other Regions.

Graduation

Central to the success of the PSNP in combination with the HABP and CCI programme is graduation out of the safety net programme. Graduation will take place when households have achieved 'food sufficiency' which is defined as a household's ability to feed itself year-round and to withstand modest shocks. Graduation at-scale from the safety net has however not taken place highlighting the fact that graduation is more complex and requires a longer time frame as originally anticipated by the Government and its international partners.

IFPRI's 2013 evaluation report observes that 'there appears to have been relatively little graduation to date' and that the 'The experience of graduates themselves indicated that the process was in most cases not transparent or well-explained' (Berhane et.al., 2013: p7-8).

Key stakeholders close to the programme relate the disappointing graduation figures to implementation challenges of the PSNP, in combination with the HABP and the CCI programme, rather than to the design of the programme itself.

Risk to PSNP's Development Outcomes

A recent PSNP project performance assessment report identifies significant risks to PSNP's developmental outcome. The report finds that despite public, government and donor support for the PSNP, and the many improvements made since the initiation of the PSNP in 2005, there remains 4 main risks (World Bank, June 2011: p viii and ix):

- Claims that political affiliations influence access to PSNP despite numerous safeguards including monitoring systems and independent evaluations.
- Population growth in Ethiopia, which is the ninth fastest growing population in the world (annual increase around three percent), is likely to undermine progress towards achieving the ambitious goals of the PSNP.
- Donor willingness to fund the PSNP is partly influenced by government performance on governance and democracy.
- Government commitment to the PSNP was, and is likely to continue to be, dependent on unrealistic graduation objectives that involve highly ambitious objectives of reducing food insecurity.

National Relief Programme and the PSNP: Expected Beneficiary Numbers

Overall relief and PSNP programming recommendations highlight the need for WFP, and other partners, notably the World Bank and the Government, to strengthen the conceptual framework and definition of target groups for relief and PSNP beneficiaries (Robertson et.al., 2010; Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

These recommendations are currently being addressed through the design of PSNP IV which will see a strong increase in the number of PSNP beneficiaries to around 10 million and a reduction in the number of Ethiopians that require relief assistance.

Households in pastoralist areas which have received relief for three consecutive years will be absorbed in the PSNP. As a result the number of future National Relief Programme beneficiaries is expected to go down.

4.4 Accountability

General

The government is committed to HA provision and makes, for example, direct financial contributions to the PSNP. The Government is focused on growth and may underserve vulnerability associated with food insecurity. Vulnerability to food insecurity is central to WFP's concern and therefore M&E is essential to account for donors' in-kind and cash contributions to address vulnerability. Rigid programme evaluations exist for the PSNP in highland areas but not for the National Relief Programme.

Quality Control System and M&E

In 2008 WFP-Ethiopia established an M&E team with work starting on the development of a database. The M&E team is now made up of four full-time staff with M&E focal points in all WFP sections. Around 100 field monitors spend up to half of their time on monitoring: they collect and analyse information, make recommendations and document programme results.

The 2014 evaluation report on WFP's PRRO found that lack of strong M&E and quality control system affected WFP's operational performance (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). The report recommends WFP to strengthen M&E systems for all components of its PRROs. USAID is providing technical capacity building support through seconding a Junior Professional Officer to assist WFP in strengthening M&E systems.

The August 2014 visit to Somali Region by the IOB team found that WFP's decentralised monitoring, and evaluation in particular, at regional level is weak. WFP lacks a strong and independent evaluation/audit team; evidence-based accountability in terms of impact studies on relief and PSNP programming is practically absent.

External PSNP progress evaluation studies of PSNP, including the one for Somali and Afar Region (Berhane et.al, 2013), are of high quality. These studies however show more potential for the use of evidence based quantitative data on the basis of more precise outcome and impact indicators.

Strategic Results Framework

In its Standard Project Reports and Annual Performance Reports WFP publishes data on its Community and Household Surveillance (CHS) survey. The CHS survey is implemented twice a year (in the period March to June and October to November) and samples 240 programme beneficiary households and 240 non-beneficiaries households (as control group) for each of 7 regions in total (a combined total of 3.360 households) with a 90% confidence level.

The IOB team found that the twice yearly Community Household Surveillance studies show some methodological weaknesses. The Community and Household Surveillance instrument should be improved and made an independent external exercise.

Some external observers doubt if WFP's M&E findings will result in changes such as, for example, the number of people being targeted. This is because *'at governmental level they plan to reduce the number of emergency assistance beneficiaries'*. Measuring impact was also said to be problematic as *'in many areas relief resource transfers are not provided as per entitlement ... the federal government will decide beneficiary numbers on the basis of quota'*. The same observers add that the Government of Ethiopia is strongly focusing on growth and over-ambitious with its Growth and Transition Plan (the government's main policy and planning document) which contributes to the government not paying enough attention to the vulnerability of large numbers of poor households living in drought prone areas.

WFP is aware that monitoring should be improved with the organisation currently working on the development of a Minimum Monitoring Requirements document.

Joint Evaluation of All Humanitarian Assistance Activities in Ethiopia

The twice yearly *Kremt* and *Meher* Annual Multi Partner Needs Assessments informs Ethiopia's Humanitarian Requirements Document. The IOB team found that the impact of WFP's PRRO programmes, resulting from the HRD, are not sufficiently evaluated; accountability could be increased by independent assessment of regional/country-wide relief programmes.

The evaluation report of WFP PRRO 10665.0 recommends to *'establish a joint evaluation of all future humanitarian activities in Ethiopia through UNDAF Humanitarian Response, Recovery and Food Security thematic group covering HA by the Government of Ethiopia, UN and NGOs'* (Robertson, 2010).

A person close to the 2010 PRRO evaluation mentioned that this recommendation is made out of concern that WFP programmes are implemented in isolation of other programmes: *'a joint evaluation will promote strategic partnerships to bridge HA and Development'*.

Other observers highlighted the need to develop a comprehensive joint M&E framework for HA provision in Ethiopia. One the key challenges to achieve this is that the UNDAF is basically a government document and that agencies are not eager to participate in this: *'voluntary participation in an UNDAF M&E framework for HA provision is not going to work; agencies have their own corporate systems and prefer those'*.

Government Ownership ... or Not

According to an internal memo by the Dutch government (BuZa, 2011) critics of the WFP are of the opinion that WFP is paying too much respect to what the government says and wants. The memo however also mentions that because of WFP's good relations with the Government of Ethiopia the WFP is the only agency that has humanitarian access to Somali Region and is entrusted by the Government of Ethiopia to improve resource delivery in Somali Region through the Hubs and Spokes system.

WFP's own response to the critique of 'being too close to the Government of Ethiopia' is that at one hand donors want to see improved government ownership over aid programming but at the other hand

that when the Government of Ethiopia does so the immediate reflex by some donors is that WFP sells out to the government. WFP is of the opinion that the government tries its best to implement programmes but that WFP plays an essential role in M&E to account for best use of donor resources to address HA needs.

Misuse of Resources: Human Rights Watch

A 2010 Human Rights Watch report presented evidence that local officials can control the Productive Safety Net Programme and in some instances restricted its use to those who join the ruling party (HRW, 2010).

In response to the HRW allegations the Development Assistance Group (DAG), a consortium of 26 donor agencies, conducted its own investigation in 2010 into its members' mechanisms for detecting the politicization of aid.

The DAG's study in response to the HRW allegations of distortion in donor-supported development programmes found that (DAG, 2010: p iv):

'In summary, our assessment suggests that PSNP and PBS are supported by relatively robust accountability systems. In the case of PBS – a programme that aims to support decentralised service-delivery, and whose programme-specific safeguards tend to focus on allocations to Woredas – ensuring that systems at Woreda and sub-Woreda levels are effective and accountable is particularly important. The Relief programme and the EOS-TSF programme face important challenges in their accountability systems, in terms of safeguards and monitoring processes, and, especially for EOS-TSF, in terms of the existence of processes and mechanisms for input and challenge'.

With regard to the Relief Programme the DAG made recommendations to improve monitoring, involve communities in the targeting process and to monitor nutritional outcomes to know the effectiveness of the relief programme. The DAG recommended transparency to be enhanced by opening up the process of need assessments and resource allocation.

With regard to the TSF Programme DAG recommended more and improved monitoring of the targeting and food distribution process and greater transparency about monitoring findings. Monitoring the impacts of the programme and improving the screening process were other recommendations.

4.5 WFP's Programme Recommendations

The 2014 WFP Evaluation

Based on the 2014 PRRO WFP operations performance Frankenberger et.al. (2014) make a number of operational as well as strategic recommendations.

The most important short-term operational recommendation is for WFP to strengthen M&E systems for all PRRO components. The main medium to long term operational recommendations are to strengthen government capacity for emergency response and to develop a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalised.

The main strategic recommendation is for WFP to design and deliver a systematic government capacity development strategy with a results based framework for the delivery of the PRRO programmes.

Findings by the IOB team

Based on the desk review, meetings and deliberations with various stakeholders and the field visits the IOB review team suggests both short to medium term as well as long term directions.

Short to medium term

Fundamental shift by WFP to investing in system development and government capacity building while WFP should maintain M&E functions over food/cash relief- and PSNP-transfers provided by the international community. In 2014 WFP started its Food Management Improvement Programme to improve the governments efficiency to deliver food assistance, both for the relief as well as the PSNP programme. The main aim of the programme is to roll-out a government food management system, including manuals and training packages, from a national cascading down to the *Woreda* level by 2015.

WFP should further increase its in-country food purchase through commercial grain trader systems and P4P to promote agricultural production in Ethiopia's food surplus areas. WFP should expand its in-country P4P programme to strengthen the capacity of farmer co-operatives to also produce for local markets. Donor incentives should also aim for WFP to purchase food locally with donors providing cash rather than in kind food donations

Increase in local purchase by WFP including a clear vision and strategy on how WFP is to assist the Government to source and manage food locally in line with increased ownership and management of relief and PSNP programmes.

Long term

The government should assume ownership (both in terms of system management and financial ownership) over PSNP programming; WFP should focusing on maintaining essential emergency response capacity to scale up Government and international relief resource transfers in times of major emergencies or crises.

Donors and the Ethiopian government should develop a strategy to phase out international food assistance. Vested interests of humanitarian agencies, including the WFP, are often aimed at self-preservation and may drag change. Having said that it is important to note that WFP-Ethiopia has promoted, and is currently implementing, important initiatives to reduce the country's dependence on international food aid assistance. Examples of such initiatives include the successful introduction of cash as a PSNP resource transfer, the use of voucher systems, the P4P initiative and pilots on risk insurance systems. Donors may need strengthening their funding incentives to expand on such initiatives and invest in other promising initiatives to enable WFP to phase out international food assistance.

4.6 Summary Findings

WFP-Ethiopia's Humanitarian Crises Programming: the 2009-2012 Crisis Response

1. WFP-Ethiopia's Humanitarian Crises Programming responds to humanitarian crises and chronic food insecurity through 3 different pathways: the National Relief Programme, Targeted Supplementary Feeding (TSF) programme and the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP).
2. WFP's primary response to the 2009-2012 crisis has been the scaling up of its existing Humanitarian Crises Programming in those areas most affected by the drought. Existing programmes saw an increase in the number of beneficiaries and necessitated subsequent increases in PRRO budgets.

WFP Financing and Dutch Government Contributions

3. The Dutch multi-lateral contributions to WFP HO contributed to more flexibility for WFP to decide aid priorities across and within countries in address critical humanitarian needs. Dutch government contributions are in cash which providing WFP further flexibility as it allows for non-food response options and regional and in-country food purchases.
4. The Dutch government expects that its contribution of core funding to WFP HO improves WFP's internal coordinated funding policy and decisions. Coordinated funding policy, as a Good Humanitarian Donorship principle, risks being undermined by WFP-Ethiopia's increased focus on in-country resource mobilization.
5. Provision of non-earmarked core funding to WFP results in increasing the 'distance' between the donor at one hand and WFP's country programme and project implementation at the other. In the case of Ethiopia this has resulted in minimal monitoring by the Dutch other than existing, and rather limited, instruments like MOPAN.
6. Another important consequence of non-earmarked core funding is that the participation of The Netherlands' government in dialogue at WFP headquarters runs the risk of being insufficiently nourished by knowledge on what happens on the ground. This certainly holds for Ethiopia where monitoring and engagement with WFP by The Netherlands Embassy has basically been non-existent.

Effectiveness of WFP Programmes

A. Operational Performance

7. The 2014 evaluation report on WFP's PRRO identifies a range of internal and external factors affecting the PRROs operational performance. Important internal factors are low levels of WFP staffing in relation to resources managed and low resource levels. The most important external factors are government staffing (low capacity and high staff turnover particularly in rural areas) and lack of government policy development.
8. The 2014 evaluation recommends that in the light of the high cost of relief and the overlap in some areas between relief and PSNP households such households should be prioritised for inclusion in the expanded PSNP (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). This issue will be addressed as part of PSNP IV (2015-18).

B. Meeting Humanitarian Needs

Are Donor Resources addressing Critical Humanitarian Needs

9. In general the 2010 and 2014 evaluation findings on WFP's PRROs suggest that donor resources have addressed critical needs and that WFP interventions have been relevant to the needs of the chronically food insecure and emergency-affected households in target areas.
10. Relief - WFP's relief operations were appropriate to emergency food needs and addressed life-saving objectives (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). The same evaluation report however also observed that: 'the relevance of needs during hungry season in lowland areas is hindered due to unaligned timing of the Humanitarian Requirements Document' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).
11. Relief - In terms of impact 'the relief rations have enabled households to overcome major food shortages'. The report however also notes that 'the gain is tenuous as coping strategies have increased since baseline' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).
12. TSF – nutrition: TSF met all outcome indicators in line with SPHERE standards (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).
13. PSNP – PSNP food transfers in Somali and Afar Regions were found to be highly relevant given the context and difficult operating environment (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). The target for reducing coping strategies was achieved and progress was made toward improving community assets and food consumption for PSNP participants ... however 'outcome targets to significantly improve food security were not met' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

Dilution of Resource Transfers

14. It is evident that relief and PSNP resources do not address identified needs in line with technical targeting criteria and resource allocation standards. In this regard WFP's relief and PSNP interventions are under-funded resulting in resource dilution on the ground.

Timeliness of Resource Transfers: Early Warning Systems

15. Early Warning Systems and HA assessment results 'have not always been consistent with regional beneficiary numbers' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014): WFP and other agencies must strongly advocacy for timely and consistent EWS and communication of assessment results.
16. EWS is not working well in lowland areas: community-level capacity to monitor, analyse and use data is needed, and shocks need to be identified more quickly.

Timeliness of Resource Transfers

17. The timeliness of resource transfers is an issue: for the relief programme, TSF and PSNP! For example the 2014 evaluation report states that the '*timeliness of TSF is hindered by pipeline breaks*' and that '*strategies for prepositioning and securely storing food should be explored*' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

Hubs and Spokes

18. In Somali Region substantial progress has been made in food delivery through the Hubs and Spokes food delivery system; however relief and PSNP distributions 'continue to face logistical and bureaucratic challenges to timely assistance delivery' (Frankenberger et.al., 2014).

C. Linkage between HA and Development

19. DRM and Disaster Response - The 2014 evaluation report of WFP's PRROs recommends WFP to link its food security initiatives to other poverty reduction efforts, as well as to DRM and disaster response (Frankenberger et.al, 2014).
20. Purchase for Progress (P4P) - WFP has significantly increased its in-country food purchase to resource its relief and PSNP programmes. The amount purchased through Ethiopian farmer co-operatives in food surplus producing areas through its P4P programme reached 19.000 MT in 2013 and an expected 40.000 MT in 2014. Promoting agricultural production by farmer co-operatives is a positive developmental investment as it will strengthen farmer co-operatives to also produce for local markets.
21. TSF and Community Based Nutrition – The importance of TSF for child development is evident and undisputed. TSF takes a developmental approach in that women get advice and practical demonstrations on food preparation and improved sanitation practice to prevent re-occurrence of malnutrition in children. The Dutch Embassy funded Community Based Nutrition programme (implemented by UNICEF and the Government) takes a developmental and community based approach to avoid malnutrition in children.

D. From Food Assistance to Food Security: Developmental Impact of the PSNP

D1. Lowland Pastoralist Areas

22. The PSNP was introduced to lowland pastoralist areas in Afar and Somali Regions in 2009 and 2010 and is rolled-out covering chronically food insecure parts of Afar, Somali, Oromia and Southern Nations Regions by the end of 2014.
23. The lack of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy informed by a resilience lens and WFP's experience with MERET has been identified as an important factor affecting WFP's poor PSNP performance (Frankenberger et.al, 2014).
24. It is interesting to note that WFP in the design and implementation of the PSNP in lowland pastoralist areas is not having a functional relationship with specialised institutes doing long term relief-developmental research in those areas.
25. In the pastoralist areas the PSNP is not supposed to result in graduation as the required complementary programmes - the Household Asset Building Programme and the Complementarity Community Investment programme – are not in place.

