Humanitarian Assistance

to earthquake victims in Haiti

Report of a desk study

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Abbreviations

ACT Alliance	Action by Churches Together for Development
ARK	Algemene Rekenkamer (Dutch for National Court of Audit)
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CCO	NGO Coordination Committee
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
ECD	Early Childhood Development
ERF	Emergency Response Fund
ERRF	Emergency relief and Response Fund (Haiti)
GoH	Government of Haiti
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCO	Interkerkelijke Coördinatie Commissie Ontwikkelingssamenwerking (Inter-Church Coordination Commission for Development Cooperation)
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IHRC	Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
KiA	Church in Action
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission In Haiti
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NLRC	Netherlands Red Cross Society
RCRC	International Red Cross and Red Crescent Organisation
RTE	Real Time Evaluation
SHO	Stichting Samenwerkende Hulporganisaties (Cooperating Aid Agencies)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
(UN-)OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
VNG	Netherlands Association of Municipalities
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WHO	World Health Organisation

1. Introduction

This study of the Dutch humanitarian assistance for the Haiti earthquake victims is part of the overall policy review of the Netherlands' humanitarian assistance.

The earthquake that hit the metropolitan area of Port-au-Prince on 12 January 2010 initiated a massive response from the Dutch public through the SHO Foundation. Altogether € 111.4 million was raised, including a contribution of more than €41 million from the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation. 15 Dutch NGOs were funded through SHO. In 2011 the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (IOB) initiated an evaluation of the SHO funded humanitarian assistance delivered during the year 2010. This desk study presents an update of this evaluation.

1.1   Research questions

The main research questions for the present desk study are:

1. ***What are the current insights into the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the UN response?***
    1.1. What assessment can be made of the UN management of the HA and more specifically of the coordination and cluster approach? The 2010 evaluation concluded that the cluster system did not operate adequately in the period immediately after the earthquake. In particular, it proved to be insufficiently inclusive (lacking appropriate Haitian representation). To what extent was the UN able to deal with the specific urban characteristics of the disaster area. What assessment can be made of the current coordination and cluster approach?
    1.2. What assessment can be made of the role and contributions by OCHA and CERF in particular?
    1.3. What can be concluded from available monitoring and evaluation reporting on the effectiveness of the response?
2. ***What are the current insights into the management and effectiveness of the SHO activities?***
    2.1. What assessment can be made of the effectiveness of the HA by IFRC and supported NGO's?
    2.2. To what extent have the longer term objectives relating to sustainability and the transition strategy to recovery and development, been achieved?
3. ***What are the main lessons from the Netherlands involvement in the Haiti response for future HA policy?***
    3.1. What can be learnt from the Haiti response for Dutch policy to concentrate most of its funding through UN organizations and to what extent were the underlying expectations as regards to coordination and less fragmentation met?
    3.2. To what extent was the expected added value of the IFRC and NGO's (reaching vulnerable groups, local networks etc.) realized? The 2011 evaluation concludes that in general, the organisations involved in the SHO Haiti campaign have been sufficiently able to provide the required support. What assessment can now be made on the basis of recent monitoring and evaluation reporting?

1.2   Methods

To address the evaluation questions, a review has been made of recent literature on the humanitarian assistance in Haiti with an emphasis on evaluations and monitoring reports. The list of evaluation studies included is presented in appendix A. Also several web resources were found with first hand experiences. Where these are used the website is mentioned as source. In addition,

interviews were held with Haiti desk officers at HQ (and if relevant at field level) of a selection of the main SHO-organizations involved in Haiti: Coraid, ICCO, Oxfam/Novib, as well as the SHO back-office (see appendix B).

The numbers in square brackets in the text refer to the documents in appendix A.

Limitations of the desk study

This study is mainly based on monitoring reports and evaluations conducted by organisations providing humanitarian assistance in Haiti. Overall it is observed that there is little information available about the performance of NGOs after the earthquake, and what is available is often unstructured and difficult to find. [20, p.20]. The same applies to many UN organisations that are operating in Haiti. Most of the evaluations that are available focus on the process of aid delivery, rather than on effectiveness of the aid. In February 2011 an analysis of gaps and duplications of evaluations was published [5]. It was observed that evaluations are fragmented, often focused on individual projects and usually without much inclusion of Haitian perspectives. It was concluded that lesson learning had to be strengthened.

SHO organisations are committed to an evaluation coverage of 50% of their disbursements. Most of the evaluations that are or will be done are not yet available. These evaluations will constitute the basis for the final evaluation to be conducted under the responsibility of SHO during the year 2015.

1.3   Overview of Dutch support to the emergency

Haiti is not a Development Cooperation partner country of the Netherlands. Support from the Netherlands is therefore exclusively in the field of humanitarian assistance. The contribution of the Dutch Government for humanitarian assistance to earthquake affected people in Haiti amounts to EUR 1 million through IFRC, and EUR 1 million through the UN appeal, to be used by the WFP for the logistics cluster. The Netherlands also contributed US$ 1.85 million to the "Debt Relief Trust Fund", used to cancel Haitian debt to the World Bank[1].

The contribution to the SHO appeal amounted to EUR 41.7 million[2]. This amount included EUR 12 million for emergency relief and EUR 29.7 million from the development budget. Part of the arrangement was that SHO would elaborate an improved method for accountability with the Dutch Court of Audit. The letter states that SHO organisations have specific expertise and a network of contacts and partner organisation in Haiti that will be used for relief en rehabilitation.

In addition to these financial contributions a Dutch Urban Search and Rescue Team and a support vessel of the Dutch navy have participated in relief operations. The Netherlands has not pledged any support at the donor conference in New York for reconstruction and development.

The Netherlands is a major contributor to the Central Emergency Response Fund of the UN. This fund has made substantial contributions to the relief operation in Haiti. The Netherland does not contribute directly to the Haiti Emergence Relief and Rehabilitation Fund.

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[1] Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Brief van de Staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken, 32 293, dd 22 November 2010.
[2] Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal, Brief van de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking, 32 293, dd 3 February 2010.

2. Current insights in the efficiency and effectiveness of the UN response

The evaluation of the UN response for the Dutch contribution to humanitarian assistance after the Haiti earthquake centres on two issues:

1. The efficiency of key UN organisations, specifically their role in coordination of the interventions of humanitarian actors and in guiding them to undertake relevant action.
2. The effectiveness of the humanitarian effort of UN organisations supported by Dutch funding.

2.1 The emergency

The epicentre of the 12 January 2010 earthquake was near the town of Léogane. That town was almost completely wiped out, but most damage was done in the metropolitan area of the capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince. An estimated 230,000 people died and more than one million were made homeless. The earthquake occurred at the end of the afternoon, when many workers had left, but many management and professional workers were still at the office and suffered heavy casualties. This affected the already weak capacity of the institutions of the Government of Haiti (GoH), and also of international organisations. The local UNDP office lost a considerable number of its senior staff, as was the case for MINUSTAH that also lost its head of mission. Survivors were either wounded or severely traumatised by the loss of family members.

The disaster triggered a massive relief and recovery effort from national organisations and from the international community. UN organisations were quick to respond, as was a whole array of international NGOs. The US military played a crucial role in the early phases of the relief effort by organising logistics.

2.2 Role of the UN after the earthquake

The UN organisations involved in humanitarian assistance after the Haiti earthquake included mainly UNDP, UNOCHA, UNICEF, WHO, UN-Habitat and MINUSTAH. Emergency financing mechanisms used to channel the funds were CERF and ERRF.

UN-OCHA is the UN organisation that bears prime responsibility for the coordination of the relief and rehabilitation effort in emergencies. For this purpose an internationally agreed system of clusters is elaborated. The cluster approach was introduced in 2005 by IASC with the aim to strengthen the coordination of the humanitarian response to emergencies across the globe. The cluster approach is a system of coordination in which a lead organization, designated for priority areas of response, is responsible for (the organisation of) coordination at global and country level, strengthening global preparedness, to develop global guidance and act as provider of last resort.

In Haiti the cluster system was put in place after tropical storms and hurricanes hit the country in August/September 2008. UN-OCHA is the UN agency responsible for the management of the cluster system. After the earthquake the clusters were activated on 15 January 2010, but it took about 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become functional. There are 12 clusters [3, p.23] Cluster leads are indicated in the following table.

Table 1: Haiti clusters and cluster leads

Cluster	Cluster lead
Camp Coordination and Camp Management	IOM
Education	UNICEF
Emergency Shelter and Non-Food Items	IOM/IFRC
Food,	WFP
Logistics	WFP
Nutrition	UNICEF
Protection	OHCHR/UNICEF/UNFPA
Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)	UNICEF
Agriculture	FAO
Early Recovery	UNDP
Emergency Telecommunications	WFP
Health	WHO/PAHO
Disaster management	

The **United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)**[3] was set up by Security Council resolution of 30 April 2004 to support the Transitional Government in ensuring a secure and stable environment, to assist in reforming and capacity strengthening of the Haitian National Police, to assist with the restoration and maintenance of the rule of law, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment and civilians. It also intended to support the constitutional and political processes by assisting in organizing, monitoring, and carrying out free and fair municipal, parliamentary and presidential elections and support the Transitional Government as well as Haitian human rights institutions and groups in their efforts to promote and protect human rights.

Following the devastating earthquake which hit Haiti on 12 January 2010, the Council, increased the overall force levels of MINUSTAH to support the immediate recovery, reconstruction and stability efforts. It requested MINUSTAH to continue, within its mandate, its collaboration with OCHA and the United Nations Country Team in supporting the humanitarian and recovery efforts. The Council encouraged MINUSTAH to provide logistical support and technical expertise to assist the Government of Haiti to continue operations to build the capacity of its rule of law institutions at the national and local level, and to speed up the implementation of the government's resettlement strategy for displaced persons. It requested the Mission to continue its support to the Haitian Government and to the Provisional Electoral Council in the preparation and conduct of Haiti's elections, and to coordinate international electoral assistance to Haiti in cooperation with other international stakeholders including the OAS. As the security situation in Haiti improved, the overall force levels of MINUSTAH were reduced.

The **Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)**[4] is a humanitarian fund established by the United Nations General Assembly in 2006 to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. Its objectives are to:

- Promote early action and response to reduce loss of life;
- Enhance response to time-critical requirements;
- Strengthen core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises.

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[3] Source: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/
[4] Source: http://www.unocha.org/

The CERF has a grant facility of US$450 million and a loan facility of $30 million. The CERF grant component has two windows; one for rapid response and one for underfunded emergencies. The fund is replenished annually by donors. CERF assures that the funds will go where they are most needed in the network of (UN) aid organizations and IOM.

Emergency Response Funds (ERF) have been established in 20 countries since 1997 to provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid and flexible funding to address critical gaps in humanitarian emergencies. ERFs are usually established to meet unforeseen needs not included in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) or a similar concerted humanitarian action plan.

ERFs predominantly fund NGOs and actively support local NGO capacity-building. They are relatively small compared with the CERF and Common Humanitarian Funds (less than US$10 million per year) and provide small- to medium-size grants. The Humanitarian Coordinators oversee the ERFs, while OCHA provides the day-to-day management and financial administration of the Funds.

The Haiti ERRF (Emergency Relief and Response Fund) was established in 2008 at the initiative of Sweden, after two hurricanes hit the country.

