

Terms of Reference
Evaluation of the Netherlands' policy
on
democratic transition in the Arab region (2009-2013)
(as approved by the Director of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) on
17/02/2014)

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1. Motivation and goal of the evaluation

This evaluation was included in the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the associated evaluation programme as an ongoing impact study of ‘democratic transition in the Arab region (Matra South)’, to be completed in 2014. The Matra South programme started in 2012,¹ and is structured along the lines of the Matra programme for Central and Eastern Europe.² The evaluation is timed to coincide with the process of deciding on the possible extension of the Matra South programme, which runs from 2012 to 2015. The evaluation will enable the government to account to parliament for the policy it has pursued and possible lessons that have been learned in the process.

The evaluation to which these terms of reference (TOR) apply aims to provide an insight into the design and implementation of the Netherlands’ foreign policy in the Arab region, focusing specifically on the goal of promoting transition.³ It covers the period from 2009 to 2013, covering the two years preceding and the two years following the wave of protests that swept through various countries in the region. That is not say that the Arab uprisings had no pre-history,⁴ or that no attention was paid to supporting transition in the region before this period (Fernández and Youngs 2005, 15-16).

Since early 2011, however, the Arab region has been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic unrest and political instability. The Dutch government responded to these developments by setting itself the goal of supporting reforms in the region. The Netherlands pursues this goal through financial, political and diplomatic efforts, both multilaterally and bilaterally. European cooperation through, for example, the European Neighbourhood Policy is part of the Netherlands’ foreign policy in the region. The North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided comments and suggestions during the drafting of these TOR.

¹ Matra South is the Dutch programme for democratic transition in the Arab region and consists of the following components: a. civil society initiatives, b. private sector investments, c. building the capacity of political organisations, d. government-to-government cooperation, including training civil servants and young diplomats (see Matra South brochure published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), together with the MENA Scholarship Programme.

² House of Representatives 32623, no. 40, 24 June 2011.

³ Policy article 2: Peace, security and stability, objective 5: promoting transition in priority areas (Explanatory Memorandum 2014). Formerly: Policy article 2: Greater security and stability, effective humanitarian assistance and good governance.

⁴ In a region where the balance of power varies from country to country, different forms of civil protest against the ruling regimes had already been emerging for some time.

2. Background information and context

The Arab world refers to countries where predominantly Arabic is spoken.⁵ Other classifications, such as the Middle East or MENA (Middle East and North Africa) less accurately reflect the subject of this evaluation. The context for the evaluation is the rapidly changing situation in the Arab region and in a number of Arab countries in particular, where political changes are occurring in rapid succession. Below is a short summary of developments in the region:

- In the period from 1920 to 1970, a process of decolonisation took place in the Arab region. At the start of the 1920s, with the exception of part of the Arabian peninsula, the whole Arab world had been colonised. Egypt was the first to rise up against colonial rule and acquired partial independence in 1922. Bloody wars of independence followed in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and South Yemen. Libya became independent in 1951, and the British protectorates on the Persian Gulf in the early 1970s.
- The Arab-Israeli conflict in particular grew to become a very sensitive issue in international relations with the Arab world (Telhami 2013, 73).
- The Arab countries were important to the Europeans for two reasons: their oil reserves and their strategic location, especially in relation to the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gibraltar. In addition, both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to cooperate with the authoritarian regimes in power in the region. They were motivated not only by economic interests but also by political and military interests in the context of the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, both the US and political Islam gained in influence in the region. The terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 changed the role and influence of the US in the region.
- Islam is by far the main religion in the Arab world, with more than 85% of the population adhering to it. Christianity is the second largest religion in the region. Arab countries have a number of Christian and other religious and ethnic minorities, including Armenians, Assyrians, Kurds, Druze, Greeks, Copts, Alawites and Turkmens). Conflicts arise in connection with religious fundamentalism, nationalism, ethnicity and secularism.
- The population of the Arab countries has tripled since 1970, from 128 million to 359 million, as a result of rising life expectancy and high birth rates. Despite the fact that birth rates in many Arab countries have now fallen, the population of the region is expected to rise further to some 598 million around 2050. The most populous Arab countries are Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and

⁵ The countries where Arabic is predominantly spoken and where the Netherlands has a diplomatic mission are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and the Palestinian Territories.