D2. Highland Agriculturalist Areas

26. Central to the success of the PSNP in combination with the HABP and CCI programme is graduation out of the safety net programme. Graduation at-scale from the safety net has however not taken place. This highlights the fact that graduation is more complex and requires a longer time frame as originally anticipated by the Government and its international partners.
27. Major stakeholders relate disappointing graduation figures to implementation challenges of the programme rather than the design of the programme itself.
28. A 2011 World Bank PSNP performance report identifies significant risks to the PSNP's development outcomes. These include claims of political affiliations influencing access to PSNP resources, Ethiopia's fast population growth which is likely to undermine achieving PSNP goals (amongst others graduation), donor willingness to continue to fund the PSNP, and continued Government commitment to the PSNP seen its highly ambitious objectives of reducing food insecurity.

D3. Expected Relief and PSNP Beneficiary Numbers

29. Relief and PSNP programming recommendations require strengthening the conceptual framework and definition of target groups for relief and PSNP beneficiaries. These recommendations are currently being addressed through the design of PSNP IV. PSNP IV will see a strong increase in the number of PSNP beneficiaries to around 10 million by absorbing households in pastoralist areas which have received relief for three consecutive years. This is expected to result in a significant reduction in the number of Ethiopians that require relief assistance.

Accountability and Transparency of WFP Programmes

30. The government is committed to HA provision and makes direct financial contributions to the PSNP. The Government is focused on growth and may underserve vulnerability associated with food insecurity. Vulnerability to food insecurity is central to WFP's concern and therefore M&E is essential to account for donors' in-kind and cash contributions to address vulnerability. Rigid programme evaluations exist for the PSNP in highland areas but not for the National Relief Programme.
31. The 2014 evaluation report on WFP's PRRO found that lack of strong M&E and quality control system affected WFP's operational performance (Frankenberger et.al., 2014). The report recommends WFP to strengthen M&E systems for all components of its PRROs. USAID is providing technical capacity building for improving WFP's M&E systems. Currently WFP is also working on the development of a Minimum Monitoring Requirements document.
32. The IOB team found that the twice yearly Community Household Surveillance studies show some methodological weaknesses. The Community and Household Surveillance instrument should be improved and made an independent external exercise.
33. External PSNP progress evaluation studies, including the one for Somali and Afar Region, are of high quality. These studies however show more potential for the use of evidence based quantitative data on the basis of more precise outcome and impact indicators.
34. The twice yearly *Kremt* and *Meher* Annual Multi Partner Needs Assessments informs Ethiopia's Humanitarian Requirements Document. The IOB team found that the impact of the relief programme, resulting from the HRD, is not sufficiently evaluated; accountability could be increased by independent assessment of regional/country-wide relief programmes.
35. The 2010 evaluation report of WFP's PRRO recommends to '*establish a joint evaluation of all future humanitarian activities in Ethiopia through UNDAF Humanitarian Response, Recovery and Food Security thematic group covering HA by the Government of Ethiopia, UN and NGOs*'. This recommendation is made out of concern that WFP programmes are implemented in isolation of other programmes: '*a joint evaluation will promote strategic partnerships to bridge HA and Development*'.
36. WFP's response to the critique of some observers that 'WFP is being too close to the Government of Ethiopia' is that at one hand donors want to see improved government ownership over aid programming but at the other hand claim that WFP sells out to the government when the Government of Ethiopia exercises that ownership. WFP is of the opinion that the government tries its best to implement programmes but that WFP plays an essential role in M&E to account for best use of donor resources to address HA needs.
37. Allegations by Human Right Watch in 2010 of distortion in donor-supported programmes, in particular the PSNP, resulted in an investigation by the Development Assistance Group (DAG) into its members' mechanisms for detecting the politicization of aid. The investigation found that the relief programme, TSF and the PSNP were *supported by 'relatively robust accountability systems'*. The DAG's report did make recommendations to improve monitoring, involve communities in the targeting process and recommended greater transparency about monitoring findings of the relief and TSF programme.

WFP's Programme Recommendations

38. The most important short-term operational recommendation is for WFP to strengthen M&E systems for all PRRO components. The main medium to long term operational recommendations are to strengthen government capacity for emergency response and to develop a comprehensive food management system that can be institutionalised. This is to be achieved by 2015 through the WFP-Ethiopia managed Food Management Improvement Programme which builds the government's food management system from a national level cascading down to *Woreda* level.
39. The main strategic recommendation is for WFP to design and deliver a systematic government capacity development strategy with a results based framework for the delivery of the PRRO programmes.
40. Short to medium term strategic directions suggested by the IOB review team include:

- Fundamental shift by WFP to investing in system development and government capacity building while WFP should maintain M&E functions over food/cash relief and PSNP transfers provided by the international community.
- WFP should further increase its in-country food purchase through commercial grain trader systems and P4P to promote agricultural production in Ethiopia's food surplus areas. WFP should expand its in-country P4P programme to strengthen the capacity of farmer co-operatives to also produce for local markets. Donor incentives should also aim for WFP to purchase food locally with donors providing cash rather than in kind food donations.
- Increase in local purchase by WFP including a clear vision and strategy on how WFP is to assist the Government to source and manage food locally in line with increased ownership and management of relief and PSNP programmes.

41. Long term strategic directions suggested by the IOB review team include:

- The government should assume ownership (both in terms of system management and financial ownership) over PSNP programming. WFP should focus on maintaining essential emergency response capacity to scale up Government and international relief resource transfers in times of major emergencies or crises.
- Donors and the Ethiopian government should develop a strategy to phase out international food assistance with donors providing further funding incentives to WFP to scale-up current initiatives (such as for example the introduction of cash as a resource transfer and the P4P programme) and develop new initiatives in support of such a strategy.

Chapter 5 UN-OCHA's HRF: Non-Food Response to Humanitarian Emergencies

This chapter reviews UN-OCHA's emergency response programming in Ethiopia as relevant to the country's 2009-2012 food and drought crisis and in line with the ToR of this study (see annex 1).

The chapter focuses on the UN-OCHA managed Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) which is a decentralised country based non-food emergency response fund. Main areas of HRF support are emergency nutrition, WASH, emergency shelter and Non Food Items (NFIs), emergency food security and livelihoods, and disaster resilience.

The effectiveness of HRF projects is being described on the basis of a desk study analysis of selected HRF projects⁴² and complemented with information from interviews with OCHA and OCHA's INGO partners.

The key questions to which this chapter seeks an answer are:

1. The complementarity of CERF and HRF (section 5.1).
2. The financing of the HRF and Dutch government contributions (section 5.2).
3. Effectiveness of OCHA's HRF and HRF projects with a focus on the 2009-2012 crisis (section 5.3).
4. Accountability and transparency of the HRF and HRF projects (5.4).
5. UN- OCHA's overall HRF performance and future directions (5.5).

The chapter ends with the most salient findings to the questions above (section 5.6).

5.1 UN-OCHA Ethiopia's Country Based Pooled Fund Mechanisms

UN-OCHA's main country based pooled funding mechanisms to respond to emergencies are the CERF and HRF. Being different mechanisms the CERF and HRF complement each other in Ethiopia.

5.1.1 Central Emergency Response Fund

Background

The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) is a 500 million USD million fund established to support rapid response and address critical needs in underfunded emergencies.

The CERF was approved by the UN General Assembly on 15 December 2005 to achieve the following objectives (OCHA, 2011b):

1. Promote early action and response to reduce loss of life;
2. Enhance response to time-critical requirements, and;
3. Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.

UN agencies have access to the CERF; NGOs do not have direct access.

Global CERF Contributions to Ethiopia

Over the period 2006-13 a total of 170,6 million USD CERF funding has been made available to Ethiopia. Out of this 100,9 million USD has been made available under the 'Underfunded Emergency' funding envelope and 69,8 million USD under the 'Rapid Response' envelope (see table 5). Of the four selected UN agencies WFP has received the major share of CERF funding followed by UNICEF, UNHCR and FAO.

⁴² UN-OCHA maintains an extensive report portfolio of all its individual HRF projects.

Table 5. CERF funding allocations to Ethiopia, 2006-13.

Year	Ethiopia CERF	Funding Envelopes		Approved CERF funding selected agencies in Ethiopia			
	CERF Ethiopia Funding	Underfunded Emergency Funding	Rapid Response Funding	WFP	UNHCR	FAO	UNICEF
2006	9.973	1.000	8.973	3.174	600	911	2.640
2007	12.366	8.998	3.368	3.345	2.076	-	4.144
2008	31.528	9.651	21.877	12.780	2.700	1.278	11.320
2009	15.645	15.645	-	6.697	1.646	2.300	4.208
2010	16.690	16.690	-	5.857	689	1.868	6.193
2011	46.476	21.976	24.500	21.004	8.038	2.250	9.124
2012	13.985	9.912	4.072	7.123	2.162	-	500
2013	23.973	17.000	6.973	11.709	1.500	1.500	3.250
Totals	170.636	100.872	69.763	71.689	19.411	10.107	41.379

All figures in 1000 US\$

(Source: compiled from UN-OCHA Ethiopia internal documentation).

CERF funding has been highly relevant in helping to addressing the 2009-2012 crisis. Over the 2009-12 period WFP has received a total of 40,7 million USD, UNICEF 21,0 million, UNHCR 12,5 and FAO 6,4 million USD.

Dutch Government Contributions to CERF

The Netherlands has been amongst the top 10 donors of the CERF for the period 2006-2010 contributing 40 million Euros per annum (Global Humanitarian Assistance, 2011a).

CERF's Performance

A general finding of the CERF 2006-2010 evaluation is that CERF has increased the predictability of funding flows for new emergencies, but less clearly so for underfunded emergencies⁴³. The increase in predictability of funding through the rapid response window at global and country level has been a key objective of the establishment of CERF in 2006 (Channel Research, 2011).

The main findings of the 2011 five-year global CERF evaluation by Channel Research as relevant to Ethiopia are:

- CERF processes are relatively less inclusive as compared to HRF with the CERF interagency monitoring systems resulting in poorer quality data and poorer learning opportunities as compared to HRF.
- Delays in CERF funding allocations to address large-scale emergencies that were initially addressed by HRF but overwhelmed HRF management capacities. Delays in passing on CERF funds tended to be less of an issue in countries, such as Ethiopia, where NGOs had direct access to HRF funds (or alternative sources of quick funding).
- CERF grant sizes were too small to enable rapid scale-up of emergency operations.

CERF and the 2011-2012 Horn of Africa Crisis

The 2011 regional Horn of Africa drought affected Ethiopia significantly but the response was more effective and timely as compared to the response in Somalia and Kenya. The key reason for this is the firm foundation of Ethiopian government systems which enabled for early warning and scaling up responses (Barnaby Willitts-King, 2012). The humanitarian system provided important resources and expertise to the Horn of Africa response; CERF was particularly important in supporting key pipelines at crucial times, and underfunded sectors (Barnaby Willitts-King, 2012).

An important finding of CERF Ethiopia and its role in responding to the 2011-12 crisis is the need to strengthen regional coordination and CERF's 'context awareness' (Barnaby Willitts-King, 2012). The report therefore recommends strengthening cross border early warning and information sharing and for large crises to deploy additional staff to support decision making in New York.

⁴³ The CERF has increased the predictability of funding through the underfunded window at global level but has remained much less predictability at country and sector levels (Channel Research, 2011: p3)

In 2012 HRF-Ethiopia hosted the 'Central Emergency Response Fund Added Value' mission and facilitated a country visit for the first global triennial evaluation of ERFs ('the Global ERF Evaluation'). The findings of both evaluations were very positive with recommendations for further improvement of the pooled funds in Ethiopia (OCHA, 2012).

5.1.2 Emergency Response Fund, or Humanitarian Response Fund

Background

OCHA's Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) are country-based pooled funds that provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid and flexible funding to respond to unforeseen, sudden-onset humanitarian emergencies (UNOCHA, 2012). In this report we use the phrase Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF), which is essentially an ERF, as it is commonly referred to by BuZa for historic reasons.

HRFs allow Humanitarian Country Teams who are best informed of the situation on the ground to swiftly allocate resources where they are most needed. Humanitarian Coordinators (HCs) oversee the HRFs, while OCHA oversees the day-to-day management and financial administration.

The HC makes decisions on HRF grants with the support of a Technical Review Board and the sector/cluster groups. An Advisory Board with donor, UN and NGO membership advises the HC on policy and strategic issues.

HRFs complement existing funding channels, such as the Central Emergency Response Fund. HRFs are not intended to provide core funding to projects in protracted crises, although some HRFs may provide funding to high-priority projects, or bridge funding in the consolidated humanitarian appeals on an exceptional basis (UNOCHA, 2012).

The HRF is a non-food emergency response fund.

Main Areas of HRF Support

As a non-food emergency response fund the main areas of Ethiopia's HRF support have been (DfID, 2013b):

- Emergency nutrition: people being provided with life-saving nutritional support. The HRF focused on the treatment of children with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM), and support to vulnerable groups including pregnant and lactating mothers.
- Water, Sanitation and Health (WASH): people benefited from safe water and improved sanitation. The HRF funds water trucking in the most urgent life-threatening cases, but also construction and rehabilitation of sustainable water sources.
- Emergency shelter and non-food items: families benefitted from support with construction of temporary shelters and basic items such as bedding materials and cooking equipment. The HRF provided funding to support sudden influxes of new refugees or those displaced internally by conflict.
- Emergency food security and livelihoods: disaster affected families supported with planting crops and families with maintaining their livestock.
- Disaster resilience: The HRF supported the most vulnerable communities to improve their resilience to disasters.

5.1.3 CERF and HRF as Country Based Pooled Funding Mechanisms

CERF and HRF Complementarity

The UK Department for International Development's (DfID) 2011 Multilateral Aid Review (MAR) listed Ethiopia's country-based pooled funds as one of OCHA's strengths. Specifically, the MAR found that 'OCHA manages a range of country-level pooled funding mechanisms that support join-up working amongst actors and foster stronger partnerships'.

The five year global evaluation of the CERF (OCHA, 25 July 2011) found that 'there seemed much to be gained in pooling some of the analytical capacities for the prioritisation of actions for CERF funding. The report found that the absence of joined-up or co-ordinated CERF and HRF review and allocation of fund is a key challenge to streamline the management and processes for pooled funds in order to

maximise benefits from analytical capacities^{44 45}. Ethiopia, in this regard, is a positive exception as CERF and HRF complementarity is enhanced by the fact that the HRF Review Board in Addis Ababa collectively decides on CERF fund allocations to UN agencies and HRF fund allocations to UN agencies and NGOs.

UN-OCHA considers both CERF and HRF as crucial instruments and central to humanitarian reform. In the words of the Representative of OCHA: *'In Ethiopia CERF is to respond to forgotten crises ... HRF is to influence the humanitarian response in those parts of the country that have an issue ...'*

5.2 HRF Financing and Dutch Government Contributions

Dutch Government HRF Contributions

The HRF in Ethiopia was established in 2007 as an emergency funding mechanism to address gaps in critical, life-saving emergency response.

OCHA Ethiopia regards both the UK and The Netherlands as having played a key role with regard to the HRF architecture and the HRF establishment: *'The HRF in Ethiopia has been set up between the twin pillars of DfID and the Dutch'* (pers. com. OCHA Representative).

Dutch Financial HRF Contributions

The Dutch government has made significant contributions to Ethiopia's HRF. Over the 7 year period 2006-2012 total contributions by The Netherlands amounted 72,618,571 million USD⁴⁶, or 31.7% of total HRF Ethiopia funding over the 2006-2012 period⁴⁷.

The Netherlands has been the second largest HRF donor after DfID which contributed 37.9% of total HRF funding in the period 2006-2012 (HRF Ethiopia, Annual Report 2012).

The Dutch government's contribution to the HRF has been a mere 1.2 million USD in 2013 and none in 2014. This abrupt reduction in HRF funding is because Dutch government contributions came out of The Hague's Acute Crisis Budget Line and therefore was a temporary contribution to HRF Ethiopia.

Senior OCHA staff expressed disappointed with regard to the Dutch government's 'disengagement' with HRF: *'The Dutch always have highlighted the interests in pooled funding. With the disengagement of the Dutch the HRF is at risk of becoming less of common pooled fund'*.

Attractiveness of the HRF Fund and its Challenges

HRF has been a very attractive fund for The Netherlands: the HRF is an independent and decentralised emergency response fund without the need for donor governments to have own administrative capacity. This fits with the Dutch government's rationale that direct core funding to the HRF results into rational, flexible and predictable funding.

OCHA realises that HRF is a very attractive fund for donors, such as the Dutch government, as *'HRF offers turn-key solutions in addressing humanitarian emergency needs'*.

There are however a number of serious downside to this; the most important ones are that The Netherlands as a donor:

- Is not actively monitor HRF; some field visits were undertaken and important donor meetings quite regularly attended by interns (students) rather than by experienced Dutch Embassy staff able to contribute constructively and make decisions.
- Has little critical awareness of the local context and the strategic nature of HRF's emergency aid priorities.
- Lacks institutional memory about the performance and HRF's strategic role in Ethiopia.

