Policy Influencing, Lobbying and Advocacy

Mozambique country study

Study Commissioned by:
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

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Acknowledgment

ACRONIMS

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
CAC	Extended Consultation Council
CASC	Private Sector Annual Conference
CESC	Centre for Learning and Capacity Building for Civil Society
CFJJ	Centre for Legal and Judicial Training
CIP	Centre for Public Integrity
CS	Civil Society
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CTA	Mozambican Business Confederation
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECOSIDA	Entrepreneurs Against HIV, Malaria and Tuberculosis
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FAMOD	Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disabilities
FORCOM	Forum of Community Radios
IHP+	International Health Partnership
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOB	Policy and Operations Evaluation Department
JANS	Joint Assessment of National Strategies
JOINT	League of Non-Governmental NGOs in Mozambique
LDH	Human Rights League
LGBT	Lesbians, Gays, Bisexuals and Transgender
NAFEZA	Centre of Women's Associations of Zambézia
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OBI	Open Budget Index
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSISA	Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa
PARP	Poverty Reduction Action Plan
PERPU	Strategic Programme for Urban Poverty Reduction
PES	Economic and Social Plan
PESOD	District Economic and Social Plan
PESS	Health Sector Strategic Plan
PILA	Policy Influencing, Lobbying and Advocacy
PSC-PS	Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection
ROSC	Civil Society Forum for Child Rights
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
UNAIDS	United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WLSA	Women and Law in Southern Africa

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1. Introduction

The Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB), of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands is undertaking an Evaluation of Policy Influencing, Lobbying and Advocacy covering the 2008-2014 period. In this context, it has commissioned country cases studies of Ethiopia, Kenya and Mozambique. The consultant (Katia Taela) has been hired to conduct the Mozambique case study. The first deliverable under the contract was the submission of an Inception Report to IOB's evaluation team and the internal IOB peer review team. The Inception note proposed the approach and methodology for the country study in light of the Terms of Reference (Annex 1). IOB's comments to the Inception Report have been considered in this report.

1.1 Scope of the country study

According to the Terms of Reference the main purpose of the evaluation is to contribute to insights and lessons about support provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy and its effectiveness. The evaluation includes the study of success factors and limitations of Northern (Dutch) organisations' support to policy influencing work of Southern CSOs. The main questions guiding the evaluation are the following:

→ How does the ministry support policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?
→ What evidence is there for the effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying strategies/ programmes in influencing policy in the public and private sector that is supportive of poverty reduction, justice and sustainable inclusive development? What factors explain levels of effectiveness?
→ How does Southern CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy at national or global level develop and how does the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations influence that capacity development? How can Northern (Dutch) organisations best support Southern CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in the future?

The present case study contributes to address the second and third main evaluation questions above outlined. **The overall objective of the case study is:**

"To generate insights and conclusions concerning the environment, practice and support of Northern (Dutch) organisations to capacity development in the area of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in Mozambique".

Specifically, the case study offers insight into how Southern CSOs operate (focus on the policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities they have undertaken); what they have achieved (focus on how they have contributed to changes in policy and what role have knowledge production, freedom of expression and civic engagement played in the policy change process) how they develop (focus on organisational development) and; what has been the role and impact of external (Dutch) support to their organisational development and policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions[1].

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[1] The ToR present these issues in the form of five evaluation questions to be looked into, with a total of 30 specific questions to answer.

1.2 Methodology

The study was conducted between October 2014 and February 2015 over a period of 40 days, during which the consultant conducted a literature review, prepared an Inception Report, attended a one-day expert meeting in the Hague[2], conducted field work in Maputo City, Nampula and Zambézia, conducted a review of organisational documents of selected CSOs, produced a draft report which was discussed during a workshop on the 17th February, at the Netherlands Embassy in Maputo, and on the 19th February participated in a workshop in Nairobi with CSO in Kenya; on the occasion the preliminary findings of the Mozambique country study were also presented.

The report is based on a qualitative study that employed a variety of sources of information and data collection methods comprising literature and document review, semi-structured interviews[3] with key informants and leadership and/or technical staff of 10 CSOs, a focus group discussion with 08 members of staff of ORAM Nampula, informal conversations with knowledgeable individuals, and participant observation at the plenary of the Provincial Civil Society Platform in Nampula[4]. Annex 2 outlines the study methods and data sources and Annex 3 provides a list of people interviewed. The discussions held during the workshops in Maputo and Nairobi as well as a work session with the IOB evaluation team on the 20th February provided valuable inputs to the present report. Also important were the written comments received from Mozambican CSOs that were unable to attend the workshop in Maputo. The country study's conclusions and recommendations draw extensively from the discussions held during the workshops.

1.2.1 Criteria for selection of 10 focus CSOs

The selection of focus CSOs has built on the work that was conducted as part of the IOB evaluation of Direct Financing to Local NGOs[5] to capitalise on the groundwork that had already been done and the relations that were built in the process. The selection of the actual cases was based on analysis of internal appraisal documents and the report of the Direct Funding evaluation, focusing on the extent to which the organisation is (or aims to be) active in the field of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy. The following criteria for selection of the 10 CSOs has been adopted:

→ 10 CSOs supported by Dutch organisations or funding;
→ At least one CSO from each region of the country (South, Centre and North);
→ At least five CSOs that were consulted as part of the evaluation of direct financing;
→ At least two CSOs that were not consulted as part of the evaluation of direct funding;
→ At least two CSOs that work at local level;

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[2] Expert-meeting took place on the 7th October 2014, in The Hague – Netherlands. The aims of the meeting were: a) to solicit advice that serves as methodological guidance for the conduct of the evaluation; b) to discuss options to strengthen the learning objective of the evaluation.
[3] The interviews were guided by the questions provided in the TORs, but modified (shortened) to focus on the most relevant issues for each group.
[4] The plenary took place on the 10th December 2014, from 9H00am to 16H00.
[5] The report is available at: http://www.iob-evaluatie.nl/directe-financiering

Furthermore, for learning purposes the selection of CSOs covered a broad range of thematic areas (for e.g. gender equality, land rights, sexual minorities' rights, local governance). Based on these criteria the following 10 CSOs were identified:

1. Associação para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável - Akilizetho
2. Centro de Integridade Pública – CIP
3. Associação Coalizão da Juventude Moçambicana - Coalizão
4. Instituto de Investigação para o Desenvolvimento José Negrão – Cruzeiro Sul
5. Forum Mulher – FM
6. N'weti- Comunicação para a Saúde
7. Rede de Associações Femininas da Zambézia -NAFEZA
8. Associação Moçambicana da Ajuda Mútua - ORAM
9. Associação Moçambicana para Defesa das Minorias Sexuais - LAMBDA
10. Women and Law in Southern Africa - WLSA

Annex 3 provides more details about the thematic areas of work, activities and location of the CSOs.

1.3 Limitations

The main limitation of the study was the period during which it was undertaken. In October 2014, General Elections were held in Mozambique, and between November and December CSOs were occupied with the elaboration of annual narrative and financial reports and the use of funds that had been disbursed late and needed to be spent in 2014. Women and feminist organisations were involved in the 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence (from 25 November to 10 December). In December, many professionals from development agencies CSOs approached by the consultant were on holidays. During this period, it was also extremely difficult to interview government officials or members of parliament. These constraints combined have affected the views captured in this report, which focus largely on people from selected CSOs, although individuals from CSOs not covered by the case studies have also been interviewed.

The lack of documentation of CSOs' policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions has also influenced the content of this report demanding an effort to balance the information provided during the interviews with that gathered through review of available documentation. The gaps contained in the preliminary report were discussed during the workshop on the 17th February 2015[6] and the inputs from participating CSOs contributed to address them in the present document.

Finally, whilst covering 10 CSOs provided a good overview of the work of a wide range of organisations, it did not allow depth about the work of individual organisations. However, we hope that the issues raised will stimulate debate and contribute to the on-going debate on civil society's involvement in policy dialogue in Mozambique.

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[6] The objective of the workshop was to discuss the preliminary findings of the study and collect inputs for its improvement. The discussion focused on the context, practices, capacities and external support for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in Mozambique.

2. The environment in which CSOs operate

This section describes the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy takes place. It focuses on: a) the political and economic context; b) basic rights and freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression, press and association) and; c) the effects of Mozambique's aid dependency on policy making processes.

2.1 Political context

Formally, Mozambique is a democratic republic with a multi-party system. In reality, there is dominance of a single political party – Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO)[7], ascendance of the party over state institutions and of the executive over the judiciary and the legislative, weak democratic institutions, politicisation of electoral and state bodies, weak opposition parties[8], and lack of social accountability.

In October 2014, Mozambique held its fifth presidential elections amidst a political climate characterised by increased distrust and deterioration of dialogue[9] between FRELIMO (in power for the past 40 years) and the main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance *Resistência Nacional de Moçambique* (RENAMO). On 15th January 2015, Filipe Jacinto Nyusi was sworn in as Mozambique's new President amid controversy surrounding the election results and doubts about Nyusi's autonomy, in relation to the cessing president (Armando Emílio Guebuza). RENAMO has refused to accept the results of the 2014 elections, alleging irregularities and fraud. In protest, it boycotted the inaugural seating of the National Assembly[10]; none of RENAMO's 89 members of parliament took part in the swearing in ceremony.

It is uncertain how the election of the new president, the appointment of a new government and the new parliament will affect state-society relations and whether the president is willing to constructively engage with citizens. Many fear that the space for civil society may reduce, deepening an emerging tendency during President Guebuza's two mandates. CSOs claim that the reduction of space for civil society is related to the interest of political elites to derive personal gains from the economic deals with companies operating in the extractive industries sector, an area which has been increasingly scrutinized by CSOs[11]. What is certain is that civil society engagements with the state have changed significantly in the last ten years. From an almost exclusive focus on complementing government's efforts to deliver services, civil society organisations are increasingly involved in monitoring provision of public services and in policy influencing.

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[7] Whilst FRELIMO continues to enjoy considerable influence as a political and economic force, the recent events associated the selection of FRELIMO's presidential candidate for the 2014 elections revealed internal fissures within the party, challenging assumptions of cohesion and homogenous loyalty to the president. Fairbairn (2011) and Buur et al. (2011) had already identified factions within FRELIMO pointing out their differentiated policy orientations.
[8] Although the pre and post elections period also shown the increased mobilisation capacity of RENAMO and ability to attract large crowds to its gatherings.
[9] Which led to localised military action between 2012 and 2014.
[10] Where FRELIMO retained the majority - 144 of the 250 seats.
[11] Interview notes.

2.2 Economic context

Gender, income and wealth inequalities; poor coverage of the formal education system and resulting high illiteracy rates; and lack of access to public institutions and services constitute important barriers for the exercise of the civil, political, social and economic rights recognised by the Mozambican constitution (OSISA 2009:6). The country's economic growth (7% GDP growth rates in the last 10 years) has not been translated in safer livelihoods and improved quality of life for the majority of the population. Despite a reduction in absolute poverty rates, shown by the national poverty assessments from 69.4% in 1996/7 to 54.7% in 2002/03, the majority of the Mozambican population continues to live below the poverty line. Poverty rates have not reduced between 2003 and 2007/08 (MPD 2010). There are significant regional and gender differences: poverty rates are higher in the central regions of the country (59.7%) and in rural areas (56.9%), and it has a female face, with female-headed households figuring amongst the poorest (CMI 2008).

Whilst many of the barriers above outlined are the effect of a history of colonial exploitation, civil war and natural disasters, they are also a reflection of inadequate policy choices. For instance, even though subsistence agriculture is the main source of livelihoods for the majority of the Mozambican population, there has been little investment in improving agricultural productivity of smallholder farmers. Mogues et al (2012) analysed the relation between low use of productivity enhancing services and technologies and public agricultural spending between 2001 and 2011. They point out that "although public agricultural expenditure (PAE) has increased rapidly over time at about 12.2 percent per year in constant prices (…), the bulk of the expenditure, about 75 percent, is on salaries and other transfers including institutional support. Spending on agricultural research and development (AgR&D), support to farmers, and provision of other agricultural services together accounted for only about 25 percent of total agricultural expenditures". The focus of macro-economic policies in the agricultural sector on rapid expansion of agricultural land area has marginalised smallholder subsistence agriculture.

Castel-Branco (2010) argues that the inefficiency of economic growth to reduce poverty rates is related to the extractive character of the economic development model adopted by Mozambique, based on large scale foreign investments focused on the extraction of natural resources (land, forestry, minerals and energy). Mozambique's "mining boom" and the recent discovery (in 2010 and 2012) of large deposits of exploitable gas in the Rovuma Basin, off the coast of Cabo Delgado province is expected to exponentially increase foreign direct investments over the next years. The impacts of these investments on Mozambicans' livelihoods are yet to be seen and many fear that these discoveries may only benefit political elites, increase social inequalities and exacerbate social and political cleavages as centralisation of party-state control over the economy and political-business alliances are strengthened (Wittmeyers 2012, Chichava 2013, ILPC 2013). The changing environment requires a new posture on the part of CSOs. While a growing number of organisations has been actively engaged in advocating for economic policies more responsive to the needs of the Mozambican population, the majority is ill-equipped to perform this role.

A political economy analysis of the petroleum sector in Mozambique points out that "rent-seeking in the central feature of FRELIMO – for personal enrichment and as a means to consolidate further political influence (which in turn enables further rent-seeking opportunities) Guebuza and his close network function as industry gatekeepers vis-à-vis foreign companies – in particular in the gas industry - earning rents through political and administrative decision-making (licensing, project approvals, land titles, fiscal regimes) and secondly, by lining up their own companies to take advantage of contracts (logistics, catering, construction etc.) (ILPC 2013:13)."

The political-economic dynamics associated with the rising cost of living and attempts to increase fuel/transport costs in 2008, of bread and other basic products in 2010, and again of transport in 2012 have stirred popular protests in Mozambique. A study conducted by IESE & IDS (2014) notes that unemployment, poverty and inequalities in combination with "the blocking or non-existence of mechanisms for dialogue between citizens and the government authorities" contributed to the adoption of violent forms of protest to express discontent. The popular protests brought forth important issues about the relations between professionalised and donor oriented civil society and citizens and between the state and citizens. The report underlines the inability of CSOs to engage with the food question and how they have distanced themselves from the popular protests.

2.3 Basic rights and liberties

The political, economic and social changes Mozambique has been experiencing have considerable implications for civil, political and economic rights. The rights granted by the Mozambican Constitution (1990 and 2004) which offer the foundation for the exercise of citizenship, including multi-party democracy, gender equality, and freedom of association, expression and press have been threatened by attempts to reduce the space for civil society and restrict people's civil liberties and political rights.

The gap between a relatively progressive legal and policy framework, the practice of public institutions and people's living conditions is deepening. Cultural arguments are often deployed to legitimise the infringement of civil liberties and associational rights - particularly women and sexual minorities' rights, based on claims that these are Western cultural exports with no resonance in local culture - whilst political rhetoric is used for intimidation and vilification of increasingly assertive and vocal civil society actors, in attempts to silencing voices that challenge the status quo, clearly violating the right to freedom of expression.

The list of people murdered for exposing or challenging the interests of political elites is growing. It includes journalist Carlos Cardoso[12], economist and banker Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua[13], director of investigation, audits and Intelligence of the Mozambican Customs

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[12] Carlos Cardoso was shot dead in central Maputo on 22 November 2000, while investigating a US$14 million fraud connected with the privatization of Mozambique's largest bank, Banco Comercial de Moçambique.
[13] Antonio Siba-Siba Macuacua was the head of banking supervision at the Bank of Mozambique and became emergency chair of the privatised Austral Bank when it collapsed in April 2001 after fraud carried out by highly placed people. Siba-Siba attempted to recover bad debts, including some from senior people in government and in Frelimo. He also cancelled contracts signed by the previous board, including one in with Nyimpine

Service, Orlando José[14], and constitutional lawyer Giles Sistac. The killing of Gilles Cistac is a brutal reminder to Mozambican citizens about the price of standing up for the rule of law[15]. As CSO' representative Alda Salomão avowed at Cistac's funeral ceremony, the strategy adopted has been "assassinate one to silence all"[16]. Mozambican CSO's have expressed their outrage at the assassination which include amongst other things a march for freedom of expression, in Maputo City[17]. The march was accompanied by heavily armed anti-riot police Força de Intervenção Rápida who impeded the peaceful protesters from ending the march in the planned location – Praça da Independência. An illustration of what has been described as gaps in legal instruments addressing freedom of assembly and demonstration which allow for "excessively restrictive interpretations" and have often been used to justify repressive action by the police (OSISA 2009: 14). Relatedly, analysts have raised concerns about the reduced budget for the police to protect citizens in contrast with increased investments in the anti-riot police[18].

Access to information about approved legislation and rights by citizens and institutions (including public) is still limited; access to information is influenced not only by geographic isolation and high illiteracy rates but also, by a weak culture of accountability. In this regard, Senga & Mattes note that "Mozambique's particular conundrum is that not only do its citizens possess relatively low levels of information about public affairs, but the three decades of monopoly over formal political power by the Marxist oriented Frelimo (…) means that available information about public affairs is often conveyed by or through sources that are anything but fonts of independent and critical information (2008:26)". On 23th July 2013, the independent newspaper Savana published a list of 40 analysts pro-regime (known as G40) supposedly hand-picked by FRELIMO's media offices to convey the government's positions and offer political commentary in state-controlled media. On 27th March 2014, Armando Nenane[19], in his capacity as citizen, submitted to the Attorney General's Office a petition for an investigation into the reported list of analysts and commentators[20]. Nenane did not receive a response from the Attorney General's Office.

In November 2014, the Mozambican Parliament approved Law 34/2014, drafted and submitted by CSOs in 2005. The law which obliges public and private bodies to release information of public interest within 21 of being requested is perceived as a first step in the

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Chissano, son of President Joaquim Chissano, who was paid $3000 per month despite his lack of experience in banking. On 11 August 2001, Antonio Siba Siba Macuacua, acting chairman of Banco Austral, was thrown down a 15-storey stairwell, as he worked in his office, just two days before he was due to present a report which would probably have identified senior political figures who had stolen millions of dollars from the bank.

[14] Orlando José was killed on 26 April 2010, only three hours after announcing on national television that three imported luxury cars had been impounded in Maputo for various illegalities.

[15] While there is significant speculation the about the reasons for the assassination of Giles Cistac, the dominant view is that it was politically motivated.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/mozambique/11455866/Prominent-Mozambique-rights-lawyer-gunned-down-in-Maputo.html

[16] During the Gilles Cistac's funeral ceremony. In Jornal Savana 13.03.2015.

[17] CSOs in Beira were prevented by the police from carrying out protests.

[18] Machado da Graça, in Jornal Savana 13.03.2015.

[19] Journalist, human rights activist, and executive director of the Mozambican Association of Judiciary Journalism (AMJJ).

[20] http://allafrica.com/stories/201407072082.html

right direction to complement the Press Law of 1991, in spite of the fact the lack of provision for an independent mechanism to oversee its implementation and deal with complaints related to failure to comply with requests for access to information.

2.4 Aid dependency

Mozambique's aid dependency has shaped policy making, affected government-civil society relations and influenced civil society interventions. Castel-Branco qualifies Mozambique's dependence on foreign aid as "multidimensional, structural and dynamic" (2008, 2011). Castel-Branco notes that "aid dependency is multidimensional when it affects the institutional culture, thinking, policies and options of the systems of governance, as well as the interactions between agents, public policy options, the financing of such policies, etc.; thus, the multidimensional nature of aid dependency means that dependency goes beyond basic resources (public finance, foreign exchange, savings) and basic capacities (technical, managerial) to include many other aspects of life. Aid dependency is structural when the basic functions of the state and society are aid dependent. Finally, aid dependency is dynamic when the pattern of development that is structurally and multi-dimensionally aid dependent generates new and deeper aid dependencies, rather than reducing aid dependency over a period of time (2008:1)."

After a steady increase, between 2000 and 2009, donor contribution to Mozambique's General State Budget has decreased in the last couple of years. The reduction of general budget support (GBS) in 2009 is associated with the *crispação* (tension) between donors-government as a result of irregularities during the 2009 elections. Donors claimed that the principle of "promotion of free, credible and democratic political processes" contained in their Memorandum of Understanding had been breached. A recent evaluation of budget support in Mozambique notes that budget support in the 2005-2012 period was also affected by a challenging context characterised by increasing donor's scepticism over budget support, disappointment with the aspirations of the Paris Declaration, increasing concentration of political power in Mozambique, and a more technically and politically demanding public policy agenda (ITAD 2014). The financial crisis in many European countries and a corruption scandal involving the Mozambican Ministry of Education appear to have also contributed to the reduction of the volume of donors' commitments. In 2013, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain withdrew their budget support yet many donors, including the Netherlands, have maintained off budget support.

Many analysts contend that aid dependency has led government and civil society organizations be more accountable to donors than to the parliament, civil society and citizens (EURODAD, Trocaire and CAFOD 2008, OSISA 2009, ITAD & COWI 2012). While partially correct, this view does not take into account the role of donors in promoting institutional and legislative reforms for promotion of good governance and accountability, more dialogue between government and civil society and between organised civil society and the general public.

Some claim that donor's influence on governance is likely to reduce as aid dependency declines and donor's interests become more commercial, as evidenced in the shifts "from aid to trade" in their policies. Other authors argue that the increased prominence of "emerging donors" (Brazil, China, India, and South Africa) attracted by the country's resource-led transformation is leading to the re-definition of the roles and relations of traditional donors (OECD-DAC) with the government challenging their efforts to harmonise the aid system (Eyben & Savage 2013, Vollmer 2013, Kragelund 2014).

Emerging donors provide investment, loans and technical assistance under the framework of South-South cooperation and/or triangular cooperation without the conditionalities imposed by OECD-DAC donors. Brazil, China, and India have historical links with Mozambique (Chichava 2012, Mawdsley 2012). Economic and political motivations underline their interest in working in Mozambique, besides their professed southern solidarity; these include the search for raw materials and new markets for their developing industries as well as the pursuit of international visibility and influence in global governance spaces (Woods 2008, Mochizuki 2009, Chin & Quadir 2012).

It is not clear what the position of emerging donors on support to civil society is. Two issues are certain a) CSOs from "emerging donor countries" have played an important role in South-South cooperation as part of initiatives supported by their home governments, and by multilateral and bilateral international development agencies (Taela 2011); b) the engagements of these donors with Mozambique and other countries, particularly in the extractive sector, has sparked protests and transnational solidarity movements (such as the World March of Women and Via Campesina) some of which focus on building the social mobilisation (with a strong component of political training) and policy influencing capacity of Mozambican CSOs. For instance, collaboration between members of Via Campesina, Brazil's Landless Rural Workers Movement (MST) and Mozambican National Farmers Union (UNAC) has increased considerably in the last years and has centred on opposition to land grabbing for agribusiness and the highly controversial Prosavana programme[21]. Although these Southern connections are longstanding (Taela 2011) and have involved NGOs, a distinctive element of more recent collaboration is its focus on fostering building social movements (e.g. women, farmer and trade unions). However, little is known about the effectiveness of these southern collaborations.