Morocco. The population of Egypt is expected to increase to 130 million around 2050 (Merkin 2010, 10).

- The population in the Arab region is young, with an average of 54% below the age of 25 (Merkin 2013, 11). Youth unemployment is high, and urbanisation is proceeding rapidly. There is substantial migration from the region to Europe and the Gulf States. Some countries in the region also act as transit countries for migrants.
- Women in the Arab region have made some advances in the past 10 to 20 years. They participate more often in education, marry later, have fewer children and more frequently seek paid employment. Yet their position lags behind that of women elsewhere in the world and there is gender inequality. Violence against women, especially during times of conflict and unrest, is a persistent problem.
- Data from Transparency International, Freedom House and the Center for Systemic Peace (Polity data series) show that the Arab world scores badly on experience with democratic government, and political and civil rights and freedoms (Dawisha 2013, 76 and Center for Systemic Peace 2011, 18).
- Since Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 December 2010, around a third of the countries that are part of the Arab region have been the scene of uprisings and civil war. In some countries (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen) this has led to regime change, while in others (Jordan and Morocco) investments have been made in political reform. The protests that started in Syria in March 2011 have led to a full-scale civil war.
- Various opinion polls showed that there had been widespread discontent among the people of Arab countries for a long time.⁶ A survey by the Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies (2012) shows that the majority has little appreciation for the general performance of their governments, with 60% saying they were dissatisfied. With the exception of respondents in Saudi Arabia, around two-thirds were dissatisfied with the economic situation in their country. The causes of the protests and regime change in Tunisia were identified as economic decline, corruption, injustice and despotism, lack of employment opportunities and rising prices. In addition, most respondents (81%) stated that civil and political rights and freedoms are preconditions for calling a country democratic.

⁶ For Arab public opinions surveys, see <http://www.arabbarometer.org>, <http://www.aaiusa.org/pages/opinion-polls> and the Arab American Institute's Zogby International Surveys.

3. Regional policy emphases

3.1 Dutch policy in the Arab region

The Netherlands' policy on the Arab region and specific Arab countries is outlined in:

- the budgets and annual reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a policy agenda and a large number of thematic policy objectives;
- letters to the House of Representatives in which policy on the Arab region and/or Arab countries is elaborated and specified in detail;⁷
- letters to the House of Representatives which focus on the Arab region and/or specific Arab countries.

The policy is also shaped using input from the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV), debates in the House of Representatives, questions in parliament and motions submitted by members of parliament. Syria, Egypt and Tunisia in particular have been the subject of specific letters to the House of Representatives.

The specific regional policy examined by this evaluation is set out in the following policy documents:

- Memorandum on 'Transition in the Arab Region', annexe to Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623, no. 16;
- 'The Situation in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623, no. 2;
- Report on the Foreign Affairs Council, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 21 501-02, no. 1031;
- Report on the European Council (DIE-332/11 of 15 March 2011);
- 'The Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East, and More on the Netherlands' Activities in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2011, 32 623-40;
- 'The Current Situation in the Countries of the Arab Region', in response to a request from the Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs, with a response to the Amnesty International report *Year of Rebellion: The State of Human Rights in the Middle East and North Africa*, Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2012, 32 623 no. 58; and
- 'Developments in the Arab Region', Parliamentary Papers, House of Representatives 2013, 32 623, no. 88.

⁷ See for example the letter to the House of Representatives on equal opportunities (Parliamentary Paper 30420, no. 180) of 10 May 2013.