⁴⁴ In 2013 the CERF secretariat undertook a global review of CERF and HRF as country based pooled funds (CERF, April 2013) with the aim to inform the preparation on a global guidance note to enhance CERF-HRF complementarity.

⁴⁵ The 2011 global CERF evaluation highlights another area for CERF-HRF complementarity as OCHA's ability to mitigate the effects of protracted sub-granting processes by UN agencies (OCHA, 2011).

⁴⁶ Contributions by the Dutch government: in 2008 25,675,674 million USD; in 2009 15,441,176 USD, in 2010 9,790,210 USD; in 2011 6,875,000 USD, and in 2012 6,428,571 USD.

⁴⁷ Total 2006-201 donor contributions were 229,090,607 million US\$ (HRF, 2012).

In this light senior OCHA officials in Addis expressed that that *'we have been an architect of our own problem'. 'We offer a turn-key service to donors and as a result donors, including the Dutch, have not only downgraded their own analytical in-country capacity but have also disengagement from HRF because they have lost sight of its strategic importance to address priority humanitarian needs'*.

Budgets and UN / NGO Fund Allocation

Established in 2007 the HRF fund has grown substantially: in 2007, the fund had a budget of 6.4 million USD and supported 17 projects; in 2008, the budget rose to 44.8 million USD supporting 64 projects (ICVA, 2009). Compared to other HRFs Ethiopia's HRF is substantial⁴⁸.

In the 2010-2013 period the HRF allocated budget peaked in 2011 during the height of the 2009-2012 drought / food crisis: 46,6 million USD (see table 6).

Table 6. HRF Ethiopia allocation by partner type, 2010-13 (in millionUSD).

Year	Budget (in million USD)			No of projects		
	Total	UN	NGOs	Total	UN	INGOs
2013	27,1	14	13,1	53	12	41
2012	38	14,2	23,7	66	11	55
2011	46,6	16,9	29,7	70	11	59
2010	25,9	6,5	19,4	56	10	46
	137,6	51,6	85,9	245	44	201

Of the 46,6 million USD spent by HRF in 2011 UN agencies received 36,2% and INGOs 63,8% of funding. UN agencies received a relative high percentage of Ethiopia's HRF funding as globally HRFs provided almost three quarters of total 2011 funds to international NGOs. Average HRF-Ethiopia grants in 2011 to NGOs have been in the order of 1.67 million USD for UN agencies and 0.50 million USD for NGOs.

UN Agencies and the WFP

The two agencies receiving the largest HRF budget allocations for country wide programming over the 2010-12 period are UN agencies:

- The WFP with a total budget of 11,0 million USD: central procurement of drought nutrition CSB in 2010 (1.7 million); 'nutrition' CSB in 2011 (5.2 million), and; 2011 nutrition RUTF (4.1 million).
- UNICEF with a total budget of 4.5 million USD: drought nutrition guideline revision in 2010 (budget 224.839); nutrition CSB (266.801) in 2011, and; nutrition RUTF (4.0 million) in 2012.

From a value for money perspective HRF funding to WFP Ethiopia might appear to be a complicated and relatively expensive way of funding WFP unnecessarily increasing the administrative cost of HA financing. According to OCHA however the WFP project was initiated to increase project efficiency and save costs. CSB and RUTFs were purchased at favourable market prices because of economies of scale (as compared to individual agencies buying emergency nutrition foods at the market) and WFP's capacity and experience with regard to pipeline, quality control and storage capacity. HRF did not fund additional overheads. INGOs welcomed the use of HRF funding for CSB and RUTFs as they also had access to these emergency nutrition foods.

From a Dutch government perspective WFP Ethiopia's access to HRF funding is questionable for a number of reasons:

- UN agencies have access to CERF and INGOs are supposed to have preferential access to HRF: HRF financing of UN agencies will reduce INGO budget availability.
- In contrast to CERF the HRF is in principle a non-food emergency response fund although it may fund nutrition related activities in special circumstances.
- For WFP Ethiopia and other nutrition focused actors in Ethiopia the nation-wide HRF project for purchasing SCB and RUTFs clearly has strategic value. From a Dutch government's

⁴⁸ In general HRFs are relatively small (less than US\$10 million per year) and provide small- to medium size grants (less than \$500,000). These are broad and flexible parameters do vary however depending on country-specific characteristics, specific emergencies and the HC's final decisions.

viewpoint CSB and RUTFs, as emergency nutrition foods, should be core to the cluster mandate of WFP / UNICEF and should not to be sourced through the HRF. CSB and RUTFs should, according to the Dutch government, be part and parcel of the HRDs and funded through multi-lateral contributions to WFP HO.

INGOs

Pre-qualified INGOs accredited by the Government of Ethiopia and positively assessed by the HRF Review Board are entitled to submit proposals.

Over the period 2009-2012 a relative large number of INGOs have received HRF funding for emergency response interventions across the country.

NNGOs


In 2011 HRFs globally provided almost three quarters of total funds to INGOs and of that amount close to 20 per cent directly to National NGOs UNOCHA, 2012). In Ethiopia however NNGOs have access to HRF funding only when partnered with accredited INGOs.

In 2012 HRF Ethiopia met with NNGOs to discuss ways of opening direct access to the Fund. Draft eligibility criteria were developed in 2012 and in 2014 HRF has offered REST direct access to the Fund as part of HRF's strategy to expand its presence into Tigray Region. This with the aim to ensure inclusivity of all humanitarian partners, to facilitate cost effective response, and to enhance the availability of broad-based local capacity for humanitarian response.

Humanitarian Financing

Donor Contributions & Predictable Financing

Effective co-ordination by OCHA is to a large extent conditioned by funding and HRF budget availability. Donor contributions to the HRF Ethiopia show a strong variation and depend to significant degree to the humanitarian situation and needs. Need was great in 2011 and 2012 but less so in 2013 which was a relative good year. See figure 3.



(Source: UNOCHA, 2013).

Figure 3. HRF Ethiopia donor contributions, 2006-13.

Recently donor contributions have been strongly reduced, including Dutch government funding. In 2013, for example, the HRF received 15.3 million USD from 6 different donors with 1.2 million from The Netherlands. According to OCHA this strong reduction in funding is due to global financial constraints and competing emerging humanitarian needs including from L3 emergencies. As a direct result OCHA failed in stepping up the response to the large influx of Sudanese refugees in Gambella.

UN-OCHA in Ethiopia considers a budget of around 15 million as the absolute minimum to address critical humanitarian crises in a 'quiet' year. With the large influx of Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia's Gambella Region 2014 is not a quiet year and available HRF budgets fall short of needs.

Facing a strong reduction in funding OCHA Ethiopia is increasingly sourcing its HRF core funding from in-country donors.

Sufficiency of HRF Finance Instrument

Subsequent HRF annual reports state that 'No application was refused on the basis of lack of funds' (see for example OCHA, 2010). At the same time the annual reports records relative large carry-over budgets of up to one third of the annual donor donations. These carry-over budgets result from donor funding practice (a large percentage of the fund is committed towards the year's end) and OCHA administrative procedures (no real time reconciliation of spent budgets HRF-Ethiopia budgets with OCHA-HO).

According to OCHA staff, interviewed during the August 2014 visit, the carry over budgets are vital for the continuity of humanitarian financing and crucial to deal with 'unforeseen' emergencies. For example, in 2012 HRF started with a large carryover balance but resources were quickly depleted by May 2012. This was due to funds provided for needs arising from the deteriorated food and nutrition conditions in the south and south-eastern parts of the country (OCHA, 2012).

With contributions being reduced in 2013 the carry-over budget of 2012, a total of USD 22,658,057 (UNOCHA, 2013) is vital for the HRF to maintain an active role in the area of humanitarian financing (UNOCHA, 2013). However it is clear that more funds will be required with the 2013-14 Sudanese refugee influx in the Gambella being a case to the point. Senior HRF staff mentioned that the HRF's ability to respond to identified humanitarian needs has been greatly reduced in 2014. In 2014 HRF had to turn down project proposals for life-saving nutrition interventions for the first time since its establishment because of a shortage of money.

A case to the point is the 2014 Gambella Sudanese refugee influx crisis; needs are overwhelming while HRF budgets are very limited. INGOs interviewed during the August 2014 visit stated that they do no longer submit project proposals to HRF as available HRF budget is not only low (around 7 million Euro⁴⁹ compared with over 50 million Euro in 2011) but also already allocated to humanitarian HRF partners.

Cost Efficiency of Ethiopia's HRF

In terms of HRF cost efficiency this section looks at the costs associated with administering the HRF fund and the overhead costs in sub-contracting projects to HRF implementing partners. The HRF Ethiopia does not use UNDP as managing agent for HRF funds; HRF funds are being managed and administered by OCHA itself.

Administering HRF-Ethiopia

OCHA charges 3% on the HRF fund to cover all costs related to fund management, except project audits. The main cost components of HRF fund administration are salaries, auditing and monitoring. Table 7 provides an overview of these costs as a percentage of the total value of the HRF fund⁵⁰. Costs are approximate and thus present an indication only of the costs to OCHA Ethiopia.

Table 7. HRF Ethiopia administration costs, 2009-12.

Year	Total HRF Fund Allocated in million USD	Cost of Salaries	Cost of Auditing	Cost of Monitoring
		as % of total HRF Fund value		
2009	39,6		0,31	0,01
2010	25,9		0,32	0,03
2011	46,6		0,13	0,03
2012	38,0	0,99	0,20	0,05

The cost of salaries as % of the total value of the HRF fund has been 0.99% in 2012; staffing costs in 2012 for the HRF unit were approximately 377,000 USD. No exact figures on HRF staffing costs are available for 2009-2011. According to OCHA staffing costs have been fairly constant over the years but with an upward trend due to annual pay rises.

⁴⁹ During the time of the assessment in August 2014 HRF staff mentioned that they did not expect additional major commitments by donors for 2014.

⁵⁰ These costs do not include international (Geneva and New York) costs associated with the HRF.

Audit costs in the period 2009-12 added up to a maximum of 0.32% of HRF fund value. Since 2010 audit costs have decreased for a number of reasons.

The cost of monitoring has been a maximum of 0.05% of the HRF fund. The main cost categories for project monitoring were staff per diems and fuel for transportation. Total monitoring costs for 2009-2012 were 41,259 USD with an average of 10,315 per year. See table 8.

Table 8. HRF Ethiopia project monitoring costs, 2009-12.

Year	DSA in USD	Fuel in USD	Total
2009	2.106	329	2.435
2010	6.278	1.045	7.323
2011	10.625	1.920	12.545
2012	16.696	2.260	18.956
Total	35.705	5.554	41.259

HRF Overhead Costs of Implementing Partners

Prior to 2011 UN were allowed 7% and INGOs 10% overhead but following 2011 UN and NGOs alike were allowed 7% overhead costs.

The maximum overhead costs are 7% with non-allowable costs clearly listed in OCHA's operational handbook for Country-Based Pooled Funds (OCHA, 2015). For example, entertainment, land purchases and interest on loans are non-allowable costs. Capital purchases are allowable if adequately justified.

5.3 Effectiveness of the HRF and Projects

This section looks at the effectiveness of the HRF and in particular of the HRF's contribution to addressing emergencies with a focus on the 2009-12 crisis.

Section 5.3.1 looks at the general effectiveness of the HRF in Ethiopia. The second section looks at how HRF strategizes project selection with the aim to increase the overall effectiveness of HRF projects to address acute humanitarian needs, cover shortcomings and inefficiencies in the Ethiopia's humanitarian system and promotes strategic engagement and co-ordination between humanitarian actors. The third section, 5.3.3, analyses the effectiveness of a selection of HRF funded projects at the height of the crisis in 2011-2012.

5.3.1 The HRF Programme's Outputs

The expected outcome of Ethiopia's HRF is to save lives, alleviate suffering and reduce disaster risk amongst populations affected by disasters through the provision of flexible funding in support of coordinated, effective and principled response to disasters (DfID, 2013a).

The expected outputs of Ethiopia's HRF are:

1. Critical needs are met in life-saving sectors and locations.
2. Disaster Risk Reduction, gender, and national response capacity are adequately addressed.
3. Accountability and transparency of humanitarian financing are improved.
4. Humanitarian coordination and institutions are strengthened, and national response capacity is built.

This section discusses the first two outputs: addressing critical needs and contributions to DRR and gender. HRF's accountability and transparency are being discussed in section 5.4. HRF's contributions to co-ordination and strengthening of institutions and national response capacity is being discussed in section 7.4.

Meeting Needs

The HRF as a Non-Food Emergency Fund

Life-saving needs have in particular been addressed through the HRF components emergency nutrition and WASH.

HRF funded emergency nutrition interventions always take place in hot spot humanitarian need areas. Senior HRF officials claim that they never had to turn down life-saving emergency nutrition interventions: ‘...except for this year ... 2014 is about the first year that we have had to turn down life-saving interventions because of a shortage of money. HRF’s ability to respond to identified humanitarian needs has been greatly reduced in 2014’⁵¹.

The HRF components Emergency Shelter & Non Food Items as well as Disaster Resilience are less relevant in addressing direct life-saving critical needs.

Scaling Up Emergency Response Capacity

Over the 2009-2012 period HRF spent the highest budget in 2011 in response to the drought in Ethiopia’s eastern and south-eastern lowland areas and the massive drought and conflict induced refugee influx from Somalia into Ethiopia’s Somali Region.

The HRF has been accredited to address life-saving critical needs in the pastoralist areas of Afar, Somali, Oromia and Southern Nations Regions, particularly in the emergency nutrition and WASH sector. See also annex 6.3 which reviews selected HRF projects in Ethiopia’s drought affected lowland areas implemented in 2011 and 2012.

In responding to the 2011 Somali refugee influx the HRF has been instrumental in enabling a rapid response in the margins of the humanitarian aid system: the initial emergency response capacity by the humanitarian actors to deal with the ‘sudden’ influx of Somali refugees was very poor. The HRF has been particularly relevant in enabling a timely and life-saving response to address the needs of Somali refugee arrivals with many of those who poured across the border between June and August 2011 being in a critical state (see also section on refugee programming). See annex 6.3 which reviews selected HRF projects addressing refugee emergency needs in 2011 and 2012.

Key Challenges in Addressing Needs

HRF monitoring findings identify important challenges in project implementation. These challenges are persistent over the 2009-2012 period and include the following monitoring themes: timeliness (in particular ‘start-up-delays’), targeting (‘very high government involvement’) and appropriateness (‘start-up delay rendering some of the activities as less appropriate’ (OCHA’s HRF country reports 2009-2012).

These findings are important but appear to be less relevant with regard to addressing life-saving critical needs particularly so in the emergency nutrition and WASH sector (see also above).

With regard to the timely addressing humanitarian needs OCHA staff mentioned that they depend to considerable degree on the capacity of its implementing partners. Some of the HRF partners find it difficult to draft proposals meeting minimum HRF standards.

Security and Access Challenges

During 2010 the international humanitarian community experienced security and humanitarian access challenges. Most notably in conflict affected zones in Somali Region (OCHA, 2010) where the Government of Ethiopia imposed restrictions on the movement of UN and INGOs. In some of these areas the WFP experienced serious delays in the movement of food convoys as a result of a shortage of military escorts (OCHA, 2010).

The lack of humanitarian access undermined the ability to address life-saving critical needs. Although access issues were eased by 2011 humanitarian access to parts of Somali Region remained problematic and often ad hoc.

⁵¹ OCHA expects a total HRF funding of 15 to 16 million for 2014 but if HRF is to address humanitarian needs around 30 million would be needed.

As part of a broader strategy OCHA and its humanitarian and development partners tried to maintain and re-establish presence in sensitive areas. In 2013, for example, OCHA funded a nutrition-sensitive livestock intervention in Fik (Nogob) Zone in Somali Region (OCHA, 2013: p5).

Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction

The HRF funds resilience programming 'when the fund is not fully utilised in responding to purely life-saving humanitarian needs' (DfID, 2013a).

During the food crisis which devastated the Horn of Africa in 2011-12 the HRF supported households to restore their livelihoods and rebuild their food security. HRF projects improved the resilience of most vulnerable households through early interventions, such as seed and tool distributions, to 'reduce the likelihood that they would need humanitarian assistance as the crisis deepened'.

HRF's INGO partners interviewed in August 2014 mentioned that HRF projects contributed relatively little to DRR and resilience building. INGOs stated that in practice addressing humanitarian needs and provision of planting materials and restocking consumed most financial HRF project resources. INGOs expressed that the 6 months HRF project timeframe was too short for meaningful DRR work and building resilience.

OCHA argues that resilience building is primarily a development activity and that the priority for humanitarian funding must remain on lifesaving. Creating better relief-development linkages through resilience building is seen by OCHA as a responsibility for all.

The HRF has financed thematic studies to look at possibilities of linking relief to development in emergencies. The linkage between HA provision through the HRF and development is weak. In the words of OCHA Ethiopia's country director: *'We don't find open doors with the development community ... they are focused on growth rather than vulnerability'*.

In 2013 HRF started prioritising livelihood interventions by linking beneficiary targeting between livelihood and ongoing emergency nutrition activities and wider livelihoods programming in order to enhance the sustainability of the humanitarian response (OCHA, 2013: p5).