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[21] ProSavana is a triangular cooperation agribusiness programme, involving Brazil, Japan and Mozambique. The programme aims to transform Mozambique's savanna drawing on Brazil's experience with its Cerrado. http://www.prosavana.gov.mz/index.php?p=pagina&id=27

3. Policy-making processes: actors and spaces[22]

This section briefly outlines the actors who engage in policy-making processes, the spaces through which civil society actors engage as well as the actual space they have to influence policies.

3.1 Actors

The government, donors and civil society organisations have been the main actors directly involved in policy-making processes in Mozambique.

Government

The Ministry of Planning and Development is the state institution with the mandate to coordinate planning processes and guide Mozambique's socioeconomic development. Senior government officials as well as technical staff from ministerial planning directorates have been the main policy actors on the part of the government, although some staff from other directorates may also contribute to policy discussions related to their areas of intervention. Overall, institutional policy making capacity is weak. While there are government officials highly qualified with expertise in their sector's areas of interventions, the majority of public officials lack specialized technical knowledge and capacity to engage in complex policy discussions. Access to learning opportunities and to information/materials to support their work are limited. In order to improve the technical, administrative and managerial capacity of public servants and support the public sector reform, the government has introduced the System of Education in Public Administration (SIFAP) and, in 2004, it created the Higher Institute of Public Administration (ISAP). All the five main courses offered by ISAP include a module on public policies, strategic planning and analysis of public policies[23]. The institution has received support from the African Development Bank and the International Institute of Social Sciences (ISS) in the Netherlands. Currently cooperates with several organisations including UNWomen to promote integrate of gender equality in public policies and budgets.

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[22] Studies and assessments of civil society's role in policy influencing or policy dialogue in Mozambique have encountered difficulties with establishing an appropriate Portuguese translation (ITAD & COWI 2012; N'weti Local Capacity Initiative Capacity Assessment Report 2014). The ITAD & COWI study had initially adopted the translation Diálogo sobre Política(s) but later changed to "*Incidência sobre Políticas*", as the former denotes dialogue around specific policies limiting the scope of term. During an assessment of N'weti capacity in the area of policy dialogue the discussion turned to the distinction between policy dialogue and political dialogue (*diálogo político*, an expression more common in Mozambique often applied in relation to dialogue between political parties). As the report notes "some participants questioned if CSOs should engage in political dialogue or they merely participate in the dialogue with different stakeholders to reach agreement on issues that benefit citizens. It was decided that for the purpose of this work [the capacity assessment], the term political dialogue (*diálogo político* in Portuguese) meant the process through which people from grassroots to national level come together to reach an agreement on a certain issue. N'weti has been building the capacity of community members to engage in dialogue regarding issues of their interest. By undertaking research using CSC [community score cards], it provides the target audience with knowledge to engage in policy dialogue. The present study has adopted the term *influência sobre políticas* which has a similar meaning to *incidência sobre políticas.*

[23] http://www.isap.ac.mz/index.php/cooperacao

Donor support to government in this area has been provided in the context of the public sector reform guided by the Global Strategy for Public Sector Reform 2001-2011; the–professionalization of public service was one of its five components. The donors supporting the reform process included the World Bank, UNDP, DFID, DANIDA, Norwegian and Irish Aid. In 2011, DFID ceased its support to public sector reform and shifted its focus to domestic accountability[24].

Donor support to policy-making capacity generally has a sectoral focus, and covers a range of sectors (e.g. World Bank in the energy sector, Norway's oil for development programme, Netherlands's support to the water sector, USAID's support to the health sector to name a few). It has encompassed embedding technical staff in ministries, mentorship, provision of targeted national-level policy analysis, improving the national statistics system and the analytical capacities of staff (to support evidence-based planning) and training in planning and policy analysis and formulation.

The UN has also supported capacity development of government institutions through its various agencies and The United Nations Development Assistance Framework 2012-2015 places a great emphasis on policy-making support. For example, it envisages support to relevant ministries[25] in the formulation of food security and production policies, strategies and plans based on harmonized and disaggregated statistics. Along these lines, FAO has provided technical assistance to Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Justice in drafting the Right to Food Law and in policy formulation, information systems and policy analysis, while UNDP has been providing support to the Parliament on the same topic (see paragraphs below on the role of the Parliament). Besides bilateral and multilateral agencies, CSO's have also contributed to strengthening the policy development capacities of the government as discussed throughout this report.

Multilateral and Bilateral Agencies

Donors have been one of the main drivers of policy-making in Mozambique and take part in most dialogue mechanisms. They have privileged access to policy-makers and to information about government policies, strategies and programmes. Donors have fostered dialogue between government and civil society by demanding the creation of spaces for participation by the government, as well as by strengthening CSO's capacity to influence and monitor policy change. In addition, by commissioning research and evaluations donors have promoted evidence-based policy decisions. Some United Nations' agencies have also taken advantage of their strategic position and privileged access to government and CSOs to facilitate the involvement of the latter in strategic planning processes. To illustrate, in 2009, the United Nations Joint Programme on HIV and AIDS office in Maputo, produced an "Agenda for civil society involvement in the development of the National AIDS Strategic Plan II", containing several activities to facilitate the process. During several weeks civil society organisations gathered in the organisation's office to plan, strategize and elaborate their position.

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[24] DFID Mozambique (2011), "Operational Plan 2011-2015", Maputo.
[25] Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), Ministry of Planning and Development (MPD), Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIC) and the Technical Secretariat on Food and Nutritional Security (SETSAN).

Civil Society Organisations

CSO involvement in policy-making processes has been limited to a small group of well-established, urban based, professionalised organisations managed by middle-class professionals, who can speak the "donor language" and are part of influential formal/informal networks that include academics, government officials, and professionals working for multilateral and bilateral organisations. Many of these urban-based CSOs are connected to a second group of also urban-based organisations whose main focus is service delivery and although they may take part in policy dialogue spaces, their actual contribution is marginal. In fact, their "dialogue" with the government usually takes place with the main purpose of informing and coordinating implementation of activities (service delivery). In addition, urban-based CSOs work with small community-based organisations and other local groups. These collaborations are linked to the service-delivery component of these urban-based organizations' work and have been focused, to a large extent, on awareness raising and community sensitization and mobilization on various issues.

Part of CSOs that engage in policy influencing has from the onset focused their interventions on the analysis of government policies, such as, Centro de Integridade Pública and Women and Law in Southern Africa (WLSA) or organisations who are not directly involved in policy dialogue (such as IESE), but have a critical agenda setting role. For other CSOs this role has evolved from participation in invited spaces due to their role in service delivery. While this shift has allowed some degree of legitimacy because "they work with the communities", their growing calls for government accountability have also created some frictions. These have manifested in the form of interference of public institutions on activities of civil society organisations and reduction of their space to conduct some activities (such as, monitoring the impacts of large scale investments in the communities), and in social and psychological intimidation by state institutions (FDC 2007, ITAD & COWI 2012).

There is an "invisible" majority of the Mozambican population that is not represented in any of the mainstream policy spaces (invited and claimed). The "invisible" majority includes self-help groups active at community level as well as non-institutionalised protestors, such as, the returnees from the former German Democratic Republic and the groups involved in recent riots (FDC 2007, ITAD & COWI 2012)[26]. Ilal et al. (2014), call attention to the importance of considering these forms of civil society arguing that "if we focus on meetings in the capital between elements of "recognised" civil society we miss out on traditional

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[26] Some argue that the recent riots in Maputo were triggered by a sentiment of exclusion from dialogue from people who did not feel represented and/or did not know where to voice their concerns (ITAD & COWI 2012, IESE & IDS 2014). A study conducted by IESE & IDS (2014) on the motivations and the political responses to the recent "hunger revolts and citizen strikes" reveals the dialectic relation between policy change and the protests. The protests were largely triggered by announcements of increase of prices of food products and prompted particular political (including policy) responses. The responses went from confrontation (disqualifying the protests, use of violent police repression, attempts to control the use of mobile phone[26]) to accommodation through price freezes and subsidies and announcing new policies, such as, the construction of 39 silos each with capacity to store 1,000 tonnes of agricultural surpluses, the Food Production Action Plan *Plano de Ação de Produção de Alimentos* (PAPA), approved in 2008, Strategic Programme for Urban Poverty Reduction 2010-2014 (PERPU), approved in 2010, and the introduction of the what the authors call the "anti-riot exchange rate" (IESE & IDS 2014).

forms of neighbourhood associations, spontaneous campaigns, self-help networks, and all the other original ways - some traditional, some modern - through which people organise when they do not feel represented by the political system (p.7)".

Lastly, while there is documented evidence on the importance of the internet, social media and mobile-phones for social mobilisation and service delivery, there is less information about their use for cyber/digital activism. For instance, Mare (2014) discusses the use of social media in the 10 September 2010 food riots, specifically the mobilising power of Short Message Service (SMS) used to mobilise people to the streets, Facebook to circulate information about the riots has they happened, while YouTube was mainly used by journalists and activists to disseminate images of police repression. Whether the use of SMS for mobilisation purposes was preceded by debates in social networks remains unclear, although the IESE & IDS (2014) claims that this has been the case. There is however evidence of post-protests debates. In an attempt to prevent the mobilisation of protesters, the government ordered network operators to suspend the mobile phone pre-paid text message service and days later it made it obligatory the registry of mobile phones against presentation of owner identification; if not registered within two months the numbers would be permanently blocked. The related ministerial diploma (153/2010 justified this measure as a means of promoting "the responsible use of SIM cards, thus contributing to maintain public order and tranquillity"[27].

One civil society representative interviewed for this study underlined the increasing importance of Facebook and Twitter accounts of Mozambican journalists and academics in shaping public debate. Cyber activist Uric Mandiquisse notes however, that journalists with social media accounts are sceptical of their potential to influence decision-making, government actions or social participation. There is however indication that they are indeed influential. An example provide by my interviewee and by cyber activist Uric Mandiquisse[28] refers to when the university lecturer José Jaime Macuane denounced, in his Facebook page, the illegality (according to the Public Probity Law) of the Mercedes Benz S350 the President of the Republic has received from the Confederation of Economic Associations. The issue soon made the headlines of various newspapers and was also discussed in non-virtual spaces throughout the country; three days later the President returned the gift to CTA. The importance of the use of social media is also reflected in the government and FRELIMO's recognition of their utility illustrated in the fact that they have also created accounts on social networks such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram and WhatsApp, and that the pro-regime journalists and academics (mainly the G40) are increasingly using social media to disseminate their views.

The Parliament

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[27] In IESE & IDS 2014, p. 29.
[28] http://globalvoicesonline.org/2014/11/24/three-cases-that-show-social-networks-are-helping-hold-mozambiques-government-accountable/

The role of the parliament has been minimal, limited to the approval of government annual plans and budgets as well as laws (mainly proposed by the government or civil society), this is related only to its weak technical capacity, but also and perhaps more importantly to its reduced constitutional powers. Also marginal is the role of political parties, including the ones with a seat in Parliament. Frelimo's majority and lack of technical capacity to engage in meaningful policy discussions have seriously hampered the ability of opposition parties to scrutinize government policies. In addition, the leaders of the two main opposition parties do not take part in the parliament. The relationship between the parliament and civil society is incipient, but the media has full access to the Parliament and has a particularly strong presence during plenary sessions.

Azevedo (2009) argues that the parliament has been neglected as a state interlocutor by donors, particularly in light of the overall support that has been provided to state institutions. The author argues that there is a risk of dilution of the Parliament's law-making role, and of the Executive taking over the Legislative, an already noticeable trend.

Overall donor support to the Parliament has been inconsistent although AWEPA and the UN (particularly the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) have been providing sustained support. For instance, UNDP in partnership with the government of Denmark has supported the strengthening of parliamentary oversight, its law-making role, and its relation with the general public and CSOs; the support has included provision of a senior parliamentary advisor who works within parliament[29].

Another example of UNDP's support to the parliament's law-making role has been the initiation and drafting of legislation on the right to food. This has been done through a) enhancing the knowledge and understanding of the members of the Parliamentary Commission on Agriculture, Economy and Environment concerning food security and the right to food, b) facilitating consultation with CSOs working in the area of economic governance, and c) exposing members of mentioned commission to international experiences in developing the Right to Food Legislation. In September 2011, members of parliament visited Brazil to learn from that country's experience in the area of agriculture; the Brazilian legislation has served as inspiration for the draft bill. On 16 December 2013, the Parliament with support from UNDP and AWEPA convened a seminar, in Maputo, to discuss its role in the promotion of agricultural policies in Mozambique and to present a draft bill on agriculture and food and nutritional security[30] to other members of parliament[31].

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[29] UNDP Mozambique (2010), "Annual Report 2009", Maputo.
[30] UNDP's project document indicates that the name of the draft bill could change from the Law on right to food to Law on Agriculture, according to recommendation from the parliamentary commission. http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/documents/projects/MOZ/Prodoc%20Part%20I.pdf
[31] http://www.parlamento.mz/noticias/385-mocambique-clama-por-uma-lei-quadro-da-agricultura; http://www.jornalnoticias.co.mz/index.php/politica/32637-caea-defende-valorizacao-do-agricultor?device=desktop

Consultations with government institutions and CSO about the bill are ongoing. The Ministry of Agriculture[32] FAO and USAID[33] have provided written comments about its content in 2014 while CSO's. There is some controversy around the draft bill, including the fact that some sectors of government and civil society had been advocating for legislation on the right to food and a draft bill had been submitted to the parliament. Interviews with a civil society representative and informal conversations with a government official indicate that the fact that the parliament has initiated the law on agriculture and food and nutrition security led government officials seek alliances with civil society "against" the parliament. Civil society is participating in the process through its membership with the Technical Secretariat on Food and Nutritional Security (SETSAN) and the Network of Civil Society Organisations for Food Sovereignty (ROSA)[34].

Private Sector

The formal relationship between the private sector and government is mediated by the Mozambican Business Confederation (CTA)[35]. Once a year takes place the Private Sector Annual Conference *Conferência Anual do Sector Privado* (CASC) which main's objective is to assess the implementation of reforms; this conference is attended by the President of the Republic. Throughout the year there are other spaces of dialogue between CTA and the government namely, the biannual Extended Consultation Council *Conselho Alargado de Consulta* (CAC) which is focused on the definition and assessment of priorities and is attended by the Prime-Minister; quarterly meetings with relevant ministers and monthly meetings with Permanent Secretaries of relevant sectors. At provincial level, there are biannual provincial forums with the participation of the Provincial Governors and monthly meetings with Provincial Directors. It is not clear whether there are more inclusive dialogue platforms that bring together other stakeholders, including civil society organisations.

Dialogue between CSOs and private sector islimited. These two actors rarely work together and there is a tendency to accentuate differences and tensions and overlook synergies, although there are some examples of collaboration between private sector and trade unions, and a couple of experiences of collaboration between CSOs and private sector initiatives in the field of health, such as, Entrepreneurs Against AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis *Empresários Contra a SIDA, Malária and Tuberculose* (ECOSIDA). ECOSIDA is an NGO constituted with the purpose of mobilizing businesses to respond to HIV and AIDS. The

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[32] Ministerial decree 01/2015 extinguished the Ministry of Agriculture and created the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security.
[33] A summary of the comments provided by USAID can be found at http://www.speed-program.com/our-work/by-sector/agriculture/resumo-dos-comentarios-sobre-o-projecto-de-lei-de-agricultura-seguranca-alimentar-e-nutricional
[34] Created in 2003 by ActionAid, the Association for Sustainable Development (ABIODES) and the National Farmers Union (UNAC).
[35] CTA was established in 1996 as the Working Committee of Associations) and in 1999 it became the Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique. It was established as a coordination forum, to interact with the government and induce an enabling business environment through the adoption and implementation of new legislation and influence sectoral economic policies. http://www.cta.org.mz

organisation engages with civil society organisations through its membership with the HIV and AIDS Partners' Forum and has established working relationships with some of them; this has included building capacity of civil society organizations/groups to reach out to workplaces through tailored partnerships.

The Land Consultative Forum is an inter-ministerial platform that brings together various stakeholders involved in land governance in Mozambique including private sector and CSOs[36]. The forum constitutes an important policy dialogue and formulation platform around land issues. There has been a timid move, in the area of land governance towards co-operation between civil society and private sector fostered by increasing competing interests over land, the government's policy of encouraging large-scale land investments, and the need to regulate and monitor emerging community-investors partnerships. Civil society organisations have been involved in "mediating" these partnerships, some of which have resulted in confrontation, violence and court action. Questions have been raised about the legitimacy of CSO's participation as well as the potential effects of their "collaboration" with investors.

Other incipient collaborative efforts between private sector and CSOs include the design of corporate social responsibility programmes, and alliance-building to influence policy change in areas of common interest, such as, transparency and anti-corruption. Some CSOs are considering raising funds from businesses and the development of products and services as part of their resource mobilization strategies. A study published by FDC (2007) indicates that the private sector and family/individuals constituted the second largest source of financial and material support to civil society organisations (25%) after foreign aid; the government's contribution was only 3%. While there is limited information on the nature of private sector support to civil society organisations, it is clear that the later need to carefully ponder the pros and cons of various models of partnership with the private sector, including the extent to which these partnerships may facilitate or hinder their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work, depending on the target.

Lastly, the public consultation in the context of environmental impact assessments (EIA) – a requirement of Mozambican environmental legislation[37] – is another space in which private

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[36] The Forum congregates government and non-government organisations, agricultural and academic institutions and private sector groupings.

[37] The Mozambican Environmental Law (20/97 of 1 October) and specific Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations (Decree no. 45/2004 of 29 September and Decree no. 42/2008 of 4 November, which amends some articles of Decree no. 45/2004). EIAs for petroleum sector are further regulated by the Environmental Regulations for Petroleum Operations (Decree no. 56/2010 of 22 November), as well as the Petroleum Law (Law no. 3/2001 of 21 February), the Regulations on Petroleum Operations (Decree no. 24/2004 of 20 August), as well Licensing Regulations for Petroleum Installations and Activities (Ministerial Decree no. 272/2009 of December 30). The EIA Regulations define three project categories (A, B and C) on basis of which the extent of the environmental assessment is determined by the Ministry for the Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA). Every investor has to forward the project to MICOA with a proposal indicating in which category it falls. If it requires a full-scale EIA MICOA is (i) to ensure that the company prepares a TOR for the EIA which warrants approval, (ii) to verify that the EIA is carried out by a certified body, (iii) to receive, distribute and comment on the full EIA report. The decision of whether the project can move ahead is make by a technical committee (CTA - Comissão Técnica de Avaliação) consisting of several ministries. Public consultation (of Interested and Affected Parties is enshrined in the Regulation on the Environmental Impact Assessment

sector and CSO interact. An example includes the involvement of the CSO Justiça Ambiental in the consultation for the Mphanda Nkuwa hydroelectric dam and its various articles[38] about the process. CSO working in the area of natural resources and environmental protection have criticised EIA's timing and procedures. The first issue of concern is the fact that the EIA process is only carried after the Exploration and Production Concession (EPC) contract has been formally signed thus, if a given project is found to have a serious negative social and environmental impact, the government would need to break the contract and consequently pay fines to the company, in order to enforce the EIA legislation. The second issue of concern is the conflict of interest related to fact that the companies are responsible for selecting and hiring consultants to conduct EIAs. CSOs advocate that this should be altered to have companies for Category A and B paying fees to MICOA who would then select consultants through an open bidding process. A percentage of the fees should be retained by MICOA to cover its increasing costs in evaluating and monitoring these investments (Ribeiro & Dimon 2011). The third issue is the lack of information, consultation, participation and monitoring during the EIA process and in the course of project implementation (Ribeiro & Dimon 2011).

CSOs have also been monitoring the social and environmental impacts of activities conducted by private sector companies. For example, Justiça Ambiental has monitored the process, ORAM and UNAC have followed the resettlement of populations affected by the activities of the mining company Vale, in Tete province. Interestingly, CSOs engagement with monitoring activities of private sector companies has largely focused in the interrelated areas of natural resources and environment.

An example of donor support to CSOs engagement with the private sector is Norway's Oil for Development Programme[39] includes provision of funding to Norwegian[40] and international NGOs, aimed at building the capacity of its partners in developing countries around transparency and accountability in petroleum governance and revenue management, as well as environmental and social sustainability in petroleum activities. Mozambican CSOs were supported through Norwegian People's Aid (until 2010), as well as the World Wide Fund which has focused on building the capacity of the civil society platform on natural resources (NORAD 2012). In March 2015, a non-profit Norwegian

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Process (Decree No.45 / 2004) and the General Directive for Public Participation in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Ministerial Order 130/2006).

The General Directive for the Public Participation Process in the Environmental Impact Assessment Process (Ministerial Order 130 / 2006 of July 19) which standardizes public participation processes.

[38]Justiça Ambiental (2011), "Principais artigos da JA! De 2001 a 2011", Maputo. http://ja4change.org/index.php/pt/recursos/publicacoes/category/1-reports

[39] Norway has assisted the petroleum sector in Mozambique since 1983. In 2005, the Norwegian government reorganised its support and established the Oil for Development (OfD) program which broaden the support, which comprised, amongst others, inclusion of civil society (NORAD 2012).

[40] Norwegian recipients of OfD funds for civil society activities are WWF Norway, Publish What You Pay Norway, the Norwegian People's Aid, the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO), Friends of the Earth Norway, Norwegian Students' and Academics' International Assistance Fund (SAIH), and the Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) (CMI 2012)

government foundation[41], Petrad delivered a course on the petroleum sector and its value chain for CSOs and journalists in Maputo.

3.2 Spaces & Space to influence

Mozambique's history has produced a closed and non-consultative governance culture (Rebello et al. 2002). While the situation has improved over the last few years, the general feeling is that openness and the nature of state-society interactions are heavily dependent on the personality, life story and good will of certain individuals. There are also considerable differences between sectors; while some certain sectors (such as health and education) have been more permeable to CSOs (particularly because of their role in service delivery), others have been more insulated. In addition, there are also legally regulated consultative platforms; the Consultative Land Forum above mentioned is a case in point. Relationships between the government and civil society organisations are often ambiguous, fragile and ever changing, even in sectors relatively more open to their participation. As a civil society representative puts it:

> "The socio-political context is favourable because our country is a champion in terms of ratifying documents created abroad and, as members of the United Nations, we have several policy monitoring platforms. However, we continue to have a political system that is captive of people. If you have a minister of health that is sensitive to an issue, your agenda will move forward (...) we have fragile institutions that are dependent on their senior leadership (...). We are worried about the change of government, we are worried about what the next government will think of us (...). Mozambique does not recognise the opinion of groups; results of opinion surveys do not matter, what matters is the opinion of the senior leader".