In addition, various policy letters on human rights⁸ and the modernisation of Dutch diplomacy⁹ refer to policy dilemmas in the Arab region.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a democratic and stable neighbouring region (and Egypt, Libya, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia in particular) serves the Netherlands' interests in the fields of security, trade, energy supplies and combating illegal migration. The government states that it seeks especially to invest in countries where there is the greatest likelihood of change and which can act as an example to the region as a whole (Explanatory Memorandum 2014, 17).¹⁰ In addition, the letter to the House of Representatives accompanying the policy memorandum on 'Transition in the Arab Region' contains the following elaboration:

We should be modest in our approach to the region, and yet show ambition and be decisive. Democracy and respect for human rights are fundamental and universal freedoms, but the primary responsibility for initiating and implementing transition processes lies with the region itself.¹¹

The example below also shows that, in practice, supporting sustainable transition raises a number of complex issues:

Our values do not change, but the world around us is changing at a dizzying pace. Take events in the Arab world for example. Certain Arab countries now have democratic systems for the first time, and have governments that were freely elected by their people. Yet the result is sometimes the opposite of what we might have expected: a democratically-elected party may deprive women and minorities of their rights. How to respond to such developments is one of the crucial questions we need to consider. Changing power structures within the world demand a creative approach.

Without the promotion and protection of human rights, there can be no democracy or rule of law. These three concepts are interwoven. The fact that they are under pressure in a number of countries means that our efforts should focus on a comprehensive drive towards human rights, democracy and the rule of law (human rights letter 'Respect and Justice for All', 2013).

Referring to the policy article 'security and stability', the government aims to support a sustainable transition in the Arab region that leads to:

- democratisation, especially fair and free elections;

⁸ Parliamentary Paper, House of Representatives, 32735, no. 1 of April 2011 and Parliamentary Paper, House of Representatives, 32735, no. 78 of June 2013.

⁹ Parliamentary Paper, House of Representatives, 32734, no. 1 of April 2011.

¹⁰ House of Representatives, session 2013 - 2014, 33 750 V, no. 2.

¹¹ Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 16 of 25 March 2011, p.2.

- development of the rule of law and protection of human rights, with special attention to gender equality, media freedom (including internet freedom), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights;¹²
- economic growth, partly by building the economic infrastructure, including promoting employment.

In pursuing this policy, the government applies the following principles:

- effective action through multilateral and bilateral channels;
- a demand-driven approach;
- intelligent conditionality, based on the three policy objectives listed above;
- no new structures but a review of existing structures using existing budgetary instruments;¹³
- effective national and international coordination.

The policy memorandum 'Transition in the Arab Region', budgets and letters to parliament contain no more detailed definitions of the concepts of transition, democratisation or, for example, democratic transition. Policy documents do present the motives underlying the policy but no clear theory behind it. Annexe 2 to these TOR contains a diagram showing how activities, programmes and policy areas are connected, including the strategic objectives specified in the budget. During the policy reconstruction conducted for this evaluation, the assumptions and theory on which interventions are based will be studied in detail. Developments in, for example, Egypt and Libya show that transition does not automatically lead to security and stability and can have a destabilising effect.

3.2 Choice of modalities and channels

To enable activities to be undertaken rapidly to promote transition in the Arab region in the short term, the government decided in 2011 to make EUR 7.7 million available by reprioritising funds within existing central programmes:

Programme	Amount in euros
Stability Fund	1.5 million
Human Rights Fund	1.5 million
Central Reconstruction Fund	1.5 million
Women's rights	2 million
Fund for Development, Pluralism and Participation (FOPP)	1.2 million

¹² LGBT = lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender.

¹³ Such as the Stability Fund or the Human Rights Fund.

This budget is expected to increase to EUR 15 million in 2015.

Data from Piramide¹⁴ (project objective and sub-SBE description) shows that in 2009 the North Africa and Middle East Department (DAM) was mainly engaged in a programme of small activities (non-ODA)¹⁵ with no objective related to the Explanatory Memorandum. This changed in 2012, with a sub-budgetary unit under the name 'social and other reforms in the Arab region', from which a variety of activities are financed (including a scholarship programme, the training of young diplomats and projects by various political parties). Some of these activities focus on the region as a whole, some on individual countries like Egypt or Syria. Some of them entail government-to-government cooperation.