2.3   Findings

Evaluations are found for the following UN entities:

- Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation 3 months after, 2010. The focus of this evaluation was to find out what has worked, what has not worked and why, and how difficulties encountered could be best addressed. Because the RTE was done in the very initial phases of the humanitarian assistance, there is no information on the effectiveness of the assistance
- OCHA, January 2011. Key questions of the evaluation are process oriented (adequacy of planning, management processes and internal/external relationships). The evaluation did not focus on the results of the overall coordination effort on the affected population.
- ERRF, 2011. The aim of the evaluation is to highlight ERRF operational strength and areas for improvement. It covers the period 2008 – February 2011. It is not always possible to determine what findings and conclusions pertain to the period after the earthquake. Effectiveness of ERRF is defined as the relevance (to address suffering) of the project it funds. In this evaluation it was not possible to assess whether ERRF funded projects produce expected results, due to lack of information.
- UNICEF, Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti, 2011. This is a review with a focus on internal systemic issues, not on results or impact of UNICEF's activities. Data on activities and results are reported to be scarce.
- Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation (RTE) 20 months after, 2012[5]. The main focus of an RTE is on process with the aim of immediate lesson learning. It is stated that an in-depth assessment of the activities undertaken could not be done due to the weakness of monitoring and evaluation systems in place. Availability of information on overall needs and the response is reported to be limited.

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[5] The date mentioned on the title page of this evaluation is January 2011, but this is only 12 months after the earthquake, probably a typing error

- MINUSTAH, 2012. This evaluation focuses on the performance of MINUSTAH between January 2010 and December 2011. It does not cover the coordination or the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance nor does it provide a thorough analysis of MINUSTAH's response to the crisis.
- UNDP, 2013 (one programme only)

All these evaluations report serious constraints for the assessment of effectiveness of humanitarian assistance, primarily due to lack of information on activities and results.

2.3.1   Coordination

On the cluster system the 2011 IOB evaluation concludes:

"The cluster system did not operate adequately in the period immediately after the earthquake. In particular, it proved to be insufficiently inclusive (lacking appropriate Haitian representation). Furthermore, the effectiveness of coordination varied per cluster. Finally, coordination proved very time consuming."

All evaluations of UN organisations present observations on the issue of coordination of the overall aid effort. A summary of these observations is presented in table 2. The essence of the observations on the performance of the cluster system centres around the following issues:

- Lack of overall leadership, resulting in problematic relationships with the military and the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission as well as limited inter-cluster coordination.
- Limited participation of Haitian organisations, both governmental and non-governmental stakeholders.
- Lack of information to feed effective coordination of interventions, including information obtained from the multitude of organisations involved, as well as information from beneficiaries about their needs and perspectives.

Other sources are also critical of the coordination of the relief effort in the initial period:

The job of coordinating the response in Haiti fell to two major groups: the United Nations, which created the humanitarian 'Cluster System' for this purpose, and the U.S. military, which became a de facto coordinator through its control of the airport. The two failed to work together. One month after the quake, a leaked email from the head of the UN agency that oversees the cluster system revealed frustration at the top: "Very little progress has been made [in the area of coordination]. This lack of capacity . . . is beginning to show and is leading others to doubt our ability to deliver."[6]

The independent evaluation of the ACT alliance considers that the cluster system in Haiti was "*particularly problematic*", and in many cases could be considered a failure. Similar to other sources it notes the considerable time involved to participate in coordination meetings and the lack of participation of Haitian stakeholders [16, p.56].

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[6] http://insidedisaster.com/haiti/response/relief-challenges, observation dated April 2010.

Table 2: Summary of observations on coordination in evaluations of UN organisations

Evaluation	Observations on coordination
IASC RTE 3 months after, 2011	• The weakness of the humanitarian leadership; • The limited collaboration between international actors and national institutions at both national and decentralized levels; • The difficulties encountered in establishing an appropriate system for collecting and analyzing data in order to provide decision-makers with information in a timely manner;
OCHA, January 2011	• Clusters quickly established, but it took 2-3 weeks for all clusters to become operational. • Interface between clusters and GoH-led coordination mechanisms remained weak. • OCHA coordinated well at the operational level, not at the strategic level. • OCHA had no clear guidelines for coordination with the military (MINUSTAH) • OCHA's leadership on appeal and financing was crucial • OCHA's ability to coordinate and relate to local NGOs and humanitarian players remains a challenge • Inter-cluster coordination remained weak throughout the period. • ERRF is a useful tool to ensure participation of small/medium size NGOs, including national ones.
ERRF, 2011	• The cluster coordination mechanism was successful in bringing to the surface appropriate proposals that meet identified needs. The ERRF management team took seriously their role of identifying needs and soliciting the right match of geographical and technical focus with partners that were able to produce positive results. • The evaluation is also positive about the contribution of ERRF to the coordination of humanitarian assistance: *"it forced the clusters to take official position on the appropriateness of a proposal and its fit inside the larger strategy of each sector".[8, p.44]*
UNICEF, 2011	• *UNICEF made efforts to ensure that clusters they led had GoH leadership. This worked w*ell in the WASH cluster, less in the Education and Child protection clusters. • UNICEF-led clusters suffered from high turnover of staff • Planning in almost all clusters suffered from absence of a systematic needs assessment in the 3 months after the earthquake.
IASC RTE 20 months after, 2012	• The problem with focusing coordination on sectors is that both inter-ministerial and inter-cluster coordination are regarded as weak. • The cluster system and the IHRC both suffer from the difficult to rectify initial lack of inclusiveness of Haitian actors • An overall aid coordination framework has been lacking. There are limited connections between different coordination mechanisms. • Clusters are mainly perceived as platforms for expatriates, not inclusive. Communication in English and later French not enough to ensure Haitian participation.
MINUSTAH, 2012	• MINUSTAH can facilitate more coordinated efforts by the international community based on a mutually agreed set of benchmarks. At the same time, Haiti also needs faster flowing and better coordinated development assistance in order to be able to take advantage of the current stability to lay a solid foundation for its socio-economic development and break the recurring cycles of violence and instability. • The work of MINUSTAH *"has been hampered by the lack of a common United Nations approach to support rule-of-law institutions."*
UNDP, 2013	• Coordination between UNDP and MINUSTAH has not really taken place

Other sources also comment on the problematic relationship between the UN humanitarian system and the military:

"*The quality of the initial response was hindered by weak humanitarian leadership structures including a weak relationship with military leadership*" [5, p.10]*.*

In June 2011 lessons from evaluations are documented. Concerning coordination the following are "emerging lessons" [10]:

- *Empower cluster leads and ensure that they are fully aware of a able to meet their responsibilities. ... Strengthen capacities and mechanisms for dealing with large numbers of often inexperienced humanitarian NGOs.*
- *Embed clusters with relevant line ministries whenever possible and draw heavily upon existing Haitian capacity.*
- *Strengthen coordination and engagement with Haitian civil society*
- *Humanitarian coordination should accommodate non-humanitarian actors (military, private sector, host government, local community and civil society.*
- *Emergency preparation should be undertaken jointly with all relevant stakeholders.*

Effectiveness of coordination varied per cluster. Several sources indicate that the WASH cluster was generally effective, what is attributed to the active and effective role of the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement (DINEPA) to lead the cluster.[7]

The UNICEF-led clusters suffered from high turnover of staff, especially in the early days. The position and role of the clusters vis-à-vis the UNICEF Country Office was not clear. Experiences with the UNICEF-led Nutrition cluster are described in the following box.

Box 1: Experiences of field staff

For the year preceding the Haiti emergency, the Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC) did not have a dedicated full time GNC Coordinator but had relied on temporary coordinators to fill the gap. When the earthquake struck, the GNC had one half-time Cluster Officer (shared with another section in UNICEF but largely working full time for the GNC) and one part-time GNC Coordinator based in the UK. The GNC Team was, therefore, running at about one third of its required capacity. The GNC Coordinator quickly re-located to UNICEF HQ to work full time on the earthquake response but the team remained without the one full time Cluster Advisor position. UNICEF's HQ Nutrition Section was also without key people having one Senior Advisor covering Nutrition in Emergencies (NIE) but one unfilled NIE post.

At the regional level, UNICEF's NIE capacity and understanding of the Nutrition Cluster was low. This added to the demands on HQ for technical support and for staff deployment to the Dominican Republic - all at a time when demands in Haiti were already stretching UNICEF's capacity.

Three weeks after the earthquake struck, the CNC Team was fully functional with one CNC Coordinator, one deputy CNC Coordinator, one IFE/CMAM/Assessment-Monitoring[14] specialist and Information Management (IM) specialist. Later, additional CNC staff were appointed including an IM assistant (local) and a Nutrition Cluster Coordinator for areas affected outside Port au Prince (sub-clusters).

Source: http://www.ennonline.net/fex/39/haiti

Frequent turnover of cluster lead staff was also mentioned as a cause for *"fractured coordination"* of the protection cluster [26, p.12/13].

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[7] For example: The Humanitarian Coalition, Haiti 2010 Earthquake Response, Final Evaluation Report, January 2012.

With the exception of the WASH cluster there was little GoH leadership/representation of the clusters. In the UNICEF clusters information management remained under-resourced. Overall however, the UNICEF-led clusters compared generally favourably compared to other clusters, especially with regard to timeliness [11].

The multitude of organisations was difficult to deal with, both for UN-OCHA, as well as for the Haitian stakeholders. In some clusters more than 50 organisations participated, and in some meetings more than 100 people participated (the maximum being 212 in a meeting of the shelter cluster)[8].

Local level clusters

In several localities local level clusters were established, for example in Leogane and in some urban districts. In these so-called "baby-clusters" a limited number of organisations took part, with the main aim to effectively coordinate their activities with other organisations that operated in those towns or districts. Respondents indicated that these local level geographical clusters were often more operationally effective for the purpose of coordination than the national sector clusters [also 7, p.24]. Local administration often played a considerable role in these local level clusters.

Box 2: Experiences with baby clusters

OCHA opened three sub-offices, including one in Leogane on 24 January, 12 days after the earthquake. By the time the Leogane office was established, a rapidly growing number of NGOs were distributing relief supplies... there were countless requests from aid organisations for guidance on where to distribute relief and on sectoral priorities, and for information on the overall situation. Local authorities also wanted help coordinating their response.

From the outset, the cluster approach in Leogane proved critical in ensuring improved partnerships among international humanitarian actors as well as with national authorities, facilitating information sharing, enhancing coherence and limiting duplication. Health was a case in point. With limited access to resources, and limited specialised staff, health providers and field hospitals were overwhelmed with patients and desperately in need of a functioning referral mechanism with other field hospitals. Coordination meetings at the sub-national level facilitated this process and allowed for a market-style exchange of equipment and health specialists. The cluster approach also ensured the application of standards and guidance agreed at the national level, supported equitable response and encouraged joint activities, for instance joint needs assessments. The inter-cluster coordination group in turn facilitated coordination between clusters on cross-cutting issues, and ensured agreement on the priorities and strategies for response.

Source: http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-49/coordinating-the-earthquake-response-lessons-from-leogane-western-haiti

Needs assessment

In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team's rapid assessment provided preliminary information regarding needs. In areas affected by the earthquake it was assumed that everyone was in need of life-saving relief, including food, water and shelter. Time pressure in the initial phase was immense. As a result, few organisations carried out their own assessments in this first phase, instead focusing all their resources on responding to immediate survival imperatives.