While international commitments and pressure[42] as well as the government's own interests have contributed to the emergence of formal spaces for policy dialogue, they have not necessarily translated into increased openness to civil society and to alternative ideas. The interactions in those spaces are well documented (Forquilha 2009, Macuane 2012, ITAD & COWI 2012, Oxfam Novib & Ibis 2013). The literature highlights the following aspects: the cult to the leader, the promiscuity between state institutions and the dominant political party, conflict of interests of government officials and members of parliament; traditional state-civil hierarchies and misconceived assumptions about the role of civil society as well as

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[41] Petrad was established by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate in 1989 to facilitate the transfer of knowledge and experience from petroleum management, administration and technology between managers and experts in governments and national oil companies. Petrad's main services and activities are channeled and financed through the Norwegian government's "Oil for development" programme (OfD).

[42] Some policy dialogue spaces were created to comply with the conditions defined by international financing institutions and multilateral/bilateral agencies and funds. For instance, the development observatories to criticism from these institutions about the lack of consultation and civil society participation in the development of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, while the spaces created for civil society participation in the "National AIDS Response" were one of the requirement of multilateral/bilateral agencies and funds for supporting the National AIDS Council.

the fact that many of these spaces are used to legitimize policy choices already made. These spaces are created "with attention not to upset the political establishment"[43]. As the ITAD & COWI (2012) report notes "openness" of the government to policy depends on how controversial the issue is. "If non-controversial – the space widens; if controversial – the space shrinks".

Policy spaces generally gravitate around specific government policy and strategies, are mainly convened by government institutions, and tend to depend on the government agenda. They include the national and provincial Development Observatories, various sector working groups and a myriad of "consultation seminars". The invited nature of these policy spaces means that the government has the prerogative of choosing whom it wants to invite. Many of the interviewees called attention to the need for more transparency and accountability regarding which groups are represented in policy spaces, particularly in government–led consultations. There are also concerns about a tendency to privileged organisations that serve the interests of the political regime in detriment of dissent voices. Political polarisation and intolerance has a negative effect on the quality of dialogue, and civil society representatives who decide to take a position run the risk of being accused of serving the interests of a particular opposition party or external agendas.

Policy dialogue spaces have not been decentralized at district/community level. While Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation (Local Development Committees and District Consultative Councils)[44] have been created to foster dialogue between local governments and communities, and members of consultative committees are expected to be consulted on planning and monitoring matters, they have a marginal role in policy-making processes; discussions at community level are not linked to district planning and budgeting processes.

Several authors have argued that these spaces are mainly occupied by local elites and questioned their real value in terms of policy influencing. Faehndrich & Nhantumbo contend that "given their weak monitoring function and focus on consultation, *Conselhos Consultivos* [District Consultative Councils] could be seen as an invited political space and a means by which the government can both capture and control civil society protest and avoid external criticism" (2012:20).

A few civil society organisations (such as, Akilizetho, ORAM, Sociedade Aberta) have been implementing activities to strengthen the capacity of the community participation and consultations mechanisms. The interventions have involved diagnostics of competences and needs assessments, trainings[45], dissemination of governance instruments, fostering

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[43] Expression borrowed from Hodges and Tibana (2004) who apply it in relation to how policy decisions are made.

[44] Through Law on Local State Organs *Lei dos Orgãos Locais do Estado* (Law 8/2003).

[45] For instance, Sociedade Aberta has provided training on the planning cycle, budgeting, monitoring, and lobby and advocacy[45]while Akilizetho has focused on partnership development, development of economic activities, and gender equality and female leadership. (Sources: Sociedade Aberta (n/d) "Acesso a Terra na Província do Maputo: Tema Central do Trimestre", Revista, 4ª edição, Maputo; Sociedade Aberta (2014), "Cidadania Activa e Governação: Um Estudo de Caso da Sociedade Aberta", Maputo; Taimo, Nelia, (2014), "Estudo de Caso Akilizetho – ADS, Nampula", Maputo).

experience-exchange, developing mechanisms to promote the inclusion of community concerns in planning processes at district level.

Sociedade Aberta and district civil society platforms have been involved in the elaboration of Community Agendas to influence the development of the District Economic and Social Plan and Budget *Plano Económico Social e Orçamento do Distrito* (PESOD). The Community Agendas are an advocacy tool containing the main priorities identified by local communities, through a process of consultations and systematization of information facilitated by Sociedade Aberta and the district platforms. The document produced is discussed with the District Technical Themes *Equipes Técnicas Distritais*[46] and presented to the District Governments aiming at the integration of the concerns identified in the PESODs. Following PESOD's approval Sociedade Aberta and the district civil society platforms (in coordination with local leaders) inform the communities with whom they have worked about the degree of integration of their concerns in the district plans and budgets and monitors their implementation.

The existence of parallel and disarticulated planning processes has been a disincentive for engaging in policy-making processes. There is one process centred on the Poverty Reduction Action Plan *Plano de Acção de Redução da Pobreza* (PARP), the key accountability instrument between donors, government and civil society, and another process centred on the Five-Year Government Programme (*Plano Quinquenal do Governo*) that is monitored by the Parliament.

The Five-Year Government Programme reflects the manifesto of the winning political party. There is not room for participation of donors and CSOs in the development of the party manifesto as the process follows internal party dynamics, but they can influence from the outside[47].

The Five-Year Government Plan is discussed and approved by the Parliament. It is on the basis of this document and not the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper that planning departments from line ministries prepare annual Economic and Social Plan *Plano Económico e Social* (PES) and Budgets and send to the Ministry of Planning and Development who is responsible for aggregating all information. Both instruments generate bi-annual and annual reports which form the basis for monitoring the implementation of the Government's Five-Year Plan. The Five-Year Government Programme also provides the basis for the development of five year sector strategic plans, such as, the Health Sector Strategic Plan

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[46] Government institutions at district level.

[47] Some civil society groups have developed interventions to influence the electoral manifestos of political parties. These have included research, training seminars as well as formal meetings. For instance, in 2014 (election year) the coordination committee of the Mozambican Civil Society Platform for Social Protection Plataforma da Sociedade Civil para a Protecção Social (PSC-PS) convened a meeting with political parties with the purpose of providing technical inputs for the integration of social inclusion in their manifestos. The coordinating committee is composed by Fórum Mulher, the Civil Society Forum for Child Rights *Forum da Sociedade Civil para os Direitos da Criança* (ROSC), Forum da Terceira Idade (FTI), Forum of Mozambican Associations of People with Disability *Fórum das Associações Moçambicanas dos Deficientes* (FAMOD). Some civil society women's networks (such as, Fórum Mulher, NAFEZA) have also implemented activities to influence party manifesto in the context of their "women in politics programmes".

Plano Estratégico do Sector da Saúde (PESS) and thematic strategies within a given sector, such as, the Gender Strategy for the Health Sector.

There is not clear policy on the collaboration between state and non-state actors for the development of these strategies. Civil society's participation in the development of five-year strategic plans tends to be limited to some sectors and if often limited to the "consultation phase", usually after the strategic and operational planning (when priorities are defined). CSOs have little say in the prioritization of strategies and identification of appropriate interventions. Below is an illustration of the development of a sector strategic plan and the dynamics described in this paragraph. It is based on the findings of an independent joint assessment of the content and process of the Health Sector Strategic Plan (PESS 2014-2019), conducted in 2013, in the context of the International Health Partnership (IHP+).

According to the report of the Joint Assessment of National Strategies (JANS), the PESS 2014 – 2019 "was developed by the Ministry of Health (Department of Planning and Cooperation) together with the other Departments of the Ministry, the Provincial Health Departments (DPS), technical and financial partners and with indirect support from Civil Society Organisations" (JANS 2013:9). The process was led by a technical working group consisting of senior staff from the National Directorate of Planning & Cooperation and technical cooperation partners (not very clear who exactly these were) of the Ministry of Health. The process which lasted slightly over than a year involved internal and external consultations. The internal consultations targeted heads of programs, departments and institutions subordinate to the Ministry of Health as well as six joint Technical Working Groups of the health sector - Administration and Finance, Human Resources, NGOs[48], Service Delivery Systems, Drugs, Logistics, Procurement and PIMA - who participated either collectively or individually. All these actors provided comments to all the three versions of the document.

The external consultation process was led by senior staff and technicians of the Ministry of Health and donors, and was conducted in two phases. The first covered development partners of the Ministry of Health and a national consultation involving all Provincial Health Directorates and representatives of civil society. The second phase covered consultations with civil society in all Mozambican provinces, seven Provincial Governments, and Government institutions at central level. Private sector health care providers were not represented. The report underlines that "the large-scale consultation of civil society and provincial governments was carried out at a time when the priorities of the sector for the next five years had already been decided upon, thus casting doubt on the contribution these stakeholders could make in influencing decision-making in the sector" (JANS 2013:9).

Arguably, CSOs' participation is more pronounced in the monitoring of the PARP[49] (through consultations and participation in Development Observatories) as few organisations engage in the development of sector strategic plans. The Development Observatories are a space

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[48] Not clear which NGOs.

[49] Ironically, the Government's Five-Year Programme 2010-2014 does not mention the PARP, and the last PARP (2011-2014) expired last year. Francisco (2012) argues that although the PARP has become more emblematic than the policy instruments defined by the Mozambican Constitution (namely the PES and the Five-Year Government Plan) it only serves to mobilise financial resources and to legitimise aid.

created by the government, but result from civil society demand. These forums meet twice a year and the agenda is set by the government, usually without the participation of civil society organisations. The selection of the civil society representatives is carried out by CSOs in coordination with the Government and represented groups include, NGO networks, academic and research institutions, foundations, trade unions, private sector, and faith-based organisations.

There is documented evidence about the ineffectiveness of the Development Observatories in terms of policy dialogue and its gradual co-option by the government; there are also concerns about the representativeness of CSOs involved (Macuane et al. 2010, Forquilha and Orre 2012, Macuane 2012). However, some have underlined that despite all its problems the Development Observatories are an important space for political bargaining (Oxfam & IBIS 2012).

In July 2014, the Mozambican Parliament approved the National Development Strategy (2015-2035) a document inspired in yet another strategic document - the Agenda 2025[50]. According to the government, the strategy results from "the need to deal with the proliferation of various strategic approaches and the limited articulation between existing planning instruments". One of the main aims of this document is "to improve the alignment between medium term instruments, specifically the Five-Year Government Programme, the Poverty Reduction Action Plan, the Integrated Programme of Investments, and sector and territorial strategies, documents that are not currently aligned, in terms of its targets and priorities, constraining their articulation in annual planning". The National Development Strategy will be operationalised through the Five-Year Government Programme, the Medium-Term Fiscal Framework, Economic and Social Plan (annual) and the State Budget (National Development Strategy 2015-2035).

Interestingly the National Development Strategy mentions civil society only once and the use of the word participation is associated with contribution and not with citizen participation. It is not clear how inclusive the production of the National Development Strategy was and none of the civil society interviewees mentioned this document. Yet it is important to underline that this does not necessarily mean that the process was closed. Many of the interviewees argued that civil society organisations have inadequate knowledge about policy- making processes, including those within the sectors whose decisions they aim to influence.

There is little evidence of policies or strategies proposed by civil society. The interviews and the documentation consulted suggest a discrepancy between civil society's engagement in strategic planning processes and in legal reform processes. While civil society's scrutiny of

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[50] Agenda 2025: National Vision and Strategies is a government document that provides the vision for Mozambique's development until 2025. According to the government "the Agenda 2025 has the particularity that it was conceived, produced and implemented by Mozambicans for Mozambicans". The development of Agenda 2025 took place over a 24 month period during which several structures were created and extensive consultations with civil society representatives at national, provincial and district levels, covering a variety of themes (explored through sector and thematic nucleus). The final document has a focus on poverty alleviation through building human capital and was approved by the Parliament in 2004 (Agenda 2025 2003).

the national legal framework has been high and documented examples of civil society's successfully influencing positive change are in the area of legislation[51] there are less examples of civil society's scrutiny of government policies and programmes beyond research-focused CSOs. The PROSAVANA programme and the Social Protection Programmes (implemented by the National Institute of Social Action) represent a couple of the few examples of CSOs' efforts to influence government programmes. The outburst of initiatives to monitor service-delivery at community level may lead to an increased focus on government programmes, however this is not yet clearly articulated in the documentation consulted or the discourses of people interviewed.

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[51] The Land Campaign which culminated with the approval of the Land Law in 1997, the Law on Domestic Violence Against Women, approved in 2009, and more recently the contested Penal Code Review Bill and the Bills to amend the pension schemes of members of Parliament.

4. CSOs engaging in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy

This section briefly presents the organisational profiles of the 10 CSOs case studies, discusses issues of legitimacy, the topics and issues in which they work (and how they have been defined), the strategies adopted (including the role of CS-platforms and thematic networks), the underlying theories of change, the effectiveness of interventions and, capacity development processes; this last sub-section includes a discussion on the contribution of Dutch organisations.

4.1. Organisational Profiles

The 10 CSOs case studies are all professionalised organisations established between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s. Three of the ten CSOs are membership/constituency-based. The majority of them is based in Maputo (Cruzeiro do Sul, CIP, Coalizão, LAMBDA, N'weti, WLSA) with some linkages with organisations in the provinces. N'weti has opened an office in Nampula province. LAMBDA has provincial assistants in Inhambane, Nampula and Pemba[52]. CIP, Coalizão and WLSA implement interventions in some provinces, in partnership with local organisations. One is a national network (Forum Mulher) and another a provincial network (NAFEZA). Forum Mulher has member organisations in all provinces, while NAFEZA's members are all based in Zambézia. Three CSOs are based in the provinces (Akilizetho and ORAM in Nampula, and NAFEZA in Zambézia).

Forum Mulher and WLSA are feminist organisations, their work focuses on women's human rights and gender equality, as well as NAFEZA's interventions. N'weti focuses on health communication, but the profile of the organisations is changing. Coalizão is a youth organisation with a particular focus on information, communication and education about young people's sexual and reproductive health and rights. CIP was formed by a group of recently graduated university students with an interest in political and economic governance, the organisation's work focuses on the promotion of integrity, transparency, ethics and good governance in the public sphere. Cruzeiro do Sul was established as a research institute by university researchers and lectures whose research main focus was on poverty, rural development, and land; this institution came to play a key role in the land campaign, the development of Agenda 2025, and in establishment of the G20, but has closed its doors in 2014. Akilizetho works in the area of local governance, with a particular focus on the establishment and strengthening of institutions for community participation and consultation. ORAM works in the area of community land rights. LAMBDA focuses on sexual minority rights.

Most CSOs combine policy influencing with service delivery work. Cruzeiro do Sul, CIP, N'weti, and WLSA have a strong research component which includes investigative journalism, formative research and academic research. Although not systematically, the

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[52] Based in Population Services International (PSI) and Pathfinder International's offices.

other CSOs have also commissioned research. All CSOs are part of several CS platforms and networks, some of which have been initiated by them. All 10 CSOs are somehow involved in policy influencing work. While some heavily rely on the platforms and networks to which they belong, others also have policy influencing interventions outside these. Some have clearly articulated their policy influencing goals and strategies, are increasingly documenting their experiences and results, and are investing resources to build their technical capacity in this area. Others, despite their long-standing engagement with these matters and accumulated expertise, have not been able to articulate a coherent approach to their policy influencing work, including the links with their other work, and their annual reports present scant information about their work.

4.2. Topics & Issues

CSOs' growing interest in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy has been accompanied by the broadening of topics and issues they address – land and food rights, sexual and reproductive health rights (which include maternal and infant mortality, fistula, abortion), women's and child human rights (premature marriages, initiation rites, sexual harassment and abuse in schools, gender-based violence, environment conservation and pollution, state and corporate transparency, urban transport and mobility, youth employment, social protection, amongst others.

While in the past civil society organisations intervened mainly on issues of social, humanitarian and human rights nature which generated little controversy, more recently many have redirected their attention to more contentious matters[53] (such as, sexual minority rights, state and corporate transparency, corruption, conflict of interest) in the sectors where they have traditionally focused. For example, CSOs working in the health sector have moved from simply calling for better health they have started monitoring availability, access and quality of drugs in health units. Similarly, organisations working in the education sector are increasingly questioning ministerial decrees (such as, one that banned pregnant girls/students from attending day classes), producing evidence on sexual abuse in schools, and denouncing corruption in the sector. In addition, CSOs have persisted in their efforts to bring to the policy debate culturally sensitive issues (such as, initiation rites, premature marriages and abortion). Other CSOs have taken up topics that had not been previously addressed (such as, sexual minority rights, transparency, conflict of interests, as well as budget and expenditure monitoring).

Rebelo et al. (2002) discuss how topics and issues become part of the agenda of civil society organisations and distinguish between: a) the issues identified by civil society activists i.e. what they feel are the main concerns of society; b) the issues actually taken up by civil society and; c) the issues of concern to citizens. They also distinguish between concerns (worries expressed by the people about things that are important to them) and issues for advocacy (important topics for debate or resolution). The document review indicates several ways through which topics and issues enter the agenda of CSOs, namely: a) based on the

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[53] Interview with INGO.

service delivery components of civil society organisations' work; b) through community consultations of various duration and degree of participation; c) drawing on findings from situational analysis, evaluations, national surveys and statistics, formative research, investigative journalism and scholarly research; d) through involvement in regional platforms and transnational movements; and e) through donor "suggestion".

The technical skills and knowledge CSOs have built around certain themes and issues over time has had an effect on the policy dialogue. Drawing on an analysis of Mozambican civil society's participation in the African Peer Review mechanism (APRM)[54] Francisco (2007) notes that civil society's contribution to the process in terms of adherence, participation and interest were focused in two of the four thematic areas covered by the review[55] namely, democracy and political governance and socio-economic development. The author asserts that whilst the debates were rich and productive showing civil society' strengthen in these two areas, they also revealed the knowledge deficiencies in relation to economic governance and corporate governance. The interviews for this study confirmed this discrepancy however, the document review also revealed that there has been significant improvement of civil society's knowledge of economic and corporate governance issues, over the past decade, due to changing economic landscape associated with the mining boom and large scale land investments as well as the emergence of organisations, such as, CIP and IESE.

4.3. Legitimacy issues

The topic of legitimacy of CSOs has generated heated debates. The issues of contention identified through the document review and interviews include the following:

The context of emergence and social basis of CSOs

The fact that some have emerged out of an effort by Northern NGOs to identify local "partners" to implement their projects which in many places was associated with the replacement of former mass democratic organisations by new groups without members of representation mandate has been problematized (Negrão 2003). For instance, many new organisations were created as a response to the availability of foreign funding for humanitarian projects, and more recently, to "combat" the HIV epidemic. Although, some of the HIV CSOs created were of people living with HIV, the vast majority did not have a constituency and lacked mechanisms to meaningfully involve targeted groups in decision-making. A study conducted by FDC (2007) notes that "high class/elite and religious minorities groups have the most equitable participation whereas the poor, the elderly, and

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[54] The African Peer Review Mechanism was launched in 2003 by the African Union and is a mutually agreed instrument voluntarily acceded to by the Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism. Mozambique acceded to the APRM in 2003, finalised its self-assessment process in mid-2008, and received the visit from the APRM Country Review Mission for Mozambique in February/March 2009. In the same year, IESE produced a critical review of the auto-assessment report submitted by Mozambique; the analysis focused on democracy and political governance. In 2013, Mozambique submitted its first report on the implementation of the APRM Action Plan; the document details the progress made by Mozambique between 2010 and 2012.

[55] Democracy and Political Governance, Economic Governance, Corporate Governance and Socio-economic Development.

the disabled groups were considered absent or excluded. Women, the rural population, ethnic minorities, youth and PLWA are considered a little under-represented or excluded from CSOs (p.32)".

 The issue of limited representation and connections of CSOs with under-privileged groups has raised questions about their legitimacy to engage in policy influencing. It has also been used to resist legal changes proposed by CSOs based on the argument that concerns reflect the views of a minority[56] and do not represent broader interests. Questions about the social rooting of CSOs has generated debate about: a) the extent to which an organization needs to have a constituency in order to engage in lobby and advocacy and; b) whether legitimacy to intervene in policy making processes should be exclusively drawn from CSOs' social basis or the causes they defend can be the very source of their legitimacy? (Oxfam & Ibis 2012). Some argue that political action is the right of every concerned citizen and organisation[57].

While many CSOs may not have a constituency, they usually seek popular support through various means (explored in the following sub-section) for their policy influencing work, and through their participation in civil society platforms and networks they work collaboratively with organisations that have a constituency. In this regard, USAID's 2013 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa asserts that Mozambican CSOs "also build constituencies through the use of social auditing and community score cards".

ITAD & COWI's report (2012) argues that organisations that were established with a clear mandate on policy dialogue, "(...) defend legitimate interests, since in most cases the issues they discuss coincide with the most critical concerns of society. As a result these organisations are held accountable not by a constituency, but by general public" (ITAD & COWI 2012). The issue of accountability to the general public seems problematic as it assumes that the latter is informed about CSOs missions and interventions. This is not certain given the dearth of information on citizen's perceptions of CSOs. The USAID 2013 CSO Sustainability Index points out that "CSOs in Mozambique do not enjoy a significant amount of media coverage (...) The public continues to be sceptical of CSOs, often seeing them as individuals pursuing opportunities to make revenue rather than as groups representing the interests of Mozambique's neediest citizens" it is however not clear which instruments were used to survey CSOs public image in Mozambique. There is little research on citizens' perceptions and expectations of CSOs. The issue of CSO accountability is connected to the lack of transparency and self-regulatory mechanisms (including conflict of interest policies, complaint mechanisms, and reporting frameworks) discussed below.

Perceived incoherence between NGO salaries & calls for greater responsibility from politicians

This perception situates NGO staff in the context of growing economic disparity and class differentiation in Mozambique. It highlights the competition among well-positioned elites for NGO jobs and resources and the contradictions between calls for greater responsibility

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[56] This was the case with the draft bill on domestic violence against women. The NGOs that drafted the bill were regarded as unrepresentative of the people.
[57] Interview with CSO representative.

from politicians and their lifestyles. This issue emerged in discussions about the civil society advocacy campaign "No to legalised robbery"[58] to contest and prevent the approval by the Assembly of the Republic (AR) of the bills to amend Law no. 21/92 of 31 December and Law no. 31/2007, of 21 December – Law on the Statute and Social Welfare of Deputies (LPSD)[59]. The bills determine a series of benefits and privileges for members of parliament and for the President of the Republic (PR). Some interviewees questioned the legitimacy of some CSOs to oppose the revision of members of parliament' pension schemes, arguing that some of the people involved in the advocacy campaign have better living conditions than them. A counter-argument is that because of the financial and material comfort CSOs' staff enjoy, it becomes harder for them to be co-opted by the government, and increases the chances of recruiting and retaining qualified staff. The issue of salaries of NGO professionals also surfaced in discussions about capacity development and the highly competitive job market in Mozambique.

Internal governance and transparency

The lack of internal checks and balances, transparency, shared decision-making, and compliance with regulations within CSOs has generated criticism about their legitimacy to point the finger at the government. A report of the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (2010) highlights the contradictions between CSOs accusing the government of lack of transparency and demanding increased accountability to citizens and their own unwillingness to disclose information on budgets, sources of funding and expenditure. While CSOs are primarily accountable to donors some have started publishing their annual narrative and financial reports as well as audit reports (for example in their websites) to prove that they are transparent and accountable. This trend is particularly notable amongst CSOs involved in policy influencing work in the areas of transparency and accountability. Making information available is also a way of showing the effectiveness of CSOs' work and of building credibility.