Total bilateral expenditure¹⁶ in the Arab region in 2009 (on the basis of Piramide) amounted to EUR 165 million, and in 2013 the available bilateral budget (on the basis of an instruction from the ministry's Financial and Economic Affairs Department, FEZ) was EUR 108.5 million. Over the years, decentralised expenditure has been almost halved (from EUR 93 million in 2009 to 48.5 million in 2013) while central funds have also decreased (from EUR 72 million to around 60 million). At the same time the number of decentralised budget holders (including Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Tunisia) rose in 2013 compared to 2009. There is an observable change in objectives/activities in Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait and Libya with a clearer focus on 'social and other reforms'. In all countries that enjoy priority as transition countries,¹⁷ with the exception of Egypt, there is an increase in funding. The decentralised budget for Egypt was higher in 2009 than in 2013, as a result of the aid relationship being phased out. At the same time, there was an increase in central funds to Egypt to promote security and stability.

A comparison of the annual plans and reports of Dutch embassies¹⁸ in Arab countries for 2009 and 2013 shows that they increasingly seek to contribute to the following policy objectives:

- greater security and stability;
- private sector development;
- equal opportunities;
- consular representation and disseminating Dutch values and interests in the international arena.

¹⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' management information system.

¹⁵ ODA stands for Official Development Assistance. It covers development aid in the form of loans or donations by governments to developing countries.

¹⁶ In addition to decentralised funds and funds delegated to embassies, these amounts also include flows of funds from ministry departments to specific countries in the Arab region.

¹⁷ Matra South priority countries: Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Morocco and Jordan.

¹⁸ 16 embassies: Abu Dhabi, Algiers, Amman, Baghdad, Beirut, (Damascus), Doha, Cairo, (Khartoum), Kuwait, Muscat, Rabat, Riyadh, Sana'a, Tripoli, Tunis, a Representative Office in Ramallah, and a consulate-general in Dubai.

Attention to human rights remains at the same high level. Activities to promote economic and trade ties (important in the richer Gulf States) and the provision of humanitarian aid (for example in Syria) are beyond the scope of this summary.

The Netherlands' multilateral contribution is specified as follows in the letter to the House of Representatives (Parliamentary Paper 32 623, no. 40) of 24 June 2011 on the Netherlands' activities in the Arab region:

Dutch contribution/period	Organisation/programme
EUR 200 million / 2011-2013	European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) with a total budget of EUR 4 billion
EUR 40 million / 2011-2013	New financial resources, of which EUR 800 million can be allocated to Southern neighbouring countries
EUR 290 million (2011-2013) ¹⁹	Loans to the Southern neighbouring region through the European Investment Bank totalling EUR 5.8 billion
Allocation not specified ²⁰	World Bank, African Development Bank, International Monetary Fund, European Investment Bank
General contribution, allocation not specified	UNDP, ²¹ OHCHR, WFP, UNICEF, FAO, UNHCR, etc.
Mediterranean Dialogue and partnership for security, furthering G8 decisions and the US- EU agreements promoting reforms in the wider Middle East	NATO (Libya)

Of course, not all the activities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed at promoting transition in the Arab region can be expressed in terms of money. Besides financial resources, diplomatic efforts

¹⁹ For Egypt, for example, EUR 449 million was reserved, of which EUR 22 million was the Netherlands' contribution (2011-2013).

²⁰ By way of illustration, IBRD/IDA operations for 2013 amounted to USD 585.4 million in Egypt, USD 183.5 million in Algeria and USD 593.2 million in Morocco. International financial institutions focused in the first instance on Tunisia (World Bank USD 1.5 billion, African Development Bank USD 500 million) and Egypt (World Bank USD 4.5 billion, IMF USD 20 billion).

²¹ UNDP plays a role in the UN coordination of efforts and has drawn up a Strategy of Response to Transformative Change Championed by Youth in the Arab Region. It focuses on improving governance and economic development (especially creating jobs for young people).

and political cooperation play an important role in achieving the Netherlands' policy objectives, for example through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP),²² which applies to nine Arab countries (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the Palestinian Territories, Syria and Tunisia). The EU uses diplomatic and economic instruments (for example in Morocco and Egypt), and sometimes military instruments (for example in Libya). Positive measures include concluding trade, cooperation and association agreements, providing loans or aid, reducing tariffs or increasing quotas. Negative measures include embargos, boycotts, freezing financial assets, reducing aid and postponing agreements. Diplomatic instruments comprise (a) services, such as monitoring elections and mediating in negotiations, (b) rewards, such as supporting applications to join international organisations and diplomatic recognition, and (c) sanctions, such as not issuing travel or visa documents or imposing arms embargoes.