Gender

Gender is an important issue as emergencies have differential impact on men and women because of their respective roles and responsibilities.

In 2010 the UN's Gender Capacity Advisor recommended the HRF to 'remain a gender-responsive funding mechanism' (OCHA, 2010). In order to ensure gender accountability a Gender Marker system was introduced in 2010 (OCHA, 2010).

OCHA staff is aware that the focus on gender by their implementing partners is often stated in order to be politically correct, and that organisational statements do not necessarily impact on practical work in the field. It is therefore important to field-monitor projects to check the quality of what is being implemented.

In 2012 gender consideration in humanitarian programming was applied with expanded gender integration in line with national level initiatives led by the Government. In 2012 around 80 per cent of HRF applications were gender coded '2', indicating that the proposed project intervention was designed to "contribute significantly" to gender equality by analysing and integrating the different needs of women, girls, boys and men in the activities (OCHA, 2012).

5.3.2 Strategizing HRF Project Allocation

According to HRF senior staff in Addis Ababa HRF is a strategic pooled donor HA fund: *'The HRF is a small fund in the big scheme of HA to Ethiopia. HRF focuses on gaps in HA delivery and strategic opportunities to improve co-ordination and effectiveness'*. In doing so the HRF prioritises fund allocations to NGOs over UN by critically reviewing UN funding requests: *'why would you as a UN agency require funding if NGOs can do the job?'*

According to senior OCHA officials the HRF strategy is to address acute humanitarian needs, to cover shortcomings and inefficiencies in the humanitarian system (*'making things work in the aid architecture'*), and to promote strategic engagement of and coordination between HA agencies.

Examples of addressing acute humanitarian needs (see annex 6.1 for more detailed information):

- Covering nutrition and WASH needs in the pastoralist areas during the 2011-12 drought.

- Paying for emergency response interventions as required to address priority humanitarian needs associated with the Somali refugee influx in 2011, in particular during the months June-August when the UN response was weak.

Examples of improving the efficiency of the humanitarian system:

- Supporting WFP as capable organisation (having the contacts, quality control systems and storage facilities) to purchase CSB as single procurement agency in a market where there are regular shortages in order to address price competition in the market by agencies involved in emergency nutrition.
- Making HA resources cheaper. For example through funding to ship plumpy-nut⁵² from France instead of having it flown in (plumpy-nut provision suffers from regular pipeline breaks).
- Making contributions to UNHAS to allow for humanitarian flights into Afar in order to facilitate NGOs to work in Afar (by making time-efficient field visits INGOs possible).
- Addressing crises that do not fall within mandates of established agencies. Such as IDPs crossing from Kenya into Southern Ethiopia (no UN agencies are mandated to address their needs).
- Providing seed money to agencies like FAO to prevent locust epidemics (so FAO can initiate operations before they secure funding through FAO Rome).

Examples of promoting strategic engagement of, and coordination between, HA agencies:

- Promote multiple-layer strategies drawing in UN, government and INGOs. A good example of this is the 2011 support to UNICEF's (UNICEF got the contacts with the Government of Ethiopia) and INGO's water tankering services in Somali Region. In engaging the WASH cluster HRF enforced co-ordination, avoided duplication and did set standards for the sector⁵³. UNICEF was granted 1.6 million and INGOs 2.0 million Euros. HRF enforced the development of a joint water tankering action plan for Somali / Afar region to address acute water situation within an overall development plan.
- Involving key expertise of FAO on agricultural projects. FAO as a consortium member manages a common proposal with multiple budgets. Joined monitoring enhances learning and uptake of good practice.

5.3.3 Analysis of HRF Projects

HRF Achievements 2009 – 13

Over the 2009-13 period a total of 158,1 million USD was spent on local populations caught up in emergencies while a total of 5,5 million USD was spent on Internally Displaced People and 13,7 million USD on refugee management (see annex 6.1, table 1). Most expenditures on refugees and IDPs in 2011-12 were related to the large scale Somali refugee influx in Ethiopia's Somali Region and the support to IDPs in the same Region.

Over the 2009-2013 period the major sectoral spending categories were: nutrition (71,4 million USD), WASH (27,7 million USD) and Food Security & Livelihoods (28,1 million USD).

In line with government policy HRF prioritises interventions in Ethiopia's so-called 'hot-spot' areas. These areas present high needs as identified in line with the twice annually multi-agency assessments implemented by government, UN and NGO partners. Identified needs are documented in Ethiopia's Humanitarian Requirements Document. The HRF thus contribute to addressing well documented and commonly agreed upon humanitarian emergency needs.

Annex 6.1 provides more detailed information on the HRF achievements in the period 2009-13.

⁵² Plumpy-nut is a peanut-based paste in a plastic wrapper for treatment of Severe Acute Malnutrition manufactured by a French company, Nutriset.

⁵³ HRF questioned the effectiveness of water tankering in Somali and Afar regions during 2011: Were humanitarian actors, including government, getting their priorities right? Interventions focused on addressing consequences from the crisis, no cross cutting issues were taking into account, no practicalities in terms of HA operations on vulnerability people and groups.

HRF Partner Performance

The HRF tracks the performance of its implementing partners through the Partner Performance Tracking System. See annex 6.2a and 6.2b for the analysis of the partner performance as based on info form OCHA's tracking system.

Key findings of the overall performance rating show that for the 8 implementing partners the overall performance rating is 'satisfactory'. Not one of the HRF implementing agencies scored an 'outstanding' overall performance, and only one agency scored 'needs improvement'. See annex 6.2a for more information.

In terms of the agencies' specific performance ratings the survey found the following:

- Timeliness: average score 'modest delays per plan, but acceptable' – 3 out of the 8 agencies scored below average.
- Appropriateness: average score 'very appropriate' – 2 out of 8 agencies scored somewhat below average.
- Community involvement: average score 'partially involved' – 3 out of 8 agencies scored below average.
- Adherence to standards: average score 'some improvements required' – 4 out of 8 agencies scored below average.
- Co-ordination: average score 'adequate collaboration' – 4 out of 8 agencies scored below average.
- Gender & Cross-Cutting Issues: average score 'some steps were taken' – 3 out of 8 agencies scored below average.
- Iterations in application review stage: average score of 4 or more.

Effectiveness of Selected HRF Projects in the period 2012-13

A review of 22 HRF projects to address drought related emergencies in Ethiopia's pastoralist lowland areas found that monitoring data indicate that most projects performed up to required standards. Monitoring data do however demonstrate the need for some HRF partners to improve on key effectiveness elements.

Most INGO projects have reported cluster involvement with some feedback. Files on UN HRF partners do not show evidence of cluster involvement which is logic as UN agencies are typically cluster leads.

In line with monitoring findings two agencies were found that the attainment of value for money was unsatisfactory requiring major remedial action (annex 6.3 year 2012). Final project reports highlighted that appropriate actions were taken.

Achievement of results and activities have been good with in some cases (particularly in 2012) agencies under achieving on activities and in reaching planned number of beneficiaries. Final project reports provide plausible and valid explanations.

No external evaluations have been carried out and few projects documented good practice in their final reports. All INGO HRF partners have an audit report on file and with no exception audit findings are positive. UN agencies have been not been audited externally. UN agencies have certified financial statements on file as issued by their own audit departments.

For more detailed information reference is made to annex 6.3.

5.4 Accountability and Transparency of the HRF and HRF Projects

Appraisal of HRF funding proposals

UN Agencies and pre-qualified NGOs accredited by the Government and assessed by the HRF Review Board are entitled to submit proposals.

The Applications are appraised for conformity with ERF guidelines and alignment with HRF priorities: emergency response, coordination considerations and cost effectiveness. Applications meeting the basic requirements are circulated to the respective clusters for review by Cluster Leads and key sector partners to ensure technical quality, sound methodology and adherence to national/sectoral guidelines and regional priorities (OCHA, 2013).

Revised applications are then forwarded to the HRF Review Board for funding recommendations. The HRF Review Board makes funding recommendations based on the proposed project's merit, its conformation to agreed priorities and strategies and in addressing identified emergency needs. OCHA submits the Board's project approval recommendations to the Humanitarian Co-ordinator (OCHA, 2013).

The HC signs the HRF Board's approved projects; in the 2009-2012 period no HRF Review Board recommended proposals were turned down by the HC.

The government is represented at the HRF Review Board; there have been no occasions whereby the government has dis-approved projects on grounds of humanitarian needs.

The HRF Review Board & Grant Management

The HRF Review Board in Addis Ababa is central to the HRF fund allocation decision making process. The UN, Government of Ethiopia and representatives of INGOs are part of the Review Board mechanism. There are a minimum of 6 people on the review board of which 3 must be of organisations other than the UN. The Review Board meets around thirty times a year lasting between 2 to 3 hours each (15 to 30 minutes per proposal).

In order to enhance fund management and allocation and share information faster the HRF-Ethiopia launched the first phase of a Grant Management System in 2013 (HRF 2013: p43).

Monitoring of Funded Proposals

HRF implementing partners are bound by the HRF project proposal and reporting format including provisions on monitoring.

HRF prescribes peer to peer monitoring missions to promote cross-learning opportunities. The general rule is that 50% of HRF projects are visited for peer monitoring. In 2011 half of HRF projects were visited, in 2013 nearly all projects were visited.

In 2012 monitoring coverage and quality improved with results from real-time assessments informing the directions as well as strategies of project implementation.

HRF internalises best practice through peer monitoring and evaluation workshops. According to HRF staff this results in much better informed monitoring and improved technical evaluation. HRF partner INGOs in Addis mentioned that peer review by thematic specialists improved opportunities for shared learning and contributed to project accountability.

HRF- and HRF Project-Evaluations

There is no independent evaluation study on the HRF Ethiopia. A few programmatic evaluations were undertaken such as for example on water trucking and the response to cholera. No ex-post evaluations of HRF projects have taken place. OCHA has indicated they are considering a programmatic evaluation which may include looking at sectoral impact and how to measure longer term impact.

It must be realised that measuring impact presents challenges. In particular in those situations where humanitarian needs are plentiful and persistent. It is evident that project impact is beyond HRF's direct operational control. Project impact depends on many factors including the operational context which is often challenging.

5.5 UN-OCHA's Overall HRF Performance

HRF Policy Revisions

The HRF has undergone a number of policy revisions since 2007 that were designed to improve its quality and effectiveness (ICVA, 2009). In 2012, the HRF began implementation of the Global ERF Guidelines. The guidelines provided a common reference tool between the Ethiopia country office and HQ. (OCHA, 2012).

As part of the 2013 UN Board of Auditor's (BoA) global exercise, the HRF-Ethiopia hosted a mission by the BoA to conduct a performance audit on OCHA's strategic engagement with implementing partners. Ethiopia was one of the case studies of the BoA to inform its report to the General Assembly.

The main purpose of the visit was to examine the Fund's programmatic mandate and management system (OCHA, 2013).

During 2013, a relative calm year with respect to human emergencies in Ethiopia, major improvements were realised. The most important one was the development of the HRF Business Case and Log-Frame by HRF in close collaboration with the Department for International Development (OCHA, 2013). The adoption of the Log-frame is expected to strengthen OCHA's partnership with donors and also potentially inform a standardized accountability framework for all Country-Based Pooled Funds (CBPF).

HRF's Overall 2012-13 Performance

According to a recent DfID report the HRF has seen several policy revisions and other gradual improvements over time. DfID's project completion report, reviewing the HRF 2012-2013 concludes that *'The HRF has an excellent track record of supporting the humanitarian response'* (DfID, 2013a). The planned 2012 and 2013 HRF project outputs were evaluated positively (DfID, 2013a):

- critical needs were met in life-saving sectors and locations: score 'outputs moderately exceeded expectation'.
- Humanitarian co-ordination and institutions were strengthened (humanitarian reform agenda, principles of GHD and principles of partnership): score 'outputs met expectation'.
- accountability and transparency of humanitarian financing has improved: 'outputs met expectation'.
- HRF adequately addressed issues of DRR, Gender and National Response Capacity: score 'outputs met expectation'.

While DfID's 2013 evaluation report is informative it is as such not an independent evaluation of the HRF. The report is written by policy staff as a basis to develop DfID's HRF business case and inform its 2014-2016 intervention strategy (DfID, 2013b).

HRF: Predictable Financing of Strategic Humanitarian Response at the Margins of the Humanitarian Aid Architecture

The annual USD 9.7 million from DfID's multi year commitment (2011-2013) to the HRF enabled the Fund to be a source of predictable financing for strategic humanitarian response. DfID's renewed commitment to contribute USD 6 million annually for the period 2014-2016 is crucially important to HRF as a predictable source of humanitarian financing.

OCHA expects to receive total HRF funding of 15 to 16 million for 2014 but according to OCHA's Head around 30 million is needed to address humanitarian needs. Most HRF funding is now in-country donor funding and according to OCHA's Head *'these days the HRF is not so pooled anymore'*.

Facing a strong reduction in HRF financing the ability of the HRF to influence the humanitarian response in those parts of Ethiopia that have an issue becomes limited, this is because *'the HRF gets things done because money talks'*.

HRF's future role depends to considerable extent on the willingness and ability of donors to make (multi-year) contributions to the fund. In relative 'calm' years the fund will remain functional at funding levels of around 15 million per year; in years of major crises the fund requirement will be much higher. In this sense DfID is seen as a strategic partner to HRF Ethiopia and The Netherlands no longer so.

Emergency Response and Disaster Risk Funds

Both USAID-OFDA and ECHO expressed an interest to form a joint emergency response fund. ECHO however cannot make contributions to HRF as this is not in line with EU policy and regulations.

The World Bank and the Government of Ethiopia think about establishing a Disaster Risk Management Fund under the direct authority of the Government. International humanitarian aid actors however make a case for a response fund in which the Government of Ethiopia is having a say but which is not under their full control: the HRF.

5.6 Summary Findings

The Complementarity of CERF and HRF

1. UN-OCHA considers both CERF and HRF as crucial instruments and central to humanitarian reform. The CERF responds to forgotten crises and HRF addresses inefficiencies of Ethiopia's humanitarian aid architecture and system.
2. In Ethiopia CERF and HRF complementarity is enhanced by the fact that the HRF Review Board in Addis Ababa collectively recommends CERF fund allocations to UN agencies and HRF fund allocations to NGOs and UN agencies.

HRF Financing and Dutch Government Contributions

3. The Netherlands and the UK have been instrumental in establishing the HRF both in terms of its architecture and its funding. The Netherlands has been the second largest donor to the HRF, after DfID, contributing almost 73 million USD over the period 2006-2012. Dutch government contributions were reduced to 1.2 million USD in 2013 and zero in 2014.
4. The Netherlands HRF funding came out of The Hague's Acute Crisis Budget Line and therefore was only a temporary contribution to HRF Ethiopia. Senior OCHA officials have not been aware of this and expressed to be very disappointed about the discontinuation of Dutch financial support and the disengagement of the Dutch with the HRF.
5. HRF has been a very attractive fund for The Netherlands: the HRF is an independent and decentralised emergency response fund without the need for donor governments to have own administrative capacity. Downside of this is that The Netherlands as a donor:
 - Is not actively monitoring the HRF; some field visits were undertaken and important donor meetings attended by interns (students) rather than by experienced Dutch Embassy staff able to contribute constructively and make decisions.
 - Has little critical awareness of the local context and the strategic nature of HRF's emergency aid priorities.
 - Lacks institutional memory about the performance and HRF's strategic role in Ethiopia.
6. Both INGOs and UN agencies have access to HRF funding. Over the 2009-2013 period the number of UN agencies applying for HRF fund has been significantly smaller than the number of INGOs. UN agencies have however consumed roughly two-fifths of the available annual HRF budgets over the 2009-12 period. This raises questions about the utility and alignment of CERF and HRF pooled funding mechanism as CERF was conceived to fund UN agencies and HRF primarily INGOs.
 - In-country HRF grant allocations to UN agencies have been very significant and reduced available HRF budgets for INGOs. This raises the question if central CERF resource allocation to OCHA-Ethiopia has been sufficient to fund UN emergency relief interventions. The claim on HRF by UN agencies may compromise INGOs access to the HRF funding channel⁵⁴. Dutch government donor policy prioritises UN channels for humanitarian assistance funding but pre-supposes INGOs preferential access to the HRF.
7. WFP has been the single largest receiver of HRF fund over the 2009-13 period. From a value for money perspective HRF funding to WFP increased project efficiency and saved costs. From a Dutch government perspective however WFP-Ethiopia's access to HRF funding is questionable for a number of reasons:
 - UN agencies have access to CERF and INGOs are supposed to have preferential access to HRF: HRF financing of UN agencies will reduce INGO budget availability.
 - In contrast to CERF the HRF is in principle a non-food emergency response fund although it may fund nutrition related activities in special circumstances.
 - As emergency nutrition foods, CSB and RUTFs, are close to the cluster mandate of WFP and UNICEF and therefore should not be priority-sourced through the HRF. CSB and RUTFs should be seen as part and parcel of the HRDs and funded through multi-lateral contributions to WFP HO.