Execution of a coordinated needs assessment took a long time. The Rapid Interagency Needs Assessment in Haiti was ready six weeks after the earthquake. Unfortunately by this time the information was no longer timely. Moreover, it had not been consolidated or presented in a way that

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[8] Reported by one of the Cordaid respondents

could support decision-making at the sub-national level, which was what aid agencies and organisations in the field needed. The assessment report did not provide data disaggregated by communal section, but only compared the larger Port-au-Prince area with the rest of the country. This was interesting from a global perspective, but was unusable by people in the field, who had to make operational decisions based on needs on the ground. The information provided was considered to be of limited operational value.[9]

Most organisations eventually conducted their own needs assessment [26, p.12]. A result of the many individual needs assessment was a "*set-in of fatigue among communities that may have experienced several visits by sometimes the same agency focusing on different sectoral interests*" [7, p.19].

Funding mechanisms

A flash appeal was issued (US$ 562M) within three days after the earthquake. The revised appeal (US$ 1.4Bn) was issued on February 18. In May cluster-leads and partners reviewed the needs and the appeal was raised to US$ 1.5Bn.

CERF allocated US$ 36.6M, with the first allocation of US$ 10M on the day of the earthquake itself, and US$ 16M made 72 hours after the earthquake. CERF was the single most important source of funding for the first five days. This is in line with the aim of CERF, to provide rapid financing after an emergency has occurred. Significant funding also came through other funding mechanisms such as the ERRF, which helped UN agencies and NGOs to quickly start their operations [17][3]. These funds are part of a total of US$ 2.368 billion pledged for humanitarian relief and US$ 5.373 billion pledged for recovery and development (excluding debt relief pledges of around US$ 1 billion) by public sector donors (excluding private funding such as NGOs). The US was the main donor contributing more than a third of the amount pledged[10]. In this document the total amount pledged by the Netherlands Government is US$ 59.6 million.

The evolution of CERF funding for Haiti is summarised in the following table.

Table 3: CERF funding for Haiti (US$)

Year	Total funding
2010	36,564,849
2011	10,371,212
2012	11,897,489
2013	7,480,100
2014	8,873,437

Source: http://www.unocha.org/cerf

The Netherlands is the second most important donor of CERF The contributions of the Netherlands to CERF are as follows.

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[9] http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-49/coordinating-the-earthquake-response-lessons-from-leogane-western-haiti

[10] http://www.lessonsfromhaiti.org/download/International_Assistance/2-overall-financing-data.pdf

Table 4: Dutch contribution to CERF (US$)

Year	Contribution of the Netherlands
2010	54,984,000
2011	54,460,000
2012	52,484,000
2013	52,124,000
2014	54,956,000

Source: http://www.unocha.org/cerf

*ERRF i*s a pooled fund mechanism managed by the Humanitarian Coordinator with support from OCHA, established since the hurricanes of 2008 at the initiative of Sweden.

Box 3: Description of ERF (general)

Emergency Response Funds (ERFs) have been established in 20 countries since 1997 to provide NGOs and UN agencies with rapid and flexible funding to address critical gaps in humanitarian emergencies. ERFs, also known as Humanitarian Response Funds in some countries, are usually established to meet unforeseen needs not included in the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) or a similar concerted humanitarian action plan.

ERFs predominantly fund NGOs and actively support local NGO capacity-building. They are relatively small compared with the CERF and CHFs (less than US$10 million per year) and provide small- to medium-size grants. Funding decisions are taken by the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and the Humanitarian Country Team, after a thorough consultation and prioritization process. HCs oversee the ERFs, while OCHA provides the day-to-day management and financial administration of the Funds.

Source: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/emergency-response-funds-erf

The Netherlands did not contribute to ERRF. Contributions from the ERRF to implementing organisations from 2010 onwards are as follows:

Table 5: Contributions to Haiti ERRF (US$)

Year	Total amount contributed by donors	Total amount disbursed UN organisations	Total amount disbursed International NGOs	Total amount disbursed National NGOs	Total disbursed
2010	81,615,247	44,043,806	25,121,724	1,299,462	70,464,992
2011	471,647	1,067,738	6,960,523	350,331	8,378,592
2012	406,467	896,656	404,205	138,940	1,439,801
2013	3,073,938	169,199	365,023	411,022	945,244
Tot	85,567,299	46,177,399	32,851,475	2,199,755	81,228,629

Source: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/emergency-response-funds-erf

Table 5 shows that contrary to its mandate, ERRF funding is mainly channelled to UN organisations (including IOM), not to NGOs. Especially national NGOs receive a very small proportion of total ERRF funding.

The 2011 ERRF evaluation report provides data on the funding and disbursements of both CERF and ERRF.

Table 6: ERRF and CERF disbursements (US$)

	Required funds	ERRF disbursements	CERF disbursements
CAP 2011 (mainly cholera 15 Nov. 2010	906,961,206	4,706,227	10,371,212
CAP 2010 revised 14 Jul 2010	946,389,684	67,898,227	36,564,849
Flash Appeal 2010	575,010,654		

Source: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/humanitarian-financing/emergency-response-funds-erf

The 2011 ERRF evaluation report considers that ERRF was effective[11], but it did not function efficiently. Main issues raised are inadequacies at the strategic level (late formulation of a strategy, and limited scope of this strategy once it was formulated) and the human resources allocated to operate ERRF. ERRF is criticised to have no clear strategy, beyond the use of clusters as a mechanism to prioritise projects, but the evaluation concludes that developing a strategy requires knowledge about the availability of funding.

ERRF was ill equipped to handle such a big amount of money. The operation of ERRF depends on the manpower allocated to it by OCHA, and the evaluation reports that this was not adequate. The main issues reported are the quantity and quality of manpower allocated to the operation of ERRF to formulate and process proposals. Also the manpower required to manage and supervise projects that were funded was underestimated [8, p.45] and as a consequence the monitoring of ERRF funded projects has been less systematic. The evaluation observes that one of the largest ever ERFs ever was managed by one of the smallest field teams. ERRF and CERF competed for skills and knowledge.

On timeliness, the evaluation report observes that ERRF funding arrived very quickly after the emergency, before CERF funds became available. The ERRF enabled UNOCHA to play a significant role quickly after the earthquake. On processing the evaluation concludes:

"Despite analysis indicating slower than ideal (and even expected) proposal and grant processing, ERRF/Haiti is still considered a rapid response mechanism and evidence indicates that the mechanism was rapid when speed was most important – at the onset of crises" [8, p.40].

Total funding provided by CERF and ERRF in the period 2010 – 2014 was US$ 156.4 million, about 2% of the approx. US$ 9.28 billion pledged for the Haiti relief and rehabilitation effort [20, p.7]. Of the total amount, approx. US$ 117 million was disbursed in the initial year after the earthquake. This represents 8.5% of the estimated total disbursed amount of US$ 1.38 billion in 2010[12].

2.3.2   Effectiveness and sustainability

An overview of the overall status of recovery and reconstruction is based on documentation of UNDP[13] and the website www.humanitarian response.info. From these sources it appears that in 2014 97% of the rubble was removed from the streets of Port-au-Prince. Of the initial 1.5 million people that were living in camps in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, 145,000 still live in camps in January 2014, decreasing to 85,000 in October 2014. Since 2010 a total of 114,124 T-shelters has been constructed, just over 9,000 houses have been reconstructed and more than 27,000 dwellings repaired. A total of 400,000 (temporary) jobs are created, the employment rate among women is 40%. In addition considerable infrastructures are build to protect against disasters, often gabions against flooding.

These are overall results achieved with the support of the international community. Very little information is available about the results of humanitarian assistance provided in Haiti by individual UN organisations. The focus of the available evaluations of UN organisations is on process issues, rather than on results achieved for the affected people.

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[11] For discussion of ERRF effectiveness see 2.3.2
[12] IOB, Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010, p.18
[13] The document Haiti Rebuilds of 2012 and the website
http://www.ht.undp.org/content/undp/fr/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/projects_initiatives/crisis_in_haiti/

The ERRF evaluation considers the Haiti ERRF to be effective, but this effectiveness is defined in terms of the relevance of the projects that the ERRF has funded (since 2008). The relevance of the projects is assessed on the basis of the project documents: it is stated that 54% of the projects aim to reduce suffering, 19% aim to improve coordination and 11% explicitly aim to support GoH. On this basis the evaluation concludes that the projects are aligned to ERRF goals [8, p.41]. There is no monitoring and evaluation system in place that provides information about the results achieved compared to the objectives of the projects. [8, p.41]. But the evaluation observes:

... six projects[14] were visited during the field work for this evaluation and all were producing expected, and a few additional unanticipated positive, results [8, p.50].

The IASC RTE +20 concludes that sustainability of the response is weak. There is no clear exit strategy and no overall plan for transition. Already before the earthquake the country depended on services from private agencies and it continues to do so.

The evaluation of MINUSTAH presents a mixed assessment of its effectiveness [18, p.21/22]. MINUSTAH was successful in maintaining political stability and facilitated the delivery of humanitarian assistance. The evaluation does not provide information about the effectiveness of the humanitarian assistance for the affected population.

The UNICEF evaluation discusses UNICEF's effectiveness as a coordinating organisation (see 4.1), not the effectiveness in terms of the results of its humanitarian interventions.

Targeting

Of the total funding of US$ 9.28 pledged for relief and rehabilitation, only 1% is disbursed to the Government of Haiti. International NGOs, UN organisations and private contractors account for most of the disbursements made. Reasons to use channels other than the GoH are its perceived lack of capacity, and the entrenched corruption and inefficiency. Systematically avoiding GoH, however, tends to undermine the public sector [20]. Even now, GoH organisations play a limited role in the reconstruction effort, NGOs and private contractors may have created a "parallel state" in Haiti[15]. Most evaluations mention problems with the inclusion of Haitian organisations (both GoH and civil society organisations). The result was that:

"The quality of the initial response was hindered by by-passing of local authorities and civil society groups; insufficient communication with affected populations." [5, p.10].

Respondents observed that NGOs find it often difficult to transfer resources to Governmental organisations. Whatever support was provided to GoH institutions is most likely to be provided by UN organisations or bilateral organisations

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[14] Of a total of 80 projects funded by ERRF
[15] This paper focuses on NGOs and private contractors only, not on UN organisations.

2.4   Analysis

Coordination

Coordination of humanitarian assistance is a prime task of most UN organisations. UN OCHA is responsible for the overall coordination of humanitarian efforts, and for this purpose the cluster system has been established. Other UN organisations are key actors in the coordination of different clusters. As appears from the findings of evaluation reports, coordination of humanitarian activities has been deficient in many respects. Key shortcomings reported are that coordination was slow, it was not sufficiently inclusive and the needs assessment that was done was too general, and did not serve the purpose of many organisations.