As far as the Netherlands was concerned the basic principle was 'more for more':²³ 'the more effective the reform process in the partner country, the closer the association with the EU can be'. In this way, the government showed itself to be an advocate of 'intelligent conditionality', with special attention for gender equality, freedom of the media (including internet freedom), religious freedom, protection of minorities and LGBT rights, and return of refugees. The importance of the Netherlands playing its own bilateral role is emphasised for strategic reasons. It is, for example, easier to discuss the human rights situation and the democratisation process when the Netherlands itself makes a direct contribution to improving that situation. At the same time, having our own set of instruments creates strategic networks that can be used to promote Dutch interests. Some countries in the Arab region may also sometimes have an explicit preference for cooperation with the Netherlands because of a specific area of expertise (for example, security sector reform or development of the rule of law) or because the Netherlands is seen as a more neutral partner.²⁴

The mission network in the Arab region has not changed since 2009, with the exception of the temporary closure of the embassy in Damascus (and transfer of the staff posted from The Hague to Istanbul) for political and security reasons. The last change was the closure of the consulate-general in Jeddah in 2004. The number of jobs at the embassies decreased between 2009 and 2013. In October 2013, there was a total of 84 full-time jobs for staff posted from The Hague (51 in policy and 33 in administrative positions) and 242.5 full-time jobs for local staff (49.7 in policy and 192.8 in administrative positions) involved in implementing policy for the Arab region. DAM had 26 full-time jobs (23 in policy and three in administrative positions).

²² The ENP is in the first instance a bilateral policy between the EU and each partner country.

²³ See Parliamentary Paper 32 623, no. 40, 'Current Situation in North Africa and the Middle East', 24 June 2011, p. 3.

²⁴ *Idem*, p. 7.

4. Evaluability and limitations of the study

The above description of the goal of the evaluation, short sketch of the background and provisional reconstruction of the policy have the following implications for the structure of the evaluation:

- The ultimate impact of support for democratic transition on the political structures of individual Arab countries is unclear and can remain so for many years. That also applies to the extent to which the changes taking place in the Arab region lead to democratic reforms (and ultimately security and stability).
- For a number of financial instruments (such as the Private Sector Investment programme²⁵ and the Reconstruction Fund) it became clear during the preliminary study that no programmes were being financed that would be completed before 2013 and the results of which would be clear during the evaluation period. For this reason the main questions of the evaluation focus on the themes of democratisation and strengthening the rule of law, rather than on the proposed support for economic growth.
- Five Arab countries (Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) have priority. Dutch cooperation with the Egyptian government was effectively suspended on 15 August 2013 after the violent actions of the Egyptian army.²⁶ This cooperation was resumed at the end of October 2013.²⁷
- Activities supported by the Netherlands must be in line with and supplement international efforts in the Arab region. We value having our own bilateral instruments and conditionality.

The political situation changes continually in the Arab countries that are the subject of this evaluation. In such situations, which can sometimes be explosive, it is difficult to assess the role and importance of internal and external actors and factors. In addition the Netherlands is a relatively small player in Arab countries in comparison with other actors. Given the problems in the region, it is not realistic to expect a significant impact on our general and strategic policy objectives. Attribution is a problem because interventions make a relatively small contribution while at the same time aiming to achieve significant changes that are dependent on a large number of actors and factors. On the other hand there is a general willingness to accept that projects in the areas of democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and human rights are often complex human and institutional processes. Furthermore there is a consensus that achieving progress in these areas requires a great deal of patience.

Democratisation and strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights are long-term political processes in which changes are not linear but proceed in fits and starts. Results have to

²⁵ Part of Matra South.

²⁶ On 24 June 2012 Mohamed Morsi Isa al-Ayyat was elected as president of the Arab Republic of Egypt, with almost 52% of the votes. He was removed as president by the army on 3 July 2013.

²⁷ Parliamentary Paper 21 501-02, no. 1304, report on a parliamentary committee meeting with a member of government, approved on 25 November 2013, p. 24.

be seen in context, making it hard to draw general conclusions. Research on the spot calls for a cautious approach to logistical limitations, insecurity and social and political polarisation.