⁵⁴ An issue that relates to this is that CERF's focus is on forgotten crises while many of the emergencies and crises in Ethiopia have become a routine: crises are no exception but rather normalcy. This according to OCHA necessitates reiterating priorities within the framework of the transformative agenda.

8. It is difficult to assess whether the total funding to HRF has been sufficient to address emergency needs. During the 2009-12 period no project proposals were turned down by HRF because of insufficient HRF funding. More recently however, in particular with regard to the 2013-14 Sudanese refugee influx in Gambella, INGO representatives interviewed during the August 2014 country visit mentioned that they no longer submit project proposals to the HRF knowing that the total amount of available HRF fund was limited and already allocated.

Effectiveness of the HRF and HRF Projects with a Focus on the 2009-12 Crisis

A. The HRF Programme in General

Meeting Critical Humanitarian Needs

9. OCHA and visited INGOs were adamant that as a result of HRF critical needs were met, particularly in the life-saving sectors emergency nutrition and WASH.
10. Senior HRF staff mentioned that the HRF's ability to respond to identified humanitarian needs has been greatly reduced in 2014. In 2014 HRF had to turn down project proposals for life-saving nutrition interventions for the first time since its establishment because of a shortage of money.
11. The timelines of emergency interventions does depend on the capacity of HRF's partners; some partners find it difficult to draft proposals meeting minimum HRF standards.

Resilience and Disaster Risk Reduction

12. The HRF funds resilience programming 'when the fund is not fully utilised in responding to purely life-saving humanitarian needs' (DfID, 2013a). OCHA argues that resilience building is primarily a development activity and that the priority for humanitarian funding must remain on lifesaving.
13. HRF's INGO partners mentioned that in practice HRF projects contribute relatively little to DRR and resilience building. HRF timeframes (a maximum of 6 months) are too short and budgets insufficient. 'INGOs stated that in practice addressing humanitarian needs and provision of planting materials and restocking consumed most financial HRF project resources.

Gender

14. In 2010 HRF introduced the Gender Marker system and by 2012 80% of project applications was gender coded '2': 'project contribute significantly to gender equality by analysing and integrating the different needs of women, boys and men in activities'.

B. Strategizing HRF Project Allocation

15. The HRF addresses acute humanitarian needs, contributes to a more efficient humanitarian system and promotes strategic engagement of and coordination between HA agencies.

C. HRF Project Analysis

16. The HRF has been instrumental in addressing both localised emergencies in Ethiopia as well as the 2011 Somali refugee emergency.
 - The HRF has been accredited to deliver life-saving localised critical needs in the pastoralist areas of Afar, Somali, Oromia and Southern Nations Regions, during 2011 and 2012 drought (particularly in the emergency nutrition and WASH sectors).
 - HRF has played a crucially important role with regard to addressing humanitarian needs amongst severely weakened / malnourished Somali refugees during the first critical months of the influx, particularly in Dollo Ado⁵⁵. Flexibility of HRF's relief fund utilisation and the short time frame to approve projects⁵⁶ have been crucially important to address the refugee emergency.
17. The HRF has contributed to the timely provision of emergency relief interventions. The HRF's interventions have been filling gaps in emergency response, improved strategic co-ordination (drawing in different partners such as NGOs, UN and Government of Ethiopia), and enhanced the

⁵⁵ Several key informants confirmed the crucial role of HRF to fund surge capacity and draw in specialised INGOs to saving lives in 2011.

⁵⁶ During 2011 it took around one month to get a project proposal approved and funded.

effectiveness of sector wide interventions (e.g. the development of sectoral guidelines such as for water tankering in the WASH sector).

Accountability and Transparency of HRF and HRF Projects

18. Accountability of HRF projects appears to be good. Project proposals are pre-screened and appraised for conformity with HRF guidelines. Agencies are invited to present and argue their proposed project proposals at the HRF Review Board. Thematic Cluster Leads review project proposals for technical quality, methodology and alignment with national as well as sectoral guidelines and in line with regional emergency response priorities. Peer review by inviting thematic specialists of other agencies operating in the area was said, by OCHA and interviewed INGOs HRF partners in Addis, to have improved accountability.
19. The government is represented at the HRF Review Board; there have been no occasions whereby the government has dis-approved projects on grounds of humanitarian needs.
20. In principle OCHA staff undertakes M&E visits aiming to visit each approved project. This has not always materialised. During the 2011 crisis around half of all projects were visited. During 2013, a relative calm year with relative few emergencies, all approved HRF projects were visited for M&E purposes.
21. There is no independent evaluation study on the HRF Ethiopia although a few programmatic evaluations were undertaken such as for example a study on water trucking and a study on the response to cholera.
22. Seen The Netherlands's initial constructive engagement in establishing the HRF it is striking that BuZa together with DfID - '*the architects and funders of the HRF in Ethiopia*' - did not plan for an external and independent evaluation of the HRF.

UN-OCHA's overall HRF Performance and Future Directions

23. HRF's future role depends to considerable extent on the willingness and ability of donors to make (multi-year) contributions to the fund. In relative 'calm' years the fund will remain functional at funding levels of around 15 million per year. In years of major crises the fund requirement will be much higher. In this sense DfID is seen as a strategic partner to HRF Ethiopia and The Netherlands no longer so.
24. Both USAID-OFDA and ECHO expressed an interest to form a joint emergency response fund. ECHO however cannot make contributions to HRF as this is not in line with EU policy and regulations.
25. The World Bank and the Government of Ethiopia think about establishing a Disaster Risk Management Fund under the direct authority of the Government. International humanitarian aid actors however make a case for an emergency response fund, such as the HRF, in which the government is represented but does not have the ultimate power to decide funding or not funding particular humanitarian emergency response interventions.

Chapter 6 Humanitarian Assistance Coordination and Delivery

This chapter focuses on the co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance and the delivery of that assistance.

The chapter addresses the following main questions:

1. The overall performance of humanitarian reform, Ethiopia's humanitarian co-ordination architecture and the resulting response to the 2011-2012 crisis (section 6.1).
2. WFP's and OCHA's HRF performance in line with key pillars of the Humanitarian Reform agenda (section 6.2 and 6.3 respectively): clusters and coordination, partnerships, donor coordination, and; government ownership and response capacity.
3. The co-ordination of the refugee programme by UNHCR and its Government counterpart and implementing agency the Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (6.4).

The chapter ends highlighting the key findings to each of these questions (section 6.5).

6.1 Humanitarian Reform and the Aid Architecture in Ethiopia

The Humanitarian Reform Agenda

The Humanitarian Reform Agenda stems from a mid-2005 review of the humanitarian response system by the Emergency Relief Coordinator⁵⁷. The review found that the humanitarian response did not always meet the basic requirements of affected populations in a timely fashion, and that the response varied considerably from crisis to crisis (OCHA, 2006).

In late 2005 the members of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) embarked on a process of humanitarian reform. This with the aim to 'strengthen humanitarian response by introducing new measures to enhance response capacity, accountability, predictability and partnership'. The three IASC-endorsed pillars for the reform process were (OCHA, 2006):

1. A strengthened Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) system, providing more strategic leadership and coordination at the inter-sectoral and sectoral levels.
2. Implementation of the 'cluster approach' to build up capacities in gap areas – as part of wider efforts to ensure adequate response capacity, predictable and enhanced leadership, accountability, predictability and strong partnerships in all sectors.
3. More adequate, timely, flexible and effective humanitarian financing, including through CERF and HRF.

A fourth element, more effective partnerships among humanitarian actors, was belatedly added following the adoption of the Principles of Partnership by the Global Humanitarian Platform in July 2007⁵⁸ (Humanitarian Reform Project, 2009).

Progress on Humanitarian Reform in Ethiopia

Improving Humanitarian Leadership

A 2009 progress report on humanitarian reform in five country case studies, including Ethiopia, identified the fundamental role and importance of humanitarian leadership for all aspects of humanitarian reform⁵⁹. The report found that strong humanitarian leadership was missing in four out of

⁵⁷ The impetus behind current global reform efforts can be traced to the poor performance of the international community's response to the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan in 2004. The then Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Jan Egeland, commissioned the Humanitarian Response Review, which made 36 concrete recommendations for improving humanitarian response (Humanitarian Reform Project, 2009).

⁵⁸ The limited focus of the reform also ignored accountability to affected populations, which remains underrepresented in the UN-led reform discussions. Another major flaw in the reform's inception was that it focused on the role of international humanitarian actors and ignored that of national and local actors. (ODI, 2009)

⁵⁹ Humanitarian leadership was seen as crucial to ensure timely and coordinated needs-based responses and sufficient funding, allocated in the right places; holding actors to account for their commitments; and ensuring that partnerships include humanitarian actors across the spectrum (ODI, 2009).

five country cases, including Ethiopia. This finding highlighted the lack of progress the reform agenda has made in improving leadership (ODI, 2009).

According to ODI's 2009 report NGO interviewees in Ethiopia felt that the Humanitarian Coordinator failed to challenge the government on issues such as humanitarian space and humanitarian principles. During the IOB country visit in August 2014 UN officials mentioned that these issues remained a concern. In particular the Government's late and underreporting of humanitarian needs and issues of humanitarian access.

There is no formal requirement for Heads of UN agencies to report to the HC. The HC, as head of UNDP in Ethiopia, may also not be seen as above agencies rather as a senior official representing one of the UN agencies in Ethiopia. This may affect the ability of the HC to co-ordinate effectively.

UN officials mentioned that 2014 was a difficult year for humanitarian response in Ethiopia and that this required the HC to be more pro-active and flag the need for more resources. It appears that insufficient humanitarian financing has contributed to UN agencies, including the WFP and OCHA's HRF (see also section 4.2 and 5.2), seeking additional funding by directly approaching in-country donors.

Cluster Approach

Strong and effective leadership must also be applied within the clusters at country level. A good cluster lead can be instrumental in effectively involving a range of humanitarian actors. The 2009 ODI report observes that cluster leads not just need technical expertise but also the skills to manage effective coordination and run meetings. They need also to ensure that the cluster functions in a partnership oriented manner.

In Ethiopia the clusters, groups of HA actors working in the same technical area, are led by UN agencies and co-led by INGOs. Clusters work in tandem with corresponding Government-led 'Sectoral Task Forces'. These structures analyse national trends and 'hotspots': prioritising areas for humanitarian action and coordination of humanitarian response (DFID, 2013).

Strong and effective humanitarian leadership determines to significant degree the strength and performance of individual clusters. Weaker clusters, said to be WHO, FAO and UNDP, contribute to less robust and well-coordinated programmes across HA partners.

Flexible and Effective Humanitarian Financing

According to ODI humanitarian financing, with the creation of the CERF and HRF, is the element of humanitarian reform that has seen the greatest progress (ODI, 2009).

Effective Partnerships

The success of humanitarian reform is also founded on more effective partnerships between UN and non-UN humanitarian actors. The Humanitarian Reform Project's analysis of the reform process found that improvements on partnerships were poorly implemented in the five country case studies, including in Ethiopia. Partnership was unevenly applied across the humanitarian spectrum and that '*a considerable cultural change is needed to embed partnership approaches within UN agencies*'. The report also noted that in Ethiopia national NGOs remain marginalised from humanitarian reform mechanisms, and are often unable to effectively engage with them (Humanitarian Reform Project, 2009).

Ethiopia's Humanitarian Aid Architecture

Background

Humanitarian coordination in Ethiopia is complex reflecting the time over which the system has evolved and the type and number of stakeholders involved (DfID, 2013a). The system has been in continued transition since the Government of Ethiopia established a government entity for the co-ordination of humanitarian assistance following the 1973 famine.

See annex 7 for Ethiopia's current humanitarian co-ordination architecture.

Ethiopia's humanitarian co-ordination architecture will continue to change most notably pending the 2009 National Policy and Strategy on Disaster Risk Management (DRM). The DRM Policy will mainstream disaster preparedness and prevention into development work, and decentralise both

decision making and capacity in line with the constitution and the federal structure⁶⁰ (DfID, 2013a, p 41). These changes are currently being implemented.

Effectiveness of Humanitarian Crises Coordination

Ethiopia's humanitarian co-ordination architecture has its challenges but was said to be working well by UN and INGO staff interviewed during the August 2014 country visit. The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team, in which the main strands of humanitarian actors meet (Government of Ethiopia, UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement) is well-co-ordinated.

A key issue is that humanitarian needs are systematically underreported by the government. A 2009 Dutch government BEMO reports for example that the October 2009 Humanitarian Requirements Document is of little practical value: 'Publication of the report is delayed while it is already widely known that the number of 6.2 million food aid beneficiaries is too low as the Government of Ethiopia for political reasons is downplaying the actual needs and number of people requiring food aid'⁶¹ (BuZa, 2009).

Humanitarian needs in Ethiopia continue to go underreported. For example, DfID claims that the Government of Ethiopia in its February 2013 Humanitarian Requirements Document underestimates the scale of relief food needs by some one million beneficiaries as compared with data obtained during joint assessments (DfID, 2013a). According to DfID accurate humanitarian needs assessment data is often made available only when needs become critical (DfID, 2013a). This does not help the timeliness and effectiveness of humanitarian crisis co-ordination and response.

Management of the 2011-2012 Horn of Africa Crisis

The management of the 2011-2012 crises reflect the achievements and challenges of humanitarian reform and Ethiopia's humanitarian aid architecture. In this regard the IASC real time evaluation, the major authoritative evaluation study on the crisis response, reports both successes as well as failures.

Key successes have been (Slim, 2012):

- IACS coordination structures effectively adapted to support complex non-cluster Government systems. Ethiopia's new Strategic Multi-Agency Coordination group proved efficient and effective at binding the Government system with its international partners.
- Technically empowered regional and zonal Governments, and local *Woreda* and *Kebele* committees proved to be a great strength in Ethiopia's response.

The main failures in terms of co-ordination have been (Slim, 2012):

- Problems in Ethiopian government coordination involving scepticism about regional estimates and mistrust of international and national NGOs.
- 'Regional strategy, planning and fundraising were effectively non-existent in UN and regional organizations'⁶².

6.2 World Food Programme: Humanitarian Crisis Programming

6.2.1 Clusters and Co-ordination

Within the cluster system the WFP is the cluster lead for Logistics, Emergency Telecommunications and, together with FAO, cluster lead for Food Security. Key roles of WFP Ethiopia as cluster lead are to provide information on food security levels in the country and to provide updates on the humanitarian food pipeline.

⁶⁰ In the interim the DRMFSS and the NDPPC remain the decision making bodies for disaster response overseeing key processes such as the assessment and the HRM, and the strategic food security reserve (ESFRA).

⁶¹ According to the BEMO donors and aid agencies planned for 7.5 million food aid beneficiaries.

⁶² The only regional humanitarian body to engage strategically was the Regional Humanitarian Partnership Team in Nairobi but it limited its role to basic information sharing with low UN agency attendance. The evaluation observed that 'Regional coordination was not helped by the "split site" of political and humanitarian hubs between Addis and Nairobi' (Slim, 2012: p12).

Dependence on Government Systems

WFP's main partner in the delivery of its PRROs, including the PSNP in Afar and Somali Regions, is the Government of Ethiopia. Government ownership over humanitarian assistance delivery is in essence an important objective of the transformative agenda. WFP's dependence however on sub-optimal/poor government food management systems and delayed communication of crucial needs and humanitarian requirements regularly hinders and slows down the cluster approach. For example, the 2014 emergency relief food distributions to acute food insecure people are seriously delayed because of critical pipeline breaks.

The Global Food Security Cluster: WFP & FAO

In 2010 the global Food Security Cluster (FSC), co-led by FAO and the WFP, was created as the UN's global mechanism for coordinating food security responses in emergencies. The FSC is to provide leadership and improved coordination to better deal with complex, multidimensional responses needed to protect food security in disasters. The FSC aims to 'support country-level clusters and strengthen their capacity to plan and implement proportionate, appropriate and timely food security responses in humanitarian crisis situations' (IASC, 2010).

Ethiopia is however not one of the FSC's 'hot spot' countries⁶³. And as such the FSC is not functional in terms of strengthening capacity to plan and deliver joined or co-ordinated WFP-FAO food security responses. The FAO/WFP joint global evaluation of the FSC does not include, nor even mention, Ethiopia (FAO/WFP, 2014).

Ethiopia is not seen as a 'hot spot' country by the FSC because the nature of food insecurity in the country is primarily chronic, and therefore predictable, and not acute. The global FSC is also less relevant to the Ethiopian context as WFP and FAO focus on different food security aspects. The WFP's food management team operates across the government's Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Sector (DRMFSS) with DRM primarily concerned with 'emergencies' and FSS with the PSNP and HABP ('social protection'). The lack of FAO engagement in the PSNP is to do with FAO's priorities in Ethiopia: The Ministry of Agriculture has requested FAO to focus on agricultural growth and not on PSNP and DRM work.

In Ethiopia the interagency Technical Working Group for Food Security & Nutrition is headed by WFP and the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; the Agricultural Task Force is headed by FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture. Joined-up programming between WFP and FAO and other cluster partners is highly relevant seen Ethiopia's protracted food crisis. However, as mentioned above, FAO has historically focused on agricultural growth and to far lesser extent on DRM work (under its Emergencies work). In this light direct WFP-FAO coordination is less relevant as compared to wider coordination amongst all stakeholders under the DRM Technical Working Group which is done quite well.

