The Netherlands is committed to doing its utmost to prevent and, where necessary, combat terrorism. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the actors that implements Dutch counterterrorism policy. Because terrorism is not confined to borders, a broad, global approach and international cooperation are essential.
Image: © ANP/Peter Hilz
Since the attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent major attacks in Europe, there has been an enormous increase in international counterterrorism efforts. These efforts are highly diverse in nature, ranging from military interventions, the development of preventive strategies and international cooperation, to projects aimed at tackling the root causes of terrorism.
Despite these efforts, though, the world has witnessed an upsurge in violent extremist and terrorist groups in Africa, the Middle East and Asia and several terrorist attacks have taken place in Europe, such as in Madrid in 2004, London in 2005, Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016. Although there has been a sharp decrease in the number of terrorist fatalities since 2014, the level of terrorist activity worldwide is still significantly higher than in the period shortly after 9/11. As a result, counterterrorism and preventing and combating violent extremism are still priorities on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' security agenda.
Yet little is known about the effectiveness of all the efforts being made in the area of counter-terrorism and the prevention and fight against violent extremism. There has also been little evaluative research on counterterrorism, either at the national or international level. Against this background IOB has carried out an evaluation of the counterterrorism policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Main Question
What results has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs achieved thanks to its activities in CT and P/CVE, and how can policy development and implementation be improved?
Conclusions
The unit responsible for CT and P/CVE policy and interventions at the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the Counterterrorism and National Security Division of the Security Policy Department (DVB/TN). Based on the policy documents available, IOB has been able to distinguish three general objectives:
- to strive for a strong diplomatic position, in both multilateral and bilateral relations, in order to influence policies, to be well-informed, and to respond in good time to new trends
- to promote the Dutch approach to CT and P/CVE
- to support projects for addressing and tackling terrorism and violent extremism
With regard to these objectives, IOB has drawn the following conclusions:
Security responses to terrorism continue to be the dominant response adopted by most governments around the world. Globally, CT professionals realise that the most common responses to terrorism are not capable of solving the underlying problem. Short-term security interventions need to adequately bridge with a longer-term preventive approach and to broader socio-economic factors leading to radicalisation and extremism. The operationalisation of a multidisciplinary approach in the field of CT and P/CVE requires a connection between the security sector and the development sector, whom both operate from different paradigms.
The sector is characterized by a major lack of knowledge and evidence about the effectiveness of CT and P/CVE interventions. Little emphasis is placed on learning from previous efforts: Insights in ‘what works and what doesn’t work’ is therefore lacking.
DVB/TN has shown to be able to respond adequately to certain opportunities, such as the co-chairmanship of the GCTF and threats such as those posed by FTFs. However, no overarching strategy has been clearly and explicitly articulated that clarifies how the different activities of DVB/TN strengthen each other and contribute to the goal of preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism.
The Dutch co-chairmanship of the GCTF helped the MFA to attain a stronger and more strategic position in the global policy arena. However, this prominence is liable to erosion now that the co-chairmanship has ended. Furthermore, it is not always clear what the goal or impact is of a stronger diplomatic position in relation to CT and P/CVE, other than promoting the Dutch approach to CT in an international setting.
Certain projects have improved the MFA’s information position, as was one of their stated objectives. In addition, projects can lead to positive, small-scale results. At the same time, their contribution to the overall Dutch security and addressing the structural drivers of extremism has been negligible.
Recommendations
- Formulate a clear strategy and milestones for CT and P/CVE and its linkages with wider security and development issues.
- Reduce the current fragmentation and strengthen the link with the security situation in the Netherlands by targeting CT and P/CVE on the southern and eastern security arenas in the ring around Europe.
- Invest in threat analysis and identification of context-specific root causes to feed policy development.
- Invest in coordination of policy development and implementation with other policy departments, embassies and ministries.
- Invest in learning by creating effective feedback loops between security analyses, policy development, project implementation and evaluations.