5. Structure of the evaluation

5.1 Focus and scope

The focus and scope of the evaluation are based on the results of the preliminary study and the above explanation. To enable the evaluation to take account of as much Dutch policy implementation as possible, the IOB evaluation report will be completed – at DAM’s request – in the first quarter of 2015.

The evaluation will focus on the five countries (Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia) that have priority in Dutch policy, and on the period from 2009 to 2013. This period covers the two years preceding and the two years following the wave of protests that swept through various countries in the Arab region. This will make it possible to cover the changes in Dutch policy after 2011. Where relevant, recent developments will be taken into account in the various supplementary studies.

The main questions to be addressed in the evaluation will focus on the following themes:

- the Netherlands’ contribution to democratisation;
- the Netherlands’ contribution to strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights.

5.2 Main questions addressed

The main question addressed in the evaluation is as follows: How has the Netherlands contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?

The following questions serve as guidelines in evaluating the relevance, efficiency and effectiveness of this contribution:

1. What problems or other factors underlie Dutch policy on transition in the Arab region?
2. In developing the policy, was attention given to theoretical and practical insights relating to democratic transition?
3. To what extent have the policy priorities been made operational through feasible measures and appropriate instruments to promote transition in the Arab region?
4. How relevant were these measures to the priorities? To what extent are they a logical extension of Dutch policy, its stated ambitions and the specific context in Arab countries? Did they take the following factors into account?
 - Did the Netherlands work with national and local partners and take account of their priorities?

- Did the Netherlands work with other international actors and, in doing so, devote attention to the complementarity of their political, diplomatic and financial efforts?
5. How timely was the Netherlands' use of its instruments and how much synergy was there between them?
 6. How well did the Netherlands work with other partners and actors at national and international level?
 7. What financial, political and diplomatic resources were deployed to implement policy in the period covered by this evaluation?
 8. What were the effects of policy implementation?²⁸
 9. To what extent was the proposed policy actually implemented?
 10. To what extent did policy implementation contribute to transition in selected priority countries?

See annexe 3 for the evaluation matrix.


5.3 Research activities

The evaluation will involve a policy reconstruction and an assessment with the regional department concerned (DAM). It will focus on the main themes listed above and will be conducted through three country case studies: Egypt (transition in relation to democratisation), Libya (transition in relation to strengthening the rule of law) and Morocco (transition in relation to protecting human rights). These countries were chosen on the basis of their relevance for policy, the scope they offer to study themes in relation to each other, the scale of the resources deployed and their different political, historical and institutional perspectives in the light of transition. This evaluation aims to assess the formulation and implementation of Dutch policy from the perspective of the local context and in the light of the political, diplomatic and financial efforts of other actors and donors referred to in the policy documents, including the EU.

In addition, two supplementary studies will be conducted: a document study of the Matra South programme and a literature study of support for democratisation. Relevant evaluations by the IOB and others, academic and scientific literature, longitudinal opinion surveys in Arab countries and relevant database statistics and indexes will also be used, together with available information on policy implementation.

The diagram below shows how the evaluation is structured and how the various components are related:

²⁸ It is not possible to attribute results specifically to the Netherlands' contribution because they have often been achieved through joint political, diplomatic and financial interventions by other donor countries and international organisations.



6. Organisation

Responsibilities

The evaluation will be conducted under the responsibility of IOB inspector Dr Margret Verwijk in cooperation with research assistant Dr Jochen Stöger. Together they will form the IOB evaluation team. The IOB inspector will be responsible for (1) the final report and the country case study on Egypt, (2) instructing and supervising the research assistant in conducting the country case study on Morocco and further study in Brussels on the application of conditionality,²⁹ and (3) contracting out and supervising the country case study on Libya, the document study of Matra South and the literature study on democratic transition. In addition the evaluation team will organise consultation with peer reviewers and peer groups and the dissemination of results.