For these deficiencies a number of reasons are identified. First, there was a lack of overall leadership. The earthquake disaster that struck Haiti in January 2010 struck the capital of the country and destroyed a large part of its (already weak) governance capacity. MINUSTAH, the UN mission that supported the Government of Haiti lost personnel and part of its leadership. The Port-au-Prince UNDP office was destroyed, and many of its staff died in the earthquake. In this "void" a number of governance structures emerged:

- The Government of Haiti (GoH) remained officially in charge, but its capacity to assume responsibilities was severely hampered and varied per sector. Moreover GoH had a reputation of weakness and corruption, and donors were reluctant to allow it to be fully in charge of the vast amounts that were committed for humanitarian assistance and recovery. The presidential election in 2011 caused political unrest and lack of continuity.
- The US military stepped in to organise the logistics of the aid-flow that was initially mainly channelled through the airport.
- UN-OCHA attempted to coordinate the activities from the overwhelming number of organisations (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) that moved in to provide humanitarian assistance through the cluster system that was already in place since 2008.
- The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was established by the GoH, but with strong influence from the US. It was led by the Prime Minister of Haiti and the UN Special Envoy for Haiti (Bill Clinton) and channelled (mainly US) aid and reconstruction funds. Its mandate ended in October 2011.

All this resulted in a situation of fragmented mandates and capacities and sometimes competing governance structures, without a clear leader emerging. Several sources mention problematic coordination and cooperation between these entities [7, p.12] [5, p.10 and p.17)Even now there is doubt whether GoH has the capacity to assume full responsibility for the reconstruction effort of the country [20, p.12] [18].

After the earthquake a large number of organisations (multilateral, bilateral and NGOs) rushed in to provide assistance. Some of these organisations have well experienced humanitarian assistance units, others have less expertise and experience. Data on the number of organisations that contribute to the humanitarian assistance effort are difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that at least 800 foreign NGOs were at some moment present in Haiti (some estimates run as high as 8000 [3,p.14]) and some dozens of multilateral and bilateral agencies. Coordination of the activities of

such a multitude and diversity of organisations is a gargantuan task, and the cluster system found it difficult to cope with it

An often noted and persistent problem is the lack of inclusiveness of the clusters, with the exception of the WASH cluster, and to a lesser extent and in a later phase the shelter cluster. Meetings and reporting were in English and only later changed into French. Meetings were initially at log base, with difficult, sometimes even no, access for representatives of GoH and national NGOs. But this lack of inclusiveness is not only due to these more or less logistical factors. It is also an expression of a deep distrust of the capacity and transparency of both GoH and national NGOs to effectively and transparently manage the huge influx of resources after the earthquake.

The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission, co-chaired by Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Jean-Max Bellerive was established to provide a platform for collaboration between donors and GoH. However, it had only an 18 months mandate and there is criticism about its effectiveness [20, p10]. A year after its creation it was still not fully operational.

A final cause for the lack of leadership and inadequate coordination was that many UN organisations found it difficult to mobilise sufficient surge capacity in their organisations or networks. One consequence was that many UN organisations relied on short term postings (often 6 weeks to 2 months), resulting in lack of continuity and also in persistent limited inside knowledge of the local situation in Haiti. That was compounded by the fact that the UNDP capacity in Port au Prince was severely affected by the earthquake.

Funding through the CERF and ERRF have represented only a small fraction of the total aid disbursed over the years 2010 – 2014. Disbursements, however, were concentrated in the first year after the earthquake. Despite criticism in evaluations these funding mechanisms seem to have played their assigned role: to provide rapid funding after an emergency, although only a tiny proportion of ERRF funds was channelled to national NGOs.

Effectiveness[16]

Overall, the Haitian economy has been recovering since the earthquake. Growth has been modest, but macroeconomic stability has been maintained and inflation generally controlled, despite the cholera epidemic and repeated hurricanes and tropical storms such as Isaac and Sandy. Economic growth is estimated to have reached 4.3 percent in fiscal year 2013, up from the 2.8 percent in 2012. This has been mainly attributed to a pick-up in agricultural production, as well as the construction and industrial sectors, particularly the textile and garment industries. Most of this momentum is expected to carry over into FY2014.

Haiti remains the poorest country in the Americas and one of the poorest in the world (with a GDP per capita of US$ 820 in 2013) with significant needs in basic services. According to the latest household survey (ECVMAS 2012), 6 million out of 10.4 million (59%) Haitians live under the national poverty line of $ 2 per day and over 2.5 million (24%) live under the national extreme poverty line of 1 dollar per day.

Reconstruction after the earthquake has been an enormous task, but much has been achieved.

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[16] From: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview

- Of the 1.5 million internally displaced people, near 1.4 million have left the camps and have been relocated. Reconstruction programs are repairing and building safe housing and upgrading neighbourhoods.
- Haitians have also benefitted from better access to some services. The biggest success has been in education, where participation rates of school-age children rose from 78 to 90 percent. However, the quality of education remains low. Only one third of all children aged 14 are in the appropriate grade for their age.
- Haiti has made progress in controlling the cholera epidemic since the 2010 outbreak. Still, more than 30 people get infected every day and water borne diseases remain one of the leading causes of infant and child mortality.
- The government has also taken action to combat extreme poverty in Haiti by launching social safety initiatives for the poorest.

Hard facts about the effectiveness of humanitarian assistance by individual organisations are difficult to find. As observed, evaluations tend to focus on the delivery process, rather than accounting for the goods and services that are delivered. Reporting is fragmented, and often inconsistent. At the aggregate level achievements are considerable, but it is not possible to attribute these achievements to individual organisations.

From relief to reconstruction

Soon after the earthquake, it was considered that for Haiti more was needed than short term relief. The enormous amounts that were pledged also presented an opportunity to bring about fundamental change in the country. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (led by former US President Bill Clinton and the Prime Minister of Haiti) was one element of the effort to initiate such a change. As is the case in most emergencies attention was paid to transiting quickly from emergency relief to reconstruction and rehabilitation. The IHRC, however, proved to be ineffective to bring about the desired change. Sources are critical of its performance[17] and it is even considered a failure by some sources[18]. The IHRC mandate was not extended beyond its original deadline of October 2011.

The OCHA evaluation [3] assesses the connectedness of OCHA activities. It concludes that the interface between the cluster system and the Government-led coordination system is "unclear". The guidelines that govern the cluster system do not provide adequate guidance to develop linkages between the OCHA led cluster system and local coordination structures that have a longer term time horizon. It also concludes that the discontinuity of staffing and the fact that a initial relief response requires staff specialised in humanitarian emergency operations make a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation difficult.

Immediately after the earthquake, MINUSTAH focused on facilitating the delivery of relief assistance, providing security and logistical support. From 2011 onwards it focused more on its original structural mandate providing political stability and institutional strengthening of the national Police and the judicial system.

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[17] http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/09/opinion/haitis-slow-recovery.html?_r=0
[18] http://www.ijdh.org/2014/05/topics/economy/bill-hillary-and-the-haiti-debacle/

The paper "Beyond Emergency relief in Haiti" of January 2011 lists a number of factors important for a smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation. These include adaptation to the specific characteristics of an urban context, emphasis on disaster prevention and preparedness, coordination with national institutions, more geographically based coordination instead of sector-based coordination and adequate funding for reconstruction. From available sources it appears that notably coordination with national institutions remains weak and that there is a persistent sector focus of the cluster coordination system. A more geographical focused coordination can be found at the level of the baby-clusters.

3. Current insights in the management and effectiveness of the SHO activities

3.1 Introduction

This section of the report focuses on the SHO supported Dutch NGOs that provided humanitarian assistance to earthquake victims in Haiti. The aim is to update the findings and conclusions of the 2011 IOB evaluation as well as to put these updated findings and conclusions in the context of current perceptions on the modalities of Dutch funding of humanitarian assistance and also on the role and mode of operation of SHO.

3.2 Overview

After the January 2010 earthquake Dutch NGOs cooperating in the SHO decided to launch a national campaign to raise funds for humanitarian assistance to its victims. A national television appeal was organised on 21 January 2010. The Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation decided that he would match the amount collected from the Dutch public at the close of the television appeal. Including the contribution from the Dutch Ministry for Development Cooperation the total amount raised was EUR 111.4 million[19].

SHO Funds are distributed among its members according to agreed ratios, not on the basis of submitted proposals (but disbursements are made based on plans)[20]. As a consequence there is considerable flexibility of funds. Because during emergencies organisations get funding from different sources the "allocation of results" to sources of funding is sometimes done after the execution of the activities. The fungibility of SHO funding is considerable, giving the organisations a considerable degree of flexibility. For many organisations SHO funding is in essence used as "un-earmarked" funding, and this complicates the formal assessment of effectiveness. For guest organisations the procedure is different. These organisations must submit a plan before they can get access to SHO funding.

The distribution of the SHO funds is done on the basis of a fixed allocation model, determined annually, but in that year identical for all emergencies. In the case of the Haiti emergency the SHO member Stchting Vluchteling has decided not to participate in the humanitarian assistance. Oxfam-Novib did not fully claim its share of 14%. Six "guest" organisations joined the permanent members of SHO: Dorcas, Plan Netherlands, Care Netherlands, Habitat for Humanity, the Netherlands Association of Municipalities (VNG) and the Salvation Army Netherlands. The agreed distribution of funds to members and guest organisations is presented in table 7.

Organisations use SHO funding for activities in different clusters. Table 8 presents the distribution of the use of SHO funds for activities per cluster.

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[19] This includes contributions received after the close of the television appeal on 21 January 2010.

[20] A condition for disbursement of Dutch government money was that all SHO members had to submit a response plan which were integrated by SHO back office into one joint SHO plan for 2011 (SHO, Samengevoegd wederopbouwplan haiti SHO deelnemers 2011 – 2014, April 2011). In principle SHO affiliates should have done the same for 2012, but this was later waived by MoFA.

Table 7: Distribution of SHO funds

Organisation	Percentage
Cordaid – Mensen in Nood	26
ICCO – Kerk in Actie	12
Oxfam Novib	14
Red Cross Netherlands	19
Save the Children	3
Tear	2
Terre des Hommes	3
UNICEF Netherlands	13
World Vision	2
Care Netherlands	1
Dorcas	1
Salvation Army	1
Plan Netherlands	1
VNG International	1
Habitat for Humanity	1

From Table 8 the following can be observed:

- There are no SHO funded activities in the clusters Camp Coordination & Management, Logistics, Nutrition, Agriculture, Emergency Telecommunications.
- With the exception of Care Netherlands, VNG International and Habitat for Humanity all SHO organisations execute activities in more than one cluster.
- Seven organisations participate in 5 or more clusters
- In 28 cases the contribution of the SHO funding to a cluster is less than 500,000 euro or less.

During the years 2011, 2012 and 2013 some organisations have terminated their activities, but because reporting is cumulative results are repeated every year. The following figure shows the duration of the activities of the SHO organisations.