Technical expertise and knowledge

CSO's increased technical expertise in some areas, particularly when compared to some government institutions grants them a considerable degree of legitimacy when they participate in policy making processes. This is manifested in invitations received by CSOs to present their research findings in government events as well as to provide training to government institutions in various areas. However, many have pointed out that civil society still lack the ability to propose alternative policy proposals and tend to provide technical inputs to policies defined by the government or simply to criticise them. Civil society's policy proposals would increase their legitimacy.

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[58] The campaign was coordinated by Fórum Nacional de Rádios Comunitárias (FORCOM), Centro de Aprendizagem e Capacitação da Sociedade Civil (CESC), N´weti - Comunicação para a Saúde, Fórum Mulher, Centro de Integridade Pública (CIP), Liga dos Direitos Humanos (LDH), and Liga de ONGs de Moçambique (JOINT). (Source: N'weti, (2014), Narrative Report of the Campaign Deputados de Luxo/No to legalise robbery.)
[59] Law no. 21/92 of 31 December lays down the rights and duties of the President of the Republic while in office and after leaving office. Law no. 31/2007 of 21 December sets out the system of welfare and social security for deputies (Source: MASC Fact Sheet N.26/July 2014).

Lack of collaboration and consensus

In policy spaces, the government has a preference for interacting with groups of organisations rather than with individual CSOs. For many years, division and lack of consensus among CSOs was used to delegitimise the claims made by individual CSOs with the argument that they represented minority voices. The use of this type of argument has slightly reduced with the formation and consolidation of thematic civil society networks with a clear purpose of influencing policies.

4.4. Policy influencing Strategies and Practices

This section discusses the preferred policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies adopted by the 10 CSOs and includes views of interviewees on their relevance to the Mozambican context. The discussion draws on the categorization of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies adapted by IOB from Start and Hovland (2004) – see figure below - outlined in the TORs for the country study (Annex 1).

The figure[60] distinguishes two main track strategies namely, "inside" (focused on cooperation and persuasion) and "outside" (focused on confrontation and pressure). "Inside" strategies generally focus on advising and lobbying while "outside" strategies focus on advocacy and activism. The diagram suggests that some strategies (advising and advocacy) are evidence/science based while others (lobbying and activism) are

interest/value based. While at first it may seem that these two dimensions are antagonistic in reality there is usually a dialectic relationships between the two. Yet, distinguishing the two is useful to identify how different policy influencing interventions are informed.

The interviews and the document review indicate that the 10 CSOs while adopting a myriad of strategies to influence policies have privileged non-confrontational interaction (inside strategies). There is a shared perception that collaboration is the best approach to influence policies in Mozambique, given its political context. The CSOs highlighted the importance of engaging not to point fingers at the government, but to work together in a cooperative

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[60] Adapted from Start and Hovland (2004) and provided in the TORs for the country study.

manner thus, they have invested in advising and lobbying strategies. These have entailed participation in formal policy spaces mainly through networks and platforms, creation of new spaces formal and informal[61], use of informal networks to access information and influential individuals, and informal contacts with the ruling party, traditional authorities and religious leaders.

The advising strategy has depended on the space provided by the government. On many occasions, CSOs have had to claim access to policy spaces and processes that were already underway without them or with selected CSOs (ITAD & COWI 2012). CSOs have had to lobby to participate in policy making and legislation drafting processes (e.g. the penal code review process)[62]. While this raises issues about how CSOs are selected to participate in policy spaces, it also evidences the re-active character of CSO policy influencing interventions. A CSO interviewee notes:

> "Civil society[63] has been reactive, it is not adequately prepared to influence the development agendas of the government, private sector and donors (...) When I talk about being reactive, means that civil society is not sufficiently organised to influence policies in a reflected manner (...) Only when the media reports something we react, and sometimes emotionally. There are situations in which we have to act immediately, even without much information, because the train is moving."

The interviewee argued that the new legislature and new government offer opportunities for CSOs to influence the agendas that will be defined, but so far nothing has been done. CSOs are also not taking advantage of the invitations received from the Parliament to place CS advisors who would provide technical assistance to MPs and attend parliamentary sessions. Many feel that CSOs are not making adequate use of existing invited and claimed spaces and defend that despite all the problems these spaces have they are important, and defend that instead of only complaining that these are "staged spaces", CSOs should engage and try to change them from inside.

Lobbying has depended upon social capital, personal networks and the extent to which they are able to tap into insider "champions of participation"[64] who provide information about on-going processes that have started without including CSO and facilitate access to key documents which improve the quality of CSO input. The trainings provided by CSOs to government officials are also windows for advising and lobbying activities. All 10 CSOs develop training initiatives targeting public officers and institutions with the view of raising their awareness and commitment. These trainings are perceived as important "advocacy tools" not only because they enable dissemination of messages and learning, but also because they create opportunities for further access to and collaboration with public

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[61] One CSO interviewee declared: "[name of organisation] is not interested in occupying created [invited] spaces. [name of organisation] enlarges the public space, it crosses the boundaries of what should be known or not. [name of organisation] disseminates information that the government tries to retain and prevent its dissemination".
[62] WLSA Annual Report 2013.
[63] While the interviewee was talking about CSO, the term civil society was used.
[64] DFID study cited in Rebello et al. (2002).

institutions. Furthermore, trainings are perceived as a contribution to the implementation of approved policies and legislation, and an important occasion for dissemination of evidence and documentation collected by CSOs (besides the publication of documents, reports and statements through media, e-mails, websites and press briefings). Annual reports rarely provide information on participants' evaluation of the trainings[65].

Despite a preference for non-confrontational interaction, the use of advocacy interventions to put pressure has significantly intensified and the use of name and shaming has also been adopted by some organisations, such as, CIP and Forum Mulher. Public opinion has been mobilised through collaboration with organisations working on social communication and media (including community radios) who disseminate information, convene radio and television debates on policy issues and invite CSO representatives, conduct investigative journalism and write/publish relevant pieces.

The recourse to peaceful marches to influence policy change has also increased. This has been aided by the use of social mobilisation techniques which have started to feature prominently in the strategic plans of CSOs. Peaceful marches have taken place in the context of broader advocacy campaigns and have always been conducted by CSO coalitions. This strategy has been mainly used by women's groups, often during commemorative dates relevant for women's rights and gender equality, such as, the 8th March, 7 of April and the 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence. However, in the last couple of years, other organisations have adhered to marches. For instance, many of the focus CSOs (based in Maputo) participated in the march for peace and against insecurity in Maputo City, on the 31st October 2013. The demonstration was against the politico-military tension in the country, kidnappings, and rape and murder of women. According to Savana, a local newspaper, around 30.000 people participated in the demonstration. A communique was read by representatives of civil society organisations[66]. The majority of CSOs (based in Maputo) has also participated in the peaceful demonstration, held on the 16th March 2014, in the context of the campaign "No to legalised robbery", mentioned in the previous sub-section.

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[65] WLSA was the only CSO that provided relevant information on participation's perceptions which comprised two evaluation reports: i) report of an external evaluation of the collaboration between WLSA and the Centre for Legal and Judicial Training conducted in 20013 and ii) External evaluation report of the project "Prevention and Response to Domestic Violence in Health Units of Maputo City" July 2008-June 2010 (2010). The project had a strong component of training of healthcare staff about the legal, moral and cultural aspects of domestic violence, as well as identification, registration and referral of cases of women experiencing domestic violence, in addition to in-service technical assistance and monitoring in health units. During the evaluation, 27 participants in the trainings courses provided by WLSA were interviewed about the training received, the utilization of the newly acquired knowledge and abilities as well as the factors affecting their utilization; in addition to these 6 managers of the health units where the health professionals worked were also interviewed about the relevance, usefulness and quality of the training as well as the best way of continuing with this initiative Health providers trained were highly interested and found useful the contents lectured. This is relevant given that for many health professionals this was the first time they heard about the content of existing legislation on women's rights (such as, the Family Law) and for those who had heard about them (mainly through the media), the training was the first opportunity they had to discuss about domestic violence. Changes regarding empowerment at individual level were also reported mainly by female nurses; their stories talk about the power of knowledge, power within and power with.

[66] http://www.wlsa.org.mz/marcha-pela-paz-e-contra-a-inseguranca/

While both advocacy and activism include public action, some CSO representatives showed reluctance to adhere to activities with an activist edge, but less reservations in relation to public communications and education campaigns. Indeed, the word campaign is very present in the PILA jargon of the focus CSO, often used indiscriminately and covering a wide range of issues, levels of interventions, and aims. To illustrate, the aims of campaigns range from influencing individuals' behaviour change in relation to sexual and reproductive health or community tolerance to gender based violence to the integration of an issue in a policy or strategic planning document.

Rebello et al. (2002) note that "'campaigns' mobilise many organisations for a given period of time (land mines, explanation of land law, All Against Violence, voter education) and then cease, or last for an indefinite period (aspects of All Against Violence, debt), or may culminate in the creation of an organisation that moves on to more permanent issues in that field (e.g. Land and Debt) (p.30). Few CSOs distinguish between advocacy aimed at policy change and that related to broader societal practices. In addition, CSOs rarely develop an advocacy strategy. The campaign for the approval of the domestic violence against women bill and the recent campaign to prevent the increase of MP's privileges are the exceptions identified.

Arguably, CSOs' preference for certain strategies is related to the perceived targets of interventions. Marches and demonstrations are more visible and tend to be received as a direct "attack" to state institutions, while public communications and campaigns to raise awareness are directed to the general public. One interviewee pointed out: "At present, the party [FRELIMO] and the parliament have fear of demonstrations (...)" and another claimed that public demonstrations often result in polarisation[67] and highlighted the importance of engaging the public while at the same time keeping the channels for dialogue open.

Reservations in relation to marches and demonstrations are also associated with the perception that they tend to be emotionally-driven and based on moral and ethical arguments rather than evidence. A CSO that has adopted this strategy as part of its violence against women work highlighted the importance of providing some sort of evidence, which in the case of marches means "giving a face to violence" and provide testimonies of people who have been affected by gender based violence (both direct victims and relatives).

While questioning the bases that drive actors involved in marches, some noted that marches are effective in the Mozambican context[68] and that they have forced dialogue. However, there is also evidence of the parliament disseminating counter-information through social media to prevent the realisation of a march in the context of the penal code review as the following quotation illustrates: "when CS announced that it is going to hold a demonstration, one day before the demonstration the parliament called us and said they have made the change we demanded, when in fact they had not"[69].

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[67] The study did not find an example in which this has been the case.
[68] "As marchistas funcionam aqui no nosso contexto" – interview with CSO representative.
[69] Interview with CSO representative.

Peaceful marches are also used to inform the public about a given situation and to generate public support, or in other words, "force the public to influence the parliament"[70]. CSO's use this strategy according to the topic and the chances of getting public support or opposition. For instance, whilst women and feminist CSOs went to the streets to demand the approval of the domestic violence against women bill, they decided not to make noise about legalisation of voluntary interruption of pregnancy (abortion) given the sensitivity of the matter. A feminist activist stated "we could not mobilise, therefore our strategy was more technical, quieter – we could not go to the streets"[71]. In this case, the collaboration with the Ministry of Health was instrumental.

4.4.1. The Role of Civil Society Platforms and Thematic Networks

Platforms, coalitions and networks are emerging as an essential mechanism for dialogue with the government. All 10 CSOs are members of various platforms and thematic networks, some are platforms themselves (Forum Mulher[72] and NAFEZA), and others have been actively involved in creation of thematic networks (e.g. WLSA in partnership with Pathfinder International established the Sexual and Reproductive Rights Network[73] - its membership includes Coalizão, Fórum Mulher and N'weti); CIP established a CSO Budget Monitoring Forum (membership includes N'weti and the Mozambican Social Protection Civil Society Platform *Plataforma da Sociedade Civil Moçambicana de Proteção Social,* PSCM-PS).

There is a multiplicity of types of platforms and thematic networks, with varied origins. Some were created in partnership with international NGOs (e.g. ROSA), others resulted from national conferences (e.g. the genesis of the PSCM-PS of which Fórum Mulher is a member was inspired by two conferences on social protection which took place in Mozambique and the participation of a small group of interested CSOs in a conference in Nairobi for the establishment of African Social Protection Civil Society Platform; PSCM-PS is a member of the African platform). Transnational connections have always played a critical role in policy influencing activities of Mozambican CSOs, but these have not been documented.

In the past, the reasons presented for the establishment of networks and platforms were associated with CSO coordination, currently joint action and protection against individual backlash have been emphasised. Many CSOs' interviewees indicated that policy dialogue through these collective mechanisms increases the effectiveness of their interventions. One interviewee noted:

> "Our experience has shown that when we mobilise for a cause through alliances we are able to progress. It has been a good experience because we draw not only from

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[70] Interview with CSO representative.
[71] Interview with CSO representative.
[72] Forum Mulher is the largest network of CSOs promoting gender equality and women's empowerment. Akilizetho and WLSA are members of Forum Mulher.
[73] The Network was created to defend the legalisation of abortion in accordance with the Penal Code Review Bill which guaranteed wide freedom and possibilities for women who wish to interrupt their pregnancy voluntarily.

external alliances, but from the networks' member organisations, who identify themselves with our principles and agendas".

Relatedly there has been growing awareness of the importance of capitalising the strengths of different CSOs to increase effectiveness interventions and improve capacity of weaker organisations. CS-platforms are an important mechanism to facilitate access to information and mutual learning, and the emergence of thematic networks within and outside CS-platforms has contributed to improve the technical skills of those involved around certain themes.

Affiliation to platforms and networks has also been a strategy adopted by CSOs addressing socio-culturally sensitive issues (such as, sexual minorities' rights or gender equality) to mobilise support from within civil society. For instance, LAMBDA participates in most HIV related CSO platforms and has been involved in the campaigns for the approval of the domestic violence against women bill as well as the in the coalition to prevent the approval of discriminatory provisions contained in the penal code review bill; through its membership with the sexual and reproductive rights network it subscribed the "Note to the Parliament: Final Comments on the Penal Code Review Bill" submitted by CSOs.

The importance of building alliances with other CSOs is clear to LAMDBA[74]. Indeed, national NGOs are identified as one of the organisations' target groups in its strategic plan for 2012-2016 because of the support they provide and their influence in policy-making processes. The organisation makes the most of the openness of some key human rights CSOs (such as, the Human Rights League, Muleide and WLSA) to defend the rights of sexual minorities. Over time, the organisation has developed the ability to identify allies to its cause within CS. During the interviews some CSOs mentioned their collaboration with LAMBDA. One CSO interviewee spoke about the difficulties of creating alliances for a cause that is socially contested purportedly because it is against "the values of the Mozambican society". The interviewee claims that,

> "Many CSOs are not ready to have an alliance with LAMBDA, because they may suffer exclusion from their own family for such cause. Support to LAMBDA may come from the embassy [Netherlands] or from a restrict group of people with a different education".

A similar approach has been adopted by Akilizetho, Forum Mulher, NAFEZA and WLSA. For instance, Akilizetho has successfully advocated for the establishment of a women's rights thematic network within the Provincial Civil Society Platform in Nampula and has mobilised members of the platform to be involved in a march in the context of the 16 Days of Activism against Gender Violence[75]. Other CSOs are increasingly aware of the need of simultaneously

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[74] Interview with LAMBDA director.

[75] On the 10th December 2014, the consultant had the opportunity to attend a plenary of the Provincial Civil Society Platform. The meeting started 45 minutes late because some members were taking part in a march to mark the closure of the "16 Days of Activism". When the march ended, Akilizetho's gender officer joined the group and thanked the material and financial support provided by the platform, yet criticised the fact that her male colleagues preferred "to sit in comfortable chairs in an air-conditioned meeting room" instead of going to the streets. She also questioned her colleagues: "why is it that with PROSAVANA we march together, but we

working to transform CSOs' values and improve good governance. For instance, CIP has been advocating for improved governance and transparency within CS.

While alliance- building through participation in platforms, networks and coalitions is valued by CSO, there is a considerable level of suspicion amongst CSOs, as the following interview extract denotes:

> "We have built few alliances, because you don't know who is who, trust is low, there are many infiltrated. However, overall, organisations are supportive, even though the subject may not interest them, they do not oppose it. We have chosen to have small, but strategic partnerships with organisations that are not afraid of expressing their views publically. Few organisations are willing to question and speak up. There are organisations that can only be invited to participate in workshops if there are no cameras [if they are not being recorded]".

Other questions concerning platforms include the weak communication and information exchange between members, as well as the tendency for some platforms to become "NGOs of NGOs"[76] based on vertical relations and communications instead of horizontality; in many cases the outcome has been marginalisation of collective interests, competition over resources, and loss of legitimacy. According to one CSO interviewee "this is the model that has been replicated in most provinces. Forums with a pyramidal structure, with members of CSOs in the social organs and a director. The director ends up losing the vision about development of civil society, manages the forum as an NGO, and conflict of interests emerge as they beginning to implement projects in competition with member organisations". Many of the CS platforms only operate if financed by international organisations.

The establishment of provincial and district platforms has been instrumental for policy dialogue with local governments, as they provide a space and visibility for smaller CBOs in policy making processes (ITAD & COWI 2012). CS platforms are particularly relevant for organisations that undertake the bulk of their lobbying and advocacy work through the platforms and thematic networks they are part of (e.g. Akilizetho and ORAM). The existence of thematic groups within the Provincial Civil Society Platform in Nampula (Akilizetho and ORAM are members) has been pointed as a good model to stimulate thematic specialisation and strengthen CSOs technical capacity and improve their knowledge and skills (ITAD & COWI 2012). This is relevant to mitigate the effects of what CSO interviewee called "the catch-all approach" adopted by many platforms instead of drawing on the areas of expertise of its members.

Unfortunately, while many organisations are actively involved in CS platforms, coalitions and networks, it is extremely difficult identifying each individual organisation's contribution; there is poor reporting of policy influencing activities in CSOs' annual reports and not all CS platforms produce annual reports of their activities; available reports generally do not

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do not fight together against violence?" and complained about the fact that for two consecutive years the platform's plenary has been scheduled for the same day as the closure of the 16 Days of Activism.
[76] CSO interviewee.

describe the contribution of each member to the processes described, even though more organised platforms (such as the PSCP) have annual plans outlining the contribution of each member for their attainment. The positive moves towards better documentation of activities through publication of newsletters, websites and production of case studies describing the experiences of CSOs may contribute to improve reporting in the long run.

The issue of contribution of individual CSOs to policy influencing work conducted by platforms is critical, particularly if one considers that in theory, these groups should be formed around the expertise and added value of individual organisations as well as a space for building individual and collective capacity through mutual learning.

4.5. Evidence-based policy influencing?

Mozambique has limited research capacity and there is lack of socio-cultural, economic and political research. This is a reflection of the focus on teaching in detriment of research in higher education investments in Mozambique.

There are few independent research-oriented CSOs in Mozambique and institutional links between academia and CSOs are nearly non-existent, although individual university researchers have been hired to conduct research on, with and for CSOs, usually on a consultancy basis. The majority of independent research organisations that stimulate policy debate are based in Maputo (these include Cruzeiro do Sul, CIP, IESE[77] and WLSA), but other CSOs have also carried out studies to support their work.

N'weti places a greater emphasis on research and all its work is informed by situational analysis/literature reviews and by formative research. N'weti has distinguished itself from other organisations by its capacity to document its interventions and capacity to incorporate research findings from other institutions (including CSOs) in its interventions. For example, its strategic plan 2011-2015 includes specific reference to research findings generated by CIP in the area of local governance and these constitute an important foundation for work on social accountability.

Forum Mulher congregates research-oriented CSOs (such as WLSA), commissions research on the status of women[78] to support its interventions, and has conducted gender analysis of key policies, such as the PARPA (in 2009)[79]. However, the organisation's interventions and their effects on women's lives have not been adequately documented; the organisation's role in the documentation of good practices and production of case studies has been negligible[80].

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[77] Institute for Social and Economic Studies *Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Económicos* (IESE).

[78] For instance, between 2004 and 2009, Forum Mulher commissioned the following studies: Gender Analysis of Economic Partnership Programmes; Gender Analysis of Human Resources in the Public Sector and Design of the Public Sector Gender Strategy; Gender Profile of Cabo Delgado Province; Gender, Tradition and Culture in Development Programmes; Gender and Violence: Psychosocial assistance; The Costs of Home-Based Care; and Property and Inheritance Rights. (Source: Forum Mulher's Mid-Term Evaluation 2004-2009)

[79] Forum Mulher's Annual Report January – October 2009.

[80] Capacity Appraisal of Forum Mulher (n/d).

Akilizetho, Coalizão, NAFEZA and ORAM Nampula while recognising the importance of research to their activities, have played a limited role in research production, however have contributed to the identification of research themes drawing from their work with communities. In its Strategic Plan 2015-2020, ORAM Nampula asserts "we are well positioned to undertake research on rural dynamics, but we acknowledge that so far we have not exploited that opportunity (p.40)". The document places greater emphasis on research and its links with monitoring and evaluation, as well as with lobby and advocacy. The plan foresees the hiring of a research coordinator to boast the organisation's work in this area.

Few organisations are able to coherently articulate the links between research production, dissemination, appropriation and use (these include, Cruzeiro do Sul, CIP, N'weti and WLSA). To illustrate, WLSA is the only feminist and women's rights CSO that conducts solid local research in its field of work and systematically integrates research results into its lobby and advocacy[81] and training activities[82]. These links are clearly outlined in WLSA's strategic plans 2004-2006, 2006-2011, and 2011-2015. There is a dialectic relationship between WLSA's research and interventions, and this is manifested in two ways: WLSA's interventions inform the selection of research topics and the research results form the basis for its other programmes. For instance, findings of research conducted on gender based violence have been integrated in the training of staff of Maternal and Infant Health Services on identification of women suffering gender based violence and referral to other services as well as in the training of other stakeholders. In addition, as part of its communication and advocacy programme, WLSA produced several information, education and communication materials (such as, teaching materials, brochures, posters and leaflets) about domestic violence.

Dissemination of knowledge is critical for its appropriation and use. CIP, N'weti and WLSA have consistently made their research findings available to the general public. Interviews highlighted the importance of developing the capacity of organisations to communicate their research. One interviewee noted that some organisations produce relevant and quality research, but are not very good at making the knowledge produced available to others. To illustrate this point, the interviewee argued that Cruzeiro do Sul (a research institution) conducted solid independent research on various topics related to land management, poverty alleviation and the informal economy, governance and decentralisation, but had difficulties making available the information produced and did not take advantage of information and communication technologies. Arguably, the research produced by Cruzeiro do Sul become known and influential because it had a highly competent and charismatic leader who used the knowledge produced influence policy-making.