Under the PSNP IV re-design the PSNP will expand its DRM work thus reducing the need for joined-up WFP-FAO work.

6.2.2 Partnerships

Partnerships with Humanitarian Actors

According to a Dutch government internal memo (BEMO, 2011) humanitarian actors criticise WFP for its solistic approach. Dutch government staff take a 'pragmatic' stand on this: *'Is WFP operating solistic? Agencies like the WFP and UNICEF have the resources to be able to afford operating on their own. They don't hav the interest to be pro-active in taking weaker partners on board'*.

Donors may demand joined proposals to enforce partnerships between UN agencies or improve on the quality of UN/INGO partnerships. This is the reason why, according to WFP-Ethiopia, the Rome based food agencies – WFP, FAO, IFAD – joined hands and started to submit joint project proposals: *'The comparative advantages are there ... donor response so far was however weak and the available budgets not significant'* (pers.com. WFP-Ethiopia officials).

⁶³ Current hot spot areas are the Central African Republic, Iraq, Liberia, Republic of South Sudan and Syria.
<http://foodsecuritycluster.net/>

Partnerships with Developmental Actors

In terms of partnerships with development actors in disaster risk management the WFP has a host of support activities within DRMFS. In particular in the area of capacity building on early warning systems, from LEAP⁶⁴ to automated weather stations, and *Woreda* risk profiling in combination with contingency plans.

WFP partnerships with development actors involved in poverty reduction efforts and promoting longer term development are limited. In practice such partnership opportunities do exist and relief-development linkages could be forged through partnerships with programmes such as USAID PRIME, ADB Resilience Programme and NGO Programmes.

Engaging Research Institutions: Lowland PSNP Adaptation

WFP's 2014 PRRO evaluation (Frankenberger et.al., 2014) clearly established the lack of WFP's lowland PSNP strategy adaptation to pastoral livelihood systems, and its lack of being informed by a resilience lens and WFP's experiences with MERET.

Conventional approaches to HA delivery are often mal-adapted to pastoral communities as already found in Ethiopia's lowland pastoralist areas during the 1997-2000 drought (Watkins, B. and M.L. Fleisher, 2002). Good understanding of pastoralists' vulnerability and risk is however crucial for policy makers and programme implementers to make informed decisions about humanitarian assistance and safety nets, as well as about social protection beyond safety nets and relief (Devereux, S. and K. Tibbo, 2013). In this it is striking that WFP does not have partnerships nor functional linkages with specialised research agencies involved in Ethiopia's pastoralist lowland areas.

IFPRI is convinced that there is a future for pastoralism in Ethiopia's pastoralist lowland areas. It is therefore essential for HA provision to be adapted to agro-pastoralist and pastoralist livelihood systems (IFPRI, 2013). This needs however a fundamental debate as the 2011-12 Horn of Africa drought has generated widespread pessimism about the future of pastoralism in the region, including in Ethiopia⁶⁵.

For WFP functional linkages with research organisations on the ground, such as the Tufts-Feinstein research programme 'Pastoralism & Policy in Ethiopia' can inform HA provision and the type and social organisation of Public Works that reduce vulnerability and risk.

6.2.3 Donor Co-ordination

Alignment of Response Options in Chronically Food Insecure Highland Areas

Addressing chronic as well as acute but transitory food insecurity, requires different response mechanisms and options to be appropriately timed and phased. This necessitates co-ordination between donors and humanitarian and development actors involved in food security programming.

In the Ethiopian highlands the PSNP has become the 'cushioned donor response mechanism'⁶⁶ in dealing with chronic and predictable needs. Designed to respond to chronic food insecurity the PSNP is also one of the response mechanism to address acute food insecurity. The sequence of response mechanisms and options in dealing with acute food needs is:

- The PSNP's contingency budget (20% of the PSNP budget).
- The Risk Financing Utility⁶⁷ (triggered in 2011 and in 2014).
- Emergency aid through the National Relief Programme.

⁶⁴ Livelihoods, Early Assessment and Protection (LEAP) is essentially early warning-early action for drought risk management. See also <http://www.wfp.org/disaster-risk-reduction/leap>

⁶⁵ According to IFPRI (2013) some actors, including the Government of Ethiopia, feel that pastoralism is unsustainable, and that sedentarization and livelihood diversification is the right way to go. At the other extreme, livestock specialists tend to argue that pastoralism makes efficient use of the combination of land abundance and climatic variability over time and space.

⁶⁶ The PSNP is seen as a good donor response to chronic and seasonal food security by all humanitarian and development actors in Ethiopia.

⁶⁷ The risk financing utility is to help poor households and communities to better cope with transitory shocks in PSNP *Woredas*. This will be extended to households outside the PSNP programme in PSNP IV.

Critical is to get the triggers for the different phases right. Key stakeholders in Ethiopia underline the need for this systemic approach; the system does however not yet work properly. Donor co-ordination and agreement on the triggers and phasing of the different response options is required.

Graduation in Pastoralist Areas

In 2014 WFP completed rolling out the PSNP in the pastoralist areas of Somali and Afar Region. Currently the PSNP is not expected to result in graduation as complementary programmes, notably the Household Asset Building Programme and the Complementary Community Investment programme, are not yet being implemented.

It is evident however that graduation out of the safety net and out of the Food Security Programme will become an important issue in the agro-pastoralist and pastoralist areas. This presents both challenges and opportunities that can only be addressed by close consultation and co-ordination between key stakeholders, including donors and both relief and development actors.

One of the key challenges is that pastoralism is facing sustainability problems associated with population growth, shrinking grazing land, and more frequent weather shocks (Headey et al., 2012). This is however in itself not a justification for neglect of pastoralism: pastoralism will be the dominant livelihood for the foreseeable future, and potentially profitable seen growing demand for livestock products. Pastoralism therefore needs to be an important component of local and regional development initiatives (IFPRI, 2013).

6.2.4 Government Ownership and Response Capacity

Systemic Ownership and Response Capacity: Government Food Management System

Government ownership over humanitarian assistance delivery is, as mentioned earlier on, in essence an important objective of the transformative agenda. Whilst the Government of Ethiopia is strongly focused on growth and committed to its ambitious PASDEP programme, vulnerability to food insecurity in Ethiopia is widespread and pronounced. The situation therefore necessitates a systemic response to address both chronic as well as acute food insecurity.

WFP's 2014 PRRO evaluation found that government ownership and HA delivery capacity is hampered by both high government staff turnover and policies. The same study also found that WFP has an 'inadequate capacity-building strategy for establishing sustainable government food management'⁶⁸. The report therefore recommends WFP to design a capacity development strategy with a results based framework, systematic capacity-building needs assessment at all levels, and development of related performance outcome indicators.

A sustainable government food management system should be able to address HA needs including relief and safety net needs. To this aim WFP is expected to roll out its Food Management Improvement Programme by 2015. Under PSNP IV (2015-2018) the numbers of Ethiopians who will receive assistance through the National Relief Programme is expected to drop significantly, and numbers of PSNP IV to increase significantly to about 10 million (mainly as a result of 'long term' relief beneficiaries in pastoralist lowland areas being absorbed by the PSNP).

Financial Ownership

The government already makes financial contributions to PRRO programming in particular to the PSNP. By far the major share of the PSNP costs is being covered by the international community through soft loans and financial and in-kind contributions.

In negotiating PSNP IV the World Bank would like to see that by 2020 the Government of Ethiopia is covering the costs of the PSNP. The total costs to operate the PSNP in Ethiopia by 2020 is an estimated 1.9% of expected GDP (pers. com. World Bank). The government's ability to assume PSNP financial ownership will depend on sustained GDP growth as well as reduced PSNP numbers (beneficiary graduation out of the Food Security Programme).

Relief and safety net food transfers are increasingly sourced through the internal Ethiopian grain market. In-country purchase is expected to increase further as agricultural output will continue to grow.

⁶⁸ The 2011 evaluation of the PRRO 10655.0 already recommended WFP to establish a food management system capacity development strategy. Progress was made on increasing GoE capacity and ownership over relief operations during the implementation of PRRO 200290.

This is an encouraging development and a strong indication that Ethiopia is making significant progress to achieve national food security through increased agricultural output.

In managing the transition away from international relief food shipments and regional food purchases to increased in-country purchase requires effective Government, WFP and donor co-ordination. With the country's strong and sustained GDP growth donors expect the Government to assume increased financial ownership to resource its Food Management System in address of humanitarian needs⁶⁹.

6.3 UN-OCHA: Humanitarian Response Fund

6.3.1 Clusters and Co-ordination

Engaging Clusters

An important focus of the HRF is to strengthen the role of the clusters. Clusters play a crucial element in HRF's resource provision through a structured and co-ordinated response mechanism and engages with in-country humanitarian partners: the government, UN agencies and INGOs.

The UN clusters do play an active role in reviewing cluster specific elements of HRF proposals. Cluster representatives provide technical and thematic feedback and make sure that standardised protocols (such as for water tankering and nutritional interventions) are observed.

HRF has made strategic contributions to cluster-wide co-ordination between its government, UN and NGO partners working in various clusters. Notably with regard to the nutrition and WASH cluster.

HRF's monitoring missions contributed to a change in Ethiopia's nutrition policy with regard to the initiation of emergency nutrition interventions. In Ethiopia's chronic nutrition affected areas nutritional programmes were triggered on the basis of admission figures of moderately and severely acute malnourished children (MAM and SAM figures). HRF monitoring missions established that admission figures are late indicators and should be replaced by proxy early indicators such as rainfall and crop production data (OCHA, 2012).

With regard to the WASH cluster HRF's strategic engagement with the government, UN agencies and INGOs has resulted in a Joint Action Plan. A direct result of this has been the development of Water Trucking Guidelines for the WASH sector (OCHA, 2012).

Inter-sectoral and Regional Co-ordination

A key finding of OCHA's monitoring has been the need to strengthen inter-sectoral as well as regional co-ordination. Co-ordination is a persistent issue as even during 2013, which was a 'quiet year' with regard to humanitarian emergencies in Ethiopia, poor inter-sectoral and regional co-ordination was a key monitoring finding (OCHA, 2013; p 36).

6.3.2 Partnerships

HRFs are supposed to strengthen partnerships among humanitarian actors through equitable access to funds, broad representation on advisory and review boards, and a transparent decision making process. Effective partnerships between the UN and non-UN humanitarian actors are seen as central to the success of humanitarian reform.

Ethiopia's HRF has adopted the humanitarian reform agenda in order to increase the HRF's predictability, accountability and partnership (OCHA, 2011).

⁶⁹ Some international observers are quite sceptical about the GoE's interest and ability to assume administrative and financial ownership over relief and PSNP programming '*... the GoE has no priority to take over HA provisioning from the international community*'. According to these observers the government is very much focused on growth to the neglect of dealing with vulnerability '*which it is happy to leave to the international community*'.

Engagement with INGOs

The Review Board

INGOs are represented on the HRF review board. In meeting with some of these INGOs, during the IOB country visit, they confirmed play an active role in advising and deciding resource allocation.

INGO Stakeholder Survey

OCHA-Ethiopia undertakes annual HRF stakeholder surveys to solicit for feedback of its partners on HRF contributing to the Humanitarian Reform Process. The survey covers key areas of humanitarian reform: cluster approach & coordination, partnerships, adequate & timely funding, predictability, and accountability & transparency.

For each of these areas HRF partners are invited to indicate the degree to which HRF has contributed to the reform agenda. Findings show that HRF contribution has been positive to very positive for all key areas of humanitarian reform with few exceptions over the years.

The 2012 stakeholder survey, for example, found that 'availability of fund', 'rapid funding mechanism', 'predictability' and 'accountability & transparency' were cited as strengths of the HRF. The overall strength of the HRF was said to be 'the availability of a coordination and prioritization forum and the robust involvement of clusters in the review of project proposals' (OCHA, 2012). These findings are in line with findings of the stakeholder survey over the 2009-13 period.

INGOs visited as part of the August 2014 country visit were asked about their opinion on the HRF. All were of the opinion that the HRF is an important instrument to facilitate flexible and timely emergency response. The most common feedback received was that the '*HRF is an in country decision making instrument with people involved who understand the context ... HRF staff understand where the needs are*'. The HRF is '*responsive and quick*' and able to deliver '*local responses at Woreda level*'. HRF NGO partners are also of the opinion that '*meeting basic proposal criteria is sufficient; no need to think through the language as for OFDA proposals*'. OCHA Ethiopia's INGO partners thus found that Ethiopia's HRF provides quick, flexible and well-coordinated financial resources.

These findings indicate that the HRF through its partnerships has increased the accountability and transparency of humanitarian system and has contributed to delivery of timely and effective response.

Areas for Improvement

Administrative Issues & Increased Funding for Resilience and Livelihoods

Some of the issues stated to be areas of weakness by the HRF INGO partners related to the Global ERF Guidelines, in particular on allowable overhead and administration costs, and allowance on the backdating of MoUs. Areas of improvement, according to the HRF INGOs thus include increased allowable overhead/administration costs and allowance on the backdating of MOUs.

Other key areas for improvement, according to the HRF INGOs, is an increased focus on both resilience and livelihood interventions. These type of interventions are not prioritised by HRF while allowed timeframes were said to be too short for meaningful work (a maximum of 6 months) and funding being prioritised for addressing life-saving emergency aid.

Access to HRF by National NGOs

In Ethiopia National NGOs (NNGOs) do not have direct access to HRF funding; NNGOs only had access to HRF funding when partnered with INGO HRF partners.

In 2012 HRF met with over 20 NNGOs to discuss ways of opening direct access to the Fund⁷⁰. Draft eligibility criteria were developed (OCHA, 2012). In 2014 HRF offered REST direct access to HRF Fund as part of HRF's strategy to expand its presence into Tigray Region.

HRF Ethiopia has assisted some INGOs to address implementation challenges. With offering NNGOs direct access OCHA-HRF intends to actively support NNGO with capacity-building initiatives.

⁷⁰ The general goal is to enhance the role of NNGOs in HA delivery; not as an opportunity for local actors to respond in areas where international organizations face access challenges due to security or political issues (as is HRF's strategy in some other countries).

Ethiopia's Restrictive NGO laws

The lack of NNGOs engagement with HRF lies fundamentally in the humanitarian reform process itself. The reform was originally driven by *'an international perspective which focused on international systems of humanitarian response, without sufficiently considering the implications of the proposed changes for national and local government structures, or the roles of national civil society actors and NGOs'* (ODI, 2009).

In Ethiopia the lack of NNGO participation in the HRF depends also on national circumstances, in particular the country's strict national NGO law. The law criminalises NNGOs which receive more than ten percent of their funding abroad and are involved in human rights activities, including campaigning for gender equality, children's rights, disabled persons' rights and conflict resolution⁷¹.

6.3.3 Donor Co-ordination

The humanitarian reform agenda includes creating meaningful partnerships, also in areas related to funding.

Apart from the HRF there are two other decentralised humanitarian funding streams in Ethiopia: OFDA and ECHO. The relationships between these donors is good. Both OFDA⁷² and ECHO are represented at the HRF review board to ensure synergy and co-ordination of emergency response.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance's (OFDA) has a standing membership in the Review Board as an observer. In 2013 the HRF extended observer status to the European Commission Humanitarian Office (ECHO). The International Rescue Committee (IRC), the prime administrator of ECHO's Emergency Response Mechanism, is a non-voting member of the Review Board.

According to senior OCHA officials the HRF is the glue to ECHO and OFDA emergency response interventions. Of the three funding streams the HRF is the easiest to access: the HRF is the least bureaucratic and the fastest in terms of the time between submitting the proposal and having the money in the bank. However, agencies funded through HRF may start with implementing emergency response interventions only after receiving the HRF fund, they are also not allowed to backdate the approved proposal.

ECHO has started funding emergency response interventions recently in 2014. ECHO's emergency response interventions have a time frame up to 3 months with a maximum budget of 250.000 Euros. According to ECHO *'it is quick impact projects with agencies going in and out'*. In practice some of the INGOs prefer ECHO emergency response funding over HRF funding although ECHO was mentioned to be a more bureaucratic and time consuming process (according to ECHO itself *'a more rigid process resulting in higher quality emergency response interventions'*). This is because ECHO indicates to INGOs, upon them submitting and discussing an initial needs assessment, whether they will ensure financial support. On that premise major agencies can start with implementation using their own financial resources. ECHO also allows implementing agencies to backdate the approved project proposal.

6.3.4 Government Ownership and Response Capacity

DfID, as one of the main architects and strategic funding partner of Ethiopia's HRF, sees an increased role for the Government of Ethiopia to address humanitarian needs: *'Over time, it is hoped that the significance of the HRF declines in terms of how much of the humanitarian caseload it funds, as Government's own capacity to meet humanitarian needs increases and development efforts, growth and resilience limit and hopefully reduce the overall caseload'* (DfID, 2013b).