Figure 1: Schedule of activities of SHO organisations

Table 8: Disbursements of SHO funds per organisation and per cluster

	Number of clusters where active*	Shelter	WASH	Food security	Livelihoods	Health	Education	Protection	Disaster management	Programme management	Total amount spent
Cordaid	5	20253	120	1709	186	2450	0	0	0	2520	27239
NLRC	4	8059	5689	0	0	1623	0	0	810	1466	17648
Oxfam - Novib	5	724	7782	0	2419	0	0	39	617	2483	14065
UNICEF NL	7	0	1832	1612	279	1699	1014	1537	247	1600	9820
ICCO - KiA	8	5186	663	542	1550	290	890	596	418	920	11054
Save the Children	3	728	0	0	0	0	1474	0	96	467	2766
Tear	6	453	139	94	231	195	37	0	0	422	1571
Terre des Hommes	5	193	617	640	95	0	0	487	0	565	2597
World Vision	2	1162	0	0	0	0	364	0	0	190	1716
CARE NL	1	0	0	0	0	1507	0	0	0	0	1507
Dorcas	4	1092	60	247	0	89	0	0	0	13	1502
Salvation Army	6	144	7	150	0	107	727	0	36	73	1244
Plan NL	3	171	0	0	0	0	546	0	194	88	999
VNG Int'l	1	0	655	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	655
Habitat	1	1478	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1478
Total		39645	17566	4993	4760	7961	5052	2659	2418	10807	95861

*Note: cluster programme management not included in count
Source SHO report 2010 - 31/12/2013

The 2011 IOB study

The conclusions of the 2011 IOB study are summarised as follows:

Effectiveness
The support provided was in accordance with the most pressing needs of the people affected by the earthquake. The activities supported were appropriate for the situation in Haiti. Achievement of planned outputs was difficult to assess, because many proposals submitted for funding by SHO were weak and reporting about achievements often inconsistent with proposals.

Management
All SHO funded organisations had a presence in Haiti prior to the earthquake. Most had experience with providing humanitarian assistance. In the initial phase the (expatriate) staff of all organisations was expanded. Needs were very obvious in the beginning. Needs assessments were done by the organisations themselves, and gradually coordinated by the clusters. The involvement of Haitian actors in needs assessments and the subsequent provision of humanitarian assistance was a persistent problem. Governmental institutions were weak and many partner organisation seriously affected by the earthquake. All SHO organisations were involved in the cluster system at different levels. The cluster system, however, was not sufficiently inclusive, it lacked leadership and participation from Haitian stakeholders.
The chain of organisations providing assistance was considered too long, involving up to 5 organisational levels between SHO and the ultimate beneficiaries. Each organisational level had its own procedures and transaction costs. Reporting on achievements proved to be often inconsistent with plans and defined types of assistance.

Recent Developments

Membership of SHO is based on the admission criteria (track record in humanitarian assistance, ISO certification, CBF certification and others). Funds are distributed among member organisations according to a predetermined formula[21]. In 2014 a commission was established to formulate recommendations on the future of SHO. One of the main conclusions was that the distribution of funds did not take into consideration the capacities and presence of organisations in specific emergencies[22]. This issue was already flagged in the 2011 IOB evaluation that stated: "*This predefined proportional distribution does not take into account the specific strengths or weaknesses of particular SHO members or guest organisations which may influence their capacity to deliver aid in a particular country.*"[23]

Also the fact that proposals are not required to determine the share of each organisation was questioned. The commission proposed a different method to distribute funds, 30% following the same system as is presently used (to allow immediate action) and 70% based on plans submitted by the participating organisations.

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[21] Although in practice SHO members frequently do not claim their (full) share.
[22] Because most organisations work through alliances or umbrella organisations the capacity currently considered is the capacity of the Dutch organisation only.
[23] IOB p. 26

3.3 Findings

3.3.1 Mode of operation

The SHO funding of activities in Haiti followed different modalities and sometimes combinations of modalities [33]:

1. Three of the participating organisations were not themselves active in Haiti prior to the earthquake. These organisations channel their share of the funds to "their" international umbrella organisation. Funds were "administratively earmarked". This was the case for UNICEF, Terre des Hommes, Dorcas and Habitat.
2. Other organisations were not themselves operational in Haiti, but often their umbrella organisation has a network of partner organisations. Funds are earmarked for specific interventions and the Dutch organisation is somehow involved in decision making. This was the case for Oxfam Novib, Care Netherlands, Save the Children, World Vision, Salvation Army Netherlands, Plan Netherlands,
3. Implementation through local networks of partner organisations. Although this implies in principle that these organisations had easy access to considerable local capacity of its networks or affiliate organisations, resource persons indicate that many of these organisations suffered casualties among their staff and loss of office facilities from the earthquake. This mode of operation is for example followed by ICCO and VNG.
4. Direct implementation, Cordaid (which to a lesser extent also operated through modality 2)
5. The NLRC operates through modalities 2 and 4.

SHO organisations already had contacts with national organisations in Haiti. The larger organisations typically had networks of a dozen or more partner organisations. After the earthquake these networks were mobilised and expanded[24].

The 2011 IOB study observes on the long "organisational chains" that exist between the SHO as the funding entity and the ultimate use of the funds at the field level. This persists until this day. Routings of funding may take complicated trajectories, for example:

Box 4: Funding of Habitat for Humanity[25]

The funding of Habitat for Humanity is as follows:
1. Cordaid receives funds from SHO
2. Cordaid transfers funds to Habitat Netherlands. This organisation deduct the AKV from this amount.
3. Habitat Netherlands transfers the remaining funds to Habitat International
4. Habitat International transfers the funds to Habitat Haiti.
5. Habitat Haiti implements the programme by itself.

Source: Habitat for Humanity Progress report March 2011 to May 2013

A clear logic for this routing of funds is not apparent. Cordaid Haiti had direct relations with Habitat Haiti and could have serviced their requested through local bank accounts. Other organisations follow similar trajectories, with additional transfer of funds to implementing NGOs.

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[24] SHO, Samengevoegd wederopbouwplan haiti SHO deelnemers 2011 – 2014, April 2011, p 60-61
[25] Habitat is a "guest" organisation of SHO hosted by Cordaid

All SHO organisations implement their programmes through locally established organisations. These are international NGOs with a national presence from the same alliance (Oxfam, Cordaid, ICCO, Tear, Terre des Hommes, Save the Children), local chapters of the alliance (Plan, Care, Habitat, NLRC), international or local NGOs (all except Oxfam, Terre des Hommes, Save the Children, Plan and Habitat) [33]. In many cases SHO organisations started their activities for the earthquake emergency with existing partners, and they used existing networks of partner organisations to the extent possible. These organisations, however, were also seriously affected by the earthquake, with casualties among their staff, surviving staff that was traumatised and loss or office facilities. Resource persons from Cordaid and ICCO mentioned that in the year 2010 considerable effort had to be devoted to re-establish existing partner organisations.

These partner organisations are mainly focused on development cooperation activities, but in Haiti emergencies are frequent, and therefore most organisations have at least some experience with humanitarian assistance in emergencies. Most existing partner networks, however, operate in rural areas. Preparedness plans and the related capacity strengthening focused on cyclone affected areas, not on an earthquake hazard

3.3.2   Effectiveness

The current insights of the effectiveness of SHO assistance are based on the reports of the individual SHO organisations to SHO, the compilation of these reports by SHO into its Annual Reports and the assessments of the Dutch Court of Audit of the SHO reports. SHO has requested each of the participating organisations to conduct evaluations that should cover at least 50% of the funds they received from SHO. At the time of this desk study the following evaluation reports are available:

- Public Health Consultants, Final evaluation of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Program of Cordaid in Haiti: 2010-2011 ECHO funded project nr 104299 and SHO & TROCAIRE funded project nr 103063, November 2011. This evaluation assesses mainly efficiency (including effectiveness of organisational structure, effectiveness of the strategy) and the results and effectiveness of the programme at the level of beneficiaries and the capacity built.
- E. Baptista, M. Treffers, P. Giesen Cordaid 2012 shelter programme 2010-2012 final evaluation report, July 2012. This report focuses on the appropriateness, effectiveness and efficiency of the programme. It explicitly includes beneficiary perspectives. It is a final evaluation conducted shortly before the termination of the programme. Cordaid shelter activities constitute approx 25% of total SHO disbursements (€ 27M of the total of € 111M).

Some evaluations are available for umbrella organisations where a contribution of the Dutch SHO organisation concerned was or might be included.

- IFRC, Federation---wide Livelihood Program Evaluation. This is a learning evaluation conducted during a very early stage of the activities (*the majority of the activities had not yet been implemented at the time of the evaluation* – p.7). The focus is on relevance and appropriateness. A NLRC livelihood programme is mentioned, but it is not presented in the evaluation.
- S. Davidson, A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Haiti 2010, April 2011. This evaluation focuses on the performance of IFRC as manager of the Shelter Cluster. No information about effectiveness and results of shelter activities.

- UNICEF, Independent Review of UNICEF's Operational Response to the January 2010 Earthquake in Haiti, 2011. This is a review with a focus on internal systemic issues, not on results or impact of UNICEF's activities. Data on activities and results are reported to be scarce.

Table 9: Overview of assessment of effectiveness and efficiency in evaluations of SHO organisations

Evaluation	Effectiveness/impact	Efficiency/management
Cordaid shelter evaluation	• Beneficiaries only eligible if they had access to land. • Shelter programme was effective	• Average costs for 6033 shelter solutions is US$ 4475[26] • Cordaid's programme was well coordinated with cluster and national policies • Adjustment to urban environment only late in programme • Cordaid is one of the most efficient shelter providers in Haiti
Cordaid Mental Health and Psychosocial Program evaluation	• The objective was achieved, but the evaluation concludes that the result cannot be solely attributed to the project • Capacity of community agents strengthened, but they do not fit into and existing (GoH) system.	• Strategy and organisational structure were generally adequate, but some shortcomings are noted, mainly lack of technical support to field workers. • Substantial coverage for a limited amount of money. • Not being linked to the Cordaid shelter programme, may have reduced the efficiency of the programme.
IFRC, Federation wide Livelihood Programme Evaluation	• Because programme is only in its initial phases no assessment of effectiveness and impact	• Programme delayed because of limited capacity of RCRC in livelihood projects, priority given to shelter, slow decision making by RCRC • Coordination within RCR "family" is good in design, in practice integration in other programmes yet to be realised.
IFRC, Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Haiti	• No assessment of results / effectiveness	• The Shelter Cluster did well in very difficult circumstances. IFRC provided adequate leadership. • High staff turnover and slow recruitment in the Delegation hampered performance. • Weaknesses are the existence of multiple coordination bodies, weak inter cluster coordination and absence of a GoH counterpart.
UNICEF, Independent Review UNICEF - Haiti	• No assessment of results / effectiveness	• *UNICEF made efforts to ensure that clusters they led had GoH leadership. This worked well in the WASH cluster, less in the Education and Child protection clusters.* • UNICEF-led clusters suffered from high turnover of staff

Oxfam mid-term partnership evaluation	• No assessment of results / effectiveness	• Oxfam has a common partnership strategy, also for emergency operations.
		• Overall, the partnership strategy has been applied systematically and consistently by the three Oxfam organisations.
		• Problems experienced are:
		  o There was insufficient knowledge among emergency staff of existing partner networks.
		  o Partners were not familiar with the change of the mode of operation during emergencies
		  o GoH capacities were not systematically analysed and used.

ACT alliance final evaluation	• Response was relevant and appropriate. • Coverage was identified as a weakness • Positive impact on capacity of partner organisations, less so in GoH institutions.	• Response had a high degree of connectedness mainly because of long track record of ACT alliance members in Haiti and good partner network. • More could have been done to build capacity of Haiti Forum.

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[26] Against an initial estimate of US$ 1,500 and a revised estimate of US$ 3,500.