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[81] For example, for the approval of the Family Law and the Law on Domestic Violence Against Women, and the production of a shadow report on the stage of implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and its submission to CEDAW Committee, in 2007.
[82] For example, training of police staff at the Police Practice School *Escola Prática da Polícia* (EPP) and Academy of Police Sciences *Academia de Ciências Policiais* (ACIPOL), as well as justice sector professionals at Centro de Formação Jurídica e Judiciária (CFJJ).

CSOs feel the need of better understanding of the context in which they operate. CSOs interventions are based on a mapping of the policy event/situation rather than a mapping of the policy context. Many CSOs do not understand how the processes they want to influence relate to the broader government's policy cycle and with existing policies. Many interviewees asserted that they tend to act upon opportunities and have not been able to anticipate processes they want to influence. They pointed out the importance of conducting political economy analysis to understand how the institutions and the system work and then decide how to act. They also highlighted the need of better understanding of emerging interest groups, the links between formal and informal politics, as well as the new geography of power relations and struggles. One CSO interviewee stated,

> "Foreign private companies have more success in their attempts to influence public policies in Mozambique, because when they arrive in the country they already know "who is who", whereas civil society does not know – it is worried about speaking the language of donors and writing projects".

CSOs understand the importance of knowledge and of backing their claims with evidence. This is perceived as relevant not only to ensure the development of relevant and sound policies, but also to establish their credibility and increase their bargaining power. CSOs that conduct research have invested in the dissemination of their research findings to various audiences, as a way to raise awareness and educate the general public by providing alternative readings of the socio-cultural, political and economic reality.

CSOs have mainly used evidence to influence formulation, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of policy. The use of evidence to influence formulation of policy has largely focused on approval of new legislation (e.g. the Domestic Violence against Women Bill, the decriminalisation of abortion). CSOs have been involved in the generation of evidence on policy implementation and until recently this was the main focus of the research commissioned. The generation of evidence on policy implementation was aligned and facilitated by their role in service delivery, however the quality of evidence produced is quite questionable, given that "evidence" produced tends to focus on the description of services available and of CSOs own role in filling in the gaps in service need.

A limited number of CSOs (such as CIP, Coalizão, Forum Mulher, WLSA) has conducted research on the domestication of regional and international human rights instruments as well as on the factors that enable and/or constrain implementation of specific policies. Their research findings have informed provision of technical assistance to public institutions mainly through training (CIP, Forum Mulher, LAMBDA, WLSA), although staff from CSOs have also been involved in the development of strategic plans and other relevant instruments to facilitate service delivery, on a consultancy basis (Forum Mulher and WLSA). The generation and use of evidence for monitoring and evaluating policy is more recent and has been associated to efforts to promote social and political accountability (CIP, NAFEZA, and N'weti).

4.6. Theories of change

This section describes how the theories of change of selected CSOs looks like. It shows the variations in the form and content of the theories of change produced. This section does not discuss the purposes for which the theories of change have been developed nor analyses the linkages between the theories of change and the logframes.

The formulation of a theory of change is something new for most CSOs; an illustration of this is the fact that CSOs that have a theory of change outlined did so in the context of their current strategic plans. Forum Mulher, Lambda, NAFEZA and N'weti clearly articulate a theory of change in their strategic plans. CIP recognises the relevance of reflecting about its theory of change. WLSA has a clear vision about the change it wants to contribute to, but this is not articulated as a theory of change. Akilizetho, Coalizão, NAFEZA, ORAM Nampula do not have an identifiable theory of change.

Fórum Mulher's Strategic Plan 2014-2018 contains a section on the Mozambican context and outlines the organisation's theory of change in the form of four narratives related to each of its thematic areas (4) namely, women's political participation and movement building; women's economic autonomy; sexual and reproductive rights; and gender based violence[83]. The narratives outline: a) the problem; b) the causes of the problem; c) the changes needed; d) and Forum Mulher's role in bringing about change. To illustrate, the narrative on women's political participation and movement building highlights the following critical elements for change: widening the democratic space for women and girls (both the formal representative system and interactions between state and non-state actors), improving political conscience and citizenship for women (through rights-education, formative processes, strengthening alliances between women in civil society and those in decision-making positions), and independent monitoring and publicising of the government's compliance with international agreements and national policies on gender equality. This in turn will generate political will to implement the legal and policy framework on gender equality and women's rights and sensitise other actors about the importance of adopting a gender perspective. Training and political action to increase political consciousness, capacity development (including around resource mobilisation), advocacy (focused on public policies and agreements, cultural and social practices, and alliance and partnership building), and information and communication are the main pillars of Forum Mulher's organisational development approach.

Lambda's Strategic Plan 2012-2016, includes a "declaration of its theory of change" which reads as follows:

> "Lambda believes that a peaceful and solidary society where the human rights of LGBT citizens are respected, protected by law and guaranteed by the State is possible if it [Lambda] leads the LBGT movement and mobilises society in order to make it more favourable to the promotion and protection of economic, political and social rights of LGBT citizens".

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[83] Forum Mulher (2013), "Strategic Plan 2014-2018". (See: annexes I, II, III and IV).

According to the document, in order for this to be achieved the following preconditions need to be in place: a) the state and public institutions recognise and protect civil and political rights of LBGT citizens; b) LGBT citizens have access to quality sexual and reproductive health care? free from stigma and discrimination; c) heterosexist and homophobic behaviours, practices and attitudes are transformed; d) new HIV infections amongst LGBT citizens are prevented and the impacts of AIDS are mitigated; e) LGBT citizens facing exclusion have adequate and relevant assistance and; f) Lambda remains strong to mobilize society towards greater respect for human rights of LBGT and promote citizenship and social participation of this group.

NAFEZA's theory of change is stated in its Strategic Plan 2014-2018 and focuses on three levels: personal, community and organisational. NAFEZA's theory of change considers how personal, community, and organisational values, knowledge and perceptions about gender equality and women's rights affect the openness/resistance of institutions to change, including policy change. It places particular emphasis on the effect of personal and institutional constraints/enablers on policy change. The main assumption is that the pursue of gender equality is deep-rooted in people's lives and that organisations reflect people's ideas and practices, a dynamic that transpires into the projects implemented by organisations and to their relations with communities; the same principle applies to bureaucracy and decision-making processes. The theory of change is articulated with the context and the SWOT analysis contained in the strategic plan.

N'weti's theory of change is outlined in its Strategic Plan 2011-2015. The organisation's theory of change is informed by health promotion and social and behavioural change theories. The theory of change is geared towards a positive impact on health determinants at individual, community and social levels. The diagram below outlines the theory of change that orients N'weti's interventions, it encompass two aspects: the first relates to fostering an enabling environment through advocacy and governance monitoring at three levels: a) between individuals (e.g. fostering positive attitudes towards behavioural change); b) within communities (e.g. community groups and authorities promoting healthy behaviours and responsive policies) and; c) societal which requires legal and policy change. Legal and policy change influencing is done through media advocacy (specifically editorial media) and community mobilisation.

The second aspect focuses on impact on individuals and their immediate interpersonal environment, fostered through awareness raising, access to adequate knowledge, and interpersonal dialogue. The theory of change considers the gradual process through which change happens, but this reflection is limited to social behavioural change and does not address legal and policy change.

MOBILIZAÇÃO SOCIAL
ADVOCACIA
MULTIMEDIA

ENVOLVIMENTO COMUNITÁRIO

REORIENTAÇÃO DOS SERVIÇOS

AMBIENTE FAVORÁVEL

HABILIDADES INDIVIDUAIS

POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS APROPRIADAS

Sociedade

Comunidades

Indivíduos

Diálogos e debates

Aprendizado através da acção e reflexão

Eficácia individual & colectiva aprendizagem social

FEEDBACK

FEEDBACK

INTERAÇÃO

FEEDBACK

FEEDBACK

MULTIMEDIA
ADVOCACIA
MOBILIZAÇÃO SOCIAL

N'weti's strategic plan also includes a context analysis as well as a section on main assumptions and how it envisages to manage risks. The main assumptions are: a) that the level and socio-political environment in Mozambique will continue to be open to the active participation of CSOs in health promotion; b) that mass media are developed and accessible to all; c) that international financial support to Mozambique's development agenda as well as for civil society strengthening will continue; d) that poverty levels will not prevent the interest of citizens and their communities in the promotion of their own health; e) that citizens organising around social accountability will increase, that community based organisations will increase and their quality improve; and f) that N'weti is capable of maintaining its independence and retain qualified and committed staff as well as changing towards a more integrated and well managed approach. The document identifies 8 strategies to manage risks, but it is not clear what the risks are nor a clear distinction between assumptions is established; one of the strategies identified to manage risks refers to the regular analysis of N'weti's plans and methodologies to ensure that they are responsive to the needs of citizens and communities and take into account their level of development and capacity development needs.

CIP's annual report 2013 acknowledges the importance of clearly articulating the organisation's theory of change in light of its vision and mission. The Strategic Plan 2014-2018 outlines CIP's main intervention areas, why it focuses on each of them (this includes a brief context analysis), how it intervenes, and what it aims to achieve. The document also identifies the key partners at national and international levels for the achievement of the organisation's goals. CIP hypotheses of change encompasses four sequentially interlinked elements: a) "where we are now" (existence of incentives for corrupt behaviour on the part of public officials; increased risk of corruption due to growth of the extractive sector and increase in public-private partnerships; and incomplete legislation coupled with lack of

transparency); b) "what CIP can do" (exposure, awareness-raising and advocacy); c) "what can CIP achieve" (public officials alert about the risks of public exposure and potential charges; the public understands issues related to state finances and there is an informed public debate nationally; political reforms increase disincentives for corruption in the public sector, improve public finance transparency and control of contracts with private sector which results in better distribution of benefits), and; d) "where CIP wants to be" (public officials behave with integrity to create responsible and efficient institutions that provide public services to Mozambicans). The theory of change includes the key assumptions made for each set of questions/hypotheses; these are mainly about context and external factors, and implementation (mainly related to CIP's capacity).

What becomes evident from the interviews and the document review is the strong emphasis place on improved public awareness and greater social mobilisation. Citizen engagement in agenda setting as well as in formulation, implementation and monitoring and evaluation of policy, at community, district, provincial and national levels are perceived as essential for change. Alliance building amongst CSO, monitoring the implementation of government policies and regional/international commitments and disseminating information about government's performance through various means are also considered essential to promote change.

4.7. Effectiveness

This section focuses on collective effectiveness and outcomes of CSOs bringing examples from experiences of collaborative associations as well as individual CSOs. The main results draw on a set of outcome indicators concerning agenda setting, policy influencing, and changing practice (See Annex 5). The outcome indicators identified are by no means exhaustive - they are used as an illustration. The results presented relate to various processes in which most or some of the selected CSOs have involved.

It is noteworthy that the assessment of the effectiveness of CSOs interventions has been negatively affected by poor monitoring and evaluation frameworks and documentation. Few CSOs' organisational reports include a discussion of their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy engagements. Some annual reports mention that a certain activity is under-way, but subsequent reports do not develop on progress and results achieved. Documented achievements of CSOs are generally expressed in terms of contribution of multiple actors, processes and strategies; although claims in terms of attribution have also been found.

A. Agenda setting

A1. Actors in society become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves, and adhere to the position of the CSOs[84]

CSOs have successfully brought forward its position regarding violence against women, women's political participation, corruption and transparency, and MPs pension schemes.

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[84] Includes collaborative associations (coalitions, networks).

For instance, CIP has produced two National Reports on Governance and Integrity in Mozambique (the reports are published every four years, the first was in 2008 and the second in 2013); the reports contain technical analysis of the policy and legal framework, its implementation as well as recommendations regarding the handling of State Budget, amongst others, thus setting the agenda in the area of governance.

CSOs have also mobilised to: a) *issue position papers, joint statements and press releases* (e.g. Open letter from Mozambican Civil Society Organisations and Movements to the Presidents of Mozambique and Brazil and the Prime Minister of Japan to Urgently Stop and Reflect on the ProSavana Programme - May 2013; Note to the Parliament: Final Comments to the Parliament on the Penal Code Review Bill; Press release on the Penal Code Review Bill concerning women's rights issued by the Provincial Platform of Civil Society Organisations in Nampula - March 2014;); b) *develop public communications and campaigns to raise awareness and engage with the media* (e.g. media advocacy at national (central) and local (provincial and district) levels for the approval of the child protection law, law on the rights of people living with HIV and AIDS in the workplace, domestic violence against women, and decriminalisation of abortion as well as to prevent the approval of certain legislation) this have resulted in increased covered of CSOs' views and activities in the media as well as increased public awareness; and c) *hold peaceful demonstrations* (e.g. peaceful march to the Mozambican Parliament - as part of the Movement for the Approval of the Law against Domestic Violence[85] - where the draft law on domestic violence was symbolically submitted[86] together as well as a manifesto against domestic violence in Mozambique demanding the discussion, approval and promulgation of the law[87]; peaceful march against discriminatory provisions contained in the Penal Code Review Bill, held in March 2014, in Maputo City; Feminist March for Equality, Solidarity and Transformation held on the 28th May 2014, in the context of World March of Women and Forum Mulher II Conference: Building Feminist Alternatives for Women and Girls Human Rights[88]; demonstration for peace and against insecurity - 31st October 2013, in Maputo City[89].

CS platforms and individual CSOs have relations with important thematic networks and interest at national, provincial and increasingly at district level. In addition, several of the 10 focus CSOs have been initiating thematic networks. CSOs emphasis on alliance-building and formation of thematic networks has had a positive effect in their access to policy making processes as well as on the quality of their technical input to discussions. While CS platforms have been effective in bringing together different CSOs, conferring more legitimacy to CSOs engagement in policy dialogue internal, unequal power relations and undemocratic

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[85] Constituted by the following CSOs: Fórum Mulher, WLSA, N'weti, MULEIDE, AMMCJ, ASSOMUDE, OMM, AMCS, FORCOM, AVIMAS, AVVD, NUGENA, NAFEZA, ADEC, AMUDEIA, FOCADE, MUCHEFA, LEMUSICA, and OXFAM GB.

[86] It had already been formally submitted in 2006.

[87] MASC (2010), "O papel da WLSA na advocacia para a aprovação da Lei de Violência Doméstica contra a Mulher", Estudo de caso, Maputo.

[88] http://www.wlsa.org.mz/marcha-feminista-pela-igualdade-realizou-se-na-cidade-de-maputo/

[89] The demonstration was against the politico-military tension in the country, kidnappings, and rape and murder of women. According to a local newspaper Savana, around 30.000 people participated in the demonstration. A communique was read by representatives of civil society organisations; peaceful demonstration against the bill on MP's privileges in the context of the campaign "No to legalised robbery" - on 16 March 2014, in Maputo City). Making issues visible and public has also contribute to generate debate have led to increased public awareness about policy issues raised, as CSOs monitoring and evaluation in this area has been weak. http://www.wlsa.org.mz/marcha-pela-paz-e-contra-a-inseguranca/

practices effect negatively on generation of consensus and representation of peripheral voices and less influential groups.

A2. PILA targets react upon the positions taken by the organization/ collaborative association

The government has started to pay attention to issues raised by CS and prepares itself to meet CSOs[90]. As one interviewee noted: "They [CSO] are making the government tense and forcing that it prepares itself to work with them. CS is more attentive and backs its arguments with facts which forces the government to prepare itself to be at the same level. The government also has its limitations, specifically the state-party linkages. CS forces the government to be more attentive, to be more responsible, and more communicative. The tension results from CS's positive work and shows that the government is also adapting to this new process. They [government] also need to learn how to interact [with civil society]". Along similar the Itad & Cowi report asserts that "two reasons can explain the shift of behaviour of the Government in relation to civil society: the risk of political cost if Government decided to ignore civil society produced evidence; and the fact that it offers a possibility of capitalising on expert knowledge otherwise not accessible to Government (2012:38). For instance, as a result of CIP's research and lobby, the government started producing the Citizen Budget[91].

A3. Relevant members of the organization or other stakeholders are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) by PILA targets

The government has established formal dialogue mechanisms in response to civil society demands (examples include Development Observatories and Institutions for Community Participation and Consultation). It has also created spaces for CSO participation in multisectoral coordination mechanisms and thematic working groups, and convenes consultation meetings and public hearings related to the development of specific documents.

For instance, in 2011 N'weti was invited by the Department of Health Promotion of the Ministry of Health to participate in the review of the Health Sector Strategic Plan 2007-2012. N'weti together with other members of the Health Promotion Group (see section on lobbying) have contributed to discussions around governance and community involvement), financing, and supervision and training.

CIP attends public hearings related to the Anti-corruption legislation reform proposals and has participated in the elaboration of the following public policies and strategies: a) Policy and strategy for the Extractive Industries Sector; Corporate social Responsibility Policy and Strategy; Proposal of Fiscal Regime for the Mining and Petroleum Sectors. CIP has also

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[90] As one interviewee noted: "They [CSO] are making the government tense and forcing that it prepares itself to work with them. CS is more attentive and backs its arguments with facts which forces the government to prepare itself to be at the same level. The government also has its limitations, specifically the state-party linkages. CS forces the government to be more attentive, to be more responsible, and more communicative. The tension results from CS's positive work and shows that the government is also adapting to this new process. They [government] also need to learn how to interact [with civil society]".

[91] CIP's Annual Report

contributed to the environment impact assessment of the construction of the liquefied natural gas plant in Palma (Pemba province) conducted by Anadarko as well as to the development of terms of reference for the production of Mozambique's fourth report to the EITI[92].

CSOs convene meetings and invite relevant State institutions to present experiences derived from implementation of interventions and research findings; they also provide technical assistance to state institutions through training of public officials on related areas. For instance, following the publication of the Open Budget Index[93] (an initiative to promote transparency in budget documents), in 2012, in collaboration with the International Budget Partnership CIP had one meetings with the National Directorate of Budget (Ministry of Finance) and another with the Parliament's Planning and Budget Committee to present and discuss the country study results. In both meetings CIP underlined the factors that undermine budget transparency in Mozambique and provided recommendations to tackle the problem.

Whereas there have been critical changes in relations between State and civil society, and CSOs' participation in invited and claimed spaces is increasingly based on their watchdog role and improved policy dialogue capacity, there is no solid evidence demonstrating that accountability mechanisms have improved.

A4. The terms of public debate are influenced: New civil society perspectives and alternative approaches are introduced into the policy debate

CIP has influencing the debate on the EITI model to be adopted by Mozambique and the scope of Mozambique's reporting to EITI through an analysis of the Mozambique EITI validation report entitled: "Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative: Mozambican Application rejected – Notes for Debate". In collaboration with the G20 and the Natural Resources and Extractive Industries Civil Society Platform, CIP submitted 11 proposals of the type of information and sectors that need to be prioritised to the EITI Coordinating Committee in Mozambique. In 2011, CIP produced the report "Implementation of EITI, natural resources management and the urgency of renegotiating and publishing the contracts with mega-projects: the case of Mozambique", based on the first report submitted by Mozambique to EITI[94]. CIP has also influenced the revision of the Mining Law (11/2007) and the Petroleum Law (12/2007). Furthermore, through its participation in the EITI Multi-Stakeholder Group, CIP has persuaded the government to conduct a research on the fiscal regimes of companies as part of the production of Mozambique's second report to the EITI, has contested the government's lack of transparency regarding contracts with mining companies and advocated to their publication, and has defended the renegotiation of contracts[95].

In 2012, CIP conducted an analysis of the state budget proposal (2013) prepared by the government. The findings of the analysis were shared with the Parliament's Planning and

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[92] CIP's Annual Report 2013.
[93] http://internationalbudget.org/wp-content/uploads/OBI2012-Report-English.pdf
[94] CIP's Annual report 2011.
[95] CIP's Annual Report 2013.

Budget Committee who promised to incorporate at least 1/3 of the issues raised in the list of questions to the government. Relatedly, as a result of a training on natural resources management, provided by CIP, members of parliament from RENAMO and the Mozambican Democratic Movement (MDM) posed questions to the government about transparency in the extractive sector. Following this parliamentarian debate the Minister of Mineral Resources announced the publication of contracts with mining companies in the ministry's website.

Akilizetho has influenced the draft guidelines on local governance bodies and citizen participation. Through informal connections had access to the draft guidelines and in partnership with CIP (as part of a governance network) prepared its position which was latter presented at the national development observatory in 2007; the guidelines were only approved in 2009.

B. Policy influencing

B1. PILA targets have changed (or not) their policy in line with the organization's position changes
  → Adoption of the law on domestic violence against women (2009);
  → Adherence to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI);
  → Approval of Anti-Corruption Legislation;
  → De-criminalisation of Abortion (2014);

C. Changing practice

C1. PILA targets change their practices in relation to implementation of policies

Overall, the Mozambican government has been very responsive in terms of developing new strategies and action plans[96] and the Ministry of Justice has recently (2012) developed an implementation plan for approved legislation[97], however their dissemination tends to focus on government, donors and CSOs, in detriment of the general public. Most instruments are not budgeted and even when they are, many tend to go unfunded and, consequently, are not implemented. There are few and inadequate mechanisms in place to enforce policies, rules and regulations. CSOs have played a crucial role not only in monitoring the implementation of national policies and strategies and their dissemination, but also in actual implementation.

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[96] For instance, in the area of gender based violence, the following steps have been given: establishment of Offices to Support Women and Children Victims of Violence; approval of the National Action Plan to Prevent and Combat Violence Against Women (2008-2012); integration of gender-based violence in the National Plan for the Advancement of Women (2010-2014) and in the gender strategies of the ministries of health, education and interior; approval of the Multisectoral Mechanism for Integrated Assistance of Women Victims of Violence; and integration of gender based violence in the training curriculums of key institutions.

[97] CIP's Annual Report 2013.

4.7.1. Factors affecting effectiveness of influencing activities

The effectiveness of CSOs policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions is affected by internal and external factors.

Internal factor affecting effectiveness:
→ *Positive internal factors* affecting the effectiveness of CSO's policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work include: CS's ability to mobilise, work collaborative and develop consensus on the matters they aim to influence drawing on the creativity and niche of individual CSOs; ability to draw on expert assistance on more technical and complex issues; ability to claim spaces for participation whilst continuing to engage with invited spaces; ability to build and draw upon informal networks and tactics to gain access to information and influential individuals; ability to work with the media, shape how issues are framed and generate public debate; readiness to read the policy environment, re-adapt its strategies, and respond to shifting processes.

→ *Negative internal factors* affecting the effectiveness of CSO's policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work include: limited competence to generate and present solid local evidence in a manner that is relevant to decision-makers; inadequate knowledge of the policy cycle, key actors and their influence in the decision-making processes, including participation champions; lack of availability and commitment to participate in a sustained manner in policy influencing processes; poor capacity to document, learn from and share past policy influencing experiences with newcomers.

External factors affecting effectiveness
→ *Positive external factors* affecting the effectiveness of CSOs policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work include: the growing tendency of the general public to express dissatisfaction about deepening social inequalities which may related to improved access to information about their rights, better education, increased availability of consumption goods coupled with decreasing purchasing power, and visible disparities between rich and poor[98]; existence of champions of participation within state institutions; availability of funding for CS's work on governance issues; and the increased access to social media and other more traditional media (radio, television and newspapers) by citizens.