7. Peer group and peer reviewers

A peer group will be formed for the evaluation, including the supplementary studies, chaired by the IOB Director, Professor Ruerd Ruben. External members will be Professor Maurits Berger, Dr Reinoud Leenders, Dr Nikolaos van Dam and Professor Nadia Molenaers. In addition to the members of the IOB evaluation team, DAM will be represented by Ernesto Braam, strategic policy advisor (backup: Bert Meijerman). The Netherlands Enterprise Agency (RVO) will be represented by Chris Baaré. In addition, as far as possible, the team will work with a peer group at country level

²⁹ In relation to the policy reconstruction and to Morocco and Egypt.

to consider and discuss draft findings and concerns arising from the country case studies. Peer reviewers for the IOB are Bas Limonard and Frans van der Wel. The peer groups and peer reviewers help guarantee the quality of interim and final findings and reporting.

8. Dissemination and use

Knowledge will be shared promptly and in close consultation with DAM to contribute to the continued improvement in formulating and implementing Dutch policy in the Arab countries/region concerned. Knowledge will also be shared in various ways (seminar/workshop/presentations) after the evaluation report has been published.

9. Products

The final report will be published in English. The minister will send the report to the House of Representatives, together with a policy response.

10. Timetable

The table below shows the timetable for the various activities:

Activity	Fourth quarter 2013	First quarter 2014	Second quarter 2014	Third quarter 2014	Fourth quarter 2014	First quarter 2015
Preliminary study by IOB	x					
Peer reviewers IOB	x		x		x	
Peer group The Hague (organisation and supervision)		x			x	
Peer groups in Arab region (organisation and supervision)				x		
Approval ToR (director IOB)		x				
Policy reconstruction	x	x				
Assessment of policy reconstruction (in the Netherlands and during field study)		x		x		
Literature study of international support for democratic transition (TOR, designation of researcher, supervision of researcher)		x	x			
Preparation of data collection methods for field study (Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Brussels)		x				

Implementation of country case studies (Egypt, Morocco, Libya) and study of effect of conditionality (EU/NL)		x	x			
Document study and results of Matra South (TOR, designation of researcher, supervision of researcher)		x	x			
Analysis and discussion of all supplementary reports and findings (for the final report)				x	x	
Draft evaluation report (reporting and discussion) and production of newsletter					x	
Approval of evaluation report and newsletter (director IOB)						x
Dissemination of findings and concerns from the evaluation (sharing knowledge is multiplying it: seminar / workshop / presentation)						x

Annexe 1 Sources consulted

Evaluations

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European Commission. 2011. A New Response to a Changing Neighbourhood: A Review of European Neighbourhood Policy. Brussels: EC.

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- Parliamentary Paper 32623 no. 2: The Situation in the Arab Region, 18 February 2011
- Parliamentary Paper 21501-02 no. 1031: Report on the Foreign Affairs Council, 21 February 2011

- Report on the European Council of 11 March 2011 (DIE-332/11 of 15 March 2011)
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
Annual reports and plans

Annual reports, Multi-Annual Strategic Plans and approval annexes from missions in the Arab region and the relevant ministry departments have been used in preparing these TOR.

The following individuals were interviewed or consulted:

Guesmi Ahmed	Ministry of Finance, Tunis
Chris Baaré	Unit manager for International Cooperation and Matchmaking, RVO
Monique Bouman	Multilateral Organisations and Human Rights Department (DMM)/ FOPP
Sylvia van Buchem	Unit manager PSI, RVO
Rym Kanzari	Ministry of Finance, Tunis
Mirjam Krijnen	Gender Equality Division (DSO/EM)
Marc Mazairac	Sustainable Economic Development Department (DDE)
Bert Meijerman	Coordinator, Transition in the Arab Region, DAM
Marc Moquette	Social Development Department (DSO)
Suzan Ouwerkerk	National Academy for Finance and Economics International project leader
Samar Taha	Ministry of Finance/Planning and International Cooperation
Liesbeth Teekamp	Stabilisation and Rule of Law Division (DSH/SR)

Annexe 2 Reflection: Theory of change (TOC) at various levels (in context)



Mix of instruments (political, diplomatic, financial) and mix of modalities/channels (bilateral and multilateral) at various levels

Annexe 3 Evaluation matrix

Focus: democratisation and strengthening the rule of law, including protecting human rights