- A. Delaitre Caushaj, Evaluation Mi-parcours des Approches de Travail des Oxfam avec les Autorités Nationales (Locales), les Organisations de la Société Covile et les Strectures Communautaires dans le Cadre de la Réponse Humanitaire en Haiti d'Oxfam, August 2011. This evaluation focuses on the modalities of cooperation with national partners of the three Oxfam organisations operating in Haiti, partly funded with the SHO funds channelled through Oxfam-Novib. There is no analysis of the results of the humanitarian assistance.
- Channel research, An Independent Final Evaluation of the Action by Churches Together, January 2012. This study evaluates the work of 7 members of the ACT Alliance. ICCO contributed resources to the work of these organisations. The aim of the evaluation is learning and accountability. It assesses achievement of results and impact, support to local structures and the performance of the ACT alliance members. It is an independent evaluation, but staff of ACT alliance organisations played an important role in data collection and interpretation and their perceptions constitute an important input in the report.

Terre des Hommes has commissioned an external evaluation of their WASH and Health Project, but evaluator has not delivered a report.

The overview of evaluation conclusions on effectiveness (table 9) show that the Cordaid shelter programme (which constitutes approx 25% of total SHO funds) was effective. It also shows that the costs of shelters was substantially higher than originally budgeted, mainly because of evolving designs (because of GoH regulation) and price increases because of scarcity of building material and expensive logistics. On efficiency and management the evaluations show that cluster management of the WASH and the Shelter Clusters was generally efficient. The ACT alliance evaluation explicitly addresses connectedness and concludes that the activities undertaken by ACT alliance members show a considerable degree of connectedness, mainly attributed to the long experience of ACT alliance members in Haiti and (as a result) the networks with local partner organisations that existed and that have been exploited for the relief and rehabilitation interventions.

SHO Annual reports

Annually SHO prepares a consolidated report on the progress of the humanitarian programmes of the organisations it funds. The annual reports present cumulative information starting from January 2010 to the end of the year concerned.

On the basis of these reports the effectiveness of the SHO organisations is summarised in table 10.

On these reports the following observations can be made:

- Despite the recommendation in the ARK assessment of the 2011 report, the proportional attribution of achievements is not systematically done. For example the UNICEF reports to have reached a total of over 700,000 children for vitamin A distribution and diarrhoea treatment, tens of thousands of mothers and pregnant women and over 10,000 vases of malnutrition. Total SHO funding for UNICEF health cluster activities until 2013 is 1.7 million euro. This suggests that the results described are for the entire UNICEF programme, not only for the SHO funding.

- SHO reporting is cumulative[27]. The result is much repetition of the targets formulated and the results achieved. It makes it very difficult to assess the effectiveness of the SHO organisations per year. The transparency of the reporting on achievements and effectiveness per year is limited.

The ARK has consolidated information about planned achievements, adjusted plans and actual results as per December 2013 for the four clusters where measurable targets and results are available. For the achievements for clusters where results cannot be meaningfully consolidated in quantifiable data the ARK provides an assessment. This is summarised in table 11.

To the results achieved as per the end of 2013 the results of organisations still operating in Haiti in 2014 must be added. These are presented in table 11a.

3.3.3   Management

Concerning management of the SHO activities consideration will be given to the adjustment of activities to the specific characteristics of the urban environment, because this was one of the key challenges for the humanitarian assistance in Haiti, to the coordination of activities at different levels and to the transition and exit strategies that were developed.

Adjustment to urban environment

Organisations adjusted gradually to the special characteristics of the urban environment in which the disaster took place. Specific problems were the slow rate of rubble removal, problems with land rights, and the high population density, i.e. the enormous number of people that had become dependent on humanitarian assistance. Adaptations were:

- Increasingly give people grants for rebuilding damaged houses instead of building new houses
- Distribute cash (cash for work programmes, grants, business subsidies) [7].
- In livelihoods activities promoting small scale businesses and rely on available skills and existing demand for services [ICCO, Oxfam].

The Cordaid shelter evaluation concludes that Cordaid started its shelter programme in rural areas in Leogane, and only in a later stage moved to the Port au Prince metropolitan area. It is concluded that Cordaid was not entirely able to adjust its programmes to the urban context [21, p.2], notably lacking integration of WASH and neighbourhood aspects in the initial phases.

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[27] This is reportedly done at the suggestion of the ARK

Table 10: Summary of effectiveness of SHO funded activities per cluster

Year	Cluster	Achievements vs. results
2011	Shelter	Many targets achieved, some only partially (construction of shelters by some organisations delayed due to late availability of material or other reasons), distribution of tools and building materials less than envisaged, less repair vouchers than envisaged.
	Water & sanitation	Infrastructures largely realised, some activities delayed. Training and organisation activities implemented.
	Nutrition	Mainly focused on children, numbers of children reached more or less in accordance to plans.
	Livelihood	Only some targets achieved, achievement of many targets less than 50%. Many activities postponed.
	Health	Most targets achieved, some activities cancelled or postponed.
	Education	Many targets achieved, some activities delayed.
	Protection	Numbers of children reached more or less according to plans, establishment of protection structures delayed.
	Disaster management	Targets on training, awareness raising and contingency plans achieved.
2012	Shelter	Many targets achieved, some only partially. Some targets reduced. Shortfall attributed to cost increases and property rights.
	Water & sanitation	Targets mostly achieved or exceeded, impressive achievements, not clear what could be attributed to SHO funding (see text below).
	Nutrition	Targets mostly achieved.
	Livelihood	Many organisations revised their plans. Some achievements, mostly entrepreneur training and subsidies.
	Health	The cholera epidemic made planned targets irrelevant. Most organisations revised plans because of this. Substantial numbers of people reached with different health services (vaccinations, rehydration, treatment).
	Education	Many deviations from original plans for a variety of reasons, a.o. cost increases, funding by other donors. Large numbers of children benefitted, attribution to SHO funding not sure.
	Protection	Targets mainly concern advocacy, dissemination of information and training. generally targets achieved.
	Disaster management	Most targets achieved, some activities delayed.
2013	Shelter	Many targets achieved, some only partially. Some targets reduced. Shortfall attributed to cost increases and property rights. Some partner organisations did not submit proposals.
	Water & sanitation	Targets mostly achieved or exceeded, impressive achievements, not clear what could be attributed to SHO funding (see text below).
	Nutrition	Targets mostly achieved.
	Livelihood	Many organisations revised their plans. Many planned targets not achieved, some outputs realised, mostly entrepreneur training and subsidies.
	Health	Many targets and plans revised. Many people reached, but with simple, basic services (soap for hand washing, extension services).
	Education	Many targets achieved, but in several cases with money from other donors. Plans revised.
	Protection	Targets mainly concern advocacy, dissemination of information and training. generally targets achieved.
	Disaster management	Most targets achieved, not all with SHO funds. Some activities delayed.

Table 11: Overview of planned results and achievements as per 31 December 2013 per cluster

Cluster	Result	Planned results	Revised plans	Achievements Dec 2013
Shelter	Tents	4770		5660
	New shelters/houses	6280	9480	6009
	Houses repaired	3678	6560	2550
	Houses controlled	7600	10482	11405
Education	Schools built	2		31
	No. Classrooms built	87	90	85
	Teachers trained	105	133	2138
	School provided with furniture	30		35
	Children provided with furniture	6000		6618
	Children provided with teaching material	14680	18190	15229
Health	Patients treated in clinics	68000	174000	59238
	National health workers trained	400	510	1170
	People vaccinated	2100		28074
	Cholera treatment centres established	69		153
	People informed through extension campaigns	77620	102620	726774
WASH	People reached with hygiene campaigns	47917	54417	152089
	People with access to sanitation	18500	36500	70666
	People with access to safe water	15477		32854
	No. of latrines built	11476	12226	7481
	No. of pumps built	23	49	4
	No. of water systems constructed	37	39	438
	No. of washing places constructed	518		0
Food security	Food supplements for malnourished children and pregnant women; information campaigns.	Some targets not achieved, others exceeded: • Terre des Hommes has reached more children and pregnant women people than envisaged. • UNICEF has not achieved targets due to revised planning in 2012		
Livelihood	Cash for work programmes, micro-credits and technical and entrepreneurial training.	Overall disappointing results, some targets achieved, most not: • Tear reached more people than planned with its cash for work programme and subsidies. • ICCO-KiA revised plans in 2012, based on proposals of partners. • Oxfam-Novib did not present quantitative targets; Several hundred individuals received professional training/support and financial support.		
Protection	Protection against sexual violence, protection of children and protection of property rights through lobby & advocacy and training	Planned results not or only partially quantified; achievements deviate from plans because needs difficult to predict.		
Disaster management	Information campaigns and advisory services	Planned results not quantified. Substantial numbers (more than 100,000) of people (often children) informed about disaster preparation. Local capacity strengthening.		

Source: ARK, Verantwoording van de hulpgelden 2013 voor Haiti, December 2014

Table 11a: Results achieved in 2014 per organisation and cluster

Organisation	Cluster	Results
ICCO	Shelter	• 9 new houses constructed • 51 houses completed
	WASH	• 24 water systems constructed • 60 open-air kitchens constructed
	Education	• Reconstruction of 1 school for vocational training • Vocational training for 80 young men and women
	Livelihoods	• Cash grant to 500 women to start small scale enterprise

	Disaster management	• Reinforcement of 90 meters river-bed
		• 30 reservoirs constructed
		• Anti-erosion measures:
		   ○ 1500 bamboo trees planted
		   ○ 20.000 (fruit) trees planted

NLRC	WASH	• Rainwater harvesting systems for 364 households • Rehabilitation of drainage systems for 480 people
	Education	• Rehabilitation of 3 schools
	Disaster management	• Early warning system covering 123,000 people • Disaster/risk awareness of 31,000 children raised • 3 schools prepared as emergency shelter • 2 offices and stores for emergency supplies for the Haiti Red Cross • Construction of facilities for the Haiti Red Cross
VNG	WASH	• Construction of waste dump for Grand Goave • Pilots for waste collection in 4 municipalities
UNICEF	WASH	• Provision of drinking water and latrines for schools and households • Hygiene education
Salvation Army	Education	• Construction of 2 schools completed • Repair of 2 other schools almost completed

Source: http://samenwerkendehulporganisaties.nl/newsarticle/dit-is-er-in-2014-met-giro555-geld-gedaan/

Coordination

OCHA, with prime responsibility to establish an effective coordination system struggled to realise an effective level of coordination of activities of this multitude of organisations, the cluster system. All SHO funded organisations participated in this cluster system, in some cases also in the regional clusters that were set-up in the affected areas outside the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area (Léogane and others). In addition to this overall coordination mechanism, SHO organisations participated in several other coordination platforms:

• Many NGOs that provided humanitarian assistance to Haiti worked either through their regular umbrella organisations, or are part of larger alliances. The coordination of activities by these umbrella and alliances organisations varied considerably. For example ICCO-KiA worked with its ACT partners and coordinated its activities to some extent with them. Cordaid is part of the Caritas network. Members of the Caritas network exchanged information about their activities, but no effective coordination of activities was done through this network. Most national Red Cross/Red Crescent organisations had a shared compound (NLRC was not based at this compound), where information was shared during regular meetings.