The World Bank is also considering setting up a Disaster Respond Fund co-managed by the Bank and the Government of Ethiopia.

⁷¹ See also: <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/ethiopian-parliament-adopts-repressive-new-ngo-law-20090108>

⁷² In US-AID funded developmental projects in Ethiopia the so-called 'crisis modifier' provides additional financial resources and thus flexibility to react to crisis. Crisis modifiers do however not cover emergency response interventions outside the geographic programme area. This is where HRF can play a strategic role for US Aid funded INGOs programmes.

More critical observers underline the need for the international community to maintain a disaster response fund, such as the HRF, within which the government is represented but does not have the ultimate power to decide funding or not funding particular humanitarian emergency response interventions.

6.4 UNHCR: The Refugee Programme

6.4.1 Ethiopia's Refugee Programme

As a relatively stable country in a volatile region Ethiopia has been host to large refugee populations. In line with its long tradition of welcoming refugees into its territory the Government pursued an open door policy towards Somali refugees during the 2011-12 crisis. The Ethiopian Government also respected the core UNHCR principle of non-refoulement (Richardson, 2013).

UNHCR and its main Government counterpart and implementing partner, the Administration for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA), provide to date protection and assistance to over 400,000 people in Ethiopia seeking refuge from insecurity, oppression or famine in the neighbouring countries.

By the end of 2013 there were 408,240 officially registered refugees; the three main groups are from Somalia (235,920), Eritrea (86,010) and Southern Sudan (82,090). Refugees are sheltered in 18 camps and provided life-saving assistance under the Care and Maintenance concept. (UNHCR, 2014).

Limited Options for Promoting Durable Solutions: Protracted Refugee Crises

As the specialised UN refugee agency the UNHCR promotes durable solutions which include local integration, resettlement and voluntary return.

In Ethiopia local integration is not allowed by the Government; there are no provisions under Ethiopia's law for local integration of refugees. Re-settlement to a third country (mainly western countries) is the preferred durable solution for many refugees, in particular youngsters, but few benefit from this solution. This leaves voluntary repatriation UNHCR's preferred durable solution in Ethiopia. Voluntary repatriation can only be pursued to areas that are safe to return to. This is precisely the reason why voluntary return is not promoted for the far majority of those who claimed refugee status in recent years.

With little scope to promote durable solutions in the short to medium term recent refugee influxes into Ethiopia are likely to develop into regionalised protracted refugee situations.

The 2011 Somali Refugee Influx

In addition to addressing the 2011 in-country challenges stemming from the drought, the Government and humanitarian partners were simultaneously responding to the massive drought- as well as conflict-induced refugee influx from Somalia. In 2011 alone almost 100,000 Somalis entered Ethiopia fleeing drought and conflict in their country. By 19 August 2012 the total number of registered Somali refugees in Ethiopia was 209,013 persons (UNHCR, 2012).

Dollo Ado, which is close to the border with Somalia, was by the end of 2012 the second largest refugee operation in the world accommodating more than 194,000 Somali refugees in five camps.

Findings of the Real Time Evaluation

The main authoritative study on the Somali refugee influx response is the 2011 real-time evaluation by Richardson et. al. (2012). This independent review identified several contextual constraints with regard to UNHCR's response to the Somali influx in Dollo Ado highlighting key findings in three areas: co-ordination, systems & policies, and operations (Richardson, 2012).

Coordination mechanisms were found inadequate for an effective response. The delivery of nutrition services, for example, was fragmented and incoherent⁷³. A main point of critique on UNHCR has been poor strategic leadership, particular in the first half year of the crisis with grossly sub-standard services at transit camps slow scale-up of nutrition services. This resulted in GAM rates that remained above

⁷³ Within the nutrition sector co-ordination was weak. As of August 2011 there were five different operational partners, alongside UNHCR, ARRA, WFP and UNICEF, involved in different parts of nutrition programming in different camps and applying different standards including enrolment and discharge criteria (Richardson, 2013: p-12).

emergency thresholds for all of 2011. The independent review commissioned by UNHCR also noted that 'many actors view UNHCR's initial poor interagency preparedness and initial response as a reflection of UNHCR's protective nature towards its mandate'. (Richardson et al, 2013: p10).

In terms of systems and policies the review found a systematic failure to trigger a timely response, limited preparedness for an effective and timely response, and a delay in activating appropriate funding. The study also identified UNHCR staffing constraints with offices operating on a minimum of staff with little reserve capacity available when the emergency arose.

With regard to operations main points of critique were: poor strategic leadership by UNHCR (particular in the first half year of the crisis); grossly sub-standard services at transit camps, and slow scale-up of nutrition services.

Refugee Assistance in Dollo Ado

UNHCR and WFP officials met during the August 2014 IOB country visit mentioned that initial refugee assistance programming in Dollo Ado district was complicated because of security concerns hampering humanitarian access, logistical problems due to poor or non-existing infrastructure, and refugee numbers that far exceeded projected numbers in Ethiopia's HRD.

At the time of influx no refugee management infrastructure existed in Dollo Ado; the Somali refugee influx into areas with established camps was relatively well managed.

The 2013-14 Sudanese Refugee Influx

WFP and UNHCR staff mentioned that the response to the South Sudanese refugee influx in 2013 and 2014 in western Ethiopian has been much better as compared to the management of the Somali refugee influx in Dollo Ado. According to senior UN officials, interviewed during the August 2014 country visit, the key reasons for this were:

- The existence of refugee management infrastructure in Ethiopia's Gambella Region, although the capacity of existing camps was outstripped quickly as a result of the high number of arrivals. The establishment of new camps in other locations was problematic due to the threat of flooding and existing tensions between different ethnic groups.
- Good functional co-ordination and working relations between UNHCR and ARRA.
- ARRA's ready acceptance to invite INGOs to assist in identified gaps in service delivery⁷⁴.

6.4.2 Clusters and Co-ordination

In line with the UN's cluster system the UNHCR, together with IOM, is cluster lead for Camp Co-ordination and Camp Management. UNCHR Ethiopia is also responsible for refugee programming in close co-ordination and collaboration with the Government of Ethiopia's Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs (ARRA).

Emergency refugee response is not part of the cluster coordination mechanism in Ethiopia. This has led to confusion amongst implementing and operational partners (Richardson, 2013: p 10).

The 2012 independent review of the Dollo Ado refugee influx found that perceptions around the UNHCR mandate were stumbling blocks to response: 'The balance between maintaining diplomacy with the host government on the one hand and responding to a major humanitarian crisis on the other proved difficult for UNHCR and partners within the humanitarian community' (Richardson et al, 2013: p 10).

The independent review commissioned by UNHCR also notes that 'many actors view UNHCR's initial poor interagency preparedness and initial response as a reflection of UNHCR's protective nature towards its mandate. (Richardson et al, 2013: p10). During the country visit of August 2014 it appeared that this view is widely held including by main UN agencies: *'there is little co-ordination amongst UN agencies with regard to refugee programming because of well-maintained territorial demarcations'*.

Also, some senior UN officials mentioned that UN-OCHA Ethiopia, as the UN's co-ordinating agency OCHA is not well informed about refugees and limits itself to general comments: *'This is because OCHA is not deeply involved: it should flex its muscles on this to provide the overall perspective including key challenges and need for resources'*.

⁷⁴ In Dollo Ado ARRA reluctantly approved of inviting INGOs to assist in refugee programming.

6.4.3 Partnerships

UNHCR - WFP

The partnership between WFP and UNHCR in providing food/cash transfers to refugees is based on the 2011 corporate tri-partite agreement between WFP and UNHCR. Staff of WFP and UNHCR in Ethiopia mentioned that this agreement works well, also during the 2011-2012 Somali refugee influx.

In the Somali refugee camps WFP have introduced cash as a resource transfer. The cash component is modest: 25% of the wheat ration is provided in the form of cash⁷⁵. Evaluations indicate that the cash distribution is highly valued by the far majority of the refugees. It has enabled them to increase the cost-efficiency of the transfers and enhanced their negotiation and purchasing power at local markets. In the words of the Refugee Central Committee of one of the camps visited during the August 2014 IOB country visit: *'the cash contribution helps us to purchase the food items of preference, it helps us to diversify our diets'*⁷⁶. Representatives of the camp's Refugee Central Committee also mentioned that cash transfers *'has given us pride and has increased moral'*.

UNHCR-ARRA-NGOs

UNHCR's relationship with ARRA is complex as a result of 'complications of dual roles as well as ARRA being both implementing partner of UNHCR and at the same time government counterpart'⁷⁷ (Richardson, 2013). Field level co-ordination between the two agencies was hindered by confusion over the roles and responsibilities of ARRA vis-à-vis UNHCR as well as ARRA's disconnect between Addis and field level coordination (Richardson et al, 2013).

During the first half of 2011 ARRA kept tight control over its role of implementing partner with regard to the Somali refugee influx, and was limiting the opening up of humanitarian space to international agencies. UNHCR leadership has been instrumental to negotiate wider humanitarian space for INGOs with ARRA. With regard to the South Sudanese refugee influx in 2013 ARRA has been more ready to opening up humanitarian space for INGOs in order to scale-up response to the unfolding crisis.

6.4.4 Donor Co-ordination

Limited Surge Capacity to Respond to Acute Crises

UNHCR's surge capacity to respond to the 2011 'sudden' refugee crisis in eastern Ethiopia has been very weak, both in terms of the timely availability of humanitarian funding and in creating the response capacity on the ground.

During the 2011 Somali drought and conflict related refugee influx in Somali Region (notably Dollo Ado *Woreda*) both CERF and the HRF are widely acclaimed to have played a critical role in making available crisis funding. This has been instrumental in addressing acute emergency needs, particularly in the nutritional and WASH domain.

In the face of the 2011 Somali refugee crisis the HRF has been accredited by enabling rapid response 'in the margins of the humanitarian aid system'. Due to a lack of funding the HRF has been far less instrumental in enabling for a rapid and timely response when the South Sudanese refugee crisis was unfolding at a time when refugee emergency response capacity was low.

Surge capacity to deal with the South Sudanese refugee influx in the Gambella Region has been a challenge although the response has been much better as compared to the 2011 Somali refugee influx in Dollo Ado. UNHCR staff did mention that surge capacity to deal with another major refugee influx is limited⁷⁸.

⁷⁵ The total ration per person per month is wheat 5 kilos (25% of the 5 kilos of wheat is being paid out in the form of cash), rice 4 kilos, sorghum 5 kilos, pulses 1.5 kilos, famix 1.5 kilo, sugar 0,45 kilo, oil 0,9 kg and salt 0,15 kilos).

⁷⁶ One of the critical issues for WFP-UNHCR is the food basket composition. WFP is providing only for refugees' basic food requirements and expects UNHCR to provide for refugees having a more diversified diet, as per the Global MOU between WFP and UNHCR. The finding that a significant portion of the cash distributions is being utilised by refugees to diversify their diet is an important observation.

⁷⁷ According to the report 'UNHCR had to respect the sovereignty of the national government and yet operationally engage with ARRA through a direct funding mechanism'.

⁷⁸ When the IOB review team asked UNHCR Addis Ababa how to deal with a possible Somali refugee influx, as projected to take place by the end of the year, UNHCR mentioned that their surge capacity to respond to such a

Donor Contributions

Donors cannot make financial contributions to a particular refugee programme in Ethiopia: donor contributions go into the shared funding pool. Agencies appear to be pragmatic in this regard and willing to produce on a donor's request to issue reports stating that their 'pooled' financial contributions have been utilised to finance a particular programme.

UNHCR is facing a shortage of funding for its refugee programme. Budgets from UNHCR Geneva for Ethiopia are decreasing due to increased global refugee assistance needs. As a result NGOs involved in the Somali refugee programme have faced reduced UNHCR budget contributions in 2013 and 2014. INGOs involved in refugee programming are less vulnerable to UNHCR budget cuts as they often receive funding from multiple sources.

Donors' bilateral funding strategies, including the Dutch government's funding strategy, of UNHCR-Geneva is very difficult to access by UNHCR's INGO implementing partners in Ethiopia.

Underfunded Appeals

UNHCR's funding appeals for refugee programming are underfunded. As a consequence refugee programmes in Ethiopia depend to considerable extent on INGOs having alternative funding sources. UNHCR's 2014 Gambella funding appeal, for example, had received a mere 28% funding commitment by end of August 2014 rendering the programme dependent on INGOs and alternative funding sources⁷⁹. Some of the major INGOs involved in refugee programming, and visited in August 2014 by the IOB team, mentioned that their main refugee programme funding resources came from major international private foundations.

6.4.5 National Response Capacity and Ownership

The Government of Ethiopia plays an important role in refugee programming through its Agency for Refugee and Returnee Affairs. As discussed above UNHCR and ARRA's capacity to manage increased refugee caseloads is limited and that therefore the contribution of INGOs to refugee programming is crucial to enhance response capacity.

6.5 Summary Findings

Humanitarian Reform and the Aid Co-ordination Architecture in Ethiopia

1. Of the four main components of humanitarian reform – leadership, cluster approach, flexible and effective humanitarian financing, effective partnerships - humanitarian financing has seen, with the creation of the CERF and HRF, the greatest progress in Ethiopia (ODI, 2009).
2. Humanitarian coordination in Ethiopia is complex reflecting the time over which the system has evolved and the type and number of stakeholders involved: Government of Ethiopia, UN agencies, the World Bank, NGOs, and the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement.
3. The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team, which is at the centre of coordination in the Ethiopia's aid architecture a key coordination, is well managed and functions well.
4. Humanitarian needs in Ethiopia continue to go systematically underreported by the Government. Under and late reporting of humanitarian needs affects HA coordination and timeliness of response. Accurate humanitarian needs assessment data is often made available only when needs become critical (DfID, 2013a).

World Food Programme

Clusters and Co-ordination

1. Government ownership over humanitarian assistance delivery is in essence an important objective of the transformative agenda. WFP's dependence however on sub-optimal/poor government food

crisis was very low 'due to the demands placed on the organisation in trying to manage the Sudanese refugee influx'.

⁷⁹ UNHCR Addis Ababa staff mentioning that resource to maintain existing camps was available, but with no additional funding to manage an increased caseload in Gambella.

management systems and delayed communication of crucial needs/humanitarian requirements regularly hinders and slows down the cluster approach.

2. The global Food Security Cluster aims to strengthen capacity to plan and deliver joined WFP-FAO food security responses. Ethiopia is however not on the 'hot spot' country list of the FSC because the nature of food insecurity in the country is primarily chronic, and therefore predictable and not acute. The global FSC is also less relevant to the Ethiopian context as WFP and FAO focus on different food security aspects.

Partnerships

3. WFP partnerships with other humanitarian and development actors involved in crisis response, risk management and poverty reduction efforts are limited.
4. WFP does not have partnerships nor functional linkages with research agencies involved in pastoralist areas. This is surprising as conventional approaches to HA delivery have been found mal-adapted to pastoral communities. For WFP functional linkages with research organisations can inform HA provision and the type and social organisation of Public Works that reduce vulnerability and risk in pastoralist areas.

Donor Co-ordination

5. Designed to respond to chronic food insecurity the PSNP is also one of the response mechanisms to address acute food insecurity. To address acute food needs it is critical to get the sequence and triggers of the different response mechanisms right (PSNP, Risk Financing Utility, and the National Relief Programme). Donor co-ordination and agreement on the triggers and phasing of the different response options is required.
6. With HA provided in lowland areas and with pastoralism being the dominant livelihood for the foreseeable future pastoralism must be an important component of local and regional development initiatives. This demands adequate coordination between HA and development donors and actors.

Government Ownership & Response Capacity

7. To increase the Government's response capacity and ownership over the National Relief Programme, TSF and the PSNP requires WFP to develop and implement an adequate capacity building strategy. To assist the Government in establishing a sustainable food management system WFP is currently rolling out its Food Management Improvement Programme.
8. Under PSNP IV (2015-2018) the numbers of Ethiopians who will receive assistance through the National Relief Programme is expected to drop significantly, and numbers of PSNP IV to increase significantly to about 10 million.
9. In managing the transition away from international relief food shipments and regional food purchases to increased in-country purchase requires effective Government, WFP and donor co-ordination. With the country's strong and sustained GDP growth donors expect the Government to assume increased financial ownership to resource its Food Management System in address of humanitarian needs.

OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund

Clusters and Co-ordination

1. The UN clusters do play an active role in reviewing cluster specific elements of HRF proposals. Cluster representatives provide technical and thematic feedback and make sure that standardised protocols (such as for WASH / water tankering and nutritional interventions) are observed.
2. HRF has made strategic contributions to cluster-wide co-ordination between its government, UN and NGO partners working in various clusters. In particular in the emergency nutrition and WASH clusters.
3. OCHA's routine monitoring persistently highlights the need for strengthen inter-sectoral as well as regional co-ordination.

Partnerships

4. The HRF through its partnerships has increased the accountability and transparency of humanitarian system and has contributed to delivery of timely and effective response.
5. The lack of National NGO engagement with HRF in Ethiopia lies in the humanitarian reform process itself, which focused on international systems of humanitarian response, as well as in circumstances in Ethiopia itself in particular with regard to the country's strict national NGO law. The HRF has recently embarked on granting selected NGOs direct access to HRF funding.