→ *Negative external factors* affecting effectiveness of CSOs policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work include: lack of government's transparency about on-going policy processes; the promiscuity between state-party institutions and appropriation of participation and consultation processes to serve political interests; tendency of state institutions and officials to adopt a paternalistic attitude towards civil society organisations; restricted access to information, including government proposals and working documents to be discussed in invited spaces; limited tolerance to questioning, social and psychological intimidation of CS representatives who express

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[98] This claim is based on observations on how people express their views and needs in the media (radio and television) as well as the recent food riots.

alternative views; and limited and ineffective mechanisms to enforce approved policies and legislation.

4.8. Capacity Development Processes

This section focuses on how Mozambican CSOs' capacities for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy have evolved over time. It develops some of the issues raised in the previous sections and introduces new elements drawing on organisational capacity assessments and sections related to organizational aspects contained in strategic plans, annual and evaluation reports, and the interviewees.

The document review reveals a growing emphasis of lobby and advocacy in the strategic plans of selected CSOs. It suggests that for the majority of CSOs policy influencing work has emerged organically from CSOs' service delivery interventions. Few CSOs were established with a clear mandate of influencing the policy and legal framework, and these mainly comprise research-oriented CSOs and women's rights and feminist CSOs (a large component of their work focuses on lobbying and advocating for gender mainstreaming). For some organisations, such as, N'weti policy influencing has resulted from linkages with CSOs conducting lobby and advocacy (in the context of work to prevent and combat gender based violence) and the recent emphasis in governance monitoring and advocacy. To illustrate, in 2013, N'weti revised its Strategic Plan 2011-2015 and one of the main revisions included refining the organisations' approach to policy dialogue. For other organisations, such as, ORAM lobby and advocacy is implicit in the organisations work, but there is not clear advocacy strategy.

Arguably, CSOs' policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work results from the combination of on-going exposure to claimed policy-making spaces, involvement in regional and international human rights related conferences and in the monitoring of implementation of instruments approved at those levels, as well as accumulated experience in service delivery at local level. This accumulated experience coupled with the recourse to human rights claims have been instrumental for the development of CSOs legitimacy to engage in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy.

There is a clear difference in terms of how lobbying and advocacy were approached in previous strategic plans and how they are addressed in current plans (particularly for CIP, Forum Mulher, Lambda, NAFEZA, N'weti, and WLSA). Previous strategic plans were quite vague about advocacy and hardly mentioned policy influencing work (with exception of CIP and WLSA) they also did not specify the focus of advocacy initiatives nor the main strategies. Although the policy influencing component has become more salient, this is not always well articulated in the strategies. There is room for improving the inter-linkages between CSO's advocacy work and their other interventions

Current strategic plans underline the importance of CS-platforms and thematic networks, including regional and international. CIP, Forum Mulher, Lambda and WLSA are particularly specific about this, by enunciating why this is relevant and how it will be achieved. For instance, Lambda' Strategic Plan clearly outlines what it expects to achieve by engaging with national as well as with international CS-platforms.

CSOs have produced organisational development plans linked to capacity assessments conducted by current and potential donors. Strengthening of lobby and advocacy capacity tends to feature under training, although most organisations recognise the importance of experience exchange and participation in meetings and conferences, domestically and abroad, as critical for learning. Organizational development plans of networks (Forum Mulher and NAFEZA) tend to emphasise provision of lobbying and advocacy training to member organisations. ORAM Nampula and Akilizetho have adopted an outward approach to advocacy training which has targeted mainly community associations (in ORAM's case) and local development councils (in Akilizetho's case). CIP, Forum Mulher, N'weti and WLSA organisational development strategies emphasise strengthening research capacity as well as the links between research and policy influencing.

An area of weakness has been the linkages between CSOs' theory of change, their monitoring and evaluation framework, and learning. This is associated with limited technical capacity in the area of monitoring and evaluation in general. While organisations are slowly adopting results-based management they face many difficulties in the definition of appropriate indicators. Policy influencing is a relatively new area for most organisations and they are still studying how to develop adequate indicators to monitor their work in this area. N'weti and ORAM foresee the development of policy influencing indicators in the context of the development of their advocacy strategies which, in principle, will happen in the course of 2015.

Although more CSOS place policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy more visibility in recent annual reports, how this is done varies considerably. While some CSOs include detailed description and analysis, others simply list relevant activities. This usually includes participation in CS- platforms and thematic networks (though without specifying what has been the organisation's contribution) and providing or receiving training on advocacy.

A large proportion of CSOs' policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work is not documented by any means. However, few CSOs systematically document the activities they have been involved in, and make it available to others, through their websites, books and brochures. For instance, feminist CSOs and its allies have documented extensively the processes that culminated with the approval of the law on domestic violence against women as well as the new Penal Code. In relation to this, an interviewee noted that documentation and dissemination is critical for learning as well as for the creation of institutional and collective memory.

Finally, CSOs involved in the movement for the approval of the law, have been involved in monitoring not only the implementation of the law, but also in following the legal reform process under way and assessing the implications of new legislation to the existing law. CIP has been doing similar work in relation to the anti-corruption legislation, ORAM in relation to the land law, and Akilizetho in relation to the legislation on the institutions for community participation and consultation. This work is done through CS-platforms and an opportunity CSOs are increasingly using is the production and submission of shadow reports to the United Nations.

4.8.1 Donors support to CSOs

Northern organisations play a crucial role in fostering CSOs' role in policy dialogue. Manning and Malbrough (2012) assert that the delivery of aid through budget support in the early 2000s was accompanied by a shift from building central government institutions to bolstering local governance, from a focus on democracy to good governance and from an increase attention to local service delivery as entry point for governance programmes. These shifting approaches have affected CSOs.

Once accused of creating barriers to internal accountability and of dominating policy dialogue spaces (OSISA 2009, OECD-GOVNET 2012), OECD-DAC donors are increasingly supporting initiatives to foster public and social accountability and strengthening civil society role in policy dialogue. This has been accompanied by the establishment of multi-donor civil society funding mechanisms and programmes in the last ten years. A few examples of donor support
 to civil society are provided below:

Civil Society Support Mechanism *Mecanismo de Apoio a Sociedade Civil* (MASC) is a five year programme (2007-2012 later extended to 2015) managed by COWI and funded by DFID and Irish AID aims at strengthening civil society organisations engagement in governance monitoring and advocacy. The programme provides funds and technical support for monitoring and advocacy activities as well as to improve organizational capacity, including internal governance[1].

Action for Inclusive and Responsible Governance *Acções para uma Governação Inclusiva e Responsável –* AGIR is five year programme (2010-2014) funded by Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands aimed at strengthening the capacity of local civil society organisations to influence in development processes and demand accountability and respect for human rights of power-holders. AGIR is implemented by 58 local civil society organisations through partnerships with four international intermediate NGOs (Diakonia, Ibis, Oxfam Novib, and We Effect). AGIR has entered into its second which will cover the period 2015-2020.

Citizen Engagement Programme (CEP) *Cidadania e Participação* is a five year social accountability programme (2012-2017) funded by DFID, Irish Aid and Danida, implemented in four provinces. The purpose of this programme is to increase citizen influence on the quality of health and education service delivery in 4 target provinces (Gaza, Nampula, Manica and Zambézia). CEP supports citizens to monitor the quality of health and education service delivery, as well as to advocate for the improvement of the quality of those services at the district, provincial and national levels[1].

Democratic Governance Support Programme *Diálogo Local para Boa Governação* (known as DIÁLOGO) is a five year programme (2012-2017) that aims at improving governance and accountability for Mozambican citizens in targeted urban municipalities (in Beira, Maputo, Nampula, Quelimane, and Tete) and sectors. The programme fosters dialogue, consultation and consensus-building through provision of funds to municipalities, civil society organizations and non-state media; it has a strong component of support to civic engagement and media strengthening. The programme is financed by DFID and managed by DAI in partnership with COWI[1].

UN Joint Programme on Civil Society was a three year programme (2007-2009) involving UN, government and civil society organizations. It focused on building the capacity of civil society organisations and structures (including traditional authorities) and in fostering their involvement in the development agenda at national and decentralised levels, through policy and advocacy, normative and technical support, capacity development around issues such as communication for empowerment, and civil society partnerships. Around 28 national and international NGOs, trade unions, and civil society platforms were supported.

These mechanisms and programmes reflect the two main strategies donors have adopted: "support to civil society" and "support through civil society" (CEP 2013), although some programmes, such as, AGIR and MASC combine the two strategies.

Support to civil society has focused on building organizational and programmatic capacity of strong and well established as well as new and weak organisations, which has included components of experience sharing and synergy building. Support to civil society has been channelled through INGOs from their home countries (e.g. AGIR) and through international consultancy companies (e.g. DIÁLOGO); direct funding to CSOs has reduced significantly. The scope of support has ranged from small short-term projects (1-2 years) to medium-term support to CSOs' strategic plans (which typically cover 4-5 years, although AGIR is entering its second phase and funding has been allocated for another 6 years). Support through civil society focuses on the implementation of social accountability mechanisms and mediation of citizens' engagement with service providers (CEP 2013).

Despite efforts to increase the coverage of civil society's support there are marked geographical inequalities with a sharp urban-rural discrepancy in civil society's access to resources, capacity, and protagonism. Initiatives to strengthen the media, trade unions and other groups are still incipient. There is a tendency on the part of donors to equate civil society with NGOs, and support has generally focused on professionalised organisations.

The 10 selected CSOs are privileged in terms of accessing donor funding and have established relations with various embassies, development cooperation agencies and INGOs, many of whom have played a critical role in their capacity development. For example, CIP has been supported by the Norwegian embassy in Maputo, through World Wide Fund for Nature, as part of the Norwegian Oil for Development programme. N'weti and NAFEZA have received funds from USAID for sexual and reproductive health and HIV-related work; Forum Mulher and WLSA have received DFID funding through MASC; Forum Mulher and NAFEZA have worked with IBIS in the area of women's political participation, and CIP and N'weti are part of a consortium funded by the Swiss Development Cooperation, aimed at fostering citizens' demand for health service delivery.

4.8.2 The role of Dutch organisations

The Netherlands Embassy

The Netherlands Embassy in Maputo and Dutch INGOs have been particularly important in the organisational development of Mozambican CSOs. As the introduction to this report indicates the CSOs were selected based on the fact that they have received Dutch support; some of these CSOs consider themselves "sons and daughters of the Dutch" given the prominent role of the Netherlands Embassy and Dutch INGOs (specifically Hivos, Oxfam Novib, and SNV) in their emergence. Most of 10 CSOs have long-standing relations with Dutch organisations.

CSOs perceive the support provided by the Netherlands Embassy as enabling and based on trust. It is enabling because as one interviewee indicated "from early on the Dutch have financed what nobody else would finance, which are precisely those things an organisation

needs to operate (an office, salaries, electricity, etc.)". Similarly, another interviewee mentioned that the core funding provided by the Embassy enabled them to focus on their work by freeing them from having to seek complementary sources of income, thus contributing to improve the quality of their work. The provision of core funding to CSOs is relatively recent and the Netherlands embassy was one of the pioneers. The trust aspect is related to working relationships and the general sense that the Embassy believes in the potential of the CSOs it funds and allows them to be creative and innovative in their approaches.

CSOs are particularly appreciative of the Embassy's public demonstration of support to CSO causes. These have encompassed including those causes in policy dialogue and speeches, participation in CSO events, convening spaces that bring together CSOs, facilitating interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and offering its premises for CSO events. By doing so, the Embassy has encouraged CSOs professionals to continue with their work and has sent a message to the government and the general public about the importance of the work of CSOs.

While CSOs appreciate the financial, material, technical and political support provided by the Netherlands Embassy some have lamented what they perceive as lack of policy coherence in the shifting priorities of the Netherlands government. Some interviewees criticised the reduction of the embassy's good governance and decentralisation programme (which directly contributed to the emergence of organisations, such as, CIP and Akilizetho) and the decision to "mainstream" good governance within the current spearheads of the embassy's portfolio (sexual and reproductive health, food and nutrition security and water).

The review of embassy documents and interviews revealed that whilst the support to advocacy civil society organisations is outlined as a cross cutting governance intervention (as well as public finance management and social protection), there seems to be a bias towards CSOs working on gender equality and women's rights (including gender based violence), sexual minorities rights, and land rights and management. In addition, although the embassy's multi-annual strategic plan (MASP) 2012-2015 states that "civil society support will be continued in light of the growing need for advocacy and monitoring of government and business activity (p.17)" and there is evidence that supported organisations are monitoring government interventions, the study found support to CSO's monitoring business activity is not clearly articulated in the three spearheads. Finally, although there is regular policy dialogue between selected CSOs based in Maputo and the Netherlands embassy, the scope to influence the definition of policy priorities by the Netherlands government seems limited, and largely confined to participation in appraisals and evaluations commissioned and/or conducted by the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The study found that continuity of funding provided by the Netherlands embassy as well political support are critical for the development of CSOs capabilities in the area of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy. The current shifts in the Netherlands government policy focus from aid to trade and towards an increased emphasis on the private sector as well as public-private partnerships provide both an opportunity and a challenge to civil society's support.

The embassy is well positioned to advocate for corporate social responsibility and to facilitate dialogue between private sector and civil society. The challenge lays in the fact that until recently the CSO's supported by the embassy have worked mostly in social sectors and governance (focused on the government), and are yet to develop the required capacity to monitor private sector interventions, particularly around food and nutrition security and water management and water and sanitation. For instance, there is a need of broadening the scope of civil society engagement the programmes supported by the embassy under the food and nutrition spearhead beyond land management and administration issues and the integration of smallholder farmers into commercial agriculture; the issue of accountability in agricultural growth corridors, particularly in public-private partnerships supported by embassy needs to be seriously considered.

Dutch Non-Governmental Organisations

A significant proportion of Dutch funding has been channelled through Dutch INGOs and these have been instrumental in the provision of support to CSOs. The technical, material and financial support provided by Hivos (to Lambda), Oxfam Novib (to NAFEZA) and SNV (to Akilizetho and ORAM Nampula) in the early years of these organisations was considered valuable and relevant. More recently, Oxfam Novib has acted as an intermediary under AGIR.

Three notable contributions from Oxfam Novib and AGIR intermediary organisations have been training, support provided to alliance-building and strengthening of CS-platforms, and their role in lobbying for coordination among donors in relation to provision of funding, particularly adherence to common funds of individual CSOs (e.g. Forum Mulher and N'weti). In addition, one interviewee highlighted the flexibility demonstrated by Oxfam Novib during the design and implementation of the sudden CSO campaign "No to legalised robbery" specifically, the rapid approval of the campaign's action plan and budget.

The training provided by Oxfam Novib under AGIR covers organisational, programmatic and individual issues and processes. The organisations working with Oxfam Novib under the AGIR programme[99] considered positive the fact that the programme does not impose a capacity development model (AGIR mid-term evaluation 2013) as well as its commitment to capacity development in the area of policy influencing and the efforts underway to find tailored made approaches. This has been a response to findings from AGIR's mid-term review (2013) which revealed low levels of satisfaction with the capacity development approach adopted because it did not take into account the age and maturity of CSOs and was not succeeding in fostering replication of training at the provincial level, where training opportunities are fewer. The box below provides an example of a recent advocacy training organised by Oxfam Novib[100].

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[99] Sub-programme on financial accountability; participation, social and legal accountability with focus on underlying causes of discrimination. Akilizetho, CIP, Forum Mulher, Lambda, N'weti, and WLSA are amongst Oxfam Novib's implementing partners. NAFEZA has submitted a proposal to the programme.
[100] M'Siri, Thierry (2014), "Relatório final da Formação dos Parceiros do Programa AGIR da OXFAM em matéria de Advocacia", Centro de Estudos e Consultoria em Desenvolvimento Comunitário, Maputo City.

In late-July 2014, Oxfam Novib organised a two-day advocacy training for its implementing partners under the AGIR programme. The training objectives were to: a) support the development of advocacy plans related to the areas of intervention of participating CSOs; b) provide theoretical and practical training on how to use social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and WhatsApp) in advocacy work. The themes discussed comprised an introduction to governance advocacy, advocacy planning and monitoring and evaluation of advocacy work. The training was attended by fourteen people (six women and eight men) from Maputo City, Maputo Province, Zambezia, Nampula and Sofala; representatives from Akilizetho, Forum Mulher, Lambda and Nweti were among the participants. The training was provided by the Centro de Estudos e Consultoria em Desenvolvimento Comunitário (CECODEC).

In relation to capacity development support, it should be noted that selected CSOs receive a wide range of support from other programmes and partners which complements that provided through AGIR. For instance, Akilizetho has received support from MASC aimed at building the capacity of the Provincial Civil Society Platform in Nampula on governance monitoring. NAFEZA and N'weti have received support from FHI 360's Capable Partners Program (CAP) , based on a participatory organisational analysis process that includes identification of organisational strengthens and weaknesses and the design and implementation of institutional development plans; specific support has included participation in individual and joint training (together with other CSOs) as well as technical assistance and coaching. The variety and uncoordinated capacity development support makes it difficult to attribute changes in the core capabilities of supported CSOs to Dutch support.

The evidence collected suggests that Dutch NGOs can best support Mozambican CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in the future through facilitate resource mobilization and donor coordination around funding modalities, brokering national, regional and international networking, providing tailor-made on-the-job training (particularly in the monitoring and evaluation of policy influencing), contributing to increase CSOs research capacity, facilitating documentation of experiences and "reporting for learning", and reaching organisations outside of Maputo.

The brokering of national, regional and international networking will have to be accompanied by mapping current connections. Assessing the strengthens and weaknesses of individual members of platforms, coalitions and networks (particularly at national level) is important not only to improve effectiveness, but also to identify adequate capacity building approaches, tailored to the needs of the group as a whole and individual members, to fully explore their potential.

5. Conclusions

There is a significant **gap between Mozambique's relatively progressive legal and policy framework, the practice of public institutions and people's living conditions**. Mozambique's economic growth has not been translated into safer livelihoods and better quality of life. Gender, income and wealth inequalities are high as well as illiteracy rates. Access to public institutions and services is limited. The political system is dominated by one-party (albeit the multi-party elections) that has ascendance over state institutions, the executive holds considerable power over the judiciary and the legislative, and democratic institutions, political parties and civil society are weak. Sociocultural arguments and political rhetoric are often deployed to legitimise the infringement of civil liberties, political rights and freedom of expression; and intimidation of more vocal civil society actors has increased. Political-business alliances as well as rent-seeking behaviour is common practice, and are expected to increase with the mining-boom Mozambican is experiencing.

Political instability has increased leading to localised military action between 2012 and 2014, but negotiations between FRELIMO and RENAMO are currently underway. While the election of a new president in October 2014 has created uncertainty about the future, it has also created a window of opportunity to improve dialogue with Mozambique's main opposition party. In March 2015, RENAMO submitted a draft bill to the Parliament proposing the creation of autonomous regions. The nature and tone of the political and public debate about the proposal have illustrated the fragility of Mozambique's democracy and civil liberties – particularly after the constitutional-lawyer Giles Cistac was killed presumably for defending the constitutionality of the proposal.

CSOs engagement with the state have changed significantly in the last ten years. From an almost exclusive focus on complementing government's efforts to deliver services, they are becoming increasingly involved in monitoring provision of public services and in policy influencing. The 10 CSOs studied are all professionalised organisations established between the 1990s and mid-2000s. All 10 CSOs are somehow involved in policy influencing work; indeed combination of policy influencing and service delivery work is a dominant feature of their work. While some heavily rely on the platforms and networks they belong to, others undertake have policy influencing activities outside these spaces. Some have clearly articulated their policy influencing goals and strategies, are increasingly documenting their

experiences and results and investing resources to build their technical capacity in this area. Others, have not been able to articulate a coherent approach to their policy influencing work, despite their accumulated experience in this area. CSOs based in Maputo are substantially stronger than those based in the provinces, reflecting differential access to financial, human and technical resources.

There is an ongoing debate on the **legitimacy of CSOs** and it has focused on a) the extent to which an organisation needs to have a constituency in order to engage in lobby and advocacy; b) whether legitimacy to intervene in policy making processes should be exclusively drawn from CSOs' social basis and if the causes they defend can be the very source of their legitimacy. This is significant given that the majority of the CSOs studied does not have a constituency and lack mechanisms to meaningfully involve targeted groups in decision-making, even though they seek popular support for their work (as expressed in the importance their attach to social mobilisation in their theories of change).

While in the past CSOs intervened in non-controversial topics, more recently they broadened the **topics and issues** they address and have re-directed their attention to more contentious matters (such as, sexual minority rights, state and corporate responsibility, corruption and conflict of interest). CSOs traditional focus on certain areas has affected policy dialogue, specifically their adherence, participation and interest have historically focused on socio-economic development and latter in democracy and political governance areas in which they are able to give a rich contribution and often possess more expertise than government officials; knowledge of economic and corporate governance is however inadequate. In addition, CSOs have not being able to come up with policy proposal and this affects their legitimacy to participate if their contribution focuses on criticising rather than presenting alternatives. CSOs legitimacy is also negatively affected by the weak internal governance and transparency, for instance many are unwilling to disclose information on budgets, sources of funding and expenditure. Relatedly, there are concerns about what is perceived as incoherence between NGO salaries and call for greater responsibilities from politicians, which situates NGO staff in the context of growing economic disparity and class differentiation in Mozambique.

The government, donors and CSOs have been the **main actors directly involved in policy making**. The role of the parliament and of political parties has been minimal. The influence of the private sector is becoming more noticeably, particularly the effects of political-business alliances on government policies. CSOs engagement in policy influencing takes place in a context characterised by lack of internal accountability. The role of the parliament and of political parties has been minimal. Multilateral and bilateral agencies have been the main drivers of policy-making in Mozambique; they have privileged access to policy makers and to information about government policies, strategies and programmes.

Spaces and space for CSOs vary depending on the sector and the issue at stake. While the health and education sectors have been more permeable to CSOs (because of the service delivery role), others have been more insulated. The relationships between the government and CSOs are often ambiguous, fragile and ever changing, even in sectors relatively more open to their participation. The political system is captive of people and there are misconceived assumptions about the role of CSOs thrive. Government's openness to

participation depends on how controversial the issue is. Many formal policy dialogue spaces (such as, the Development Observatories created by the government in response to CSOs' demand) are consultation focused and not been decentralised at district/community level. Formal policy spaces tend to be used to legitimise policy choices already made, yet many consider that despite all their deficiencies they are important for political bargaining. There is not clear policy on the collaboration between state and non-state actors for the development of national policies and the existence of parallel and disarticulated planning processes constitutes a disincentive for engaging in policy-making processes. The study found while CSOs' scrutiny of the national legislation has been high, there are less examples of related to government policies and programmes, beyond the research-focused CSOs.