- Resource persons of both ICCO-KiA and Oxfam-Novib indicated that coordination in their respective alliances has been considerably streamlined and tightened, as a result of the experiences in among others Haiti.
- Some SHO organisations operate in Haiti through their international umbrella organisations: CARE-Netherlands, NLRC, Plan Netherlands, Oxfam-Novib, UNICEF Netherlands, World Vision, Save the Children, Tear. Other organisations are often part of alliances, but still maintain their individual presence in Haiti. These umbrella organisations and alliances are also platforms for coordination.
- The NGO Coordination Committee (CCO) is a coordination platform for 15 international NGOs. This includes the following SHO organisations, either directly or through their international umbrella organisations: CARE, ICCO via the ACT Alliance, Habitat for Humanity, Oxfam International, Plan International, Save the Children, Tearfund and World Vision.

The effectiveness of these different coordination mechanisms could not be assessed.

Transition and exit strategies

SHO organisations were requested to present exit strategies for the termination of their activities. The exit strategies that are listed in the 2013 SHO report show some common elements:

- Most frequently mentioned is the transition from humanitarian assistance to regular development programmes, usually in partnership with national NGOs. The organisations that described such an exit strategy were working in Haiti prior to the earthquake. This exit strategy was mentioned by Cordaid, ICCO-KiA, Oxfam-Novib, NLRC, UNICEF, Save the Children, Care, Plan and Habitat for Humanity.
- Efforts to embed the results achieved with SHO funding directly with beneficiaries. This included participatory planning, support to beneficiaries for micro-projects, training. Organisations that mention this approach as exit strategy are Cordaid, Save the Children, Tear and Care.
- Transfer of activities to national or local authorities. This included mainly WASH and health programmes and was mentioned by Oxfam-Novib, Terre des Hommes, Plan, Salvation Army and VNG-International. No reports are available on the sustainability of these activities after they have been transferred to national or local authorities. This is likely to be dealt with in the final evaluation of SHO to be conducted in 2015.

After the huge influx of funds for humanitarian assistance, financial sustainability is likely to be the most problematic issue. This issue is mentioned by NLRC, Plan and VNG. All three indicate that they will support initiatives of their partner organisations for local fund raising.

Reporting

The 2011 IOB study commented on the consistency of the reporting of individual SHO organisations with plans and with the consolidated SHO report. A scan of the latest reports of individual SHO organisations (see appendix A) and the SHO Annual reports indicates that the results are generally consistent with the targets mentioned in the plans, or it is clearly stated that activities are not implemented including the reasons why this was not done. What can be observed is a very different

level of detail in reporting by individual SHO organisations. For the majority of organisations the results are presented in more detail than the plan targets.

The result categories used in the reports of individual organisations correspond to the cluster categories used in the SHO Annual reports. Only in some specific cases, where clusters are broadly defined (for example livelihood, protection) results are sometimes mentioned that could also be categorised in other clusters.

The ARK bases its assessments on the SHO annual reports. For the 2011 assessment a field visit was made to Haiti. The 2011 ARK report includes an assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of the activities of SHO organisations. The assessments by the ARK reports are summarised in table 12.

Targeting

Most organisations mention that they focus on vulnerable groups such as youth and women. Of the 14 SHO organisations 5 organisations have a mandate that focuses explicitly on children. These organisations also usually include (pregnant) women as their target group. Other organisations included an element of protection in their programmes, favouring women or female headed households in their other programmes (distribution of shelters, training, health services, micro-credits).

3.4   Analysis

On the basis of the available reports it is concluded that the effectiveness of the activities of SHO organisations is generally good. In all clusters initial plans had to be revised and targets generally reduced. Main reasons mentioned in the reports for not achieving initial targets and the need to revise plans are increased costs, delays because of external factors (notably logistics and land rights, political unrest, the cholera epidemic and cyclone Sandy). For organisations that are working with local partner organisations, the plans that these local organisations submitted often deviated from what was initially foreseen (in 2010), due to changing contexts and perceptions of needs.

Results achieved by SHO supported activities in the livelihood cluster prove to be generally below expectations. An important factor (that emerged during discussions with resource persons) may be that livelihood activities require a different temperament and time horizon than prevails in times of urgent humanitarian assistance. After an emergency has occurred humanitarian organisations to the extent possible mobilise staff with experience in humanitarian assistance programmes. Such programmes are characterised by a highly charged dynamic, and a great sense of urgency. Assistance must be provided immediately and to a large number of people. Urgency overrides issues such as ownership and sustainability that are essential for livelihood programmes. It is also a situation where considerable amounts of goods and services are distributed for free. Although the typical "humanitarian assistance culture" fades progressively after some time, the implementation of livelihood programmes remains problematic in such a context.

Table 12: Key observations of ARK on SHO reporting

Year	Key observations
2010	**The 2010 report presents an assessment of the annual SHO report:** The assessment highlights a number of shortcomings in the annual SHO report: • The flows of funds in Haiti is not sufficiently clear and therefore it is not possible to trace how much of the funds flows to international umbrella organizations, partner organizations and the SHO organisation field offices. • The SHO audit protocol does not require the auditor checking the data underlying income and expenditures. • There is no single definition of the costs for the program management and every aid organization decides what its charges as programme management costs. • It is not always clear how the relief organizations link the results achieved with the money spent. • The distribution of proceeds of the Giro 555 campaign over different participants differs from the actual distribution of funds.
2011	**The 2011 report includes an assessment of the SHO system of accountability and the report, as well as an assessment of the relevance and effectiveness of the activities of SHO organisations:** *On the reporting and accountability* Our assessment shows that accountability in 2011 by both the SHO and its participating organisations is improved. Concerning accountability of the aid-programmes, we see there is often a complex chain of organizations. This makes it difficult to ascribe costs and results to the correct organisation. Aid organizations can reduce costs, reduce the burden of accountability and increase transparency by: • The use of integrated databases for planning, monitoring and evaluation. • The standardization of donor conditionalities between sister organizations and the introduction of a uniform management system. • Increased importance of qualitative accountability for aid programmes that incurr additional costs to enhance sustainability. • "Proportional allocation" as a way to justify results to a donor organization. Furthermore, it appears from our study that the SHO is accountable, as agreed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *On the relevance and effectiveness* The assistance provided was relevant for the affected people. The SHO organisations also strengthened partner organisations contributing to stronger civil society. Factors contributing to success are: • Careful coordination with partner organisations • Contracting local staff to the extent possible • Participation of beneficiaries • Advocacy for affected people and local organisations A number of organisations has reduced targets or only partially achieved the targets set. Limiting factors were: • Contextual factors, mainly defective infrastructure, the cholera epidemic and weak GoH institutions • Lack of focus of the activities of SHO organisations. Inadequate coordination between humanitarian organisations, multilateral organisations and between clusters.
2012	**The 2012 report presents an assessment of the annual SHO report:** On reporting, the ARK concludes that the 2012 SHO report comprises some substantial improvements compared to previous years, mainly clear numbers on the flow of funds, planned results and actual achievements, as well as an explanation of any differences between these two.
2013	**The 2013 report presents an assessment of the annual SHO report:** The main conclusion of the ARK is that reporting by the SHO and the different SHO organisations does not allow a comprehensive understanding of the results achieved and the results against plans. Results cannot be easily aggregated. Some organisations report on the number of water points established, others on the number of people with access to safe water. Shelters built are of different quality and hence costs, but this does not appear in the reports. Organisations do not report on internal constraints or problems.

Management

On management of the SHO programme the following is concluded:

- The long "organisational chains" persist until this day. This applies to both full members as well as to guest organisations. Even if different steps in the chain do not directly charge costs, there are transaction "costs" in terms of administrative and procedural requirements that must be fulfilled. The logic of such channelling is not clear.
- Effective participation in coordination has transaction costs: organisations must (occasionally) participate in meetings, prepare reports and coordinators must monitor the activities of organisations. The question arises if a small contribution[28] to activities in a cluster justifies the transaction costs for the individual organisation, and also if the limited contribution justifies the transaction costs that must be made by cluster management to monitor and coordinate the contribution of that organisation. There seems not to have been an incentive from the side of SHO to stimulate SHO organisations to focus on one or two clusters, but some organisations themselves reported to contemplate a degree of specialisation.
- The transition from humanitarian assistance to livelihood and reconstruction programmes proves to be difficult. This is partially due to the different cultures of humanitarian assistance and longer term development programmes. Just as the transition from development work to humanitarian assistance required a change of staff and organisational culture, such a change, but then in reverse is required for the transition from humanitarian assistance to development work, including livelihood programmes. Such programmes also require different professional skills to plan and implement them.
- Consistency with plans of reporting by the SHO organisations has considerably improved compared to the 2011 IOB evaluation. The observations of the ARK focus on the comparability of results between the different organisations. Lack of standardisation complicates consolidation. Because SHO organisations often work through umbrella organisations/alliances standardisation will be very difficult to realise. SHO should be more explicit to highlight this.

Lessons learned

The experience in Haiti (and other emergencies) has resulted in a number of lessons learned that are progressively applied by the SHO organisations:

- More effort is required to enhance disaster preparedness. This could be done with the traditional partners, but also in collaboration with local government en other actors such as the national Red Cross organisations.
- More emphasis on local organisations. One resource person observed that the UN cluster system has a "bias against indigenous organisations". One of the roles of SHO organisations is to counter that bias.
- A system for coordinated needs assessment is required. Based on the experiences in among others Haiti such a coordinated system has been developed under the aegis of the Inter-

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[28] This refers to the SHO contribution only. Because most organisations receive funding from different sources, total commitments to a cluster may be more substantial.

Agency Standing Committee (IASC) of the UN (MIRA). One resource person indicated that his (SHO) organisation has used this system in South Sudan.

- Resource persons indicated that their organisations will promote working through their umbrella organisations/alliances to make better use of expertise and experience of other organisations.
- Geographical focus is important. It allows to establish close relationships with local government institutions, other organisations and gain trust of the local population[29].
- To ensure that affected people benefit from the construction of shelters intensive communication and cooperation is required with land owners, local government institutions and the affected people themselves[30].
- In emergencies planning for the medium term or longer is difficult, especially when working with local partner organisations. The duration of SHO funding for Haiti was longer than usual (5 years). SHO intends to reduce the period for spending funds, what will reduce the problems experienced with planning.
- SHO is developing a system to distribute funds based on capacity to deliver on the ground in a specific emergency, rather than on overall capacity to deliver humanitarian assistance. One resource person indicated that also the support base in the Netherlands (draagvlak) of the organisation should be taken into consideration.
- For Oxfam an important lesson was that in urban environments government institutions are key stakeholders, probably more so than in rural areas (In Haiti Oxfam cooperated intensively with the municipal drinking water organisation and the relevant ministry). As a result of the Haiti experience Oxfam is reviewing its collaboration with governmental institutions.
- Livelihood programmes need specific expertise and are difficult to executed in an emergency/humanitarian assistance context. Also the socio-economic environment in Haiti was not conducive for a (micro-)credit programme.

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[29] SHO, Samengevoegd wederopbouwplan haiti SHO deelnemers 2011 – 2014, April 2011, p.22
[30] Ibid, p. 22

4. Conclusions

On the basis of the findings the following is concluded.