EVALUATION CRITERIA	EVALUATION QUESTIONS	FINDINGS AND SOURCES
Chapter 1: Motivation for the evaluation, goal, questions addressed and method on the basis of the Terms of Reference		
Context: period from January 2009 - December 2013		for chapter 2 of the report: description of problem - context
<p>The main question addressed in the evaluation is as follows: How has the Netherlands' foreign policy contributed to promoting democratic transition in the Arab region?</p> <p>The main considerations for this evaluation are:</p> <p>a) The Arab region has changed radically in a short time and is in transition. Since the start of 2011 a number of Arab countries have been the scene of mass protests, socioeconomic unrest and political instability.</p> <p>b) Changes have been made to the Netherlands' foreign policy in response to the changing situation in the region. As a consequence it is desirable, from a political, diplomatic and financial perspective, to evaluate the policy and its implementation.</p> <p>The evaluation programme for 2010 to 2015 included an evaluation of democratic transition in the Arab region.</p> <p>1. What problems or other factors underlie Dutch policy on transition in the Arab region?</p> <p>2. In developing the policy, was attention given to theoretical and practical insights relating to democratic transition?</p>		<p>Assessment of policy theory (mini-sessions with staff in The Hague /embassies in the case study countries) and policy reconstruction (parliamentary papers, AIV reports, policy documents, general dossiers, internal ministry communications), literature study on democratisation, academic literature and evaluations, interviews with key actors and stakeholders</p> <p>Indices (Bertelsmann Foundation, Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, Transparency International, etc.), Arabstats, Arab Human Development Reports, review of documents (internet research, ministry, embassies)</p> <p>Appropriate use of tables and graphs. Overview of main programmes and expenditures</p>
I. Relevance		for chapter 3 of the report: the relevance of the Netherlands' strategy to the Arab region
<p>3. To what extent have the policy priorities (democratisation, strengthening the rule of law and protecting human rights, economic growth) been made operational through feasible measures and appropriate instruments to promote transition in the Arab region?</p> <p>4. How relevant were these measures to the priorities? To what extent are they a logical extension of Dutch policy, its stated ambitions and the specific context in Arab countries? Did they take the following factors into account?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Did the Netherlands work with national and local partners and take account of their priorities? Did the Netherlands cooperate with other international actors and, in doing so, devote attention to the complementarity of their political, diplomatic and financial efforts? 		Parliamentary Papers, policy documents, national strategies, policy documents of other actors in the region/countries (strategies and interventions), general dossiers and dossiers on individual activities, literature study, supplementary document study of Matra South, evaluations and academic literature, country case studies on Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders
II. Efficiency and III. Effectiveness – Did the Netherlands operate in a timely and efficient way? How effective was the Netherlands in achieving results		for chapter 4 of the report

through interventions in the region?		
II. Efficiency		
5. How timely was the Netherlands' use of its instruments and how much synergy was there between them?		Supplementary document study of Matra South, country case studies of Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, document study, overviews of expenditure, annual plans, annual reports, Multi-annual Strategic Plans
6. How did the Netherlands work with other partners and actors at national and international level?		
7. What financial, political and diplomatic resources were deployed to implement policy in the period covered by this evaluation?		
III. Effectiveness		
8. What were the effects of policy implementation?		Supplementary document study of Matra South, country case studies of Morocco, Egypt and Libya: tapping local knowledge sources, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, document study
9. To what extent was the proposed policy actually implemented?		
10. To what extent did policy implementation contribute to transition in selected priority countries?		
Lessons learned and concerns: what lessons can the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs learn from the evaluation for future policy formulation and implementation?		for chapter 5 of the report
Main findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the main strong points of the policy formulated for the Arab region and its implementation? • What are the main weak points of the policy formulated for the Arab region and its implementation? 	Available supplementary study on Matra South, findings of literature study, findings of country case studies on Morocco, Egypt and Libya (comparison: actors/added value of NL, coherence of instruments, needs of country/region, effects of conditionality), evaluation reports, document study, interviews with key actors and stakeholders, sharing and discussing findings
Concerns	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What lessons can be learned (from both positive and negative findings) for the formulation and implementation of future Dutch policy on the Arab region/countries? 	