In terms of **policy influencing strategies and practices** the study found that while adopting a myriad of strategies the 10 selected CSOs have privileged **non-confrontational interaction** (advising and lobbying). There is a general consensus that collaboration is the best approach to influence policies in Mozambique, given its history and political context. Inside strategies have entailed participation in formal policy spaces, mainly through networks and platforms, creation of new formal and informal spaces, use of informal networks to access information and influential individuals. The advising strategy has depended on the space provided by the government and has been fundamentally re-active. There is a shared feeling that CSOs are not making adequate use of existing invited spaces. Lobbying has depended upon social capital, personal networks and the extent to which CSOs are able to tap into 'insider champions of participation'. The training provided by CSOs to government institutions have created entry-points for advising and lobbying activities.

Despite the preference for non-confrontational interaction, the use of advocacy strategies, including name and shaming, has intensified significantly in the last ten years. Public opinion has been mobilised through a combination of collaboration with the media as well as awareness raising events in the communities. Relatedly, few CSOs distinguish between advocacy aimed at policy change and that related to broader societal practices. A limited number of CSOs has an advocacy strategy. Overall, CSO representatives showed reluctance to adhere to activities with an activist edge, but less reservations in relation to public communication and education campaigns; feminist and women's organisations in general tend to resort more to this strategy than other CSOs, although more organisations have joined peaceful marches in the last 12 months. Interestingly, the CSOs interview do not make a distinction between advocacy and activism. An illustration of this is the fact that many peaceful marches have taken place in the context of broader 'advocacy campaigns'.

CSOs' preference for certain strategies is related to the perceived targets of interventions and is issue-dependent. Marches and demonstrations are more visible and tend to be seen by government officials as a direct 'attack' to state institutions, while public awareness raising communication and campaigns are directed to the general public. In fact, CSOs do use peaceful marches to inform to the public about a given situation and 'to force the public to influence state institutions', however these strategy is not suitable for all issues particularly if there is a risk of getting public opposition instead of support.

CSOs policy influencing work is affected by the **limited research capacity** and lack of socio-cultural, economic and political research. Institutional links between academia and CSOs

are nearly inexistent and there are few independent and sound research-oriented CSOs active in stimulating policy debate. While all 10 CSOs have commissioned studies to support their work, the scenario is quite mixed in terms of access, generation and use of scientifically sound research among them. Some CSOs are research-based, others place a great emphasis on research and all their work is informed by literature reviews and formative research, others have only contributed to the identification of research themes drawing upon their work with communities. All CSOs recognise the importance of research to their activities and expressed the need of a better understanding of the context in which they operate. Many feel that they have acted upon opportunities and have not been able to anticipate the processes they want to influence. Some underlined that CSOs do not create adequate space for learning and do not allow time for their professionals to read and familiarise themselves with existing research. Relatedly, few are able to coherently articulate the links between research production, dissemination, appropriation and use. Dissemination of knowledge is critical for its appropriation and research-based CSOs are exploring ways of improving how they communicate their findings. Few CSOs systematically integrate research results into their lobby and advocacy and training activities, and the majority does not have the human and technical capacity to document their interventions.

The study found that platform that **CSO platforms and thematic networks** are an essential mechanism for dialogue with the government, since the latter has a preference for interacting with groups rather than individual CSOs. For many years, the government has used the division and lack of consensus among CSOs to delegitimise the claims made by individual CSOs arguing that they represented minority voices. While in the past the reasons for establishing networks and platforms were associated with attempts to improve their legitimacy and coordination, currently join action and protection against individual backlash have been emphasised. Affiliation to platforms and networks has also been adopted by CSOs addressing socio-culturally sensitive issues (such as, sexual minorities' rights) as a strategy to mobilise support from within civil society. CSOs platforms and networks are also perceived as an effective way of capitalising the strengths of different CSOs and of providing space and visibility for smaller CBOs in policy making processes.

The **main challenges of CSOs platforms and networks** relate to i) their tendency to adopt a catch-all approach instead of drawing on the areas of expertise of its members; ii) weak communication and information exchange between its members; iii) the tendency of platforms becoming "NGOs of NGOs" and of developing vertical relations and communication instead of horizontality; iv) poor representation of peripheral voices and less influential groups v) dependency on funding from international organisations; vi) difficulty in identifying the individual contribution of its members; vii) lack of solidarity and quest for protagonism and; viii) considerably high levels of suspicion among CSOs.

The assessment of **effectiveness of CSOs' interventions** has been negatively affected by poor monitoring and evaluation frameworks and documentation. However, the study found that CSOs have successfully brought forward their positions regarding violence against women, women's political participation, corruption and transparency and MPs pension schemes. Government officials have started to pay attention to issues raised by CSOs and prepare itself for meetings with CSOs, this includes considering evidence produced by CSOs

and capitalising on expert knowledge otherwise not accessible to them. In addition, government officials and parliamentarians have attended meetings convened by CSOs to present research findings and lessons learned from project implementation and well as trainings delivered by CSOs. There is evidence that CSOs have influenced the terms of public debate by bringing new perspectives and alternative approaches, examples include the discussion land grabbing, the citizen budget and an integrated approach to gender based violence.

In response to CSOs' persistent lobby and advocacy the Mozambique has adopted a law on domestic violence against women, adhered to the EITI, approved anti-corruption legislation and de-criminalised abortion. Overall, the Mozambican government has been very responsive in terms of developing new strategies and action plans and the Ministry of Justice has recently developed an implementation plan for approved legislation. However, the dissemination of these instruments tends to be limited and their actual implementation remains a challenge.

The study found that availability of funding for policy dialogue interventions, CSOs ability to mobilise around a common issue, awareness raising initiatives targeting various audiences, existence of champions of participation within state institutions, and the growing tendency of the general public to express dissatisfaction about deepening social inequalities had a positive contribution to the effectiveness of CSO's policy influencing work. While the limited competence to generate and present solid local evidence, inadequate knowledge of the policy cycle and drivers (due to various factors including lack of transparency of the part of the government and restricted access to information), and limited availability and commitment to participate in a sustained manner in policy-making had a negative contribution.

In terms of **how the capacity of the 10 CSOs has developed**, the evidence gathered suggests that for the majority of organisations policy influencing has emerged organically from their service delivery interventions and a combination of exposure to domestic policy-making spaces, participation in regional and international meetings and trainings, and monitoring the implementation of conventions and declarations approved at those levels, through the production and submission of shadow reports to United Nations bodies. Although all 10 CSOs have included lobby and advocacy work in their strategic and organisational development plans, and many have delivered advocacy training to others, policy influencing is still a relatively new area for most them; they are in process of clarifying their views and approaches to policy influencing and of identifying adequate indicators to monitor their work in this area.

The **support provided by Dutch organisations** to civil society strengthening has been critical. The Netherlands embassy and Dutch NGOs have been particularly important in the history and organisational development of all studied organisations. CSOs perceive the support provided by the Netherlands embassy as enabling and based on trust. They are also appreciative of the embassy's public demonstration of support to their causes. Dutch NGOs (Hivos, Oxfam Novib and SNV) have provided technical material and financial support since the early years of many organisations. Capacity development in the area of policy influencing has been integral component of the support provided. The on-going support

provided by Oxfam Novib under AGIR in the form of provision of advocacy training and alliance building has been highlighted. Dutch NGOs have also brokered national, regional and international networking and this role is expected to be strengthened in the future.

The majority of the CSOs has more than one source of support to capacity development and donors are increasingly focusing on assisting CSOs perform their watchdog role and engage in policy dialogue. The lack of coordination of donor support to CSOs policy influencing work prevents an accurate assessment of what has been done and what is still missing. CSOs themselves are unable to present an overall picture of the support they have received in this area in the last six years.

The document review and the interviews conducted suggest however, that a substantial proportion of **support has focused largely on supporting functions**: knowledge, freedom of expression and civic engagement, but de-linked from policy influencing. For instance, knowledge production has focused to a large extent on making information available to communities (e.g. by producing simplified version of approved legislation and disseminating it); production of scientific and policy relevant knowledge is more limited. Besides, while there has been a strong emphasis on reaching communities, approaches have traditionally has focused on "changing communities" and to a lesser extent in fostering citizen participation in community life (for instance, even HIV prevention initiatives with a strong component of citizen involvement have often restricted citizen involvement to information of dissemination and awareness raising, and occasionally to home-based assistance of AIDS patients).

Initiatives aimed at fostering civic engagement in monitoring provision of public services are relatively new and there are **many issues that are yet to be explored**, such as i) drivers and barriers to individual engagement (CEP 2013); ii) interactions and power relations with CSOs mediating these processes; iii) the existence and nature of grassroots social movements and their potential to influence policy change; iv) the extent to which civic engagement is generating political support and commitment at district, provincial and national levels; v) spaces and forms of cyber-activism and; vi) whether and how CSOs integrate citizens' concerns in their policy influencing agendas.

6. Recommendations

The recommendations focus on Dutch organisations' support to policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy work of CSOs and were formulated based on discussions with CSOs at workshop on the 17th February.

Recommendations for the Netherlands Embassy

- Support to CSOs capacity development in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy needs to take into account the shifts from aid to trade and a stronger emphasis on the private sector and in public-private partnerships. The embassy is well positioned to promote accountability in public-private partnerships, foster corporate social responsibility and facilitate CSOs efforts to lobby the private sector.
- Donor coordination around support to CSOs' capacity development in the areas of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy is much needed and the embassy can promote it within AGIR and in the donor groupings in which it takes part.
- Policy dialogue between the embassy and supported CSOs could be strengthened. While the embassy has created many spaces for interaction with CSOs, many feel that dialogue around shifting policy priorities of the Netherlands government could be improved and that this would contribute to strengthen mutual accountability.
- Fostering internal accountability through promotion of multi-stakeholder collaboration. The embassy can draw on the connections forged through its previous support to democratic governance and decentralisation to promote linkages between CSOs and political parties, parliament and municipalities.
- Financial sustainability is essential for the long-term survival of CSOs and the effectiveness of policy influencing work. The embassy could foster dialogue with CSOs and other donors on alternative and diversified sources of funding to increase not only financial sustainability, but also the autonomy and legitimacy of CSOs.
- Research capacity strengthening and supporting the production of scientifically sound and contextually relevant knowledge is fundamental for policy influencing.

Support to research-based CSOs needs to be combined with institutional support to universities and facilitation of partnerships between universities and CSOs who lack the capacity to define, contract, monitor and quality assure solid research in their areas of intervention.

- More equitable allocation of funding for CSOs taking into account current geographical disparities in terms of capacity and the diversity of CSO actors.

Recommendations for Dutch NGOs

- Support CSOs efforts to build alliances, networks and platforms at national, regional and international levels. This ought to address issues of distrust, power relations and internal accountability mechanisms.
- Support the development of CSOs self-regulatory frameworks (e.g. code of conduct) to improve internal governance, accountability and legitimacy.
- Strengthening the links between CSOs and citizens in the definition of policy influencing agendas would help improve the relevance of CSOs work to the later and bridge the gaps between the two.
- Efforts to promote use of social media need to be accompanied by local research on spaces and forms of cyber-activism (including state controlled) and their effectiveness in policy advocacy considering the small percentage of people with online access.
- Ensure that young people and youth organisations are targeted by policy influencing capacity development to ensure intergeneration knowledge exchange and institutional sustainability of interventions.
- Promote learning on the experience of mass democratic organisations, religious groups and non-institutionalised protesters and their contributions for civic engagement and policy change.

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Annexes

Terms of Reference

Country Studies Ethiopia and Mozambique in the Context of the Evaluation of Policy Influencing, Lobbying & Advocacy

Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

14 August 2014

Rationale

Lobbying and advocacy was included in the ministry's evaluation programming in 2012. The main reason for this evaluation was to support the enhanced attention of the ministry for lobbying and advocacy by providing lessons and insights from experience of supporting these activities.

The Dutch Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation has informed parliament in 2013 in a letter about the governments' commitment to a strong role for civil society, which it believes has the ability to place topics of general interest on the agenda of governments and private sector parties locally, nationally and internationally. The underlying idea is that in doing so civil society contributes to decision-making that reflects the collective interest. The letter stressed that the state and markets function better when they include social issues in their decisions. Both Dutch and EU policies regard civil society organisations (CSOs) as critical and independent development actors that need political space so that they can enrich policymaking and contribute to more inclusive and sustainable growth and development.

However, there is little systematic knowledge available at the ministry about support provided for lobbying and advocacy and its effectiveness. Nor is there any information available about the factors leading to or impeding success. Lobbying and advocacy activities are not recorded as such and there is no monitoring and evaluation framework available.

The main purpose of this evaluation is therefore to contribute to insights and lessons that may support the development of lobbying and advocacy policy and in particular to gain a better understanding of how the ministry may best support CSOs in developing countries. As part of the overall evaluation, country case studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique will be carried out. The evaluation will cover the period 2008-2014.

1. Background

Definition of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy

There are many descriptions of what policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy entails. The following definition will be applied in this evaluation (see figure 1):

Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy covers a wide range of activities conducted to influence decision-makers in the public and private sector at international, national or local levels towards the overall aim of combating the structural causes of poverty and injustice and contributing to sustainable inclusive development.


Figure 1: Generic Theory of Change (Source: IOB)

This evaluation will focus on support provided directly for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy (B). But the evaluation will also consider support provided for creating the supporting functions (A) and possible direct material or non-material involvement of donors with decision-makers (C). Through its departments and embassies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides financial support and occasionally diplomatic support (directly at political level) or political backing to local civil society. Dutch NGOs and CSOs provide financial support for programme implementation and

assistance with capacity development, facilitate access to international networks or participate directly in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities.

Some characteristics of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy

Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy has a number of specific characteristics:

- it takes place in a contested environment in which the legitimacy of proposed changes, the resources employed and results achieved will be debated;
- it focuses on questions of political power and power structures;
- it focuses on complex and dynamic change, with the consequence that action and reaction are often not directly traceable;
- it often requires a continuous effort to maintain or enlarge space that has initially been captured;
- it leads to change that can manifest itself at different levels;
- it is a long and difficult process with unpredictable results that are influenced by many actors and factors.

Strategies of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy

Policy influencing may involve different strategies (see figure 2):

- 'inside' and 'outside' track strategies;
- approaches that are led by evidence and science versus those that are primarily interest and value based.

This approach sets out four possible strategies (I-IV). Policy influencing often combines some or all of the four strategies. Inside track strategies work closely with decision-makers through advising and lobbying (I and III) and entail behind the scenes activities usually directed at collaboration and persuasion. Outside track approaches seek to influence change through advocacy and activism (II and IV) and involve public activities, which are usually directed at pressure and confrontation. The distinction between evidence/science-based and interest/value-based does not necessarily mean these categories are completely opposite or independent; certain values can be supported by scientific evidence and academic research producing evidence is often preceded by an interest in or a value judgement on a specific topic.


Figure 2: Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies

Supporting functions

Knowledge, freedom of expression and civic engagement are often preconditions for successful policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy (see figure 1):

- *Knowledge production* refers to the research, documentation and dissemination processes that make information available to communities. Scientific quality and societal relevance of knowledge produced are important.
- *Freedom of expression* (and free press and freedom of association) is essential in informing the wider public and providing a platform for interest groups.

- *Civic engagement* refers to how citizens participate in community life. It is of vital importance for the legitimacy of policy influencing and of the CSOs involved, and it is a condition for mobilising political involvement and commitment.

Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities also can aim at and affect these supporting functions; improved policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy may mean that the supporting functions are strengthened, which in turn makes the environment for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy to be successful more receptive and adaptive.

The ministry's policy on policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy

There is no overarching policy document on policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy during the evaluation period 2008-2014, but references to the importance the ministry attaches to policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy can be found in specific policy frameworks. An overview of such frameworks is presented in the overall ToR for the evaluation, p. 12-14. A document that has contributed much to the thinking about policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy of the ministry is titled 'Supporting domestic accountability: Exploring conceptual dimensions and operational challenges'.[101]

2. Overall evaluation framework

Objective of the evaluation

To generate insights and conclusions that fulfil the learning goal of the evaluation by means of:

- a critical analysis of the support provided by the ministry;
- a study of the evidence of the effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy and factors that explain degrees of effectiveness;
- study of how Northern (Dutch) organisations may best support the policy influencing work of Southern CSOs (success factors and limitations).

Focus of the evaluation

The evaluation will focus on the effectiveness of the ministry's support to:

- International, Southern and Dutch organisations participating in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy collaborative associations;
- Dutch organisations providing financial and other support to CSOs in developing countries aimed at strengthening their capacity to achieve their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy objectives.

Demarcation and limitations of the evaluation

- Limited information is available on the effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy; therefore the evaluation will also face restrictions in that respect.
- Establishing causal linkages in terms of attribution is challenging; therefore the evaluation will aim to establish plausible contribution associations between the increase in activities of CSOs and changes in policy processes.
- Given its learning goal, the evaluation will not impose accountability on the effectiveness of Dutch financial support or measure efficiency.
- The evaluation will select illustrative cases that serve the learning goal of this evaluation. It will not aim for optimal representativeness.
- The evaluation takes the position that organisations and the system in which they operate are open systems that function in and respond to complex environments. It assumes that organisations are embedded in wider systems that transcend geographical levels (local, national and global).

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[101] *'Supporting domestic accountability: Exploring conceptual dimensions and operational challenges'*; ECDPM, October 2009.

- The evaluation also takes the position that capacity development is a non-linear, endogenous process –rather than something that results from outside support.

Main evaluation questions[102]

- How does the ministry support policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?
- What evidence is there for the effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying strategies/ programmes in influencing policy in the public and private sector that is supportive of poverty reduction, justice and sustainable inclusive development? What factors explain levels of effectiveness?
- How does Southern CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy at national or global level develop and how does the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations influence that capacity development? How can Northern (Dutch) organisations best support Southern CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in the future?

3. Case studies Ethiopia and Mozambique

Why Ethiopia and Mozambique?

This part of the research will build on the work that has been conducted as part of the recent IOB evaluation of direct funding.[103] The rationale for that support was to strengthen CSOs, a number of which are involved in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy.

The reasons for choosing Ethiopia and Mozambique are that the expenditures in these two countries were most substantial and that the context in which policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities take place (the enabling environment for CSO engagement in general and policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in particular) is different in the two countries. The legislative and political context for CSOs to operate is quite restrictive in Ethiopia, while in Mozambique it is more open and conducive.

Objective of the case studies Ethiopia and Mozambique

To generate insights and conclusions concerning the environment, practice and support of Northern (Dutch) organisations to capacity development in the area of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in Ethiopia and Mozambique that contribute to the learning goal of the evaluation.[104]

Main questions

1. How can the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy takes place be characterised?
2. How can CSOs engaged in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy be characterised?
3. What is the practice and effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy of 10 CSOs in both Ethiopia and Mozambique?
4. How does the capacity of these 10 CSOs to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy develop?
5. How does the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations influence capacity development of these 10 CSOs concerning policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?

Specific questions

1. How can the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy takes place be characterised?
   - To what extent and how is freedom of expression, press and association guaranteed?

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[102] For specific questions and indicators, see the overall ToR for the evaluation, p. 19-20.

[103] http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2014/03/03/iob-evaluatie-useful-patchwork-direct-funding-of-local-ngo-s-by-netherlands-embassies-2006-2012.html

[104] Most of the cases to be studied in the context of this evaluation concern NGOs directly funded by the Embassies of the Netherlands in Ethiopia and Mozambique. In addition, some activities funded by other Northern (Dutch) organisations will be selected.

- What is the level and nature of civic engagement; to what extent do CSOs enjoy legitimacy for policy influencing?
- To what extent have CSOs access to sources of scientifically sound and societal relevant knowledge?
- To what extent and how does the environment influence the opportunity to undertake policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities?
- What constraints do CSOs experience that prevent them from engaging in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy or achieving their objectives?
- What are other important characteristics of the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy takes place?

2. How can CSOs engaged in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy be characterised?
   - Which CSOs are the main actors in the arena of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy and what are the topics/issues they are concentrating on?
   - How can CSOs engaged in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy be classified in terms of rooting (e.g. grass roots organisations, community based organisations, intermediary organisations, NGOs, trade unions, international NGOs, etc.)?
   - Which strategies follow CSOs in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities (refer to typology as presented in figure 2)?
   - What is the scientific quality and social relevance of their knowledge as precondition for successful policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy of CSOs?
   - To what extent do CSOs cooperate (locally, nationally, internationally) in the context of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities?
   - What are other important characteristics of CSOs engaged in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?

3. What is the practice and effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy of 10 CSOs in both Ethiopia and Mozambique?
   - What are the main characteristics of the selected CSOs, with special attention for their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy practice
   - Do the organisations have a theory of change for policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy; how does it look like?[105]
   - Does it include a context analysis (policy issues, power relations, formal and informal channels, etc.) and a picture of what drives change in the 'target'?
   - What main activities have the organisations undertaken?
   - What planned/unplanned achievements have been realised at the various result levels (refer to A-B-C in figure 1)?
   - What is the evidence for such achievements (expressed in terms of attribution and/or contribution)?
   - What external and internal factors explain levels of effectiveness?

4. How does the capacity of these 10 CSOs to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy develop?
   - How do Southern CSOs' policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies/programmes evolve over time?
   - How do they develop their legitimacy to engage in policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?
   - How do they act in their environment and how do they adapt their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies/programmes to changes?
   - Do they have organisational development plans and are these linked to their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy programmes; how are they linked?
   - How do they monitor and evaluate their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities; do they use the resulting insights to adjust their policy and how it is implemented?
   - Are mechanisms in place to notice/monitor policy changes that may have been stimulated by the policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities of the CSOs?

5. How does the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations influence capacity development of these 10 CSOs concerning policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy?
   - What is the support strategy of the Northern (Dutch) organisations and what support do they provide (link to figure 1)?

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[105] See also Annex 4 of the overall ToR.

- What factors explain the effectiveness of the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations?
- Does external (Dutch) support meet the need of the CSOs and how do they perceive that support (supportive/constraining/otherwise)?
- How has it helped them to strengthen their capacity and to achieve their policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy objectives?
- How can Northern (Dutch) organisations best support Southern CSOs' capacity to practise policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy in future?

Effectiveness indicators

Effectiveness relates to the relationship between particular actions and the results of those actions:

- the policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities of organisations (figure 1: results level B) and changes in development policies and practices in public and private sector (figure 1: results level C);
- the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations for and changes in the production of knowledge, freedom of expression and civic engagement (figure 1: results level A);
- the support provided by Northern (Dutch) organisations and changes in the supported organisation's capacity at results levels A and B.

The effectiveness for each organisation or programme (results) will be assessed against its own theory of change, objectives, activities/inputs and indicators and against how these have evolved over time.
Assessment of effectiveness will be further guided by the outcome indicators (see Annex 1).

Changes in capacity will be assessed using the 5C framework (see Annex 2). The generic set of indicators for each capability will be specified for this assignment in an early stage of the evaluation.

Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies and activities will be categorized according to figure 2: I. Advising, II. Advocacy, III. Lobbying, and IV. Activism.