4.1 UN organisations

1. The 2011 IOB evaluation concluded that coordination was problematic, and not sufficiently inclusive and inter-cluster coordination was weak. The present findings indicate that this has persisted until the present day.
2. The effectiveness of coordination varied per cluster. Several sources indicate that the WASH cluster was and is comparatively successful, which is mainly attributed to the strong role taken by DINEPA. After a rocky start, the shelter cluster also appear to have been effective.
3. Coordinated needs assessments were late and did not provide sufficiently detailed information to be of use for the operational needs of organisations on the ground. As a consequence many of these organisations relied on their own needs assessments.
   Among others (but not only) because of the Haiti experience a coordinated approach has been developed for needs assessments, in which both UN organisations and many of the larger NGO alliances participate, the Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), developed under the aegis of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC).
4. For UN organisations, mobilisation of "surge capacity" was frequently mentioned as a serious problem affecting their performance as cluster coordinators. The surge capacity was often based on staff assigned to Haiti offices of several UN organisations for a period of 6 weeks or 2 months. This lack of continuity made overall coordination less effective.
5. For Haitian organisations and for GoH access to coordination meetings was difficult. The fact that, initially, these meetings were mostly held in English and later in French tended to exclude mainly Creole speaking participants of Haitian organisations and GoH. Physical access to log base where most of the coordination meetings were held was difficult for representatives of Haitian organisations.
6. Another factor that undoubtedly complicated coordination by the clusters is the sheer number and diversity of organisations that deployed in Haiti, the lack of professionalism of some of these organisations and the fragmentation of their programmes.
7. Geographical clusters ("baby-cluster") appear to have had more operational relevance for the work of many NGOs.
8. The UN system was effective in organising appeals and funding for humanitarian assistance in the early days of the response. CERF and ERRF proved to be effective instruments for rapid funding of humanitarian assistance in the initial phases of the emergency.
9. There is little information about the effectiveness of humanitarian activities executed by UN organisations. What information is available indicates that the effectiveness is reasonable to mixed.
10. The role of the key UN organisations, mainly UN-OCHA is being reviewed. This has resulted in the "transformative agenda", that allows a more tailor-made approach to coordination and programming of humanitarian activities. It allows also for a bigger role of national governments and national capabilities in relief efforts.

4.2 SHO organisations

11. As a matter of principle, SHO does not steer the allocation of funds. Funding is therefore considered to be "un-earmarked" by SHO organisations. In more recent emergencies, however, a very limited and tentative form of "steering" seems to have occurred (geographical distribution of funding in Syria, allocation to "different countries" in the ebola crisis).

12. The issue of "long implementation chains" persists, although some NGO alliances attempt to streamline their operations in emergencies. Funding through UN organisations that ends-up with INGOs implementing programmes adds at least one extra level to the "chain".

13. Little documented information is available about experiences of NGOs to mobilise surge capacity, but information from resource persons suggests that in the case of Haiti it was not problematic for NGOs to mobilise surge capacity quickly after an emergency, and that staff often remains in their position for a longer time than is the case for UN organisations.

14. SHO funding was distributed among 14 organisations, and most of these organisations executed activities in several clusters. This resulted in considerable fragmentation of the aid. It may have emerged from the fact that partner organisations often have a geographical focus rather than a sector focus. The value added of participation of so many organisations and in so many clusters is not clear, but it burdens the organisations themselves with the need to mobilise required expertise, and it multiplies the participants in cluster coordination processes, complicating cluster coordination. Interviews indicated that some of the larger SHO organisations are aware of this and seek to specialise on specific clusters/sectors.

15. The consistency and accessibility of annual reporting by SHO has considerably improved over the years. Comparability between organisations, as noted by the ARK, however, has not been achieved.

4.3 Comparing channels

The Netherlands has delivered humanitarian support to Haiti mainly through UN organisations and through SHO organisations. Although no specific assessment was made of the comparative advantages of both channels the following issues emerged.

Targeting
From available documentation there is no detailed information on whether UN organisations or NGOs focus more explicitly on vulnerable groups. Several resource persons mentioned that many UN organisations implement their programmes on the ground to a considerable extent by funding programmes of (international and national) NGOs. They suggest that this would imply that the target groups reached by UN funded NGO executed activities are not fundamentally different from those targeted by other programmes executed by these NGOs. This obviously does not apply to UN funding for other activities (infrastructure, setting-up townships).

One resource person observed that SHO organisations are reluctant to transfer resources to GoH institutions. Although it is widely reported that this applies also to UN organisations and other bilateral/multilateral organisations, whatever support has been given to GoH has been provided mainly by organisations other than the SHO organisations.

Reporting

One resource person states that the reporting by SHO organisations is more detailed and specific than the reports provided by UN organisations. The reports available for the humanitarian assistance to Haiti confirm this suggestion. Reports of individual SHO organisations and the overall SHO reports are distributed and made available on the different websites. They are clearly aimed at a wider public, but the extent to which they are read by a broader public is not known. However, these reports do generate a broader coverage by Dutch media than UN reports. As observed by the ARK in 2015, the information provided does not give details about the comparability of the results presented by the different SHO organisations.

Visibility and public support

One reported advantage of channelling funds through SHO organisations is that the Dutch public will identify itself more clearly with national aid organisations, that have deep roots in Dutch society, than with UN organisations. This is expected to enhance public support for emergency assistance and possibly for development cooperation more generally.

Local networks

SHO organisations operated in Haiti prior to the earthquake under different modalities. Some of the SHO organisations had extensive networks of local partner organisations, and long relations with these organisations. Resource persons indicated that these local organisations presented opportunities to shift relatively quickly from development work to relief and rehabilitation and back to development. These networks assure a permanent presence, promoting sustainability. ICCO states that it has played a role in establishing contacts between other international organisations and its own network of local partner organisations.

Appendix A: List of documents studies consulted

2010	
1	URD/GPPi, Cluster Approach Evaluation 2. Synthesis Report, April 2010[31]
2	URD/GPPi, Inter-Agency Real-Time Evaluation in Haiti; 3 months after the earthquake, August 2010
2011	
3	A. Bhattacharjee and R. Lossio, Evaluation of OCHA Response to the Haiti Earthquake. Final Report, January 2011
4	URD 2011 Beyond emergency relief in Haiti, January 2011
5	Alnap / DAC / UNEG Haiti Earthquake Response, Mapping and analysis of gaps and duplications in Evaluations, February 2011
6	Guha-Sapir et al, Independent Review of the U.S. Government Response to the Haiti Earthquake. March 2011
7	Carine Clermont, C, D. Sanderson, A. Sharma and H. Spraos, Urban Disasters - lessons from Haiti. DEC March 2011
8	L. C. Morinière, External Evaluation of the Haiti Emergency Relief & Response Fund (ERRF), 2008-2011 . April 2011
9	S. Davidson, A Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster Haiti 2010, April 2011
	SHO, Samengevoegd wederopbouwplan haiti SHO deelnemers 2011 – 2014, April 2011
10	OECD DAC 2011 Evaluation insights number 1: Haiti Earthquake Response, Emerging Evaluation Lessons, June 2011
10a	Delaitre Caushaj, A., Evaluation Mi-Parcours de Approches de Travail des Oxfam avec les Autorités Nationals (Locales), les Organisations de la Société Civile et les Structures Communautaires dans le cadre de la Réponse Humanitaire en Haiti d'Oxfam, August 2011.
11	UNICEF Evaluation Office, Independent Review-UNICEF-Haiti September 2011
12	Public Health Consultants, Final evaluation of the Mental Health and Psychosocial Program of CORDAID in Haiti 2010-2011ECHO funded project nr 104299 SHO & TROCAIRE funded project nr 103063, November 2011.
12a	IOB, Assisting Earthquake Victims: Evaluation of Dutch Cooperating Aid Agencies (SHO) Support to Haiti in 2010. November 2011
13	Deters L (2011) Evaluation the use and impact of ECD kits post-earthquake haiti 2010,
14	Grunewald et al (2011) real-time evaluation of humanitarian action supported by DG ECHO in Haiti
15	Oxfam, Haiti earthquake response, Evaluation of Oxfam GB DEC funded Programme, 2011
2012	
16	Channel research, An Independent Final Evaluation of the Action by Churches Together Alliance Haiti Appeal HTI-101, January 2012
17	IASC, Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Earthquake in Haiti, 20 months after, January 2012
18	Office of Internal Oversight Services, Programme evaluation of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, March 2012
19	SHO, Vierde gezamenlijke SHO-rapportage Haïti 13 januari 2010 - 31 december 2011, April 2012
20	Ramachandran, V. and J. Walz 2012 where has all the money gone, May 2012
21	E. Baptista, M. Treffers, P. Giesen Cordaid 2012 shelter programme 2010-2012 final evaluation report, July 2012
22	CIDA, Corporate Evaluation of CIDA's Humanitarian Assistance 2005 – 2011, August 2012
23	ARK. Verantwoording van de hulpgelden 2011 voor Haïti, November 2012

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[31] In this evaluation the field study of the Haiti clusters concerns the functioning of the clusters before the earthquake.

24	HelpAge, Evaluation of DEC funded Projects in Haiti, 2012
2013	
25	Delphine Thizy Consulting, Federation-wide Livelihood Program Evaluation. January 2013
26	E. James, J. R. Dargis et al A Study on Protection and Accountability in Haiti following the Earthquake in January 2010. February 2013
27	SHO, Vijfde gezamenlijk SHO-rapportage. 13 januari 2010 - 31 december 2012, April 2013
28	Privat, C. Evaluation Finale, Programme Conjoint pour la Prévention des conflits et cohésion sociale du F-OMD en Haïti, August 2013
29	ARK, Verantwoording van de hulpgelden 2012 Haiti, December 2013
30	LEF group, Rapport d'Evaluation du projet partnerariat pour development des departements sanitaires UNICEF, 2013
31	Universite quisqueya 2013 Evaluation WASH dans 50 ecoles du Departement de lOuest
32	Saada, D. And Flereme, P, Rapport d'evaluation du projet Etat de Droit du PNUD 2010-2012, 2013
2014	
33	SHO, Zesde gezamelijk SHO-rapportage. 13 januari 2010 - 31 december 2013, April 2014
34	URD, Evaluation du Programme d'Appui à la Reconstruction du Logement et des Quartiers, Programme conjoint entre les organisations Onusiennes, February 2014
35	Build Change, Homeowner-Driven Housing Reconstruction and Retrofitting in Haiti; Lessons Learned, 4 Years After the Earthquake, January 2014

Reports of individual SHO organisations

Organisation	Period covered
VNG International	January tot December 2013
Dorcas	Juane 2011 to December 2011
Habitat for Humanity Netherlands	March 2011 to May 2013
Terre des Hommes Netherlands	January 2011 to June 2012
Tear Netherlands	January to December 2011
Salvation Army Netherlands	January 2011 to December 2013
Care Netherlands	January to June 2013
Save the Children Netherlands	October 2010 to September 2013
World Vision	January 2010 to December 2013
Cordaid	January 2010 to December 2012
ICCO	January 2010 to December 2013
Oxfam Novib	January to December 2012
NLRC	January to December 2013
UNICEF	January 2010 to December 2013

Appendix B: Resource Persons

ICCO-Kerk in Actie	
	Mr. Dick Loendersloot
	Mrs. Els Hortensius
Cordaid	
	Mr. Paul Borsboom
	Mr. Piet Spaarman
	Mrs. Maartje Pronk
Samenwerkende Hulp Organisaties	
	Mrs. Baukje Heemskerk
Oxfam-Novib	
	Hans van der Hoogen