Donor Co-ordination

10. Besides the HRF there are two other decentralised humanitarian funding streams in Ethiopia: OFDA and ECHO. The relationship between these donors is good. Both OFDA and ECHO are represented at the HRF Review Board to ensure synergy and co-ordination of emergency response.

Government Ownership & Response Capacity

11. The World Bank is considering setting up a Disaster Respond Fund co-managed by the Bank and the Government of Ethiopia with funding contributions by the Government.
12. More critical observers underline the need for the international community to maintain a disaster respond fund, such as the HRF, within which the government is represented but does not have the ultimate power to decide funding or not funding particular humanitarian emergency response interventions.

UNHCR's Refugee Programme

Management of the 2011-12 Somali & the 2013-43 South Sudanese Refugee Influxes

1. Coordination mechanisms were found inadequate for an effective response to the 2011 Somali refugee influx. A main point of critique on UNHCR has been poor strategic leadership, particular in the first half year of the Somali refugee crisis with grossly sub-standard services.
2. Compared to the management of the Somali refugee influx the response to the 2013-14 South Sudanese refugee influx has been much better. This has been attributed to the pre-existence of refugee management infrastructure in western Ethiopia, functional co-ordination and working relations between UNHCR and ARRA, and ARRA's ready acceptance to invite INGOs to assist in identified gaps in service delivery.
3. With limited scope and options for promoting durable solutions to the refugee crises – local integration, resettlement, or voluntary return – in the short to medium term, the Somali 2011-12 influx and the current South Sudanese refugee influx are likely to develop into regionalised protracted refugee situations.

Clusters and Co-ordination

4. Emergency refugee response is not part of the cluster coordination mechanism in Ethiopia and this has led to confusion amongst operational and implementing partners (Richardson, et.al., 2012).
5. The 2012 independent review of the Dollo Ado refugee influx found that perceptions around the UNHCR mandate were stumbling blocks to response: 'The balance between maintaining diplomacy with the host government on the one hand and responding to a major humanitarian crisis on the other proved difficult for UNHCR and partners within the humanitarian community' (Richardson et.al., 2012).

Partnerships

6. The partnership between WFP and UNHCR in providing food/cash transfers to refugees is based on the 2011 corporate tri-partite agreement between WFP Rome and UNHCR Geneva. The partnership works well and has been instrumental in introducing cash as a resource transfer. Refugees' experience with cash resource transfers has been very positive.
7. UNHCR's relationship with its government partner ARRA is complex because of 'complications of dual roles and ARRA being both implementing partner of UNHCR and at the same time government counterpart' (Richardson, 2013).

Donor Co-ordination

6. CERF and the HRF have played an important role in financing part of the initial response to the Somali refugee influx at a time when UNHCR failed activating appropriate funding of its own.
7. Due to a lack of funding the HRF has been less instrumental in enabling a rapid and timely response at the time when the South Sudanese refugee crisis was unfolding.
8. Donors' bilateral funding strategies, including the Dutch government's funding strategy, of UNHCR-Geneva is very difficult to access by UNHCR's INGO implementing partners in Ethiopia.
9. Budgets from UNHCR Geneva for Ethiopia are decreasing due to increased global refugee assistance needs. Commitments to UNHCR funding appeals fall short of expectations which makes refugee programming in Ethiopia to considerably extent dependent on INGOs with access to other funding sources.

Government Ownership & Response Capacity

10. UNHCR and ARRA's capacity to manage increased refugee caseloads is limited which makes the contribution of INGOs crucial to enhance response capacity.

Chapter 7 Main Review Findings

This final chapter presents the main findings in line with the four research questions and their specific issues as stated in the Terms of Reference (see annex 1):

1. The extent to which the United Nations humanitarian assistance strategy responded to the 2009-12 crisis context (section 7.1).
2. The assessment of The Netherlands' humanitarian assistance policy and support to addressing the 2009-12 crisis in Ethiopia (section 7.2).
3. The effectiveness of supported humanitarian assistance interventions, in particular with regard to the WFP's humanitarian crisis programming (section 7.3) and UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund (section 7.4).
4. The degree to which expected improvements in humanitarian assistance coordination and delivery have been achieved (section 7.5).

7.1 The UN's Humanitarian Assistance Response to the 2009-12 Crisis

Since the 1970s the severity, frequency and impacts of drought in Ethiopia have increased and drought affected areas have been expanding. Ethiopia is particularly vulnerable to weather related shocks with rain varying greatly by region and being unpredictable. Ethiopia, still being labelled as in a protracted food crisis, is characterised by longstanding pockets of poverty and food insecurity. Particularly in rural areas where people are dependent on rain-fed agriculture in marginal environments affected by land degradation and water scarcity.

The 2009-12 crisis is a result of successive bad rains and rising inflation which deepened a chronic livelihoods crisis. This tipped into a potential disaster by putting extreme pressure on food prices, livestock survival, and water and food availability (Slim, 2012). The wider 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis affected 4.8 million Ethiopians and an additional 8.2 million people in the Horn. Persistent drought conditions and insecurity in neighbouring Somalia and Eritrea resulted in large refugee influxes into Ethiopia, particularly during 2011 and 2012.

The management of the 2009-2011 crisis in Ethiopia has been helped by the country's pre-existing humanitarian assistance infrastructure and food security policy; longer term safety nets in combination with an emergency relief system.

In Ethiopia's drought affected highland areas the Productive Safety Net Programme, as a systemic response to addressing chronic food insecurity and accommodating acute needs, played a key role in addressing humanitarian needs.

The humanitarian response in Ethiopia's drought affected lowland areas has been more problematic as a result of dependency on emergency relief operations, limited understanding of agro-pastoralist livelihoods and poor humanitarian access in some areas, particularly in parts of Somali Region. Ethiopia's National Relief Programme has however been instrumental in reaching most people in time and has been accredited to have saved the lives of thousands (Slim, 2012).

The Somali refugee emergency response in Ethiopia was weak and did not work well, particularly in Dollo Ado *Woreda* in Ethiopia's Somali Region (Slim, 2012).

Despite advanced early warning the international community's response to the 2011-12 Horn of Africa crisis was delayed. Ethiopia's response to the crisis, as compared to the response in Somalia and Kenya, was however strong and being helped by effective Government, donor, UN and INGO partnerships.

7.2 The Netherlands' Humanitarian Assistance Policy and Support

Dutch humanitarian assistance policy emphasises the importance of a strong central coordination role by the UN in humanitarian crisis situations. In line with Good Humanitarian Donorship principles, and for reasons of assumed efficiency, Dutch government policy selected UN channels for humanitarian assistance funding.

The Dutch government's direct humanitarian assistance funding to Ethiopia prioritised WFP and OCHA and was primarily based on the track record of WFP's Protracted Relief and Recovery

Operations and OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund to deliver humanitarian assistance 'at-scale'. Monitoring and follow up by the Dutch government on its funding was limited, also because of BuZa's limited technical and human resource capacity, and to significant degree based on 'trust'.

The Dutch government expects that its contribution of core funding to WFP Head Office improves WFP's coordinated funding policy. Coordinated funding policy, as a Good Humanitarian Donorship principle, risks however to be undermined by WFP-Ethiopia's increased focus on in-country resource mobilization.

Dutch multilateral contributions did increase WFP Head Office's flexibility to decide aid priorities across and within countries to address critical humanitarian needs. Dutch government contributions, being in cash, also provided WFP-Ethiopia (through the WFP Head Office) with much needed flexibility to allow for non-food response options and regional and in-country food purchases.

Provision of non-earmarked core funding to WFP resulted in increasing the 'distance' between the Dutch government as a donor and WFP's country programme. Monitoring by the Dutch government was minimal other than existing, and rather limited, instruments like MOPAN. An important consequence of Dutch government non-earmarked core funding is that the participation of The Netherlands' government in dialogue at WFP headquarters runs the risk of being insufficiently nourished by knowledge on what happens on the ground. This undermines the Dutch government's constructive engagement with WFP.

In line with Dutch government expectations core funding to OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund resulted into more rational, flexible and predictable funding in address of non-food humanitarian emergency needs in Ethiopia. Faced with a recent decline in donor funding OCHA-Ethiopia is increasing its efforts to source its HRF funding through in-country donors. From a Good Humanitarian Donorship perspective and international donor policies and practice this undermines the principle of the HRF as a country based pooled funding mechanism.

The HRF has been a very attractive fund to The Netherlands: the HRF is an independent and decentralised emergency response fund without the need for donor governments to have their own technical and administrative capacity. Downside of this is that The Netherlands is not actively monitoring the HRF, has little critical awareness of the local context and the nature of HRF's emergency aid priorities. Even more important is that the Dutch government lacks institutional memory about the performance and HRF's strategic role in Ethiopia.

UN agencies have consumed roughly two-fifths of the available annual HRF budgets over the 2009-13 period. This raises important questions about the alignment and utility of CERF and HRF pooled funding mechanisms as CERF was conceived to fund UN agencies and HRF INGOs and in special circumstances only UN agencies. WFP has been the single largest receiver of HRF fund over the 2009-2013 period. From a value for money perspective HRF funding to WFP Ethiopia is a complicated way of funding WFP but it has not unnecessarily increased the administrative costs of humanitarian assistance financing.

The Netherlands HRF funding came out of The Hague's Acute Crisis Budget Line and therefore was a temporary contribution to HRF Ethiopia. Senior OCHA officials have not been aware of this and expressed to be very disappointed about the discontinuation of Dutch financial support to the HRF and the Dutch disengagement with Ethiopia's HRF.

The lack of strategic co-ordination and alignment between The Hague's central allocation of direct humanitarian assistance funding and the Dutch Embassy's in-direct more developmental funding minimises Dutch contributions to disaster risk reduction in Ethiopia's food insecure areas. With the exception of contributions to the Productive Safety Net Programme, the Community Based Nutrition programme and the thematic multi-year support to INGOs, Dutch government capacity to address underlying vulnerability to Ethiopia's recurrent food crises and to increase resilience is fragmented institutionally between relief and development programming.

7.3 Effectiveness of WFP's Humanitarian Crisis Programming

WFP-Ethiopia's Humanitarian Crises Programming, the Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations, responds to humanitarian crises and chronic food insecurity through 3 different pathways: the National Relief Programme, Targeted Supplementary Feeding and the Productive Safety Net Programme.

WFP's primary response to the 2009-2012 crisis has been, as per design, the scaling up of its existing PRRO in those areas most affected by the drought. The most important internal factors affecting WFP's PRRO performance were low levels of WFP staffing in relation to resources managed and the

low resource levels. The main external factors were the low capacity and high government staff turnover and lack of policy development.

WFP interventions were relevant to the needs of emergency-affected households and chronically food insecure households in target areas. Donor resources met most critical humanitarian needs of WFP's target groups. WFP's relief operations were appropriate to emergency food needs and addressed life-saving objectives. Emergency TSF met all outcome indicators in line with SPHERE standards. PSNP food transfers in Somali and Afar Regions were highly relevant given the context and difficult operating environment.

The timeliness of resource transfer delivery was an issue for both relief, TSF and PSNP. In Somali Region food delivery has been improved through the Hubs and Spokes system, timely assistance delivery remained however an issue. Relief and PSNP resources do not address identified needs in line with technical targeting criteria and resource allocation standards; WFP's relief and PSNP interventions are under-funded resulting in resource dilution on the ground.

An important factor affecting WFP's poor PSNP performance has been the lack of a lowland pastoral PSNP strategy informed by a resilience lens and lack of inclusion of WFP's experience with MERET. WFP's PRRO evaluation reports recommend WFP to link its food security initiatives to other poverty reduction efforts as well as to DRM and disaster response (Frankenberger et.al, 2014). By strengthening programmatic linkages WFP's PSNP can contribute better to resilience in the lowland pastoralist areas.

Central to the success of the PSNP, in combination with the Household Asset Building Programme and Complementary Community Investment programme in Ethiopia's chronically food insecure highland areas, is graduation out of the safety net programme. Graduation at-scale has however not yet taken place. This highlights the fact that graduation is more complex and requires a longer time frame as originally anticipated by the Government and its international partners. Major stakeholders relate disappointing graduation figures to implementation challenges of the programme rather than to the design of the programme itself.

PSNP IV (2015-2018) will strengthen the conceptual framework and definition of target groups for relief and PSNP beneficiaries. PSNP IV will see a strong increase in the number of PSNP beneficiaries to around 10 million and a significant reduction in the number of Ethiopians who require relief assistance.

7.4 Effectiveness of UN-OCHA's Humanitarian Response Fund

In Ethiopia CERF and HRF complementarity is enhanced with the HRF Review Board collectively deciding CERF allocations to UN agencies and HRF allocations to INGOs and UN agencies. The HRF addresses acute non-food humanitarian needs, covers shortcomings and inefficiencies in the humanitarian system ('making things work in the aid architecture'), and promotes strategic engagement and coordination between humanitarian assistance agencies.

The HRF has delivered life-saving critical needs in Ethiopia's drought affected pastoralist areas, in particular in emergency nutrition and WASH interventions during 2011-12. The HRF has also played a crucially important role to address humanitarian needs amongst severely weakened and malnourished Somali refugees during the first critical months of the 2011-12 refugee influx in Dollo Ado, Somali Region.

The HRF has contributed to the timely provision of emergency relief interventions. HRF projects have filled gaps in emergency response and improved co-ordination by promoting multi-partner strategies. The HRF has also enhanced the effectiveness of sector wide interventions by contributing to the development of sectoral guidelines such as for water tankering in the WASH sector.

The HRF's focus has been on life-saving needs and livelihoods provisioning and has made modest contributions to resilience programming and DRR (in particular disaster preparedness). In practice HRF project timeframes (a maximum of 6 months) have been too short for meaningful resilience and DRR programming. HRF available budgets have been prioritised for addressing life-saving needs and critical livelihoods provisioning.

7.5 Humanitarian Reform: Humanitarian Assistance Coordination & Delivery

Of the four main components of humanitarian reform (leadership, cluster approach, flexible and effective humanitarian financing, and effective partnerships) humanitarian financing has, with the creation of the CERF and HRF, seen the greatest progress in Ethiopia.

Under and late reporting of humanitarian needs by the Government has negatively affected humanitarian assistance coordination and timeliness of response.

The food security cluster approach is regularly hindered and slowed down because of WFP's dependence on poor government food management systems and delayed communication of crucial needs and humanitarian requirements.

Ethiopia is not one of the global Food Security Cluster 'hot spot' countries. This is because the nature of food insecurity in the country is primarily chronic, and therefore predictable and not acute.

In Ethiopia's chronically food insecure highland areas donor and stakeholder co-ordination is crucial to trigger and phase the different response options (PSNP, Risk Financing Utility, and the National Relief Programme) in dealing with acute food insecurity. In pastoralist areas humanitarian and development assistance coordination is poor but essential for local and regional pastoralist initiatives to strengthen resilience.

To increase the Government's ownership over the National Relief Programme, the TSF and the PSNP, requires WFP to develop and implement an adequate capacity building strategy to assist the Government in establishing a sustainable food management system. WFP is currently addressing this issue through the Food Management Improvement Programme which started in 2014.

The UN clusters play an active role in reviewing cluster specific elements of the HRF proposals. Through government, UN and INGO partnerships the HRF has increased the accountability and transparency of Ethiopia's humanitarian system and has contributed to delivery of timely and effective response. Coordination between the three decentralised humanitarian funding streams in Ethiopia is good. OFDA and ECHO are represented at the HRF review board to ensure synergy and co-ordination of emergency response.

The HRF fulfils a need for the international community to maintain a disaster response fund within which the government is represented but does not have the ultimate power to decide funding, or not funding, particular humanitarian response interventions.

UNHCR's coordination mechanism was inadequate for an effective response to the 2011 Somali refugee influx. A main point of critique on UNHCR has been poor strategic leadership, particular in the first half year of the Somali refugee crisis with grossly sub-standard services. UNHCR's response to the 2013-14 South Sudanese refugee influx has been much better. The response has been helped by the pre-existence of refugee management infrastructure in western Ethiopia, functional co-ordination and working relations between UNHCR and ARRA, and ARRA's less reluctant acceptance to invite INGOs to assist in identified gaps in refugee service delivery.

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Annexes

- Annex 1. Terms of Reference.**
- Annex 2. Itinerary.**
- Annex 3. List of BuZa Staff Interviewed.**
- Annex 4. Dutch Direct HA Financing to Ethiopia, 2004-2013.**
- Annex 5.1 Characteristics and Evaluation Findings WFP PRRO & School Feeding Programme.**
- Annex 5.2 WFP Outcome Indicators PRROs.**
- Annex 6.1 HRF Achievements, 2009-13.**
- Annex 6.2a HRF Partner Performance 2011-14: Quantitative Review.**
- Annex 6.2b HRF Partner Performance 2011-14: Qualitative Review.**
- Annex 6.3 Effectiveness of Selected HRF Projects, 2011-12.**
- Annex 7. Ethiopia's Humanitarian Coordination Architecture**