Reporting at aggregate level will be structured according to the results levels presented in figure 1.
Research design

Policy changes are highly complex and anything but linear or rational processes, shaped by a multitude of interacting forces and actors. To address this problem the evaluation will be guided as much as possible by the principles of contribution analysis, as an evaluation approach to address the causality problem. It will aim to compare an intervention's postulated theory of change with the evidence, in order to draw conclusions about the contribution it has made to observed outcomes. The aim of contribution analysis is to critically construct a contribution story which builds up evidence to demonstrate the contribution made by an intervention, while also establishing the relative importance of other influences on outcomes. The approach draws on the idea that an intervention's theory of change can be used to infer causation by assessing whether the mechanisms or processes that it aims to initiate have in fact occurred.

The first main evaluation question will be addressed on the basis of a reconstruction of Dutch policy on development cooperation in the 2008-2014 period.

The second main evaluation question will be addressed by focusing on a review of available literature including evaluation reports, IOB and MFS II reports, background information on human rights/ gender, etc., three case studies of lobby & advocacy campaigns and 10 policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities in both Ethiopia and Mozambique.

The third main evaluation question will be addressed on the basis of the 10 policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities in both Ethiopia and Mozambique. This will generate insight into how Southern CSOs develop and operate, and what they achieve. The case studies will also contribute to the development of a framework for analysing similar cases more systematically. The organisational development of the Southern CSO, the policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities it has undertaken, how they have contributed to changes in policy and the role of the

supporting functions will be addressed first. Once that has been established, the role and impact of external (Dutch) support will be considered.

Evaluation methods

To answer evaluation questions 1 and 2 the following methods may be applied[106]:

- Document survey on the position of civil society, the enabling environment, the freedom to operate and the legitimacy of CSOs;
- Document survey on policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies of CSOs, knowledge and capacities of CSOs, patterns of international, national or local cooperation between CSOs and other organisations/actors;
- Interviews/group discussions with experts of research institutes, CSOs and NGOs in the field of civil society;
- Interviews with government officials and foreign representatives (Embassies, EU delegation, international NGOs, multilateral organisations) about their perception of the roles and patterns of cooperation with CSOs.

To answer evaluation questions 3, 4 and 5 the following methods may be applied:

- Study of CSO strategic multi annual plans, annual plans, organisational development plans (including capacity development plans);
- Study of CSO policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy strategies, objectives, programmes and activities;
- Study of CSO annual reports, progress/monitoring reports, evaluation reports, organisational development progress reports (including capacity development progress reports);
- Study of capacity development strategies/approaches, plans, methods and experiences/results of Northern (Dutch) organisations providing capacity development support to Southern CSOs;
- Interviews with CSO staff, with representatives of their constituencies, with representatives of institutions/organisations/companies (Governmental, private, non-governmental) that are target of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities, with representatives of Northern (Dutch) organisations that provide capacity development support and with the Netherlands embassy.

Products

The findings of the evaluation will be presented in a final report. The findings of the country cases Ethiopia and Mozambique will be presented in country reports that will serve as input for the overall final report. The production of the country reports will be the responsibility of a lead consultant in Ethiopia and another lead consultant in Mozambique. The country reports will be written in English.

Organisation

The country studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique form an integral part of the overall evaluation of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy. The team leader of the overall evaluation is mr. Piet de Lange, inspector IOB; he is assisted by ms. Anique Claessen, research assistant IOB. The team leader will be advised by an internal IOB peer review team and by a reference group of external experts.

The implementation of the country studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique will be coordinated by mr. Floris Blankenberg, inspector IOB. One lead consultant will be contracted to carry out the case study in Ethiopia; another one will be contracted to carry out the case study in Mozambique. The two lead consultants report to Floris Blankenberg. He may decide to join the lead consultants during the implementation of the country studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique (not more than one week each) in order to gain better understanding of the issues concerning lobby and advocacy in these countries. The two lead consultants remain responsible for the production of the country reports.

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[106] See also Annex 3 of the overall ToR.

IOB will contract the lead consultants in compliance with the public procurement law. In consultation with and with the approval of Floris Blankenberg, they may decide to outsource part of the work to (an)other local consultant(s), but this does not necessarily have to be the case. In case of outsourcing, the lead consultants remain responsible for the work done by other consultants. They will also be responsible for their contracts and payment. There will be no direct (business-like) link between Floris Blankenberg and possible other consultants.

Main tasks of the lead consultants

- Designing the evaluation approach and methodology.
- Tuning the approach and methodology with the other lead consultant[107]
- Preparing an inception report for the country study as outlined below.
- Implementing the country study.
- Organizing a workshop to present and discuss the provisional results of the country study to/with the Royal Netherlands Embassies, involved CSOs and other relevant parties.
- Producing and submitting a draft and a final country report.

Qualifications of the lead consultants

- Experience in conducting multi-stakeholder evaluations.
- Knowledge of the role and position of civil society and of the landscape of CSOs/NGOs in the country.
- Knowledge of policy influencing, lobby and advocacy and of capacity development theory and practice in the country.
- Availability of a network of relevant actors to consult during the country study.
- Excellent writing abilities and fluency in English.

Inception reports

The lead consultants will produce an inception report four weeks after the start of the assignment. This inception report should propose a methodology and approach for the country studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique. The inception reports, written in English, will have a maximum length of 10 pages, excluding annexes.

The draft of the inception reports will be reviewed by the IOB evaluation team and the internal IOB peer review team. After taking into account the outcomes of these consultations, a go/no-go decision will be taken by the responsible inspector about the actual implementation of the country studies. If the decision is positive, the lead consultants will conduct the studies and prepare the country reports. In case there are still issues to be resolved, the lead consultants will revise the inception reports.

The inception report should go into the following aspects:

- A description of aspects to be included in the characterization of:
  - the socio-political environment in which policy influencing, lobby and advocacy takes place;
  - CSOs that are engaged in policy influencing, lobby and advocacy (link with figure 2);
  - the 10 selected CSOs with a focus on policy influencing, lobby and advocacy activities;
  - the type of achievements/results/effects of the activities of the 10 selected CSOs (link with figure 1);
  - the capacity development process of the 10 selected CSOs;
  - the support of Northern (Dutch) organizations to capacity development of the 10 selected CSOs.

- A description of methods and type of sources to be used to:

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[107] Lead consultants for the case studies in Ethiopia and Mozambique.

- produce the characterizations of the socio-political environment and the CSOs engaged in lobby and advocacy;
- measure achievements/results/effects of policy influencing, lobby and advocacy activities of the 10 CSOs;
- assess the influence of external and internal factors to explain levels of effectiveness;
- assess the quality of the theory of change for lobby and advocacy;
- assess how capacity of CSOs develops;
- assess how Northern (Dutch) organizations contribute to capacity development of CSOs;

- A description of how the approach and the methodology of the country cases have been tuned between the two lead consultants.

- A description of how/to what extent the outcome indicators (see Annex 1) and the indicators for changes in capacity (5C framework: see Annex 2) will be used to assess the outcomes of lobby and advocacy activities and of changes in capacity of CSOs.

- A reflection on and a further refinement of the specific questions presented in this ToR.

- A description of how reporting of findings at individual CSO level will be reported at aggregate level, structured according to the results levels as presented in figure 1.

- An overview of relevant documents and resource persons to be consulted and projects to be visited.

- An evaluation matrix summarizing research questions, indicators, methodology and information sources

- A description of limitations of the proposed research approach and methodology

- An overview of organizational aspects:
  - A detailed work- and travel plan, including time-planning
  - A plan for the workshop for Embassy staff, CSOs and other actors
  - A draft table of contents of the country reports
  - Tentative: the considerations to outsource part of the work, the name(s) and description of expertise of proposed additional consultant(s) with CV
  - Tentative: a description of division of tasks between lead consultant and additional consultant(s)
  - A detailed budget for the implementation of the country study

Country reports

After a go decision on the inception reports will have been taken by the responsible inspector, the country studies will be implemented on the basis of the proposals in the approved inception reports. If the decision is positive, the lead consultants will conduct the studies and prepare a draft country reports.

They will present preliminary conclusions of the country study for comments and suggestions to embassy staff, involved CSOs and other actors during a workshop in Ethiopia resp. Mozambique. Comments and suggestions will be taken into account while writing the next version of the country reports. The lead consultants will make the draft reports available to the embassies and involved CSOs for fact-checking. Factual errors will be rectified.

They will submit the next draft of the reports for approval by the responsible inspector. Each report, written in English with an executive summary, will have a maximum length of 25 pages, excluding annexes.

Annex 2: Study Methods and Data Sources

Case Study theme	Study participants	Study methods	Documents to be reviewed
Characterization of the socio-political environment/political economy of policy making processes	• Key informants and experts on civil society from academic institutions and think-thanks • CSO and NGO actors • Multilateral and bilateral donors; • Government officials;	• Document review; • Interviews	• National policies (Five-Year Government Plan; PARPA II 2006-2009 & PARP 2011-2014; Agenda 2025) • Strategic plans of sectors targeted by CSOs' policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions; • Legislation on CSO • Guidelines on CSO participation in policy making processes • Documentation on donor support to Mozambican CSOs • Joint government-donor annual reviews (2008 - 2014) • Relevant literature documenting policy-making processes
Characterization of the CSOs engaged in lobby and advocacy	• Key informants and experts on civil society from academic institutions and think-thanks • CSO and NGO actors • Multilateral and bilateral donors; • Government officials;	• Document review; • Interviews	• Mappings, assessments, situational analysis, reviews and evaluations related to Mozambican CSOs, including regional and international studies, commissioned by CSO and donors.
Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy practices (including the quality of the underlying theory of change) of CSOs and their effectiveness	• CSO staff; • Representatives of CSOs' constituencies representatives of organisations (governmental, non-governmental, and) targeted by policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities; • Representatives of (Dutch) organisations that provide capacity development support • EKN.	• Document review; • Interviews; • Participant observation • Focus group	• CSO strategic multi annual plans, annual plans, and capacity development plans; • CSO annual reports, progress/monitoring reports, evaluation reports, capacity development progress reports; • Relevant literature documenting policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy processes.
Influence of external and internal factors	• CSO staff; • Representatives of CSOs' constituencies representatives	• Document review; • Interviews; • Focus group	• CSO annual reports, progress/monitoring reports, evaluation reports, organisational development progress reports (including capacity development progress reports);

on effectiveness of policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy interventions	of organisations (governmental, non-governmental, and) targeted by policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities; • Representatives of (Dutch) organisations that provide capacity development support and; • EKN		• Relevant literature documenting policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy processes.
The process of CSO capacity development	• CSO staff; • Representatives of CSOs' constituencies representatives of organisations (governmental, non-governmental, and) targeted by policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy activities; • Multilateral and bilateral donors; • Representatives of (Dutch) organisations that provide capacity development support and; • EKN	• Document review; • Interviews; • Focus group;	• CSO strategic multi annual plans, annual plans, and capacity development plans; • CSO annual reports, progress/monitoring reports, evaluation reports, capacity development progress reports; • Relevant literature documenting policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy processes;
Contribution of Dutch organisations to capacity development of the 10 CSOs	• CSO staff; • Representatives of (Dutch) organisations that provide capacity development support and; • EKN	• Document review; • Interviews; • Focus group; •	• CSOs strategic plans, annual and evaluation reports • Dutch organizations' multi and plans; • Dutch organizations' annual reports and evaluation reports; • Relevant literature documenting policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy processes commissioned by Dutch organisations;

Annex 3: People Interviewed & Focus Group Discussion Participants

Name	Organisation/Location	Position
Célia Jordão	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Senior Adviser Food and Nutrition Security
Denise Namburette	N'weti/Maputo	Executive Director
Eleásara Antunes	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Gender, HIV, and Social Protection Officer
Felizberto Mulhovo	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Political Affairs, Media and Culture
Jan Huesken	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Head of Cooperation
João Pereira	MASC/Maputo	Management Unit Director
José Macuane	MAP Consultoria/Maputo	Partner & Managing Director
Padil Salimo	MAP Consultoria/Maputo	Partner & Executive Director
Calisto Ribeiro	ORAM/ Nampula	Executive Director
Pedro de Carvalho	Akilizetho/Nampula	Former Director
Olga Loforte	Akilizetho/Nampula	Gender Officer
Sara Ubisse	NAFEZA/Nampula	?
Cândida Quintano	NAFEZA/ Nampula	Executive Director
Fernando Menete	Rede Uthende	Coordinator
Alex Muianga	Coalizão/Maputo	Coordinator
Luís Felipe Pereira	Cruzeiro do Sul/Maputo	Former Coordinator
Agueda Nhantumbo	UNFPA/Maputo	Gender Programme Officer
Maria José Arthur	WLSA/Maputo	Project Coordinator
Antoinette Van Vugt	Oxfam Novib/Maputo	AGIR Coordinator
Adriano Nuvunga	CIP/Maputo	Executive Director
Danilo da Silva	Lambda/Maputo	Executive Director
Nzira de Deus	Forum Mulher	Programme Director
Josefa Langa	MMAS/Maputo	National Director

Participants in Focus Group Discussion with ORAM Nampula

1. Alfredo Suae – West Subdelegation
2. Calisto Ribeiro – Executive Director
3. Cardoso Sefane – Database operator Operador de banco de dados
4. Célia Cândido – Coordinator Southern Zone
5. Clautro Caetano – Land Use Sector
6. Fátima Collet – Gender Coordinator
7. Filomena Judite Wale – Coordinator of the Ribaue Sub-delegation
8. Horácio Miguel – Lobby and Advocacy
9. Luciano Armando –Motivator Southern Zone
10. Manuel Vilhão – Northern Subdelegation
11. Sidónia Barrote – Coordinator of Subdelegation West

Annex 4: Thematic areas of work, Activities and Location of Selected CSOs

CSO	Full Name CSO	Areas of work	Activities	Province
Akilizetho	Associação para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável	• Social accountability • Local economic development • Local governance	• Civic engagement • Monitoring services delivery at local level	Nampula
CIP	Centro de Integridade Pública	• Public and electoral finances • Transparency and anti-corruption • Decentralization and local governance	• Research • Advocacy • Training	Maputo
Coalizão[108]	Associação Coalizão da Juventude Moçambicana	• Youth rights • Sexual and reproductive health rights	• Youth civic engagement • Awareness raising • Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy	Maputo
Cruzeiro do Sul[109]	Instituto de Investigação para o Desenvolvimento José Negrão	• Land • Development policy • Poverty	• Research • Lobby and advocacy	Maputo
FM[110]	Fórum Mulher	• Women's political participation and movement building • Women's economic autonomy • Sexual and reproductive health and rights • Gender based violence	• Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy • Research • Civil engagement • Movement building • Training	Maputo
LAMBDA	Associação Moçambicana para Defesa das Minorias Sexuais	• Sexual minorities' rights • Sexual and reproductive health and rights	• Public education • Policy influencing • Advocacy	Maputo
NAFEZA	Rede de Associações Femininas da Zambézia	• Gender based violence • Sexual and reproductive health and rights • Economic empowerment	• Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy • Movement building • Civic engagement • Training	Zambézia
N'weti[111]	N'weti Comunicação	• Sexual and Reproductive health and rights	• Research	Maputo

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[108] http://www.coalizao.org.mz

[109] http://www.iid.org.mz/modelo/index.html

[110] https://www.facebook.com/forumulher/info?ref=page_internal

[111] http://www.nweti.org/

	para a Saúde	• Gender based violence	• Public education • Social mobilisation • Advocacy	& Nampula
ORAM	Associação Moçambicana da Ajuda Mútua	• Land rights • Associativism	• Lobby and advocacy • Land delimitations • Awareness raising • Movement building	Nampula
WLSA[112]	Women and Law in Southern Africa	• Gender based violence • Sexual and reproductive health and rights	• Action research • Training • Policy influencing, lobbying and advocacy	Maputo

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[112] http://www.cip.org.mz/

Annex 5: Outcome Indicators

A. Agenda setting	
A1. Actors in society become aware of the issues at stake, organise themselves, and adhere to the position of the organization's[113]	• The organization brings forward successfully its position regarding the issue, at national and international levels • Media cover the organization's points of views and/or activities • Other stakeholders publicly support the organization (number of petitions, public debates, actions in new and "old" media, demonstrations) • The organization has relations with important thematic networks and interest groups • Societal groups are exposed and aware of how the issue affect their livelihoods • Societal group organize themselves (to claim space) at local, national, and international level
A2. PILA targets react upon the positions taken by the organization/ collaborative association	• PILA targets respond to interventions or position taken by the organization (statements in documents, media outlets, agendas, speeches, papers; parliamentary questions or votes).
A3. Relevant members of the organization or other stakeholders are invited to participate in meetings (or organise meetings) by PILA targets	• The organization has access to and relations with decision makers (type and frequency of individual informal and formal contact). • The organization's or other stakeholders participate effectively in relevant meetings at national and international level (round tables, participation in official delegations, consultation meetings organised by the relevant authorities, etc.) (institutionalized vs. more transient; solicited or volunteered) • The organization manages to allow marginalized groups to participate in decision making meetings at national and international levels.
A4. The terms of public debate are influenced: New civil society perspectives and alternative approaches are introduced into the policy debate	• There is coherence in language between the organization and PILA targets • PILA targets change their agenda in line with the position of the organization
B. Policy influencing	
B1. PILA targets have changed (or not) their policy in line with the organization's position changes	• Policy in public and private sector institutions at national and international levels has changed • Frames introduced by the organization are taken up in policy documents and speeches of officials at national and international levels • Budget is allocated for changed policy at national and international levels. • Demonstrable institutional reforms law enforcement have taken place
B2. Demonstrable shift in accountability structure for government	• Shifts in accountability structures for governments/authorities have taken place (openness of results of implementation of policies)
C. Changing practice	
C1. PILA targets change their practices as to implementation of policies (= practices) in the "field"	• The PLIA target communicates the policy to the general public and/or institutions operating at local level. • The PILA target develops new strategies or work plans to ensure implementation of policy. • Plans are implemented in a sustainable manner • Official mechanisms in place to enforce policies and rules/regulations

Annex 6: Indicators for assessing the five core capabilities

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[113] An organization could also be a collaborative association (coalition, network).

Core capability	Components
1. Capability to relate	• Political and social legitimacy. • Integer leadership and staff (upright, incorruptible or undiscussed). • Operational credibility /reliability. • Participation in coalitions. • Adequate alliances with external stakeholders.
2. Capability to commit and act	• Presence of a work plan, decision taking and acting on these decisions collectively. • Effective resource mobilisation (human, institutional and financial). • Effective monitoring of the work plan. • Inspiring /action oriented leadership. • Acceptance of leadership's integrity by staff.
3. Capability to deliver on development objectives	• Financial resources. • Facilities, equipment and premises. • Human resources. • Access to knowledge resources.
4. Capability to adapt and self-renew	• Understanding of shifting contexts and relevant trends (external factors). • Confidence to change: leaving room for diversity, flexibility and creativity. • Use of opportunities and incentives, acknowledgment of mistakes that have been made and stimulation of the discipline to learn. • Systematically planned and evaluated learning, including in management.
5. Capability to maintain coherence	• Clear mandate, vision and strategy, which is known by staff and used by its management to guide its decision-making process. • A well-defined set of operating principles. • Leadership is committed to achieving coherence, balancing stability and change. • Coherence between ambition, vision, strategy and operations.

Additional indicators for assessing collaborative associations

Core capability	Additional indicators for collaborative associations
1. To commit and act	• Leadership is shared rather than positional • Members act to satisfy the interests of all members
2. To deliver on objectives	• There is sufficient transparency, data freely shared and explained
3. To adapt and self-renew	• Members effectively deal with their diversity and power asymmetries
4. To achieve coherence	• There is a results-driven structure and process • Attitudes of respect and trust are present, avoiding stereotyping or reactive behaviour (culture) • Credit and responsibility for the collaboration is shared among members • Members ensure that views of less powerful stakeholders are given a voice

Annex 7: Workshop Programme

The IOB Evaluation of Policy Influencing, Lobbying & Advocacy. Date: 17th February 2015

Time	Session	Facilitator
09H00	Arrival , registration and introduction of participants	Katia Taela
09H25	Word of welcome	Embassy Representative
09H30	Introduction to the overall evaluation (background, link with funding/policy, what IOB wants to achieve with the evaluation). Brief round of questions	Piet de Lange (IOB team)
10H00	Brief presentation of relevant findings of the broader study Brief round of questions	Anique Claessen (IOB team)
10H20	Brief presentation of findings from Ethiopia - Context - Practice of PILA - External support and its influence on capacity Brief round of questions	Floris Blankenberg on behalf of Lebesech Tsega (consultant Ethiopia)
10H35	Brief presentation of findings from Kenya - Context - Practice of PILA - External support and its influence on capacity Brief round of questions	Kashmil Masheti (consultant Kenya) or
10H50	Presentation of findings from Mozambique - Context - Practice of PILA - Capacity for PILA - External support and its influence on capacity for PILA Round of questions/discussion	Katia Taela (consultant Mozambique)
11H20	Tea Break	
11H40	Group work (3 groups) on reflection on findings - issues for discussion/ learning (1, 2, 3 or 4 issues to select) on the basis of 3 questions - Context - Practice of PILA - Capacity for PILA - External support and its influence on capacity for PILA	CSO Representative of each group with one rapporteur each
13H10	Lunch Break	
14H00	Plenary presentation of results of group work on reflection on findings - issues for discussion/learning. Three questions: - To what elements of the presentation by the local consultant do you agree/disagree (and why)? - What do you consider good/not so good practice (and why)? - What are your recommendations (and why)? Round of questions/discussion	Floris Blankenberg (IOB team)
15H15	Summary recommendations	Local consultants/all
15H45	Way forward	Piet de Lange (IOB team)
16H00	Closure	Embassy representative

Annex 8: Workshop Participants

Name	Organisation/Location	Position
Anique Claessen	IOB-MFA/The Hague	Research Assistant
Antoinette Van Vugt	Oxfam Novib/Maputo	AGIR Coordinator
Calisto Ribeiro	ORAM/ Nampula	Executive Director
Cândida Quintano	NAFEZA/ Nampula	Executive Director
Célia Jordão	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Senior Adviser Food & Nutrition Security
Eleásara Antunes	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Gender, HIV, & Social Protection Officer
Felizberto Mulhovo	Netherlands Embassy/Maputo	Political Affairs, Media & Culture
Floris Blankenberg	IOB-MFA/ The Hague	Inspector
João Olaia	Akilizetho/Nampula	Advocacy Officer
Katia Taela	Consultant/ Mozambique	Country Study consultant
Kasmil Masheti	Consultant/Kenya	Country study consultant
Luís Felipe Pereira	Cruzeiro do Sul/Maputo	Former Coordinator
Graca Samo	Forum Mulher	Executive Director
Nzira de Deus	Forum Mulher	Programme Director
Padil Salimo	MAP Consultoria/Maputo	Partner & Executive Director
Pedro de Carvalho	Akilizetho/Nampula	Former Executive Director
Piet de Lange	IOB-MFA/ The Hague	Inspector
Philip Machon	MASC/Maputo	Grants Manager
Stelio Bila	CIP/Maputo	Programme coordinator